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Master Thesis:

MANAGEMENT CONTROL PACKAGES IN THE

PUBLIC SECTOR: A CASE STUDY

By

Joost Klok

University of Groningen

Faculty of Economics and Business

Msc Business Administration O&MC

February 2014

Supervisor: Berend van der Kolk

Museumstraat 12 9711HS Groningen

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2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ... 2

1) INTRODUCTION ... 4

2) LITERATURE ... 5

2.1 New Public Management ... 6

2.2 New Public Management in the Netherlands ... 7

2.3 Management Control Systems and Management Control Packages ... 7

2.4 Management Control Elements ... 8

2.5 Context of Management Control Packages: Contingency Theory... 10

2.6 Context of the Public Sector ... 11

2.7 Political Actors ... 11

2.8 Difficulties Measuring Performance in the Public Sector ... 12

2.9 Which type of Management Control in the Public Sector? ... 13

3) METHODOLOGY ... 13

3.1 Research Design and Method ... 13

3.2 Data analysis ... 14

3.3 Case Description ... 15

4) FINDINGS: CONTROL ELEMENTS ... 15

4.1 Result Control Elements ... 15

Goals ... 16

Measuring Results and Result areas ... 16

Rewards ... 17

Punishments ... 17

Conclusion on Result Controls ... 18

4.2 Action Control Elements ... 18

Procedures ... 18

Behavioral Constraints ... 19

Preaction Reviews ... 19

Action Accountability ... 19

Redundancy ... 20

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4.3 Personnel Control Elements ... 20

Selection ... 20

Training ... 21

Job Design ... 22

Self-monitoring/self-control ... 22

Conclusion on Personnel Controls... 23

4.4 Cultural Control Elements ... 23

Culture ... 23

Communication of Norms and Values ... 24

Mutual-monitoring ... 24

Conclusion on Cultural Controls ... 25

4.5 Dominant Control Element ... 25

5) DISCUSSION ... 26

5.1 Management Control Package in the Case Study Department ... 26

5.2 Influence of Political Actors ... 27

5.3 Difficulties Measuring Performance in the Public Sector ... 29

5.4 Theory Development ... 31

6) CONCLUSION ... 32

Further Research ... 34

7) REFERENCES ... 34

Abstract

The aim of this case study is exploring the influence of public sector context on the configuration of Management Control Packages. The research question is: How do political

actors and performance measuring difficulties influence the configuration of a management control package in a public organizational function? We found that influence of political

actors result in strong personnel and cultural control in the organizational function. Furthermore, the public sector has multiple problems when measuring performance, this makes result control problematic. Additionally, we provided insight in the configuration of Management Control Packages and we give direction for further research.

Keywords: New Public Management; Management Control Package; Management Control System;

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4 1) INTRODUCTION

The Dutch government is facing severe pressure to increase their performance and reduce their costs by modernizing their public sectors (Lapsley, 2009). Most recent are the Dutch government plans to reduce the number of municipalities in the Netherlands by creating a select number of “super municipalities” (Coalition Agreement Rutte II). However, the pressure on the local governments to increase their performance is nothing new. In the past there has already been much attention to introducing more businesslike principles in the governmental organizations (van Helden, 2000). For example, in order to increase

performance and efficiency, the Decision Budget and Responsibility (Besluit Begroting en Verantwoording) was introduced in 2004 and consequently the introduction of output

orientated budgeting (programmabegroting). The introduction of these businesslike reforms in the public sector has often been labeled under the term New Public Management (NPM) (Boden, 1998).

In short, the NPM philosophy is the adoption of a more ‘managerial’ approach to

administration by public services (Kickert, 1997). Hood (1991; 1995) argues that the main elements of NPM are rooted in new institutional economics. Some of the core elements of new institutional economic theories are self-interested behavior, opportunism, contract agreements and strict monitoring. To control these core elements and increase the overall performance of the public sector, businesslike Management Control Elements (MCE) were implemented in local governments (van Helden et al., 2010). An MCE is a system, rule, practice value or other activity that is in place in order to direct employee behavior (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Examples of MCEs are: budgets, codes of conduct, corporate mission statements and instruments for performance management.

Furthermore, a coherent set of systematically used MCEs to achieve a certain goal can be called a Management Control System (MCS) (Chenhall, 2003). There are many concerns with the use of businesslike MCSs in the public sector. First of all, the transferability of

businesslike MCSs to a public sector is contested since the specificity of the public sector and its context is not included (Boden et al 1998; Leeuw & van Thiel, 2002; Lapsley 2009; Cristofoli et al. 2010). To quote Cristofoli et al. (2010); “the factors identified by extant private sector contributions do not seem to play the same role in affecting public sector control mechanisms”. This reasoning is in line with theory that indicates that in different circumstances or contexts different types and combinations of controls are needed (Ouchi 1979; Otley, 1980; Chenhall 2003). Consequently, it is questionable that you can successfully implement the businesslike MCSs directly into a public setting.

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5 at specific control elements; all the control elements in place and their interconnection should be considered (Fisher, 1998; Malmi and Brown, 2008).

Multiple authors have called for more research between context and the configuration of a MCP. Sandelin (2008) argues: instead of merely examining the relation between management control system and contingent factors, future studies should examine the effect of functional demands on the total package of management control. In addition, Malmi and Brown (2008) call for research that identifies which control elements fits best in a MCP and are essential for maintaining control and which control elements in a MCP are less important. This paper will try to give more insight into how a MCP and its control elements functions and how context shapes the package. The context we are interested in is the context of the public sector. There are many contextual factors that distinguish the public sector from the private sector. A public organization will have to deal with, among others; goal complexity, authority relations, public scrutiny and political influences (Allison, 1980). However, we have identified two contextual factors that are particularly interesting in combination with the research in MCPs. Otley (1994) and Kickert (1997) argue that political actors have great influence on the

working condition in the public sector. There is, to the best of our knowledge, no research that links the influence of political actors to the design of control elements and systems.

Furthermore, Meyer & Guypta (1994) and Leeuw & van Thiel (2002) discuss that it could be difficult to measure performance in the public sector. Again, it is interesting to link this to the configuration of a MCP, especially since in the private sector many of the MCSs are based on businesslike “hard” performance, and in the public sector the products are often intangible (Leeuw & van Thiel, 2002).

Given the relatively new and unexplored nature of MCPs this thesis adopts an exploratory research strategy (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). A case study is an appropriated technique in exploratory research. Consequently, the following research question is formulated: How do

political actors and performance measuring difficulties influence the configuration of a management control package in a public organizational function?

