The case of Slovakia

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The construction of ‘otherness’ in the online

discourse of a radical right party:

The case of Slovakia

Petra Ondrisakova S3219976

Thesis supervisor: dr. A.M.L. Van Cauwenberge Second reader: dr. S.A. Eldridge II MA Journalism University of Groningen

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to explore the discursive strategies of ‘othering’ used in the online discourse of the Slovak radical right party Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia. The popularity of the radical right has been rising in the past decade and this phenomenon has brought further attention to the discourse of these parties. The creation of ‘otherness’, or in other words, the creation of in-groups and out-groups is a common part of radical right rhetoric. This study is set up to get a better understanding of this creation of ‘otherness’ in Slovakia, a country that serves as an example of Central and Eastern European radicalism.

Critical discourse analysis is used to identify these discursive strategies of ‘othering’ and, in a subsequent step, to compare the discourse of the analysed party Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia in a pre-election and post-election time frame. The results show how out-groups and in-groups are created in political discourse and how the geographical and historical context of the country influences the discourse strategies that are taken. In addition, the comparison of the two analysed time frames provides insight in the development of radical right discourse when a radical right party becomes incumbent.

Key words:

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES:

Figure 1: Official website of Kotleba – People’s Party our Slovakia. ... 26

Table 2: Discursive themes identified in the sample ... 28

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1

Introduction

Eastern and Central European countries have come a long way since the revolutions that overthrew Communist regimes in 1989. In the past 28 years, they have become stable democratic countries and most of them are respected members of the European Union. At the same time, Eastern and Central Europe have also encountered challenges in the integration processes during the transition from communist to democratic countries, one of which being the unprecedented popularity of radical right parties. While the rise of the radical right is not solely an Eastern and Central European issue, the support of radicalism is especially remarkable in the countries on the East Side of the former Iron Curtain, as pointed out by Minkenberg (2017). Slovakia, which forms the focus of this thesis, is one of these countries.

Radical right has been present in different forms in Slovak politics since the establishment of Slovak Republic in 1993. However, the parliamentary elections in March 2016 have shown that radicalism in the country is getting stronger, emphasizing the need to pay attention to this development. This thesis, therefore, aims to take a closer look at the Slovak radical right party Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia1, in particular at the discursive creation of in-groups, out-groups and ‘Others’ in their political rhetoric as distributed via the party website.

The reason why ‘the Other’ is a central focus of this thesis is because it is one of the most prevalent discourses in the radical right parties’ rhetoric. Majority of studies conducted on the topics of ‘othering’ were analysing the radical right in the Western and Northern Europe (see Sakki and Pettersson 2015, Atton 2006, Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapil, 2004, Van Dijk, 1997). On the other hand, there are no studies on the discourse of ‘othering’ focused specifically on radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. It is relevant to have a look at radical right rhetoric in Central and Eastern Europe because the different geographical and political context of this part of Europe could also influence the discursive strategies of ‘othering‘. This thesis, therefore, aims to discover what discursive strategies of ‘othering’ radical right in Slovakia uses and who are ‘the Others’ in their discourse. The second part of the research is focused on the comparison of the discursive strategies of ‘othering’ in the discourse of the party in two different time frames, before and after the party has been elected to the parliament. The position of the Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia has changed from a marginal community it was in 2009 to a

1_{In this study I will interchangeably use names: ‘Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia’ and shortcut ‘Kotleba –}

ĽSNS‘, or simply ‘ĽSNS‘ (from Slovak original – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko). They all refer to the same party.

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2 political party running for elections in 2016 and during this change its discourse has shifted and became tamed (Nociar, 2012). Because of this change, this thesis aims to compare the discourse of the party in the pre-election period from the December 1st_{2015 to March 5}th_{2016, the day}

of the elections, and then exactly a year after, from December 1st 2016 to March 5th 2017. This comparison shows whether being part of the political establishment has strengthened the ‘othering’ discourse, or on the other hand if the discourse has become more tamed. The aim of this research is, therefore, two-fold: an exploration of Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia radical right discourse about ‘Others’ and its development when moving from a radical, anti-establishment party to a parliament member.

The two proposed research questions therefore are:

RQ I: What discourse strategies does the Slovak radical right party Kotleba - ĽSNS use in order to create the notion of ‘otherness’ in their political discourse on the official party website (www.naseslovensko.net)?

RQ II: What is the difference between the party’s pre-election (December 1st 2015 to March 5th 2016) and post-election discourse (December 1st 2016 and March 5th 2017)?

This thesis is relevant for three main reasons. First, the present study is the first to examine radical right discourse of ‘othering’ in Eastern and Central Europe, making it possible to compare this discourse to radical right discourse in Western Europe, as documented in past work. This comparison adds to previous studies that mapped differences in rhetoric between different radical right parties across Europe. Second, it unravels changing discourses in the rhetoric before and after a party becomes incumbent. Third, it raises awareness about the issue of the radical right in Europe. Pointing out discourse strategies of radical right might raise awareness among citizens about processes of ‘othering’ which might be overlooked in the discourse.

In order to answer the research questions, I utilize a critical discourse analysis. This type of analysis is the most suitable research method because it specifically aims to analyse a discourse which is connected to social problems, such as ‘othering’ (Van Dijk, 2001). This thesis is structured in four chapters. In the theoretical framework I present the relevant concepts for the study of radical right discourse and an overview of previously conducted studies on the discourse of ‘othering’ in radical right rhetoric. The following chapter introduces the aim of the study, contextualizes Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia and presents the methodological

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3 groundwork for the analysis. The results of the analysis are presented in the Results section and the Conclusion and discussion part contains the final notes and observations from the analysis.

1. Theoretical framework

Within the theoretical framework of my thesis, I will introduce several broad concepts and theories that are salient for the analysis of the radical right parties’ discourse. This theoretical introduction is fundamental to properly answer the research questions because it helps to comprehend how radical right in Europe operates and what types of discourses it employs in order to create the notion of ‘otherness’.

In the first part of this chapter, I introduce definitions of what is radical right and answer questions, such as which political parties classify as radical right parties and which features and agendas they have in common. Because this thesis focuses only on the radical right party in Slovakia, I introduce studies that have distinguished radical right in different parts of Europe and explain what circumstances have engendered the differences between radical right in Western and Eastern and Central Europe.

