The Dynamics of Social Capital in
Effectuating Collective Action; Building
Proactive Resilience
Master Thesis MSc. BA Strategic Innovation Management;
MSc. International Business & Management.
Thirza Koopmans
s1886827
02-07-2014
Wordcount: 25203
University of Groningen
All the “tiny magnets” (individuals) need to orient themselves in the same direction (develop spiritually in addition to emotionally and physically) to fully magnetise (move towards
sustainability) the piece of iron (earth) they belong to. (Venkatesh, 2009)
I would like to give special thanks to Engbert Breuker, who has opened up his professional life for me. He showed me the beauty of the opportunities that lay ahead of us, the beauty of being a World Improver, but also the urgency for taking action in this world, that we are part of but not own.
I am grateful to all the organizers of ‘De Ontdekking van Groningen’, who took the time for me to express their thoughts, values and beliefs. Their thoughts have shifted my mental model and enriched me with knowledge in so many different fields.
I would also like to express my thanks to all the persons I interviewed, their openness and friendliness have helped me in my research process and broadened my views.
This thesis was made possible through the support and help of my supervisors, dr. Bart-Jan Pennink and dr. Thijs Broekhuizen. I am grateful for their valuable advice and insightful comments.
Lastly I would like to thank my family and friends, who put up with me in the final steps of my academic career. Thank you for your advice and mental support.
God knows what is hiding in those weak and drunken hearts Guess he kissed the girls and made them cry
Those hard-faced queens of misadventure God knows what is hiding in those weak and sunken lifes
Fiery throne of muted angels Giving love but getting nothing back oh
God knows what is hiding in this world of little consequence Behind the tears, inside the lies
A thousand slowly dying sunsets
God knows what is hiding in those weak and drunken hearts Guess the loneliness came knocking
No one needs to be alone oh save me People help the people
And if you're homesick, give me your hand and I'll hold it People help the people
Nothing will drag you down Oh and if I had a brain Oh and if I had a brain
I'd be cold as a stone and rich as the fool That turned all those good hearts away
Birdy – People Help the People
Table of Contents
PREFACE 1
ABSTRACT 4
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 3
2.1 Social Capital 3
2.1.1 Social Capital Definition 3
2.1.2.Sources of social capital 4
2.1.3.Dimensions of social capital 4
2.1.4. Dynamics of Social Capital 5
2.1.5. Types of network ties 5
2.1.6. Network Structure Mechanisms 6
2.2 Collective Action 7
2.2.1. Collective Action Problems 7
2.2.2 5 Games of Collective Action 8
2.2.3. Participation in Collective Action 8
2.2.4. Complex Operationalization of Collective Action 9
2.2.5. Phases of Collective Action 10
2.3 Social Capital and Collective Action 10
2.3.1 Trust and Reciprocity 10
2.3.2. Networks 11
2.3.3. Institutions 12
2.3.4. Public Entrepreneurship – The Missing Link 12
2.4 Resilience 13
2.4.1. Typology of Resilience 13
2.4.2. Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems 14
2.5 Social Capital, Collective Action, Proactive Resilience and Sustainable Development 14
2.5.1. The Social Dimension of Sustainable Development 15
2.5.2. Shadow Networks 16
2.5.3. Model: Social Capital and Collective Action Building Proactive Resilience 16
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 17
3.1. Case Study 17
3.1.1.Case study research 17
3.1.2. Case selection 17
3.1.3. Case description 18
3.2 Data collection 19
3.2.1. Principles of data collection 19
3.2.2. Interviews 20
3.2.3. Participant observation 21
3.2.4 .Documents and archival data 21
3.3 City Region specific Event - Appreciative Inquiry and Future Search 21
3.3.1. Future Search 21
3.3.2. Appreciative Inquiry 22
3.3.3. Appreciative Future Search 22
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 22
4.1 Phase 1: Pre-event Movement 22
4.2 The Three-Day Event 26
4.3 Post-Event Movement 29
6.1 Discussion 36
6.2 Conclusions 38
6.3 Limitations 39
6.4 Directions for further research 40
The Dynamics of Social Capital in Effectuating Collective Action;
Building Proactive Resilience
THIRZA KOOPMANS
University of Groningen
ABSTRACT
This study explores the dynamics of social capital in collective-action settings in the form of various processes in a social (-ecological) movement and how these dynamics build proactive resilience to sustain the Earth. This study provides a thorough theoretical background on the concepts under study: social capital, collective action, (proactive) resilience and sustainable development; visualized in a model. A case study is used to provide insight in the dynamics and reveal underlying mechanisms. The key findings of this research are: (1) dynamics of social capital create and enhance the formation and operation of collective-action, where collective action can be seen as the utility of social capital; (2) consciousness on the functioning and use of social capital and group dynamics may enhance collective action formation, operation and outcomes (3) the dynamics of social capital and collective action can stimulate societal change (innovation adoption and behavioral change) to enable systemic change by the formation of social networks forming a shadow system, that will enable safe-fail experiments for innovation, and; (4) proactive resilience starts at an individual level, therefore we need to shape public entrepreneurial motives. The conclusions are visualized in an adapted model and theoretical and practical implications are provided.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This study explores the dynamics of social capital in collective-action settings in the form of various processes in a social (-ecological) movement and how these dynamics build proactive resilience to sustain the Earth. Since humankind has become a dominant force of nature - the Anthropocene era -, humanity is shaping the global landscape, exerts unprecedented pressures on the planet’s resources, and pushes the Earth’s biophysical system far outside of its historic operating range (Steffen et al. 2005; Weinstein et
worlds’ financial (stock-market collapse), trade (e.g. market “bubbles”), food (famine), and resource-extraction systems (supply-demand cycles) (Westley et al., 2011; Weinstein et al., 2013). Concerned scientists point to the urgent need of sustainable transitions, requiring radical, systemic shifts changing deeply held values and beliefs, patterns of social behavior, and multi-level governance management regimes (Westley et al., 2011). Additionally, innovation potential and human creativity are needed to interlink social and ecological systems, building resilience and improve global sustainability (Westley et al. 2011).