The goal of this research will be the creation of constructs that can explain the relation between public specific contextual elements and the configurations of MCPs in the public sector, i.e. theory development. These hypotheses and constructs can be tested by future empirical research. In the next chapter (literature) we will define the key terms and outline the most important theories on MCPs and the public sector. The literature chapter will be

followed by the methodology section after which the results will be shown. Finally, these results will be compared with existing literature and constructs will be created.

2) LITERATURE

In this case study we investigate how the contextual factors “political actors” and “difficulties measuring performance” influence the Management Control Package in a municipal

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6 broadest terms and work our way down to more specific terms. Finally, the extant literature on difficulties in measuring performance in the public sector and the effects of political actors will be explored in order to make predictions of possible relations with control elements. 2.1 New Public Management

New Public Management (NPM) can be considered a rather loose ‘container’ term for the introduction of economic rationality, public accountability, and businesslike styles and instruments in the public sector (Hood 1991; 1995; ter Bogt et al., 2010). Hood (1991) was one of the first to define NPM, nevertheless, the term NPM was already used in the 1980s (Hood, 1995). Van Helden (2000) uses NPM characteristics identified by Hood (1991, 1995) to create an overview of the differences between Old Public Management and New Public Management. These differences between characteristics can be found in table 1 below.

TABLE 1

(Van Helden, 2000)

We use this table from van Helden (2000) since it encompasses all of the characteristics identified by Hood (1991, 1995) and it gives a comprehensible summary of the assumed basic elements of NPM. However, there has been criticism on the concept of NPM and its elements. According to (Dunn & Miller, 2007), NPM is based on instrumental-rational action and therefore, NPM fails to acknowledge other domains of rationality. The other domains of rationality are: interpretive rationality (rationality is subjective and can differ per group), and critical rationality (groups and individuals are free, emancipated, and have critical

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7 rationality. There is more critique; for example, Lapsley (2009) argues that NPM is

incorrectly perceived as a solution and a recipe for managers who seek efficient systems of management. Lapsley (2009) observed that in practice there is much disappointment under policy makers after implementing NPM techniques since the expectancies were too high and results are lacking.

For the remainder of this paper we will treat the characteristics mentioned in table 1 as the basic representation of NPM, however, we acknowledge the criticism as explained in the previous paragraph. In the next paragraph we will discuss NPM in the Netherlands since the case study will take place in this country.

2.2 New Public Management in the Netherlands

The primary characteristics of NPM may vary from country to country and can develop over the course of time (ter Bogt et al., 2010). One of the major motives to introduce NPM in a country is the promise of resource saving in case of acute financial stress or an oversized government (Hood, 1995; van Helden, 2000). This was also the case in the Netherlands; in the 1980s there was public and private pressure to reduce the costs of the Dutch public sector (van Helden and ter Bogt, 1998). It needed to make budget cuts, hive off tasks and work more efficiently (van Nispen and Noordhoek, 1986). To achieve this goal, private sector financial techniques where implemented. An example of this is the BBI project which was initiated in 1989 and finished in 1995 (Beleid en Beheers Instrumentarium). This project revised the planning and control tools of the Dutch public sector (van Helden and ter Bogt, 1998).The BBI tools include, among others; revised performance reports and standards, creation of output and result controls and auditing of outcomes (van Helden and ter Bogt, 1998). The tools mentioned are all elements in a management control system, which we will discuss next. 2.3 Management Control Systems and Management Control Packages

A Management Control System (MCS) is defined by Chenhall (2003) as “the systematic use of management accounting practices, such as budgeting or product costing, with addition of other controls, such as personal or clan controls, to achieve some goal”. Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) have a simplified definition of an MCS; “the collection of control

mechanisms that are used”. However, for this paper this is a too broad of a definition since it does not encompass the specific details to make the distinctions between an MCS and a Management Control Package (MCP). Malmi and Brown (2008) define MCP as the collection or set of controls and control systems, this contains traditional accounting controls,

administrative control and cultural controls. Organizations may have numerous controls present, and they all may be used to some extent to align individual’s activities with

organizational goals (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Although the terms MCS and MCP seem to have a lot of overlap, we think there is an important distinction to make. An MCS is the

systematical use of some coherent set of control elements to achieve some goal (Chenhall,

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8 MCS consist of multiple control elements that work together. Applying this definition; it is possible to have a single control element that stands alone since it is not part of a MCS. A MCP can have some stand alone control elements in addition to the MCSs. In this paper we will treat MCP as all the MCSs and control elements combined in one place.

The most basic assumption of Management Control System (MCS) is the idea that it is not effective to only look in isolation at specific elements in the control system; all the control elements in place and their interconnection should be considered (Fisher, 1998; Malmi and Brown, 2008). These different control elements can be divided in four categories (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007), which we will discuss in the next paragraph.

2.4 Management Control Elements

A management control element is a system, rule, practice value or other activity that is in place in order to direct employee behavior (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) divide all the control elements into four categories: result controls, action controls, personnel controls and cultural controls:

1) Result controls involve rewarding employees for their results, mostly in the form of “pay for performance”. Although monetary rewards are most common, there are more examples of rewards; job security, promotions, autonomy, and recognition (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Result controls require predefined targets in order to compare actual performance with the target performance. For the employees, targets provide conscious goals and the ability to interpret own performance (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Results controls are only effective if three conditions are present; “knowledge of desired results”, “controllability”, and “the ability to measure controllable results effectively” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). “Organizations must know what results are desired in the areas they which to control, and they must communicate those desires effectively to the employees” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Furthermore, “employees whose behavior are being controlled must be able to affect the results in a material way in a given time period” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Lastly, controllable results can be measured effectively when they are; precise, objective, timely, and understandable (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007).

2) “Action controls involves ensuring that employees perform (do not perform) certain actions known to be beneficial (harmful) to the organization” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). This goal is achieved by making the actions of the employees the focus of control (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007. According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2007), there are four basic forms of action controls; behavioral constrains, preaction reviews, action accountability, and redundancy. Behavioral constrains can be applied physically or administratively: Physical examples are; locks, computer passwords, and limited access to certain areas. Administrative constrains are used “to place limits on an employee’s abilities to perform all or a portion of specific tasks” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Another form of action control is

preaction review; it includes scrutiny of action plans and budgets and is done by management

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9 actions, communicating these definitions, monitoring the actions, and punishing actions that deviate (or rewarding good actions) (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). The last form of action control is redundancy; assigning more people to a task than necessary (backup people). “Action controls are only feasible when managers know which actions are desirable

(undesirable) and managers should be able to make sure these actions do (do not) occur” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007).