Later on, I focus on the issue of contemporary forms of racism and their discourse, which is often present in the radical right agendas and I pay attention to the studies about the denial of racism. In the next subchapter, I introduce the theories about ‘the Other’ and the political discourse of ‘Othering’. In the final part of this theoretical framework, I present results of several previously conducted studies on the radical right discourse, to illustrate already mentioned theories and concepts. This chapter aims to help the reader obtain all necessary background information for a proper comprehension of this thesis.

1.1 Contextualizing the radical right discourse

The phenomenon of radical right parties is not entirely new in Europe. The radical right has been slowly gaining support since the mid-1990s, and in recent years it has become a standard feature of politics in some European countries (Minkenberg, 2013). According to Rooduijn (2015), the most salient mark of the radical right success and its rising popularity was in May 2014, during the European Parliament elections. Here, the radical right parties, such as National Front in France and UK Independence Party in Great Britain have won a quarter of the votes in their respective countries (Döring and Manow, 2015). National Front and UK Independence Party, however, were not nearly the only parties that have gained victory in 2014. The radical right in Denmark, Slovenia, Italy and Austria also gained considerable support and the single

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4 influential radical right party that did not perform surprisingly well was the Dutch Party for Freedom (Lazaridis, Campani and Benveniste, 2016).

In order to understand the discourse of radical right political parties, we need to situate it within the ideology, history, and policy goals of these parties. According to Mudde (2007), these parties have features that are common for all of them, however, it is important to note that they are not homogenous and uniform in their agenda. As Lazaridis, Campani and Benveniste (2016: 2) ask "Can Marine Le Pen and Beppe Grillo really be united under the same political banner? Does it make sense to compare gay rights supporter Geert Wilders, the Catholic Conservative Timo Soini and the neo-Nazi Michaloliakos, or to associate the Cinque Stelle with the anti-immigration Dansk Folkeparti?" Mudde (2007) also notes that researchers have been struggling with the definition of radical right and therefore they often use interchangeable and vague terms when talking about the radicalism in the politics. In this thesis, I will apply Minkenberg’s (2017: 12) definition of radical right where he states that "the term includes all variants of collective actors (parties, movements, sub-cultural milieus) which emerge in times of accelerated political, socioeconomic, and cultural change and which fight such change by radicalizing the inclusionary and exclusionary criteria of national or ingroup belonging". This definition narrows down the list of parties that can possibly classify as radical right parties. However, to define these parties more precisely, I also apply Mudde’s (2007) so-called ‘maximum definition’. Maximum definition is based on looking for similarities amongst the radical right parties, which aims to find as many of them as possible in order to define the group. Therefore, Mudde’s definition is based on the recognition of the three core concepts that are common for all populist radical right parties. These core concepts are nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007).

Mudde (2007: 22) defines nativism as "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state". The reason why Mudde (2007) employs the term ‘nativism’, instead of more the common term ‘nationalism’ is because he sees ‘nationalism’ as a term which is too broad and does not make a distinction between moderate and liberal nationalist parties and radical nationalists (Mudde, 2007). The second core concept of populist radical right parties is authoritarianism. Simply said, authoritarianism is "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely." (Mudde, 2007, 23). Authoritarianism was extensively described by Aron et. al (1969) where the authors conducted a so-called, ‘F scale’ – a personality test that

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5 examines the level of ‘authoritarian personality’. The test is based on a number of features which are common for this kind of personality, such as, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, conventionality, and power and ‘toughness’ (Aron et. al, 1969). The third and the last core value is populism – a term which, according to Diamanti (2010) has become "one of the words that appear the most (…) in the political discourse for some time now." (Diamanti, 2010 in Lazaridis, Campani and Benveniste, 2016, 4)2. This frequent usage of the term has also engendered the rise of more specific neologisms such as neopopulism, euro-populism or national populism. However, for the purposes of this study we can conclude that in broad terms, populism is characterised with cynicism towards political, economic or cultural elites, whom the radical right shows as a group of traitors who turned their backs on ‘good’ people (Rooduijn, 2015). Another noteworthy feature of the radical right parties in Europe is Euroscepticism. According to Rooduijn (2015), Euroscepticism is still a standard feature of the majority of contemporary radical right parties and the critical position towards the EU corresponds with previously mentioned nativism and populism (see Roodujin, 2015, Mudde, 2007).

According to these studies, we can conclude that radical right parties are nativist, authoritarian and populist, they call for internal homogeneity of the state, and they are often Eurosceptic, which corresponds with their nativist approach to the state and nation.

1.1.1 Radical right in Central and Eastern Europe

It is necessary to distinguish between particular countries when analysing the discourse of radical right parties. The previous subchapter provided a broad definition and description of the radical right, however, according to Minkenberg (2013), there are several notable differences between the radical right in Western and Eastern and Central Europe. Given this thesis’ focus on radical right in Slovakia, I will first zoom in on defining characteristics of the radical right in this region. In his study, Minkenberg (2013, 2017) describes Central and Eastern European radical right as less structured, more anti-system and more fluid compared to Western Europe. He notes that "the Central and Eastern European group can be identified by the extremism of their radical right’s agenda (anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-minority and anti-EU) which is only marginally moderated among the major right-wing parties in government" (Minkenberg, 2013, 21). These differences between Western and Eastern / Central European radical right groups, therefore suggest that there is also a difference in the way these parties utter their core features (nativism, authoritarianism and populism) (Pirro 2014).

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6 Minkenberg (2013) states that this discrepancy was caused by the separate development of the Western and Eastern parts of Europe during the 20th_{century, but also by the development that}

followed the revolutions in 1989. Here, we can distinguish three reasons why the radical right on the Eastern side of the former Iron Curtain differs from the Western one. The first reason is the economic development in the Eastern and Central Europe after 1989. The transition towards the market economy has created an unprecedented gap between the rich and poor, which was relatively new to the people and it showed the lack of capital in this part of Europe (Minkenberg, 2013). The second reason is the political development after 1989 because most of Eastern and Central European countries lack any conjunction to liberal democratic movements, which helped to shape Western European countries (Minkenberg, 2013). The third reason is the non-existence of the immigration issue in the Eastern and Central Europe, which are often integral to the central agenda of the radical right in Western Europe (Minkenberg, 2013).

