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Incumbent Exploratory Innovation:

Engaging with Startups Using Corporate Accelerators

Bram Beks

S2415321

MSc Business Administration – Strategic Innovation Management

University of Groningen

Master thesis

Final Version

23rd of June 2019

Word count: 13123

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ABSTRACT

Incumbents are increasingly crossing their organizational boundaries using corporate accelerators to access novel innovations from startups. However, the differences in size and structure between them make collaborations a challenge, while these innovations provide opportunities for incumbents to engage in exploratory innovation. This study provides an integrative theoretical model of incumbents’ strategies to search, evaluate and acquire external knowledge from startups. The programs are designed to function as interfaces, where incumbents are using innovation platforms to actively search and evaluate propositions from startups. The startups can respond to challenges set by the incumbents. Once submitted, the startups propositions are mutually developed using an open innovation approach via multiple acceleration phases. The structure allows for a wide search scope, promotes experimentation with novel knowledge and explorative innovation. Which in turn can increase the overall internal motivation to innovate for the incumbent. However, important success factors are the perceived innovativeness of the incumbent firm, the internal motivation to innovate and support from key stakeholders for continuity in programs and the resulting engagements.

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1.INTRODUCTION

Radical innovation can disrupt competitive landscapes and shift positions of leadership from incumbents (well-established corporates) to new entrants such as startups. These innovations create new market opportunities, but simultaneously transform demand in markets in which incumbents are active. This transformation may pose a threat to the current market strategy of such incumbents (Schumpeter, 1942; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Internal forces such as inertia, bureaucracy and established commitments may induce incumbent firms to be less responsive to threats and change. Conversely, different economic incentives enable startups to be more creative, risk oriented and responsive compared to incumbents (Chesbrough, 2006; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Chandy and Tellis, 2000; O’Conner & DeMartino, 2006). Thus, radical innovations, albeit crucial for both organizational and economic growth, continuously challenge incumbent’s business models and technologies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003).

Contemporary literature on innovation highlights the benefits of external sources of knowledge for a firm’s innovative performance. By crossing their organizational boundaries, incumbent firms can access ideas, information and knowledge. This increases the efficiency of their innovation endeavors (Chesbrough, 2006, Laursen and Salter, 2006; West & Bogers, 2014). Incumbents increasingly make efforts to reach out to the entrepreneurial innovation ecosystem. Hinting the possibility that these are sourcing innovative knowledge increasingly through startups. Alongside established forms of incumbent-startup engagement a new form is established: corporate accelerators. This form enables corporates to obtain external knowledge from selected startups. (Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; Mallette & Goddard, 2018).

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Despite growing body of literature on corporate-startup collaborations, most scholars have focused on outcomes for startups (Cohen, Fehder, Hochberg and Murray,2019; Scott, Shu and Lubynsky, 2015) and success factors of the outcomes for corporates (Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman, 2012; Wise and Valliere 2014; Kohler 2016). Connecting with startups is a potential low-cost manner of external knowledge acquisition for incumbents (Hathaway, 2016; Prashantham, 2019). From current literature on accelerators, the elements of what constitutes an accelerator program are known (Kohler, 2016; Cohen et. al, 2019). On the other hand, it remains unclear how incumbents find the “right’ startups to innovate more efficiently via these corporate accelerator programs.

Thus, the objective of this study is to develop a deeper understanding of startup-incumbent engagement via corporate accelerator programs. Furthermore, the paper aims to seek further understanding of how this engagement fits within an open innovation paradigm. A comparative multiple case study design is chosen, which provides an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of startup-incumbent engagement (Yin, 2013). Herewith, this paper seeks to answer the following research question:

“How do incumbent firms search, select and acquire knowledge from startups for their open corporate accelerator programs to foster explorative innovation?”

By studying three different corporate accelerator programs in three different industries. This study finds that incumbents search for market ready startups, which are specifically chosen for their fit with the organization. The corporate accelerator program settings allow for experimentation, risk taking and an internal motivation to innovate. Access to market ready solutions and the program settings provide opportunities to shorten the innovation cycle and promote explorative innovation. Furthermore, incumbents are adapting the programs as interfaces to interact with the startups, which facilitates the embeddedness of the incumbent in the startup ecosystem. Lastly, programs are used to innovate in the core business. Therefore, the corporate accelerator program fits on a continuum of external engagement activities of the incumbent, between incubation and corporate venturing.

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exploratory innovation and how this effect is grounded in the search, evaluation and acquisition of external knowledge strategies of the firm. The programs enable an incumbent to connect and exploit the entrepreneurial ecosystem, while the programs’ structure allows multiple accelerations phases with cohorts of startups. The programs provide opportunities to maintain a wide search scope, without the direct disadvantages of search breadth.

This report is structured as follows. The conceptual background and methodology are, respectively, described in section two and three. The findings are presented in section four. At last, the discussion and conclusion are described in section five.

2.0 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

This section starts with connecting open innovation, exploratory innovation and incumbent-startup engagement. Subsequently, a framework is introduced to describe established practices how incumbents search, evaluate and acquire external knowledge from startups, focused on exploratory innovation. Followed by literature on corporate accelerators.

2.1 Open Innovation Paradigm

An important paradigm within the innovation literature highlights the benefits of employing external sources of knowledge to achieve and sustain innovation (Huizing, 2011). In the past, incumbents developed innovations internally on the assumption of maintaining competitive advantage. Open innovation is a paradigm that enables incumbents to alleviate from the assumption of developing everything internally. The value from innovation shifts from having the initial idea originate in one’s own lab to identifying, evaluating and acquiring external knowledge to innovate (Chesbrough, 2003; O’connor, 2006; West & Bogers, 2014). Open innovation in this paper is defined in line with Chesbrough (2006), with an explicit focus on inflows of knowledge: Open Innovation is the use of purposive inflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation (Chesbrough, 2006: 1).

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ideas needed to innovate are located within firm boundaries (Chesbrough, 2003). As a result, an increasing number of incumbents (established firms), cross their organizational boundaries and access novel and potentially disruptive innovations through collaborations (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Already as early as Schumpeter (1942), scholars have shown that startups are potential sources of emerging and potentially disruptive innovations (Kohler, 2016). Incumbents increasingly apply corporate accelerators as instruments of open innovation to facilitate collaborations with startups (Cohen et, al., 2019).

