The Mask of Contrails
Neoliberal Governmentality and the Air Navigation Charge
Name: S.C.A. Jansen Studentnr: s1805320 Course: Master Thesis
Degree Programme: International Relations Study phase: Master
Contents
Introduction page 1
Chapter 1 The Theoretical Framework page 6
The Governmentality Approach page 7 Neoliberal Governmentality page 9 Neoliberal Governmentality and Risk page 12
Chapter 2 Airspace Sovereignty and International Aviation page 14
The International “Airspace Ownership Debate” page 15 A Changing Perspective on Absolute Airspace Sovereignty page 18 Airspace Sovereignty and the Single European Sky page 20 The Organization of Air Navigation Services page 20 Airspace Sovereignty and ANS in the Single European Sky page 22
Chapter 3 The Birth of Aviation Liberalization in Europe page 26
The Process Towards a Single Market of Transport Services page 27 Launching European Aviation Liberalization page 29 A Challenging Process Towards European Airspace Harmonization page 30 Challenges and Opportunities of the Single European Sky page 33
Chapter 4 The Evolution of the Air Navigation Charge page 38
The Early Beginnings of the Air Navigation Charge page 39 The Process Towards a European ANS Charging System page 42 The Single European Sky Reforms page 43 The European ANS Charging System and the Air Navigation Charge page 45 anno 2016
An Alternative Approach: Modulating Charges page 47
Chapter 5 Neoliberal Governmentality and the Air Navigation Charge page 50
Problematizing Europe’s State Funded ANS system page 51 Problematizing the Provision of Europe’s ANS system page 55 Problematizing Europe’s Private Sector Funded ANS system page 58
Conclusion page 62
1 Introduction
The amazing tangle of contrails is sometimes the only evidence of complex flight activity in the European skies. Nevertheless, Europe deals with almost 26.800 flights on an average daily basis and handles around 9.8 million flights a year (European Commission, 2015a). This makes European airspace one of the busiest in the world. To make matters worse, recent predictions reveal a 19 per cent increase in European flight traffic for 2021 (Eurocontrol, 2015a: 35). As such, European airspace is becoming increasingly congested and the costs associated with it cost the aviation industry almost $ 3.8 billion a year, particularly due to delays. The time passengers waste in these delays is a consumer cost worth of an estimated $ 7.7 billion (IATA, 2014). Moreover, the European Commission recently stated that inefficient airspace management in Europe adds 42 kilometers to the distance of an average flight forcing aircraft to burn more fuel, generate more emissions and pay more costly air navigation charges (European Commission, 2013a). In sum, increased flight activity and inefficient airspace management causes serious airspace congestion in Europe with significant economic, societal and environmental consequences.
Since 2004, the European Union gained competences in air traffic management (ATM) and launched the Single European Sky (SES) reforms. These reforms aim to achieve high air traffic safety standards, optimized capacities, a cost-efficient air transport system and less environmental impact in favour of citizens, the aviation community, the economy and the environment (Jarzembowski, 2011: 180). In the context of these reforms, this research will focus specifically on the cost efficiency aspects of the Single European Sky. In essence, this implies reducing costs related to air navigation service (ANS) provision through reforms of Europe’s ANS charging system and the air navigation charge.
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391/2013) laying down a common charging scheme for air navigation services (European Commission, 2013b). Basically all European states (EU and non-EU) have established their own charging zone and charge their own unit rate based on the costs of ANS provision in their area of responsibility. There are different sorts of air navigation charges, notably en route charges, terminal navigation charges and communication charges.
The focus of this research will be specifically on the en route charge (hereinafter referred to as air navigation charge). This charge is levied for each flight performed in the airspace falling within the responsibility of a state (‘user pays principle’) and takes into account the distance flown and, less than proportionately, the aircraft weight. Although values significantly differ among states, air navigation charges represent more than 70 per cent of total revenues for 75 per cent of European ANSPs (Castelli and Ranieri, 2007: 5). As such, air navigation charges are by far the main source of revenues for any European ANSP. The Central Route Charges Office (CRCO) is responsible for the billing and collecting of air navigation charges on behalf of 39 member states (EU and non-EU) and estimates that the air navigation service industry amount to about € 8 billion each year (Gleave, 2015: 8).
In sum, Europe’s ANS charging system and the air navigation charge represent a significant economic interest and play a major role in shaping European ATM from a financial and economic point of view. As such, they are important tools in the hands of governments and the European Commission to govern the conduct of Europe’s most important air traffic stakeholders, i.e. ANSPs and airspace users, in their ambitious project towards a cost-efficient European ATM system.
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governments and international institutions, as well as the role of non-state actors (Sinclair, 2012: 20).
In order to investigate European airspace as a global political space, this research employs the governmentality approach, developed by Michel Foucault, as a theoretical and methodological toolbox. As such, it includes not simply the institutional apparatus of government but also the instances, cases, and fields when government is practiced on all manner and spheres of conduct. In this way, this research provides valuable insight in how the cost-efficiency of Europe’s ATM system is constructed as a particular problem of government and how this problem is managed by governments. Although multiple types of thought, or governmental rationalities, inform the way we think about government, this research focuses on the neoliberal governmental rationality in particular. This form of government is aptly described by Lemke as “a politics of truth, producing new forms of knowledge, inventing new notions and concepts that contribute to the government of new domains of regulation and intervention” (Lemke, 2002: 55). As such, the neoliberal governmentality perspective provides valuable insight in the establishment, maintenance and transformation of contemporary and historical orders of governance in European airspace. But more importantly, neoliberal governmentality contributes to a better understanding of the process through which a cost-efficient European ATM system is governed through the deployment of inventive technologies, such as Europe’s ANS charging system and the air navigation charge. In this process, neoliberal forms of government increasingly rely on rationalities and technologies of risk to render particular problems. In this context, the concept of risk is understood as a calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals, collectivities and populations (Dean, 2010: 206). From this perspective, this research will analyse how the concept of risk is deployed by governments to represent particular problems in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goals (Ewald, 1991: 199).
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traffic stakeholders governed through risk? The case of neoliberal governmentality and the air navigation charge.