Therefore, Minkenberg (2013) concludes that the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is less marginal than in Western Europe, however it is also more extreme, more anti-democratic and these parties often "proclaim their nostalgia for the old despotic regimes, and the ethnic and territorial conception of national identity" (Minkenberg, 2013, 15). Additionally, these parties often contest the new liberal system in the Eastern and Central Europe (Minkenberg, 2013, 2017)

Several scholars have also examined the policy issues which Eastern and Central European radical right address the most. According to Bustikova (2009: 223), these are "nationalism, anti-communism and intolerance to ‘the other.’" On the other side, Pirro (2014: 247) in her study mentions that the radical right parties are "addressing post-communist issues such as ethnic minorities, corruption, and the European Union (EU)". However, these policy issues are not exclusive, and they partly overlap - for example, a radical right agenda focused on minorities is connected with nationalistic tendencies (see Pirro 2014, Bustikova 2009). Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, I will focus on three themes resonating in radical right agendas in Central and Eastern Europe, namely nationalism and minorities, corruption, and the European Union. Nationalism is a well-known phenomenon in Eastern and Central European countries (Pirro, 2014) because for most of their history a majority of these countries were struggling for their existence as part of multinational empires (Szucs, 1990 in Minkenberg, 2013)3. During the

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7 20th_{century the period between the two world wars was scarred by authoritarian and}

ethno-clerical movements (Pirro, 2014) and after the end of World War II, these countries continued to bring up nationalist agenda in order to increase political legitimation in otherwise weakly legitimised regimes (Minkenberg, 2013). Therefore, nationalism and nativism were never too far away from the political agenda of Eastern and Central European countries.

The authoritarian regime before and during the Second World War is especially important, because as Bustikova (2009: 230) states "[a]lmost all extreme-right parties of Eastern Europe make a direct claim to the legacy of an inter-war fascist or pro-Nazi movement" which is also connected to their approach towards minorities, such as Romani. Studies focused on radical right parties in Western Europe often list immigration as the most salient or one of the most salient issues (see Burke and Goodman, 2012, Charteris-Black, 2006, Wood and Finlay, 2008). However, migration has not significantly affected Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the World War II, and immigrants cannot play the role of scapegoats in the same way they do in Western Europe (see Bustikova 2009, Minkenberg 2013). Therefore, more salient for the agenda of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are national minorities living in the country and neighbouring countries (Minkenberg, 2013, 2017). On the other hand, Bustikova (2009: 237) mentions that "anti-Semitism without Jews is a common phenomenon" which projects into the anti-immigration agendas of the radical right in countries that have never been influenced by mass immigration.

Another issue in radical right agendas often mentioned in relevant studies is corruption (see Pirro, 2014). Radical right parties often use the issue of corruption to frame themselves as not only anti-establishment but also as anti-communist parties (Mudde, 1996). The issue of corruption is connected to the communist past of these countries and the privatisation processes following the 1989 revolution – here, radical right parties often blame elites for acts of cronyism and mismanagement during distribution and privatisation of property in the 1990s (Pirro, 2014). Corruption is a salient issue for the voters of the extreme-right because according to Bustikova (2009), these voters have lower levels of trust in public officials than other voters. She presents this as evidence that "support for the extreme right is associated with the non-accountability of political leaders and corruption" (Bustikova, 2009, 232).

The last issue often mentioned in studies focused on the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe, is the European Union and its policies. The conclusions of scholars about the importance of the EU to the radical right agenda, however, differ. Radical right parties often counter neoliberalism and liberal agenda (Minkenberg, 2013), especially when it comes to

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8 issues such as gender equality, protection of minorities and LGTB rights (see Bustikova, 2009). On the other hand, Pirro (2014) concludes that, according to a public survey she analysed in her study, the EU should not be considered as a crucial issue when elucidating the electoral success of these parties, because according to her research, the public salience of the issue was actually low (Pirro, 2014). However, Pirro (2014) focuses her study on three different political parties –Bulgarian Politicheska Partiya Ataka (Political Party Attack), Hungarian the Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for better Hungary, Jobbik) and Slovak Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS). Her research showed that levels of public salience of the European Union politics are low in both Slovakia and Bulgaria, but it is essential to highlight the fact that Pirro was analysing different radical right party in Slovakia than the one analysed in this thesis.

1.2 Racism and denial of racism

The primary objective of this thesis is to identify the discourse strategies of creating ‘the Other’, a term employed in sociology to describe "all people the Self perceives as mildly or radically different" (Riggins, 1997, 3). Concepts of race and racial discrimination are parts of this perception as well, because racism helps to create the difference between the in-group and ‘the Other’, or as Hall (1989: 445) calls it, the difference between “belongingness and otherness“. There are many existing definitions of racism, but for the purposes of this research, I will apply Van Dijk’s (2012: 15) definition, set in the European context. As he states: "Racism is here defined as a system of ethnic or “racial” dominance, that is, of systematic power abuse of a dominant (European, “white”) group against various kinds of non-European groups – such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, and refugees – in Europe, the Americas, and other European-dominated countries." Drawing on Jones (1972), we can distinguish three types of racism – individual, institutional, and cultural. The individual racism emphasises biological differences; institutional racism refers to the restrictions of opportunities for discriminated groups, and cultural racism refers to the expression of the superiority of only one race’s cultural heritage (Jones, 1972). When it comes to ethnic domination, Van Dijk (2012) argues that there are two different dimensions – social and cognitive. The social dimension is represented in everyday discriminatory practices (such as an unequal distribution of resources and power); the cognitive dimension consists of various stereotypes and prejudices that both motivate and legitimise the social dimension practices. These forms of prejudice are mostly acquired through the process

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9 of socialisation and shared through both everyday conversation and institutional talk within the dominant group (Van Dijk, 1992).

Because of the increased popularity of the radical right parties, described in the previous part of this study, racism is still a salient topic to study. However, according to Van Dijk (2000) racism nowadays differs from the ‘old’ kind of racism, represented by slavery, apartheid and open discrimination. Instead, he uses the concept of ‘new racism’ (Van Dijk, 2000).

The ‘new racism’ and the discourse of new racism is not openly racist - it admits that everybody is equal, but it also puts emphasis on differences between races and underlines stereotypes typical for one race, such as high crime rates, dependence on welfare and prevalence of single-parent families (Van Dijk, 2000). These stereotypes are usually connected to four different tenants of modern racism distinguished by McConahay (1986: 92 - 93):

1. The belief that racial discrimination does not exist anymore because people of colour (McConahay mentions specifically black people) have the same opportunities as anyone else.

