The Influence of Norms on Behavior

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M.A. THESIS IR/IO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The Influence of Norms on

Behavior

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DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “The Influence of Norms on Behavior – Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and Non-Intervention”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

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Abbreviations

AU - African Union GA - General Assembly

GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council HLP - High-Level Panel

ICISS - International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty LAS - League of Arab States

NAM - Non-Alignment Movement

OIC - Organization of the Islamic Conference RtoP - Responsibility to Protect

SC - Security Council

UK - United Kingdom

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Introduction

In February and March 2011, the United Nations Security Council (SC) adopted resolutions 1970 and 1973 in response to the suppression of peaceful protesters in Libya by Qaddafi’s government. In Resolution 1970, the Security Council condemned the violation of human rights taking place, and attempted to stop those violations by referring the situation to the International Criminal Court. The Security Council also imposed targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes against specific members of the Qaddafi regime.1 In mid-March 2011, Qaddafi told the world that “officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches” and “any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed.”2_{Among other factors,}

the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with Resolution 1970 and the deteriorating situation in Libya led to the adoption of Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011.3 This time, the Council authorized member states to take “all measures necessary” to protect civilians.4 With these words, Resolution 1973 marked the first time in the history of the Council that it authorized the use of force to protect civilians against the wishes of a functioning host government.5 Military action against Libya began two days after the adoption of the Resolution, and by October 2011 Muammar Qaddafi was dead and the National Transitional Council was in power.6

NATO’s military intervention in Libya was not uncontroversial. It caused much debate about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the international community’s response, as well as the responsibility of the international community when it comes to humanitarian issues. According to some, the military action by the international community in Libya marks the first implementation of the sharp edge of the emerging norm “the Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP).7 The RtoP was first formulated and developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which published a report called “The Responsibility to Protect” in 2001, dealing with the competing principles of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.8 The ICISS stated in this report

1

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/RES/1970, (26 February, 2011). 2

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 838.

3

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/RES/1973, (17 March, 2011). 4_Ibid.

5

The SC came close to doing so with Resolution 794 in 1992, when it authorized the Unified Task Force to ease the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, but this was in the absence of a central government rather than against one. 6

Aiden Hehir, "The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect," International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 138.

7

Ramesh Thakur, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free Pragmatism," Security Challenges 7, no. 4 (2011): 13-25. Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011): 263-269.; Thomas G. Weiss, "RtoP Alive and Well After Libya," Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011): 287-292. 8

For further elaboration about humanitarian interventions see for instance; Mine Pinar Gozen Ercan,

Undertaking the Responsibility: International Community, States, R2P and Humanitarian Intervention (Trento:

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5 that “sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”9 In the report by the ICISS, the RtoP embraced three specific responsibilities; the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild. Together, these components made the RtoP a continuum with the aim of ending genocides and other mass atrocities.10 The RtoP was adopted by the UN General Assembly at the World Summit in September 2005, which was partly the result of Kofi Annan’s strong commitment to the emerging norm.11 The content of the Outcome Document of the World Summit differs in some ways from the ICISS report, lacking specific criteria for intervention and without explicit recognition that the RtoP implies a continuum.12 To what extent this should be seen as a disappointment is a subject of discussion among policy makers and scholars.13 Nonetheless, whatever the flaws of the Outcome Document, the adoption of the RtoP by the World Summit in 2005 transformed the ICISS proposal into an international principle endorsed by the complete UN membership.14 However, since the first emergence of the RtoP, there has been major debate about the usage, legitimacy, effectiveness and success of the RtoP and this has not come to end after 2005.15 This debate surrounding the RtoP fits into a broader issue within International Relations theory, regarding the influence of international norms on individual or collective behavior and the relationship between national interests and normative rules.

After the intervention in Libya in 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon declared; “The Security Council today has taken an historic decision. Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government.”16 Some scholars agree with the Secretary-General and emphasize that the RtoP played a major role in shaping the response of the SC; while others point out that it is still unclear to what extent the RtoP influenced the decision to intervene.17 If the RtoP was influential in the decision to intervene, it would be expected that the rhetoric used by the Security Council members justifying the intervention in Libya acknowledged the

9_{International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottowa: The}

International Development Research Centre, 2001).

10

Ibid.

11_{Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect - Ending Mass Atrocities Once and for all (Washington D.C.: The}

Brookings Institution, 2008), 47; Marc Pollentine, Constructing the Responsibility to Protect (Cardiff: Cardiff University School of European Languages, Translation and Politics, 2012) 263.

12_{Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 92.}

13_{See for example Alex J. Bellamy “Wither Responsibility to Protect” 167-69; Nicholas Wheeler “A Victory for}

Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit” paper presented at the conference on “The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?” University of Toronto, October 6-7, 2005.

14_{Ibid., 95.} 15

Ibid., 4-7. 16

Ban Ki-moon, “Statement by the Secretary-General on Libya,” New York City, New York, March 17, 2011.

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6 RtoP. Hehir however points out that in public statements, members of the SC did not mention the RtoP. Further, even though Resolution 1970 is written in the spirit of the RtoP, the responsibility of the international community to protect Libyan citizens is never mentioned. The “responsibility to protect” mentioned is that of the Libyan authorities, not of the international community, and the legitimate basis for the intervention mentioned in both resolutions is UN Charter Chapter 7; there is no mention of the action being advised by the RtoP.18_{It is thus very unlikely that the Responsibility to}

Protect was one of the main reasons and guiding factor in the SC members’ decision to adopt Resolutions 1970 and 1973.