Chapter one will be devoted to the theoretical framework of this research. It introduces the governmentality approach, developed by Michel Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France in 1977-8 and 1978-9. It engages with the key concepts of governmentality and provides valuable insight in the way particular problems come to be constructed as problems of government and how these problems come to be managed by governments. This will be exemplified with a particular governmental rationality, i.e. the neoliberal governmentality. As such, this chapter reflects upon the main aspects of neoliberal governmentality and demonstrates that it increasingly relies on technologies of risk to render particular problems. In this manner, chapter one sets the scene for the rest of this research. It represents the theoretical context through which the government of a cost-efficient European ATM system will be analyzed.
Chapter two introduces the reader in the way political and legal orders of governance in European airspace are constituted and operated in contemporary and historical settings. In other words, it provides an indispensable background through which the responsibilities concerning the provision of Europe’s ANS system should be understood. It focuses on the prevalence of the traditional notion of absolute airspace sovereignty in international agreements, but it also observes that the concept of absolute airspace sovereignty is not absolute and unchanging. Especially due to the impact of new political and economic realities, such as liberalization, modernization and globalization (Shrewsbury, 2003: 116). As such, it introduces a new perspective on the concept of airspace sovereignty. This perspective will be exemplified with Europe’s ambitious project towards a single European sky. Although the Single European Sky comprises several air traffic management reforms, the main focus in this chapter is centred on its impact on airspace sovereignty and the provision of air navigation services.
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liberalization in Europe will only be as successful as its weakest part, which clearly is airspace and its harmonization. Consequently, a large part of this chapter will be devoted to the challenges and opportunities of European airspace harmonization, i.e. the Single European Sky.
Chapter four examines the cost-effectiveness aspects of the Single European Sky reforms in further detail. It will be argued that the successfulness of Europe’s airspace liberalization can only be achieved by reforming ATM with a solid financial basis. As such, Eurocontrol’s ANS charging system and the air navigation charge play a major role in shaping European ATM from a financial and economic point of view. Before investigating Europe’s current route charging system, however, this chapter starts with a historical introduction of the air navigation charge. All steps towards the development of a global charging system will be considered. Secondly, this chapter focuses on the development of Europe’s route charging system. It examines its early beginnings with the introduction of Eurocontrol’s multilateral route charging system in 1970 until the Single European Sky initiative in 1999. Subsequently, this chapter elaborates on Europe’s current ANS charging scheme and the air navigation charge as we know it today. The last section of this chapter will be devoted to the modulation of charges, as an alternative approach towards Europe’s airspace congestion problem.
6 Chapter 1 The Theoretical Framework
Governmentality may be regarded as a particular analytical technique that came to the fore during the period in which Marxist theory lost favour and many ‘critical’ social theorists were seeking an alternative framework that provided a new way of grasping issues of politics and power (O’Malley, 2008: 52). The governmentality approach could be distinguished from more traditional approaches to questions of power and authority that are generally referred to as ‘theories of the state’ (Dean, 2010: 16; Miller and Rose, 1990: 3; Gordon, 1991: 4; O’Malley et all, 1997: 501). Dean argues that ‘theories of the state’ are primarily concerned with “the search for an origin or a source of the power held to reside in the state, the attempt to identify which agents hold or possess that power, and whether that power is legitimate or not” (Dean, 2010: 16). The study of governmentality is continuous with these type of theories in that the conduct of power and authority should not be taken for granted. However, it rejects many distinctive principles of ‘theories of the state’, such as the unitary character of the state, the problems of legitimacy, the notion of ideology, and the questions surrounding the possession and source of power (Dean, 2010: 34). As such, Rose and Miller argue that theories of the state do not adequately characterise the diverse ways in which rule is exercised in contemporary forms of government (Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). For this reason, governmentality aims to offer an alternative approach to issues of politics and power. This approach includes not only the institutional apparatus of government but also the instances, cases, and fields when government is practiced on all manner and spheres of conduct. By doing this, governmentality assumes that “discourses on government are an integral part of the workings of government rather than simply a means of its legitimation, that government is accomplished through multiple actors and agencies rather than a centralized set of state apparatuses, and that we must reject any a priori distribution and divisions of power and authority” (Dean, 2010: 37; O’Malley, 2008: 53). In this respect, governmentality forms a unique and diverse way of thinking about government.
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approach will be dealt with in the first section of this chapter. The second section elaborates on the neoliberal rationality of government. Neoliberal forms of government increasingly rely on rationalities and technologies of risk to render particular problems. The final section of this chapter, therefore, will be devoted to the concept of risk.
The Governmentality Approach
The governmentality literature forms a varied but nevertheless fairly consistent and increasingly influential body of thinking about government (O’Malley et all. 1997: 501). Government, here, is closely related to Foucault’s ‘conduct of conduct’, or the power to act on the actions of others (Foucault, 1982: 790; Gordon, 1991: 2). From this perspective, Dean defines government as:
any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (Dean, 2010: 18; Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).
In the context of this definition, governmentality is not only concerned with how we exercise authority over others, but also how we govern ourselves. In this regard, government relates to the ways in which an individual questions his or her conduct so that he or she may be better able to govern it (Dean, 2010: 18). As such, Lemke asserts that governmentality centres the view that what is to be governed is itself self-governing, and thus any act of governance must take account of the self-regulating order of things (Lemke, 2001: 201). In other words, governments must always address the question of the right balance between governing too much or too little, governing but not disrupting the self-governing capacities of that which it rules (O’Malley, 2008: 55). This research, will discuss both practices of government and practices of the self. In other words, practices concerned to “conduct the conduct of others” and those concerned to “conduct one’s own conduct” (Dean, 2010: 20). Before these practices will be exemplified within the context of neoliberalism, this chapter will elaborate on the key concepts of governmentality in closer detail.
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adoption of a theoretical strategy in which power is decomposed into rationalities of government, governmental programmes and technologies of government.