2. The belief that people of colour are pushing themselves too hard into the places where they are unwanted.

3. The belief that these demands coming from people of colour are unfair.

4. The belief that institutions are giving people of colour too many advantages and they do not deserve them.

Similar to McConahay’s conclusions, Quillian (2006: 322), in his study on new racism conducted in The United States, concludes that "most white Americans support the principle of equal treatment regardless of race and repudiate the practice of discrimination. At the same time, white respondents endorse many stereotypical beliefs, doubt the existence of significant racial discrimination, and show low levels of support for efforts to achieve racial equality through government intervention".

Most racial stereotypes and prejudices are shared through everyday conversations within dominant groups and racism in these talks is "subtle and symbolic" (Van Dijk, 2000, 34). This systematic negative portrayal of ‘the Others’, out-group members, and minorities, leads to the creation of mental models and reproduction of racism. Therefore, this subtle way of racist talk seems harmless (at least in comparison to ‘old’ racism), but it has the same negative effect and leads to discrimination and exclusion of minorities (Van Dijk, 2000).

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10 Because racism has become socially unacceptable, even illegal, and because it is almost always shared in this subtle, modern way, a part of new racism is also the denial of racism (Van Dijk, 1992). Denial of racism has two different dimensions – social and individual, but for the purposes of this study, I will focus on the social dimension, which is more relevant for the analysis of political discourse. This dimension is typical for the discourse taking place in the public sphere. The public sphere is a physical or virtual space for public discussion and deliberation, but also a place of struggle for power (Goodnight, 1987), for example in parliamentary discussions, press, schools, and professional environments, such as in corporations and organisations (Van Dijk, 1992).

Van Dijk (1992: 92) distinguishes four different types of denial, namely: 1. "act-denial (‘I did not do/say that at all’);

2. control-denial (‘I did not do/say that on purpose’, ‘It was an accident’); 3. intention-denial (‘I did not mean that’, ‘You got me wrong’);

4. goal-denial (‘I did not do/say that, in order to…’)"

Van Dijk (1992, 1993) described several discursive strategies of denial of racism frequently appearing in Western parliaments. Firstly, a positive self-representation, or as Van Dijk names it ‘nationalist self-glorification’ helps politicians to create an idea that racism is "always elsewhere, and always a property of the others" (Van Dijk, 1992, 109, emphasis in the original). Nationalist self-glorification helps parties to create the image of themselves as fair and supportive of equal rights, despite subtle racist talk or actions (Van Dijk, 1992).

The strategy that often follows this self-glorification is what Van Dijk (1992) calls ‘Fair, but…’ where politicians admit the positive and humanitarian aim of particular initiatives, but they also reject the idea right after, often presenting it as too idealistic, economically self-destructive or merely unwanted for various reasons.

Similarly, another common example of the denial of racism is a reversal strategy, where (often members of right-wing parties) reverse charges of racism and accuse ‘the Others’ (minorities, immigrants, socialist parties…) of being racist, such as National Front in France accusing competing parties of "anti-French racism" (Van Dijk, 1992, 114).

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11 1.3 Creating ‘the Other’

The history of ‘the Other’ can be traced all the way back to the ancient times, where Plato used this term to describe the relationship between ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ – the observer and the observed. However, as mentioned before, in modern sociology this term is used differently, and it describes people that observer (the Self) sees as different (Riggins, 1997).

Distinguishing ‘the Other’ is a base of social relations and the hierarchy of power. Okolie (2003) explains that "[s]ocial identities are relational; groups typically define themselves in relation to others. This is because identity has little meaning without the “other.” So, by defining itself a group defines others" (Okolie, 2003, 2). Therefore, by creating ‘otherness’ or simply ‘othering’, dominant groups establish and preserve power relations. The creation of ‘otherness’ often leads to exploitation, restricted access to societal resources such as housing, employment, welfare, and restricted access to power, which is held almost exclusively by members of the dominant group (Okolie, 2003). This system of inequality is being reproduced and enhanced, both by everyday discrimination (action) and by acquiring beliefs that form and support this discrimination, such as prejudices (cognition) (Van Dijk, 1997).

This also brings us to the role of political elites in the process of ‘Othering’. As Van Dijk (1997, 33-34) states: "They are the ones who ultimately make the decisions on immigration and immigration restrictions, on discrimination and measures against it, on affirmative action policies, and on general resources for housing, welfare, and education for immigrants and minorities." Besides legislative power, political elites have the power to reproduce inequality by influencing the public discourse and changing public opinion through media (Van Dijk 1997).

Van Dijk (1993, 1997) described several significant themes often present in western politicians’ discourse about ‘the Other’. These are, for example, references to inherent and typical traits of ‘the Other’, references to in-group values which are different from values of ‘the Other’, storytelling about personal experiences with ‘Others’ and rhetorical figures, such as persuasion and manipulation. Finally, he concludes that threat posed by ‘the Other’ was a central populist theme that appeared in parliamentary discussions in every country he analysed in his research - these were parliamentary discussions in the United Kingdom, the United States and France (Van Dijk, 1997).

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12 Creation of otherness, and therefore inherently a creation of in-groups and out-groups is also accompanied by phenomena of out-group homogeneity and ingroup favouritism (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986). According to ingroup favouritism hypothesis, people are more favourable towards people in their group, than towards outsiders. Out-group homogeneity hypothesis presumes that people perceive the members of out-group as more homogenous in their traits. On the other hand, they see people in their group as more individualistic (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986). The danger of this perception is that the less complex is the person being seen as, the more extreme are the judgments towards him or her (Linville and Jones, 1980). Therefore, if a group of people become deindividuated, the out-group discrimination becomes stronger (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986). Creating the out-group homogeneity was, therefore, identified as one of the discursive strategies of ‘Othering’ in the radical right discourse (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015).

1.4 Previous studies on radical right discourse

Scholars who have conducted studies on the topic of radical right discourse and the construction of ‘the Other’ have discovered some discursive strategies that radical right politicians use in their discourse about either minorities or their political or ideological opponents. For a better arrangement of this chapter, I have divided these strategies into three categories – namely: positive self-representation, negative other-representation and cultural essentialism. Here, I will illustrate these strategies with examples from previous studies and connect them to broader theories I have introduced in the previous pages of this research.