2.1.1 Incumbent Firms and Explorative Innovation

Incumbent firms depend on explorative, breakthrough innovation for their sustainable growth, as mature businesses become commoditized and loyal markets saturated (O’Connor, 2006). Exploratory innovation is defined in line with de Visser et. al (2010, p1162.) “Explorative innovations are radical innovations designed to meet the needs of emerging customers or markets” and “require a departure from existing knowledge”. Implicating that an explorative innovation effort is needed to establish radical innovation. Incremental innovations are often extensions to existing processes, radical innovations are inherently connected with the development or application of new knowledge and technologies. These in turn provide the foundation on which future generations of innovations are built for the incumbent. Thus, critical to the long-term success of incumbent firms, although inherently associated with high degrees of uncertainty, risk and costs (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; O’Connor & DeMartino, 2006).

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Various scholars have studied how incumbents could successfully develop more radical innovations. In his seminal paper, March (1991) argues that exploration requires bringing together a heterogeneous set of skills and capabilities. Ahuja & Lampert (2001), found that in order to overcome routines that favor mature solutions, firms should explore novel, emerging and pioneering technologies. Other scholars found that explorative innovation is associated with longer time horizons, due to the need to establish a common ground and mutual understandings (Makhija & Ganesh 1997). Additionally, a continuity in engagements is needed as short-term engagements were only beneficial towards exploitative innovation (Neyens, Faems and Sels, 2006)

Table 1, Overview of exploratory literature

2.1.2 Startups as External Knowledge Sources for Incumbent Explorative Innovation

Open innovation could be an instrument to radically shorten the long lifecycle of exploratory innovation. If ideas, technologies and discoveries can be sourced from external parties, the incumbent does not have to develop everything internally. Interacting with the market and technology partners allows for combining of external knowledge with proprietary knowledge which can inherently shorten the development cycle (Chesbrough, 2003; O’Connor 2006).

Startups are an example of technology partners in the market more capable of delivering radical innovation (Leifer, McDermott and O’Connor, 2000). They are not limited by the organizational bureaucracy of incumbent firms. Instead, they are flexible, respond to market signals and structure new business models (O’Connor & DeMartino, 2006). They do however suffer from numerous disadvantages, such as lack of resources or brand identity. Resulting in a lack of credibility with partners and the market. According to Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015), credibility and reputation are seen as main success factors by startups. Furthermore, startups typically do not possess the complementary

Study Element that promotes exploratory innovation in incumbent

firms

Neyens et al. (2006) Continuity of engagements

Makhija and Ganesh (1997) Long time horizons due to need to establish common ground and mutual understandings

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assets needed to scale innovations. Large firms, however, do possess these resources and credibility but are inherently limited in agility and developing novel ideas due to their organizational structures (Chandy and Tellis, 2000; O’Conner & DeMartino, 2006).

Thus, incumbent-startup collaboration should, in theory, be a win-win situation. Incumbents possess resources and legitimacy that startups aspire for, while startups have agility and novel ideas that incumbents’ value (Prashantham, 2019). To complement an incumbent firms’ internal knowledge base an incumbent firm has to look for external sources to obtain knowledge from. According to West and Bogers (2014), obtaining external knowledge can be divided into three stages: search, evaluate1 and

acquire external knowledge from external sources (Figure 1). The following sections discuss in detail what elements of importance are for incumbents in their engagements with startups in each stage.

Figure 1: schematic overview stages (adapted from West and Bogers, 2014)

2.2 Searching for Sources of External Knowledge

Research on interfirm collaboration has shown that interorganizational asymmetries may inhibit incumbent-startup collaboration. As Doz and Shuen (1988, p.332) pointed out, ‘‘the two organizations are quite different, have no common language, no way to comprehend each other’s operating mode, and no understanding of managers’ roles and position in the other organization.” Accordingly, discrepancies in size, power and structure limit the startups’ ability to connect with the right department and individuals within large corporations (Prashantham, 2019). On the other hand, incumbents are experiencing difficulties with finding the right startups in the ever-expanding startup support- and

1 West and Bogers (2014), call the stages search, enabling/filter and acquire. For the ease of this study I changed

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system (Kohler, 2016). Thus, there is a need to create an interface to overcome the large gap between incumbents and startups (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015).

According to the external knowledge sourcing literature, a first step in facilitating incumbent-startup engagement could be creating a clear search strategy by the incumbent (Laursen & Salter, 2006; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). This innovation search pertains sourcing and identifying external knowledge from innovation ecosystems and is therefore key for obtaining external innovation (Haapalainen & Kantola, 2015; Sofka & Grimpe, 2010). External search practices assist firms in realizing effective and continuous engagement linkage with the outer innovation ecosystem (Martini, Neirotti & Appio, 2016).

Examples of established practices are internal search attitudes, such as crowdsourcing and gatekeepers. The latter refers to employees who act as boundary spanners between a firm’s external and internal environment (Walsh 2015). Using crowdsourcing, incumbents can benefit from a large pool of contributors and enables creative solution finding (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). When accessing this external knowledge, firms may post challenges on innovation platforms or interact with innovation communities (Frey, Lüthje, Haag, 2011). Enabling the focal firm to transfer the process of identifying relevant knowledge to the problem solver, which is beneficial towards the efficiency and distance of search for external knowledge (Ebner, Leimeister & Krcmar, 2009; Afuah & Tucci, 2012). In addition to an internal search attitude, firms can also use external stakeholders, such as innovation intermediaries. These help incumbents by linking them with relevant partners and facilitate interaction between heterogeneous players in the ecosystem (Howells, 2006; Lopez-Vega & Vanhaverbeke, 2016; Hossain, 2010).

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lifecycle, search depth is more effective, which entails sourcing from a limited number of channels. As novel knowledge is often only possessed by a select few (Laursen and Salter, 2006).

2.3 Evaluating Startups for Explorative Innovation

Evaluating the ‘right’ startups to engage with is possibly the biggest challenge for incumbent firms (West & Bogers, 2014). The startup enterprise is often in a relatively early stage of the business cycle and reluctant in fully disclosing all relevant knowledge upfront. Their ideas, although often novel to the incumbent, might still be in their infancy. Incomplete information inhibits the ability of incumbent firms to fully evaluate the startups’ ideas and technologies (Fetterhoff & Voelkel, 2006). The high levels of complexity, uncertainty and subjectivity of the knowledge needed for radical innovation and the large numbers of startups to choose from are limiting the likelihood of selecting the ‘right’ startups as external source of knowledge (Martini et al., 2016).

