Relationships among Moral Reasoning, Empathy and Cognitive Distortions in Juvenile Offenders.
Daphne Hes 5615976 Augustus 2012
Faculteit Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen Vakgroep: Forensische Orthopedagogiek
Klinische Ontwikkelingspsychologie
Onder begeleiding van: C. James, MSc. Beoordeeld door: Prof. dr. G. J. Stams
1 Abstract
Aim of the this study was to investigate the specific relationship among moral reasoning, empathy and cognitive distortions in juvenile offenders. The 134 participants completed questionnaires of cognitive distortions, affective and cognitive empathy and a moral interview was administered. Results show that affective and cognitive empathy were distinct aspects of empathy but did not have different correlations with the other measures. As hypothesized a negative relation was found between empathy and cognitive distortions. Contrary to the expectations no relation was found between moral reasoning maturity and cognitive distortions on the one hand and moral reasoning maturity and empathy on the other. Therefore no evidence was found for a mediation of cognitive distortions between moral judgment maturity and empathy, which was expected based on the neutralizing hypothesis. Alternative explanations for the present results with a focus on the limitations of the current measurement of empathy are discussed, and recommendations for further research are given.
Introduction
Although a lot of attention has been paid to social-cognitive processes in relation to delinquent behavior, not so much is known about the specific relationship among several social-cognitive processes in juvenile delinquents, such as moral reasoning, empathy and social-cognitive distortions. Several reviews show that adolescent and adult delinquents perform less well on these concepts compared to non-offenders (Hollin, 1990; Ross & Fabiano, 1985). Therefore it is often considered important to focus on social-cognitive skills in interventions intended to reduce recidivism among juvenile delinquents. Recently, Barriga, Sullivan-Cosette and Gibbs (2009)
2 have studied the relationship of these key social-cognitive processes. Aim of the current study is to replicate some aspects of the results they found. After introducing these three relevant concepts, it will be hypothesized that these processes are interrelated and, more specifically, that cognitive distortions are mediating the relationship between moral reasoning maturity and empathy.
Moral reasoning
Kohlberg (1969) developed a cognitive-structural theory about moral reasoning. His theory describes three levels of moral development, each consisting two stages. The higher the stage, the more complex the perspective-taking skills that are needed. Hoffman (2000) considers moral development more as a socialization process in which norms and values are transferred to children. Gibbs (2003) tried to combine the mainly cognitive model of Kohlberg with the mainly affective declaration of Hoffman to his Socialmoral Stage Theory. This theory states both an immature and a mature level, each containing two stages of moral reasoning. The first stage of the immature level is unilateral and physicalistic. Moral judgments of this stage are made on the basis of unilateral authority and rules or have a relation to punishment after a violating of the rules. Moral reasoning on the second stage is mainly instrumental or based on exchange. Some understanding of social interaction is needed to be able to use this stage. As part of the mature level of moral reasoning, stage 3 reasoning is based on a prosocial understanding of emotional stages, care and good conduct. The highest stage of Gibbs’ model has a focus on systematic acting and standards. An understanding of the complex social structures is needed.
A meta-analysis of Stams et al. (2006) shows that the stage of moral reasoning concerning juvenile delinquents is generally lower than for non-offender adolescents. This lower level of moral reasoning maturity is also found in adults (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson, & Palmer, 2011). The average stage of moral reasoning for juvenile delinquents is stage 2 (Gibbs,
3 2003) and for delinquent adults stage 3 (Stevenson, Hall, & Innes, 2003). Higher moral judgment maturity seems to be related to more prosocial behavior (Gibbs et al., 1986), while a lower moral judgment maturity is related to more antisocial behavior (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001).
Empathy
Empathy can be defined as “the ability to understand and share in another’s emotional stage or context.” (Cohen and Strayer, 1996, p. 988). From the age of six, empathy shows a negative correlation with externalizing and anti-social aggressive behavior (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969; Kaukiainen et al., 1999; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). A higher level of empathy promotes prosocial behavior (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009). There is a distinction between the affective response and the mental effort to comprehend the emotion of others. Cognitive empathy can be described as the ability to understand someone’s emotional state, and affective empathy refers to the sharing of the emotional state of another person (Cohen & Strayer, 1996). A meta-analysis of Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) emphasized that it is necessary to distinguish this affective empathy from the cognitive when related to criminal behavior. In their meta-analysis, Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) found that predominantly a low level of cognitive empathy is related to delinquency. On the other hand, later research of the same authors shows it is especially affective empathy that is related to delinquency (2007).