1.4.1 Positive self-representation

Positive self-representation was previously mentioned in connection to racism denial, where it serves as a defence strategy against accusations of racism (Van Dijk 1992, 1993). However, positive self-representation plays a direct role in the construction of ‘the Other’ as well. Atton (2006) illustrates it with an example of the texts published on the official British National Party website. In this study, he uses critical discourse analysis to examine the online discourse of members and supporters of the BNP and he analyses how the party presents the British culture and ‘the Others’. He demonstrates the use of positive self-representation strategy in the analysis of the section where the party introduces its members and supporters. His analysis here shows that its supporters are presented as ‘ordinary people’ fearing for the future of their children. Here, the party turns around the notion that the minorities are oppressed, and it describes the majority (in this case white, British people) as the discriminated and oppressed

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13 group (so-called anti-White racism) (Atton, 2006). Atton’s (2006) study is also an example of the new racism, mentioned earlier in this chapter, where white supremacy is not expressed openly, but it is presented through published letters of scared citizens, mothers worried about their children and ordinary people feeling endangered. Therefore, it is again the white identity which the British National Party presents as ‘othered’ (Atton, 2006).

However, positive self-representation of radical right parties can also be displayed in contrast to other ideologies and political parties. As an example serves Wood and Finlay’s (2008) analysis of the online discourse of British National Party after the bombing attacks in 2006. In their study, they focused specifically on the presentation of Muslims and Islam in the BNP online discourse. In their analysis they identified two discursive themes - the threat posed by Muslims and the threat posed by multiculturalism. In the analysis of ‘the threat posed by multiculturalism’ Wood and Finlay (2008) demonstrated the use of positive self-representations in contrast to ideologies and politicians. Here, they show the example of the British National Party labelling liberals and supporters of multi-culturalism as oppressors of free speech and ‘Nazis’ and themselves as "the only democratic party" (Wood and Finlay, 2008, 719).

Showing the threat posed by the ‘Other’ is also connected to what Van Dijk (1992) calls justification of racism, where the racism is justified by the claim that the speaker is only stating the facts (Van Dijk, 1992). Media outlets and politicians often use this strategy, and it allows for the justification of any form of racism (for example extensive reporting on ‘black crime’ in media, racist parliament speeches) with an argument that they are only reporting the reality (Van Dijk, 1992).

It is important to mention that positive self-representation is not typical only for political and institutionalised discourse, it is also a part of the everyday talk and media discourse. Leudar and Nekvapil’s study (2000) about the presentation of Roma community in Czech television debates between 1990 and 1995 serves as an example of that. According to their research, these debates were more focused on all the positive qualities of Czech people, which Roma people were lacking, instead of studying Roma people and their culture (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2000).

1.4.2 Negative other-representation

Negative other-representation and positive self-representation often appear in a discourse side-by-side. However, in this subchapter, I will focus on one specific part of negative other-representation common in radical right discourse - the construction of common enemies (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015).

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14 Sakki and Pettersson (2015) list category distinctions and categorical generalizations as one of the discursive strategies for creating the common enemy. The creation of category distinctions is a part of group essentialism. Essentialism is based on the idea that groups of people (in radical right discourse these groups are often ethnic or religious minorities) have specific characteristics that are inherent and common for all group members and this approach is often a foundation of stereotypes and prejudice (Verkuyten, 2003).

Group essentialism also often serves as a justification of unfair social order, which often goes hand in hand with racist prejudice (Verkuyten, 2003). Wood and Finlay (2008) illustrate it in their previously mentioned analysis of discursive representations of Muslims in the articles written by the British National Party members. They use an example of political speech where the politician refers to jihadists as a ‘ghost army’ and they explain that "the reader cannot be sure whether any particular individual Muslim is or is not part of this army. Any Muslim living in Britain, then, is a potential Islamic terrorist" (Wood and Finlay, 2008, 712 - 713). Wood and Finlay (2008) here show how BNP blurs the line between ordinary Muslims and radicals, creating an idea of one homogenous group of people and suggesting that the whole group is potentially dangerous.

When it comes to the negative representation of both the political enemies and minorities, a common phenomenon is to talk about the economy and the cost, such as, money spent on asylum seekers, minorities abusing a social welfare and so on (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015). A common discursive theme is blaming other politicians for misusing taxpayers’ money and for irresponsible distribution of financial sources. At the same time, they portray ‘the Others’ as expensive or as groups of people who misuse the social welfare system. (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015). The process of quantification strengthens this discursive technique – precise numbers used in the discourse of radical right serve to enhance the seriousness of their arguments (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015).

1.4.3 Culture and cultural essentialism

The third category of discursive strategies often used by radical right is culture and cultural essentialism in the talk about ‘the Other’.

Radical right discourse about preserving and isolating culture from ‘outsiders’ and outside influences was analysed by Atton (2006) in the context of the United Kingdom. Here, he concluded that the British National Party "seeks to isolate the defining characteristics of British culture, the better to ‘preserve all the positive aspects of our culture’" (Atton, 2006, 577). To

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15 accomplish that, BNP publishes articles about British literature, poems and portrays the British culture as a monoculture, which is under attack and in need of defence (Atton, 2006).

Hand in hand with isolating the national culture goes cultural essentialism, based on the idea that certain cultures are incompatible and therefore not able to be shared or exist side by side because it would endanger a group identity (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015). According to Sakki and Pettersson (2015: 157) "[r]esearch has demonstrated that this is characteristic of the new Islamophobia, with members of Islamic culture portrayed as culturally and ideologically incompatible with Christianity. Here, criticism is directed at an abstract construct, Islamic ideology, and not at individual Muslims".

1.4.4 Discursive themes

This synthesis of studies utilising critical discourse analysis to examine discourses of radical right parties around the world (e.g. Wood and Finlay 2008, Hatakka, Niemi and Välimäki 2017, Sakki and Pettersson, 2015) shows us that there are several common discursive themes that the radical right frequently uses. In this subchapter, I will present the central common themes identified in the previous studies.

The first theme is ‘Deviant Group of People’ discovered in Sakki and Pettersson’s (2015) research, where they examined discursive construction of ‘Otherness’ in Finland and Sweden. This representation of ‘the Other’ is in line with previously mentioned ‘negative other-representation’ (Van Dijk, 1993) and according to Sakki and Pettersson (2015), this theme can be split into two different discourses – ‘Norm Breakers’ and ‘Welfare Abusers’ (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015). Talking about ‘the Other’ as a norm breaker means constructing the identity of the particular group as inherently dangerous and stereotyping these groups as criminals, therefore creating out-group homogeneity. Similarly, Wood and Finlay (2008) have distinguished a discursive theme they have named Muslims as Threat. Their study was focused on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the United Kingdom, while Sakki and Pettersson (2015) study discourses about immigration and asylum seekers in Finland and Sweden. Still, the central theme of threat is present in both studies.