Therefore, engagements with startups which are exploratory in nature need to align with other external activities and the market focus of the incumbent firm. Menon and Blount (2003) distinguish three dimensions that are particularly relevant to evaluate external knowledge: content quality, feasibility and strategic value. Ideas of startups are screened according to their fit with the values and culture of the incumbent firm as well as the fit with the firm’s current resources and capabilities. Highly innovative startup ideas require a higher degree of tolerance for risk, uncertainty and incompleteness. Firms implement different methods to assess these explorative ideas, ranging from formal screening criteria to informal intuitive decisions (Feldman & Page, 1984). However, to enhance the likelihood of exploratory innovation, incumbent firms should evaluate whether the startup complements their knowledge. Similarities in knowledge are more likely to promote renewal, which is linked to exploitative innovation (Makri, Hitt and Lane, 2010). Desouza et al., (2009) found, that successful firms implemented clear cut protocols and screening methods to evaluate ideas. Other methods that incumbents might apply are third parties to aid them in the evaluation, such as universities or research institutions (Desouza, et.al, 2009).

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first go/no-go decision upon which human and financial resources are assigned to further engagement (Hammedi, van Riel and Sasovova, 2014). Other factors that contribute towards this assessment are not limited to characteristics of the external source, but also factors internally to the firm such as R&D capabilities and complementary assets (Ceccagnoli et. al., 2010).

2.4 Acquire: Corporate Accelerators as Instruments to Enhance Incumbent Explorative Innovation

The final step of obtaining innovation from external sources is to actually import and acquire the external knowledge into incumbents’ organization. Kang & Kang (2014), describe formal and informal mechanisms for incumbent firms, respectively ‘buy’ and ‘cooperate’.

Buying refers to contracting and buying the property rights. While this approach is an effective and quick way to gather external knowledge, these interactions do not provide open collaborative knowledge exchange (Martini et. al, 2016). Also, the effectiveness is limited by the paradox of openness, where once information is out in the open, there is no need to pay for it (Laursen & Salter, 2014). Another method of buy is corporate venturing, which is aimed at acquiring a startup directly. This method implies corporate ownership of the startup, which has its downsides. Many startups’ ideas are often still in early phase of development they need to be nurtured further. Directly acquiring them limits the agility and creativity, e.g. when the startup is directly integrated (Gans & Stern, 2003; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015).

A different way for incumbents to cooperate with startups are corporate accelerator programs and are defined as: “company-supported programs of limited duration that support cohorts of startups during the new venture process via mentoring, education, and company specific resources.” (Kohler 2016, p. 2). Here, incumbents and external startups engage to advance product or service development and thus, venture creation by making use of complementary assets (Kohler, 2016; Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, & Van Hove, 2015). According to Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015), within corporate accelerators, corporate ownership is not included, which is the case with corporate venturing.

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perspective of open innovation. Incumbent and startups enter a voluntary agreement of further development of both startup and/or incumbents’ product, resembling a dyadic, non-equity interorganizational collaboration mode. Providing motivations for both sides to contribute to the engagement (Bianchi, Cavaliere, Chiaroni, Frattini, & Chiesa, 2011; Gassmann, Enkel, & Chesbrough, 2010; Weiblen & Chesbrough).

Startup accelerators could function as an interface, which allow possible engagements and the localization of novel knowledge outside of incumbent firms’ boundaries. The programs need a clear proposition to be successful and the collaboration needs to fuse both incumbent and startups’ interest to create mutual value (Weiblen & Chesbrough,2015; Prasantham, 2019; Kohler, 2016). Using cohorts of startups, increase the chances to acquire novel technologies, especially compared to single engagements. Enabling existing business units to explore ideas that normally fall outside of the business scope (Kohler, 2016). By using a ‘warm up’ period before full engagement, the incumbent and startups create a mutual understanding and common ground (Makhija and Ganesh 1997). Improving the likelihood of establishing a long-term commitment and continuance in collaboration, which are beneficial towards exploratory innovation (Neyens et al, 2006).

2.5 Conclusion of the Conceptual Background

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However, as is criticized by Kanbach & Stubner, (2016, p. 1773) “different objectives and motives of the established companies behind these programs often remain unclear”. Most research has inherently focused on the last phase of obtaining external knowledge. The drivers of searching and employment, via evaluation and acquiring external knowledge of startups. By means of open innovation, the benefit of incumbent explorative innovation has been largely overlooked.

Table 2 - Literature overview of obtaining external knowledge established practices

3.0 Methodology

In this multiple comparative case study, the corporate accelerator programs from three incumbent firms from different industries (Health, Paint and Chemicals) were studied. The selected approach allows for a full variety of evidence building and using. These multiple sources of evidence, e.g. interviews (8), publications and articles (174), provide ample opportunities to gain a detailed and in-depth understanding of field solutions, hacks, mechanisms and practices (Yin, 2013).

3.1 Industry and Case Selection

The different industries were selected based on the availability of corporate accelerator programs. The phenomenon is still relatively new and adoption of this type of external innovation effort is not widely established (Cohen et al., 2019). Choosing different companies, active in different industries, allow for a wider comparison of the use of accelerator programs. A variety in industries may provide insights in different corporate accelerator settings, and a better angle on best practices employed.

Search Evaluate Acquire

Search strategy

(Laursen & Salter, 2006; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014)

Content quality, feasibility and strategic value (Menon & Blount, 2003)

"Buy" or "Cooperate"

(Kang & Kang, 2014)

Gatekeepers (Walsh, 2015) Formal and informal screening

(Feldman & Page, 1984)

Buy: Corporate venturing

(Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015)

Crowdsourcing using innovation communities or innovation platforms

(Frey, Lüthje, Haag, 2011)

Universities or research institutions as intermediaries (Desouza et al., 2009)

Cooperate: corporate accelerator programs

(Kohler, 2016)

Innovation intermediaries

(Howells, 2006; Lopez-Vega & Vanhaverbeke, 2009; Hossain, 2010)

Knowledge complementarity (Makri, Hitt

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The chosen industries though, are all affected by recent trends, developments and radical innovations, which are threatening incumbents’ existing business models. Therefore, all industries experience the need to innovate to ensure firm survival. Furthermore, these industries experience, high levels of regulations. Before a product can be taken into production is takes numerous steps and tests before it will be approved and marketable. Increasing the longevity of the innovation development cycle and creating barriers for new entrants.