Foucault used the terms rationalities of government to distinguish between different aspects of government as an activity or practice (Gordon, 1991: 3). From this perspective, O’Malley asserts that rationalities of government, or ‘mentalities of government’, are concerned with “how government is thought into being in programmatic form, how the practitioners of rule ask themselves the question of how best to govern, what concepts they invent or employ to render their subject governable in certain ways, and how government constantly reforms itself in light of failures and evaluations” (O’Malley et all, 1997: 502; Foucault, 1991: 88). The activity of government is, in this context, an intensely problematizing and moral activity. It is problematizing because it is about how problems and people are thought about, what solutions to problems are dreamed up and what ends are imagined as ideal outcomes (Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). It is moral because policies and practices of government presume to know what constitutes “good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives” (Dean, 2010: 19; Rose and Miller, 1992: 179). In this regard, it is no surprise that the activity of government is not absolute and unchanging. Instead, there are multiple and heterogeneous ways in which we think about government, involving different types of agency and authority and employing different types of thought. This makes government an intensely reflective activity, constantly concerned with problematizations and re-problematizations.
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183). In this context, Miller and Rose argue that modern forms of rule require an investigation of apparently humble and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern: “techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as tables; the standardization of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design and architectural forms”, the list is heterogeneous and is, in principle, unlimited (Miller and Rose, 1990: 8).
In sum, rationalities of government, governmental programmes and technologies of government form a distinct attitude towards practices and ideas on how to govern. In doing so, Foucault has introduced an unique perspective on government, power and knowledge. This section demonstrated that there are multiple and heterogeneous ways of thinking about government, yet one type of thought might be characterized as the dominant contemporary rationality of government. This type of though it generally known as neoliberal governmentality and the key concepts of this rationality will be elaborated upon in the subsequent section.
Neoliberal Governmentality
Foucault has introduced a concept of neoliberalism that goes beyond typical accounts that view it as a policy agenda or ideology. It directs our attention away from the actual policies or ideological statements to consider the more general program that speaks through it. As such, Lemke defines the neoliberal rationality of government as a “politics of truth, producing new forms of knowledge, inventing new notions and concepts that contribute to the government of new domains of regulation and intervention” (Lemke, 2002: 55). This section will distinguish and elaborate upon the various key concepts of the neoliberal rationality of government. Bear in mind, however, that there is more than one type of neoliberalism, each with its own distinguishing characteristics.
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plausible. In other words, Lemke claims that “government refers to a continuum, which extends from political government right through to forms of self-regulation”, namely ‘technologies of the self’ (Lemke, 2001: 201). Thus, as previously explained, any act of governance must take account of the self-regulating order of things. This theoretical stance allows for a more complex analysis of neoliberal forms of government that feature not only direct intervention through empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals. Neoliberalism, thus, renders individual subjects increasingly self-responsible. Accordingly, Lemke claims that “neoliberal rationalities aspire to construct responsible subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts. As the choice of options for action is the expression of free will on the basis of a self-determined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by the subject alone, who is also solely responsible for them” (Lemke, 2002: 59).
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With the construction of markets, governments are able to manipulate the environment and spaces within which the interests, choices and freedom of individuals are exercised. Coming back to the neoliberal notion of freedom, this process shows the ambivalence of neoliberalism regarding the self-determining individual. The exercise of authority presupposes the existence of a free subject of need, desire, rights, interests and choice. However, its subjection is also a condition of freedom: “in order to act freely, the subject must first be shaped, guided and moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom through systems of domination, such as the market” (Dean, 2010: 193). In this process, Zuidhof contends that the market shifts from being an object of government to becoming an instrument of government (Zuidhof, 2012: 150).
This brings forth the third aspect of neoliberal rationalities of government. In neoliberalism, government is no longer just governing the market, but markets govern our modes of government. This entails that in neoliberalism the standard, liberal opposition between markets and government is in fact deconstructed (Zuidhof, 2012: 162). Therewith, it becomes much harder to differentiate the realm of the market from that of government. Lemke explains that when government starts to resemble markets and markets become a form of government, this does not mean a diminishment or a reduction of state sovereignty, rather “a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government, that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors” (Lemke, 2002: 58). In other words, the difference between state and society, politics and economy does not function as a foundation or a borderline, but as element and effect of specific neoliberal technologies of government (Lemke, 2002: 59).
12 Neoliberal Governmentality and Risk
The governmentality approach provides one of the most influential analyses of the nature and development of risk-based techniques in government over the past thirty years. In contrast to cultural analyses of risk, that concern themselves with the sociological ways risk is associated with particular social meanings and group processes, O’Malley asserts that governmentality theorists focus overwhelmingly on governmental plans and programs (O’Malley, 2008: 74). Opposed to Beck’s ‘risk society’ theory, which considers risk as a unity, governmentality emphasizes the different approaches to understanding risk and the different implications for the forms of governance that employ them. As such, governmentality theorists have developed an understanding of risk as a rationality of governance. From this perspective, Ewald argues that “there is no such thing as risk in itself, but risk is a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goals” (Ewald, 1991: 199). In other words, risk is not regarded as intrinsically real, but as a particular way in which problems are viewed or imagined and dealt with (O’Malley, 2008: 57). Because risk is a calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals, collectivities and populations, it is impossible to speak of incalculable risks, or of risks that escape our mode of calculation (Dean, 2010: 206).
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To conclude this chapter, the governmentality approach offers an unique theoretical and methodological toolbox through which all instances, cases, and fields of government on all manner and spheres of individual and collective conduct can be analyzed. With the focus on neoliberal rationalities of government, this research will attempt to exemplify the dominant contemporary rationality of government with its “deliberate politics of truth, producing new forms of knowledge, inventing new notions and concepts that contribute to the government of new domains of regulation and intervention” (Lemke, 2002: 55). The concept of risk plays an instrumental role in neoliberal governmentality, as it is a considered way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goals. With this theoretical framework in mind, the objective of this research is to investigate how Europe’s most important air traffic stakeholders, i.e. ANSPs and airspace users, are governed through risk by focusing specifically on the role of the air navigation charge and Eurocontrol’s ANS charging system in Europe’s ambitious project towards a cost-efficient ATM system.