However, group essentialism is not typical only when talking about migration. Leudar and Nekvapil (2000) mention a similar type of discourse when exploring how Czech television debates portray Roma communities. The portrayal of ‘the Other’ as a deviant, dangerous individual/community is therefore similar across different countries, and different ‘Others’.

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16 Thus, this discursive category might appear in the critical discourse analysis conducted in this study as well.

Another identified discursive theme is a negative portrayal of political and ideological enemies, such as liberals, neoliberals and supporters of the European Union. Sakki and Pettersson (2015) named this discoursive theme ‘Inner Enemies’ and distinguished its two main branches– ‘The Tolerant Are the Most Intolerant’ and ‘The Tolerant as Traitors’ categories. The former one serves as an example of previously mentioned racism reversal. Here, radical right groups frame their inner enemies (according to their study, these are often leftist green activists) as violent and dangerous, or frame the Muslim population as responsible for growing anti-Semitism (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015). These strategies are also examples of negative other-representation, based on the portrayal of the tolerant ones as the people who have betrayed their roots and their nation (Sakki and Pettersson, 2015). According to Atton (2006), it is also common to appeal to shared cultural history and nostalgia. Culture is often presented as endangered because the other politicians have betrayed their nation when supporting migration and globalisation.

However, the enemy does not always have to be a particular party or a politician. Wood and Finlay (2008) have identified another repeating theme of radical right discourse – a portrayal of Multiculturalism as a Threat. Typical for this discourse is presenting multiculturalism and terrorism as a similar form of threat – as one being directly responsible for the other. Similar to this, Sakki and Pettersson (2015) have examined Threatening Ideology as another repeating theme. Interesting to note here is that despite the time gaps between these two studies the themes of radical right discourse barely differ.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter is aimed to introduce theoretical conceptualisations of ‘radical right parties’ (see Mudde, 2007, Minkenberg, 2013, 2017), ‘new racism’ and ‘racism denial’ (see Van Dijk, 1992, 1993), and creation of ‘the Other’ (see Okolie, 2003). Additionally, it identified and discussed discursive strategies and themes that have been found in previous critical discourse analyses of radical right texts (see Wood and Finlay, 2008, Sakki and Pettersson 2015, Atton, 2006). Theoretical understanding of the concepts introduced in this chapter will help to utilise the critical discourse analysis in this thesis and identify discursive themes of the creation of ‘the Other’.

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2. Research design

This thesis focuses on the examination of the discursive strategies of ‘othering’ used in the discourse of Slovak radical right party Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia. In the previous chapter of the thesis, I introduced the theoretical framework crucial for this analysis and the previously conducted studies focused on the radical right discourse. In this chapter, I present the methodological groundwork for this thesis. In order to answer the research questions, I analyse the online discourse of Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia on their official website using critical discourse analysis. This chapter, therefore, introduces the foundation for the critical approach to language studies, in particular, the relation between linguistics and social norms, as well as examining the three-dimensional approach to the critical discourse analysis used in this research (Fairclough, 2001).

2.1 Aim of the study

There are two reasons why I focus on Slovak radical right in particular. First, Slovakia serves as an example of a difference between Western and Central /Eastern European radical right. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the radical right in Eastern and Central Europe differs from the radicalism in Western Europe due to the different economic, political and social development in these two parts of the continent (Minkenberg, 2013). Slovakia is a parliamentary republic with a multiparty system, however, it had only returned to a democratic regime and market economy several decades ago, and its history is marked by different totalitarian regimes (Cia.gov, 2017). Minkenberg (2017) describes Central and Eastern European radical right as less organised, more radical and often openly nostalgic of authoritarianism during or after the World War II. The previously mentioned studies focused on the topic of radical right discourse were conducted in Western European countries, and therefore this study aims to perform this type of analysis in Central Europe.

Second, analysing Slovak politics has a personal relevance for me. As a Slovak citizen who firmly believes in equality and democracy, I was shocked watching radical right emerge in a country and gain unprecedented support in the parliamentary elections in 2016. The primary concern was the history of the party filled with initiating racial hatred, admiration of the Third Reich and a holocaust denial (see Tharoor, 2016, Cuprik, 2016). Because of this, I consider it essential to add a study about Slovakia to the landscape of discourse analyses of radical right parties in Europe.

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18 Critical discourse analysis explores the discourse in its context. It means that CDA studies how the discourse interprets the reality but also how the reality and the social relations influence the discourse (Richardson, 2007). In order to present the context in which Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia operates, I briefly introduce the history of authoritarian regimes in Slovakia, the context of contemporary Slovak politics and the role of the radical right it. These subchapters are essential for the critical discourse analysis utilised in this research because they provide a look at the ideological roots of the examined party. After introducing the context of the discourse, I present the research questions, the analysed sample of articles published on the official website of Kotleba - ĽSNS and I explain in detail the process of the analysis.

2.2 Radical right in Slovakia: The case of Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia

As mentioned before, introducing the context where radical right operates is crucial to utilize the critical discourse analysis. The following section provides this context to a reader who is not entirely familiar with the political and historical development in Slovakia and the current situation in the government. The first part of this chapter introduces the history of the radical right in Slovakia and the legacy of the interwar and the World War II period that Kotleba - ĽSNS draws on (Minkenberg, 2017). The second part explores the development of the Kotleba – ĽSNS party, demonstrates the ideological roots of the party and illustrates the paradigm shift in their politics, which influenced their discourse as well. The final part shows the position of Kotleba – ĽSNS in Slovak political system and briefly introduces the other governing parties. These three parts of the chapter lay the foundation for the critical discourse analysis by placing Kotleba - ĽSNS into a historical, ideological and political context.

2.2.1 History of the radical right in Slovakia

In order to analyse the discourse and to study the ideology of Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia, we have to first take a look at the role of Slovakia in World War II. According to Minkenberg (2017), the history of the country (in this case, the non-democratic regime during the World War II.) always plays a role in shaping the radical right. Comprehension of the position of Slovakia during the war period is therefore essential for this analysis because the legacy of the First Slovak State (1939- 1944) 4_{is rooted in the ideology of Kotleba – People’s}

Party Our Slovakia.