3) Personnel controls “build on employees’ natural tendencies to control themselves” since most people have a conscience that leads them to do what is right and they find

self-satisfaction when they do a good job and see their organization succeed (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). The ultimate goal of personnel controls is the creation of self-monitoring. The phenomenon of monitoring is discussed in extant literature under a couple of labels;

self-control, intrinsic motivation, ethics and morality, trust, and loyalty (Merchant & Van der

Stede, 2007). Self-monitoring is “the naturally present force that pushes most employees to want to do a good job” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Personnel controls can be implemented through three major methods: selection and placement of employees, training, and job design (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Selection and placement revolves around finding the right people to do a particular job. Training increases the employees’ sense of professionalism and it creates interest in the job by helping employees to understand their job better (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). And finally, job design should support motivated and qualified employees to enable them to achieve a high probability of success (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007).

4) Cultural controls can also be described as mutual-monitoring and it “taps into social pressure and group norms and values” (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Cultural controls are effective when the members in the group have emotional ties to one another (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Cultures are built on shared (and communicated) norms, values, traditions, beliefs, and ideologies (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007).

To conclude, result and action control are considered more formal and direct, and personnel and culture controls are considered as “soft controls” and indirect (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Sandelin, 2008). In addition, these four different control types can supplement and/or replace each other (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). If some control types are not effective, an organization will have to rely more on the remaining possible control types to keep the goals of the employees in line with the goals of the organization (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007).

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10 for an public organization, since it is dependent on the context of the organization (Chenhall, 2003). First of all, we start with explaining our vision on context with the help of contingency theory.

2.5 Context of Management Control Packages: Contingency Theory

How MCPs should be shaped depends on the context; different context requires different types of control (Ouchi, 1979; Otley, 1980; Otley, 1994; Chenhall, 2003). Otley (1980): “particular features of an appropriate accounting system will depend upon the specific

circumstances in which an organization finds itself”. “The appropriate design(s) of MCPs will be influenced by the context within which they operate” (Chenhall, 2003). These ideas are heavily based on contingency theory, which started taking shape in the early 1980s by the work of, among others, Ouchi (1979) and Otley (1980). “Contingency theory is based on the premise that there is no universally appropriate control system which applies equally to all organizations in all circumstances” (Otley, 1980). However, contingency theory is highly fragmented due to various factors such as; “disparate definitions of variables, insufficient data and underspecified models” (Gerdin and Greve, 2004).

Gerdin and Greve (2004) reviewed 10 articles in the contingency literature, and they identified some basic distinctions between approaches used by the contingency literature. First of all, there is the distinction between a Cartesian and Configuration approach. Supporters of the Cartesian approach believe that “fit between context and structure is a continuum that allows frequent, small movements by organizations from one state to fit to another” (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). On the other hand, researchers deploying a Configuration approach believe that “there are only a few states of fit between context and structure, with organizations having to make “quantum jumps” from one state of fit to another” (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). The Cartesian approach is characterized by reductionism, and the

Configurational approach is characterized by holism. Reductionists in the contingency

literature believe that single contextual factors affect single structural attributes and these context-structure pairs affect performance (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985) Holistic theory, however, indicates that relationships can only be understood if many contextual and structural variables are analyzed simultaneously (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985).

The second distinction Gerdin and Greve (2004) make, is between a Congruence versus a

Contingency approach. A Congruence approach assumes that there is no need to link context

with performance since, due to “survival of the fittest”, only high performing organizations survive (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). On the other hand, in the Contingency approach, “fit is understood as a positive impact on performance due to certain combinations of context and structure” Gerdin and Greve (2004). Consequently, “high-performing as well as

low-performing firms do exist as a result of more or less successful combinations of context and structure” Gerdin and Greve (2004).

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11 For this paper we focus on a Cartesian and Contingency approach. The public sector is quite often turbulent and policies can change depending on the politicians in power. This means that the public sector has to make all kinds of small changes; this fits best in the Cartesian framework. Furthermore, a Congruence approach is based on the survival of the fittest; bad-performing organizations go bankrupt. This is not the case in the public sector; therefore a

Contingency approach is more applicable. In the remaining of this paper the influence of

context will be treated from a Cartesian and Contingency perspective. In the next paragraph we will elaborated on the specific context of the public sector.

2.6 Context of the Public Sector

As mentioned in the introduction, it is contested that businesslike management control

elements can successfully be transferred to the public sector, since the specificity of the public sector and their context is not included (Boden et al 1998; Leeuw & van Thiel, 2002; Lapsley 2009; Cristofoli et al. 2010). In order to illustrate the specific context of the public sector, we list a couple of important differences between the public and private sector. Allison (1980) has grouped these differences into three basic clusters:

1) The difference in environmental characteristics; market exposure, formal legal constraints, and political influence.

2) The relation between environment and organization; coerciveness, scope of impact,

public scrutiny and expectations.

3) The differences in organizational factors; goal complexity, authority relations, performance, incentive structures, and personal characteristics.

These clusters and their elements are backed by findings from other authors. For example, Kickert (1997) and Cristofoli et al. (2010) also recognize the important role of the

environment and character of a public organization and it tasks on the management and structure of the organization. Furthermore, Hofstede (1981) found some factors that can characterize a portion of the public organizations: ambiguity of goals, the immeasurability of the outputs, and the non repetitiveness of the activities.

Cristofoli et al. (2010) have explored the influence of the contextual elements “environment characteristics” and “task characteristics” on control within the public sector. However, authors identify two other very important contextual factors; “political actors” (Otley, 1994; Kickert, 1997), and “difficulty in performance measurement” (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Leeuw & van Thiel, 2002). The influences of these two factors on control within the public sector are less in depth described, and in our case study we would like to explore the effects of “political actors” and the “difficulties of performance measurement” on the configuration of MCPs in the local government. In the next two paragraphs we will discuss the extant literature on these two contextual factors.

2.7 Political Actors

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12 for the many theories of the relations between politicians and bureaucrats”. Brignall & Modell (2000) also recognize the “complex interrelationships between multiple stakeholders and the intensely political nature of decision-making in public sector organizations”. This complexity created by political influences, results in complex and ambiguous goals (Allison, 1980; Hofstede, 1981).

Otley (1994) identifies the need for organizations to be flexible when dealing with political influences. According to Otley (1994), organizations can create flexibility by empowering their employees instead of leaving all the power with a few senior managers. In order to cope with the changes that can come from political actors, the organization will require the “active involvement of many more people than has been traditional, and the mechanisms for control of such activities will necessarily involve increased levels of self-control and group

accountability” (Otley, 1994). Therefore, in our case study, we expect empowerment of the employees when dealing with political actors.

2.8 Difficulties Measuring Performance in the Public Sector

The first step in measuring performance is determining what to measure. Ballantine et al. (1998) identify a couple of possible performance indications; financial performance, process performance, outcome performance and output performance. This is a multiple dimensions view on performance measurement (Ballantine et al, 1998). Since the 1990s some multiple dimensions models have been developed like the widely used Balance Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). These types of models have had a lot of criticism, for example from an institutional perspective (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Norreklit, 2000). The criticism encompasses, among others; not including all the stakeholders and underestimating the influence of power relationships (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Norreklit, 2000). This can be related back to the influence and power of the political actors mentioned in the previous paragraph. As mentioned, (Allison, 1980; Hofstede, 1981) argue that political influence result in ambiguous and complex goals. It is difficult to effectively measure results when the goals are ambiguous and complex.

In addition, there are more problems with measuring performance in the public sector. One is called the performance paradox and refers to weak correlation between performance

indicators and performance itself (Meyer & O’Shaughnessy, 1993; Meyer & Gupta, 1994). Leeuw & van Thiel (2002) argue that the “audit explosion”, caused by NPM reforms, resulted in an increase in performance measurement in the public sector. However, when

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13 characteristics of the public sector into account. In particular, the effects of political actors and difficulties in performance measurement.

2.9 Which type of Management Control in the Public Sector?

The department in our case study is chosen to fit in one extreme of the Ouchi (1979) model. This results in a low ability to measure outputs and low knowledge of the transformation process (Ouchi, 1979). Consequently, these characteristics influence the expected control elements. As mentioned earlier, result control requires the ability to measure outputs and

action control requires knowledge of the desired actions (transformation process) of the

employees (Merchant & van der Stede, 2007). Therefore, due to the chosen position in the Ouchi (1979) model, we would not expected strong forms of result and action control. A second argument against results control is provided by Allison (1980) and Hofstede (1981), they argue that political influence result in ambiguous and complex goals. It is difficult to effectively measure results when the goals are ambiguous and complex. Finally, in the event that performance is measured, policy makers should make sure that performance indicators should reflect quality and reliability Leeuw & van Thiel, (2002).

Furthermore, In order to cope with the changes that can come from political actors, the organization will require the “active involvement of many more people than has been traditional, and the mechanisms for control of such activities will necessarily involve increased levels of self-control and group accountability” (Otley, 1994). Self-control and group accountability are, respectively, personnel and cultural control elements (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Consequently, following the reasoning of Otley (1994), we expect strong personnel and cultural control elements when dealing with political actors.

Concluding, result and action control is not very likely in the case study department due to problems when measuring performance and a low knowledge of the desired actions of the employees. When an organization cannot rely on result and action control, they will have to implement more personnel and cultural control to keep the activities of their employees in line with the goals of the organization (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Furthermore, with the help of personnel and cultural control, organizations can incorporate the flexibility needed when dealing with political actors (Otley, 1994).

3) METHODOLOGY 3.1 Research Design and Method

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14 and “knowledge of transformation process” (see table 1). One department in a municipality is chosen and this department should score low on the two scales in order to fit into one of the extremes of the Ouchi (1979) model. Consequently, the department should have a low ability to measure outputs and little knowledge of the transformation process. This technique will ensure a heterogenic case and therefore speeding up the process of theoretical saturation. However, complete theoretical saturation is very time consuming and would require more departments and interviews than possible in the timeframe of the master thesis. Hence, to limit the scope, only one department is chosen and three managers, five employees, and one alderman will be interviewed.

TABLE 2

Ouchi (1979)

This research will involve triangulation by desk research, observations and conducting formal and informal interviews with managers and employees of the departments in the municipality. The initial research questions will provide guidance for the direction of the interviews. The data will be coded, after which it will be described, compared and categorized. The results of the analysis will be use to shape constructs. Finally these results will be compared with existing theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).

3.2 Data analysis

The data is analyzed and structured by categorizing the control elements mentioned by the interviewees. The possible categories are: result controls, action controls, personnel controls and cultural controls. When a mentioned control element is recognized, it is designated to one of the four control categories by color coding. Furthermore, the contextual factors; “political actors” and “difficulties measuring performance”, are color coded as well. After this initial structuring process, these codes of control elements and contextual factors were put together in a separate document. With the help of this document the results section is written. Table 3 gives an overview of the data collected by the interviews. When all the control elements and contextual factors are illustrated, we will discuss the influence of the contextual factors on the control elements and their total package, the management control package.

TABLE 3

Function Topic Area Gender Age Word Count

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Department Head Management and Area Development Male 45 8.064

Manager 1 Management and Housing Male 41 9.412

Manager 2 Management and Traffic Female 42 10.958

Employee 1 Youth Housing Male 38 8.812

Employee 2 Finance and Local Economics Male 39 7.503

Employee 3 Area Development, Parking and Cycling Female 31 10.279

Employee 4 Housing Male 40 9.285

Employee 5 City Accessibility and Traffic Female 37 6.818

3.3 Case Description

This case study has taken place in a department in the municipality of Groningen, which is responsible for the development of policies and vision on a wide range of subjects in order to improve the livability of the city. Possible general subjects are: traffic, housing, energy, sustainability, and environment. This department is responsible for the realization of projects in these subjects and constantly has to negotiate with external parties like contractors, housing corporations and external advisors. A second task of this department is answering questions and giving advice to the aldermen and council members if needed. Most of the questions and requests come directly from the alderman that has the specific responsibility for a certain subject. This makes the aldermen the most important principal. These two tasks combined result in a wide range of possible daily activities. The department consists of fifty employees and three managers.

4) FINDINGS: CONTROL ELEMENTS 4.1 Result Control Elements

Result control elements depend on measured results and an incentive system coupled with these results. The rewards in the incentive system are almost always monetary. Furthermore, result control requires predefined targets in order to compare actual performance with targeted performance. Consequently, these predetermined targets give an employee goal clarity. The employee should have the ability to influence the outcomes of these goals in order for result control to be effective. We will proceed by exploring if and how result control elements are used in the department.

Most of the interviewed employees and managers have the idea that their work is result driven. Nonetheless, they do recognize some problems when defining good results. Manager 2: “of course the employees should deliver results; however, what is the definition of a result”? Mostly, the employees see results as good quality of their written work and their ability to deliver their notions and proposals on time as scheduled by the organization, the city council and alderman. Employee 1: “in the end, a certain document has to be finished and this document has to be of good quality”. An important end result is the approval of their proposal by the city council, as employee 2 mentioned: “if the city council approves your proposal, you have done a good job”. Some interviewees do identify some disadvantages with these

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16 cost you a year, or you can write twenty simple documents which will not take that much time”. Consequently, the department has issues when establishing results. However, do they set up goals/targets and accordingly; reward (or punish) the employees when (not) reaching these goals? We will answer this in the next paragraphs.

Goals

Quite apparent, after the interviews, was the lack of goals set by management. Employee 5: “you will not be told to produce this many documents or notions”. Or employee 2: “there is no systematic system to set goals”. When asked if there are any goals set by management for results, one employee simply answered: “no”. However, in the occasions that goals are set, they are established by the employees themselves. Manager 2: “the employees set their own goals; if the alderman asks for a notion, then the employee will have to judge when something can be finished and delivered”. These goals involve time and quality; manager 1 mentioned: “the goals are qualitative; is your work on time and is the quality sufficient”. The same

manager adds: “it is hard to set specific quantitative goals”. However, we must concluded that managers do not set targets or objectives that must be achieved.

Measuring Results and Result areas

Many of the interviewees identify “missing the deadline” as a measurable bad result. Employee 3: “if your (documents) are constantly too late, you will have difficulties doing your job in the future”. Manager 2’s opinion on measuring results: “that is simple; the employee has to deliver his/her work on time”. A second result area, according to the interviewees, is the ability to please the council and aldermen with the help of a high quality written piece. The department head: “the bond with the council is very important, you can measure the quality (of the piece) on the basis of the satisfaction of the receiver (the council)”. Employee 1: “if the politicians approve your proposal, then you probably did a good job”. Employee 5: “your pieces have to be of good quality in order to enable the council to make a decision”. Nonetheless, the employees and managers do admit that this result area is hard to measure: “this is harder to measure than some sort of financial reckoning”. The alderman interviewed also recognizes the difficulty of measuring the quality of the delivered written piece:

The quality of the piece is dependant of many factors. Is it readable? Is it

comprehensive? However, the creation of the piece is not a goal in itself, is also needs to be passed by the council, so they have to be satisfied. The piece has to answer all the questions and has to be realistic. How do you judge the importance of these different aspects? We do not have any type of measuring system for this.

One employee agreed very much; “Results? No, these are not measured”.

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17 written pieces and meeting the deadlines of the pieces. The next two paragraphs will elaborate on any kind of reward or punishment system.

Rewards

Rewards in this department come in a couple of types. First of all, you have the formal way to reward someone for good results. This is done with the help of bonuses. Manager 1: “we have the possibility to recommend someone for a bonus, if this person did exceptionally well and performed beyond their regular job description”. However, the manager also adds; “the maximum number of bonuses per department is three, and it is also very unique to happen, you will have to get permission of the municipal secretary and due to all the budget cuts, this is very difficult”. This image created by the manager is supported by the other interviews: Employee 5: “we do not get rewards in the form of a bonus”. Employee 3: “there was a bonus system; however, I do not know if this is still in place, I believe not”. Manager 1 admits:

As a manager, you got minimal reward options. This results in managers who do not take the evaluation (of employees) too serious. We have a minimal system of

rewards.

Thus, rewards in the form of bonuses are not very common. Another form of formal reward has to do with the possibility of an automatic rise in pay grade. If an employee consistently performs well, they will automatically go up in their pay grade. The managers have the power to give a good or bad performance evaluation and; as a result, preventing or aiding this

automatic rise in their wage. However, since this is an automated system in the municipality, the managers cannot actively give a rise in wage, as manager 1 explains: “when an employee gets good performance appraisals over a period of three years, they will automatically go up in pay grade; however, as a manager, we cannot speed up this process”.

The second category of rewards is informal and more common. The most used informal reward is handing out compliments after achieving good results. Alderman: “if I think it is a good piece, I will let them know it”. Employee 1 on rewards in general: “You will be told: great job, you will get compliments”. In the interviews, some other forms of small informal rewards are mentioned; a bouquet of flowers, a gift coupon, getting more responsibility, getting the more prestigious projects, or getting the possibility to do an extra educational course. Thus, informal rewards from time to time are certainly in place; however, this department hardly uses formal rewards.

Punishments

Punishments are not very common in the department. Almost every employee answer was the same when asked if punishments existed: “Not that I know off, never experienced it”, “I cannot imagine it (people being punished)”. One employee did explain the lack of a punishment policy quite well:

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18

decides otherwise. If you did your best to get good results, but other parties do not cooperate, then that is not your fault.

In this department, there is no real form of formal punishment for not reaching goals. The next paragraph will sum up the result controls previous mentioned.

Conclusion on Result Controls

The employees and managers of the case study department have the idea that their

organization is result driven. There are two main result areas indentified; the quality of the written pieces and the ability to meet the deadlines. Although these two areas could be measured according to the interviews, this is not happening. Moreover, it became apparent that the department does not have any kind of performance measurement system since goals are not clear and therefore, targets could not bet set. Consequently, the formal reward system is not coupled with achieving measurable results. Formal rewards included bonuses and aiding increase in wage by giving positive appraisals. Nonetheless, these formal rewards are rarely used. However, if the managers believe that employees do their job well, they will mostly give informal rewards like compliments and more responsibility.

4.2 Action Control Elements

Action control elements are all about making sure that the actions of the employees are beneficial for the organization and does not harm the organization (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). This can be achieved by setting up strict protocols and procedures. As

mentioned in the theory section, there are four forms of action control elements: behavioral constraints, preaction reviews, action accountability, and redundancy. In the next paragraphs we will list, per category, the action control elements found in the department. However, we will start with describing the procedure policy of the department.

Procedures

The political system requires many procedures and has many deadlines for written pieces. There are many intermediate checks by all kind of people and departments, before the city council or board of aldermen receive the written pieces. Manager 1: “There are a lot of steps and procedures if you want your piece to be in a meeting of the city council or board of aldermen”. Employee 5: “in order to serve the politicians, we have certain procedures and this also consist of filling in many forms”. Alderman explains why this is important:

The risk with procedures is that it can slow you down. However, if we did not have these procedures, we are taking the risk having to send back a lot of the documents (because they are not complete or contain errors).

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19 Conversely, when asked if these procedures and steps are documented, the interviewees don’t really recall any type of blueprint of the formal route. Employee 1: “I don’t know”. Employee 4: “good luck looking for it (protocol documentation)”. So, the formal route is not very much written down. However, there is documentation for filling in the compulsory forms: “this is (shows documentation) the documentation for filling in the forms and formulating your arguments”. To sum up, the department has to deal with many procedures, protocols and forms in order to serve the political system. On the other hand, except for the forms, this formal route is not written down and has to be learned on the job. In the next couple of paragraphs we dive more detailed into action control elements.

Behavioral Constraints

The interviewees do not have the idea that they are constrained in their access to

documentation on the department. Manager 1: “no, I do not see any significant limitations”. Manager 2: “in principle, everyone can access everything”. Almost every employee answered simply “no” when asked about the presence of access limitation.

Preaction Reviews

The managers do not review or approve the planned work of the employees. The employees determine how they do their own work and make their own schedule. Manager 2: “they do not have to show me how and when they are going to do their work, it is their own

responsibility”. Employee 1: “I do not let my managers know what I’m going to do every week”.

Action Accountability

An organization needs to specify what actions are (un)desirable and communicate this, if an organization wants to make their employees accountable for the way they do their work, their actions. The case study department does demand one action that always should be taken. To explain this, it is necessary to briefly illustrate the process of a written proposal intended for the politicians: It begins with an employee accepting a problem and beginning on a

solution/answer and ends when the piece is processed in a meeting of the board of aldermen or the city council. Throughout this process, the author remains responsible for all the aspects of the piece. This process is roughly laid out in a document and the managers do

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20 There is one important action control in this department we need to mention. The employees are required to write down how they spend their working hours, they have to assign hours to specific subjects. However, this policy is imposed form outside of the department and is not taken seriously. Employee 1:

We have a system in which we have to write down our hours. But this is not really used. Everyone is obligated to write down their hours, but there is nobody that checks it. So everybody does fill in their hours at random. One colleague evens make figures when he fills in his hours.

The managers also recognize the problems with this system: Manager 1 “at the moment, we do not use it”. Manager 2: “It is a registration system; however, we do not use it for

management control”.

Redundancy

There is no form of a redundancy policy in this department. There are no more people assigned to a task than necessary.

Conclusion on Action Controls

The department has to deal with many procedures and protocols due to the political process. The way these processes and protocols work is not very well documented. There is

documentation that roughly describes the actions that an original author of a piece should take when this piece should go to the politicians. The most important action is; involving everyone whose working field overlaps with the concepts in the piece. The action of involving

everyone is such an important one that supervisors constantly check if this action is performed correctly. Besides this action, the employees are mostly left free for their other actions and or not checked by the superiors. Furthermore, the employees do not have any kind of restriction or limited access to information within the department. Nor do they have to let their planned work to be reviewed and evaluated by managers. The employees do have to write their hours down, but this system does not work.

4.3 Personnel Control Elements

The main objective of personnel controls is enabling employees to control and motivate themselves (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). General personnel controls methods are: selection of employees, training, and job design. A combination of these methods could lead to “self-monitoring” or “self-control”, this is the process which pushes the employee to be natural committed to the organizational goals (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). In the next paragraphs we will list the personnel control methods used in the case study department.

Selection

The selection procedures in the department are based on the capacities of the applicant and fit in the team. New employees have a high level of education and most of them have an

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21

We need people with an open-mindset and the ability to think broad. So we really pay attention to this (in an interview). We really selected people who are employable on different levels and different subjects. I think we succeeded in this intention.

Moreover, employees do recognize this high level of education: “I think the skill level in this department is very high, we do draw some very talented people and this is something you notice”. Besides being highly educated and broad minded, the applicants also need to fit in the team. This is done with the help of regular employees. In addition to the formal selection staff, a couple of regular employees are being asked to join the interview with the applicant. Manager 2 on this policy: “we consciously invited some regular staff to see if it fits on a personal level”. And the regular staff seems to appreciate this approach: “this combination of formal and informal (the selection approach) is something I welcome”.

Training

We can divide training in the training of newly hired employees and the constant training of regular staff. First of all, we will discuss the training policy on newly hired employees.

Newly hired employees are moderately supported. Manager 1 explains: “we have some sort of small trainee programme and manager 2 and I do walk into their offices (of the new

employees) more often than we do with other employees”. Manager 1 admits a lack of training for new employees: “new employees are placed in the department however, we do not have some kind of manual for them. I think we should do more for new young

colleagues”. Moreover, employees recognize this image: “it is learning on the job, you will have to do it yourself; you can ask your colleagues for information”. However, as a newly hired employee, you will get assigned a coach, a senior employee. Employee 5: “I know our new employee has a coach here”. Manager 1: “we do have a buddy system, a senior employee is coupled with a junior employee and they can discuss the way they do their work”.

Furthermore, the managers do emphasize that all of this is very dependent on the person and their needs. Manager 1: “we adjust the training on the needs of the person”. Employee 5: “it depends on how much you (as new employee) ask of them (managers/coaches)”.

The second type of training is the training for regular staff. There are formal possibilities to get trained on different kinds of subjects. The department has a training budget and the managers can use this to train staff. Staff is trained on their own request or when a manager indicates that the employee could use some extra training in a subject, as manager 1 explains:

We have a fixed training budget. With the help of meetings and/or a performance review, we make arrangements with the employee when there is a training need. And this is two-fold; we can tell you what we think is helpful, on the other side; you can tell us your training needs. However, I must say that this is quite on an ad-hoc basis and we do not really have a general strategy to approach these issues.

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22 some sort of elaborate vision for that (the training policy)”. Employee 1 adds: “since I worked here, there has barely been any training”. A plausible explanation is been given by employee 5: “how much you get out of it (training policy) depends on how much attention you give to it (the possibility to get trained)”. Manager 2 elaborates on this:

If you (the employee) distinctly can tell us what you need, than we can search for a fitting training course. However, there are many types of persons, one person might need it (training) and another person does not want anything.

To conclude; there are formal possibilities for training; nevertheless, this is not very well communicated with the staff. Furthermore, predominantly the staff themselves will have to make apparent that they want to be trained.

