Lying press, oh Lying Press: War-Propaganda in German
Media
A case study on how the Tagesschau frames key politicial players in the Syrian War
Source: Zeit Online
Author Lorraine Wenzel S2918277 University University of Groningen MA Journalism Faculty of Arts Date Supervisor 02.11.2016 Scott Eldridge Assistant Professor
Word Count Journalism Studies
28.598
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction...6
1.1 War Propaganda today?...6
1.2 Research case Tagesschau - One cannot escape the Frames...8
1.3 Background - The Syrian War...9
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework...12
2.1 Framing...14
2.1.1 Framing, War and Propaganda...16
2.1.1.1 Framing, War and Propaganda in German History...17
2.1.1.2 Framing, War and Propaganda in recent Cases in the U.S...20
2.1.2 The Relation of German, American and Russian Nationalism...22
2.1.2.1 Framing War and Nationalism...24
2.1.2.2 The Connection of Stereotyping- and Nationalism-Frames...27
2.1.3 Framing War and Stereotyping...28
2.1.4 Framing and Sourcing Practices...33
Chapter 3 Method...37
3.1 Why TV?...37
3.1.1 Why the ARD?...39
3.1.1.1 Why the Tagesschau?...39
3.2 Content Analysis...41
3.2.1 Coding...42
3.2.1.1 Analyzing the Content of the Tagesschau...43
3.2.1.1.1 Analyzing Stereotypes and Nationalism...44
3.2.1.1.2 Analyzing Sourcing Practices...46
Chapter 4 Analysis...47
4.1 The key Players in the Tagesschau Coverage...48
4.2 All Average - Analysis of Length and Placement...49
4.3 Analysis of Stereotype- and Nationalism-Frames...53
4.3.1 Stereotype- and Nationalism-Frames of Germany, the U.S. and Russia in Comparison...54
4.3.1.2 Russia needs to be kept at Bay...58
4.3.1.3 Germany: No Support for the own Country...62
4.4 Analysis of the Sourcing Practices...64
4.4.1 Officials at Work...65
4.4.2 The Critical Journalist...66
4.4.3 Source Implications for News Coverage...69
4.5 What about Information?...70
Chapter 5 Conclusion – No Foundation for the Mistrust?...71
References...78
Appendices...87
Appendix 1: Coding...87 1.1 Table Transcript...87 1.2 Transcript...911.3 Analysis: First Coder...124
1.4 Analysis: Second Coder...133
Appendix 2: Figures...141
Appendix 3: Other Sources...147
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Length Pieces...51Figure 2: Placement Pieces...51
Figure 3: Placement Pieces (divided into first and second)...52
Figure 4: Stereotyping Germany and America...56
Figure 5: Stereotypes Russia...58
Figure 6: Cold War Frames Russia...60
Figure 7: 'Them' vs. 'Us' Frames...61
Figure 8: Nationalism Frames 'Us'...61
Figure 9: Stereotyping Germany and the Refugee Crisis...63
Figure 10: Sourcing Practices...65
Figure 11: Sourcing Practices – Journalists...66
Graphic 1: Timeline Tagesschau...49
Graphic 2: Screenshot Tagesschau S2...55
Graphic 3: Screenshot Tagesschau N3b...57
Graphic 4: Screenshot Tagesschau N3b...57
Graphic 5: Screenshot Tagesschau N3b...57
Graphic 6: Screenshot Tagesschau S3...59
Graphic 7: Screenshot Tagesschau S3...59
Graphic 8: Screenshot Tagesschau J1...68
Graphic 9: Screenshot Tagesschau O2a...68
Abstract
Framing analysis on war coverage in media has been included in a number of research studies and has demonstrated that and how war propaganda has been used during the two Gulf Wars in American Media, for instance, but has lacked the focus on the Syrian War and German news organizations. As since the beginning of the Syrian War, German mass media have increasingly been accused of being biased and spreading war propaganda, the current study sets out to explore how the key foreign political players, Germany, Russia and the U.S. are framed in the Tagesschau, the most influential German public service broadcast.
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to research in recent war reporting and framing practices. A mix of qualitative and quantitative content analysis was used, where one-year Sunday evening coverage was coded for length and placement of the pieces as well as stereotype-, nationalism-frames and sourcing practices. Analyzing the data, no traces of war propaganda could be found. However, just very few pieces about the actual war could be found in general. The findings demonstrate how underreported the Syrian War and the actions of the key political players within it are. The findings have implications for the educational and informational duty of a public service broadcast, such as the one analyzed.
Key Words
Chapter 1 Introduction
Journalism: Who still trusts us? was the headline of an essay in one of the leading weekly German Papers Die Zeit last year.1 Above a picture with a handwritten banner saying Stop the war-propaganda, ARD, ZDF, Spiegel, Springer, Zeit, N24…lies.2 ARD, ZDF, Springer and the others mentioned are the leading and most important media organizations in Germany and accusations like that are no longer an exception, but the rule, especially since the start of the Syrian War in 2011. It has not just affected Syria and the countries around it, but also Germany, the U.S. and Russia. Combined, these three countries are key political players when it comes to foreign policy and decision making in regard to Syria and the war. All three are affected by the decisions of the other due to geopolitical strategies and have influence on foreign relations globally. How these countries influence foreign policy is therefore a big part of how the media frame the topics. The media influence the public and the public, as a part of democracy, influences policy. Consequently, if the accusations of German media spreading propaganda were right, it would threaten the democratic system.
1.1 War Propaganda today?
German quality media is in general regarded as following traditional journalism standards, such as balanced reporting or transparency. Hallin and Mancini (2004) place Germany in the democratic corporatist model which is distinguished by high professionalization, self-regulation and a state that provides press freedom, among other things. However, the German mass media are increasingly accused of being biased, by supporting the government´s view, and being mixed up with policy, by using officials as sources, for instance, and consequently no longer living up to the traditional standards (see Kocks, 2012; Lilienthal, 2012; Schimmeck, 2010). The mistrust does thereby not just refer to German mass media, but to mass media in general. Hence, it is not just a German media-problem, but can be placed in a broader picture (see Hardy, 2008; Castells, 2009; Brants and Voltmer, 2011).
Where does this mistrust come from? As van Zoonen (2012, p. 4) states: "Such complex articulations of general trust and specific distrust need to be seen in the context of wider social and cultural developments, specifically those related to ‘modernity’, ‘risk society’ and ‘fear
1
German: Journalismus: Wer vertraut uns noch? From http://www.zeit.de/2015/26/journalismus-medienkritik-luegenpresse-vertrauen-ukraine-krise, last accessed: 12.06.2016.
2
culture’." As a result, it can be anticipated that trust or distrust are at their highest in times of crisis or war, for example. Coincidentally, society is now facing crisis and war as these are omnipresent including the Syrian War and the prominence of terror across the world that comes with it. She continues saying that people do not just turn to themselves and away from media as source of knowledge, but that also "conspiracy theories offer an illusion of knowledge and control, of causal connections in a chaotic world and of clearly identifiable actors (Muslims, ‘the Left’, Jews) or institutions (Big Pharma, ‘the Government’) to blame" (van Zoonen, 2012, p. 5). The part that needs to be stressed here is the mention of government control. It is not only conspiracy theorists who refer to the influence of the government on media, but also scholars. For example, Bird and Dardenne (2009, p. 211) state that mainstream corporate media "appear to adopt official government narratives more than counter them." Those government narratives are at their highest in times of war as previous research and the example of the U.S. during the Gulf Wars have shown (see Kuyper, 2002; Kamalipour and Snow, 2004; Bennet et al., 2007). Nowadays the public knows that the American media under the Bush administration were used as a political tool back then (see Tumber, 2004; Kellner, 2004; Miller, 2004; Castells, 2009). They were controlled and restricted by the government and performed war propaganda. Also Russia´s media is state controlled (see Kuyper, 2002; Kamalipour and Snow, 2004; Amelina, 2006; Bennet et al., 2007). Still, these are not the sole countries having a history in government control over media and (war-)propaganda. Germany´s war propaganda during the Nazi-Regime was a whole new ball game (see Miller, 2004; Amelina, 2006; Ross, 2008; Zhao, 2012). To undertake research on this topic, it firstly must be explained what is considered war propaganda in general and how it was used in German and American history. This is elaborated in the theoretical framework.
a content analysis of the most influential German broadcast Tagesschau.
1.2 Research Case Tagesschau - One cannot escape the Frames
The research question guiding this paper is: How does the German news program Tagesschau frame the key political players in the Syrian War? The focus of the research is therefore not on the Syrian conflict or the refugees, but on the interventions of the key players within the war. Especially, the goal is to see how Germany portrays itself with, and in comparison to, the other nations, asking: How are Germany, the U.S. and Russia framed in terms of stereotyping and nationalism? It is expected this analysis will show a similar portrayal of Germany and the U.S., already through a quite similar democratic as well as media system, and a different one when it comes to Russia. The rational is explained in more detail later in this paper. As also sourcing practices play an important role when it comes to framing, but also in terms of propaganda, it asks further: What sources are being used in the Tagesschau? This paper compares Germany to the U.S. and Russia using a comparative approach, through the exposure of framing aspects, so differences and similarities can be identified (see Entman, 1991).
Framing describes the way news can be categorized into certain types, or frames. Studies have shown that these frames can influence how the audience perceives and thinks about topics. Meaning, through framing media offer an interpretation of reality and it is highly likely that the audience will adapt this interpretation. Consequently, framing has a significant impact on society and policy in general (see Entman 1991, 1993, 2009, 2010; McCombs, 2004, 2005). How exactly framing works is further explained in the first part of this paper to go on to a general overview of framing and war.
Specifically stereotyping and nationalism are highly influential frames when it comes to war or foreign reporting and crisis. What is more, sourcing practices are one of the main aspects that shape the outcome of the news The heavy reliance on government officials is essential as here the political agenda comes into play. Those were dominant in terms of recent wars in the U.S., be it the Vietnam one or the two Gulf Wars (see Kuyper, 2002; Kamalipour and Snow, 2004; Bennet et al., 2007). So is it the same case for German media?
further explains the choices made concerning the analysis. Broadcast news has been chosen as television is still the main source of information – 69% of the German public turn to it, according to a Forsa survey.3 Furthermore, "[t]elevision news, one opinion survey after the next indicated, proved to be the most used – and most trusted – news source for people in countries such as the U.S. and Britain during the Iraq War" (Allan and Zelizer, 2004, p. 6). What is more is that war coverage in general has become more compelling in broadcast, especially through the mix of visuals and words (see Allan, 1999; Wanke, 2012; Gerhards et al. 2011).
To make analysis feasible a cluster sample of the ARD Sunday evening news at 8 pm within the timeframe of December 2014 to December 2015 is used. During this year the refugee crisis, itself a result of the Syrian War, reached its peak and affected Germany the most, according to the Migratory routes map of Frontex.4
Even if research has explored news and the Syrian War from different approaches (see Pantti, 2013; Smit et al., 2015), there is no research yet that focuses specifically on the Tagesschau. The paper contributes to media understanding by analyzing how German media report about recent wars. It can be a start to fill the gap in research on recent war-reporting in German media. To do so, it firstly needs to be clarified what the Syrian War has been all about.
1.3 Background - The Syrian War
The Trigger of the Civil War in Syria was a peaceful protest in the course of the Arab Spring in 2011 that ended in an armed riot. The initial aim of the protest was to democratize Syria. According to Yassin-Kassab and Al Shami (2016) what was most remarkable is that the movement unified people across boundaries – be they ethnic, religious or sectarian boundaries. It was about applying political rights in general. However, in the end the democratization was not the topic anymore. It has been much more a fight of different religious and ethnic groups. During the fourth year of the war, it decomposed more and more in isolated centers of conflict.
What began as youths scrawling anti-regime grafts in Daraa has given way to a countrywide insurgency that pits regime loyalists against a hodgepodge of army defectors, volunteers, and committed jihadists. Parallel to this internal escalation, the convict has drawn in external actors, including both Syria’s
neighbors and extra-regional powers (Martini et al., 2013, p. 1).
For those extra-regional powers, the U.S., Germany and Russia play an important role. The direct participation of the Syrian allies in Iran with its Hezbollah militia, Russia with its military actions, and the formation of an Anti-IS coalition on behalf of the United States turned the civil war into a geopolitical issue and an over regional conflict (see Martini et al., 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al Shami, 2016).