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Chapter 2 Airspace Sovereignty and International Aviation
State sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law. However, the term is very often used in a political sense, with differing interpretations depending on context and intention (ICAO, 2013: 1). Some academics have defined the word sovereignty as “the complete and exclusive authority which a state exercises over all persons and things found, under or above its territory” and “the right of the state freely to determine its relations with other states or entities without the restraint or control of another state” (Franklin, 2007: 426). In view of Axford, in modern political discourse the word sovereignty is usually used to denote the combination of political power and territorial space, where that territory is a nation (Axford et all., 2008: 486). In other words, sovereignty is said to be an attribute of nation-states, where a country’s governing institutions exercise power and effective control over their allotted domain. In addition, Axford attributes to the concept of sovereignty two distinct aspects: an internal and an external aspect (Axford et all., 2008: 486). A state which possesses internal sovereignty is one which has the authority and ability to exercise command over its society. In this situation there are no alternative sites of authority within the nation. However, that is not the full story because even if this condition holds, a state is sovereign only if no higher body has authority over that state’s assigned society. The external dimension of sovereignty is intrinsically related to the role played by sovereignty in the global order. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 provided arguably the first coherent statement of the way in which the principle of sovereignty should order the international environment. Violation of the internal affairs of another country was widely recognized as a breach of public international law (Kaiser, 2010: 155). Ever since, especially as the world has become divided into nation-states, sovereign statehood has been the keystone of world politics (Axford et all., 2008: 486).
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ambitious project towards a single European sky. Although the Single European Sky comprises several air traffic management reforms, the main focus of this section will be on its impact on airspace sovereignty and the provision of air navigation services. However, before these reforms will be discussed within the context of the Single European Sky, the term “air navigation services” will be explained in more detail in section four. This will be important, especially considering the prominent role of ANS in the remainder of this research. The final section of this chapter will elaborate on the concept of airspace sovereignty and the provision of ANS within the context of the phased transition towards a single European sky.
The International “Airspace Ownership Debate”
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different zones of the sea. Summarized in four categories, the following approaches concerning the ownership of airspace could be distinguished;
a. The air is completely free;
b. By analogy to the law of the sea, the airspace should be divided into a totally free high zone and a low zone;
c. Complete state sovereignty over airspace above its territory in accordance with the principle cuius solis est dominium ejus est usque ad coelum, or “whose is the soil, his is up to the sky”;
d. Airspace above territory is subject to state sovereignty, but there is freedom to overfly (Polkowska, 2011: 581; Shrewsbury, 2003: 121).
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however, no consensus was reached about the regime of the airspace. Germany and France advocated freedom of the air, as they had much to gain by opening up airspace to the advantages they held in aircraft technology. Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia, with less developed aircraft technology, supported the position that national sovereignty extends to the airspace above the territory of states. Great Britain, in particular, was very determined to uphold this principle, due to its long struggle to secure domination over the seas and obtain security for its islands. Because these security concerns were paramount to the British, creating new security risks by having foreign aircraft freely transiting British airspace did not entice the British to be supportive of any freedom of the air approaches (Shrewsbury, 2003: 128).
When nations from Europe, America, China and Japan met again in Paris after World War I in 1919, the world had changed. Unlike before, World War I was a war which had involved the industrial power of the adversaries. Railways played a crucial role and aviation had developed rapidly. The military capabilities of aviation were fully exploited for reconnaissance, attack and air defence. The size, performance and reliability of aircraft had drastically improved. The Conference was successful and, for the first time, a comprehensive Convention on Aerial Navigation was agreed upon. Given the impact of war, it was no surprise that article 1 of the Paris Convention of 1919 stated:
The High Contracting Parties recognise that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. For the purpose of the present Convention, the territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent thereto (Paris Convention, 1919: art. 1).
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international custom. In this context, the philosophy of air law was founded on the concept of sovereignty in airspace and would sustain its credibility through this customary concept until something occurred to change the international norm (Shrewsbury, 2003: 129).
World War II brought another dimension of progress to aviation technology: trans-oceanic, high-altitude flights with heavier, faster and more reliable aircraft including the development of the turbo-jet engine and radar. Air forces became crucial for air-lift and strategic roles. History repeated itself. When nations met again in Chicago in 1944, shortly before the end of the war, national security was as important as the prospect of a flourishing commercial air transport industry. Both views were clearly reflected in the discussions between delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom (Heere, 1999: 71). The United States aimed for a maximum of freedom for civil aviation, as the United States relied on their virtual monopoly in the construction of big aircraft which could fly anywhere. On the contrary, the United Kingdom did not possess such aircraft, and pleaded for a controlled use of the airspace. What they did possess was the Commonwealth, which made it possible to control, at very many points of the globe which were still British, the landing rights necessary for the long distance routes of the United States. In the end, the United Kingdom won the debate. As a result, the nations at the Chicago Conference re-stated the governing principle of air sovereignty in the Convention on International Civil Aviation:
The Contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. For the purpose of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State (ICAO, 1944: art. 2).
A Changing Perspective on Absolute Airspace Sovereignty
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is clearly indicated by the opening up by a number of states in Europe of their hitherto closed borders to international air travel.
Airspace Sovereignty and the Single European Sky
The Single European Sky within the European Union, could be considered one of the clearest instances of a new way of looking at absolute airspace sovereignty (Schubert, 2000: 258; Haanappel, 1995: 317; Shrewsbury, 2003: 147). In October 2001, the European Commission announced proposals for a framework regulation aimed at creating a single European sky by December 31, 2004. The common objective for the Single European Sky is to achieve high air traffic safety standards, optimized capacities, an efficient, also cost-efficient air transport system and less environmental impact in favour of citizens, the aviation community, the economy and the environment (Jarzembowski, 2011: 180). This common project was highly critical, because among the motivating forces for moving to the creation of the Single European Sky was the issue of aviation safety and security in the face of a highly congested European airspace. However, no effective or efficient solution for this problem would be feasible, unless the traditional view of airspace sovereignty in Europe would be reconsidered and applied in a different way (Shrewsbury, 2003: 148; Tammenoms Bakker, 2011: 13; Riemens et all. 2011: 18; Franklin, 2007: 425). This is important, especially with regard to the provision of air navigation services, which have traditionally been provided on a strictly national basis in Europe. Nevertheless, several arguments could be formulated why the provision of these services should be organized outside the traditional sovereign function of the state and within the context of the Single European Sky. However, before this section will discuss the provision of air navigation services and absolute airspace sovereignty within the context of the Single European Sky, the term “air navigation services” requires some further explanation. This will be useful, especially considering the prominent role of ANS in the remainder of this research.