The health industry has many stakeholders involved, with their own agendas and incentives (Herzlinger, 2006). Along with implemented barriers to new entrants, which threaten the current business models of incumbents and practitioners, make the adoption and diffusion of innovations difficult. Even though the industry is highly dependent on innovation and needs different business models to successfully engage in radical innovation (Hwan & Christensen, 2008). Both chemicals and paint industries are mature industries, that consist of highly diversified portfolio in products and raw materials. The industries with their high volumes of production are subject to high price sensitivities and demanding environmental requirements. Making innovation of essence to stay competitive (Deloitte,2017; KPMG,2018).

The cases are selected on the following criteria: (1) They represent large incumbent firms, (2) are engaging with the external environment in open innovation efforts with startups via corporate accelerator programs. (3) There is enough diversity between incumbents to provide room for generalization. The cases in this study are presented in table 2.

3.2 Data Collection

The data collected and used for this research is sourced from both interviews and secondary sources. This allows for data triangulation and evidence grounding (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, secondary data on each program’s participants and results of the past accelerator programs were compiled. These are anonymously described and provided in Appendix C. Nexis Uni articles, internal documents, program websites, LinkedIn and CrunchBase were used to compile this data.

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deeper understanding of the cases. How different companies employ the accelerator programs, what their motivations were and to be more specific in knowledge on industries they were active in. As these elements are of influence on how companies use corporate accelerators to select and employ startups for explorative innovation means, an overview of the interviewees is presented in appendix A.

In order to ensure reliability, all interviews have been recorded (total of 322 minutes), conducted with an interview protocol, anonymously transcribed and sent to interviewees for approval (Riege, Table 3 - Overview of the cases in this study

Company Case1 Case 2 Case 3

Industry Healthcare Paint Chemistry

Nr of employees >70.000 (2018) >30.000 (2018) >10.000 (2018)

Description Global startup program, multiple

locations. Standardized working packages are available in which the startups get training from experts. After a 3 month program there is a public event after which startups are selected for further collaboration

Startup challenges, participants can submit their ideas to a platform. Consists of two acceleration phases. 1: startups on the innovation platform. Internal challenge teams and startups both enrich and adapt the proposed solutions.

2: A final with selected startups by top management, on location, for joint proposition development.

Startup challenges, participants can submit their ideas to a platform. Consists of two acceleration phases. 1: startups on the innovation platform. Internal challenge teams and startups both enrich and adapt the proposed solutions.

2: A final with selected startups on location, for joint proposition development.

Approach Global startup program Startup Challenge Startup Challenge

Other engagements Incubation, Venturing Incubation None

Partner (s) No Multiple Multiple

Selection criteria •validated their technology and

have a working prototype •more than one founder •full-time team member •focused more on their go-to-market strategy and approach

•Solutions offering significant impact on performance •Technology readiness level •Value proposition and unique selling points

•Business readiness level

•Proof of concept •Working prototype •Not just an idea

Search Via local hubs and network.

Dedicated unit as interface.

Active search, with communication via platform interface.

Active search with media strategy. Communication via platform.

How does it work? •Submission of ideas

•Enrichments of ideas •Selection •3-months •public event •go no go decision •Online submissions •Active pre-accelerator phase, engagement with startups and experts via platform

•Selection

•3 day Accelerator program •Go/no go decision

•Online submissions •Active pre-accelerator phase, engagement with startups and experts via platform

•Selection

•3 day Accelerator program •Go/no go decision

Screening process One time enrichment process of

interesting startups

Continuous via platform challenge team

Continuous via platform challenge team

Application process Online - focus areas Online platform - Challenge Online platform - Challenge

Outcome of program Collaboration opportunities with early-stage startups via:

investment co-creation joint development go-to-market licensing agreements

Joint development contracts Partners also provide collaboration opportunities.

Collaboration

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2003). Additionally, the secondary data and transcript data are stored in a database to provide a chain of evidence in support of the research (Yin, 2013).

3.3. Data analysis

The secondary data was coded and stored in excel, in which a total of 43 participants in each last edition accelerator program of each incumbent were collected. These were stored in an excel, based on type of company, industry and the stage of development cycle.

The interview data was coded using the ‘Gioia Methodology’ (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). The approach is selected, for its systematic inductive research method that not only lets new concepts surface, but also enables the researcher to generate persuasive new theories (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). Thus, while leaving room for creativity, a systematic, rigorous approach is maintained to develop new concepts. In the first order analysis, all the transcripts were read again, and sections of interest were highlighted. To adhere faithfully to informant terms, these highlighted sections were stored in excel supported by interviewee quotes. This resulted in a total of 118 highlighted sections. By means of color-coding differences and similarities were sought among the categories, which reduced the number of categories to a more manageable number of 37 ‘first order concepts’. Applying the ‘gestalt analysis’ (also known as pattern matching) (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) similarities in the sections and subjects of these interviewees’ quotes were increasingly focused on concepts and tentative relationships emerging from the interviews. This process resulted in fifteen of second order themes, which suggested concepts that complement and explain phenomena that are being observed through the data. A particular focus is being paid to nascent concepts that do not seem to have an existing reference in the current literature, or concepts that ‘leap out’ because of their relevance to a new domain.

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the findings section. The data structure is a valuable visual aid, but it promotes a static state of the identified phenomenon, therefore, a more dynamic theoretical model was constructed, explaining the relationships among the concepts. This grounded theory model, can be found in the discussion sections. To ensure construct validity, multiple sources of evidence were used for the analysis, including interviews (8), Nexis Uni articles (174), and numerous different case-specific sources (Riege, 2003).

3.4 Research Quality

Case studies are important to study early phase new management theory (Yin, 2013). Though, without rigor in case studies the relevance of management research cannot be claimed (Scandura and Williams, 2000; Gioia et, al., 2014). Therefore, in their study on rigorous case studies, Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, (2008) use four criteria to assess the quality of case studies: reliability, internal validity, construct validity and external validity. If all these criteria are met, the case study can pass as a rigorous study. Reliability entails whether the same results will be obtained if the study is conducted by performing the same steps again. Whether the researcher provides logical reasoning which is compelling enough to defend the conclusions of the study is referred to as internal validity. Construct validity refers to whether the research investigates what it claims to investigate. External validity refers to whether de research findings can be generalized to a particular domain (Gibbert et al., 2008). An overview of measures taken in each stage of research to address the concerns regarding validity and reliability are provided in table 4.