4_{The First Slovak State (also known as Slovak State) was one of the Hitler’s satellite states with political}

practices such as racial scapegoating, anti-Semitism and mass media control. This authoritarian clerofascist period ended in 1944 with the Slovak National Uprising. (Teich, Kováč and Brown, 2011).

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19 Griffin (2007) lists First Slovak Republic (1939 – 1944) as an example of a clero-fascist regime. Here, clero-fascism is "[t]he ideology and political praxis of clerics and theologians who either tactically support fascism as a movement or regime while maintaining a critical distance from its totalising, revolutionary, and basically secular objectives, or integrate elements of fascist values and policies into the way they conceptualise their mission on earth as devout believers in a divinely ordained world" (Griffin, 2007, 217).

This relationship between the contemporary Slovak radical right and the wartime Slovak State was summarised by Cameron (2016) for the BBC: "[T]he Slovak State was an authoritarian, clerical-fascist regime modelled on Nazi Germany. The Hlinka Guard enthusiastically hounded the regime's enemies, most of all Jews. [...] This is the regime venerated by Marian Kotleba and his 13 newly-elected fellow deputies in his People's Party-Our Slovakia party. It's a regime he once described as „like living in heaven“" (Cameron, 2016). The clerofascist legacy is essential for this thesis because it illustrates the connection between religion and radicalism during the existence of the Slovak State and the relation of ĽSNS to this historical period.

2.2.2 Development of the Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia

Radical right movements emerged in Slovakia after the revolution in 1989. At that time, the extreme right was predominantly represented by several unofficial groups of skinheads and football hooligans (Nociar, 2012). According to Nociar (2012), an ‘unofficial group‘, here, means a group without formal structure and hierarchy, in which the primal concern is not to gain power and public influence. Officially registered radical right groups started to emerge in the early 1990s, and at the beginning of the new millennium they have begun to penetrate the public space (Nociar, 2012).

According to Nociar (2012), the predecessor of Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia was a radical right group, briefly registered as a political party, called Slovenská Pospolitosť (Slovak Togetherness). Slovenská Pospolitosť was founded in the mid-1990s and was registered as a political party in 2005. The group has attracted the attention of media with their torch marches against ‘Gypsy extremism,’ where the group members wore military uniforms resembling the uniforms of wartime Slovak State militia collaborating with Hitler (Nociar, 2012). Because of the strong anti-democratic position of the party and allegations of spreading racial hatred, the Supreme Court banned the Slovak Togetherness in 2006 (Štefančík, 2013). However, the idea of ‘Gypsy extremism’ remained present in the discourse of current ĽSNS (Cunningham, 2016).

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20 In order to renew activities of the banned Slovak Togetherness, the members of the party decided to take control of the already registered political party called Strana priateľov vína (Party of the Friends of Wine). Shortly after taking over the party, they renamed it to Kotleba - Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko (Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia or Kotleba - ĽSNS). Marian Kotleba, a former organiser of Slovak Togetherness’s anti-Roma torch marches, was a central figure in both the Slovak Togetherness and Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia (see Nociar, 2012, Nemčovská, 2015).

For the purposes of this analysis, it is crucial to note that the focus of the party partially shifted after the ban in 2006. According to Nociar (2012), one of the central issues in their agenda has become the critique of the current forms of democracy and injustice in the country. Some topics on their agenda stayed the same, but the approach towards them has become more tamed. One of the issues that have remained prevalent in the party’s discourse were Romani people living in Slovakia (Nociar, 2012). Romani people are the second biggest minority group in Slovakia, making up approximately 2% of the population (Cia.gov, 2017), and they are often reported to be the fastest growing ethnic group in Central and Eastern Europe (Stauber and Vago, 2007). According to Neuwahl (2000), Romani have considerably lower living standards compared to other ethnic groups in the country; they struggle with 40 – 50 % unemployment and live on the margins of society, often in camps lacking necessary facilities. After the revolution in 1989, Roma people have become a frequent target of neo-Nazi groups, and according to Pew Research Centre (1991: 4) "in Czechoslovakia nearly everyone questioned (91%) had some thing unfavorable to say about these nomadic people, who are hated openly". When it comes to the Kotleba – ĽSNS party, Roma minority has remained essential in their discourse, however, the approach to this issue has shifted. According to Nociar’s (2012) report, the party has previously called for a eugenics programme to ‘solve’ the issues with Roma people. Nowadays, their discourse revolves around the subject of welfare abuse and the high crime rates in certain parts of the country, caused by Roma minorities.

The party identifies itself as being based on Christian and national values. These nationalistic tendencies go hand in hand with strongly Eurosceptic attitude. The rise of radical right parties in Europe have been accompanied with severe anti-Brussels propaganda (Caiani and Guerra, 2017) and in the case of Kotleba - ĽSNS, leaving the EU was one of their primary objectives in the pre-election campaign (Kotleba - Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko, 2017b).

When it comes to the rights of sexual minorities, Kotleba - ĽSNS is strongly heteronormative. One their official pre-election objectives were also to support conservative values and

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21 traditional family (Kotleba - Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko, 2017b). The party also rejects the registration of same-sex partnerships, while often referring to the LGTB movement as ‘sexual extremism’ (Nociar, 2012). Such values are important for the analysis in this study because they might strongly influence which groups are ‘othered’ in the discourse of the party.

2.2.3 Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia in a context of Slovak politics

As mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, critical discourse analysis studies the discourse in its context. Two previous subchapters have already introduced the context of authoritarianism in Slovak history and the development of radical right movements in the country. However, according to Van Zoonen (2005: 5), politics is structured on a "system of differences between what could be called left and right, progressive and conservative, change and stability, or libertarian and authoritarian". Because the People’s Party Our Slovakia is a parliamentary party, their discourse also might react to the agendas and legal propositions of other political subjects. Therefore, to be able to place Kotleba - ĽSNS in contemporary Slovak politics is it also crucial to first briefly introduce Slovak political system and other parties competing for power.

Slovakia is a democratic, parliamentary republic and elections to the parliament take place every four years. In order to be part of the Slovak parliament, a party needs to gain at least 5% of votes (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2016). Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia participated in parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2012 but was incapable of gaining sufficient support from voters to become a part of parliament (Nociar, 2012).

However, the year 2013 became a turning point for the Slovak radical right. Marian Kotleba, the leader of the banned Slovak Togetherness and current Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia chairman, run for the elections of self-governing region governor, he unexpectedly won 55,5% of votes and was elected the regional governor of the Banska Bystrica region (Cameron, 2016). After this triumph, the party participated in parliamentary elections again, in March 2016. According to Hlavac (2016), opinion polls predicted that only six parties should gain enough support to become the part of a parliament.