The Organization of Air Navigation Services
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background of ICAO’s “International Standards and Recommended Practices”, the aspects of the different air navigation services encompassing the four pillars will subsequently be explained (ICAO, 2001: 1).
The first ANS pillar deals with ATM and consists of all services related to air navigation facilities such as air traffic services (ATS), air space management (ASM) and air traffic flow management (ATFM). ATS comprehends flight information services (FIS) which provides advice and information for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. In addition, it encompasses alerting services, a service notifying the appropriate organisations in case aircraft are in need of search and rescue aid. Both services are carried out by air traffic control (ATC) which has the significant task to prevent collisions by maintaining sufficient separation between aircraft in the air as well as between the aircraft and potential dangerous obstructions on the ground. In order to succeed in accomplishing adequate and safe separation, ATC is separated into three categories. Firstly, there is an approach control service taking care of ATC services for arriving or departing controlled flights. Secondly, there is an aerodrome control service dealing with aerodrome traffic and, last but not least, there is an area control service controlling aircraft in flight which, once they have ascended from an airport and reached a certain point, will be monitored until they are to be handed over to adjoining area control services or descend to lower airspace. However, an adequate and safe separation of aircraft is one thing, guaranteeing an orderly flow of air traffic is another. ATM therefore does not only comprise ATS, but also includes ASM and ATFM. Basically, ASM handles the management of airspace as efficient as possible in order to satisfy as many airspace users as possible. It is tasked with the allocation of airspace to its users as well as the way in which airspace is structured by means of routes, zones and flight levels. In turn, ATFM is constituted with the objective of contributing to a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic by ensuring that ATC capacity is utilized to the maximum extent possible and that the traffic volume is compatible with the capacities declared by the appropriate ATS authority. Together, ASM and ATFM support efficient utilization of available airspace and airport capacity while keeping delays to a minimum whereas ATS is predominantly involved in the control of the aircraft (van Antwerpen, 2002: 7).
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encompasses meteorological services (MET) providing meteorological forecasts, briefing and observations as well as any other meteorological data that are indispensable for the safe conduct of flights. The fourth and final ANS pillar comprises ancillary aviation services, dealing with search and rescue (SAR) and delivering aeronautical charts and information services (AIS).
In sum, the four pillars comprising ANS, include a whole range of unique and highly valuable air navigation service aspects. Each air navigation service has its own role in maintaining safe and orderly flight expeditions and, as such, have proven to be indispensable in the dynamic and ever-expanding world of commercial aviation.
Airspace Sovereignty and ANS in the Single European Sky
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This would generate better economies of scale which will ultimately benefit many airspace stakeholders in Europe’s commercial aviation activities.
To sum up, the old notion of providing and organizing air navigation services within national boundaries has proven to be ineffective and inefficient. Although states are still inclined to retain as much control as possible over ANS and their sovereign airspace, developments with respect to the creation of functional airspace blocks (FABs) in Europe indicate that a new perspective on the provision and organization of these services within the context of the Single European Sky has gradually been accepted.
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However, up until now this decision-making process has not been beneficial for the operationalization process of Europe’s cross-border FABs. Officially, all FABs had to be completely implemented by December 2012, however Europe has currently reorganized 67 national airspace blocks into nine cross-border FABs and, till so far, only two of these have been completely implemented. Consequently, delays in delivering operational FABs are holding back the implementation of the Single European Sky to a significant degree, which in turn results in inefficiencies in the entire European air traffic management system. This results in additional costs to 5 billion euros a year which are passed on to airlines and their customers in addition to increased journey times, delays and emissions (European Commission, 2015a). In view of Baumgartner and Finger, this gridlock in the implementation process of Europe’s cross-border FABs and the Single European Sky could be explained by the involvement of too many actors with too diverging interests (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 40). Yet, issues relating to sovereignty and the position of the state have proven to be particularly challenging (Franklin, 2007: 425). This is not only because sovereign states directly relate to several international bodies, but also because sovereign states cumulate a certain number of functions and integrate a certain number of actors. As such, Baumgartner argues that the position of states vis-à-vis FABs and the Single European Sky is far from coherent, torn as it is between its conflicting roles as policymaker, regulator and owner of ANSPs (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 39).
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elements that are not perforce state obligations, such as ANS, but which have traditionally been integrated with the broader vision of sovereignty (Schubert, 2000: 259; Haanappel, 1995: 317). Overall, the transition to the Single European Sky will not be without challenges. Delays and additional costs in delivering operational cross-border FABs clearly indicate that lots of work still needs to be done. Nevertheless, the intrinsic motivation of the EU to take on such a daunting task is indisputable evidence that the absolute airspace sovereignty regime is crumbling in Europe.
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Chapter 3 The Birth of Aviation Liberalization in Europe
Before the creation of the single market in air services, European aviation was characterized by protectionism, collusion and fragmentation (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 1; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 7; Button, 2001: 255). Air transport markets in Europe were drawn within national boundaries with a large presence of domestic flag carriers. Most of them were government supported and operated oligopolistic or monopolistic routes. Beyond recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on technical issues, economic regulation was the sole competence of national authorities. Airlines’ fares, flying frequencies, airport access conditions and capacity rules were all subject to approval or control. There was little infrastructure policy, and international flows were mostly the result of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Without the existence of an effective European internal market; competition was weak, and despite the increasing traffic figures, the overall performance of the sector exhibited a progressive lack of competitiveness as compared to the consolidated United States market or the emergence of the Asian hubs (Finger and Hovald, 2013: 37). Although some states may have benefited, overall it tended to protect inefficient operations and distort the overall pattern of services provided. It acted as a restraint on trade and had associated with it the same undesirable economic implications as tariffs (Button, 2001: 256).
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The Process Towards a Single Market of Transport Services
Although, following the First World War, there weren’t large numbers of aircraft noticeable in the skies, governments realized that regulations were required and that some standardisation should be applied. This was particularly important in Europe with its multiple national boundaries and languages. As described in the previous chapter, one of the lesser known decisions emanating from the Versailles Peace Treaty, was the International Convention for Air Navigation (ICAN). Following the world’s first commercial mid-air collision on 7 April 1922 over France, measures were taken to ensure it wasn’t repeated. These measures included carriage of radio and organising a defined set of routes for all to follow visually (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 30).