Current increasing engagement in “sustainable practices” is insufficient to create sustainable systems (Weinstein et al., 2013). Efforts by private and public actors and institutions take on a reactive rather than proactive approach, thereby failing to address the underlying source of the unsustainable world, lacking systems thinking (Sterman, 2012). As Weinstein et al. (2013) notes, “we seem to be moving along a path where innovation is primarily leading to optimization of the status quo rather than to system innovation”. To build public understanding required for action, an effective science of sustainability and development of skills are required, to recognize the boundaries of our mental models, in order to expand them, and become aware of, and take responsibility for the consequences of our decisions (Sterman, 2012). According to Weinstein et al. (2013), this requires “new knowledge gained from use-inspired research (Stokes, 1997; Kates, 2012) and rigorous applications of that research to expose our hidden assumptions and biases”.
Sustainable development has been perceived as a combination of the three dimensions, or ‘pillars’, environmental, economic and social dimensions. Since the Rio conference in 1992, these three pillars have constituted the basis for most of the definitions of sustainable development in
international organizations, such as the OECD (2001) and Commission of European Communities (2001). Lehtonen (2004) stresses in his paper the common recognition of the social pillar being the ‘weakest’ pillar in current analytical and theoretical underpinnings. Sustainable development has been essentially an environmental issue, with as focal point, integrating environmental concerns into economic decision-making (Lehtonen, 2004).
To study the social dimension of sustainable development, Lehtonen (2004) suggests a social capital and individual capabilities approach. Pelling and High (2005) in their research also pinpoint towards a social capital approach to study the coevolution of social networks and norms in the production of adaptive capacity in collective action settings; communities of place and communities of practice. Adaptive capacity is an emergent property of social systems for sustainability in the context of climate change and can be categorized between reinforcing existing institutions or adding resilience through flexibility, safeguarding core functions but not the system itself. This latter categorization of adaptive capacity, what we term ‘proactive resilience’ (following Tompkins and Adgar, 2005), allows for systemic change toward sustainable development, where “the multi-layered and multi-faceted social ties of everyday social interaction may be a community’s best resource in maintaining a capacity to change collective direction” (Pelling and High, 2005).
through dynamics of social capital inspires to build proactive resilience for local (-regional) sustainable development.
The case study used in this research is the social movement ‘The Discovery of Groningen’. This movement roughly started in April 2013, with a variety of people concerned on the sustainable development of Groningen, a Northern Province of the Netherlands. Discussions, meetings and environment scans were performed and over time, organically, a group was developed that collectively engaged in the organization of an event that would bridge between different stakeholder groups to search for innovative opportunities in the city region. After the event, some first steps were taken to develop initiatives, but it should be considered more generally as a social (-ecological) movement that raises issues to foster sustainable development.
The aim of this study is to explore the dynamics of social capital in effectuating collective action in the process of a social movement to inspire local sustainable development and build proactive resilience.
This leads to the following research question:
How do dynamics of social capital effectuate collective action in order to build proactive resilience?
The sub questions used to answer our research question are:
1. How does social capital effectuate collective action?
2. How can an appreciative future search conference be used to effectuate collective action?
3. How can collective action through social capital build proactive resilience?
4. How does proactive resilience affect systemic change for sustainable development?
The outline of this thesis is as follows; we will start with a thorough theoretical background on the concepts of social capital, collective action, resilience and the relationships between these concepts. Also theoretical background on appreciative future search will be provided here, since the event that will be under study was organized as such. Next the problem context and research methodology will be explained, followed by a description of the case study. To continue, the case will be analyzed and the findings on base of this analysis will be presented. A discussion will compare and relate the findings to existing research literature. In the conclusion, a summary of the research findings will be provided, as well as the theoretical and managerial implications. Finally the limitations of the research will be discussed and interesting venues for further research will be presented.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND
2.1 Social Capital
2.1.1 Social Capital Definition
The term ‘Social Capital’, credited to Jacobs (1961), has increasingly received attention by scholars over the last decades and broadly refers to the resources derived from social relationships. The term social capital is still in an emergent phase. Current literature and research on social capital still comprises different uses and connotations from various scholars’ perspectives (De Carolis and Saparito, 2006).
Following Adler and Kwon (2002), Payne, Moore, Griffis and Autry (2011) performed a comprehensive review of two decades of management research in which social capital has been empirically applied across levels of analysis. They identified two dimensions along which one can broadly divide the use of social capital in research, the level of analysis; individuals or collectives and the locus of activity; internal or external ties. According to Payne et al. (2011), most definitions are based on the conceptualizations of social capital by Burt (2000) and Coleman (1990).
Burt’s (2000) conceptualization of social capital focuses on external linkages creating ‘brokerage opportunities in a network’. Here, social capital refers to the benefits that accrue from networks that are rich in structural holes” (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
The conceptualization of social capital by Coleman (1990) takes on a utilitarian approach (Macke and Dilly, 2010) focusing more on the linkages among individuals or groups internal to a collectivity (Adler and Kwon, 2002), which serve as a resource to achieve their goals and satisfy their interests (Macke and Dilly, 2010). Here, social capital is defined as “some aspect of social structure that facilitates certain actions of individuals within the structure” (Coleman, 1990).
Other definitions of social capital which are often cited are these by Adler and Kwon (2002), Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and Bourdieu (1986) (Payne et al. 2011).
Social capital will be an independent variable in the causal model that will be displayed in section 2.5.3. Several sources, dynamics and dimensions will be discussed in the upcoming section of social capital. These will be included in the process-model that will be provided in Appendix B, as to increase understanding of the role of social capital in the process toward proactive resilience and sustainable development.