The most popular party according to opinion polls was SMER-SD (Direction-Social Democracy) known for their controversial populistic moves, which held the majority of parliament seats in the previous electoral term. Other five parties were nationalistic and conservative SNS (Slovak National Party) often also labelled as radical; recently founded centre-right party #Sieť (#Network) which was positioning itself as the leading opposition to

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22 ruling SMER-SD; liberal SaS (Freedom and Solidarity) and anti-establishment OĽaNO (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities) gathering various politicians and personalities whose main aim was to stop the one-party majority of SMER-SD (see Hlavac, 2016, Rybář and Spáč, 2017). All of these parties have been able to gain enough support to get into parliament. Another surprise was the success of a newly founded party SME RODINA (We are family), known for its prevalent anti-immigration, heteronormative and anti-establishment agenda (Rybář and Spáč, 2017).

In these parliamentary elections, Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia surprisingly gained 8% of votes and won 14 seats in parliament. This breakthrough was unexpected, mainly because a remarkable number of votes was coming from first-time voters. Almost one-quarter of the young adults who voted for the first time cast their ballots for the radical right (Terenzani, 2016). In the past year and a half, the party has faced several scandals, such as using number symbolic of Nazism during charity events (Mikušovič, 2017) and controversial statements about protecting white children (The Slovak Spectator, 2017). Despite that, the party is still an active part of the current parliament of the Slovak Republic.

2.3 Research Questions

In this thesis, I use critical discourse analysis to examine the texts written by members of Slovak radical right party Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia on their official website. This critical discourse analysis aims to identify the discursive strategies of the creation of ‘the Other’ in their written discourse over the course of three months in years 2015 and 2016 and three months in years 2016 and 2017.

The first research question aims to identify specific discourse strategies used on the official website of the party. Within the theoretical framework of this thesis, I have outlined some common strategies and discursive themes found in the previously conducted studies. However, these studies were conducted in western European countries (United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Finland). As mentioned in the theoretical framework, radical right in Eastern and Central and Western Europe is not identical, and the discursive strategies found in the studies presented above might differ from the ones discovered in this study. The first research question is thus relevant for two reasons. First, the analysis of the discourse strategies of the party can help to understand the differences between Western and Eastern / Central European radicalism, outlined by Minkenberg (2013). The second reason is that Kotleba - People’s Party Our

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23 Slovakia has only been a parliamentary party for a short time and it has never been examined in a discourse analysis before.

However, to provide a closer look at the development of the party’s discourse, I also introduce a second research question here. The purpose of the second research question is to compare the discursive strategies in two different time frames. The preceding subchapter has illustrated how the party’s position has changed from a marginal radical group to an elected parliament member. The shift in the party’s focus has been briefly mentioned in Nociar’s (2012) report on radical right in Slovakia. However, this thesis aims to use CDA to compare time frames before and after the party have become a part of the parliament. The reason why is this analysis relevant for the contemporary research is because it is not confirmed whether the shift towards more tamed discourse is still an ongoing phenomenon or, on the contrary, whether being a parliamentary party means that the ĽSNS is returning to their more radical position. The second research question, therefore, aims to explore whether elections in 2016 influenced the discourse strategies of the radical right party Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia.

The research questions proposed in this thesis are:

RQ I: What discourse strategies does the Slovak radical right party Kotleba - ĽSNS use in order to create the notion of ‘otherness’ in their political discourse on the official party website (www.naseslovensko.net)?

RQ II: What is the difference between the party’s pre-election (December 1st 2015 to March 5th 2016) and post-election discourse (December 1st 2016 and March 5th 2017)?

2.4 Critical discourse analysis

To answer the proposed research questions, I use critical discourse analysis (CDA) to identify discursive strategies in the articles published on the party’s official website. These articles were published on the website during the analysed period in the section ‘Our Opinions’. These articles were written by various party members, and they mostly react to current events and political issues. The details of the sampling procedure are further explained in this chapter. Critical discourse analysis is one of the most appropriate methods for this research for several reasons. Firstly, according to Van Dijk (2001) critical discourse analysis is a suitable research method to analyze a discourse connected to social problems, power struggles, inequality, and group oppression. Therefore CDA is a suitable method also to explore ‘othering’ and especially examine discourse focused on minorities. Secondly, critical discourse analysis is an

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24 interpretative method of analysis and therefore, instead of simply quantifying features in text, CDA searches for the meaning of these features. It takes into consideration the context of the discourse and does not just ‘reads off’ the meaning of the text (Van Dijk, 2001) and it is based on the idea of dialectical relationships between language and society (Richardson, 2007). However, the creation of social practices that produce oppression and inequality do not have to be conscious. It often happens without people knowing what the consequences of their discourse are (Richardson, 2007) and for this reason, utilising critical discourse analysis might even help to raise self-consciousness of radical right party’s voters.

According to Fairclough (2001), critical approaches to language studies combines linguistics with social analysis. The essential principle of the critical discourse analysis is that the relationship between language and society is dialectical, or in other words, it is a two-way relationship (Fairclough, 2001). This means that critical discourse analysis presumes that every discourse is determined by social practices, but the discourse also plays a role in the very creation of these practices.

Therefore, seeing language as not only a form of communication, but as social practice, enables researchers to explore the relationship between discourse and social conditions (Fairclough, 2001). The internal, dialectical relationship between linguistics and social structures also influences the process of ‘othering’ in political discourse. If the discourse is a part of the production of social life and norms, then it also has to play a role in the production of social inequalities, such as racism, oppression and ‘othering’ (Richardson, 2007). Thus, a critical approach to the study of discourse and language enables us to scrutinize the relations amongst power, ideology and discourse (Wodak, 2001). Critical discourse analysis pays particular attention to the links between discourse and power. Therefore, the purpose of CDA is "analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (or in discourse)" (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, 2).

CDA is, however, still a growing body of academic work and the approaches of scholars somewhat differ. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the work of Fairclough and this three-dimensional approach to the CDA. According to his study, CDA explores relationships between three dimensions of discourse - texts, interactions, and contexts, or in other words "description of text, interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction, and explanation of the

The case of Slovakia

The construction of ‘otherness’ in the online

discourse of a radical right party: