Time-bomb?
Domestic issues: Identity, Urbanization and Social Inequality Endangering China’s Rise to Power
Sieger Veenstra University of Groningen
Department of International Relations and International Organizations Supervisors: N. De Deugd
J.F. Meijer (partially)
Abstract
In the China threat China is perceived to rise in a belligerent way that eventually will lead to a shift in hegemony in international relations. However, China also deals with a large number of domestic issues that can serve as impediment to its rise. This thesis examines in particular urban development and corresponding issues such as corruption in local governments and lack of empowerment of farmers. This thesis provides a case study revolving around the Wukan uproars 2011 and its impact on rural-to-urban development. The findings are that, even though Wukan can be perceived as a failed case, it set an example for other incongruity among governments and rural citizens and can seriously hamper China’s rise by contesting the political clout of the Communist Party of China. Implications for International Relations are that social constructivism is the most fit to explain how a discrepancy in identity formation between the government and the society of China implies that competing interests exist, and that in turn competing interests can potentially destabilize state-interests. This instability can be further intensified if between different levels of government different interests exist. In line with different interests is a different manifestation of identity, and those identity may compete. If the state leaves no room for different identities and tries to quell oppression it may lead to identity loss, and symptomatic for resistance against identity-loss comes in the form of social unrest and “mass incidents”.
Contents
Introduction 5
Research questions and outline thesis 11
Chapter 1. The China-Threat: a nascent superpower or a ticking time-bomb? 13
China-Threat theory 13
Ideological threat 13
Economic threat 15
Military threat 17
Domestic issues: social unrest and an increasingly contested CCP 18
Urbanization 19
Economic reforms and migration 20
Social inequality 21
Social instability and the CCP 23
Chinese nationalism and the CCP 24
Repression of opponents 27
Differences between Hu and Xi-administrations 29
Hu Jintao and Wen Jaobao 30
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang 31
Chapter 2: China: two states perhaps? A constructivist approach 33
Methodology and research design 33
Different perspectives on China’s rise in International Relations 34
Realism 34
Liberalism 35
Constructivism 36
Sino-centrism and Chinese identity formation 38
Sino-centrism 38
Identity and interest-formation 39
Identity building 41
Chapter 3. Urbanization: the case of Wukan 43
The Wukan Uproars 43
Timeline of the Wukan protests 45
Uniqueness of Wukan-case 47
Identity and interests of the CCP 50
Urbanite: issues with consumerism, local corruption and decentralization 50
Urbanite: urban utopia and its issues 53
Empowerment of the villagers 54
Transparency of checks and balances 55
Identity-gap and interest-gap 57
Socials protests 60
Chapter 4: The Wukan-case: lessons in International Relations 62
Lessons for the China threat theory 62
Realism: holism versus reductionism 63
Liberalism: differentiation versus egalitarianism 65
Constructivism: universality versus location specificity and differentiation 66
General lessons for Constructivism 68
Holism, differentiation and location specificity 69
The lessons for IR Theory 71
Summary and Conclusions 74
Introduction
In International Relations, one of the main focusses is on the growth of China in international affairs. China’s growth gives rise to debate, mostly revolving around whether or not China will overthrow the political hegemonic position of the USA. In general, this debate entails the China-Threat Theory versus its sceptics. On the one hand, the China-China-Threat theory argues that due to an increasing assertive position China will eventually destabilize regional security and may become a belligerent global superpower.1 Usually as a perspective of American realist scholars2, this threat perception is attributed to ideological characteristics of China, namely its change from a ‘low profile’ strategy to a more assertive ‘getting things done’ strategy; to the increase in developing its military capacity; and China’s economic rise that made China the world’s second largest economy.3 The more belligerent attitude that China has taken is in accordance with the power transition theory, which in essence assumes two major components: firstly, the rise of a certain state can outgrow the current hegemon of a particular period of time. Secondly, the surpassing of the hegemon by the newcomer has been accompanied often with major wars.4 So in the case of China, would China rise and surpass the USA’s hegemony, there is a chance that a major war occurs according to the power transition theory. However, it is also argued that wars would only occur if, in this case China, demands changes in the international system, perhaps as holding a negative stance towards the imperative hegemony of Western norms and values, and in particular towards those imposed by the USA.5 The question is therefore, would China demand changes in
the international system?
1 Examples of literature in this perspective are not exhaustively: Bill Gertz, The China Threat (Washington, DC:
Regnery Pub., 2000); Charles Glaser, 'Will China's Rise Lead To War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism',
Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): pp. 80-91; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise Of China And The Future Of The West: Can
The Liberal System Survive?', Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): pp. 23-37; Gertz and Glaser write from a realist perspective; Ikenberry from a liberalist perspective.
Those whom touch on the China-Threat view but not necessary agreeing with the anti-China stance are (not exhaustive): Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 758-771.; Denny Roy, 'Hegemon On The Horizon? China's Threat To East Asian Security', International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): pp. 149-168; Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of
Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (2003): 265-284; Chengxin Pan, 'The "China-Threat" In American Self-Imagination:
The Discursive Construction Of Other As Power Politics', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 3 (2004): pp. 305-331.
2 See Chengxin Pan, 'The "China-Threat" In American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction Of Other As
Power Politics', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 3 (2004): pp. 305-331.
3 See Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12,
no. 35 (2003): 265-284; Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 758-771;
4 Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, 'Power Transition Theory And The Rise Of China', International
Interactions 29, no. 4 (2003): pp. 269-271.