2.1.2. Sources of social capital
Extending the notion of social relations as the source of social capital, the key sources of social capital as explained by Adler and Kwon (2002) are opportunity, motivation and ability.
Opportunity for social capital transactions is being created in the network of social ties. Internal ties create the opportunity for collective actors to act together. External ties give actors the opportunity to leverage their contacts’ ties and resources. Opportunity can be examined by analyzing the structural configurations of a network – network analysis.
A second source for social capital is motivation and can be considered a more direct source of social capital. The source of motivation lies in the forms of norms and trust. Portes (1998) distinguishes between two forms of motivation as ‘consummatory’ – based on internalized norms through socialization and the experience of a shared destiny with others, and ‘instrumental’ – also based on norms, created by dyadic social exchange (Blau, 1964), called ‘enforced trust’, where obligations are enforced by the community on both actors (Portes, 1998).
A third source of social capital is ability, the competencies and resources at the nodes of the network. This source enhances the value of social exchanges within a network, as ability has the potential to mobilize valuable resources and competencies. Without the ability to exchange resources, no value can be derived from social exchange and the concept of social capital becomes a concept of no value. ‘Associability’ is a term for the ability and willingness to define and enact upon collective goals, thus combining the two sources of motivation and ability into one concept (Leana and van Buren, 1999).
The sources of social capital will be incorporated in the process-model (see Appendix B), since the sources are needed for the formation, but also the operation and utility of social capital.
2.1.3. Dimensions of social capital
The structural dimension involves patterns of relationships between actors in a network that can be analyzed from the perspective of network ties, connectivity, configuration, density and stability (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Coleman, 1990). The conceptualization of social capital by Burt (1992) stresses the importance of positioning within a network because it can confer differential access to information. Structural holes exist when different clusters are only sparsely connected to one another. He suggests that people who hold one or few connecting position(s) between clusters can act as a broker for nonredundant information, or than an entrepreneur can benefit from the structural hole, through leveraging the nonredundant information for profit, as a tertius gaudens (Burt, 1992, 1997; De Carolis and Saparito, 2006).
The relational dimension focuses on the role of direct ties between actors and the relational outcomes of interactions; “the nature of the personal relationship that develops between specific people” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Trust, norms and identification are relevant factors to this dimension. Trust enhances the willingness of actors to share knowledge and to increase commitment (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005), thereby promoting cooperation, and in turn increased cooperation reinforces higher levels over trust (Putnam, 1993). Macke and Dilly (2010) further stress the behavioral component of the relational dimension, revealed in trust and distrust (Putnam 1993, 2000), norms (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993) obligations and expectations (Coleman, 1990; Granovetter, 1992), participation and diversity tolerance (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).
The cognitive dimension refers to “shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among parties”; shared visions in shared codes and narratives, values and other cultural elements (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). By sharing each other’s thinking processes, one allows for exchange of information, learning and knowledge creation (De Carolis and Saparito, 2006). This dimension is not being explored in the literature according to some authors (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).
2.1.4. Dynamics of Social Capital
In order to understand the functioning of social capital, we need to understand the different forms of social capital which can be distinguished: bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Onyx and Bullen, 2000). These are the types of interpersonal relationships that give form to social capital and are a site and outcome of reciprocity (Pelling and High, 2005).
Bonding social capital refers to the impact of
the internal ties of a collective and the substance of the network relationships within that collective (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Leana and Van Buren, 1999). It is characterized by strong relations of mutual aid in the local context and high levels of participation, resulting in dense multi-functional strong ties but with localized trust, and generates empowerment within horizontal networks (Onyx and Bullen, 2000). The mutual support is thus limited to a certain group or network and cannot be extended (Macke and Dilly, 2010).
Bridging social capital refers to the impact of
ties developed between individuals and groups of different clusters. This type of social capital focuses on the individuals’ external ties, which can serve to expand the skills and networks resources, not accessible in other ways (Onyx and Bullen, 2000). These ties cross group boundaries in a horizontal direction (Pelling and High, 2005).
Linking social capital considers relations of
unequal power and allows for the unification of the collective social capital and the individual social capital approach (Macke and Dilly, 2010). As Pelling and High (2005) describe, linking ties are the relationships that cross group boundaries in a vertical direction, e.g. social classes, community groups and donors (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).
The dynamics of social capital will be incorporated in the process-model (see Appendix B), as the active dynamics are a necessary and very important for enabling and enhancing the formation, operation and use of social capital.
2.1.5. Types of network ties
strong and loose or weak ties. They distinguish between these types of ties based on five elements: networks, reciprocity, trust, shared norms, and social agency.
From their analysis on these 5 elements, Onyx and Bullen (2003) theorize bonding social capital as “dense, multiplex networks, long term reciprocity, thick trust, shared norms, and less instrumentality”. Bonding social capital can thus be characterized as ‘strong’ ties.
They theorize bridging social capital as being associated with “large, loose networks, relatively strict reciprocity, perhaps a thinner or different sort of trust, greater risk of norm violation, and more instrumentality”. Bridging thus seems to be characterized as ‘loose’ ties.
However, in their research Onyx and Bullen (2003) find that the dynamics of social capital are much more complex than hypothesized. For bonding social capital both strong and loose ties are highly important. Furthermore, they find that strong ties are more relevant for bridging than expected. Exceptions to this were loose ties with formal professional status, suggesting professionals can play a strategic role in facilitating connections across groups.
People recognized by their professional status can be used as bridging links without the relatively slow process of repeated interaction involved in developing trust, the ‘bonding’, needed to create ‘strong’ ties. This is conditioned by a demonstration of commitment to the values of the community, thereby suggesting voluntarily contributing to local organizations is a good indicator of such a commitment. A breach of trust would have far reaching effects in the functioning of a society. Furthermore, multiple, cross cutting ties between people, organizations and social categories together serve for ‘bonding’ in the society as a whole (Onyx and Bullen, 2003). The findings of this research noting the importance of loose and strong ties in bridging social capital align with research by Burt (1998, 2000) on the importance of structural holes in social capital theory.
2.1.6. Network Structure Mechanisms
Burt’s (2000) work on social capital builds on the social metaphor of social capital that people
who do better or somehow better connected. The social capital metaphor is the contextual complement to the human capital explanation why some people do better. The inequality of people explained by human capital is that people who do better are more able individuals, who are more intelligent, more attractive, more articulate and more skilled. He stresses that more compelling results could be obtained and integrated across studies, if attention of social capital research would focus on the specific network mechanisms responsible for social capital. In the process of social capital research as a network analysis and a critical issue, new light can be shed “on related concerns such as coordination, creativity, discrimination, entrepreneurship, leadership, learning, teamwork, and the like” (Burt, 2000). He describes two network mechanisms that are highly relevant to the performance, the outcomes of social capital. However, first we start with two related concepts that have gained wide support in various literature streams.
The first concept is network contagion. Because of the ambiguities inherent of market information, presumptions are made of firms imitating other firms in adopting policies. Networks can replace information and within the social structures, penalties are efficiently monitored and enforced. The advantage underlying the network contagion explanations is that transmission of beliefs and practices is ensured more readily between certain people and organizations in a social structure.
The second concept is network prominence. Again on the notion of ambiguity inherent of market information, investors who do not have accurate market information, can replace this information by considering the standing of the other party in the social network, as a signal of quality (Burt, 2000; Podolny, 1993). Network prominence is thus about the reputation created by a certain positioning within a social structure or network.
structure of prior relations among people and organizations in a market can affect, or replace, information” (Burt, 2000)
Network closure is a source of social capital, as
in closed networks in which everyone is connected (a dense network), access to information and sanctions are facilitated, which in turn increases trust (Burt, 2000). Network closure is associated with bonding social capital.
Network brokerage underlies the social capital
of structural holes argument, as brokerage opportunities on structural holes (Burt, 2000; Burt, 1992). Structural holes are the weaker connections between groups, the holes between social structures. These create brokerage opportunities as it creates a competitive advantage for the individual whose relationships span the holes. “Structural holes are the opportunity to broker the flow of information between people and control the projects that bring together people form opposite sides of the hole” (Burt, 2000). Network brokerage is associated with bridging social capital.
He finds that brokerage across structural holes is the source of added value in networks, but that network closure can be critical to realize the value that is buried in the holes (Burt, 2000).
2.2 Collective Action
A general definition of collective action still does not exist in the existing literature. Most definitions do have in common that collective action requires the involvement of a group of
people, a shared interest within the group and the
involvement of some kind of common action that works in pursuit of the shared interest. Furthermore, this action should be voluntary to distinguish it from labor (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). As an example, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) mentions the definition by Marshall (1998) where collective actions is an “action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests”.
The function of advancing the common interest of a group of individuals can be performed by organizations, as they also serve personal,
individual interests. One major obstacle in advancing the common interest collectively when it is not performed in an organization, is the fact that all members of the group have an interest in obtaining the collective benefit, but they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good (Olson, 2002).
However, in absence of organization, when a number of individuals share a common or collective interest, individual, unorganized action which also serves individual interests, will either not be able to advance that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest adequately (Ostrom, 1990).
Collective action will be an independent variable in the causal model displayed in section 2.5.3 and also be part of the process-model provided in Appendix B.
2.2.1. Collective Action Problems
Until late 1960s, collective action has been described as ‘a common or shared interest among a group of people, and that there was a natural tendency for these people to act together in pursuit of those interests’. Olson argued otherwise in 1965: “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”, as people are not willing to voluntarily contribute. He defined collective action as: any action providing a collective good, a good that cannot be withheld from any other member of a group or outside the group (Olsen, 1965). The rational, self-interested individual would not engage in such behavior for a collective good, creating the free-rider problem (Oliver, 1993).
Ostrom and Ahn (2007) recognize this view on collective action as the first generation of collective-action theories (e.g. Olson 1965), which had been expressed by earlier group theorists (Bentley, 1949; Truman, 1958). Core to these theories is an image of atomized, selfish and fully rational individuals (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007). Since Olson’s contribution to social science, explaining the ‘irrational’ character of collective action, the concept has been treated as problematic by most social scientists (Oliver, 1993).
has become a core principle for understanding collective action (Ostrom, 2005). Additionally, second-generation theories also make use of behavioral and evolutionary game theories, relevant to social capital research (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007).
2.2.2 5 Games of Collective Action
Heckathorn (1996) presents 5 games that are relevant to the dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. By understanding these games, one can promote collective action by resolving the dilemma in the game, or change the game, so the dilemma is easily resolved or eliminated.
(1) Prisoner’s Dilemma: The prisoner’s
dilemma is special in the analysis of collective action. It is named for two criminal suspects separately questioned about a crime. Their interests derive from the preference order of the core game’s payoffs. The most preferred is for one to benefit from confessing when the other remains silent, followed by both to remain quiet and receive light sentences, next comes severe punishment for both when both confess, and the worst is when only the other confesses and one’s own penalty is most harsh. The essential problem in this game is the trust one places in the action of the other to serve in the shared interest. This game has become the paradigm for cases in which individually rational actions lead to collectively irrational outcomes
(2) Chicken Game: The chicken game was
named for a contest in which teenage drivers test their courage by driving straight at one another. Each player can choose to chicken (swerve to avoid a collision) or daredevil (do not swerve). The essential problem in this game is bargaining and can be found in systems which have collective action as a common interest, but have opposed preferences regarding the precise direction of that action. The hawk/dove split often arises in social movements, where purists claim that pragmatists are selling out by forsaking the movement’s essential goals, and pragmatists claim that
purists’ unwillingness to compromise will lead the movement into ruin.
(3) Assurance Game: The assurance game
presents exactly opposite dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma game. The game derives its name from the fact that each player can be motivated to cooperate by the mere assurance that the other will do the same. Here, there is consensus on terms how to cooperate and participation with others is highly valued, but the individual will only participate when others participate as well. When there is no belief that others will participate, this can become a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. Alternatively, in these systems participation is self-reinforcing, creating the problem of coordination.
(4) Privileged Game: In a privileged game,
there is no social dilemma, because individual and collective rationality perfectly coincide. A highly valued collective good will already be provisioned and a collective good which is not value, will also not create a dilemma. Not in all collective goods provision dilemmas are inherent.
(5) Altruist’s Dilemma: In an altruist’s
dilemma, the problem is not too little social cooperation, but rather too much, because that is what others prefer they do. This problem occurs in cases where the cost of providing the public good exceeds its benefits, so production is collectively irrational. This can also occur in cases of organizing collective action where selective incentives are employed, because actors can then compel one another to act altruistically.
2.2.3. Participation in Collective Action
However, if collective action is assumed to be irrational, then the question arises why public participation and social movements do occur.
of incentives individual decision-makers face. The process of participation may be affected by problems of non-cooperative behavior (e.g. shirking and the free-rider problem) (Rydin and Pennington, 2010).
Firstly, public choice suggests that exceptions to non-cooperative behavior mostly occurs in
small-group situations, where potential participants
know each other and there is the prospect of strategic bargaining in an iterative social context. In these circumstances, free-riding can be better monitored and punished, making participation more likely (Rydin and Pennington, 2010). Secondly, private selective incentives may stimulate participation, which may be in the form of material or non-material goods, where only the ones who agree to cooperate enjoy these goods. This can be a consumable good, but it might also be simply sufficient to participate because of “the prospect of meeting friends who share similar values and beliefs, and the enjoyment of collective effort with these people”. A third option might be the view that participation has an effect for a political entrepreneur, reducing the discounting of political benefits (Rydin and Pennington, 2010).
A comprehensive review on collective action theories by Oliver (1993) shows that coordination and interdependence mechanisms can substitute for the absence of individual incentives for participation, to overcome collective action problems. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) state that formal and informal organizations may be helpful in coordinating collective action. Collective action can manifest itself as an event, an institution or as a process. Institutionalization of collective action as an event remains by itself a very interesting question. However, where institutionalization reduces transaction costs over time, the more institutionalized collective action is, the less flexible and adaptable it becomes (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004).
Interdependence mechanisms relate to the concept of ‘critical mass’. The more people who participate, the more likely it is that one will decide that it is in one’s own best interest to participate as well. In Heckatorn’s game typology of collective action, this is closest to the assurance game (1996).
Oliver (1993) also concludes that the degree of group heterogeneity affects the outcomes of collective action. Furthermore, she stresses that the
‘rational actor’, mainly described by Olsen (1965) in the first-generation of collective-action theories, still has a place, but now shares the stage with the adaptive learner, who is willing to contribute to a collective good for reasons known only to himself (Oliver, 1993). Coordination mechanisms for bringing these individual actors together remain a rich venue for research (Oliver, 1993).
The collective action problem remains troublesome, especially when it comes to active participation instead of passive membership (Rydin and Pennington, 2010). The collective-action problems and participation incentives are displayed in table 1 (see Appendix A). When it comes to environmental issues, active participation is even more difficult to stimulate, where there is little incentive to actively participate, shirking is almost anonymous, there is no collective sanction to free-ride behavior and costs for monitoring are prohibitive (Rydin, 1998).
2.2.4. Complex Operationalization of Collective Action
The concept of collective action has had a central role in the development paradigms of the 1970s, which have been largely based also on the presumption that communities would fully engage collectively over a large range of activities, with little attention given to what types of activities were best managed at the community level, as described by Seabright (1997). Very little attention was given to understanding how collective action arises to deal with different issues, and how it is sustained (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004).
outcomes, decisions, actions, inputs, proxy variables, conditioning or explanatory variables, and the process of implementing collective action need to be clearly defined.
Further complicating the operationalization of the concept of collective action is the dynamic character of the collective action process in relation to social relationships and the distinct methodological approaches used by different social sciences disciplines (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004).
The multi-level, dynamic and complex character of collective action researched using various distinct methodological approaches makes operationalization of the concept of collective action a difficult task.
2.2.5. Phases of Collective Action
Now we have a better understanding of all the complexities related to the concept of collective action, we lastly need to address the further complicating, temporal scale of collective action. As Heckathorn (1996) suggests, collective action exists in three phases, except for the smallest and most highly centralized systems of collective action.
The initial phase mainly depends on the contribution of either ‘zealots’ (Coleman, 1990) or a ‘critical mass’ (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). Zealots are according to Coleman (1990) individuals who are willing to bear extreme costs, seemingly out of proportion to the personal benefit involved. Critical mass has been described above as the interdependence mechanisms, where people are willing to contribute as other people do as well (Marwell and Oliver, 1993).
During the intermediate phase, marginal returns to contributors, strategic interaction or the operation of selective sanction grows the ranks of contributing actors.
Finally, during the mature phase, the limits of the collective good production are approached because of physical constraints on further production or too many additional contributors to make it functional.
The temporal scale of collective action has some implications with regard to researching collective action. When researching collective action over time, long-term analysis is needed. Otherwise, a
‘snapshot’ of collective action would be created, simplifying the complex dynamics of collective action, explaining only current conditions (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). The different phases of collective action require other mechanisms to promote collective action as they present distinct collective-action problems (Heckathorn, 1996). Furthermore, collective action may also serve a temporary need. Therefore dissolution of collective action groups or a lack of activity, may not be a bad thing. Also, collective action may be under rapid adaptation and change, meaning that timing of data collection is of great importance.
