To decide or not to decide: The influence of BIS/BAS, decisional conflict, and framing on decision deferral
Master Thesis, Msc Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
March 23, 2014
Lars Ewoud de Vries Student number: 1517481
Email: L.E.de.Vries@student.rug.nl
Supervisor B.A. Nijstad
ABSTRACT
Much research on decision-making has been done, but few studies have investigated the deferral of decisions. This study investigated the influence of BIS/BAS, decisional conflict, and framing on decision deferral. A sample of 134 students participated individually in a laboratory experiment and made three decisions, which were presented, in random order. Each decision consisted of four versions according to a 2 x 2 structure, manipulating decisional conflict (low vs. high) and framing (positive vs. negative). BIS and BAS showed no effects on time-to-decision and deferral. This study replicates the previous findings of high decisional conflict leading to more deferral, less deliberate decision-making, and less experienced certainty. Unexpectedly, it was found that in a positive framing situation more time was used in a low conflict condition compared to a high conflict condition, meaning that the decision strategy used dependents on the amount of decisional conflict.
INTRODUCTION
During our life we constantly make decisions, some of which are of major importance and some are of minor importance.
Sometimes, a decision is easy and effortless, but at other times a decision is stressful and costs a lot of effort. Indecision can lead to minor problems like passing on a good deal or missing the bus or train. It could also lead to bigger problems like being indecisive about the merger that can save the company, or failing to apply for the job that you really want. Not making a decision can have disastrous consequences not only for the decision maker, but also for others and companies. Knowing what is of influence on indecision and in which way is of great importance, because after understanding the causes of indecision it is possible to reduce or eliminate indecision (Anderson, 2003; Nijstad, 2011).
For many, decision-making is daily routine, but for individuals that are indecisive it is an enormous burden. Indecision is related to decreased confidence in decision making, doubts about previously made decisions, reconsideration, worrying, decreased self-esteem, external locus of control, distractibility, elicitation of anger in others, and procrastination (Milgram & Tenne, 2000). Furthermore, indecision also plays a role in various clinical syndromes, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; American Psychiatric Association, 2000; see Thordarson et al., 2004), depression, and dependent personality disorder (DPD). Frost and Shows (1993) found that the extent to which procrastination is problematic and the amount of procrastination are correlated with indecision. Furthermore, indecision is also linked to symptoms of hoarding: the acquisition of possessions that have low or no value, and not being able to discard these possessions (Frost &
Gross, 1993).
It is known that various personality traits influence indecision. For example, neuroticism has a positive relationship with indecision and extraversion and conscientiousness have a clear negative relationship with indecision (Germeijs & Verschueren, 2011). Furthermore, we know that indecision is caused by situational variables (Anderson, 2003). One of the most important situational variables is decisional conflict, which occurs when none of the available alternatives is superior to other alternatives on all dimensions (Anderson, 2003; Dhar &
Nowlis, 1999; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Another situational variable is the way a decision is framed also plays a role in decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Decisions can be framed as a loss or as a gain and the reaction to these situations can be different (Kübergher, 1998). Decisions that are framed as losses and decisions in which alternatives have mostly negative attributes tend to be more difficult and demanding (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Botti & Iyengar, 2004).
Unfortunately, current research on the topic of indecision is rather limited, especially on the topic of the interaction between individual differences and situational variables on indecision. In this paper, I examine indecision as a consequence of dispositional approach/avoidance motivation, using measures of the Behavioural inhibition system (BIS; linked to avoidance motivation) and Behavioural activation system (BAS; linked to approach motivation; see Carver & White, 1994). I propose that BIS and BAS will interact with the situational variables decisional conflict (low vs. high) and framing (gain vs. loss) to influence indecision. In particular, BIS is associated with sensitivity towards losses, and individuals high on BIS will have difficulty making decisions that are framed in terms of losses, especially when decisional conflict is high (and it is unclear what the best alternative is). Further, BAS is associated with a sensitivity towards gains, and I expect that BAS is negatively related to indecision when choices are framed in terms of gains, and that decisional conflict will in that case have a weaker effect for individuals high as opposed to low on BAS.
Thus, the question that I will try to answer in this study is: what is the interaction between individual differences (in terms of BIS and BAS) and situational factors (decisional conflict and framing) on indecisiveness? These relations will be studied by means of an experiment, in which I examine effects on time-to-decision and decision deferral as indications of indecision. I hope that, by studying the interaction between individual differences and situational factors on indecision, I am able to give more clarity about this topic.
THEORY
Decisional conflict
When making decisions, conflicts can arise because individuals do not know how to trade off costs against benefits, the risks of the decision against its value, and immediate contentment against future distress (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Decisions between options with one being better in every aspect are easy and are free of conflict. On the other hand, decisions between options that both have clear disadvantages and advantages create conflict. Individuals experiencing this type of conflict delay their decision and try to seek additional information or options. In this high conflict situation, individuals are more likely to defer decisions compared to a low conflict situation (Anderson, 2003;
Tversky & Shafir, 1992). In other words, when the alternatives are about equally attractive but not identical, individuals are likely to defer as
it creates a decisional conflict. The delay or deferral of a decision is called choice deferral, and refers to a situation in which an individual chooses not to choose for the time being (Anderson, 2003). Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Time-to-decision is higher when there is a decisional conflict as opposed to a situation without a decisional conflict.
Hypothesis 1b: Indecision is higher when there is a decisional conflict as opposed to a situation without a decisional conflict.
Indecision
The terms indecision and indecision both are related to not making a decision, but there is a clear difference in the meaning of both terms. The term indecision refers to having problems making decisions in a specific situation, like when choosing a career direction, not implying that one has problems making decisions in other areas (Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002). In contrast to indecision, indecisiveness has been defined as the chronic inability to make decisions in various contexts and situations (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gaffner & Hazler, 2002;
Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002; Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2006; Saka & Gati, 2007; Saka, Gati, & Kelly, 2008) caused by pervasive emotional and personality related difficulties (Gati, Asulin-Peretz, & Fisher, 2012; Germeijs & Verschueren, 2007; Saka, Gati, & Kelly, 2008).