On the other hand, there are the sceptics of the China-Threat theory, who believe that China will not become a belligerent nation wishing to deprive the USA of its hegemony by force or change the international system: China is gradually liberalizing and reforming itself to fit in into the international system: examples of this are China’s ascension into the WTO, China’s role in aid-development and China’s rise in FDI, both inward and outward to name a few.6 Moreover, it is usually when something goes wrong in China that the anti-China scholars point out that China is a rising threat to the world.7 Additionally, there are many domestic issues that serve as impediment to such a development.8 Domestic issues that China deals with are corruption, environmental degradation, social protests, urban-rural divide, declining economic growth and urbanization to name a few; most of the aforementioned issues are intertwined.9
This thesis will elucidate the effect of especially urbanization and social unrest on the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and how domestic problems affect International Relations: I will argue that rural-to-urban migration, corrupt practices in urban development and especially land expropriation for rural-to-urban land conversion, as well as a widening gap between rich and poor are exacerbating the social unrest that trigger social protests. In turn, these social protests contest the legitimacy of the CCP’s political clout, and with that, such protests put pressure on the position of the CCP. Implications for International Relations theory are that domestic problems can act as impediment for becoming a global superpower. Therefore, the rise of China, and the idea that China might become ‘the non-western challenger’ is not uncontested per se, but is unlikely to happen without solving the domestic problems the CCP is grappling with.10
My findings are that there is a difference in identity and interest-formation between the CCP and the local governments, as well as between the different levels of government and the society of China. In addition, there seems to be an identity gap between the CCP and the Chinese society. One could, in fact, argue, that there are two different notions of the Chinese state: on the one hand an ideological China based on the Confucian notion of Chinese nationalism and
6 See Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 758-771. 7 See Charles Glaser, 'Will China's Rise Lead To War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism', Foreign Affairs 90,
no. 2 (2011): pp. 80-91
8 Not exhaustive: e.g. Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp.
758-771.; Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (2003): 265-284.
9 See e.g. Gordon G Chang, The Coming Collapse Of China (New York: Random House, 2001): pp. xv-xx; Susan L.
Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 758-771.; Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (2003): pp. 265-284.
10 ‘the non-western challenger’ is a reference to Andreas Bøje Forsby, The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise Of A
Confucian values. This notion of Chinese nationalism is strongly based on Sino-centrism that generally encompasses four components: firstly, Sino-Civilization, that is, the tendency to refer to China as a civilization rather than a nation state due to its relatively long isolation; secondly, Confucian philosophy: as a unifying and harmonizing societal order; thirdly, dynastic authoritarianism: in line with the Confucian philosophy, this entails a strong patriarchal hierarchy in society; and lastly Han-ethnocentrism: the defining of oneself as a Han-Chinese, and due to the proliferation over time, now some 90% of the Chinese citizens identifies themselves as a Han-Chinese.11 It is not really that notion that differs, but the way it manifests itself is different among how the CCP wants it to be prevalent, and how it is perceived and practiced among the citizens of China: one the one hand there is the “China Dream of Renaissance” (or the Big Dream) wherein the CCP got the political clout through the Mandate of Heaven, which entails a Confucian notion of power legitimacy obtained by successful rebel leaders.12 The China of the Big Dream encompasses China as the Middle Kingdom and wherein everyone lives in perpetual harmony, under the reign of a good leader.13 As an unifying ideology, Chinese nationalism is proliferated by the CCP. Likewise, in need of developing a coping mechanism for China’s economic growth and socio-economic development due to globalization, Hu Jintao, the previous leader of the CCP, came up with the idea of Harmonious society harmonious world. In short the harmonious society/harmonious world idea gives rise to China’s more proactive approach whilst maintaining a tight hold onto the more proactive citizens of China as well. In order to retain peace in China, Hu spurred economic developments to quell social protests, among them is the strong emphasis on urbanization. Likewise, China’s rise was perceived to be controversial, and thus China coming about as a peaceful rising nation was a necessity.14 In case of Xi Jinping, the current leader of the CCP, it is a more assertive somewhat Neo-Maoist idea of making China the Middle Kingdom again that seems to be a mechanism to quell social protests.15
11 Summarized from Andreas Bøje Forsby, The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise Of A Sino-Centric China
(Copenhagen: DIIS, 2011): pp. 19-30
12 See Dingxin, Zhao, 'The Mandate Of Heaven And Performance Legitimation In Historical And Contemporary
China', American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009): pp. 416-433.
13 See Hoang Anh Tuan, 'Xi Embraces China's Big Dream', Asia Times, 2013, accessed May 6, 2015,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-040413.html.
14 Summarized from Yongnian Zheng and Tok Sow Keat, '‘Harmonious Sociery' And ‘Harmonious World’: China's
Policy Discourse Under Hu Jintao', China Policy Institute 26 (2007).
15 See See from Xiangwei Wang, 'Reform: Easier Said Than Done', in The China Renaissance: The Rise Of Xi Jinping
And The 18Th Communist Party Congress, Jonathan Sharp (Ed.), 1st ed. (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing
Company, 2013), pp. 191-230; Willy Lam, 'The Maoist Revival And The Conservative Turn In Chinese Politics',
On the other hand, there is societal China: the Chinese people who deal with the harsh reality of corruption,16 lack of public participation,17 and those who are quelled by the government
if they express their discontent through popular protests in accordance to permission the Mandate of Heaven provides if their government is deemed a bad one.18 What is a very striking paradox that seems to further complicate the quelling reality is that social protests that in accordance to the Mandate of Heaven should be allowed, are suppressed if they grow to larger scales and if they include more than only the Han-Chinese.19 So strangely, the CCP seems to want to prevent the expression of Confucianism, which is that what it is trying to proliferate (in very selective format, that is).
The causes for the social protests are inter alia the domestic issues that are listed above, and in this thesis I will specifically focus on urbanization and urban development. Urbanization may not be an unnatural phenomenon due to the idea that in cities economically one is better off,20 but in China urbanization has been so explosive that is might even been too fast for China to handle: in 2014 53% of the population of the PRC lived in cities,21 and there are forecasts that state that by 2030, 70% of the Chinese population will living in urban areas22: that percentage accounts for around one billion people.23 The core issues in urbanization are the registration system which effectively separates rural from urban citizens;24 Land expropriation that eases land conversion for real-estate developers;25 and corruption, since real estate developers are often gaining quite an
amount of wealth when developing urban areas in China, leaving an array of ghost towns and massive drops in arable farmland, whereas many people still live in bad housing for too high
16 See Yan Sun, 'Corruption, Growth, And Reform: The Chinese Enigma', Current History (2005): pp. 257-263. 17 See Yongnian Zheng, 'China In 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety. And Uncertainty', Asian Survey 52,
no. 1 (2012): pp. 28-41; Yongjun Zhao, ‘Rethinking China’s Land Tenure Reform: The Emergence of Farmers’ Land Shareholding Cooperatives’, Land Tenure Journal 2 No. 12 (2013): pp. 95-118.
18 Elizabeth J. Perry, 'Challenging The Mandate Of Heaven: Popular Protest In Modern China', Critical Asian Studies
33, no. 2 (2001): pp. 163-180.
19 Ibidem
20 This is called the pull-factor effect of a city: specifically for China see: Aimin Chen and N. Edward Coulson,
'Determinants Of Urban Migration: Evidence From Chinese Cities', Urban Studies 39, no. 12 (2002): pp. 2189-2197.
21 Shannon Tiezzi, 'Urbanization With Chinese Characteristics', The Diplomat, 2015, accessed May 6, 2015:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/urbanization-with-chinese-characteristics/
22 Emily T. Yeh, Kevin J. O’Brien & Jingzhong Ye, ‘Rural politics in contemporary China’ The Journal of Peasant
Studies 40 no. 6 (2013): pp. 915; Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization, World
Bank (2015): accessed 04-01-2015, via:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/publication/urban-china-toward-efficient-inclusive-sustainable-urbanization
23 The Economist,. ‘Building the dream, April 19th 2014: pp. 3.
24 See Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, 'The Hukou System And Rural-Urban Migration In China: Processes And
Changes', The China Quarterly 160 (1999): pp. 818-855;
prices.26 Likewise, corruption is often to the detriment of the citizens that are deprived of their land
or farmers.27 Additionally, rural migrants in urban areas have been facing discrimination due to
their rural status. Many rural migrants and farmers decide to express their discontent through social protest, which grew from 9000 in 1993 to 180.000 in 2010.28 The initially evasive approach of the Chinese government to urbanization issues and social inequality is caused by the fear of the CCP for being deprived of their political clout, as well of their gain in urban development. Therefore, to keep citizens content urbanization is propagated to be the new source for economic growth.29 Even though the CCP tries to reduce corruption, it still seemingly does not work and real-estate developers and corrupt politicians on local level to work hand in hand to gain money from land that is often deprived from farmers.30 The implications of such a gap in interest and idea formation between governmental levels and the Chinese populace is that there is perhaps identity-loss that causes social protests: an identity gap between the government and the society can lead to identity loss and symptomatic for the preventing of identity loss in the society is communal resistance in the form of social protests. In order to keep check of domestic stability, the CCP uses very selective Confucian values as an unifying mechanism. But rural migrants and rural citizens are oppressed if they speak out in line of their, also Confucian, values. It is paradoxical that the CCP wants to create unity by means of Confucian values as well as preventing the proliferation of acting in line of it, because it might lose legitimacy of reigning China: it digs its own grave with implementing such a policy.
In order to cover especially land-expropriation in rural-to-urban land conversion for the sake of urbanization, corruption in these practices and poor implementation of land-protection laws, as well as to demonstrate how competing interests lead to differentiated identity formation and can lead to identity loss when the state leaves no room for different identities and tries to quell oppression, I will use a case-study revolving around the protests in Wukan in 2011 to show that
26 See e.g. Peter Day, ´Ordos: The biggest ghost town in China´ BBC Magazine , 2012, Accessed May 6 2015:
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17390729
27 Ibidem;
28 See John Knight, 'The Economic Causes And Consequences Of Social Instability In China', China Economic Review
25 (2013): pp. 18
29 Ian Johnson, 'China Embarking On Vast Program Of Urbanization', The New York Times, 2015; Jeremy Page, Bob
Davis and James T. Areddy, 'China Turns Predominantly Urban: Transfer Of Millions To Cities Is Double-Edged Sword; Property Demand A Factor In Land Grabs', Wall Street Journal, last modified 2012, accessed July 2, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203735304577166652002366514.
Keqiang Li, 'Li Keqiang Expounds On Urbanization', China.Org, last modified 2013, accessed June 27, 2015,
http://china.org.cn/china/2013-05/26/content_28934485.htm.
30 See Zheng, Yongnian. 'China In 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety. And Uncertainty'. Asian Survey 52,
Research questions and outline thesis
This thesis will cover the following research question: to what extent is there a difference in
identity and interest formation between the CCP and the Chinese populace and what are the implications IR theory regarding the rise of China?
The subsequent questions that will be used in the chapters in this thesis in order to answer the main question are the following:
Chapter 1. What is the context wherein the issues of rural-to-urban land conversion in China are embedded?
Chapter 2. How can constructivism explain the difference between the identity and interest formation of the CCP on the one hand and Chinese populace on the other hand?
Chapter 3. What contributed to the issues regarding urbanization in the case of Wukan in China? How did the Wukan case of urbanization lead to social protests and what was the reaction of the CCP? To what extent is there an identity and interest gap regarding urbanization between the CCP and the citizens of Wukan? What lessons can be learned from the Wukan case regarding urbanization and what are the implications for the China Threat View? (What lessons can be learned from the Wukan Case for International Relations theory?)
The following structure and approach will be used in this thesis: in the first chapter I will further outline the Threat debate, as well as the domestic issues that contravene this China-Threat view. This context is necessary to outline because many domestic issues that China faces are far-reaching and very intertwined with each other. Likewise, I will explain in detail how urbanization, social inequality and a pressured position of the CCP are interrelated, and how they are embedded within the context of the China-Threat view.
In the second chapter, I will argue that a constructivist approach, rather than realism or liberalism, can explain the behavior of CCP on the domestic issues that in turn increase the social unrest because firstly, realism tends to take the domestic of China for granted as if the state were a black box and thus does not take into account internal issues. Liberalism and in particular liberal IR theory assumes that states are a representation of the society as well as that society’s preferences shape state’s behavior.31 But the CCP does not seem to work in accordance of the society.
Therefore, constructivism is used as perspective to argue that internal issues, in the case of this thesis, distorted identity building and a gap between the government and the society lead to social unrest.
31 Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory Of International Politics', International
The third chapter is concerned specifically with urbanization as one of the domestic issues, and how urbanization issues constitute to identity and interest formation. I will explain in a case-study on the village of Wukan, how urbanization is perceived to be a beneficial practice by the Chinese government to generate urbanization and make it attractive for developers to develop housing, and how it is opposed, in this case effectively, by the Chinese citizens protesting against this.32 In the case of Wukan, it comes about eloquently that urbanization encompasses both an increasing gap between rich and poor due to corruption and unclear legislation, as well as lots of other issues, that are either unresolved by the government or inadequately reacted on.33
In the fourth chapter I will draw upon the pervious chapters and argue what lessons can be drawn from the Wukan case in light of the China-rise. Firstly, rather than using realism by itself there is need for holism and that can be achieved by addressing internal issues of a state rather than reducing that to a black box. Secondly, in case of solely using liberalism, there is need to address reversibility. Also as aforementioned, liberalism entail that state’s behavior is a representation of societal interest, but that would inherently mean that the CCP would act in accordance to the society which does not seem to be the case. Lastly, constructivism is the most fit for addressing the rise of China in that that it argues that identity and interest formation influences state’s behavior, but here location specificity should be emphasized rather than taking a universal approach to culture or identity, because constructivism assumes a stable state identity. 34 In this thesis the main
lesson provided for International Relations theory is that competing interests exist, and that in turn competing interests can potentially destabilize state-interests.
32 See Malcolm Moore, 'Wukan Seige: Chinese Government Vows To Hunt Down Rebel Village 'Leaders'', The
Telegraph, 2011, accessed May 6, 2015:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8957781/Wukan-seige-Chinese-government-vows-to-hunt-down-rebel-village-leaders.html.
33 Ibidem; Zheng, Yongnian. 'China In 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety. And Uncertainty'. Asian Survey
52, no. 1 (2012): pp. 28-41; Yongjun Zhao. 'China's Land Tenure Reform: Time Fo A New Direction?'. The China
Review 11, no. 2 (2011): pp. 125-152.
34 See for more references Andreas Bøje Forsby, The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise Of A Sino-Centric China
Chapter 1. The China-Threat: a nascent superpower or a ticking time-bomb?
China-Threat theoryAs mentioned in the introduction, the China-Threat debate entails that China due to its rapid growth, seriously threatens regional stability, and may threaten the interests of the USA in the nearby future.35 Emma Broomfield36 and Denny Roy37 divide the main forms of the ‘China-Threat’ into three main fields that cause the threat to the regional stability and the hegemonic position of the USA: ideological, economic, and military. Moreover, for each threat, they pose counterarguments. Both pros and cons are summarized in the following.
Ideological threat
The ideological threat entails that due to China’s historical importance and hegemonic position in the East Asian region, the idea that China wishes to resurge that ‘middle-kingdom’ position: China used to have a regional hegemony in the East Asian region until the end of the Qing Dynasty (approximately 1644-1911).38 Due to the age of Humiliation, a period circa from the first Opium War that forcibly opened up China by Great Britain in 1840 until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China was oppressed by the West, and correspondingly lost its hegemony.39 China now wishes to restore that Middle Kingdom position by promoting and
proliferating China’s communist model of economic growth called the Beijing consensus outside China, 40 and propagating the idea of Chinese exceptionalism to its citizens.41 It needs to be
emphasized that communism might not be the right term to address this ideology any longer, since communism ultimately lost its credibility as an ideology for the CCP due to historical events, most notably “The Great Leap Forward” and “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” led by Mao, both of which had disastrous consequences. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to quickly modernize China through mass mobilization in a period of only three years and because of which
35 See Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12,
no. 35 (2003): 265-284; Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 758-771.
36 Emma Broomfield is a George Washington University Graduate in International Affairs and concentrations in Asia
and Development Studies.
37 Denny Roy is a Chicago University PhD Graduate in Political Science, focused on Northeast Asian political and
security issues
38 Dingxin, Zhao, 'The Mandate Of Heaven And Performance Legitimation In Historical And Contemporary China',
American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009): pp. 429.
39 William A. Callahan, 'National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, And Chinese Nationalism', Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political 29, no. 2 (2004): pp. 199-218.
40 See for more details: Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004);
cited here from Yasheng Huang, 'Rethinking The Beijing Consensus', Asia Policy 11 (2011): pp. 4
41 See William A. Callahan, 'Sino-Speak: Chinese Exceptionalism And The Politics Of History', The Journal of Asian
some 20–30 million are thought to have starved to death (1958–1960).42 This ultimately led to The
Cultural Revolution started in 1966, in which Mao called on for a public overthrow of the government in name of “the proletarian revolution and the fight against bureaucratic and neo-capitalist structures.”43
Due to the loss of credibility of communism, nationalism in the form of aggrandizing and proliferating Confucianism and a rise in (albeit very selective) historical awareness is used more and more in order to legitimize for example territorial expansion in the South-Chinese Sea,44 as well as promoting China’s developing model known as the Beijing Consensus in its neighboring countries or in Africa.45 The Beijing consensus is often presented as being an alternative to the Washington Consensus, and assumes that economic growth is driven by the state which keeps a strict controls on the economy, as opposed to the free-market liberalist Washington Consensus with a clear distinction between the state and the economy.46 What is additionally seen as a point of issue in China’s ideological stance is an apparent anti-America attitude, and it is argued by Broomfield that “it uses xenophobia as a way of rallying the Chinese people around the PRC leadership and against the US”.47
What can be argued against this ideological perception is that firstly, China, unlike the West, was merely non-imperialistic, and even though it used to be a regional hegemon in the past, it was nowhere similar to the Roman Empire or anything like that.48 Also, it is more likely that
China will grow to become a benign superpower, due to a strong norm of righteousness in line of the Confucian philosophy of an unified and harmonious societal order and strong dynastic authoritarianism that concedes with a strong patriarchal hierarchy in society.49
42 Thomas Heberer, 'The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”: China's Modern Trauma', Journal of Modern
Chinese History 3, no. 2 (2009): pp. 168
43 Quoted in Thomas Heberer, 'The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”: China's Modern Trauma', Journal of
Modern Chinese History 3, no. 2 (2009): pp. 165
44 See for a more detailed overview: Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'A Legal Analysis Of China's Historic
Rights Claim In The South China Sea', The American Journal of International Law 107, no. 1 (2013): pp. 124-141; Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, 'Legitimacy And The Limits Of Nationalism: China And The Diaoyu Islands', International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): pp. 114 -146; (not exhaustive)
45 See for a more detailed overview: Martyn Davies, Peter Draper and Hannah Edinger, 'Changing China, Changing
Africa: Future Contours Of An Emerging Relationship', Asian Economic Policy Review 9, no. 2 (2014): pp. 180-197.; May Tan-Mullins, Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, 'Redefining ‘Aid’ In The China-Africa Context', Development
and Change 41, no. 5 (2010): pp. 857-881; (not exhaustive)
46 See for more details on the Beijing consensus: Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign
Policy Centre, 2004); cited here from Yasheng Huang, 'Rethinking The Beijing Consensus', Asia Policy 11 (2011): pp. 4
47 Cited from Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary
China 12, no. 35 (2003): pp. 269
48 See, Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 763
49 Yan Xuetong, “China’s Post-Cold War Security Strategy” Contemporary International Relations 5 no. 5 (1995):
pp. 6-7 (in Denny Roy, 1996, pp 763); Andreas Bøje Forsby, The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise Of A
Also, the strong morality due to Confucianism and the homogenous composition of the Chinese population gives rise, especially under the CCP, a notion of Chinese exceptionalism: this notion is based on the idea that China’s imperial history paved the way for the development for a unique Chinese culture and population. 50 China’s exceptionalism is one of the main fundaments on which Chinese nationalism is based, and it is constructed by facts and fables in the long imperial history of China. Chinese exceptionalism manifests itself into claiming great power reformism: the idea that China will again become a great power, the Middle Kingdom; a pacifist attitude, that stems from the supposition of the benevolence of the Chinese imperial history. It is not comparable to the more forceful western imperialism. Also, it stems from the century of Humiliation, and therefore the CCP vows to not pose onto other states what has been posed upon China. Lastly, it Chinese exceptionalism is based on harmonious inclusions, described by Feng Zhang to be “sinocentric hierarchy, supposedly relied on the ‘rule of virtue’ (that is, China’s moral quality), and implied China’s magnanimous admission of other polities into the family of the Chinese civilization under the influence, leadership, or even perhaps domination of the Chinese empire. In contrast, contemporary inclusionism by adopting accommodationism as a basic policy principle has little connotation of Chinese leadership or dominance, or at least not yet.51 Also, Chinese exceptionalism is almost ubiquitously compared with American exceptionalism, similar to Chinese exceptionalism the idea that the USA is morally and politically exceptional and therefore legitimized to expand its institutions and beliefs — freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and capitalism.52 The rise of China, of course, is supposed to challenge the notion of American
exceptionalism and thus perceived be threat. This is also evident in the economic threat and military threat.
Economic threat
The supposed economic threat entails that China’s explosive economic growth since the 1990s implies a contested economic position of the USA. More specifically, it is argued that the trade-deficit on the side of the USA threatens the interests the USA has in the East Asian region, and indirectly, the Middle East, as well as global interests.53 Due to China’s huge population of some
50 William A. Callahan, 'Sino-Speak: Chinese Exceptionalism And The Politics Of History', The Journal of Asian
Studies 71, no. 01 (2012): pp. 33-55.
51 Quoted in Feng Zhang, 'The Rise Of Chinese Exceptionalism In International Relations', European Journal of
International Relations 19, no. 2 (2011): pp. 312. Feng Zhang is a Fellow in the Department of International Relations,
and in the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at the Murdoch University.
52 Paraphrased in Feng Zhang, 'The Rise Of Chinese Exceptionalism In International Relations', European Journal of
International Relations 19, no. 2 (2011): pp. 318
53 See Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12,
1.3 billion people plus quite some diaspora, some 50 million54, the potential threat is not so much
China itself, but ‘Greater China’. ‘Greater China’ encompasses wealthy overseas Chinese whom possess a lot of capital. An example is described by Broomfield: ethnic Chinese make up 5% of the Indonesian population, but possess some 75% of the national wealth.55 This is considered to be a threat to the commercial and economic stability of the rest of the world due to the imbalance of the Chinese compared with the rest of the population.56 Consequences of Chinese growth, such as severe environmental degradation are also an argument that make China a potential threat for the world, as well as being an impediment to the economic growth in China itself: “Life expectancy in the north has decreased by 5.5 years due to air pollution, and severe water contamination and scarcity have compounded land deterioration problems. Environmental degradation cost the country roughly 9 percent of its gross national income in 2008, according to the World Bank, threatening to undermine the country's growth and exhausting public patience with the government's pace of reform”57
However, at the same time, there is also a growing and deepening economic interdependence between the USA and China.58 Therefore, it is futile to argue that economic growth of China will eventually lead to a break between these two actors because it would “destroy the political environment and opportunities necessary for economic development”.59 Lastly, but
certainly not the least, the internal problems that China faces are thwarting the growth of China to become a superpower. These endogenous developments are the main focus of this thesis and will be elucidated later in this chapter. In short, developments such as urbanization, environmental degradation and depletion of resources, and corruption, to name a few, are able to undo the economic basis that China has formed over the past thirty years, and will make a continued
54 The population of China was 1,357,380,000 in 2013 according to the World Bank ‘Population, total‘ accessed May
10, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL; The China Daily, 'Hu Meets Overseas Chinese Organizations Leaders', 2012, accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/09/content_15007664.htm.
55 Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no.
35 (2003): pp. 272
56 Denny Roy, 'Hegemon On The Horizon? China's Threat To East Asian Security', International Security 19, no. 1
(1994): pp. 154.
57 Beina Xu, 'China's Environmental Crisis', Council On Foreign Relations, last modified 2014, accessed April 9,
2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608.
58 See Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 762; Emma V.
Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (2003): pp. 277
economic growth as it has experienced very difficult and even dangerous due to the social and environmental impact of economic reforms that made China grow so fast.60
Military threat
The military threat is argued to be the most detrimental of the three threats. China’s military modernization makes China to become a regional hegemony by means of its military force:61 “China is now an economic superpower and is fast becoming a military force capable of unsettling America” according to The Economist.62 China extensively modernized its military capacity and
the expenditures of the CCP into the People’s Liberal Army (PLA) their budget grew from 1.7 % of the GDP from 1995 to 2,1 in 2013..63 This rise might seem small but between 1995 and 2013 the Chinese economy also grew around 10% per year until 2010 after which it dropped slightly to 7.7% in 2013.64 Furthermore, the idea exists that economic and military growth and expansion
into the USA of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other state-related Chinese companies and institutions are also perceived by several American anti-China hands65 as a threat
to the USA as a means of some sort of soft-power proliferation of China.66 This is enhanced by anti-USA perceptions on the side of the Chinese population67.
However, there is (or needs to be) a distinction between the growth and modernization of the military, and the actual intention to use it.68 Additionally, the expenditures on the military by the Chinese government is still smaller than that of the USA: it accounts for 2.1% of the GDP in 2013 on Chinese side whereas in the same year the USA spent 3.8 % if its GDP to the military force69. China also has a lot of catching up to do in order to be a real threat to the USA in theory.70 Finally, notwithstanding China’s military modernization, it is unlikely that China would attack its
60 Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 763; Emma V.
Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (2003): pp. 277
61 Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments', Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): pp. 759 62 Cited from The Economist, '‘China And The Paradox Of Prosperity’', 2012. pp. 7
63 Military expenditure (% of GDP)’, World Bank, accessed May 10, 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS;
64 GDP growth (annual %), World Bank, accessed May 10, 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries
65 See e.g. : Bill Gertz, The China Threat (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 2000); Richard Bernstein and Ross H
Munro, The Coming Conflict With China (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1997).
66 Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no.
35 (2003): pp. 276;
67 See Chengxin Pan, 'The "China-Threat" In American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction Of Other As
Power Politics', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 3 (2004): pp. 305-331.
68 Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no.
35 (2003): pp 278
69 Military expenditure (% of GDP)’, World Bank, accessed May 10, 2015,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
neighbors or the USA since China and the USA are economically so interdependent, it would not be beneficial for China to deploy any offensive strategy against the USA.71
What the above has given is an overview on how China as a whole poses a seeming threat. However, counterarguments show factors that contravene the notion of China as a threat. What the aforementioned does not take much into account are endogenous factors that have their effect on the Chinese government and its policies. These have been stressed by several authors72 to be ‘the downfall of China’ would these issues not be reduced. The following part will outline domestic issues that constrain China from becoming a global superpower. I will especially emphasize urbanization and increasing social inequality and how these two main forces put pressure on the position of the CCP.
Domestic issues: social unrest and an increasingly contested CCP
As aforementioned, the ideological, economic and military developments in China constitute to the perceived China-Threat. What can be seen is that the threefold China-threat theory is only one side of the coin, and for every argument constituting to the threatening image of China, there are counter-arguments and many of these can be traced back to domestic problems China deals with.73 In this section, I will outline the domestic issues of urbanization and corresponding social inequality that constrain China from becoming a threat towards the global order. These issues also play a role in contesting the position of the CCP.. The assessed domestic issues are not the only existing problems that contest the CCP and constrain China’s growth, but the major problems I focus on are urbanization and increasing social inequality that trigger social unrest in the Chinese society.
71 Emma V. Broomfield, 'Perceptions Of Danger: The China Threat Theory', Journal of Contemporary China 12, no.
35 (2003): pp. 277-281
72 Not exhaustive: Susan L Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): in particular:
Chapter 1 ‘Strong Abroad but Fragile at Home’, pp. 1-12 and Chapter 3 ‘Domestic Threats’ pp. 35-78. Gordon G Chang, The Coming Collapse Of China (New York: Random House, 2001): pp. xv-xx; both Shirk and Chang argue from a constructivist point of view, arguing that the national policies and foreign policies are shaped by the interests of the Chinese people, and in these cases, that internal issues are impediment to the rise of China.
Urbanization
in 2014 53% of the population of the PRC lived in cities,74 and there are forecasts that state that by 2030, 70% of the Chinese population will living in urban areas75: that percentage accounts for some 1 billion people.76 These high numbers are the result of massive urbanization rates which started increasing especially from the 1980s onwards, but within the literature on rural-to-urban migration, there is quite some divergence in the migration-incentives of this rural-to-urban migration, and why it contributes to the urbanization in China. On the one hand, it is argued by several authors that rural-to-urban migration was not willingly done by rural peasants, due to the negative status effect rural migrants have in comparison with urban citizens and other urban-migrations: rural migrants remain to be the lowest social class in urban areas because of the hukou system that sunders urban from rural citizens, and because of which rural citizens are denied access to most social services and education in urban areas; and secondly, a lack of having a social network in due to retaining interpersonal relationships with their rural family and friends.77 This
is further amplified by a stigmatized image and discrimination of rural migrants. On the other hand, it is argued by other authors that there is a desire to remain an urban dweller and that the status effect is compensated by a positive relative income effect.78 There is also a shortage of arable land due to other man-made problems such as land-expropriation and land-conversion, which makes a return home impossible.79 On top of that, natural causes such as environmental degradation including desertification and soil-pollution significantly decrease arable land also trigger migration to urban areas.80 All in all, some 8 million ha of arable land was lost between 1995 and 200581, and it is said by The Guardian that now 3.3 million ha is contaminated due to pollution.82
74 Shannon Tiezzi, 'Urbanization With Chinese Characteristics', The Diplomat, 2015, accessed May 6, 2015:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/urbanization-with-chinese-characteristics/
75 Emily T. Yeh, Kevin J. O’Brien & Jingzhong Ye, ‘Rural politics in contemporary China’ The Journal of Peasant
Studies 40 no. 6 (2013): pp. 915; Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization, World
Bank (2015): accessed 04-01-2015, via:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/publication/urban-china-toward-efficient-inclusive-sustainable-urbanization
76 The Economist,. ‘Building the dream, April 19th 2014: pp. 3.
77 Ye Liu, Zhigang Li & Werner Breitung, 'The Social Networks Of New-Generation Migrants In China’s Urbanized
Villages: A Case Study Of Guangzhou', Habitat International 36, no. 1 (2012): pp. 194
78 Alpaslan Akay, Olivier Bargain and Klaus F. Zimmermann, 'Relative Concerns Of Rural-To-Urban Migrants In
China', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81, no. 2 (2012): pp. 421-441; Aimin Chen and N. Edward Coulson, 'Determinants Of Urban Migration: Evidence From Chinese Cities', Urban Studies 39, no. 12 (2002): pp. 2189-2197.
79 Yaohui Zhao, 'Leaving The Countryside: Rural-To-Urban Migration Decisions In China', American Economic
Review 89, no. 2 (1999): pp. 281-286;
80 Yongjun Zhao, 'China's Land Tenure Reform: Time For A New Direction?', The China Review 11, no. 2 (2011):
127-128
81 Ibidem
82 Jennifer Duggan, 'China Could Lose Millions Of Hectares Of Farmland To Pollution', The Guardian, last modified
Economic reforms and migration
Despite the discrepancy in the literature and the intricate nature of migration decisions, it is agreed on that one of the major causes of the massive rural-to-urban migration (but also the other issues) is the implementation of the Household Responsibility System and its consequences. In 1978, the Household Responsibility System (hereafter abbreviated as HRS) was inaugurated, and entailed several measures to reduce social inequality and consequent social unrest83. The HRS reforms encompassed three major components84:
1) Price-reforms, which entailed increasing procurement, increase in retail prices and a higher market price. This should lead to a stable market that had a high crop production. The main consequences of the price-reforms was an increase in costly prices subsidies the government had to pay due to increasing agricultural output. Thus, the subsidies increased when output was (unexpectedly) higher.85
2) Institutional reforms that entailed improvement in management that would increase efficiency in monitoring agricultural work and production efficiency, as well as increasing the farmers’ incentives. Before the reforms, agriculture was done in the framework of a production team system. Neighboring households assessed agricultural work and reported this at the provincial government. The issue was the monitoring itself, which did not happen adequately, because the incentive to do so was low: rewards for monitoring in a team were not tied to individual efforts and output.86 3) Market and Planning reforms that encompassed e.g. mandatory quotas to retain high production, and reduce emphasis on self-sufficiency rather than crop production for the commercial rural market.87
The reforms in the HRS, as well as other market-oriented economic reforms initially did bring economic growth during the first years of their implementation and onwards but it was very unevenly distributed: in other words, inequality rose significantly.88 Paradoxically, liberal market oriented reforms in general brought excessive corruption. Also, in the past few years, China slipped in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International: China ranked #100 out of 175
83 Chengri Ding, 'Land Policy Reform In China: Assessment And Prospects', Land Use Policy 20, no. 2 (2003): pp.
110;
84 With the same contents, four categories are used in Chengri Ding, 'Land Policy Reform In China: Assessment And
Prospects', Land Use Policy 20, no. 2 (2003): pp. 110-114. Furthermore, one needs to keep in mind that all land in China is still state-owned: the land tenure system does not decrease the power over this land by the state: the village collective is a mere decentralized structure, and they only ought to distribute land among farmers.
85 Summarized from Justin Yifu Lin, 'Reforms And Agricultural Growth In China', The American Economic Review
82, no. 1 (1992): pp. 37;
86 Ibidem, pp. 37 87 Ibidem, pp. 36-39;
88 See e.g. Chengri Ding, 'Land Policy Reform In China: Assessment And Prospects', Land Use Policy 20, no. 2
states on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2014.89 China dropped significantly in the
rankings in comparison with previous years: #80 out of 177 states in 2013; 90 #80 out of 174 states
in 2012;91 and #75 out of 182 states in 2011. 92This can be attributed to two matters: to the
opaqueness of the anti-corruption campaign launched by Xi Jinping that has been touched upon in the introduction; and the consequence of perpetuated expansion of incentives and opportunities created by economic liberalization and therefore the scale and scope of corruption has taken epidemic levels.93 Additionally, also paradoxically, despite corruption, China managed to experience rapid economic growth because it always seemed to avoid corruption of the destructive kind at the national level and in the most productive sectors; 94 but nevertheless, as aforementioned, the manifestation of economic growth was not egalitarian partially due to corruption. Economic reforms especially exacerbated the rural-urban divide in China, and in 2009 urban citizens earned 2.33 times more salary per term than rural citizens.95 More specifically concerning the HRS, the reforms made it harder for farmers to sustain themselves. Competition became fierce, and reduced middle-size smaller farming companies to having sustain themselves on small-scale farming. Small-scale farming practices are, however, not taken into assessment by the central government and therefore is impediment to economic growth within the agricultural sector.96 But also for more general economic reforms, the consequences were wage inequality due to a rewarding attitude to productivity and labor efficiency.97
Social inequality
What also exacerbated social inequality were the issues of discrimination towards and a segmentation of migrants from rural areas in urban areas, as well as the hukou system. Discrimination leads to less opportunities for rural migrants to develop and climb higher in the
89 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2014', last modified 2014, accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
90 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2013', last modified 2013, accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results;
91 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2012’, last modified 2012, accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results;
92 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2011', last modified 2012, accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results;
93 Yan Sun, 'Corruption, Growth, And Reform: The Chinese Enigma', Current History (2005): pp. 257-263. 94 Ibidem, pp. 258
95 Nan Wu, 'Income Inequality In China And The Urban-Rural Divide - Journalist's Resource', Journalist's Resource,
last modified 2014, accessed May 25, 2015, http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/china/income-inequality-todays-china.