4.0 FINDINGS

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startup ecosystem, via an interface. For clarity of explanation, however, only the emergent dimensions are discussed (2nd order themes, A to K).

Table 4 Measures taken to ensure the validity and reliability of this research

4.1 Search Scope – Searching for external knowledge

Startup Interface (a) All three cases showed that in order to have an effective search strategy, the incumbent must establish a point of contact between them and the startup ecosystem. The differences in size, not only make collaborating more difficult, but also finding each other. If there is one point of contact, all efforts are centralized. “Which prevents a confusion on contact points and different goals” (Case 1). There are different ways to go about this, when there are more initiatives a unit can be implemented as a startup interface, “which functions as an umbrella for all external engagements “(Case 3). On the other hand, it is also difficult for startups to approach incumbents. “having a spokesperson who functions as startup liaison” enables startups to access and find the right department to connect with. More importantly using the interface, the incumbents are able to approach startups actively, facilitate communication and provide clear signals to startups. “Via my LinkedIn account we approached startups directly” (Case 2). Nowadays, startups have many options in their startup support system. If an incumbent clearly signals its needs, is easy to find and approachable via their interface for engagements, then the search strategy of the incumbent will be more effective. Apart from the many

Criterion Reliability Internal Validity Construct Validity External Validity N/A Data analysis

Based on: Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki. (2008);Yin (2009)

Multiple sources of evidence

Within case analysis, followed by pattern matching

Selection based on theoretical sampling

Developed and used a case study database

Involved a researcher who did not gather the data

Developed Case study protocol

Established a conceptual background prior to data analysis

Adapted constructs from prior emperical analysis from related research fields

N/A Multiple sources of

evidence

Chain of evidence provided

Used replication logic between multiple case studies

Clearly described cases with contextual factors

N/A Research stage

Clear sample criteria

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options, the startup ecosystem is also widely dispersed geographically. Either connecting to the local ecosystems, “using local partners enables us to have a global scope” (Case 2). Or being present locally, “We use local hubs and even run programs from there” (Case 1). Allow for the full exploitation of the global startup network.

Figure 1 - Data structure

• We are better able to asses the value of external knowledge within our core business • Accelerate startups within core business

knowledge allows for mutual proposition development

(f) External engagement continuum (e) Distance to core business

(g) Startup-challenge fit

Startup selection

• Look for perfect startup-challenge fit • Not necessarily the most innovative

startup ‘out there’

• Standardized assessment approach • Look for complementarity • Different types of startups require other

engagement instruments

• ‘Venturing’ when outside of core business • Use of intermediaries, like VC firms, due to lack

of assessment capabilities.

• Link with ecosystem via hubs and partners • Facilitating communication via separate unit or

startup liaison • Perceived innovativeness • Actively approach and find startups

• Proof of concept or prototype • Market ready, not ‘just and idea’ • Initial paying customers

(a) Startup Interface

(c) Challenge or focus setting

(d) Startup criteria

• Before we can ‘engage’ with startups a clear strategy is needed

• What are new product-market combinations to support our existing innovation efforts • Consistency of engagements • Long term opportunities

(b) Strategy and vision of the incumbent firm

Search Scope

• We clearly communicate challenges to enable startups to engage with those challenges • Challenges are set in line with long-term goals • Business units co-determine challenges

Aggregate Dimensions 2nd Order Themes

1st Order Concepts

• Open platform with active engagement • Everyone is able to see other submissions

“open”

• Mutual proposition development • Collaboration as end-goal

• Radical innovation takes time

• Engaging with ‘market ready startups’ limits development times by 1-3 years

• Open platform allows for a wider scope of startups

• Urgency of challenges involves internal stakeholders

• Platform allows for early acceleration • Program tasks are part of core responsibilities of

business units

• Willingness to cannibalize own business • The programs allow for early failure • Platform approach: early and multiple go/

no-go

(h) Open innovation

(i) Uncertainty avoidance

(k) Internal motivation to innovate (j) Experimentation/risk taking

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Strategy and vision of the incumbent (b) Using clear communication, an incumbent’s intents are signaled to startups. These intents need be in line with the overall vision and strategy of incumbent firms. “Our engagements need to be aligned with the overall strategy” (Case 1). Otherwise the resulting innovations from programs might not be of value to the organization. As one of the informants explained “In our first edition, we had great innovations from our first programs, however, nobody wanted them.” To prevent undertaking initiatives which prove to be fruitless in the end, the search strategy is constructed by “identifying interesting product market combinations”. Another issue here is the

f. External engagement continuum

Representative Supporting Data for Each 2nd Order Theme

2nd Order Themes Representative 1st Order Data

a. Startup Interface

b.Strategy & vision of incumbent

c. Challenge or focus setting

d. Startup criteria “We do ask a minimal proof of concept, otherwise the development time would be too long. We

do not want just "ideas" we need working solutions” (Interviewee 5).

Some markets might be of high interests to startups, but would make no monetary sense for a big corporate to play in"(interviewee 2).

"initial paying customers" (interviewee 1).

e. Distance to core business “The challenges and our focus of the program is near our core business. We have the expertise

and knowledge in-house to really evaluate and assess the startups ourselves" (Interviewee 5). Our experts then are able to better engage and help the startups to further develop a mutual proposition" (Interviewee 5).

In the end we want to have solutions that we can directly jointly further develop. At the end of the day, both parties are discussing how much money you’re going to make" (interviewee 6). “Using a startup liaison could be one of those strategies” (Interviewee 4).

“By publishing our challenges online on our platform, we enable startups to connect with the right department and person. Normally it would take a long time for startups and corporates to connect”(Interviewee 5).

“an accelerator program as an interface to connect with the right startups” (Interviewee 5). “An important success factor of accelerator programs is your reputation in the startup ecosystem” (interviewee 3)

"We actively approached startups but finding them is difficult" (Interviewee 6).

“To engage with as many startups as possible for our challenges, we use local partners that are well connected and find startups that fit our challenges” (Interviewee 5).

“To engage with startups, you need a very clear strategy, this starts with identifying a business focus”(Interviewee 1).

“We look for interesting product market combinations that support our current innovation strategies” (Interviewee 2).