2.3 Social Capital and Collective Action
To understand the relation between social capital and collective action, we need to start with the research by Adger (2003), who states: “Common to all theories of social interaction, however, is the recognition that collective action requires networks and flows of information between individuals and groups to oil the wheels of decision making. These sets of networks are usefully described as an asset of an individual or a society and are increasingly termed social capital.” So, social capital is the facilitator of collective action and collective action can be understood as one of the flows associated with social capital (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; Uphoff, 2000). This implies that empirical research must usually incorporate both concepts when analyzing collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004).
The linkages between social capital and collective action as described in this section (trust and reciprocity, networks and institutions) will be incorporated in the process-model (see Appendix B) and can be directly related to the dimensions of social capital. Current public entrepreneurship literature is still very limited and will therefore not be included in the causal model, but will be in the process-model (Appendix B).
2.3.1 Trust and Reciprocity
networked with one another, and within institutions that reward honest behavior. Trust can be defined as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action” (Gambetta, 2000), what reduces the risk of cooperation. According to Leana and Van Buren (1999), trust is both an outcome and an antecedent to successful collective action. This can be explained by the concept of reciprocity.
Putnam (2000) shifted the focus from trust towards reciprocity in his writing. Trust reinforces norms of generalized reciprocity, but reciprocity is a social attribute through which trust is enacted in interpersonal transfers of information or resources. We can distinguish between balanced and generalized reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity involves an exchange between two individuals who exchange perhaps on a regular basis or something of roughly the same value. Generalized reciprocity is less direct, one individual might help another without expecting anything in return, but rather assumes a third party will be predisposed to extend help knowing the reputation of the first individual for generosity and helpfulness (Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 1993). This distinction also offers insight in that when one relies on generalized reciprocity, individual behavior does not directly influence the behavior of others (Pelling and High, 2005).
The distinction between the two types of reciprocity was also suggested by Ostrom (1998). She defined reciprocity as both an internalized personal moral norm, as well as a pattern of social exchange. She defines reciprocity as involving a family of strategies in collective-action situations, including “(1) an effort to identify who else is involved, (2) an assessment of the likelihood that others are conditional cooperators, (3) a decision to cooperate initially with others if others are trusted to be conditional cooperators, (4) a refusal to cooperate with those who do not reciprocate, and (5) punishment of those who betray trust.”
Ostrom and Ahn (2007) describe reciprocity in game-theoretic terms, as a prevailing pattern of interaction among individuals, in an efficient equilibrium of repeated social dilemma games, with multiple types of individuals and incomplete information. So trust reinforced by reciprocity has the ability to overcome the problems of collective action.
2.3.2. Networks
Putnam (1993) stresses that dense networks of social exchange are a crucial condition for the rise of the norm of generalized reciprocity, as transmission of information across individuals about their trustworthiness is made available within these dense networks (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007). This idea also relates to the network structure mechanisms of Burt (2002), where network closure enables successful collective action.
In a research by Siegel (2009), the role of networks on political participation has been researched. His work can also improve understanding of the role of networks on participation in collective action in other cases, such as in this research. His four main conclusions are:
(1) Small World networks efficiently induce high levels of participation, as it spreads quickly via a combination of strong and weak ties. However, the more strong ties present in the network, adding weak ties decreases participation.
(2) Village networks are similar to small word networks. Participative behavior spreads first within and then between villages, what leads to less efficiency and slightly less participation. In this network, weak ties more often encourage participation than in Small World networks.
(3) Opinion Leader networks are networks in which the number of elites (who have many connections) and the degree of elite conformity in motivations are the most relevant. Participative behavior spreads outward from motivated elites to followers. Generally these networks permit lower levels of participation than Small World networks.
2.3.3 Institutions
Institutions are most often defined following North (1990), where “institutions are the rules of the game in society or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Institutions can be broadly defined as the prescriptions that specify what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted, and the sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007; Crawford and Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom et al. 1994). These rules are human beings’ efforts to establish order and increase predictability of social outcomes. They can be used to further the interest of many individuals “or, collective-choice processes are being controlled by a well-organized subgroup, to benefit the group more than others.” (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007).
Institutions can be both formal and informal. Formal institutions (written laws, administrative regulations, court decisions, and so forth) can encourage or discourage individual’s efforts to voluntarily solve their collective action problems. The right set of formal institutions, a rule of law, a democratic atmosphere, and a well-structured government, can be a valuable social capital for societies (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007).
When formal institutions are improper or impractable, individuals may devise ‘their own’ informal institutions. Informal institutions here are self created working rules, to deal with collective-action problems. In order to create a sustainable set of working rules, time and resources to devise, revise, monitor and sanction are required. A set of working rules will create common understanding among the individuals involved regarding what actions and outcomes are expected and of others (Aoki, 2007). The rules used by individuals to structure their patterns of relationships may enhance or retard the creation of other forms of social capital. Successful self-governing systems require a sustainable set of working rules, as a form of social capital.
Social capital in itself is dynamic. Social capital can be created, weakened, destroyed, strengthened, or transformed, and can enhance the outcomes of a few without any impact, or even at the expense of others. Also the outcomes of social capital in collective action can do good, but also do
(unintended) harm instead (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007).
2.3.4 Public Entrepreneurship – The Missing Link
The dilemma of collective action as described by Olsen (1965) is that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”, and therefore not voluntarily contribute to pursuit of the collective interest. To overcome collective-action problems, various literature has been discussed. Offering selective incentives has been suggested as one of means, but the question than arises, “how these selective incentives can be offered during the founding period of an interest organization” (Kuhnert, 2001). As he notes, while active collective participants can respond to preexisting structure of selective incentives, the organizers of the group themselves cannot, as their incentives are part of the future. In any objective sense, there is no existing structure at the moment of innovation.
According to Kuhnert (2001), the missing link in the Logic of Collective Action is the public entrepreneur. The term ‘public entrepreneurship’ was introduced by Ostrom, (1965) in the same year as Olson published the Logic of Collective action. She used it to explain why collective action can occur, taking on a dynamic theoretical perspective, as she focuses on the process that leads to collective action. The tasks of a public entrepreneur consists of: (1) initiating collective action projects under uncertainty; (2) set innovative process in motion and; (3) engage in organizational and management activity. It is key that someone is able to envision the possibilities of joint action and therefore is willing to bring together the necessary factors, or stakeholders for decision-making.
transformed into political decisions, there are four ways available to political leaders, namely through:
(1) discovery – or overlooking- of existing preferences;
(2) subjective interpretation and selective acceptance of discovered preferences (3) Purposeful creation of preferences that have
not existed before, and;
(4) Unintended creation of political preferences in the process of democratic discourse Recognizing the preferred characteristics of collective action entrepreneurs related to the capability of leadership and persuasion, as found in the political arena, to initiate collective action, we need to discover latent opportunities and understand the interdependency between leaders and followers.
Furthermore, we need to understand the motives for the formation of collective action. The motives for a public entrepreneur are considered as an endogenous process. The motives for public entrepreneurs for entrepreneurial action can be:
(1) The power motive (sensation of power) (2) The motive to prove oneself superior to
others (competition)
(3) The motive to prove one’s current ability superior to one’s former ability (self-competition)
(4) The differentiation motive (benefit from being different)
(5) The joy of creating (just getting things done, exercising one’s energy and ingenuity)
Lastly, we need to understand that the process purposeful institutional innovation is under uncertainty Therefore, it can often lead to errors and unforeseen consequences. Secondly, public entrepreneurs can pursue different design concepts, inducing perhaps even more innovating activity by rival public entrepreneurs. Public entrepreneurship can occur at different levels (Kuhnert, 2001) and can exist in various forms, in a hybrid between the public and private sector.
2.4 Resilience
Humanity has severely perturbated the ecological systems supporting human systems and well-being (Westley et al. 2013). Facing the potentially disastrous changes in the global system because of human activities is not only an intellectual reconciliation but a challenge. Technological solutions will be not enough to face this challenge and therefore requires major social, political, economic change: we need to change the way we interact with the natural system that supports us. Sustainability or sustainable development is the popularized term for ensuring the natural environment will maintain in a form that it can continue to meet future human needs (Handmer and Dovers, 1996).
The sustainability debate is pervaded by uncertainty: biophysical uncertainties are compounded by uncertainties in the political system, institutional and technological change, evolving societal values, economic fluctuations and so on. The key policy response to uncertainty for sustainable development is the precautionary principle, defined in the Rio 1992 declaration as: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. Other official definitions also stress anticipatory or preventive measures. However, tools for operationalization are of limited value for advancing sustainability, where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowitz & Ravetz, 1991).
The resilience perspective is increasingly used as an approach for understanding the dynamics of social-ecological systems. It builds on the work of Holling (1961) and can be defined as follows: “resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, and parameters, and still persist.” (Holling, 1973).
2.4.1. Typology of Resilience
recognition of the dynamic interdependency between both complex systems, but also the recognition that any defined system is a subsystem is fundamental. Dovers and Handmer (1992) distinguish between reactive and proactive resilience. Reactive resilience as an approach to strengthen the status quo and making the current system resistant to change, aiming for constancy or stability. A proactive resilience approach accepts the inevitability of change and tries to create a system that is capable to adapting to new conditions and imperatives. These two approaches are considered as extremes, it is likely that in a complex society there is a mixture of the two. To structure argumentation in the current sustainability debate, Dovers and Handmer (1996) propose a three-way classification of resilience: (1) Resistance and Maintenance; (2) Change at the Margins, and; (3) Openness and adaptability. This typology is in terms of the assumption underlying the society or institution under study (Dovers and Handmer, 1996).
Resistance and Maintenance This type of
resilience is characterized by a resistance to change, with a focus on maintaining the status quo. The lack of flexibility and inability to adjust to new circumstances will most likely result in irreversible damage.
Change at the Margins This type is characterized
by an acknowledgement of the unsustainable character of the system and engagement in some incremental changes. However, this type of resilience will most likely be insufficient to force the necessary changes to the system.
Openness and Adaptability This type of
resilience can be characterized by its openness to radical change to social structures and institutional arrangements. Major changes towards becoming a sustainable society are being performed and in this form uncertainty and unanticipated outcomes are well managed. A threat to this highly adaptable society is the chance that (irreversible) maladaptive changes are being made.
Proactive Resilience will be the dependent variable in the causal model as presented in 2.5.3., leading toward sustainable development.
2.4.2 Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems Folke (2006) argues that the resilience concept of social-ecological systems, being complex adaptive systems, is not simply captured by the resistance to change and persistence to disturbance. He stresses that it is the adaptive capacity of resilience that allows for continuous development, a dynamic adaptive interplay between sustaining and developing with change. As explained by Folke (2006), too much of sustaining the system and too much of changing the system, will ultimately lead to collapse. Therefore it is very difficult to transform a resilient system from the current state into a more desirable one. We thus need to create a dynamic interplay of the different types of resilience as explained above.
Following Carpenter and Gunderson (2001), resilience providing adaptive capacity incorporates besides a buffer capacity also aspects of adaptation, learning and self-organizing capacity, and can be interpreted as:
(1) “the amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain within the same state or domain of attraction,
(2) the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization (versus lack of organization, or organization forced by external factors), and;
(3) the degree to which the system can build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation.” (Folke, 2006)
The self-organization, learning and adaptive capacity will be incorporated in the process-model (Appendix B) that will enhance the functioning of the shadow networks for sustainable development that will be discussed in the following section (2.5.2.).
2.5 Social Capital, Collective Action, Proactive Resilience and Sustainable Development
emphasis on sustainable development of the social-ecological systems shifts more towards transformability as opposed to adaptation. This implies that we need to extend the focus and research systems emerging from ecological economics and explore the social dimension, drawing on new institutional and social capital theory to increase understanding of the elements that shape individual and collective action (Folke et al. 2006). Transformability relies on the collaboration of a diverse set of stakeholders operating at different social and ecological scales in multi-level institutions and organizations (Olsson et al. 2004). It is individuals who can play an essential role in providing e.g. leadership, trust, vision and meaning in the transformation towards sustainable development, tied together in the web of social networks.
However, transformation may not be immediately feasible, and so, reform now is better than no change at all (Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien, 2005). Governments have a key role in moving towards sustainable development and need to push business for reform. Also, reformers assume that there will be a reform of the political system increasing democracy and public participation. We citizens need to raise the issues, mobilize the media and build coalitions linking researchers, social movements and direct action, cohesive enough to realize change (Hopwood et al., 2005). To be successful on an urban level, we need a combination of best practice, enlightened civic leaders, active partnership with local business and public determination (Girardet, 1999). Thus, where governments and business are engaging in reforms, our main focus should be to support flexible institutions and social networks in multi-level governance systems (Folke et al., 2005).
2.5.1. The Social Dimension of Sustainable Development
Scholars argue that to make the transformation to sustainable development, we need to address its social dimension (Adger, 2003; Folke et al. 2006; Folke et al. 2005; Folke et al. 2003; Lehtonen, 2004; Newman and Dale, 2005; Tomkins and Adger, 2004). The social dimension refers to both individual and collective levels, it is reflexive and it is immaterial. The reflexivity of the social
dimension entails that “our perceptions and interpretations of the objective social conditions change the behavior of individuals and social collectives, hence influencing the objective themselves” (Lehtonen, 2004). Therefore, social phenomena themselves are difficult to grasp and analyze, in particular quantitatively (Lehtonen, 2004) and its interconnectedness with the economic, demands for a holistic approach.
Literature suggests that “the multi-layered and multi-faceted social ties of everyday social interaction may be a community’s best resource in maintaining a capacity to change collective direction” (Pelling and High, 2005). Pelling and High (2005) take a social capital approach for understanding adaptive behavior in communities. They stress the need to address questions regarding the formation, operation and utility of social capital in building and facilitating adaptive capacity.
Lehtonen (2004) studied the individual capabilities and social capital approach. He recognized the methodological complexities and sensitivity of the issues involved and therefore suggests that learning by doing and broadening the range of stakeholders involved to increase legitimacy and credibility may be the only way of overcoming these complexities.
Tompkins and Adger (2004) argue that resilience and adaptive capacity can be build by community social networks, referring to the dynamics of social capital, with a good mix of bonding and bridging ties. Newman and Dale (2005) in response to Tompkins and Adger (2004) argue that building adaptive capacity is only half of the advantage gained by such social networks. Newman and Dale (2005) stress the proactive side of adapting to resilience as being the ‘development’ component of ‘sustainable development’. In their argument, they refer to Holling (2001): “Sustainability is the capacity to
create, test, and maintain adaptive capability. Development is the process of creating, testing, and maintaining opportunity”. Thus, ‘sustainable
sufficient condition for enabling these conditions, provided it also enhances functional diversity (Dale and Onyx, 2005). To develop proactive responses to environmental challenges, “this may involve the deliberate development of bridging and bonding social capital to create vertical integration (linking) between communities and links to power brokers and the strengthening of networks that are globally interconnected in new and novel ways” (Newman and Dale, 2005).
In order to build a convincing argument on the role of social capital in building proactive resiliency, the ambiguities and limitations of social capital should be made more transparent so we enhance our understanding on the opportunities of social capital, but also the negative aspects inherent to social capital. Honest and critical appraisal is therefore essential (Pelling and High, 2005; Newman and Dale, 2005).
2.5.2. Shadow Networks
The uncertainty inherent to decision-making regarding climate change demands for new supporting institutions to be created (O’Riordan and Rayner, 1991). Rayner complains in 2006 that although the need for new institutions with more public engagement and reflexive governance is recognized, we need to move towards identifying those pathways that enable adaptive action. We need institutions through which multiple viewpoints and values are collected to enter the decision-making arena, serving as a base for building adaptive capacity (O’Brien, 2006).
Pelling, High, Dearing and Smith (2008) researched relational spaces within organizations that cut across the formal organizational structures for learning and adaptation, which they define as shadow spaces. In these shadow spaces, individuals or sub-groups can experiment, imitate, communicate, learn and reflect on their actions in ways that surpass formal processes, offering a potential approach to focus on process, rather than output, enabling proactive adaptation. Key in these shadow spaces is both individual as social learning.
Westley et al. (2011) integrates the concepts of shadow spaces and social networks. He recognizes the opportunity for individual actors to play pivotal
roles in learning processes by providing leadership, building trust, developing visions and sense-making, connecting people and networks as brokers and play a key role as nodes in learning networks (Westley et al., 2011) Institutional entrepreneurs, or perhaps public entrepreneurs, can work at building innovation niches (a shadow system) to nurture innovative alternatives, while simultaneously destabilize the (protective) resilience of dominant unsustainable systems, securing the required resources. These activities can be performed in shadow networks. Shadow networks can be defined as informal networks that work both outside and within the dominant system. These networks are incubators for new ideas and approaches, for example for governing and managing social-ecological systems.
Existing research on the performance of ‘shadow networks’, which have the ability to catalyze public participation toward more experimentation with alternatives, remains problematic with regard to implementation of new ideas. It is important to have a champion who sustains dialog until learning reaches a point that allows and encourages implementation (Westley et al. 2011). They further suggest the potential significant role of social media and similar communication technologies in providing platforms for the stimulation and integration of ideas, as well as mobilizing collective action at key moments of opportunity. To enable safe-fail experiments in ‘shadow networks’ in communities worldwide, financial and political support is required.
In the process-model (Appendix B), shadow networks (functioning as innovation niches) will be included which may form together a shadow system (enabling the creation of a system of safe-fail experiments for innovation; enabling and enhancing innovation adoption and behavioral change) that may enable systemic change for sustainable development; building proactive resilience.