Cognitive distortions
Self-serving cognitive distortions are inaccurate attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs, which serve a positive self-image (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). These cognitive distortions are used to aim moral disengagement from an act (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). Bandura
4 and his colleagues examined these mechanisms, which may be focused on the conduct itself, the effect of the conduct or on the victim. When focused on the conduct, a person can make use of moral justifications by referencing to higher moral values, they can make use of palliative comparison and of euphemistic labeling. The effect of the conduct can either be minimized, ignored misconstrued. Both focuses have to do with the replacement or diffusion of responsibility. The third way of disengagement is by dehumanizing or blaming the victim (Bandura et al., 1996). In relation to anti-social behavior, Gibbs and Potter developed a four-category typology of cognitive distortions, which is nowadays most frequently used in this research field. First they distinguish primary cognitive distortions, referring to self-centered attitudes and beliefs, from secondary cognitive distortions, which refer to rationalizations that serve to neutralize feelings of empathy-based guilt. Secondary cognitive distortions can preserve the self-image of the juvenile after an antisocial act and can be split up in three categories, i.e. blaming others, minimizing/mislabeling and assuming the worst. Several studies show juvenile delinquents to have more cognitive distortions than non-delinquent peers (e.g. Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000; Barriga, Morrison, Liau & Gibbs, 2001; Lardén, Melin, Holst, & Långström, 2006; Liau, Barriga, & Gibbs, 1998).
The relationship among moral reasoning, empathy and cognitive distortions
Several authors point out there is a relationship between moral reasoning, empathy and cognitive distortions. Barriga, Sullivan-Cosetti and Gibbs (2009) examined the relationship between the three social cognitive processes. They found that moral judgment maturity was associated with greater empathy, cognitive distortions were related to a lower level of empathy and moral judgment was negatively related to cognitive distortions. Lardén et al. (2006) also studied the relationship between the three social cognitive processes. They identified significant zero-order correlations in the same direction as Barriga et al. (2009).
5 Landon et al. (2011) studied the relationship in offending adults and found similar results. A Dutch study of Nas, Brugman and Kroops (2006) on the effectiveness of the EQUIP program, did not find a relation between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions. A correlation analysis conducted by Gibbs et al. (1986) in their study of the relation between moral judgment, moral courage and field independence, did not show a significant correlation between moral judgment maturity and empathy. These contrasting results make it worthwhile to replicate earlier research on the relationship between these three social cognitive processes, especially in the category of 16 to 23 years old adolescents and young adults. Since most research has similar results, in the current study it is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between empathy and moral judgment maturity, a negative relationship between empathy and self-serving cognitive distortions, and a negative relationship between moral judgment maturity and self-serving cognitive distortions.
Kaplan and Arbuthnot (1985) emphasized in their research on differences in empathy between offenders and non-offenders the importance of distinguishing cognitive from affective empathy in offending adolescents. In addition, research of Jolliffe and Farrington (2004; 2006; 2007) shows that these two aspects of empathy are separate constructs, which have their own influence on anti-social behavior. In addition to the previous correlational studies to moral reasoning maturity, empathy and cognitive distortions, in this study a distinction will be made between affective and cognitive empathy. Barriga et al. (2009) differentiated between the two types of empathy and found no significant differences in relation to the other social cognitive processes. Therefore, in this study it is hypothesized there is no significant difference between the types of empathy in the correlation measures.
A third aim of this study is to focus on the way these three social cognitive processes influence each other. Both empathy and moral reasoning from the second stage upward, require a certain level of perspective-taking (Hendriks, Rutten, Stams, & Brugman, 2004). Hoffman
6 (2000) suggested that empathy is necessary for moral development, and empathy can activate moral principles. Gibbs (2003) does not agree that empathy is the primary motivator of moral action and in his model he speaks of coprimacy, which means that moral principles and empathy should both motivate moral behavior.
The link between moral judgment maturity, empathy and cognitive distortions is explained by Bandura (1991). He states that offending does not go together with a positive self-image, which causes empathic or cognitive dissonance stress (see also Festinger, 1957; Hoffman, 2000). To minimize this stress, the offender can employ cognitive distortions. This neutralization of empathy happens by disengaging the self-concept from empathic experience (Bandura, 1991; Gibbs, 2003; Sykes & Matza, 1957) The cognitive distortions make the juvenile feel less responsible and, therefore, he can retain his positive self-image.
Based on the models of Gibbs (2003) and Hoffman (2000) a higher level of moral reasoning should lead to greater responsibility and therefore more empathic stress when the behavior does not match the moral values. Empirical support for this theory is found in the study of Lardén et al. (2006). Yet, the correlation between moral judgment maturity and empathy did not remain significant after controlling for cognitive distortions, which point in the direction of a mediation effect of cognitive distortions. Barriga et al. (2009) found a mediation effect of cognitive distortions on the relation between moral identity and empathy. No mediation effect was found of cognitive distortions on the relation between moral judgment maturity and empathy, but it is not clear if the relation between moral judgment maturity and empathy remained the same after controlling for cognitive distortions or decreased. Moral judgment can be seen as a part of moral identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2005) and Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) showed a moderate relation between moral judgment and moral identity. In this study it is therefore hypothesized that cognitive distortions are mediators between moral reasoning and empathy.
7 Method
Participants
Participants were 134 male offenders aged 15-26 with a mean age of 19 years and 5 month (Mdn = 19, SD = 2 years and 4 months). They are part of the New Perspectives Aftercare Program (NPAP) effectiveness study. Their main ethnic backgrounds were 28% Moroccan ( N = 37), 25% Surinam ( N = 33), 15% Dutch (N = 20) and 8% Turkish (N = 10). All boys were living in or around three big cities in The Netherlands, i.e. Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. About one third are childhood onset young offenders, who had their first contact with the police before age 13.
Instruments
Moral reasoning: The Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992) is a production measure of moral reasoning. It consists of an interview including eleven questions related to several aspects of moral reasoning: contract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law and legal justice. For example: “Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to their friends?” (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007). First the juvenile needs to make a decision if the statement or question is important for him, followed by an explanation. The verbatim answers were written down and scored in the way Gibbs et al. (1992) proposed. The item’s scores can be converted to a level of moral reasoning fitting the stages of Gibbs’ model. The reliability (test-retest, internal consistency and inter-rater) and validity (criterion and construct) of the English version is good (Bassinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995). In the present study the reliability was α = 0.69 and L6 = 0.78. An inter-rater reliability was calculated with the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), specifically the two-way random effects version. This
8 calculation was based on 10 interviews scored by two different raters. The ICC was determined to be ri = 0.70, indicating a sufficient reliability.
Empathy: To measure cognitive and affective empathy, the Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006) is used. This questionnaire consists of 20 questions. Nine questions measure cognitive empathy and another eleven questions are related to affective empathy. An example of a question measuring affective empathy is: “I get caught up in other people’s feelings easily”. An example of a cognitive item is: “I can often understand how people are feeling even before they tell me”. The juvenile is asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statements along a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Jolliffe and Farrington (2006) confirmed the reliability and validity (construct, convergent, divergent). Two studies showed that the validity of the translated Dutch questionnaire is sufficient for the Dutch population (Ahlrichs, Van den Berg, Van den Born, Bruns and Herbrink, 2009; Beld et al., 2009). In the present study, the total empathy scale had a reliability of α = 0.61 and L6 =0.79. For the affective scale the reliability is α = 0.55 and L6 = 0.67 and for the cognitive scale α = 0.61 and L6 = 0.73.
Cognitive distortions: The How I Think questionnaire (HIT; Barriga & Gibbs, 1996) measures the level of self-serving cognitive distortions. The questionnaire has been translated by Nas (2002). The outcome shows an overall score for cognitive distortions and a score for the four distinguished types of distortions, i.e.: self-centred, blaming others, minimizing /mislabeling and assuming the worst. The list consists of 54 items, e.g. “If someone gets beat up, it’s usually his or her own fault,” and “If you back down from a fight, everyone will think you’re a coward.” The juvenile is asked to indicate their degree of agreement along a 6-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The studies of Barriga and
9 Gibbs (1996) show a sufficient reliability and validity. Nas, Brugman and Koops (2008) also found satisfactory reliability and validity (convergent and divergent) in a Dutch sample. The internal consistency of the HIT in this study was α = 0.94 and L6 = 0.97. The subscales also all had a good reliability ranging from α 0.81 – 0.86 and L6 ranging from 0.82 – 0.87.
Social desirability tendency: Doing research with questionnaires is always prone to a response bias. Of special interest is the social desirability bias, which contains “the inclination to respond in a way that will make the respondent look good” (Beretvas, Meyers & Leite, 2002). The social desirability tendency is proved to be of influence on the score of the HIT and depends on the ethnic background (Van Buuren, 2008). The Social Desirability Scale (SDS, Crowne & marlowe, 1960) consists of 15 items. Each item describes a socially desirable attribute. An example is: “I practice what I preach”. The juveniles have to answer these statements with true or false. Reliability of the SDS in this study was α = 0.84 and L6 = 0.86
Procedure
The juvenile and young adult offenders were approached for the aftercare program NPAP during the last phase of detention or shortly after release. Participating on the NPAP can be voluntary or imposed by the court. Participating in this research is on a voluntary base. The juveniles were randomly assigned to the NPAP-condition or Treatment As Usual (TAU). For this study, no distinction is made between the NPAP-condition and the TAU condition. Questionnaires were administered shortly after commencing NPAP or TAU. The juvenile is asked to answer several standardized questionnaires, including de Basic Empathy Scale (empathy) and How I Think questionnaire (cognitive distortions). Halfway through the
10 assessment the semi-structured SRM-SF interview is conducted. A 20 euro reward is given to the juveniles for their time and effort.
Results
Of the 134 participants seven refused the moral interview. Two other social moral interviews did not have enough valid answers to score. These six juveniles were deleted before the analyses of the SRM-SF, 125 remaining for this analysis. Due to a computer failure, some of the questionnaires of 12 participants got lost. Analyses of the BES were therefore conducted on 122 participants and of the HIT on 130 participants.
The measurement of empathy showed on average a value of 3.15 (SD = 0.43). The juveniles scored higher on the cognitive scale (M = 3.49, SD = 0.61), t(121) = 9.21, p < .05, than on the affective scale (M = 2.87, SD = 0.52), t(121) = -9.23, p < .05. As shown in Table 1, cognitive and affective empathy did not correlate with each other. This means there is a distinction between these two sides of empathy and further analyses were conducted separately for affective, cognitive and total empathy. The average score of cognitive distortions was M = 2.44 (SD = 0.82). The average total score for moral reasoning maturity was M = 239.93 (SD = 35.380). This corresponds with transition level between the moral reasoning stages 2 and 3. The majority of the participants scored in the stage 2 (N = 39), 2/3 (N = 65) and 3 (N = 18).
Zero-order correlations were computed among empathy (affective, cognitive and total), cognitive distortions, moral reasoning maturity and social desirability. As shown in Table 1, a negative correlation between overall empathy and cognitive distortions was found. Also both affective empathy and cognitive empathy negatively correlated with cognitive distortions. Because a strong correlation was found between self-serving cognitive distortions and social desirability, the correlations with self-serving cognitive distortions should be
12 controlled for social desirability. The correlation with overall, affective and cognitive empathy remained significant after controlling for social desirability.
Cognitive distortions and moral judgment maturity were neither related to each other. In contrast to the hypothesis, no relation has been found between moral judgment maturity and empathy. Therefore, the last hypothesis about the mediation effect could not be tested.
Discussion
The present study examined the relationship among three social cognitive processes, i.e. moral reasoning maturity, empathy and cognitive distortions, in juvenile delinquents. The mixed results of previous studies made replicating correlation analyses worthwile. In addition to earlier research, a distinction has been made between affective, cognitive and overall empathy. Both subscales had a strong relation with the overall scale, but did not correlate with each other, which means they are two separate constructs. As hypothesized, a higher level of empathy was related to less cognitive distortions. This was the case for both affective, cognitive and overall empathy. Contrary to the hypothesis, no relation was found between empathy and moral reasoning maturity, nor between moral reasoning maturity and cognitive distortions. Therefore no evidence was found for the mediation hypothesis in which cognitive distortions should mediate between moral judgment maturity and empathy.
The negative relation between empathy and cognitive distortions is in line with the findings of Barriga et al. (2009), Langdon et al. (2011) and Lardén et al. (2006). These results support the neutralizing hypothesis in which the use of cognitive distortions makes a person feel less responsible. As a consequence the empathic distress the juvenile experiences is lessened (Bandura, 1991; Festinger, 1957; Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Sykes & Matza, 1957).
13 The relationship between cognitive distortions and moral reasoning maturity as found in the research of Barriga (2009), Langdon (2011) and Lardén (2006) did not occur in the present sample. In one other Dutch study no relation was found either between cognitive distortions and moral judgment maturity (Nas et al., 2006). Questions can be raised as to whether this difference can be explained by the Dutch culture or by translations of the questionnaires. There are no clear reasons for doubting the translations, since the reliability and validity are good. Also the level of moral reasoning maturity is comparable to other studies with juvenile and adult offenders (e.g. Gibbs et al., 2007; Stams et al., 2006) as is the level of cognitive distortions the juveniles are using to other international studies (e.g. Barriga et al., 2009).
Despite the fact that most research found a steady but weak relation between the level of empathy and the level of moral reasoning maturity (Barriga, 2009; Langdon, 2011; Lardén, 2006), this relation did not occur in the current study. The present results are in line with the study of Gibbs et al. (1986). Gibbs and colleagues did add empathy as a control measure and did not give an explanation for the absence of the correlation.
A main distinction between the present study and other studies it is compared to, is the measurement instrument of empathy. All cited studies used different instruments. In the meta-analysis of Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) about empathy and offending, they state there are differences in the scales that are used to measure empathy. Compared to other instruments, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), used in the study of Barriga et al. (2009), was less likely to identify low empathy among offenders (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004). The BES was developed to overcome shortcomings of other empathy questionnaires (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004) and the 2007 study of Jolliffe and Farrington shows that the BES is able to measure low levels of empathy in offenders. It is possible that a more accurate measurement of empathy positively influenced the results.
14 A limitations of the present study concerns the internal reliability of the BES, which was only α = 0.61, however the reliability was satisfactory when using Guttmans Lambda 6, which was 0.79. There are two Dutch validation studies of the BES. None of these studies tested the validity in a delinquent population. One of the differences between the present results and the original study of Jolliffe and Farrington (2006) and a Dutch validation study in a non delinquent juvenile population (Beld et al., 2009), is that in this study no correlation is found between cognitive and affective empathy. Jolliffe and Farrington explain this correlation by pointing out that both parts of empathy involve reactions to emotion of another. From this one study it is not clear if the Dutch translated BES is not a good instrument for juvenile delinquent, or that for Dutch offenders the affective and cognitive aspect of empathy does not have a strong common background.
Besides its moderate reliability, it can be questioned if measuring empathy with a questionnaire is the right way at all. Differences have been found between self-report empathy and responsive empathy (Robinson, Roberts, Strayer, & Koopman, 2007). Self-report empathy measures show only slight differences between people, while responsive empathy measures are able to make a clearer distinction. Also neuropsychological research of Rameson, Morelli and Lieberman (2011) point to these distinctions. They made a distinction between the trait empathy and state empathy. The most significant differences in empathy were found in the state empathy under cognitive load, both measured with a self-report questionnaire and fMRI (Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2011). In the present study only the trait empathy is measured and there was no cognitive load. It is likely the juveniles are under cognitive load while committing an offence and therefore it would be interesting to measure empathy state in further research in circumstances with cognitive load.
The fact that most of the boys got the EQUIP training while incarcerated could be of further influence. This program with a focus on decreasing the amount of cognitive distortion,
15 is standardly available for all boys in juvenile prisons. Nas et al. (2006) proved that the EQUIP program caused a reduction of cognitive distortions. It would be interesting to replicate the study with boys before they got this specific training.
Another potential limitation concerns the moment of administering the SRM-SF. In most cases, this interview was done the at first research moment. In some cases it was not possible to do this interview the first time. Those interviews were conducted 3 months later, while the aftercare program was already started. Though this was only the case for a few interviews, it would have been better if all interviews had been done before the start of the program.
Since the BES lacked sufficient reliability and divergent results compared to the validation study, this instrument should first be tested in a Dutch delinquent population.
This study shows that the relationship between empathy, cognitive distortions and moral judgment maturity in juvenile delinquents is still not clear. More research needs to be done to make this relationship clear, because understanding this relationship can give direction to prevention and treatment programs for juvenile delinquents.
16 References
Ahlrichs, C., Van den Berg, V., Van den Born, R., Bruns S., & Herbrink, M. (2009). Validering van de Basic Empathy Scale in Nederland. University of Amsterdam. Not publicated.
Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of self-regulation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 248-287.
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 364-374.
Barriga, A. Q., & Gibbs J. C. (1996). Measuring cognitive distortion in antisocial youth: development and preliminary validation of the ‘‘How I Think’’ questionnaire. Aggressive Behavior, 22, 333–343.
Barriga, A. Q., Landau, J. R., Stinson, B. L., Liau, A. K., & Gibbs, J. C. (2000). Cognitive distortions and problem behaviors in adolescents. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 27, 36-56.
Barriga, A. Q., Morrison, E. M., Liau, A. K., & Gibbs, J. C. (2001). Moral cognition: Explaining the gender difference in antisocial behavior. Merrill-Palmer Quarterley, 47, 532-562.
Barriga, A., Sullivan-Cosetti, M., & Gibbs, J. C. (2009). Moral cognitive correlates of empathy in juvenile delinquents. Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, 19, 253-264. Basinger, K. S., Gibbs, J. C., & Fuller, D. (1995). Context and measurement of moral
judgment. International Journal of Behavioral Development , 18, 537-556.
Beld, M., Hornby, N., Maschke, B., Van der Neut, M., Stoeten L., & De Wit, M. (2009). De Nederlandse validering van de Basic Empathy Scale. University of Amsterdam. Not published.
17 Beretvas, S. N., Meyers, J. L., & Leite, W. L. (2002). A reliability generalization study of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 62, 570-589.
Cohen, D., & Strayer, J. (1996). Empathy in conduct-disordered and comparison youth. Developmental Psychology, 32, 988-998.
Crowne, D.P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349–354.
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85.
Feshbach, N. D., & Feshbach, S. (1969). The relationship between empathy and aggression in two age groups. Developmental Psychology, 1, 102-107.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of Cognitive Dissonance. New York: Row , Peterson and company.
Gibbs, J. C. (2003). Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gibbs, J. C., Barriga, A. Q., & Potter, G. B. (2001). How I Think Questionnaire, manual. Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: measuring the
development of socialmoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., Grime, R. L., & Snarey, J. R. (2007). Moral judgment
development across cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims. Developmental Review, 27, 443-500.
Gibbs, J. C., Clark, P. M., Joseph, J. A., Green, J. L., Goodrich, T. S., & Makowski, D. G. (1986). Relation between moral judgment, moral courage, and field independence. Child Development, 57, 185-193.
18 Guerra, N. G., & Slaby, R. G. (1989). Evaluative factors in social problem solving by
aggressive boys. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 17, 277–289. Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2005). Identity as a source of moral motivation. Human
Development, 48, 232-256.
Hendriks J., Rutten E., Stams G.J., & Brugman, D. (2004). De MOL graaft naar het geweten: een nieuw instrument. In Le Sage, L., Stegge, H., & Steutel, J. (Eds.) Jeugddelinquentie en gewetensontwikkeling. Conceptualisering, diagnostiek en behandeling. Amsterdam: SWP.
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University press.
Hollin, C. R. (1990). Cognitive-Behavioural Interventions with Young Offenders. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.
Jolliffe, D., & Farrington, D. P. (2004). Empathy and offending: A systemic review and meta-analysis. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 9, 441–476.
Jolliffe, D., & Farrington, D. P. (2006). Examining the relationship between low empathy and bullying. Aggressive Behavior, 32, 540-550.
Jolliffe, D., & Farrington, D. P. (2006). Development and validation of the basic empathy scale. Journal of Adolescence, 29, 589–611.
Jolliffe, D., & Farrington, D. P. (2007). Examining the relationship between low empathy and self-reported offending. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 12, 265-286.
Kaplan, P. J., & Arbuthnot, J. (1985) - Affective empathy and cognitive role-taking in delinquent and nondelinquent youth. Adolescence, 20, 323-333.
Kaukiainen, A., Björkqvist, K., Lagerspetz, K., Österman, K., Salmivalli, C., Rothberg, S., & Ahlbom, A.(1999). The relationships between social intelligence, empathy, and three types of aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 25, 81-89.
19 Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (p. 347-480). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Langdon, P. E., Murphy, G. H., Clare, I. C. H., Steverson, T., & Palmer, E. J. (2011). Relationships among moral reasoning, empathy and distorted cognitions in men with intellectual disabilities and a history of criminal offending. American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 6, 438-456.
Lardén, M., Melin, L., Holst, U., & Långström, N. (2006). Moral judgement, cognitive distortions and empathy in incarcerated delinquent and community control adolescents. Psychology, Crime & Law, 12, 453-462.
Liau, A. K., Barriga, A. Q., & Gibbs, J. C. (1998). Relations between self-serving cognitive distortions and overt vs. covert antisocial behavior in adolescents. Aggressive Behavior, 24, 335-346.
Miller, P. A., & Eisenberg, N. (1988). The relation of empathy to aggressive and externalizing / antisocial behavior. Psychology Bulletin, 103, 324-344.
Nas, C. N. (2002). Hoe Ik Denk Vragenlijst (HID). Utrecht: Utrecht Universtiy.
Nas, C. N., Brugman, D., & Koops, W. (2006). The effects of the EQUIP intervention program on moral development, cognitive distortions and social skills in juvenile delinquents. Kind en Adolescent, 27, 112-127.
Nas, C. N., Brugman, D., & Koops, W. (2008). Measuring self-serving cognitive distortions with the ‘How I Think’ questionnaire. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 24, 181–189.
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 365–392.
20 Rameson, L. T., Morelli, S. Al, & Lieberman, M. D. (2011). The neural correlates of empathy: experience, automaticity, and prosocial behavior. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24, 235-245.
Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: an empirical examination of the moral individual. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 1610-1624.
Robinson, R., Roberts, W. L., Strayer, J., & Koopman, R. (2007). Empathy and emotional responsiveness in delinquent and non-delinquent adolescents. Social Devlopment, 16, 555-579.
Ross, R. R., & Fabiano, E. A. (1985). Time to Think: A Cognitive Model of Delinquency Prevention and Offender Rehabilitation. Johnson City, TN: Institute of Social Sciences and Arts.
Stams, G. J., Brugman, D., Deković, M., Van Rosmalen, L., Laan, P., & Gibbs, J. C. (2006). The moral judgement of juvenile delinquents: a meta analysis. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 34, 697-713.
Stevenson, S. F., Hall, G., & Innes, J. M. (2003). Sociomoral reasoning and criminal sentiments in Australian men and women violent offenders and non-offenders. International Journal of Forensic Psychology, 1, 111-119.
Stocks, E. L., Lishner, D. A., & Decker, S. K. (2009). Altruism or psychological escape: why does empathy promote prosocial behavior? European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 649-665.
Sykes, G. M., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: A thory of delinquency. American Socialogical Review, 22, 664-670.
Van Buuren, M. (2008). De invloed van etniciteit op de sociaal wenselijkheidscore van de Hoe Ik Denk vragenlijst. Utrecht University. Not published.