More substantial regulation, however, can be traced back to the Chicago Convention in 1944, when more than 50 signatory states acknowledged that the international nature of aviation would certainly require coordinated regulation (Wagner, 1970: 40). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established to oversee the main rules of air transport, in the form of compulsory standards with essential specifications regarding the reliability and safety of services, air traffic control and airport operating rules, and recommended practices covering many other technical and operational issues related to infrastructure, aircraft and services. All of the European countries signed or later ratified this Convention on International Civil Aviation, and hence it defined the pillars of their national air transport policies. In the immediate post-era, aircraft transportation remained fairly unusual on the Continent, but as technology improved and in-flight comfort increased, their advantage over land or sea journeys became more and more evident. As the sector grew during the following decades and air travel progressively became the dominant means of transport for long-distance passenger movements, it was clear that new rules and more pieces had to be implemented (Baumgartner, 2007: 3). Simultaneously, the economic and political union born after the Treaty of Rome (1957) and reinforced through the concept of a ‘single market’ introduced by the Single European Act (1986) rendered the previous design incomplete (Finger and Hovald, 2013: 37).
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treaties, including most importantly the Chicago Convention of 1944, a dense network of bilateral air services agreements, and detailed national rules. Interlocking global and regional organizations, created in the 1940s and 1950s, were firmly established venues for the handling and management of air transport matters (Button, 1996: 280). Second, member governments, supported by European flag carriers, had been significantly opposed to Community intervention. They supported the Chicago regime, were satisfied with the extensive powers it granted to them, and feared any change that might threaten their ability to protect their aviation industries. In addition, they regarded the Commission as bureaucratic and inexpert in aviation matters, and could not see how it might play a useful role. Third, the original provisions of the EEC Treaty appeared to leave any decision concerning the possibility of Community intervention to the Council of Ministers acting unanimously. It therefore required opposition on the part of only a single government to prevent action (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 3).
Despite these apparently insuperable barriers, fruitful developments in the 1970s and 1980s would eventually tip the balance in favour of the European Commission.
29 Launching European Aviation Liberalization
Soon after the judgement, the European Commission developed a coherent policy on air transport liberalization which it started implementing, since 1987, across its member states by way of regulatory means (Petrick-Felber, 2014: 15; Shrewsbury, 2003: 147). To achieve full air transport liberalization, the required changes were based on two key ideas: the liberalization of services by dismantling internal barriers and removing the obstacles that hindered competition; and the harmonization of the rules that blocked the integration of national markets and limited fair trade (Finger and Hovald, 2013: 37; Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 30). More concretely, European air transport liberalization has been realised by way of ‘Liberalization Packages’. The First Liberalization Package, which was enacted on January 1, 1988, reinforced the ECJ ruling of 1986 by explicitly acknowledging that all competition rules of the EC Treaty do apply to air transport but most importantly, it enacted a package of measures concentrating on the core aspects of regulation: market access, designation control, capacity approval and fare agreements (Petrick-Felber, 2014: 16). The basic philosophy was that deregulation would take place in stages. “Evolution rather than revolution being the watchword and workable competition being the objective” (Button, 2001: 258). The Second Liberalization Package was ratified on November 1, 1990. It extended EC liberalization through a set of interim arrangements; conditions for the setting of tariffs and capacity-sharing were relaxed and block exemptions from competition policy were continued but in modified form (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998: 185). The Third Liberalization Package, enacted on January 1, 1993, was to be the final stage towards creating a single market in air transport. It allowed the airlines of a European member state to operate to and from any EU member state, including on domestic flights. A European operator license was established and pricing was completely liberalized (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 30; Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998: 186).
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decades of privilege, but are no longer owned, bankrolled or controlled by governments. They compete in a single market against independent carriers (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 1).
Still, the process towards complete aviation liberalization in Europe is confronted with significant barriers. As such, Baumgartner argues that while aviation liberalization policies have been successful in the case of air transport and less successful in the case of airports, they have been encountering a gridlock in the case of airspace (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 29). Yet, air transport is a system of which airlines, airports and air traffic control are all indispensable elements. Air transport liberalization in Europe will thus only be as successful as its weakest part, which clearly is airspace and its harmonization (Crespo and Fenoulhet, 2011: 4; Button and Neiva, 2013: 73).
A Challenging Process Towards European Airspace Harmonization
The liberalization of the European airspace, called the Single European Sky (SES), is the most recent, yet decisive, element of the European Commission’s aviation liberalization agenda (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 30). Air traffic management was initially regarded primarily as a safety service and the constraints in terms of cost and delays had to be tolerated. It did not begin to be seen as a restrictive factor before the 1980s. Until then, airports has been regarded as the main bottleneck and it was thought that the development of air transport was therefore only limited by the number of runways which the environment would tolerate. However, airspace proved to be much more challenging (European Commission, 1996: 6).
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structured functionally in line with major traffic flows; its management was uneven; and national authorities used different technologies that were not mutually compatible (van Antwerpen, 2002: 19). En route services, which provide for the transfer from one set of national authorities to another, were particularly problematic.
Although in the early 1960s Eurocontrol was created by West European states as an operational body with supranational control over Europe’s upper airspace, the same governments had progressively ‘scaled back’ its functions over the following two decades. As such, Eurcontrol’s activities were restricted to a small area of northern Europe, some of its functions returned to national hands, and new areas of responsibility were restricted to intergovernmental cooperation in research, training and planning. The reduced ambitions were reflected in the organization’s revised Convention of 1981 (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 139).