Because the terms indecision and indecision have different meanings it is important to make a distinction between the two.
In line with the previous definitions of indecision and indecisiveness, Savickas (2004) made a distinction between undecided individuals, referring to individuals with an inability to choose but who will choose in the near future, and indecisive individuals referring to individuals having chronic indecisiveness caused by high anxiety and low problem-solving abilities. Indecision, as mentioned, refers to a normal phase in life, and indecisiveness can be seen as a personality characteristic that pertains in various contexts and situations. Indecision and indecisiveness are multifaceted concepts, which contain various decision-making problems. Individuals high in indecisiveness have the perception of increased decision difficulty (Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002), are experiencing higher levels of uncertainty (Cooper, Fuqua, &
Hartman, 1984; Rassin et al., 2008), use less effective decisional strategies (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000, 2001), require more cognitive effort in decision making (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001), feel more threatened by ambiguous situations (Rassin & Muris, 2005a), are more likely to postpone decisions (Rassin & Muris, 2005b), and use more time choosing between different alternatives (Frost & Shows, 1993). Moreover, indecisiveness has been associated with individual characteristics such as neuroticism (Jackson, Furnham, & Lawty-Jones, 1999), obsessive–compulsive tendencies (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton et al., 1994), and perfectionism (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton et al., 1994).
BIS/BAS system
Gray (1990, 1994) proposed the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), which gives an explanation to the biological basis of extraversion and neuroticism. Gray proposed that the BIS/BAS systems are responsible for sensitivity to cues of punishment and cues of reward respectively. The BIS system is an aversive motivational system that is sensitive to signals of punishment, non-reward, and novelty.
Activation of the BIS system causes inhibition of movement towards goals (Gray, 1990). The BAS system is an appetitive motivational system that is sensitive signals of reward, non-punishment, and escape from punishment. Activation of the BAS system causes movement towards goals (Gray, 1990).
Approach-avoidance motivation is closely related to Gray’s (1994) BIS/BAS systems. As stated by Elliot (2008) “approach motivation may be defined as the energization of behaviour by, or the direction of behaviour toward, positive stimuli (objects, events, possibilities), whereas avoidance motivation may be defined as the energization of behaviour by, or the direction away from, negative stimuli (objects, event, possibilities)”.
Approach motivation is associated with positive stimuli and can be defined by appetitive behaviour, and avoidance motivation by aversive behaviour (Adams, Ambady, Macrea & Kleck, 2006). Organisms evaluate stimuli as positive or negative, which in turn leads to approach or avoidance behaviour. Depending on the context, positive or negative evaluations can take on some different meanings.
As mentioned, neuroticism and extraversion play a role concerning indecision and are closely related to the BIS (neuroticism) and
BAS (extraversion) systems (Carver & White, 1994). Neuroticism is characterized by sensitivity to cues of punishment or frustration, and
high-neuroticism individuals are mainly motivated to avoid punishment. High-neurotic individuals tend to show avoidance behaviour in
novel situations Extraversion on the other hand is characterized by sensitivity to cues of reward, and extraverts are mainly motivated by pleasure or reward. Furthermore, extraverts tent to show approach behaviour in novel situations. (Gray, 1990, 1994).
In conclusion, we can state that individuals who score high on BIS are probably more prone to indecision. Moreover, this is likely to be especially the case when there is a decisional conflict compared to no decisional conflict. In situations of decisional conflict, not a single alternative is clearly the best choice, and choosing each alternative has both advantages and disadvantages. Given that individuals who are high on BIS will tend to focus on disadvantages and are sensitive towards cues that signal potential losses, these individuals will experience difficulty when all alternatives have clear disadvantages. In contrast, when one alternative is clearly the best choice, and there is no decisional conflict, individuals high on BIS will choose the best option and show no indecision. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is:
H2a. There is a positive relation between BIS and indecision and between BIS and time-to-decision, but this is especially the case when there is decisional conflict.
On the other hand, individuals who are high on BAS focus mostly on reward signals. In the context of a decision, this implies that they look mostly for the advantages of each alternative, and focus less on their disadvantages. This will make individuals high on BAS in general less indecisive. Furthermore, it will reduce the degree to which decisional conflict affects their decision-making, and it is expected that individuals high on BAS are relatively decisive even when there is a decisional conflict. Stated differently, in cases of low decisional conflict, indecision is low regardless of BAS. However, in cases with high conflict, BAS will be negatively related to indecision. Therefore, the hypothesis is:
H2b. BAS is negatively related to indecision and time-to-decision, especially in cases when there is a decisional conflict.
Framing
The classic work by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) shows us that by means of framing effects decision-making can be influenced by the way options are presented or framed. They define a decision frame as referring “to the decision maker’s conception of acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice. The frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). In the experiment they conducted, they asked participants to choose between two options for dealing with the “Asian disease problem” (ADP).
Participants were presented with the following:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
Participants in a positive-framing condition were then asked to choose between Options A and B:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
By comparison, participants in a negative-framing condition chose between Options C and D:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
The results of the ADP showed that in the positive framing condition, 72% chose option A (the certain option), and in the negative framing condition, 78% chose option D (the uncertain option). Although the situations were equivalent, the framing effect caused a preference shift.
In the positively framed situation (i.e., numbers of lives saved) participants chose a risk-averse option, and in the case of the negatively framed situation (i.e., number of lives lost) participants chose a risk-seeking option. In a meta-analysis Kühberger (1998) summarized many replications of the framing effect and other studies that identified some of the conditions that strengthen or weakened it. Overall it can be concluded that the framing effect is robust.
In his study, Rubinstein (2013) found that messages framed as a loss were more consistent with the motivations of recipients who are
responsive to punishment cues (i.e. BIS), while messages framed as gain are more consistent with the motivations of recipients who are responsive to reward cues (i.e., BAS). Following this we could say that negative framing has more influence on individuals high on BIS compared to individuals high on BAS. And the other way around that positive framing has more influence on individuals high on BAS compared to individuals high on BIS. In most framing studies there is no option to defer the decision. When this becomes possible (as in this study), perhaps negative framing leads to deferral. Especially, when the individual is high on BIS. On the other hand when the framing is positive it is possible that there is less deferral. Therefore I state the following hypothesis:
H3a: In the case of high decisional conflict we expect that individuals high on BIS in the negatively framed condition show more deferral than participants in the positively framed condition with high decisional conflict.
H3b: In the case of low decisional conflict we expect that participants in both the framing conditions show the same amount of deferral.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants were 134 students (73 male and 61 females) of the University of Groningen who participated individually. For their participation respondents had the option of either receiving research credit points or a financial compensation of €4. The average age was 21.43 (SD = 2.81).
Each participant made three decisions about different situations (employee, friend, roommate), and the three decisions were presented in a random order. For each decision, there were four versions according to a 2 x 2 structure, manipulating decisional conflict (low vs. high) and framing (positive vs. negative). For each of the three decisions, participants were presented with one of these four possibilities, determined random. For example, the first situation presented to the participant could be ‘choosing a roommate with high decisional conflict’, while another participant would receive ‘cancelling a friend with low decisional conflict’ as the first situation.
Procedure
Participants were greeted by the experimenter, and were seated at a table before entering the experiment room. The participants received a paper that contained information about the experiment, and after the introduction participants were asked to read and sign the informed consent.
Now, the participants were escorted to their assigned cubicle where they were seated behind a personal computer. Participants were told that the test was self-explanatory and that they had to carefully read the instructions. When the instructions were read they had to press continue to start with the assignment. They were also asked if they had any questions before starting the experiment.
Participants started with answering questions about their demographics and three personality questionnaires; one for BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), one for indecision (Frost & Shows, 1993), and one for on the Big Five personality traits (John & Srivastava, 1999).
The second and final part of the study consisted of three decisions that were presented in random order. Each decision had a low and high conflict version, and each decision also had a version which either positively framed (choose) or negatively framed (cancel). The decisions were based on previous research (Dhar, 1996; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999), and altered to reflect situations that occur in daily life. In the low distinctiveness version, two options were offered that were approximately equally attractive. The options consisted of several attributes that were either the same for both options or were of approximately similar value. In the high distinctiveness conditions, one of the options was identical to one option in the low distinctiveness conditions, but the other option was made less attractive by changing some of the attributes to more negative ones. Framing was manipulated by asking participants to choose one of the alternatives in the positive frame condition, and by asking participants to cancel one of the options in the negative frame condition.
Participants were asked to imagine that they had to make a decision to either cancel or choose one of the options in question. Next to
both options there was the possibility to choose the option ‘I will choose later’, which was the deferral option. An example decision for choosing (positive frame) is:
“Imagine that you are a personnel advisor and have to hire someone for the organization you are working for. You have gone through the procedures and have identified two candidates. You can decide which of the two candidates you would like to hire now, but you can also decide to make your decision later.”
Low distinctiveness version
Employee 1 Employee 2
Features: Features:
- Team player - Team player
- Intelligent - Intelligent
- Positive work attitude - Positive work attitude
- Punctual - Loyal
- Leadership skills - Management skills
- Problem solving skills - Interpersonal skills
High distinctiveness version
Employee 1 Employee 2
Features: Features:
- Team player - Team player
- Intelligent - Intelligent
- Positive work attitude - Positive work attitude
- Punctual - Sometimes unprepared
- Leadership skills - Inattentive
- Problem solving skills
An example of a cancelling (negative frame) decision is:
“Imagine that you would like to have a social event tomorrow. Two of your friends have invited you for an evening out, and to your dismay you find out that you have said yes to both of them. Unfortunately, it is not possible to go out with both of them. So you would have to choose which friend you will cancel. You can make this choice now, but you can also make the choice later.”
Low distinctiveness version
Friend 1 Friend 2
Features: Features:
- Trustworthy - Trustworthy
- Honest
- Cares about you
- Honest
- Cares about you
- Accepts who you are - Sticks with you in good and bad times
- Fun to be with - Has a lot of humour
- Has interest in what you do - Supportive in what you want to achieve High distinctiveness version
Friend 1 Friend 2
Features: Features:
- Trustworthy - Trustworthy
- Honest
- Cares about you
- Honest - Likes you
- Accepts who you are - Sticks with you in good and bad times
- Fun to be with - Always late
- Has interest in what you do
After each decision participants were presented with some additional questions about the decision. These questions measured the
distinctiveness of the options, experienced certainty, and how deliberately or impulsively they had made their decision.
At the end participants were presented with a message that told the participant that they finished the experiment, and that the participant could leave the cubicle and go to the researcher. The participants were debriefed and if they had any remaining questions there was room to ask them. Furthermore, the participants had to fill in a form, which confirmed that they finished the experiment and if they received research points or money.
Measures
Indecision. This factor is measured using the Indecision Scale (Frost & Shows, 1993). This scale contains 11 items and measures general indecision (see appendix A). Participants had to answer these items by means of a 5-point Likert-scale (1 - strongly disagree to 5 - strongly agree). After scaling all items into one variable, Cronbachs α was .82.
BIS/BAS Systems. The BIS/BAS systems were measured by using the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994) that contains twenty items (see appendix B) and has four factors, one reflecting sensitivity of the BIS, and three reflecting dimensions of sensitivity of the BAS, including Drive, Fun Seeking, and Reward Responsiveness. The items are measured using a 5-point Likert-scale (1 – completely disagree to 5 – completely agree). After scaling these items into a BIS and BAS variable, Cronbachs α was .78 and .77 respectively.
Big Five Dimensions. The Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) is composed of 25 items (see appendix C), and is measured using a 5-point Likert response scale (1—absolutely false to 5—absolutely true; John & Srivastava, 1999). The BFQ distinguishes among five fundamental personality dimensions consisting of Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. All 25 items were scaled and divided into the five dimensions: Openness to experience (α .66), Conscientiousness (α .79), Extraversion (α .77), Agreeableness (α .72), and Neuroticism (α .79).
Indecision. The different choice options that were derived from previous research (Dhar, 1996; Dhar and Nowlis, 1999) had three choice options, namely choose/cancel option 1, choose cancel option 2, and I will choose later (deferral). Choosing later was seen as a form of indecision. Furthermore, the time a participant took to make the decision was measured in seconds.
Post-decision measures. After each decision the participant was asked to answer some questions concerning their decision. The questionnaire was composed of 19 items (see appendix A) and measured using a 5-point Likert-scale. The 19 items were scaled and into five variables: distinctiveness, experienced certainty, certainty threshold, deliberate/impulsiveness, and taking action.
The variable distinctiveness, which measured how distinct option 1 and option 2 were from each other, consisted of 4 items: 1) How attractive did you find option 1, 2) How attractive did you find option 2, 3) The two options were approximately equally attractive, and 4) It was clear what the best option of the two options was. The absolute difference between items 1 and 2 was calculated, and item 3 had to be recoded. The Z-scores of the 4 items were used and scaled into 1 variable, Cronbachs α .87).
Experienced certainty measured the amount of certainty the participant felt about the made decision, and was measured using 3 items:
1) I am certain about my decision, 2) I feel confident about my decision, and 3) I am certain which option was the best option. These three items were scaled into one variable, Cronbachs α was .83.
To measure certainty threshold three items were used: 1) I wanted to be absolutely certain I chose the best alternative, 2) I would only choose option 1 or 2 if I’m certain it is the best available alternative, and 3) It was important to me to choose the best available alternative.
These three items were scaled into one variable, Cronbachs α was .78.
To measure how deliberate/impulsive the participants made their decision four items were used (1 – deliberate, 2 – impulsive, 3 – spontaneous, 4 – well thought-through) and answered by means of a 5-point Likert-scale (1 – Not at all to 5 – Strongly). Item 2 and 3 had to be recoded, and thereafter the four items were scaled into one variable, Cronbachs α .70.
To measure if participants were taking action when making their decision, 5 items (1 – taking action, 2 – being careful, 3 – avoid mistakes, 4 – Choosing an X that was good enough, 5 – Choosing the best X) were used, and answered by means of a 5-point Likert-scale (1 – Not at all to 5 – Strongly). The five items combined gave an insufficient Cronbachs α. Therefore, after checking the correlations, question 5 and 8 were omitted and the variable was scaled using the items 6, 7, and 9, Cronbachs α .70.
RESULTS
Data analysis
Because each individual participant was asked to make three decisions, the data have a nested structure, in which decisions are nested within participants. Thus, there are two (nested) levels within the data: the level of the individual, and the level of the decision. BIS and BAS and other personality attributes were measures at the level of the individual. However, decisional conflict and framing were manipulated at the level of the decision, and the dependent variables (e.g., deferral, time-to-decision) were also measured at the level of the decision.
Therefore, analyses were conducted using (if possible) multi-level regressions, in which decisions are nested within individuals, and in which predictors are both at the level of the individual (e.g., BIS, BAS), and at the level of the decision (e.g., decisional conflict, framing).
To test our hypotheses, we also examined the cross-level interactions of individual and decision level data.
Manipulation checks
To check the manipulation of distinctiveness, a multilevel regression was performed. In this analysis experienced distinctiveness, of high versus low distinctiveness choices, was the dependent variable and conflict, framing and conflict*framing the independent variables.
The multilevel regression analysis showed a significant effect of conflict on distinctiveness, t(398) = -8.73, p < .01. Experienced distinctiveness was higher for low conflict (M = .48, SD = .81) than for high conflict choices (M = -.44, SD = .73), confirming that the conflict manipulation was successful.
For framing and conflict*framing no significant effects were found (t(398) = 0.42, p > .05 and t(398) = - 0.24, p > .05 respectively).
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and correlations of all variables used in this study.
Correlations
Variables M SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Individual level
1 Gender 1.46 .50 1
2 Age 21.43 2.80 -.01 1
3 BIS 3.42 .71 .30** .20** 1
4 BAS 3.82 .46 .04 -.05 -.03 1
5 Indecision 2.74 .65 .12* .09 .43** -.13** 1
Decision level
1 Conflict .52 .50 1
2 Framing .45 .50 -.01 1
3 Time 30.53 15.76 .17** -.07 1
4 Deferral .18 .39 .20** -.04 .01 1
5 Distinctiveness .00 .90 -.52** .02 -.33** -.48** 1
6 Experienced Certainty 3.86 .97 -.35** .04 -.20** -.37** .65** 1
7 Certainty Threshold 3.82 .88 -.21** -.03 -.09 .12* .26** .35** 1
8 Deliberate Decision-making 3.52 .79 -.22** -.07 .04 .15** .17** .30** .43** 1
9 Taking Action 3.62 .88 -.13* -.05 -.04 .26** .13** .20** .56** .52** 1
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations of study variables Note: * = P < 0.05, ** = P < 0.01
Hypothesis 1a, 1b, 2a, and 3a (effects of BIS)
I first examined my hypotheses concerning the effects of the manipulations (conflict and framing) and BIS on both time-to-decision
and deferral. Hypothesis 1a predicted that high decisional conflict would lead to higher time-to-decision than low decisional conflict.
Hypothesis 1b predicted that high decisional conflict would lead to more indecision than low decisional conflict. Hypothesis 2a predicted that individuals who score high on BIS are indecisive and take longer to decide when there is decisional conflict. Hypothesis 3a predicted a three-way interaction: BIS especially relates to indecision when conflict is high and decisions are framed in terms of losses.
To examine these hypotheses, a multilevel regression analysis was performed, in which time-to-decision was the dependent variable, and decisions were treated as nested within individuals. Time-to-decision was right-skewed, and was log-transformed before analysis (taking the natural logarithm). Predictors were BIS at the individual level, and conflict and framing at the decision level. Furthermore, all interactions between these predictors were examined. Because each individual made three decisions in a random order, we also included, as control variables, two dummies for decision and two dummies for order. The variable Decision defines the answer that was given by the participant. The dummy Decision 1 has the value 1 for the second decision made and the value 0 for the other two decisions; the dummy Decision 2 has the value 1 for the third decision made and the value 0 for the other decisions. The variable Sequence defines the order in which the decisions were given. The dummy Sequence 1 has the value 1 for the second decision that was randomly given and the value 0 for the other two decisions; the dummy Sequence 2 has the value 1 for the third given decision and the value 0 for the other decisions. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis. As we can see, conflict showed no significant effect on time, B = 0.10, t = 1.60, ns, and Hypothesis 1a is not confirmed. Furthermore, the interaction between BIS and conflict is not significant, B = .02, t = 0.25, ns, and hypothesis 2a is not confirmed. Moreover, Hypothesis 3a predicted a three-way interaction among conflict, framing, and BIS. Indeed, a negative significant effect was found for the three-way interaction, B = -.20, t = -2.15, p < .05. This three-way interaction is plotted in figure 1, which shows that in the high conflict and positive framing condition there is a negative effect of BIS on time-to-decision. This means that high BIS persons take less time in a high conflict and positive framing situation. Because Hypothesis 3a predicted a positive effect of BIS in the high-conflict and loss framing condition, this hypothesis is not confirmed.
A parallel analysis was performed on decisional deferral. The predictors in this analysis are identical to the previous analysis.
However, because deferral is a dichotomous variable (no/yes), a logistic regression was performed. The results of the logistic regression analysis for BIS on Deferral are shown in table 3. The analysis yielded a positive significant effect of Conflict, B = .93, t = 6.32, p < .001 (in the last step), meaning that in high decisional conflict situations an individual was more likely to show deferral. This confirms Hypothesis 1b. However, as can be seen in the table, none of the effects involving BIS was significant, and Hypotheses 2a and 3a are again rejected.
Additionally, Framing showed, although not significant at p < .05, a small negative effect on time, B = -0.12, t = -1.80, p < .1. In the high conflict condition (Figure 1) we see no downward or upward trend in the negative framing condition, but in the positive framing condition we see a downward trend, suggesting the possibility of a main effect of framing in the high conflict condition. In the low conflict condition (Figure 2) we see a possible trend downward in the negative framing condition and for the positive framing condition a possible trend upward, suggesting the possibility of a main effect of framing in the low conflict condition.
Table 2. Conflict, Framing, BIS on Time
95% Confidence Interval
Parameters B SE t Lower Bound Upper Bound
Decision D1 0.12 0.06 2.21* 0.01 0.23
Decision D2 0.19 0.06 3.34** 0.08 0.30
Sequence D1 -0.19 0.06 -3.39** -0.30 -0.08
Sequence D2 -0.24 0.06 -4.32*** -0.35 0.13
Conflict 0.10 0.06 1.60 -0.02 0.22
Framing -0.12 0.06 -1.80† -0.25 0.01
BIS -0.04 0.06 -0.66 -0.17 0.08
Conflict*Framing 0.11 0.09 1.19 -0.07 0.29
Conflict*BIS 0.02 0.06 0.25 -0.11 0.14
Framing*BIS 0.09 0.07 1.34 -0.04 0.22
Conflict*Framing*BIS -0.20 0.09 -2.15* -0.38 -0.02
Note: B scores of multilevel regression analysis.
(† = P < 0.1, * = P < 0.05, ** = P < 0.01, *** = P < 0.001)
Table 3. Conflict, Framing, BIS on deferral
Model
Predictor 1 2 3 4
Decision D1 0.502
(2.262) 0.538 (2.494) 0.519 (2.305) 0.522 (2.326) D2 0.577
(3.071)† 0.583 (3.009)† 0.561 (2.760)† 0.562 (2.771)†
Sequence D1 0.010
(0.001) 0.101 (0.099) 0.067 (0.043) 0.071 (0.048) D2 -0.212
(0.435) -0.160 (0.238) -0.192 (0.338) -0.193 (0.341)
Age -0.039
(0.658) -0.032 (0.404) -0.035 (0.477) -0.035 (0.481)
Gender 0.018
(0.005) 0.004 (0.000) 0.021 (0.006) 0.020 (0.005)
Conflict - 1.080
(14.097)*** 0.939 (6.338)* 0.934 (6.315)*
Framing - -0.216 (0.644) -0.497 (0.983) -0.523 (1.032)
BIS - 0.048 (0.057) -0.311 (0.671) -0.254 (0.334)
Conflict x Framing - - 0.403 (0.453) 0.426 (0.490)
BIS x Conflict - - 0.364 (1.522) 0.304 (0.648)
BIS x Framing - - -0.009 (0.001) -0.119 (0.054)
BIS x Conflict x Framing
- - - 0.154 (0.065)
Nagelkerke X
20.019 0.083 0.091 0.091
Note: B scores of logistic regression analysis. Related t- scores are in parenthesis
(† = P < 0.10, * = P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001)
Figure 1. High conflict, BIS and Framing on Time Figure 2. Low conflict, BIS and Framing on Time
Hypothesis 2b and 3b (effects of BAS)
Two more analyses were performed to examine the effects of BAS on indecision. These analyses exactly parallel those pertaining to BIS, with time-to-decision and deferral as dependent variables, only replacing BIS with BAS as a predictor. Hypothesis 2b predicted that individuals who score high on BAS are decisive and take less time when there is decisional conflict. Hypothesis 3b predicted a three-way interaction, and that BAS would reduce indecision especially in conditions of decisional conflict and gain framing. The multilevel regression analysis on time-to-decision showed no main effect of decisional conflict (that was already discussed before), and no effects of BAS (see table 4). Hypotheses 2b and 3b were therefore not confirmed. Although Hypotheses 3b is not confirmed, table 4 shows a small effect of Framing (B = -0.13, t =-1.91, p < .10), and the three-way interaction (B = -0.11, t =-1.73, p < .10). In the high conflict condition (Figure 3) we see no downward or upward trend in the negative framing condition, but in the positive framing condition we see a downward trend, suggesting the possibility of a main effect of framing in the high conflict condition. In the low conflict condition (Figure 4) we see a possible trend downward in the negative framing condition and for the positive framing condition a possible trend upward, suggesting the possibility of a main effect of framing in the low conflict condition.
The results of the logistic regression analysis for BAS on Deferral are shown in table 5. As can be seen there is no significant effect involving BAS on Deferral, and Hypotheses 2b and 3b must be rejected.
Table 4. Conflict, Framing, BAS on Time
95% Confidence Interval
Parameters B SE t Lower Bound Upper Bound
Decision D1 0.12 0.06 2.19* 0.01 0.23
Decision D2 0.18 0.06 3.27** 0.07 0.29
Sequence D1 -0.19 0.06 -3.41** -0.30 -0.08
Sequence D2 -0.24 0.06 -4.38*** -0.35 0.14
Conflict 0.10 0.06 1.57 -0.02 0.22
Framing -0.13 0.07 -1.91† -0.26 0.00
BAS -0.05 0.07 -0.77 -0.18 0.08
Conflict*Framing 0.12 0.09 1.26 -0.06 0.30
Conflict*BAS -0.01 0.04 -0.32 -0.10 0.07
Framing*BAS 0.01 0.05 0.12 -0.08 0.10
Conflict*Framing*BAS -0.11 0.06 -1.73† -0.23 0.02
Note: B scores of multilevel regression analysis.
(† = P < 0.1, * = P < 0.05, ** = P < 0.01, *** = P < 0.001)
Table 5. Conflict, Framing, BAS on Deferral
Model
Predictor 1 2 3 4
Decision D1 0.502
(2.262) 0.540 (2.509) 0.525 (2.356) 0.525 (2.361) D2 0.577
(3.071)† 0.583 (3.014)† 0.565 (2.803)† 0.567 (2.815)†
Sequence D1 0.010
(0.001) 0.103 (0.105) 0.082 (0.065) 0.085 (0.069) D2 -0.212
(0.435) -0.159 (0.235) -0.183 (0.307) -0.182 (0.306)
Age -0.039
(0.658) -0.030 (0.360) -0.040 (0.620) -0.040 (0.626)
Gender 0.018
(0.813) 0.025 (0.009) -0.029 (0.011) -0.030 (0.012)
Conflict - 1.083
(14.21)*** 0.912 (6.144)* 0.914 (6.161)*
Framing - -0.221 (0.675) -0.491 (0.976) -0.490 (0.975)
BAS - -0.072 (0.063) -0.085 (0.051) -0.084 (0.050)
Conflict x Framing - - 0.395 (0.446) 0.392 (0.438)
BAS x Conflict - - 0.148 (0.802) 0.131 (0.349)
BAS x Framing - - 0.014 (0.002) 0.014 (0.003)
BAS x Conflict x Framing
- - - 0.036 (0.013)
Nagelkerke X
20.019 0.083 0.088 0.088
Note: B scores of logistic regression analysis. Related t- scores are in parenthesis
(† = P < 0.1, * = P < 0.05, ** = P < 0.01, *** = P < 0.001)
Figure 3. High conflict, BAS and Framing on Time
Figure 4. Low conflict, BAS and Framing on Time Additional results
Participants were also tested on how they made their decision and in what way they experienced certainty. The following three variables were tested: Deliberate decision-making Taking action, and Experienced certainty. Six more multilevel regression analyses were performed to examine the effects of BIS, Conflict, and Framing on Deliberate decision-making, Taking action, and Experienced certainty and also the effects of BAS, Conflict, and Framing on Deliberate decision-making, Taking action, and Experienced Certainty. These analyses exactly parallel those pertaining to BIS and BAS, with time-to-decision and deferral as dependent variables, only replacing the dependent variables with Deliberate decision-making, Taking action, and Experienced certainty (see Appendix B and C).
As we can see in table B4 for BIS (appendix B), Conflict showed a significant effect on Deliberate decision-making, B = -0.31, t = -3.04, p < .01. Furthermore, in table C4 for BAS (appendix C) we also see a significant effect of Conflict on Deliberate decision-making, B = -0.32, t = -3.07, p < .01. For both, BIS and BAS, meaning that in low conflict conditions individuals make more deliberate decisions than in high conflict conditions.
Figure 5. BIS/BAS and Conflict on Deliberate decision-making
Table B5 (appendix B) showed a positive significant effect of BIS on Taking action, B = 0.29, t = 2.37, p < .05. On the other hand,
table C5 (appendix C) showed no significant effect of BAS on Taking action, B = 0.10, t = 0.82, ns. The effect of BIS on Taking action
means that individuals are high on BIS are more prone to taking action compared to individuals low on BIS. Figure 6 illustrates the results of
BIS and BAS on Taking action.
Figure 6. Low and High BIS/BAS on Taking action
Table B2 (appendix B) for BIS, showed a negative significant effect of Conflict on Experienced certainty, B = -0.58, t = -4.72, p <
0.001. Table C2 (appendix C) for BAS, showed a negative significant effect of Conflict on Experienced certainty. Meaning that, both for BIS and BAS the certainty that is experienced is higher in the low conflict condition compared to the high conflict condition.
DISCUSSION
Summary of Results
Much research on decision-making has been done, but research on decision deferral is not. This study tries to add insights to the currently available literature about decision deferral in relation to decisional conflict, BIS/BAS and framing. Six hypotheses were proposed, two concerning decisional conflict on indecision and time-to-decision, two regarding effects of BIS and BAS on indecision and
time-to-decision, and two regarding the effect of framing on indecision in high and low conflict conditions. Hypotheses were tested in a controlled lab setting at the University of Groningen, and participants were students and participated individually. The experiment consisted of a 2 x 2 design manipulating decisional conflict (low vs. high) and framing (positive vs. negative). Each participant made three decisions in random order and for each of the three decisions participants were presented with one of four manipulations, determined random.
I expected that high decisional conflict would lead to higher time-to-decision than low decisional conflict. Previous findings suggest that decisional conflict leads to delay of a decision and consequently taking more time (Anderson, 2003; Tversky & Shafir, 1992).
Inconsistent with these findings, we found no effect of decisional conflict on the amount of time a participant took to make their decision. It is not clear why this difference appeared, although Rubinstein (2013) states that response time has large variance and to obtain clear-cut results one needs hundreds of participants responding to the same question. Therefore, the amount of participants in this study could be on the low side to give significant results.
I also expected, in line with earlier findings on deferral (Anderson, 2003; Tversky & Shafir, 1992), that high decisional conflict would lead to more deferral compared to low decisional conflict. Consistent with this reasoning I found that deferral was more apparent in the high decisional conflict condition compared to the low conflict condition. Meaning that in situations with high conflict between choice options, deferral becomes a more viable option.
BIS had no direct relation with decisional conflict. Furthermore, my prediction that a person high on BIS shows more deferral in a
high conflict and negative framing situation was not supported. In contrary I found that instead of taking more time the participants took less
time to decide in the high conflict situation with positive framing. Meaning that individuals in the negative framing condition take roughly the same amount of time in both the low and high conflict condition (see figure 1). This suggests that negatively framed questions create a situation in which high or low conflict is not of influence on the time one takes to make the decision. On the other hand, in the positively framed condition participants took less time to decide when facing a high conflict question compared to low conflict. This rather unexpected result shows the same pattern, although not significant, for BAS (see figure3). Looking at framing literature ((Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) one could say that in the negative framing condition (cancelling) an individual shows more risk-seeking behaviour and therefore chooses one of the two cancelling options available instead of deferral. Whereas, in the positive framing condition (choosing), individuals show more risk-averse behaviour and therefore choose the deferral option instead of one of the two choosing options. This could also explain the amount of time taken. When in the low conflict and positive framing situation, an individual behaves risk-averse and therefore needs more time to decide which option to choose, although it is clear which option would be best. In the high conflict and positive framing condition, both options are approximately similar which makes the decision difficult, and therefore, because of risk-aversion, it is easier and quicker to choose the deferral option. The decision strategy used in a positive framing situation depends, therefore, on the amount of conflict between options and if there is the option to defer.
Additionally, I have looked at the variables Deliberate decision-making, Taking action, and Experienced certainty. I found that when decisional conflict is low individuals take more deliberate decisions, compared to high decisional conflict (see figure 5). As it is clear in the low conflict situation which option is best, one could expect that in this condition an individual will take a more deliberate decision. When conflict is high, it becomes more difficult to choose, and therefore the decision is less deliberate.
Furthermore, I found that individuals high on BIS are seeing their decision more as taking action compared to individuals low on BIS (see figure 6). This effect does not compare with previous literature that states that activation of BIS causes inhibition towards goals, in other words, not taking action.
The amount of experienced certainty was higher in the low conflict condition compared to the high conflict condition. This comes as no surprise as our manipulation was successful. High decisional conflict situations will lead to more uncertainty. Because of this uncertainty findings in previous literature become clear. This uncertainty could explain the findings of Tversky and Shafir (1992) that individuals are more likely to defer if there is high decisional conflict.
Implications
This study contributes to the literature on decision-making by investigating the effect of BIS/BAS, decisional conflict and framing on deferral. Based on previous literature decisional conflict is an important predictor of decision deferral and difficulty of choice (Anderson, 2003; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). This study confirms the effect of distinctiveness on deferral, deliberate decision-making, and experienced certainty. Showing that high conflict leads to more deferral and less deliberate decision-making and certainty.
The expected effects of BIS and BAS were not found in this research. Somewhat unexpectedly, I found that instead of taking more time to decide in a high conflict situation with positive framing, participants took less time to decide. This effect of positive framing on time shows a difference in decision-making strategy between low and high decisional conflict situations. Contrary to this there is no difference in decision-making strategy in the negative framing condition.
Knowing the effects of personality, decisional conflict and framing on decision-making is highly useful. Although no effects of BIS and BAS were found it would still be useful to search for personality traits that could hinder or enhance decision-making. For example, a company with a position that requires you to make quick and adequate decisions, although various factors play a role in decision-making, it could benefit the company greatly if they have an employee with personality traits that enhance decision-making. The same holds true for decisional conflict and framing. Taking these factors into account could lead to more effective and efficient decision-making
Limitations and future directions
Strength of this study was the use of questionnaires that were based on existing research. Furthermore, the experiment was conducted
in a controlled setting with a good amount of participants. However, some limitations have to be addressed. The first limitation concerns the
robustness of the decisions. Although the manipulations were based on existing literature (Dhar, 1996; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999), they were
altered to reflect situations that occur in daily life. Due to time constrains it was not possible to test the robustness of these manipulations.
Furthermore, the daily life situations used in this study are by no means excluding other possible situations. Future research should therefore test for robustness and try and find other possible situations that could be used to further test the effects of personality, decisional conflict, and framing on deferral. Secondly, the experiment was combined with another experiment, with as reasons to attract a large pool of participants and to use the allotted laboratory space as efficient as possible. My experiment came directly after the first one, which could affect my results. The first experiment could have various effects on the participant, for example the effects tested in the first experiment could influence the participant and cause the participant to become disinterested or become physically or mentally tired. Therefore, this experiment should be replicated separately from other experiments to see if different effects are measured. A third limitation is the fact that the experiment was conducted in a controlled setting, which makes it difficult to generalize the results to actual real life situations.
Therefore, case studies of actual real life situations should be conducted in future research to expand the current findings and to come to more conclusive answers. Finally, the data gathered in the present study were from students of the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Although a homogenous group, this also leads to difficulties to generalize the results to other groups and situations. Future research is needed to investigate whether the effects of the present study also apply to other groups. Despite these limitations, this study provides new and valuable empirical information on the effects of BIS/BAS, decisional conflict, and framing on deferral.
Conclusion
In summary, the present study extends our knowledge on framing by showing that in a positive framing situation more time was used in a low conflict condition compared to a high conflict condition, meaning that the decision strategy dependents on the amount of decisional conflict. Unfortunately, BIS and BAS showed no effect on time-to-decision and deferral. What was found is that high decisional conflict leads to more deferral, less deliberate decision-making, and less experienced certainty, which replicates previous findings. With the current study, I hope to make a significant contribution to the conceptualization of the construct deferral.
References
Anderson, C.J. (2003). The psychology of doing nothing: Forms of decision avoidance result from reason and emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 1, 139-167.
Adams, J., Reginald B., Ambady, N., Macrae, C.N., & Kleck, R.E. (2006). Emotional expressions forecast approach-avoidance behavior.
Motivation & Emotion, 30(2), 177-186. doi:10.1007/s11031-006-9020-2
Botti, S., & Iyengar, S.S. (2004). The Psychological Pleasure and Pain of Choosing: When People Prefer Choosing at the Cost of Subsequent Outcome Satisfaction. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 87(3), 312-326.
Carver, C.S., & White, T.L. (1994). Behavioral Inhibition, Behavioral Activation, and Affective Responses to Impending Reward and Punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(2), 319-333.
Cooper, S.E., Fuqua, D.R., & Hartman, B.W. (1984). The relationship of trait indecision to vocational uncertainty, career indecision, and interpersonal characteristics. Journal of College Student Personnel, 25, 353–357.
Dhar, R., (1996). The effect of decision strategy on deciding to defer choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 4, 265-281.
Dhar, R., & Nowlis, M. (1999). The effect of time pressure on consumer choice deferral. Journal of consumer research, 25(4), 369-384.
Elliot, A.J. (2008). Handbook of approach and avoidance motivation. New York: Psychology press.
Ferrari, J.R., & Dovidio, J.F. (2001). Behavioral information search by indecision. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 1113–1123.
doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00094-5
Frost, R.O., & Gross, R.C. (1993). The hoarding of possessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 367-381.
Frost, R.O., & Shows, D.L. (1993). The nature and measurement of compulsive indecision. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 683–692.
Gaffner, D.C., & Hazler, R.J. (2002). Factors related to indecision and career indecision in undecided college students. Journal of College Student Development, 43, 317–326.
Gati, I., Asulin-Peretz, L., & Fisher, A. (2012). Emotional and personality-related career decision-making difficulties: A three-year follow-up. The Counseling Psychologist, 40(1), 6–27.
Gayton, W.F., Clavin, R.H., Clavin, S.L., & Broida, J. (1994). Further validation of the indecision scale. Psychological Reports, 75, 1631–1634. doi:10.2466/pr0.1994.75.3f.1631
Germeijs, V., & De Boeck, P. (2002). A measurement scale for indecision and its relationship to career indecision and other types of indecision. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 18, 113–122. doi:10.1027//1015-5759.18.2.113
Germeijs, V., & Verschueren, K. (2007). Educational choices in adolescence: The decision-making process, antecedents, and consequences.
In V.B. Skorikov & W. Patton (Eds.), Career development in childhood and adolescence (pp. 203–219). Rotterdam, the Netherlands:
Sense.
Germeijs, V., & Verschueren, K. (2011). Indecisiveness: Specificity and Predictive Validity. European Journal of Personality, 25, 295-305.
doi: 10.1002/per.786
Gray, J.A. (1990). Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition. Motivation and emotion, 4, 269-288.
Gray, J.A. (1994). Personality dimensions and emotion systems. In P. Ekman & R.J. Davidson (Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 329-331). New York: Oxford University Press
Jackson, C.J., Furnham, A., & Lawty-Jones, M. (1999). Relationship between indecision and neuroticism: The moderating effect of a tough-minded culture. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 789–800. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00027-6
John, O., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The big five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspecitves. In L.A. Pervin & O.P.
John (Eds.), Handbook of personality theory and research (pp. 102-138). New York: Guilford Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39(4), 341-350. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341
Kühberger, A. (1998). The influence of framing on risky decisions: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75, 23 – 55.
Milgram, N., & Tenne, R. (2000). Personality correlates of decisional and task avoidant procrastination. European Journal of Personality,
14(2), 141-156.
Nijstad, B. (2011). Moeilijke beslissingen. Gedrag & Organisatie, 24, 304-315.
Patalano, A.L., & Wengrovitz, S.M. (2006). Cross-cultural exploration of the Indecision scale: A comparison of Chinese and American men and women. Personality and Individual Differences, 41, 813–824. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2006.03.023
Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (2005a). Indecision and the interpretation of ambiguous situations. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 1285–1291. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.06.006
Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (2005b). To be or not to be . . . indecisive: Gender differences, correlations with obsessive-compulsive complaints, and behavioral manifestation. Personality and Individual Differences, 38, 1175–1181. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.07.014
Rassin, E.G.C., Muris, P., Booster, E.M.L., & Kolsloot, I. (2008). Indecision and informational tunnel vision. Personality and Individual Differences, 45, 96–102.
Rubinstein, A. (2013). Response time and decision making: An experimental study. Judgement and Decision Making, 8(5), 540-551.
Saka, N., & Gati, I. (2007). Applying decision theory to facilitating adolescent career choices. In V.B. Skorikov & W. Patton (Eds.), Career development in childhood and adolescence (pp. 181–202). Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Sense.
Saka, N., Gati, I., & Kelly, K.R. (2008). Emotional and personality-related aspects of career decision-making difficulties. Journal of Career Assessment, 16, 403–424. doi:10.1177/1069072708318900
Savickas, M.L. (2004). Vocational psychology, overview. In C. Spielberger (Ed.), Encyclopedia of applied psychology (pp. 655–667).
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier.
Thordarson, D.S., Radomsky, A.S., Rachman, S.S., Shafran, R., Sawchuk, C.N., & Ralph Hakstian, A.A. (2004). The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI). Behaviour Research & Therapy, 42(11), 1289-1314. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2003.08.007
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science, 211(4481), 453-58.
Tversky, A., & Shafir, E. (1992). CHOICE UNDER CONFLICT: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision. Psychologial Science
(Wiley-Blackwell), 3(6), 358-361.
APPENDIX A
Overview of Personality questionnaires
Individual items for the Indecision Scale
1. I try to put off making decisions 2. I always know exactly what I want 3. I find it easy to make decisions
4. I like to be in a position to make decisions
5. Once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident that it is a good one 6. I usually make decisions quickly
7. Once I make a decision, I stop worrying about it 8. I become anxious when making a decision 9. I often worry about making the wrong choice
10.
After I have chosen or decided something, I often believe I’ve made the wrong choice or decision
11. It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long time
Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are reverse scored
BIS/BAS Scales: Items