“Managerial short-termism is perceived a big problem for radical innovations resulting from the program” (Interviewee 1).

“Managers therefore tend to cut projects that they do not find interesting anymore. So, one needs a disciplined investment attitude” (Interviewee 1).

“We ensure challenges fit with the long-term strategy of Case 3. The input of the challenges comes from the business units” (Interviewee 5).

"We clearly communicate these challenges to the outside world via our platform, so that startups can directly engage” (Interviewee 5).

“We let the business units set the challenges” (Interviewee 6).

where we have different instruments for external activities, along a continuum" (Interviewee 2). “The more startups are away from our core business, the more we look at them and their developments” (Interviewee 2).

“For those startups in different markets or industries venturing approach is more applicable” (Interviewee 4).

“In order to find better startups, incumbents can employ instruments such as intermediaries, like VC firms, to find startups” (Interviewee 4).

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inconsistency of management, as informants described, “managerial short-termism is a big problem for any explorative innovation efforts”. Undisciplined investment attitudes cause projects to be cut from funding. Thus, as the interviewee from case 1 summarized, “initiatives need to be long-term, have organizational support and are combined with alignment of current engagements”.

Challenge or focus setting (c). Via the interfaces, challenges are clearly communicated to the ecosystem. As one of the program leads explains, “The input comes from our business units”, by letting the units determine the challenges, the startups are solving ‘real problems’ of the incumbents. “They know what problems they want to get solved and are the ones that in the end have to work with the startups”. There are always multiple challenges per cohort of startups. By clearly signaling these to the

g. Startup-Challenge fit

h. Open innovation

i.Uncertainty avoidance

j. Experimentation/risk taking

k. Internal motivation to innovate

Representative Supporting Data for Each 2nd Order Theme

“Radical innovations often imply creative destruction of own business, the willingness to cannibalize one's own business is necessary to innovate"(Interviewee 3).

Engaging with startups increases the willingness to cannibalize, otherwise the startup would do it anyways” (Interviewee 1)

“When it turns out that it doesn’t work out, you pivot and try it another way, or in the case of a corporate, you try a different startup” (interviewee 8).

“Our program is an accelerator program from day one, as soon as we publish our challenges online. Via our platform we are able to accelerate startup propositions directly with our team of experts” (Interviewee 5).

2nd Order Themes Representative 1st Order Data

“The program has had a really positive influence on the company. The startups that worked with the business units have led to the rest of the business to realize that innovation is important for us” (Interviewee 5)

“We have changed from a very short-sighted and short term view on innovation to a more long term view. From it does not belong on our roadmap to we will change our roadmap, what they do is really cool. The program has put us on the map again in the industry as innovative player”(Interviewee 6)

"The challenge team their tasks belong to their core responsibilities" (Interviewee 5) "Radical innovation takes time" (Interviewee 6)

"Major advantage of applying corporate accelerators is to implement market ready solutions which can greatly optimize throughput times by 1-3 years of lesser development

time"(Interviewee 3).

"By publishing our challenges online on our platform, we enable startups to connect with the right department and person. Normally it would take a long time for startups and corporates to connect" (Interviewee 5).

“It is mainly that we see if it is a good fit between the startup and our challenges. Otherwise, in the first place we wouldn't go to too much trouble to properly define the challenges” (Interviewee 5).

“We try to adopt an standardized approach as much as we can. A final selection is made by top management, that are often selecting them on a bit of a gut feeling too” (Interviewee 6). "They might not necessarily be looking for the most innovative startup out there, but a startup that best fits" (Interviewee 7).

“Our platform is completely open to anyone; everyone is able to see what others have posted as a response to our challenges” (Interviewee 5).

“We ask startups to hand in their propositions the challenges posted, where they also need to state what they'll need from us. As we want them to not only solve our problems, but that there is a mutual result” (Interviewee 5).

“We aim for mutual ownership of developed material during the program. Collaboration is the final end-goal of the program. If we were to invest, we would only do so via our partnerships” (Interviewee 6).

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startup ecosystem the startup is able to see if their knowledge fits to the problem. This defines the search scope of the incumbent firm to a great extent and prevents, as described by one of the program leads, “searching for everything that is out there”. Improving the efficiency of search. One of the informants described, “We clearly communicate these challenges to the outside world via our platform, so that startups can directly engage”. Both Case 2 and 3 used an innovation platform, which was accessible through a website to communicate the challenges and have startups directly sign up. Via other innovation contest websites, LinkedIn, networks of employees and partners the startups were actively approached. Startups could only participate, if they subscribed on the platforms.

Startup criteria (d). The scope of search included specific criteria for the startups. These are quite general and sometimes differ slightly depending on the type of challenge set. Criteria include a “proof of concept”, “working prototype” or “initial paying customers”. As a program lead describes, “We do not want just ‘ideas’ we need working solutions”. Working solutions are able to “limit development times” and limits the likelihood of adopting something in “which we invest and then it later on turns out is not a solution that does not work for us”. Additionally, these strict criteria allow to keep “a heartbeat”, offering conversations on how to jointly further develop and “less fuzz over IP”. Additionally, one of the consultant informants describes, “A lot has changed in 5 years, there are so many options for startups.” Implicating that startups are not all waiting for incumbents to approach them, there needs to be a clear win for them to be willing to engage with incumbents. Signaling clearly what the intentions are, pre-set criteria and a point of entry or submission of propositions are thus elements which constitute an active and effective search strategy.

4.2 Startup Selection

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While at the same time, in this specific area they are seen as innovative by peers in the industry. As an informant described, “our reputation in the industry is very good, we developed over 700 patents last year alone”. Startups are due to that credibility more inclined to work with them (Case 1).

External engagement continuum (f). Naturally, not all startups fit the challenges but that does not necessarily imply that they are not interesting to the incumbents. As an informant describes, “for those startups in different markets or industries venturing approach is more applicable”. The focus of core business can be explained by organizational capabilities, “we see our innovation projects along a continuum, where we have different instruments for external activities”. Case 1 applies corporate venturing and incubation to explore ideas outside of the core business. Through this experience, case 1 is able to engage with more seed-stage startups. As is confirmed by coded secondary data (appendix c). Case 2 and 3, who have less experience, choose startups that are more market ready. Deliberately choosing the core business for their accelerator programs, to gain more “internal support” and to be able to “really put value to startups ideas”. One of the expert informants explained, “it takes time and resources to develop such a continuum”. “The best” startups might also already be taken by the venture capital firms (VC). “They are better embedded in a startup network and scout startups early on”. Therefore, incumbents might sometimes even use a VC to aid them in the evaluation of startups. As, one of the consultant interviewees stated, “the incumbents lack capabilities to assess particular startups.” Most incumbents are limited to their own business areas, and not specialized in assessing a startups potential.

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they are never able to fully formalize the assessment and “a final selection is made by top management, that are often selecting them on a bit of a gut feeling too”.

4.3 Accelerator Program Setting

Open innovation (h). Rather than having one acceleration phase, both case 2 and 3 implement two acceleration phases. They adapted to a form of crowdsourcing platform to collect all the startups, in which they openly posted their challenges. The “platform is completely open; everyone is able to see what others have posted as a response to our challenges.” The first phase can be described as an open idea collection, where “challenge teams actively engage with the startups on the platform” and “get expert input to sharpen their propositions”. This provides the incumbents time to get to know the startups better. In the second phase, the actual accelerator phase there is an open innovation approach, as one of the program leads described “we want them to not only solve our problems, but that there is a mutual result”. Furthermore, during the acceleration phase, no equity of any sort is taken in the startups: “we aim for mutual ownership of developed material during the programs”. Implicating that the startup and corporate engage in a voluntary collaboration to promote mutual proposition development. Adopting these two phases of acceleration are effective in a way that startups actually get something out of being on the platform, even if they are not selected for the final program in the end. While the incumbent enables itself to collect a large database of external knowledge and solutions which might be of value later on.

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accelerator program to connect with the right startups”. As the startup ecosystem is widely dispersed and it would take time to find solutions internally.

Experimentation/risk taking (j). The program settings allowed for more risky opportunities, even when these opportunities implied the cannibalization of their own business. One of the program leads described, “if we are not going to do it ourselves, then someone else will do it, so why not work with them?” The program settings allow for early failure, as a lead mentor informant described, “when it turns out that it doesn’t work out, you pivot and try it another way, or in the case of a corporate, you try a different startup”. The programs apply a cohort approach and are of short duration. Providing a “unique opportunity to engage with multiple relevant startups that are pioneering with new technologies”. The two programs that adopted the platform approach even have two acceleration phases and their “program is an accelerator from day one”. Compared to case 1, this allows for multiple go/no go decisions during the process before actually formally engaging with the startups. Informants stated that this enabled them to engage in projects that would have otherwise not been pursued.

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5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

Based on the findings. this section presents the discussion and conclusion. Where this paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question:

“How do incumbent firms search, select and acquire knowledge from startups for their open corporate accelerator programs to foster explorative innovation?”

First, an integrated model which presents the grounded theory (figure 2), providing a rather more dynamic picture compared to the data structure (figure 1) presented in the findings. This model is used to provide a graphic representation and will be used as an aid throughout the discussion section. Thereafter, the theoretical- and practical implications are presented. Lastly, this paper discusses the limitations of this study and suggestions for future research.

Figure 2 - Integrated model

5.1 Integrated Theoretical Model

The integrated model (figure 2) shows a dynamic approach to how incumbents search, select and acquire knowledge from startups to support their exploratory innovation efforts. The most important causal

Search Evaluate Acquire

Open innovation Challenge/business focus Startup criteria Accelerator Program setting Risk taking/ experimentation Internal motivation to innovate Startup Interface Innovation ecosystem Local hubs/ partners Use of intermediaries Strategy and vision Market sizing Search scope Distance to core business Startup-Challenge fit Selection of startups Perceived innovativeness and reputation Incumbent Post accelerator program Exploratory innovation + + + External engagement continuum

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relations are discussed using the literature and structured by stages of search, evaluate and acquire (West & Bogers, 2014)

Search

Incumbents develop their overall search strategy, where startups are to be one of the search channels. These need to be aligned with the overall innovation search efforts, in order to provide continuity and consistency in their management (McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). The programs fit in a broad search strategy (Laursen & Salter, 2006), the incumbent is able to engage with ‘cohorts’ of startups at once. Using challenges that are set to meet, business units their ‘real problems’, unit managers too, are responsible for interacting with the startups. Aiding in the prevention of the managerial attention problem. A search scope limits the likelihood of searching too wide, by using specific startup criteria, which prevents having to assess ‘just ideas’, the incumbent is able to innovate more efficiently (Laursen & Salter, 2006).

The search scope sets the stage for the startup interface. Incumbents had implemented their own open innovation platforms which functioned as interfaces. This can be seen as a form of hybrid crowdsourcing, only there is no communication between the crowd and the incumbent firm, like there is in innovation communities. Rather, there are individual engagements between startups from the crowd and the incumbent firm on their open, website-based platforms. The platforms are still entirely open as every contributor is able to see other contributions to the problem. Therefore, still shifting the process of identifying relevant knowledge which is needed to solve the challenges from incumbent firm to the startup (Frey et. al, 2011).

Startup liaisons can be seen as a distinct form of gatekeepers. Rather than connecting the internal firm with outside technologies or knowledge, they function as bridge makers to close the gap between incumbent and startups (Walsh, 2015; Kohler, 2016). The liaisons are often the program directors or program leads, connecting the startups with right departments or persons.

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increasingly more options available, when the incumbent is perceived as more innovative it increases its exposure and possibility to attract more startups. Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) argue that credibility is key in the startup ecosystem, and a gap exists between the startup and corporate world. Thus, adapting startup interfaces are a way to overcome the large gap between incumbents and startups, although credibility of the incumbent is an important success factor.

Evaluate

Using innovation platforms, incumbent firms were able to implement two accelerator phases. In the first one the startups that responded to the challenges all got input and feedback from expert challenge teams. This allowed them to already adept their propositions. The incumbent is then able to screen for quality, feasibility and strategic value of submitted startups ideas (Menon & Blount, 2003). The platform is a standardized approach to collecting and building a database covering a wide variety of solutions to an incumbent’s problems. This approach allows for a well-grounded evaluation for complementarity in knowledge which is needed for exploratory innovation (Makri et al., 2010). To be able to better evaluate for complementarity, the firms deliberately chose the core business as an area to innovate in. They are better to assess the value of external knowledge from the startups and are perceived more innovative and credible in this area, therefore attracting more and better startups (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). Additionally, incumbent firms sought for market ready solutions, that at least had a proof of concept or working prototype. Implying that incumbent firms do not necessarily select the most innovative startups in the ecosystem, they select startup-challenge according to their fit with challenges. Bringing together heterogenous sets of knowledge and capabilities (March, 1991).

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venture capital firms. This type of external stakeholders possibly plays an increasingly importing role in facilitating the search and selection of startups (West and Bogers, 2014).

Acquire

The first acceleration phase allowed for a thorough screening of knowledge. Using an active information pull, the incumbent is better able to select projects of most potential and complementary value to continue with (Makri et al, 2010). After a final selection of startups is made through selectiveness, the second acceleration phase begins. Via an open innovation approach with cohorts of startups a mutual development of a startup and/or incumbents’ proposition starts. This approach contains multiple go/no go decisions and enables incumbents to experiment with a risky projects and explorative search (Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014; Makhija & Ganesh, 1997). Avoiding high degrees of uncertainty associated with early phases of exploratory innovation, compared to single engagements, such as venturing (O’Connor, 2006; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). After the second acceleration phase, selected startups are invited to continue collaborating with the incumbent.

A major success factor to acquire knowledge from startups, is the internal motivation to innovate. Initiatives like accelerator programs are often secondary tasks for employees. By innovating in the core business, these programs are of higher urgency to the company. Program tasks then belong to core responsibilities of the business units, indirectly gaining more support from key stakeholders. This support is needed to ensure the continuity in the engagements that result from the program. These elements altogether, promote the development of exploratory, radical innovations (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Neyens et al., 2006; March, 1991).

5.3 Theoretical Implications

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incumbents’ ability to innovate via corporate accelerators. Chesbrough (2006) already emphasized on the innovativeness of startups and their ability to disrupt industries. However, little research focused on how these startups can be used to enable corporate innovation. This study highlights corporate accelerators as an instrument to facilitate collaborative explorative innovation. The theoretical contributions of this study are threefold:

First, this paper provides an integrated model for how incumbent firms search for, evaluate and acquire external knowledge from startups. This study identifies a hybrid form of innovation crowdsourcing platforms that enables firms to build databases of startup solutions to their problems. Incumbents use these databases as search and evaluation instrument which provides with a window on new knowledge and technologies. Additionally, these platforms function as interfaces to interact with the startup ecosystem. These innovation platforms then, enable two-way communications and differ from previously identified communities and platforms. Where current literature highlighted the difficulties of incumbents and startups to connect (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015), via these interfaces there is a clear point of entry which facilitates, communication, engagement and interaction with the startup ecosystem. An important complementary element here is a different form of gatekeeper, that instead of identifies and translates new technologies to the rest of the firm, functions as a bridge maker between incumbents and startups (Walsh, 2015).

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participating in the programs contain ‘the most novel’ information, as they mostly try to innovate in their core business via market ready solution, it will still be novel to the firm. Such exposure helps to overcome routines that favor mature solutions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001).

Third, this study identified that incumbents apply corporate accelerators to innovate in core business areas and by mostly implementing solutions that are market ready (proof of concept). Either due to other external engagement activities, such as venturing or incubation. Aimed at pursuing innovation initiatives outside the core business areas. Others were limited in assessing ideas or were perceived less innovative outside their core business areas and therefore attracting less startups.

5.4 Practical Implications

Practitioners of innovation management that want to achieve more exploratory innovation in incumbent firms and are interested in corporate accelerator programs as an instrument can use the integrated model as a guide. Although, they need to be aware that the way to exploratory innovation is not a unidirectional one and is easily influenced by different context settings. The model functions as a best practice overview and shows the causal relationships between certain elements of importance to innovation.

Managers should take note of the elements facilitating the different phases of search, evaluate and acquisition of external knowledge. They should start by creating a program which functions as a startup interface and centralize all external engagements with startups under one umbrella. Choosing a startup liaison who will be the spokesperson for the program is of complementary value. This enables the startups to find the incumbent, and the incumbent the startup. To set the search scope, managers should take careful consideration of the chosen area to run the programs in. Especially at first, when the incumbent might not be seen as the ideal partner to innovate with, the incumbent should most likely choose an area in which its perceived innovativeness is considered high. This will attract naturally more startups. Often this is in the core industry, where its credibility is already present. Innovating in the core business allow managers to get more internal support and motivation to innovate, which is important for the success of the program.

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Therefore, corporate accelerator programs are an effective instrument to leverage on the innovativeness of startups. At first, when the capabilities are not yet as far developed, managers should leverage their market power to engage with mostly market ready startups in their core markets, that already have either a prototype or a proof of concept. The exploratory lifecycle can be inherently shortened and provide potential for exploratory innovations. A semi-standardized approach allows for admittance of multiple startups at once via cohorts, which are thoroughly pre-screened for their fit with the organization. Instead of single engagements, the incumbent is able to spread risks and uncertainty over multiple startups at once. However, managers should consider important success factors such as perceived innovativeness of the incumbent firm, the internal motivation to innovate and support from key stakeholders for continuity in programs their resulting engagements

5.3 Limitations and Future research

First, within qualitative case studies, the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. This form of research depends on the skills of the researcher and as such the findings are grounded using the interpretations of the data collector. Implicating that the results could be biased. Second, for this study eight interviewees were interviewed to provide construct validity, however, only four of the interviewees actually work at the programs described in the cases. Of which one as a consultant for one of the programs. The other interviewees were highly knowledgeable in the field of corporate accelerators and did provide a broader perspective to the cases. However, they were mostly focused on the specifics of the companies they each individually worked for. Third, the study is only focused on three industries, which limits generalization. Other known industries that engage with startups, could be more focused on other elements and therefore search, evaluate and acquire knowledge differently. Finally, another limitation is the relative newness of the programs in the cases. It remains unknown whether the programs will be successful in later stages.

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and acquire knowledge from startups via corporate accelerator programs holds and differs in different industries. Second, the innovation platform approach provides an interesting approach which needs further investigation, to see if there are additional effects of building a large database of possible viable solutions to the firm. Third, corporate accelerators as startup interfaces need further evidence of their effectiveness as facilitators of incumbent startup engagement. This research identified startup liaison and the programs as instruments, but there could be different implementations and versions to achieve a profitable embeddedness in the entrepreneurial ecosystem for incumbent firms.

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