These arrangements came under increasing pressure when air traffic in Europe increased in the late 1980s (Schubert, 2003: 32; Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 30). In 1987, ECAC predicted that air traffic movements would double between 1987 and 2000. In 1986 only 12 per cent of intra-European flights were delayed by more than 15 minutes, but by 1988 that figure had risen to 20 per cent and reached 25 per cent the following year (European Commission, 1996: 6; Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 139). About half the delays were considered attributable to problems of congestion in air traffic control. This appeared inacceptable, not only because of the direct cost of delays to airlines, but also in view of the millions of hours wasted by the traveling public, as well as the deteriorating perception of air transport at a time when it faced increased competition from other transport modes (European Commission, 1996: 6; Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 30; van Houtte, 2000: 24). The Association of European Airlines (AEA) contended that the lack of efficient available airspace and the limited technical capacity of the air traffic control systems created substantial and unnecessary costs of airlines, passengers and the European economy as a whole. As such, it calculated total losses at $ 4190 million in 1988. En route air traffic control services were identified as a particular problem, with estimations that it cost the same amount ($ 1.6 billion) to produce en route air traffic control services in the ECAC countries as it cost the US system to handle three times the number of flights (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 139).
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and Finger, 2014: 31). For this reason, the main duties of the Community remained largely limited to financing initiatives taken by Eurocontrol and ECAC and to legislate the standards adopted by Eurocontrol. Intergovernmental cooperation proved to be more suitable to deal with this highly technical area, where consensus between the different actors was necessary to move ahead. Furthermore, the military dimension of air traffic management was highly sensitive and did not lend itself easily at that time to inclusion in the Community agenda (van Houtte, 2000: 25).
Since mid-1994, however, delays increased again and over 1995 the proportion of flights delayed by more than 15 minutes was 18.4 per cent (European Commission, 1996: 6). The Balkan War in 1999, in particular, had a major impact on European aviation. Conducting a war in Central Europe whilst maintaining safe and normal operations around the airspace impacted by military operations, was an unprecedented challenge. At the same time, accommodating large movements of military aircraft in parallel with the normal operations of commercial traffic resulted in closures of airspace, rerouting of flows and reduction of capacity. As a consequence, airspace users complained because delays in 1999 were 30 per cent higher than in normal times (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 31).
The serious delays occurring in 1999 forced the Commission to look again at the air traffic delays and congestion in Europe. The Commission emphasised the urgent need for appropriate technical and operational measures. But more importantly, it recommended profound action on the underlying cause of the delays, by establishing collective management of Europe’s airspace, arguing that “Europe cannot keep the frontiers in the sky that is has managed to eliminate on the ground” (European Commission, 1999: 4). This joint management should make it possible for sectors to be constituted and for routes to be established regardless of frontiers. The division of airspace between civil and military aviation must also take account of the new geopolitical realities and form part of a consistent and efficient framework (van Houtte, 2000: 25).
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To map out the action required both at national and European levels, the Commission created a High Level Group to which the member states appointed senior civil and military representatives. By the end of the year 2000, the High Level Group had completed its report, which emphasized the need to consider airspace as a common resource, managed as a continuum. Progress was necessary on several fronts, including joint civil and military management of air traffic, the development and deployment of new technology and the interoperability of equipment. It confirmed that reform of ATM required the intervention of a strong Community regulator, but expected the Community’s involvement to be supported by Eurocontrol’s technical expertise (European Commission, 2000: 23; Crespo and Fenoulhet, 2011: 5; van Houtte, 2000: 26).
In sum, the accomplishment of the liberalization of European aviation required Community involvement in ATM as a result of the various pressures, outlined above. On this basis, the Commission launched in 2001 the consultation process of four proposed regulations (framework regulation, service provision regulation, airspace regulation and interoperability regulation), which, in 2004, became part of the Single European Sky legislation, better known as SES I (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 31).
Challenges and Opportunities of the Single European Sky
Since 2004, the European Union gained competences in air traffic management and the decision making method moved away from intergovernmental practice to the EU framework. The main objective of the Single European Sky is to reform ATM in Europe in order to cope with a sustained air traffic growth and air traffic operations under the safest, more cost- and flight-efficient and environmentally friendly conditions. This implies de-fragmenting the European airspace, reducing delays, increasing safety standards and flight efficiency to reduce the aviation environmental footprint and reducing costs related to service provision (European Commission, 2015b).
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The EU launched its first Single European Sky (SES I) package on April 1, 2004. This package took the form of four Regulations. Firstly, the Framework Regulation (EC Regulation 549/2004) which laid down the framework for the creation of the Single European Sky. This regulation established the Commission as regulator and the Single Sky Committee, including member state civil and military representatives, representatives from Eurocontrol and other stakeholders, to assist it. Secondly, the Service Provision Regulation (EC Regulation 550/2004) created a common licensing system for air traffic providers. Thirdly, the Airspace Regulation (EC Regulation 551/2004) created a single European Upper Information Region to organize airspace into Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs). Fourthly, the Interoperability Regulation (EC Regulation 552/2004) aimed to ensure that systems, equipment and procedures function coherently to improve air traffic management (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 146).
Although, SES I was initially considered a breakthrough, it soon became clear that a truly single sky was still not being achieved. The system remained fragmented. Regional initiatives of service integration (FABs) were diverse in scope and in ambition, and the prospect of a serious ‘capacity crunch’ was looming in the light of forecast traffic growth. Furthermore, little progress had been achieved in improving cost efficiency. This situation was placing the future competitiveness of the European aviation industry at risk. A highly competitive aviation industry required the best possible infrastructure with the highest level of safety and best possible cost efficiency (Crespo and Fenoulhet, 2011: 5).
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human factor pillar was considered as the overarching SES pillar, as it was acknowledged by all stakeholders that the SES could not be successful without full buy-in and support of the staff concerned (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 32).
However, the operationalization of the Single European Sky, as part of the liberalization of the European aviation sector, has proven to be a challenging task. According to Baumgartner, there are too many actors involved with too diverging interests (Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 40). This has created a complex situation.