Further, there were several unique circumstances and factors that made intervention possible in the Libya case. The exceptional clarity of the threat of mass atrocities with an extremely short time frame, Libya’s intransigence, strong demands by the UK and France for tougher international response, and the support of the League of Arab States (LAS) and the African Union (AU) which helped framing issues and defining the scope of possible international action.19 As Bellamy argued; it is likely that the protection of susceptible people and the prevention of mass atrocities will demand different methods in most other cases, and it is possible that then “neither the will nor the consensus necessary for the use of military force will be present.”20 It is thus unlikely that the intervention will cause positive precedents of the use of the RtoP. And as Aiden Hehir emphasizes, “If the decision to intervene was influenced to a significant extent by a collective desire to abide by the principles of the RtoP, then the international community has undoubtedly entered a new era. If, however, the intervention was the consequence of a unique constellation of necessarily temporal factors unrelated, or only tangentially related, to RtoP, then the intervention, though undeniably significant in itself, has limited long-term implications.”21

To what extent the RtoP influenced the decision of the international community to intervene in Libya is therefore an interesting and relevant case on different levels; not just for scholars interested in the intervention in Libya or the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect, but also relevant for the study of the influence of norms on behavior and the relationship between norms and interests in a wider context. There is still much debate about when, why and how norms will be able to influence actors’ behavior, and why norm violation or compliance occurs. This research will contribute to the debate about the influence of the RtoP on the decision to intervene military in Libya and on a more general level to the debate between the logics of consequences and

18_{Hehir, The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect,}

137-159. 19

Bellamy and Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 841.

20

Bellamy, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, 267. 21

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7 appropriateness, analyzing to what extent actors are motivate by normative rules or national interests. Therefore, the main research question of the thesis is “To what extent were the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and the following authorized military intervention by NATO in Libya in 2011 influenced by the emerging international norm ‘the Responsibility to Protect’?”

Norms are generally regarded as a set of inter-subjective understandings and collective expectations regarding proper behavior in a given context or identity.22 In other words, norms require a collective evaluation and future expectations of behavior in terms of what “ought to be done.”23 This distinct ‘oughtness’ of norms enables them to create expectations about appropriate behavior in the international society, and these expectations contribute to the likelihood that the norms will be followed. Therefore, norms by definition concern behavior.24 According to Jeffrey Legro, the potential of norms to influence interests, individual actors’ behavior and collective practices depends to a large extent on norm ‘robustness’.25 The specificity of a norm will improve its influential potential by offering clear definitions, clear rules and generating consensus about its applicability. The durability of a norm will improve its influence since actors will be more willing to adhere to norms when these are based on old rules, reaffirmed at several occasions, part of international law or when there are few violations. Norms with low durability have little basis for influence, with actors not used to accepting the rules or the normative basis behind the rules. Finally, norms will be more influential when there is high concordance about the norm, in the form of widespread support. In order to understand to what extent the RtoP could have been able to influence the decision-making process regarding the situation in Libya, the norm’s robustness will be studied with the use of Jeffrey Legro’s theory.

This thesis will show that even though the RtoP was adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005, the norm evolved with problems of specificity, durability and concordance. The RtoP’s limited robustness leads to the hypothesis that the norm does not have strong influential power, and therefore could not have been influential in guiding the decision to intervene military in Libya in 2011. The question then remains which factors did influence the strong international reaction to the situation in Libya. This thesis will argue that the intervention in Libya is best explained from a political psychology approach, showing that in fact the intervention should not be understood as a result of actors’ desire to comply with the new normative rules of the RtoP, but rather as a justifiable violation

22

Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3, Special Issue: Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences (Sep., 1996): 364.

23_{Annika Björkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections,"} Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2002): 15.

24

Ibid.: 21.

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8 of the norm non-intervention relating to the principle of state sovereignty. Such a political psychology approach adds to the debate between traditionalists and constructivists about the influence of norms on behavior by stating that actors can follow at the same time both the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. According to the political psychology approach, in cases of moral dilemmas when a nation’s interest conflicts with international normative rules, actors’ will make the decision to comply or violate a particular norm based on the ability to justify violation.26 This thesis will show that in fact there was a moral dilemma involved in the case of Libya, with Security Council members strongly reaffirming their commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference while at the same time justifying their actions in Libya on the basis of several unique circumstances which presented themselves as justifying incidents. The debate about the intervention in Libya in 2011 and the question whether or not the Responsibility to Protect had anything to do with the decision to intervene misses thus an important point by not taking into account the prevailing norm of non-intervention and the strategic interests of the world leaders in the region.

In the first chapter, the theoretical framework and methodology of the research will be discussed. A conceptualization of norms as well as a background of the relationship between norms, interests and behavior from different theoretical approaches will be given and explained why and when norms matter in the study of individual and collective behavior, with the use of the theory of norm robustness. The political psychology approach will be discussed as well, as this theory will be used in later parts of the thesis to explain the intervention in Libya in 2011. In the second chapter, the RtoP’s influential power will be assessed by examining the extent to which the RtoP meets the three criteria of norm robustness. This chapter will conclude with the statement that the RtoP is not very robust, which according to Legro’s theory leads to the hypothesis that the RtoP could not be expected to guide or influence actors’ behavior. In the third chapter, the extent to which the RtoP had influence on the decision to intervene in Libya is assessed and it is determined if its robustness influenced the impact the norm had in this particular situation. This chapter will show that the RtoP was not a major factor in making NATO’s intervention possible and that the intervention should be regarded more as a violation of the norm of non-interference than compliance with the RtoP.

26

Vaughn P. Shannon, "Norms are what States make of them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation,"

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1. Theoretical Framework and Methodology: Norms and the Influence

on Behavior

1.1 Conceptualization of Norms

Norms have gained prominence in international relations theory through much of the constructivist work, which has explored the emergence of norms and the causal relationship between norms and policy.27 It is important to first conceptualize norms and differentiate them from similar concepts like institutions and ideas. In this thesis, a common definition of norms will be used which perceives a norm as a set of inter-subjective understandings and collective expectations regarding proper behavior for a given identity in a particular context.28 From a constructivist perspective, ideas and norms can both have the power to influence identities, it is thus for analytical reasons important to make a clear distinction between these concepts. The main difference is that ideas can be present without having any behavioral implications.29 Further, ideas can be held privately and entail thought, making them subjective rather than intersubjective like norms.30

There is also an important distinction to make between the concept of norms as used by constructivists in political science and institutions as used by sociologists. For sociologists, institutions are collections of standards and rules of appropriate behavior, whereas norms isolate single standards of behavior.31 If this distinction would not have been made clear, there is a danger of confusing interrelated elements of social institutions when talking about norms. For example, ‘sovereignty’ should not be seen as an international norm but rather as a collection of norms, with rules and practices changing over time that structure this institution.32 Further, it is important to realize that norms may not be widely held by actors but nevertheless be collective features of a system, for example by being institutionalized in formal rules or law. The distinction between common and collective norms, with the possibility of some norms being common as well as collective, is crucial for distinguishing different types of norms and different types of normative effects.33

27

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International

Organization (Autumn, 1998): 887-917.; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality

and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Jul 1995, 1995): 451-478.; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in The Culture of National Security - Norms and Indentity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33-75.

28_{Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 887-917.; Jepperson, Wendt and}

Katzenstein, Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security, 33-75.; Florini, The Evolution of International

Norms, 363-389.

29_{Albert S. Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 69-108.} 30

Björkdahl, Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections, 21.

31

Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 887-917.

32_{Ibid.: 891.} 33

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10 Norms are believed to influence behavior in different ways.34 The most widely used distinction of norms is between constitutive and regulative norms. Norms that “specify the actions that will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity and to respond to it appropriately,” operate like rules constituting (defining) an identity.35 Norms can also be ‘regulative’ in cases where they operate as standards for the proper deployment of a defined identity; standards defining what proper behavior for a particular identity should be. Thus, norms can constitute identities in the first place, and prescribe behaviors for already constituted identities.36 Regulative norms can either constrain or enable specific behavior. Through constituting or regulating, norms can create expectations about who the actors in a particular context will be, and how these actors will behave.

A problem with the study of norms in relation to conceptualization is the difficulty of observation. Like most other motivations for political action, often there is only indirect evidence of norms. Claims about international norms are therefore difficult to support since it is not possible to visually inspect them. Scholars are thus forced to use secondary evidence of norm existence.37 Because norms are held collectively, there is generally a substantial amount of discourse surrounding the norm that can be studied, in the form of public statements, treaties and legal documents. According to constructivism, the way actors communicate about norms is often just as important, if not more so, as the way they act. Hence, focusing on action alone is not enough, since it would recognize norms only after states decided to adhere to the norm or act upon it.38

Studying the causal relationship between norms and behavior reveals more problems. The approach of associating attitudes with behavior is based on the idea that norms prescribe consistent behavior. However, since self-interest can coincide with normative behavior, the study of behavior can only demonstrate cases in which norms did not influence behavior. Cases in which there is no correspondence between norms and behavior are much stronger evidence for the lack of influence of norms that would be a strong correlation in arguing for their impact. Evidence of behavior corresponding with norms is always subject to the counterargument that self-interested behavior just happened to correspond with the appropriate behavior.39 The case of the RtoP and the analysis of its alleged influence on the intervention in Libya will add to the study of the relationship between norms and behavior by offering an argument against the influential power of the RtoP.

34

Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 887-917.

35

Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security, 54.

36_{Ibid., 54.}

37

Gregory A. Raymond, "Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms," Mershon International

Studies Review 41 (1997): 219.

38

39_{Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement}

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1.2 Do norms matter?

There is much debate about the relevance and power of international norms in international relations theory; however few deny that they play a role in international relations. As Hans Morgenthau stated; “certain things are not done on moral grounds, even though it would be expedient to do them. Such ethical inhibitions operate in our time on different levels with different effectiveness.”40 Rationalists approach the relationship between behavior and norms from a utilitarian perspective and follow the “logic of consequences.”41 According to this logic, rational, cost-benefit calculations drive actors to meet their desired goals. Norms in this sense will only be complied with if they meet actor’s defined interests.42 There are two main variants dominant within this ontological framework; realism and neoliberalism. Realism argues that norms carry little independent causal weight, as actors comply only with norms when it suits their national interests and will violate norms when they conflict with defined interests. Thompson argues that nations “define international morality to coincide with the demands of national survival” and that norms are “peremptory only when national interest is not endangered.”43 Shannon notes however that realists cannot asses when the cost-benefit scale of interest calculations tip against norms, without resorting to “non-falsifiable ad hoc interpretations.”44 Further, situations where no material interests are served are left unexplained. There have been many examples of states acting in the absence of material concerns, with normative reasons. The puzzle of why in certain cases states act in these instances cannot be explained by the pure power-maximizing model of classical realism.45

Neoliberal institutionalism shares the ontological starting point of realism, assuming rational, selfish actors in an anarchic international society. Neoliberals argue however that institutions, regimes and norms have power to constrain actors.46_{Institutions and norms enable commitments}

and conformity through monitoring and sanctions as well as factors like transparency and communication.47 Neoliberals are therefore able to explain norm compliance by states in cases when it means sacrificing short-term material interests. Institutions change the payoff matrix of the long term absolute gains by inserting the reputational costs of violating norms.48_{However, as Shannon}

40

Morgenthau as quoted in Goertz, “Toward a Theory of International Norms”.

41

J. March and J. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International

Organization 52 (1998): 943-970. 42

Shannon, Norms are what States make of them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation, 295.

43

K. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980) as quoted in Shannon, Norms are what States make of them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation, 293-316.

44

45

Ibid.

46_Ibid. 47

R. Mitchell, "Regime Deisgn Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance," International

Organization 48 (1994): 425-458.; R. Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Norms," American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 1095-1111.

48

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12 notes, neoliberalism remains focused on costs that reflect material, individual gain. Moral norms are not directly addressed, and the focus is solely on norm compliance within specific regimes and institutions rather than global norms per se.49 Neoliberal institutionalism therefore remains a rationalist model of self-interest; where norms are followed because the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs of not acting on short-term interests.50 Decisions to comply with norms or not are made with calculations based on self-interest, the same as realists argue. The approaches share thus the common logic of consequences, facing the same criticisms despite their differences.51

From a constructivist perspective, meaningful behavior or action is only possible within an inter-subjective social context. There are many variations of constructivism, in this thesis the focus will be on those with a positivist ontological background that acknowledges reality to exist, but whose meaning derives from collective understandings.52 From this perspective, actors create their relations with, and understandings of, others through normative influences and practices. Structure is thus meaningless without some inter-subjective understanding of norms and social practices.53 Constructivists argue that states learn about expectations of appropriate behavior from these social practices. This approach is grounded in the “logic of appropriateness” that believes actors determine how to behave and what interests and identity to claim through the social environment.54 This socialization of states is presumed to be influenced by the imitation of other, successful, states; praise for conformity by others; disapproval and social isolation from deviation; and diplomatic and economic pressure.55 From this perspective, states are also believed to comply with norms because of the impact this has on its identity and “esteem.”56

The relationship between norms and interests is in this view constitutive; emerging norms and different normative contexts change state interests and create new interests. Hence, for constructivists the argument about whether action is norm-based or interest-based misses the point that norm conformance often is self-interested.57 By constituting or regulating, norms can create different possibilities for action and construct options that would not have been clear in the absence

49_{Ibid.: 296.}

50_{Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa,}

451-478.

51

52_{In contrast, critical constructivism works from a constitutive epistemology which rejects the positivist}

assumption of an external, observable reality. This approach denies that anything can be understood outside the context and language of actors. From this perspective, norms are not objective things, but rather products of (possible pervasive hegemonic) discourse.

53

Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 173.

54_{March and Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 943-970.} 55

Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 887-917.; Florini, The Evolution of

International Norms, 363-389.

56_{Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 887-917.} 57

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13 of a norm.58 For instance, normative discourse can structure new contexts of the realm of acceptable practice, making certain practices illegitimate or acceptable.59 Norms help define goals and purposes for states and offer a general vision and direction for action. Norms not only affect actors’ interests, but the way actors connect their interests and preferences to policy and action as well.60

To summarize, from a constructivist perspective, shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about social practices are what give the world structure, order, and stability. In this context, norms are believed to channel and regularize behavior; they often limit the range of choice and constrain actions. There are however problems with this approach, the most important being its inability to explain deviations and the assumption that norms are clearly and commonly understood by actors.61 The emphasis on structure makes it for constructivists difficult to explain violations, since not all states act similar within a structure. Constructivists assume that “shared expectations” are literally clear, which is not always the case since actors are humans, and not all-knowing observers of objective reality; they are imperfect interpreters of it.62

Neither rationalist nor constructivists offer satisfactory explanations for the puzzle when and why states will comply with, or violate norms. It remains unclear as well why some international norms are more influential than others and how norms relate to other factors like individual – material- interests. The debate between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness misses however an important point, since they are not mutually exclusive.63 Actors’ decisions may be influenced by both awareness of international norms and individual calculations of interest, and the important question is what role both factors play in decision-making processes. In order to answer this question, Shannon follows DiMaggio in suggesting an interactionist perspective that “embeds the logic in the interaction between mental structures instantiated in practical reason on the one hand and institutional requirements on the other.”64 This political psychology approach suggests that decisions result from the interaction between agent and structure, by which actors pursue goals while keeping in mind acceptable behavior in a particular prevailing social structure. The possibility for actors to justify an exception or violation from normative rules depends thus partly on the characteristics of the norm itself, and for part on the situation in which the moral dilemma of the actor takes place.

58

Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in The Culture of National Security - Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 149.

59

Ibid., 149. 60

61_{Shannon, Norms are what States make of them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation, 293-316.} 62

Ibid.: 298.

63

Ibid.

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14 The characteristics of the RtoP and its influential power will be studied in this thesis with the use of the theory of norm robustness. In order to understand why some norms are more influential and will thus be less vulnerable to violations than others, Jeffrey Legro distinguishes three conditions under which norms are likely to matter most. The potential of norms to influence individual actors’ behavior and collective practices depends according to him on this “norm robustness.”65

1.3 Norm Robustness

From a political psychology perspective, the decision to violate or comply with a norm is based on the ability of actors to interpret the norm’s parameters in a way that is most beneficial to their needs. Legro’s theory of norm robustness offers criteria that explain why some norms are more open for different interpretations than others, and therefore will be more influential in decision-making processes. Since norms are dichotomous, existing in varying strengths, Legro makes an attempt to understand why some international norms are more influential than others in particular situations.66 He assesses norm strength as robustness with three criteria which determine robustness; specificity, durability and concordance.67 He also tries to understand how much international norms matter relative to other factors, because it is almost always possible to identify some norm to explain a particular effect in a certain situation.68 Legro’s statement is that norms that are more robust will be more influential regardless of whether the dependent variable is identity, interests, individual behavior or collective practices and outcomes.69

The first criteria that should be studied to determine a norm’s robustness is specificity. Overly complex or ill-defined norms will damage actors’ understandings of the norm and negatively influence its robustness, while relative precise and simple rules and guidelines will empower the norm and its influence. Specificity can thus be assessed by examining actor’s understandings of the simplicity and clarity of the norm. The second criteria is durability, which refers to how long the rules of the norm have been in force and how they endure challenges to their prescriptions and parameters. If norms have had a long-standing legitimacy and if the violations of the norm have been penalized, a norm can be considered durable. Violations are in this sense not necessarily invalidating to a norm, the issue is whether the violators are socially or self-sanctioned for doing so. The final criteria is concordance, which denotes how widely accepted the rules of the norm are in diplomatic

65_{Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism, 31-63.} 66 Ibid.: 33. 67 Ibid. 68_Ibid. 69

For evidence of the power of robust norms see for example Paul, “Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in

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15 discussions and treaties; in other words the extent of inter subjective agreement.70 This dimension can go both ways; public efforts to reaffirm a norm could be a sign that the norm is weakening, instead of viable; and if a norm is widely accepted, there may be no need to discuss it in public debates. The context is important in this sense to assess whether or not affirmation is contributing to the norms robustness. The overall expectation is “that the clearer, more durable, and more widely endorsed a prescription is, the greater will be its impact.”71_{If norms are less robust, the expectation}

is that actors will be more inclined toward violations, which can also be explained by the political psychology approach. If a norm is effective, states’ expectations of the future will shift as the norm becomes more and more integrated in international society. Leaders in world politics in that case should make reference to the norm in the decision-making process and recognize the penalties of non-adherence.72

In his article, Legro does not give a precise formula on how to aggregate the three criteria for robustness. It is clear however, that any evaluation of robustness must measure the three criteria independently from the norm’s effects. Judging interests of actors according to their behavior, whether the actor complies with norm or not, can result in circularity. Some degree of deviation from the norm is also possible without implying its refutation, making only relying on what actors do not enough. Relying on what actors say however, how they justify or defend their actions can be misleading. This interpretive approach sees norms as communication devices, making their presence and efficacy better judged by normative justifications than by behavior itself. The problem with this approach is to distinguish manipulation and deception from more “genuine” forms of communication, because of the strategic role of deception of public statement. A compromise is thus necessary, studying both rhetoric and behavior at same time.73

1.4 A Political Psychology Approach to the Relationship between Norms and

Interests

As explained in previous parts of this chapter, actors can make decisions based on both the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences, as they are not mutually exclusive. Decision-making processes are influenced by several needs that can be derived from constructivist logic; the first is the need to organize and simplify reality for the purpose of effective action. Especially in situations of limited time and incomplete or ambiguous information, actors often need to rely on cognitive shortcuts to organize their world and make decisions.74 Secondly, actors feel the need for social 70 Ibid.: 35. 71_Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73

Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and their Limits," in The Culture of National Security - Norms

and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 484. 74

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16 approval. As a member of an identity group, for example a democratic liberal state, actors will desire to enhance their social image, seeking respect and approval from members of the same identity group. This need causes decision-makers to be aware of the social meaning of their actions and behavior. In relation is the need to maintain positive images of itself. The desire to enhance one’s esteem leads actors to behave in accordance with internalized norms and their own values.75

The desire to fulfil these three needs can cause different types of behavior and influence decisions made by actors. In cases when there is a value conflict between one’s interest and international norms, there is a so-called moral dilemma. Norm compliance in a situation without value conflict or moral dilemma is influenced by the need to enhance social approval by one’s peers, while violation would risk social disapproval. Further, compliance makes it possible to retain a positive self-image and esteem, which are both important to actors. Decision-makers are accountable to themselves and their peers, so it is hard to consider policies that conflict with one’s values and identity. Beyond these psychological reasons, actors will comply with norms for strategic and instrumental reasons, like avoidance of possible sanctions. Finally, actors prefer the status quo in order to avoid any problems, or not to “rock the boat.”76 These reasons make it that norm conformity is standard behavior in international politics, as it helps actors organize reality, direct action in appropriate directions, improve social relationships and strengthen self-esteem. However, actors are not only concerned with appropriate behavior. They are motivated as well by the pursuit of interests, which often conflict with the expectations of appropriate behavior.

In order to violate a norm, actors thus need to resolve these moral dilemmas of the motivation to violate on the one hand and the social constraint of acceptable behavior on the other. According to the political psychology approach, actors will make the decision to comply or violate a norm based on the “dynamics by which they organize and understand reality, struggle to avoid negative social judgements, and maintain a positive self-image.”77 The outcome of these dynamics depends on both the individual will and the social ability to violate a norm.

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17 be subjectively interpreted and applied by humans. This involves subjective assessment of the norm’s prescription, parameters and whether a particular situation is applicable to the norm’s parameters. Decision-makers therefore decide what a norm “really means” and define it as they see them in particular circumstances. Norms essentially are as Shannon puts it “what states make of them.”79 Therefore, a norm will be less susceptible to violations if it offers limited room for different interpretations. A clearly articulated, codified norm offers fewer options for actors within an identity by which they can violate and maintain social integrity.

Secondly, the situation needs to be able to provide the actor with a plausible outlet based on the norm’s parameters. If a situation is not amenable to denial, an actor will be more likely to comply with the appropriate behavior prescribed by the norm. The willingness of an actor to actually violate a norm depends thus party on the belief of the decision-maker that such course of action is acceptable, legitimate policy. This makes sense, because if an actor beliefs it is not violating any social expectations, violation of a norm is more likely to occur. Actors will evaluate what they belief other peer members would accept as appropriate behavior. Norms thus interact with agents and are context dependent, based partly on ones image of the other in a particular situation.

1.5 Operationalization of Theories

In the next two chapters, it will be argued that the RtoP is lacking robustness, limiting its ability to influence decision-making processes and that it is therefore unlikely that the RtoP would have been able to guide the decision to intervene military in Libya in 2011. Second, by studying the adoption of SC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 this thesis will show that indeed it is very unlikely that the RtoP, or more broadly a new normative order, was one of the main reasons for the strong international reaction to the Libyan situation. Instead, it will be argued that old principles and norms related to state sovereignty and non-interference are still very relevant and the thesis will follow the political psychology approach by stating that NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 should be regarded as a justifiable exception from the – robust –norm of non-intervention.

In order to examine a norm’s strength and its potential to influence decision-making processes, the three criteria for norm robustness need to be assessed. Legro uses a constructivist toolbox and understands norms as having different relationships with identities, interests and behavior. The most important problem with the conceptualization of norms according to Legro is the difficulty of assessing a norm independent of the effects attributed to the norm. If this is not done properly, there is the danger of tautology, since one can almost always identify a norm to explain a certain effect.80 When studying a norm’s robustness, it is therefore important not to take into

79_Ibid.

80

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18 account the behavior or action that the norm is supposed to be responsible for. Another problem with the assessment of norms is that there is often a bias to study the norms that has “worked.”81 It is however just as important to study ineffective norms, in order to understand why some norms have more influence than others. Further, Legro identifies the problem of neglect of alternative explanations for the effects attributed to norms. This thesis addresses these three problems, by assessing the norm’s robustness independently from the Libya intervention in chapter two, by studying a norm that has not been able to effectively influence behavior and by offering alternative explanations for the behavior by the international community in chapter three.

Legro presents no exact formula on how to combine the three criteria into an overall measure of robustness, it is thus partly interpretive. Jeffrey Legro notes in his article that the specificity of a norm concerns the quality of the definition of the guidelines for restraint and use, and how well these are understood. For a norm to be considered specific, the concepts and definitions in a norm must be clearly outlined and easily understandable for all actors. It also needs to be clear what will be understood as a violation of the norm. The existence of disagreements about a norm is a signal that a norm is not specific enough. From the approach that norms are in essence what states make of them, the less specific the norm, the easier it will be for actors to justify violations. If there is a lengthy code that is too complex or ill-defined, it will be easier for states to find ways in which to legitimize violation of the norm, and likely as well that countries will argue about what the norm entails or how to implement it, minimizing the influence a norm can have. It is therefore important that a norm is relatively simple and precise, making it more difficult to justify violations. The specificity of a norm can be best assessed by examining actors’ understandings of the simplicity and clarity of the norm, as Legro under scribed.82 The study of a norm’s prescriptions and parameters is important, since these could allow different interpretations of what a norm entails.83 In paragraph 2.1, direct sources of the RtoP like the ICISS report; the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change; and the World Summit Outcome Document will be examined in terms of clarity of definitions, guidelines and disagreements, and differences between the three descriptions of the RtoP. Further, an assessment of the international community’s understanding of the RtoP norm will be made.

The durability of a norm denotes how long its rules have been in effect and how they weather challenges to their prohibitions. The required amount of time needed for enough durability needs to be assessed case-by-case, since Legro did not make a clear description on how long would

81

See for example Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against

South Africa, 451-478.; Price and Tannenwald, Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos, 114-152.

82

Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism, 34.

83

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19 be long enough. Legro looks at relative durability when discussing for example rules regarding submarine warfare. These have been in place since the Hague Peace Conference of 1988, which he therefore regards as durable. Existing older norms and ongoing normative contestation will negatively affect a norm’s robustness, which is therefore an important factor to take into account.84

Violations and international response to violations are very important in determining a norm’s durability as well. For example, Legro considers the norm regarding strategic bombing as less durable than the rules of submarine warfare, even though these rules have been in effect since 1907. The violations occurring in WWI and WWII show that the norm was not respected, with violations occurring without effective sanctions, and therefore less developed than the norm of submarine warfare.85 If the norm has evolved with long-standing legitimacy and violators or violations of its rules have been penalized, it is more likely that the norm can influence individual or collective behavior. The important issue is whether actors are sanctioned, socially or by itself, for violating the norm. If violations can happen only with great loss of social esteem, actors will be more inclined to comply with the norm.86 In paragraph 2.2 of the thesis, first the background and history of the legitimacy of the RtoP will be examined, as well as its relationship with state sovereignty and the related norm of non-intervention. Hereafter, cases of violations will be discussed and reviewed to what extent these contribute negatively to the RtoP’s durability. For the RtoP, misuse of the norm is possible when interventions for reasons other than human protection are being legitimized with the RtoP. Violation is however also possible when the international community fails to act in cases of large-scale atrocities. These will be discussed when analyzing the RtoP’s durability.

The final criterion for a norm’s robustness is concordance. According to Legro, concordance indicates the acceptance of the rules in diplomatic discussions and treaties. Concordance should be assessed in terms of support for the norm. The support from a large amount of states and critical states are both important, as Legro emphasizes the importance of the support by Britain, Germany, the US and Soviet Union for the submarine warfare rules.87 The importance of support by critical states, those affected directly by the norm, is also highlighted by Finnemore and Sikkink.88 The degree of intersubjective agreement is important for the potential to influence behavior. It is important to note that public efforts to reaffirm a norm may be a sign that a norm is weakening

84

For more information about norm contestation see for example Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality," European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2010): 103-127; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996); Suzette R. Grillot, “Global Gun Control: Examining the Consequences of Competing International Norms,” Global Governance 17 (2011): 529 – 555.

85

86

Shannon, Norms are what States make of them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation, 293-316.

87_{Ibid.: 40.} 88

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20 instead of it being viable. The context is therefore of importance. Affirmation by concurring to its acceptability is more reinforcing and contributing to its robustness, it can be damaging however when actors put special conditions on their acceptance. On the other hand, when a norm is never mentioned or discussed publicly, it can be a sign that the rules are being taken for granted and that actors are not considering violating it. Legro suggests that concordance can be best assessed through review of the records of national and international discussions that involve these norms.89_{For the}

RtoP, debates and discussions surrounding the norm will be discussed to assess its concordance in paragraph 2.3.

It is important to realize that the three criteria for robustness are interconnected, as Legro gives an example of limited robustness directly affecting a norm’s specificity in the case of rules regarding strategic bombing.90 In chapter two of this thesis, the three criteria will be assessed separately but the links between the characteristics of the norm will be taken into account and an overall assessment of the RtoP’s robustness will be made. It will conclude that the Responsibility to Protect is lacking robustness on all three areas, which leads to the hypothesis that the RtoP could not have been influential in the decision to intervene in Libya.

In chapter three, first the influence of the RtoP on the adoption of SC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 will be measured. As mentioned before, the measurement of a norm’s influence on individual or collective behavior needs to be a combination of focus on discourse and action.91 In order to assess the influence of the norm on this particular kind of action, the focus will be on the discourse in the texts of the resolutions themselves as well as on the language used by the Security Council members during the meetings before and after the adoption of the Resolutions. Further, it will be analysed if the action as authorised by the SC was the result of a new normative order, or still justified and legitimized by older and more robust rules like chapter VII of the UN Charter. The conclusion will be that it is very unlikely that the RtoP had major influence on the decision-making process or was one of the guiding principles for the SC members to decide to take action in Libya.

A political psychology approach will be used in the final part of chapter three to explain why the intervention should be considered as a violation of non-intervention rather than compliance with the RtoP. Non-intervention is considered a relatively robust norm in Legro’s terms.92 It predates 1945, has been widely accepted and held since then, as codified in the UN Charter. The language of the norm in its various forms is consistent in specifying against direct or indirect military intervention

89_{Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism, 31-63.} 90

91

92_{Richard K. Herrmann and Vaughn P. Shannon, "Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation,}

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21 in another state.93 The question thus follows what made the intervention in Libya possible. Following the political psychology approach, in chapter three the national interests of the Security Council members regarding the Libya case will be assessed in order to understand if and why they would be willing to violate the rules of non-interference. It will then be assessed if there was a moral dilemma for the actors involved. Secondly, the prescriptions and parameters of the norm of non-intervention will be assessed to understand what the level of interpretability is and the exceptionality of the situation in Libya will be discussed, in order to understand to what extent the situation made violation of the norm possible and justifiable without loss of (self-) esteem and social approval.

93

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22

2. The RtoP’s Robustness and it’s Behavior-Changing Potential

2.1 Specificity

The Responsibility to Protect was first developed and introduced by the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention. The commission was launched in September 2000 and published its 90-page report and a 400-page supplementary volume of research essays, bibliography, and background material, all under the title “The Responsibility to Protect” a year later. The text in the report was found by consensus among the commissioners and therefore a product of compromise between conflicting opinions, trying to make it as broadly acceptable as possible.94 This is possible one of the reasons the RtoP lacks clarity, both conceptually as institutionally.95

The RtoP as designed in the ICISS report encompasses three elements; prevention to “address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk”96; reaction to “respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases with military intervention”97; and rebuilding to “provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm of the intervention was designed to halt or avert.”98 It is emphasized in the report that the priority of the RtoP should be at the prevention phase. There is however a big discrepancy between the commission’s sophisticated and nuanced treatment of intervention and its brief and confused take on prevention and rebuilding.99 The same can be said about the commission’s conclusions on rebuilding, lacking clear parameters and prescriptions. This indicates that the focus of the RtoP and what its main components are, or should be, is not very clear and open for discussion, disagreements and violations of the norm. Further, Bellamy points out that the ICISS did not answer the question of the legitimacy and legality of interventions not authorized by the UN Security Council.100 The commission stated that the SC should be the first organ to discuss any matter relating to military intervention fur human protection purposes, but it failed to unconditionally exclude the possibility that the RtoP might ultimately be taken on by the General Assembly, regional organizations, or coalitions of states if the SC would fail to act. The ICISS left open

94_{Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 38.} 95

David Chandler, "Unravelling the Paradox of the Responsibility to Protect," Irish Studies in International

Affairs 20 (2009): 33.

96_{International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, XI.} 97

Ibid.

98

Ibid.

99_{Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 52.} 100

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23 whether and under what conditions or circumstances an intervention unauthorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly would be legitimized.101

Among scholars and policymakers, there was much divided criticism on the principle of the RtoP, some commentators stating the norm encompassed too much for it to be able to be effective, others stating the RtoP was focused on not enough at all, or that the norm was too narrow or just too broad.102_{This shows as well that in the international community, there was little agreement on}

what the rules of the norm entail, what they should entail and how they should implemented. As Alex Bellamy, one of the main supporters of the RtoP, pointed out; the central weakness of the report according to critics is “its failure to articulate a conceptually coherent, innovative and realizable account.”103 For example, the commission failed to specify what it meant with “large scale” killing and ethnic cleansing, and to clarify its perception of “actual or apprehended”. The report is vague as well in the part about the operational recommendations, and failed to explain how the prevention component needed to be actualized.

After the ICISS report introduced the principle of the RtoP, it was reaffirmed in the report “A More Secure World” by the High-Level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges, and Change of the UN Secretary-General.104 In its report, the panel endorsed “the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”105 The purported scope of the RtoP remained unclear in the panel’s report; stating that there was a “collective responsibility of every state when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.”106 The mentioning of the responsibility of “every state” left room for different interpretations. Stahn states correctly that this could be seen as a reminder of the erga omnes nature of international obligations, or it could allow for a broader reading that endorsed a wider concept of responsibility, under which the responsibility of the host state shifts to every other state in cases where the former is unable or unwilling to act.107

101_{Chandler, Unravelling the Paradox of the Responsibility to Protect, 104.} 102

Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 60.

103

Ibid., 62.

104_{For further elaboration about the role of the HLP for the emergence of the RtoP, see for instance Marc}

Pollentine, Constructing the Responsibility to Protect (Cardiff: Cardiff University School of European Languages, Translation and Politics, 2012).

105_{The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility}

(New York: United Nations, 2004).

106

Ibid.

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24 Further, the panel broadened the “just cause” thresholds from the ICISS report by adding “serious violations of humanitarian law” to the list containing genocide, large scale killing an ethnic cleansing. It narrowed the preventive component of the “just cause” criteria, insisting that the criteria would be satisfied if the threat was actual or “imminently apprehended”, as opposed to simply “apprehended” as the ICISS proposed.108

The High-Level Panel Report was the first step to adoption of the RtoP at the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy discussions at the World Summit in 2005, the RtoP was adopted in the Outcome Document. The Outcome Document contains two paragraphs (138 and 139) on the RtoP.109 The clearest commitment is made in paragraph 138; which opens with the statement that “[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”110 This sentence focusses on the traditional idea of duty that the host state has towards its citizens, which is reaffirmed by the formulation in the text; “We accept that responsibility…”111 However, the passage regarding the responsibility of the international community on a more intersubjective level, is framed in a more cautious way.

The Outcome Document has taken over the distinction between three responsibilities as proposed in the ICISS report, and treats each of these individually with diverging degrees of support. The prevention part is described more as a general appeal to the international community to support states and the UN in the prevention of crimes, which does not actually add new duties to the international community since the UN members already have committed themselves to the support of peace and security through the UN Charter.112 The responsibility to react in cases of mass atrocities is described in paragraph 139 and states that the “international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”113

This suggests that regarding peaceful measures, there is some intersubjective acceptance of an international responsibility. Regarding collective measures under Chapter VII through the Security Council however, the sentence used in paragraph 139 only states that the member states reaffirm their preparedness to take forceful action. This suggests a more voluntary engagement, rather than a mandatory prescription or duty to react.114 Further, states were reluctant to commit themselves to more than to act on a “case-by-case basis” through the Security Council, with no assumption of a

108

Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 75.

109

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 2005 World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1.

110_Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113_Ibid. 114

The Influence of Norms on Behavior