According to the Österreichischer Rundfunk,5 400.000 people have died since the beginning of the war,6 while 11,6 million Syrians are on the run. The UN refugee agency says, the refugee crisis in 2014 has been the biggest since the genocide in Ruanda in 1990.7 This refugee crisis has affected Germany heavily. In February 2015 the numbers of refugees that came to Germany reached its peak – according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, more than one million.8 The debates in Germany about the refugees were immense. Not just among the government, but especially among the public. Due to this the Merkel government was increasingly criticized. Not just the number of refugees, but also the dissatisfaction on behalf of the public, were the perfect moment for the right wing party Alternative für Deutschland to gain influence and eventually rise, according to Kai Arzheimer, Professor of Political Science in Mainz. In relation to that the voices that criticized the media of being state controlled and spreading war propaganda became louder and louder.9 A big part of the mistrust discussion in Germany was
triggered by the accusations of the German media being a Lügenpresse10 in recent times. This
term is a political catchphrase that refers to a decrease of medial production and is used to disparage the mass media. The usage of the term reached its peak during World War II, when the agitators of the Nazi-regime used it to claim that the press is controlled through a Judaism of the world. It was consequently utilized as a part of anti-Semitic propaganda and by that as a part of framing the war (see Schmolke, 1971; Schmitz-Berning, 1998). During the last two years the term has been rekindled and it has been used increasingly with the rise of the right wing party Alternative für Deutschland and the demonstrations of PEGIDA, a right wing and anti-Islamic organization. They refer to the German news media as being state controlled and spreading lies to manipulate the public in terms of the Syrian War or the refugee-policy, to
5 Eng. ‘Austrian radio broadcasting’
6 http://orf.at//stories/2336759/, last accessed: 21.06.2016.
7 http://www.unhcr.org/559d67d46.html, last accessed 21.06. 2016.
8 http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/01/asylantraege-dezember-2015.html, last accessed:
21.06.2016.
name just a few examples.11 This research looks to elaborate and discuss the Lügenpresse problematic based on the analysis made.
Hence, the Syrian War and the involvement of the political players and the accusations of the German media being biased are directly intertwined.
What needs to be stressed though is that in the investigated timeframe, of December 2014 to December 2015, no direct military involvement of Germany took place. Talking about propaganda being necessary in war times: While the U.S. was directly involved in the two Gulf Wars, at the point in time the propaganda accusations were raised, Germany was not. Still, there was some involvement on behalf of Germany. German armed forces protected and monitored the Syrian airspace above the Syrian frontier from January 2013 to January 2016 as part of the NATO operation Active Fence. Furthermore, Germany was involved in the war through armament supply, that was officially stopped in May 2013. The German armed forces have since been directly committed in the Syrian War after the attacks on Paris in November 2015.12
In Summary, the U.S. and Germany contributed to armament supply at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, the U.S. conducted a war on terror like they did before in the Gulf Wars - not just because of the rise of the Islamic State (IS), but particularly by forming an Anti-IS-coalition. Coming to their Syrian policy, the U.S. as well as Germany stand against the Assad regime and therefore against the Russian Syrian policy. Russia supports the Syrian regime and by that the Syrian president Bashaar Al-Aassad due to its history and political involvement and participates actively through military actions in the war (see Martini et al., 2013).
Moreover, through IS and the refugee crisis, fear and emotions play an important role within the (European) societies. As shown by Castells (2009) propaganda has an easy match as soon as societies are guided by emotions. Particularly, when strong emotions come into play, people or societies are easier to influence. The fear of new terroristic attacks is quite high at the moment. If it is propagated that the only way to fight this fear is to increase the involvement in the Syrian War, society will rather support it than if emotions do not play a role. Still, to actually perform propaganda, framing is essential.
11 http://gfds.de/volksverraeter-und-luegenpresse-die-pegida-und-ihre-woerter/, last accessed: 29.04.2016.
12 http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw49-de-bundeswehreinsatz-isis-freitag/397884, last accessed:
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework
To answer the research question How does the German Tagesschau frame the key political players in the Syrian War? the theoretical framework is build on a mix of quantitative and qualitative content analysis using aspects of framing analysis, inspired by the work of Entman (1991, 2009, 2010) and McCombs (2004, 2005), to identify the way countries are framed and the degree to which stereotyping, national identity and sourcing practices might contribute to a propaganda-laden coverage of the war in Syria.
Propaganda in media would not just mean, that journalism does not fulfill its duty anymore, but that it is actually instrumentalized by the government. Still, what actually is the duty of journalism? One way to answer this question is the Fourth Estate Model. Hampton (2010) defines the Fourth Estate as a self-governed institution, independent from policy and government with the duty of a self-contained (political) education of society. He says (2010, p. 3) "whatever the formal constitution, genuine political power resides in the informal role of the press which in turn derives from the relationship of the press and its readers." This means, it is next to the executive, the legislative and the judiciary the fourth column for a functioning society. Even if the media do not have own power to change policy, they are there to educate and inform the people, so that media can influence policy through open debate and coverage, according to this model. Castells (2009, p. 194) says, the media are not just the Fourth Estate, but much more important than that. "[T]hey are the space of power making." This space is given in how a message is framed or what sources are being used in the coverage, for instance. He (2009, p. 194) continues, "[t]he media constitute the space where power relations are decided between competing political actors and social actors. Therefore, almost all actors and messages must go through the media in order to achieve the goals." However, the Fourth Estate model is an ideal and this ideal cannot live up to its own standards, particularly due to growing private media ownership or financial considerations within media organizations, to name just a very few examples (see Hampton, 2010). Actually, it should provide the public with balanced and non-biased information. This is particularly the role of public service media like the Tagesschau.
media is to trigger open debate about policy. Without information and education, a democracy cannot work. How shall people vote or know about their own rights or grievances within their society without getting information? Providing people with balanced information to contribute to political education is what public service media should be there for. Furthermore, those are financed by the public through taxes. This finance model ensures that the public service media are government free as well as not submitted to media and market mechanisms. Consequently, the formation of both individual and free opinion is essential for public service media. The leading principles are therefore independence, impartiality, diversity of opinions and balance. Hence, they have a duty distinguished by a cultural and societal broadcasting mandate that includes not just consumer interests, but an educational and informational mandate. All to give more room for political topics and the concentration on hard news especially in comparison to private media that often include infotainment or soft news (see Thussu, 2007; Gerhards et al., 2011). Accusations have been made that the ARD seems not to fulfill neither the role of the Fourth Estate nor the one of a public service broadcaster and is influenced by several factors. Particularly the way they frame has been criticized. Frames are essential in how to bring a message across as it gives the power to represent topics in a certain way, specifically when it comes to war-reporting. Meaning, as Castells (2009) states, through framing, specific aspects of a message or an event itself are highlighted. This highlighting activates certain mechanisms, like stereotypes or a preset belief-system, within the brain of the audience and leads consequently to a particular interpretation of reality. This is often called a window on the world (see Lippmann, 1957). It is always just a certain view or a certain interpretation of a message promoted through framing by news organizations. Consequently, other interpretations are always possible. This is particularly important in terms of alleged propaganda.
As the focus lies on the key political players in the Syrian War, the main question leads to the sub questions:
• What are the most frequent frames found in Tagesschau’s references to Germany, the U.S. and Russia in respect to stereotyping and nationalism in Syrian War coverage? • What are the sources used?
• Can traces of propaganda be found in news coverage?
This is further elaborated below. After doing so, a mix of quantitative and qualitative content analysis is applied to analyze framing in terms of stereotyping, nationalism and sources.
2.1 Framing
How news organizations use frames is not only important because they can set the agenda, and in doing so, influence what audiences think about, but also how they think about topics. This is especially important for the aim of this research (see McCombs, 2004, 2005; Entman, 2010). For Entman (1993, p. 52) "[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." Consequently, framing is how news are represented.
This research is thereby focused on the sociological tradition of framing analysis that deals with the outcome of the news work. As media scholars have found, by applying framing analysis, news are never a mirror of reality (see McCombs 2004, 2005; Strömbäck et al., 2008; Hanusch, 2009; Entman, 2010). The way news is framed by media organizations is influenced by different factors which all contribute to the outcome of it. Different influences lead to different interpretations of topics. Different interpretations mean, different reflections of reality. One comprehensive mirroring of reality is therefore simply not possible. These influences are not just financial considerations, but particularly newsroom routines like journalistic values, norms and newsgathering practices. Also the need to find proper sources under time pressure needs to be taken into account (see Strömbäck et al., 2008). As Reese (2004, p. 247) puts it: "These “routinized frames” are revealed through the recurring combination of visual and verbal elements within media coverage, showing what organizing principles are at work in the decisions of news managers and news sources." Therefore, routinized frames cannot just show the routines within the newsroom, but also within a society and by that the ideology of a society. Still, it is a mutual influence between frames and news workers.
certain interpretation is promoted "often along with a moral judgment that provides an emotional charge. Repeating frames over time in multiple texts gives a politically significant proportion of the citizenry a chance to notice, understand, store and recall the mental association for future application.”
The more an issue is framed by media organizations in a certain way, the more we accept it as an interpretation of reality and finally adapt this perception of reality. This means that framing influences how people view certain issues and by that the society and the belief-system of the respective society (see Gorham, 1999; Kuypers, 2002; Entman 2009, 2010). As the public and their belief-system influence policy in turn, the way news organizations frame stories can also be a political tool. This is of importance for the power elites. Even if the press is responsible for the framing, the agenda is set by those in power (Bennet et al., 2007). How is this even possible?
Often the government is the only information source available in terms of war reporting and crisis and has by that a great power to set the agenda in the first place. Sourcing practices and the availability of sources or the access to information in general are the key words here. The access to government officials is not only often the easiest way to gather information, but they are also often the only ones who have information at all. As again working routines and time pressure play an important role for how news organizations frame, generally journalists do not have any other option than using official sources.
the case in this thesis: "[O]nce the “war on terror” frame became well established in the media, it was highly risky for the second-tier political elites to counteract it with their statements and votes." Public opinion and political elections are mutually dependent: Especially in the U.S., Schudson (2003, p. 159) adds: "[F]oreign policy decisions are often made in interaction with public opinion. Officials have to consider how their actions will be viewed by the public." Still, how can framing as a political tool turn into propaganda laden war-coverage?
2.1.1 Framing, War and Propaganda
Fighting a war implicates the need for ties between citizens and soldiers or citizens and the government automatically. As Schlechter (2004, p. 25) puts it: "There is a need for popular mobilization and media support. Motivating, managing, massaging, and feeding the media is a key strategic imperative to build and sustain a consensus behind any war policy." In order to build this consensus, propaganda and media support are necessary and they are not new in war. "It has been a staple of every conflict, a tool that governments deploy to demonize their enemies and mobilize their nations" (Schlechter, 2004, p. 25). However, what exactly is propaganda?
In general propaganda is the dissemination of ideological ideas and opinions to influence the public in a particular direction, according to its definition (see Zaharna, 2009).
Herman and Chomsky (1988, 2002) developed a propaganda model which explains the phenomena in relation to the power of society elites. They base their research on American mass media with the focus on developing a model that shows that mass media act in the interest of power elites through propaganda. Included in this model are the so called news filters which influence content, including "concentrated ownership (…), advertising as the primary income source, the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business and “experts” (…), flak as a means of disciplining the media" (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 2), as well as anticommunism. One example of their findings is the unbalanced coverage of the genocides of Cambodia and Indonesia in the end of the 1970s. While the communist Cambodia was heavily reported, the Indonesian genocide had little coverage. Herman and Chomsky relate this back to the fact that Indonesia was an important political and economic partner for the U.S., while the communist Cambodia was seen as a political opponent. According to their findings and the model, the interests of power and political elites play an important role in terms of media coverage as shown by the example.
powerful sources or the “buying out” of individual media and/or journalists by government authorities." Not all of those aspects can be researched here, but particularly the sourcing practices and the ideologies, shown by the use of stereotyping and nationalism, are essential for this paper.
Another definition of propaganda is given by Castells (2009, p. 264). He says propaganda is "(a) the fabrication and diffusion of messages that distort facts and induce misinformation for the purpose of advancing government’s interests; and (b) the censorship of any message deemed to undermine these interests, if necessary by criminalizing unhindered communication and prosecuting the messenger." Here again the focus lies on government control of the media and power elites that shape the outcome of the news.
When it comes to media practices today, the question arises: Where does propaganda start and when does a journalist just work within his usual work and societies normative standards? Allan (1999, p. 60) states, that "[t]he propagandist, unlike the journalist under ordinary circumstances, sets out with the deliberate intention of deceiving the public, of concealing ‘the truth’ so as to direct public opinion in a particular way through manipulative tactics, devices and strategies." Even if journalism can reflect elements of propaganda, particularly through government control, the aim of the propagandist is a different one: Persuading and compelling the society in a default direction. Like it was the case in German history, where also government control was played out to its fullest.
2.1.1.1 Framing, War and Propaganda in German History
The year 1890 was essential for the development of propaganda efforts in Germany. With the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of the German empire, the Foreign Ministry attempted to centralize the foreign press relations and became more interested in controlling the media and by that in propaganda, according to Ross (2008). With the beginning of World War I, press freedom was restricted and censorship was implemented already. Journalists were not allowed to report about both sides or cover the war directly from the front, for instance.
Germans could not keep up with the allies in terms of propaganda at that point in time. Dominikowski (1993) describes how Great Britain and France were using propaganda to demonize the Germans during World War I. They claimed for example, German soldiers ate Belgian children. Through this demonization the British and French ensured support from their nations to fight the Germans. By being affected by the propaganda of the allies, Germany realized the importance of propaganda during war times in the first place.
The press restrictions and the first hand experiences of the Germans were the beginning of a professionalization of propaganda and media control. However, it was only in the beginning of World War II when the propaganda in Germany made a significant step away from what it was in the nineteenth century, distinguished as panoptical and disciplinary forms of governance, to a whole new ball game: A mechanism of persuasion and seduction (see Kohlmann-Viand, 1991; Ross, 2008). Already in Mein Kampf Adolf Hitler said it is necessary to control the masses through propaganda (see Kohlmann-Viand, 1991).
What is more is that policy as well as science have started to understand the importance of propaganda and by that the importance to study it to pursue the public in favor of the government’s will (see Ross, 2008). From the 1920s on, and previously through the experiences of World War I, psychology studies concerning propaganda had started to develop (see Bussemer, 2008). The most important propaganda theorist in the 1920s Johann Plenge:
saw the key to understanding human nature in the insights of mass psychology. Accordingly, he laid particular emphasis on the communicative power of visual symbols (‘the sign infused with meaning’) which, like the stereotypes simultaneously described by Walter Lippmann, were capable of conveying complex messages in concentrated form and ‘enabling the entire meaning to emerge within the inner experience of the observer’ (Ross, 2008, p. 219).
Meaning, stereotyping and propaganda are deeply intertwined, as the example of the representation of the Jews leading up to World War II has shown.
concerning the Third Reich policy, but also the national reconstruction of Germany as a Fatherland was controlled. Not only were press restrictions included, but everything concerning culture and society. The whole point was not solely about managing public opinion, but about unifying the nation behind the governments leadership. Consequently, building a coherent picture of a nation is crucial to propagate support for a government. That is why "[f]rom the very beginning of the Nazi regime, the mass media played a central role in the attempt to replace the competing class, regional, and religious loyalties in Germany with a new sense of ‘national community’" (Ross, 2008, p. 302). This began with the selection of journalists on behalf of the Ministry (see Kohlmann-Viand, 1991) and went on to the Nazi Press law from 1933 to manage public opinion.
This press law stated "that journalists must ‘regulate their work in accordance with National socialism as philosophy of life and as conception of government’” (Miller, 2004, p. 13). Joseph Goebbels, head of the Ministry of Propaganda, perfected the war reporting and propaganda to a whole information management then. Newest media technologies like audio and film contributed to a professional looking war reporting. "At base, modern propaganda techniques sought to enable elites to exercise rational leadership without openly breaching the principles of democratic sovereignty" (Ross, 2008, p. 223). To do so, radicals invented a new vocabulary, including iconography and rituals, to ensure the support of the nation, disregard the allies, and attract attention in general. By using the same stereotypes and visual metaphors all over again, they used the same techniques as tabloids use nowadays. "This was, in short, political propaganda designed for a mass public that had become accustomed to the attention-grabbing techniques of modern media spectacle" (Ross, 2008, p. 235).
The control of mass media, and by that framing, was therefore the main tool to perform propaganda. The entertainment industry and the massive cinema production and development belonged to the whole media control. All in favor of the war and the Nazi regime. All in line with the messages the society was allowed to consume.
a war weapon. The newest and most modern instrument was thereby the radio which was extensively used to influence the masses (see Kohlmann-Viand, 1991). Even if the radio and the newspaper should both be used as instruments of the political-national public guidance, the radio would come first. What the radio was back then in terms of influence, television is today (see Thussu, 2007).
2.1.1.2 Framing, War and Propaganda in recent Cases in the U.S.
Even if the Iraq War is seen as the first proper media war, where media were actively used to get support for it, the Vietnam War is known as the first war on television as here the event was covered, through and by the new medium television, for the very first time (see Cumings, 1992; Dominikowski, 1993; Kellner, 2004). During the Vietnam War, the audience turned against the U.S. government due to the coverage of the daily life of dying in My Lai. To avoid this in the future, the U.S. government has changed its strategies in how to handle the media during war times afterwards (see Dominikowski, 1993).
Tumber (2004, p. 190) says: "Ever since the Vietnam War, governments and the military had experimented with different methods of “controlling” and “managing” the media." Journalists were misinformed or given wrong information particularly from the U.S. government, for instance (see Allan, 1999). However, even if media control has started during Vietnam, the whole propaganda machinery in the U.S., was fully played out during the two Gulf Wars.
In the first Gulf War in 1991 "the Bush administration and the Pentagon carried out one of the most successful public relations campaigns in the history of modern politics in its use of the media to mobilize support for the war" (Kellner, 2004, p. 136.). Castells (2009, p. 265) describes the Iraq War as "a textbook case of political propaganda." It included not just wrong information from official sources, but also monitoring the media as well as direct U.S. government intervention.
information turns into a weapon and "the integration of propaganda and media institutions into the war machine. The experience of Iraq in 2003 shows how the planned integration of the media into instruments of war fighting is developing" (Miller, 2004, pp. 8).
As CNN was dominant in the global coverage of the Iraq War, they also tended to shape the general global coverage and by that how the war was framed. Not just the fact that the U.S. media are commercial and through that the subject of competition for audiences and profits, but also the fact that especially mainstream media tend to favor official sources during crisis, contributed to the influence of the government. But it was more than that:
The Bush administration controlled the media discourse in part through disinformation and propaganda and in part by means of control of the press via the pool system. A military pool system was set up which restricted media access to soldiers and the battlefield; members representing different media like the press, radio, and television were organized into “pools” and taken to chosen sites (Kellner, 2004, p. 137). The Bush Administration did not only make sure that reporting in favor of the government took place, but it was also the tightest control of the press in recent times. Additional to constant misinformation, the Bush administration set up a PR campaign by the U.S, public relations firm Hill and Knowlton "which invented Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait, such as the killing of premature babies who were allegedly taken out of incubators and left to die on the floor" (Kellner, 2004, p. 142). This story was testified under tears by a 15-year-old teenage girl. The campaign mobilized military action and support for the war once more. However, the story was fabricated and the girl, the daughter of the Kuwait ambassador to the U.S., was trained by Hill and Knowlton beforehand – something the audience could not have known when the story was broken.
When military actions began, "[t]elevision served primarily as a propaganda apparatus for the multinational forces arrayed against the Iraqis and as a cheerleader for their every victory" (Kellner, 2004, p. 144). Television was therefore particularly important for the Bush administration’s war propaganda due to its compelling influence on audiences.
message control is propaganda. The embedding found expression in the over average use of words like we and us in the media coverage (see Allan and Zelizer, 2004). The usage of nationalism and identity-formation, and by that framing in favor of the government, needs to be stressed here.
In general, mass media often follow the lead of their government and "are frequently more willing accomplices in wartime propaganda than they care to admit, and may even play a significant part in instigating conflict" (Schlechter, 2004, p. 25). Research has shown that particularly during crisis and war "the media coverage tended to support the foreign policy interests of the media organization’s home government (…)" (Nikolaev, 2016, p. 109). Framing that supports the government happens thereby especially through sourcing practices, stereotyping and nationalism. So what about stereotyping and nationalism concerning the three countries this research investigates on? In order to put Germany, the U.S. and Russia in relation, a look at their history is necessary.
2.1.2 The Relation of German, American and Russian Nationalism
Medvedev and Neumann (2012) state that the German-Russian-Identity is one of the key narratives for the Other. The Other is meant as the distinction between us and them. In terms of nationalism, it is the distinction between one nation and another one that differentiates them to whatever extent. Depicting the Other does not just help to distinct between the own country and the other more easily, but also to legitimize and underline how foreign countries are represented. What is more is that through a particular representation a legitimatization of, for instance, political actions takes place.
Political decisions and considerations on behalf of the Americans contributed to this. "By acting as an American partner, a grateful Germany might make up for economic or military limitations of U.S. power, engaged elsewhere in the world and hamstrung by domestic discontent. This wider framing helped to change perceptions of Germany from a past problem to a potential solution, thereby paving the way for American approval of unity" (Jarusch, 1997, p. 339). Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt (1997, p. 1) state: "The last century of German and American relations has witnessed a close relationship emerging from the great antagonism between the two powers during the era of the world wars."
Especially after World War II the images of the Americans towards the Germans changed in the sense that Germany, particularly in connection to Russia and the European policy, is seen as the crux of Europe. "On the one hand, there were deep suspicions of a German otherness that had provided the dark counterfoil to liberal democracy in the twentieth century, on the other hand there was also much pride in American remaking of the Germans as trustworthy democrats after 1945" (Jarusch, 1997, p. 337). Consequently, through history the American-German perception and relationship has changed from a Them to an Us. While Germany´s otherness was altered, the Russian one still remains the same.
Already America’s and Russia’s completely different political systems after World War II and the ideologies that come with communism or capitalism led to a distinction between Them and Us (see Gibert, 1977). Even if Russia is regarded as a democratic system due to the fact that the president is elected for instance, it is more seen as a dictatorship and stands through this against the values of a Western democracy. Western societies in general identify themselves through the distinction with Non-Western societies (see Benda, 1999). This means stereotypes and nationalism could be used to sketch a negative picture of that other country to clarify the distinction between Them and Us once more. Gibert (1977, pp. 11) adds another factor which distinguishes the Russian-American relation: "What to do about the Soviets is now and has been since World War II the dominant question in U.S. national security policy; (…) The reason for the criticality of superpower relations is simple: only the Soviet Union has the capability to destroy the United States and vice versa." Still, there is more to add. In terms of the Syrian War there is an additional dynamic of Them vs. Us due to the different political agendas. While Russia supports the Assad regime, Germany and the U.S. are against it (see Martini et al., 2013).
also acts as a mediator between Russia and America. The American Cord Meyer (1969, p. 51), reviewing American images on Germany, wrote back in 1960, that "[c]ontemporary German foreign relationships are intertwined with our own. But mark the change since 1945: there we focused upon a German problem with Russian variations; today we have our conflict with Russia, and Germany is the most important factor in the European engagement with global communism." What was said back then, still remains today and can be seen on the countries’ nationalism-representation.
2.1.2.1 Framing War and Nationalism
The most important concepts on nationalism have been firstly developed by Bourdieu (1991) and Anderson (1991) and refined by Billig (1995). Billig (1995, p. 83) says, "if ‘our’ nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation among other nations." This means the national we cannot be existent without the foreign other to be "part of the imagined universal code of nationhood." So what does that mean? According to Bourdieu (1991, p. 224), "reality, (…), is social through and through" and identity is a social construct. Anderson (1991, p. 6) defines the nation as "an imagined political community. (…) It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community." Hence, the distinction between Them and Us is a made distinction which is constantly in negotiation. By defining the nation as a construction and constructor of collective identity, common identities can be created. Consequently, by defining Us, you can define Them (see Bourdieu, 1991; Medvedev and Neumann, 2012). Riggins (1997, p. 5) states: "The public that so fervently distinguishes between Self and Other rarely realizes the illusory nature of the opposition. “The Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me,” Sartre (1965) writes. “I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being” (pp.189-190)." Billig (1995, p. 10) adds nationalism is not a "form of identity among countless others. (…) it is a way of thinking or ideological consciousness. In this consciousness, nations and national identities and national homelands appear as ‘natural’."
those representations are recalling illustrations of nationalism nearly subconsciously through repetition and their subliminal nature (see Billig, 1995). By repeating narratives of nationalism, identity is shared and constructed through symbols such as myths and legends, but also through language or the political system. Based on that a definition of identity and a reality of that identity are constructed (see Schirmer 1998; Benda 1999).
Hence, the banal nationalism is not about an extreme form of nationalism but much more about the everyday, prevalent one. Billig (1995) argues that through its hidden nature the banal nationalism is a powerful tool to reinforce ideology and identity and by that the distinction to the Other. It is a particularly powerful political tool as it remains unchallenged and undiscovered.
The nation "frames nationalism as a doctrine, ideology, or belief system that is structured by the social conditions and the cultural resources of modern society and, at the same time, is structuring nation as the subject if the preeminent form of modern political integration" (Schirmer, 1998, p. xx). Meaning, by sharing the same culture, the individual belongs to a group which is in the end forming the nation.
For the imagined community and by that the definition of identity, media play a crucial role, as Anderson (1991) states. He says, nations are cultural artifacts which are created by the novel and the newspaper as vehicle towards the end of the 18th century in Europe. Media offer the
platform for the imagined community. For example, by consuming the same news with the same content, people belong to this community. Thereby, the confined borders of the nation are the determinants of the newspaper. Also Billig (1995) points out that news plays a crucial role in repeating nationalism. Expressions such as the president or "our boys" (Billig, 1995, p. 126) divide news into home and foreign ones.
Therefore, the press produces cultural products drawing upon "the imagined community of its readers" (Conboy, 2006, p. 47). Consequently, cultural ideologies are being transported through media texts. Media is the vehicle to spread, confirm or contest identity constructs and has "the capability to emphasize the significance of certain issues while downplaying others" (Major and Coleman, 2008, p. 318). Again, media imparts a certain interpretation of reality through framing and has by that the power to influence the audience in perceiving messages, stereotypes or nationalism.
print constructs reality. The reader, the newspaper and the community build a syntax of solidarity which is shown by an exclusion and inclusion in the nation. Every reader within the nation will understand the media context and will also feel included in that nation. Consequently, community can be constructed by the instantaneity of the press. Still, it does not just count for the reader, but also for the viewer or any other kind of mass media consumer. "Nevertheless, collective identities are an indispensable part of the formation of individual identities, insofar as they locate an individual´s place in the social space" (Schirmer, 1998, p. xxiv).
It is again about being in a cultural context which can be understood by everyone, who is part of this context and, by that, part of the nation. As mentioned above, nationalism is highly used in framing war and performing propaganda, but also in foreign reporting practices, according to Hallin (1991), who researched on American and Russian stereotyping and nationalism. By constructing the Other, we can also better define ourselves. Peterson (2013, p. 14) adds: "When depicting the Other as not being up to the standards of one’s own group, the image of the Self is boosted as virtuous and good."
America’s media are an example here. The "official policy resulted, at least in part, from the adoption of a conflict perspective in which the United States and Russia were seen as polarized forces", according to Wasburn and Ruth Burke (1997, p. 669). What is more,
[i]n the case of American mythologies about Russia, the ideological intent of representing Russia as America’s “eternally dangerous other” is naturalized as historically contingent, and constructed events are translated into essential — eternal — elements of Russian character. In this process, representations of Russia as dangerous, backwards, or morally corrupt lose their ideological baggage and come to be seen as simple statements of fact. Importantly, these representations become not merely facts, but are also presented as justifiable and objective reasons for ideologically based public policies and positions (Honey, 2013, p. 17).
Here the connection of stereotyping and nationalism can be seen. The Other, nationalism, identity and stereotyping are highly interconnected and are again the main factors, next to sourcing, in order to deliver support for the own government in times of war and crisis and policy in general.
H1: Germany and the U.S. are represented as Us, against Russia represented as Them.
Talking about them and us, Bignell and Orlebar (2005, p. 107) state that especially images contribute to identification. "Reflecting the nation means representing both what is considered normal and ordinary as well as what is deviant and exceptional" and particularly visuals are highly influential here. Cumings (1992) adds that television creates a community in the same sense as Anderson talks about the imagined community. Still, television is able to create more than just a community and by that nationalism. It has also the highest media capability in recalling stereotypes.
2.1.2.2 The Connection of Stereotyping- and Nationalism-Frames
When it comes to stereotyping, one can distinguish between the Self and the Other through a cognitive simplification (see Hallin, 1991). Meaning: We can make sense of the Self and the Other through simplification, basically by organizing and constructing new knowledge around prior knowledge in schemata. The schemata on the other hand help us to understand stereotypes. From those stereotypes develops the distinction between Us and Them or the Self and the Other. For example, the totalitarian communist Russia is defined in distinction to the neoliberal Germany. What comes with the communist system are characteristics like dangerous or backwards which stand against a progressive and liberal Germany. Consequently, if we hear communism, the brain will recall a schema that is charged with characteristics like danger. We automatically stereotype communism as dangerous and as we also automatically make a distinction between the dangerous them and the good us, we distinguish between the Other and the Self eventually.
Consequently, through using stereotypes, we are part of a group and can distinguish between them and us then. In the end, stereotyping leads to nationalism as an identification process (see Brass, 1991).
That could also be seen on the war on terror and the framing consequences in the U.S. Castells (2009) says there were two frames activated to mobilize Americans in support of the Iraq War. Next to the war on terror it was the patriotism frame and by that the activation of nationalism which triggered support. Furthermore, nationalism is especially visible during war times, like the example of the Vietnam War showed. Several studies investigated that "(…) the familiar tenets of ‘objectivity’ were recurrently recast in favor of a ‘patriotic’ reportorial stance" (Allan, 1999, p. 172). Those examples cannot only be found during the Vietnam War. Billig (1995, p. 56) adds that during every war nationalism does not just get visible, but turns from "over-heated nationalism" to "warm glow of patriotism". Consequently, nationalism has never been away, but the perception of people changes in the sense that nationalism and support for the own country are allowed and accepted during war times. He especially refers to the Gulf War and the Falkland War, where "[p]rotagonists were not fighting on behalf of God or a political ideology. They claimed, on both sides, to be fighting for rightful nationhood" (Billig, 1995, p. 3). To implement this rightful nationhood in the first place, stereotypes are essential.
2.1.3 Framing War and Stereotyping
German history has shown that the concepts of portraying and stereotyping are one of the main aspects of war-reporting, but they are not alone on this. Not just the demonization of the Germans as the evil on behalf of the French and the British during World War I, but also the war on terror frame in U.S. media are examples here. There stereotypes like the Muslim as the evil terrorist were common, for instance. However, stereotypes are not only used during war times, but in foreign reporting practices in general (see Gade and Ferman, 2012). They help to explain and make sense of the foreign country mostly in distinction to the known own. Still, how does stereotyping work?
by what we learn from other people" (Gorham, 1999, p. 231). Framing operates with those pictures "by leaving gaps in the information that the audience fills with their preconceived schemas: These are the interpretive processes in the human mind based on connected ideas and feelings stored in the memories" (Castells, 2009, p. 158).
How we simplify reality and construct and organize our prior knowledge in schemata was developed by Fiske and Taylor (1987) and Graber (1988). Fiske and Taylor (1987, p. 140) state: "A schema is a cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given concept or stimulus." Schemata are therefore organized around prior knowledge or experiences and connected to "attributes of the concept and the relationships among the attributes." Graber (1988) adds, those schemas help to classify and manage new knowledge or information around the old one. It is also referred to schemas as commonsense or stereotypical models of the world. Basically, the schemas, and belief-systems which come with it, are set in a person´s mind through the (cultural) environment a person is brought up in (see Holsti, 1976).
That does not mean that stereotypical models are all negative in general. First of all, we need stereotypes to manage new information. Furthermore, through stereotyping not just exclusion from a group but also inclusion in a social group takes place (see Gorham, 1999; Czopp et al., 2015). Through that it helps to understand "social relations in the society at large, as well as signify the power relations within a society" (Gorham, 1999, p. 231).
However, not all negative, does not mean all positive. "[M]uch of what we ‘know’ about the world comes from agreeing with other people that a particular fact is ‘true.’ And since it is these images of the world on which people base their behavior, and not necessarily any ‘objective reality,’ the possibility for serious media-based consequences is great" (Gorham, 1999, pp. 231). Particularly as, according to Castells (2009, p. 169), "[i]t appears that information per se does not alter attitudes unless there is an extraordinary level of cognitive dissonance. This is because people select information according to their cognitive frames." Meaning: New information need to fit already existing frames or schemata to be understandable. If the information does not fit any existing schema, it will not necessarily change our perception about an issue. As also journalists are part of the society and the cultural environment, they will use the frames that fit the ideology of the specific community in the first place, too (see Hanusch, 2009). Doing so, media and media workers have the power to let audiences see particular issues in a certain way via framing.
disagreement with the war that can ultimately influence political decision makings. "Naturally, the belief system is not neutral; it finds it easier to accept political communications which confirm existing notions of reality and is less inclined to accept information which contradicts or requires the modification of existing images of the world" (Gibert, 1977, p. 3). Stereotyping is consequently crucial for the influence on policy. What is more is that as soon as stereotypes are used over and over again in media coverage, the audience will see the foreign or even their own country in the way media frames it.
Especially the factors of proximity or cultural and political differences need to be taken into account when it comes to stereotyping – not just to expose differences, but also similarities (see Saad-Heller, 2000).
What does that mean for this research? As TV offers the highest authenticity possible, through the connection of images and audio, when it comes to media (see Ritscher et al., 1981; Wanke, 2013), distance between events and the audience is eliminated. The effect of stereotyping is consequently higher. Castells (2009, p. 156) states, according to a study of Graber (2007): "News (particularly images) can operate as sources of stimuli equivalent to lived experience." Consequently, particularly broadcast can play out on the stereotypes that are set in a culture and society.
Germany and the U.S. have a similar culture and by that similar values and views, not just due to their history as mentioned above, but due to a quite similar democratic and media system and by that a quite similar belief-system, especially in comparison to present day Russia (see Vartanova, 2012). Even if Germany has a parliamentary system and the U.S. a presidential system, the democratic values are comparable (see Lösche, 2008).
both stand for balanced and unbiased reporting in terms of policy. In the end, and this is important for the aim of this research, the journalism standards and ideologies are similar. As the media system and the political system are deeply intertwined, the same society-values are supported. Those values are applied to the foreign policy and particularly to the policy regarding the Syrian War – especially as both countries follow the same political line: Germany and the U.S. stand against the Assad-Regime. Compared is therefore how the Syrian War policy of those both countries is represented, particularly by contrasting Russia. Can all that be seen in how Germany and America are stereotyped in the Tagesschau? That leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: Germany and the U.S. are stereotyped in a positive way and similarly.
Already due to the German, American and Russian history after World War II, which is explained in the nationalism-chapter, Russia always seems to play the antagonist-role (see Golubev, 2013; Malinova, 2013). Russia did not just differ from the other two countries through their communist system in the past, excluding East Germany, but also today. The Russian democratic system is more seen as a dictatorship and stands through that against the values of a Western democracy.
As Russia supports the Assad regime, it seems to stand against the German-American political decision making and is threatening the decisional power and by that the attempts to stabilize the political situation in Syria and consequently the way out of the war. That leads to the question: How Russia is framed in terms of stereotyping within the Tagesschau.
In respect to Russia, politicians such as Gerhard Schröder or Klaus von Dohnanyi raised their voices for a fairer treatment of Russia in politics, media and society, as well as journalists such as Gabriele Krone-Schmalz or Peter Scholl-Latour.13 Those say that there will not be any balanced reporting, especially if the topic challenges the political discourse of the German government. But those accusations are problematic, as the named people are generally regarded as Pro-Russian-biased or even anti-governmental. However, what is more is that also 44% of the public believes that the Germans consciously convey a negative image of Russia, according
13 http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/politische-literatur/gabriele-krone-schmalz-die- russlandversteherin/11418230.html, or http://www.tagesspiegel.de/weltspiegel/interview-mit-peter-scholl-latour- scholl- latour-ueber-die-krise-in-der-ukraine-und-edward-snowden/9652136-2.html, last accessed 03.06.2016.
to polls from 2007 (see Bläser, 2014).
Golubev (2013), researching on stereotypes and foreign policy in connection to Russia, states that when it comes to crisis, stereotypes are recalled in general. But when it comes to crisis- reporting and Russia, Cold War stereotypes or even stereotypes from earlier times are recalled. Honey (2013, p. 13), researching on the representation of the Russian Anna Chapmans in American papers, adds: "The constructions of contemporary myths about Russia derive in part from a history of the successful application of anticommunism in the consolidation of neoliberalism as an American ideal during the Cold War." Neoliberalism and by that anticommunism are seen as the natural political system, including characteristics such as being liberal, moral and patriotic. In contrast, the communism system pertained as an atheist totalitarian system (see Honey, 2013).
Furthermore, Taras (2013, pp. 1) relates the images and perceptions of Russia, from and in foreign policy, to images of power: "More emotive terms have been used in the West to construct images of Russia’s power. Imperialism, expansion, and revanchism are commonly used concepts." While Imperialism stands for the economic and political influence on other countries up to their submission, revanchism is a policy with the goal to reconquer a country that was lost during war. "Security threat, grand strategy or design, resurgence, destabilizing actor, and ambition are additional terms employed to convey the Kremlin’s appetite for power." Wasburg and Ruth Burke (1997, p. 671.) add: "While media analysts tended to agree that subsequent world events could no longer be signified by the cold-war news frame, there was no consensus among them concerning the future of news making." Basically, Cold War perspectives and frames have still been used in journalism in general after the Cold War era, even if some research indicates the opposite (see Wasburg and Ruth Burke, 1997). That leads to the third hypothesis:
H3: Russia is stereotyped in terms of Cold War frames and, by that, as a threat for a functioning German-American policy in respect of the Syrian War.
opposition to an anticommunist one, it does not reflect the values neither of liberalism nor of free market capitalism. By reconstructing those schemata and myths, and through that the reframing of Russia in Cold War terms all over again, the vision of Russia still remains the same.
The findings coming out of one of the three hypotheses might not be solely valuable, but in connection, they show how the Tagesschau frames the key political players in the Syrian War. After doing the first step in analyzing the stereotype- and nationalism-frames, the next one is to research the sourcing practices to provide a more coherent picture of the framing practices of the Tagesschau. Furthermore, it also shows, whether there is one-sided reporting which could lead to wrong facts and traces of war propaganda.
2.1.4 Framing and Sourcing Practices
To carry out research on sourcing practices, the work of Schudson (2003) and Manning (2001) build the foundation. Schudson (2003, p. 134) states, that "[t]o understand news we have to understand who the “someones” are who act as sources, and how journalists deal with them. (…) News represent who are the authorized knowers and what are their authorized versions of reality." How a message is designed is therefore highly influenced by the sources. Consequently, the depiction of a certain interpretation, and by that the shown reality of a topic, is shaped by the selection of sources.