First of all, states representa key role in the accomplishment of the Single European Sky, but continue to run into real or alleged sovereignty issues (van Dam, 2015: 44; Paylor, 2013: 42; Tammenoms Bakker, 2011: 13). A number of these can be associated with the sovereign density of more than forty states that form part of the European area that is directly or indirectly affected by the ATM related legislation and ambitions of the European Union. Moreover, under Article 28 of the Chicago Convention, sovereign states are solely responsible for the provision of air navigation services (ICAO, 1944: art. 28). This makes it difficult for states to adjust their traditional views of airspace and ANS as a primarily national responsibility linked to self-defence. However, they need to define agreements with military users and neighbouring states to optimize airspace within and across borders. They also need to align the expectations of their, still mostly government owned, air navigation service providers (Schubert, 2000: 241; Tammenoms Bakker, 2011: 13). Nonetheless, given the growth in air traffic, an underlying need for efficiency and air safety, Shrewsbury claims that the notion of airspace sovereignty will be reconsidered and ultimately applied in the Single European Sky (Shrewsbury, 2003: 150). Or, to reiterate the words of Haanappel and Schubert, states are becoming increasingly liberal in the exercise of sovereignty, which is clearly indicated by the opening up by a number of states in Europe of their hitherto closed borders to international air travel (Haanappel, 1995: 317; Schubert, 2000: 259).
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depend on the delineation of their national airspace by sovereign states. The reason being that ANSPs, separated from the national governmental or civil aviation administration, will be better able to respond to the needs of airspace users for providing safe, quality- and cost effective services with minimal en route delays. The European ATM system will therefore have to allow the creation of corporate or private consortia of ANSPs that will operate in a growing competitive environment (van Dam, 2015: 48). So far, however, FABs have evolved in a manner which closely follows the existing geographical distribution of existing national ATM infrastructure. As such, current FAB boundaries display a significant degree of contiguity with national borders, and most FAB initiatives are regarded as being influenced by geography, historical-political relationships and cultural commonalities (Lawless, 2014: 78; van Dam, 2015: 49; Paylor, 2013: 42; Button and Neiva, 2013: 75). It should be noted in this context that merely creating national FABs would pre-empt and render useless the EU goal of improving safety and efficiency in the SES airspace. In view of the interests and responsibilities of the now corporatized or privatized national ANSPs, most states are very reluctant to transfer these competencies to the EU. Positions of most controller and labour unions, as witnessed by strikes and other actions, further strengthen that reluctance (van Dam, 2015: 48).
Thirdly, European airlines and the European Commission belong to the most important stake holders of the Single European Sky. More concretely, they should be considered the main drivers behind its accomplishment. As such, they are continuously pressing for more action (Paylor, 2013: 44; Baumgartner and Finger, 2014: 40). In a joint statement responding to the ineffectiveness of the SES till so far, the joint heads of the Association of European Airlines, the European Low Fares Airline Association, the European Regions Airline Association and the International Air Carrier Association dismayed the lack of political will and remembered states that they themselves signed up to the Single European Sky Regulation, admitting that the current highly inefficient situation is unacceptable and must be addressed urgently (Paylor, 2013: 44).
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harmonization. Nevertheless, European airspace harmonization is confronted with the problem of too many actors with too diverging interests. As such, the process towards a fully operating Single European Sky seems to be a dream, far removed from reality. The key question, however, is one of will. Will is something that follows from commitment to shared objectives and confidence in the parties involved to deliver their part of the changes required. Nevertheless, commitment to the objectives of the Single European Sky does not appear to be a bottleneck. According to Tammenoms Bakker, the main challenge is to build the confidence of all the parties involved in the required change programme (Tammenoms Bakker, 2011: 13). Only then will the current gridlock in the Single European Sky be overcome and will the liberalization of the European aviation sector, finally, be completed.
The next chapter will examine the Single European Sky in further detail. The successfulness of Europe’s airspace liberalization is closely related to the key performance indicators (safety, capacity, environment and cost-effectiveness) as defined in both SES packages. A perfect balance between these KPI’s is the ultimate goal.
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Chapter 4 The Evolution of the Air Navigation Charge
Airspace congestion is a significant problem across the Single European Sky. A 2011 study for Eurocontrol estimated the cost of Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) delays to amount to more than € 1.25 billion or € 1.66 per ATFM delayed flight (Gleave, 2015: 33). The European Commission launched the Single European Sky initiative to reform ATM in Europe in order to cope with a sustained air traffic growth and air traffic operations under the safest, more cost- and flight-efficient and environmentally friendly conditions. The main aspects and challenges of the Single European Sky have already been dealt with in the previous chapter. This chapter, however, will focus specifically on the cost-efficiency aspects of the Single European Sky. A successful reform of European ATM can only be achieved by creating a solid financial basis. Europe’s ANS charging system and the air navigation charge play a major role in shaping European ATM from a financial and economic point of view. Indeed, air navigation charges are by far the main source of revenues for any European ANSP. Although these values significantly differ among states, en route charges represent more than 70 per cent of total revenues for 75 per cent of European ANSPs (Castelli and Ranieri, 2007: 5). Moreover, the Central Route Charges Office (CRCO) estimates that the air navigation service industry amount to about € 8 billion each year (Gleave, 2015: 8). For this reason, Europe’s ANS charging system and the air navigation charge should be considered important tools in the hands of governments and the European Commission to govern the conduct of Europe’s most important air traffic stakeholders, i.e. ANSPs and airspace users, in their ambitious project towards a cost-efficient European ATM system.
39 The Early Beginnings of the Air Navigation Charge
In the early days of air transport, relatively slow air speeds meant that transition from one area to another presented no particular air navigation problems and aircraft were seldom able to overfly a state without landing in it. Hence, the required navigation aids were marginal and not very expensive. As such, radio and navigation aids were provided by states and widely considered a government responsibility (Button and Neiva, 2014: 67; Fron, 1998: 5; Mclnally, 2010: 104; Brancker, 1968: 174).
The first international reference to the concept of charging for the recovery of costs incurred for the provision of airport navigation aids is the Paris Convention of 1919 (Huet, 2011: 147). Article 24 of the Convention states that:
Every aerodrome in a contracting State, which upon payment of charges is open to public use by its national aircraft, shall likewise be open to the aircraft of all the other contracting States. In every such aerodrome there shall be a single tariff or charges for landing and length of stay applicable alike to national and foreign aircraft (Paris Convention, 1919: art. 24).
Although these tariffs or charges were limited to airport services and costs, by this time, there was of course still no extensive provision of air navigation services. This explains why no explicit reference was made in the Paris Convention to tariffs or charges for air navigation services. Nevertheless, some revenue to offset the cost of providing air navigation services was obtained by states through airport landing fees, as defined in Article 24 of the Convention (Brancker, 1968: 174).