Job Design

The employees of the department are divided in rooms capable of around 3-4 persons. The type of employees put in the same room is strategically determined. Young and inexperienced personnel are put together with senior staff, and even people working on totally different subjects are mixed. Manager 1: “there are people put together who do not relate in their working fields, in this manner these different employees better know what is going on in the department as a whole”. It is the intention of the managers to get a mixed group in order to prevent a too narrow view of individual employees. This is needed because the subjects are often interrelated and need a lot of cooperation, as The department head mentioned: “we work a lot with interconnections (between subjects)”. Employee 2 verifies this: “different people are put together and different disciplines are put together in order to attack the problems we face, this has been very stimulated (by the management)”.

Furthermore, the department does not really works with formal job-descriptions due to the hectic working conditions. Manager 1 illustrated: “We work with very abstract

job-description, so they do not really mean anything”. Employee 2 explains: “my job description would depend per dossier; we work in such a complicated environment and there is no blueprint for this work”. Almost all of the interviewed employees do not know their formal job-description. Nonetheless, they do know what is expected from them: “I just know what is expected from me”. Manager 1 clarifies: “we (the managers) discuss with the individual employee what tasks are ahead and what we expect from them”. Employee 3 adds: “it (knowing your task) happens quite organic and there are also a couple a moments in your work that nobody could predict”.

Self-monitoring/self-control

Employees have a very high degree of self-monitoring and self-control. Manager 1: “there is a lot of self-control; determining for yourself how things should be done, we (the managers) do not tell them how and when”. The department head elaborates:

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23 Employees are aware of this and they like this approach, as employee 1 explains:

The supervisors are hardly involved in your work, and this is very convenient if you can cope with this; you will get a lot of freedom and you can perform and schedule your work how you want it.

Other reactions of employees are as well very positive on their high level of self-control and self-monitoring. Employee 4: “I’ve got a lot of freedom in my work, and I like it, I like it to be responsible”. The next paragraph will recap the personnel control elements in the case study department.

Conclusion on Personnel Controls

When new employees are hired, they should have a high level of education, a broad interest field and open-mind, and they have to fit into the team. After they are hired, they will be assigned to a coach, a senior employee, who will help them if needed. They will not get a lot of documentation or guide lines, and will have to learn “on the go” with the help of their colleagues. Consequently, training of new staff is minimal. If the more senior employees want extra training, than this is possible, however they most likely have to bring up this need themselves. Managers are not that active in pushing people towards training, however, their approach can vary per employee.

The employees are mixed by experience and subject expertise throughout the rooms in the department. This is done to encourage cooperation and communication, this enables better problem solving. In addition, due to the hectic nature of this work, there is no real job-description possible. However, the employees do know what is expected from them, due to meetings with managers in which they discuss problems ahead. Furthermore, the employees have a high level of self-control and this gives them a high level of responsibility. Moreover, the staff appreciates this level of self-control.

4.4 Cultural Control Elements

Cultural controls involve mutual-monitoring through social pressure and group norms and values (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Cultural controls are effective if group members have emotional ties to one another (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). In the next paragraphs we will describe the cultural and the cultural control elements in the case study department.

Culture

The department has a very strong and informal culture. Managers would like to see themselves as not being more important than the normal employee. Manager 1: “it (the structure) is very horizontal and informal, we the managers are not above the staff, but part of it and there is a very good team spirit, everybody gets along”. Moreover, there is an emotional connection since the employees know each other well, as illustrated by managers 3:

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24

Everybody in this department loves their work. There is much and good contact between colleagues and people are willing to do things for each other. That is very pleasant. And if something really has to be done, than people will have no problem to make overtime in the evening or in the weekend. This is a nice department to work for; there is a very positive culture.

Apparently, there is a very positive and open culture in this department and everybody seems to be very happy with their way of work and is willing to help and support each other.

Communication of Norms and Values

There is one very important moment where the managers really communicate the group norms and values. There is a briefing each week where the managers briefly evaluate and discuss the ongoing projects and the projects ahead with the whole group. The department head illustrates this process: “because this (the briefing) is with the whole group, you will notice that the individual employees really see what we as a group think is important, the group norm”. The employees are aware of this: “the briefing is a moment that we really exchange group values. There is a personal note (in the briefing) and I really see it as a framework for our norms”. Besides this briefing, the norms and values are communicated by example. The managers and other important persons in the department set the right example. The department head “we have a lot of guidance trough exemplary behavior, it is very important in the group what the alphas are doing, are they working an hour extra”. There are a couple of very important group values and norms communicated in the department. The most important are: open-attitude, involvement, communication, and

compassion. Open-attitude and involvement are important since the politicians and managers would like the employees to be really social involved and aware of the things going on outside the department. Employee 1 discusses this desire: “I think they (the managers) really appreciate involvement, you have to be involved with your work and you have to know what is going on in the news and what are the latest developments, how can this influence your work”. Furthermore, good communication is a very important value in the department. Employee 2 explains: “if you have a question, you just briefly walk into each other offices and discuss it, there is a lot of information sharing going on here”. Employee 3 adds: “this is a club of people who are really comfortable with sharing things with each other”. Lastly, compassion and feeling safe are very apparent values in this department. Employee 5: “I notice that, especially in a municipal organization, there is a lot of compassion for each

other”. The department head: “people are very well willing and helpful”, and; ”we have a very safe environment, we really protect each other”. However, this could have a downfall:

“sometimes we are somewhat too nice for each other”.

Mutual-monitoring

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25 other hand, manager 1 said: “people do watch over each other’s shoulder”. In addition,

employee 1 remarks:

Your colleagues do keep an eye on each other. For example; “do not forget; your piece will be in the commission meeting next week and you are supposed to be there”. People do look wider than their own work, and this happens pretty well.

Other employees think this is very person dependent: “if you want it (feedback), than you will have to ask for it, but when you do ask, you will find that everyone is willing to give it”. Employee 4: “I think this (mutual-monitoring) is very person dependent, some are very open and others you will hardly hear or see”. However, employee 4 later adds:

Slowly but surely we are going to a culture where this (mutual-monitoring) will be done more often. I begin to see that people are more and more often being addressed for their way of working. I also try to make a conscious effort to do this more often.

Consequently, mutual-monitoring seems to be happening in the department. Nonetheless, different people have different views on the extent to which it happens, this could be

explained by the different types of person; if you are open-minded, it is more likely that you will anticipated in the mutual-monitoring process.

Conclusion on Cultural Controls

There is a very positive and open culture in this department and everybody seems to be very happy with their way of work and is willing to help and support each other. Important group values and norms are: open-attitude, involvement, communication, and compassion. These are communicated most often in the weekly group briefing and through exemplary behavior by managers and alphas. Mutual-monitoring is visible in the department, nonetheless, the extent to which can deviate per person.

4.5 Dominant Control Element

The employees are mostly let free in the way they do their work. This translates in a very cultural and personnel controlled organization, as described by employee 1:

We are really driven by culture. It is because of the people who work here, their education level and their tasks. It is the ability to be able to get things done on your own, and the culture should support that. People (the managers) only intervene if there is no other way.

Furthermore, manager 1 supports this idea:

It is a department with only highly educated people and they are very driven and have a very high level of responsibility. And I think that managing through culture really fits in this department.

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26 5) DISCUSSION

In the next couple of paragraphs we will discuss the listed results, their interconnection and their implications with the help of our theoretical framework. First of all, we show the total management control packages as described in the result section. Secondly, we described how the two contextual factors influence the management control package. Finally, these case specific relations will be generalized towards more general concepts.

5.1 Management Control Package in the Case Study Department

Table four shows all the control elements found in the department, they are divided in the separate control categories and together they form the total management control package (MCP) of the case study department. As mentioned by Merchant & Van der Stede (2007) and Sandelin (2008), control types can replace or supplement each other. We found that in the case study that the “soft” controls, cultural and personnel control, replaced result and action controls.

TABLE 4

Management Control Package

Result controls Action controls Personnel controls Cultural controls

-Results areas are quality and the ability to meet the

deadline (dependability). -No performance targets and/or formal performance measurement system. -Rewards are not coupled with measurable results, but based on managers’

satisfaction of employees work.

-Formal rewards (bonuses and increase in wage) are present but very limited and rare.

-Informal rewards are more common (compliments, more responsibility, prestigious projects).

-Only one action accountable for: when an employee works on a piece, every relevant colleague has to be consulted. This process is documented and supervisors check regularly. -Hour registration system.

However, not taken serious and does not work effectively.

-No behavioral constraints and/or preaction reviews.

-Selection: highly educated and broad deployable personnel.

-Job design 1): mixed groups in order to improve communication and awareness.

-Job design 2): no formal job-descriptions. Managers communicate their expectancy of employees in informal conversations. -Training: training of personnel is lacking, no active policy. However, it is possible if asked for by personnel.

Self-control is achieved.

-Open and informal culture. -Values and norms: open-attitude, involvement, communication, and compassion.

-Group values and norms are communicated through the briefing (group session) each week, and through exemplary behavior.

Emotional ties are achieved.

Mutual monitoring is partly achieved (depends on person).

WEAK WEAK VERY STRONG DOMINANT

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27 easily shared. Since the work can become quite hectic and complicated at times, employees will have to be involved and should be open to help each other. Managers openly

communicated these requirements and they will give the right exemplary behavior. The personnel controls are designed to support the cultural controls. New employees will have to be highly educated, open-minded and motivated. Furthermore, the job is designed to support an open and flexible culture. These cultural and personnel control elements work

systematically and coherently together to achieve the goals of the department and for this

reason we can define this as a Management Control System (MCS) (Chenhall, 2003). One personnel control does not fit into this MCS; “training of personnel”. The training policy is not systematic and not actively promoted by managers. Therefore, “training” can be classified as a standalone control element. Nonetheless, the other personnel and cultural control

elements can be seen as one MCS within the MCP.

Secondly, although result and action controls are weak in the department, we have found some distinct result and action control elements; formal rewards are possible (bonuses and increase in wage) and there is an hour registration system for personnel. Nonetheless, the rewards are rare and not coupled with measurable results. Furthermore, the hour registration system is seen as obligated by external actors and is not supported by managers in the case study department, as a result, the hour registration system is not taken serious and is not used for management control. Although these control elements are present in the MCP, they are not used systematically and coherent to achieve the goals of the department. Therefore, these result and action controls are not part of an MCS (Chenhall, 2003) but rather decoupled and standalone control elements. However, there are two exceptions in the result and action control categories. In order to assure that the written pieces are of good quality, there is an action where the employees are accountable for. When employees work on a piece, they are constantly checked by their supervisors if every relevant colleague is consulted. The end-quality of a written piece strongly depends on the degree of communication with relevant actors. Consequently, these two control elements are systematic and are coherent with the goals of the personnel and cultural controls. Therefore, it is reasonable to put them in the same MCS as the personnel and cultural control mentioned in the previous paragraph. To conclude, table four shows the MCP of the case study department. In the MCP we can distinguish one MCS: all the personnel and cultural control elements with the exception of “training” and with the addition of “quality” as result area and “communication with relevant colleagues” as accountable action. The remaining control elements are not systematic and

coherent; as a result they are standalone controls within the MCP. In the next paragraph we

will discuss the influence of “political actors” and “difficulties measuring performance” on the design of the MCP.

5.2 Influence of Political Actors

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28 publicity in the press and there will be no big decisions made, this will influence our work”. Additionally, after the elections it is possible to have different politicians and political parties in power. Different political parties can create new force fields that influence the work of the employees. Employee 2 on this subject: “if two political parties do not get along, a project could be cancelled and you will not be able to influence this process and that is what makes this work difficult”. Moreover, a different politician as client will affect the working demands, as explained by employee 3:

Our previous alderman could wake up one morning and could completely change her mind on a subject we already discussed. It is quite strange that your client can completely change direction, but this happens with politicians.

Changing directions of politicians can occur due to changing items that the general public finds important or are in the news at that moment. Politicians can jump into this item and it is the task of the department to follow their clients, this can lead to changing subjects per week. The interviewed alderman underlines the pressure resulting from this: “sometimes the work load is very high and everybody starts to follow each other as a result of the high demands of the politicians”. Employee 1 elaborates on this process:

The politicians demand a lot. It is about the issues of the day. An alderman can come up with a new item and it is our task to quickly address this item. It is about constantly catching up with the political reality because something has happened.

Consequently, the employees have to constantly deal with shifting political interests and orders. On the other hand, the politicians expect from the employees that they can

independently come up with new proposals when the employees sense a certain need from the general population, as the alderman discusses: “they (the employees) have to know what is happening in the city and in the society, they have to sense the needs and signal this to us (the politicians) in a timely manner.”.

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