96 See Yongjun Zhao, ‘Rethinking China’s Land Tenure Reform: The Emergence of Farmers’ Land Shareholding
Cooperatives’, Land Tenure Journal 2 No. 12 (2013): pp. 95-118.
97 John Knight, 'The Economic Causes And Consequences Of Social Instability In China', China Economic Review
social ladder due to underpayment, bad housing and subsequent higher criminality among some of the migrant groups. This further encroaches the already bad image of these migrants.98 In a
survey conducted in Shanghai to urban citizens “nearly one-third of respondents in Shanghai said they would not like to live next door to a migrant, against only one-tenth who said they would rather not live next to a poor person. In Changchun, a less outward-looking city in the north-east, nearly two-thirds said they did not want to live next to a migrant” .99
The hukou also brings about straining effects on migration: namely it affects the settling and social and economic development of rural migrants in urban areas. The hukou was implemented in order to directly regulate the population mobility. It furthermore functions as means of social control.100 The registration-system grants access to education, health care and housing. Thus, for those who move from rural areas to the city, social services are scarce since these are mainly accessible for only those with an urban hukou.101 There have been a few reforms in order to empower rural migrants in rural areas in order to reduce migration to the cities: tax reforms in order to eliminate agricultural taxes so incentives of farming practices would be more appealing.102
More specifically aimed at urbanization, reforms to ameliorate the rural-urban income gap were presented: Lou Jiwei, the Chinese Minister of Finance stated on the developments of urbanization that “It is necessary to put people at the core of urbanization, supported by institutional and systemic innovation, and unleash the development potential of urbanization through reform. We need to accelerate reform of the fiscal and tax system as well as investment and financing mechanisms, promote the application of the public-private partnership (PPP) model, to help build a diverse and sustainable urban financing mechanism. We need to gradually address the issue of basic public services for rural migrants, and create a mechanism to link the financial payment system for rural migrants transferring to urban areas, in order to achieve the goals for people centered urbanization.”103 Despite these reforms, migration is still negatively perceived,
98 Emily T. Yeh, Kevin J. O’Brien & Jingzhong Ye, ‘Rural politics in contemporary China’ The Journal of Peasant
Studies 40 no. 6 (2013): pp. 917-918
99 Quoted in The Economist, 'Ending Apartheid', last modified 2014, accessed May 25, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21600798-chinas-reforms-work-its-citizens-have-be-made-more-equal-ending-apartheid.
100 Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, 'The Hukou System And Rural-Urban Migration In China: Processes And Changes',
The China Quarterly 160 (1999): pp. 820.
101 Emily T. Yeh, Kevin J. O’Brien & Jingzhong Ye, ‘Rural politics in contemporary China’ The Journal of Peasant
Studies 40 no. 6 (2013): pp. 916.
102 Ibidem, pp. 917
103 Quoted in World Bank, 'China: A New Approach For Efficient, Inclusive, Sustainable Urbanization', last modified
and the stigmatization of rural migrants and their subordinate position remains. This lack of change gives rise to social instability which is discussed in the following.
Social instability and the CCP
Social instability is viewed to be a threat to both the political order and to the continued rapid growth of the Chinese economy.104 Social instability is not easily measured, but often it is approached by looking at the amount of social protests. Social protests increased drastically in number: the number of so called “mass-incidents” rose from 9000 in 1993 to 180.000 in 2010. Although the number is said to be 80,000 to 100,000 incidents per year, all are estimates as these protests are usually censored quickly after they are ‘discovered’ by the local governments.105 These manifestations of social discontent are argued to be cast in the economic policy making because social instability can have severe hampering effects on the economic growth.106 Social
protests are not only rising in quantity, but also in scope: it expanded from small scale rural protests into major cities. This is further enhanced by increasing anger against the government and challenges therefore the political legitimacy of the government.107 Lastly, but not unimportant, there is an internationalization of social protests due to an increasing role of exogenous factors that play a role in mobilizing protests, such as the inspiring impact the Arab Spring had on mobilizing protests against the unevenly distribution of power.108 Also, international coverage of major protests, as in the case of Wukan which will be covered in the third chapter, constitutes to internationalization of social protests and puts external pressure on the Chinese government.109 As a consequence, political awareness puts the CCP in a precarious position: on the one hand, it might want to increase nationalism and with that its performance legitimacy by quelling protests that go against the ideology of the CCP. But on the other hand, they could also give more room for reforms and empowering the citizenry more and thus enhancing the legitimization of the position of the CCP.
104 Paraphrased from John Knight, 'The Economic Causes And Consequences Of Social Instability In China', China
Economic Review 25 (2013): pp. 17
105 Financial Times, 'The Accuracy Of China’s ‘Mass Incidents’', last modified 2010, accessed May 25, 2015,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a.html.
106 Ibidem, pp. 18
107 Yongnian Zheng, 'China In 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety. And Uncertainty', Asian Survey 52, no.
1 (2012): pp. 28-41. John Knight, 'The Economic Causes And Consequences Of Social Instability In China', China
Economic Review 25 (2013): pp. 17-26.
108 Yongnian Zheng, 'China In 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety. And Uncertainty', Asian Survey 52, no.
1 (2012): pp. 28-41.
109 Steve Hess, 'Foreign Media Coverage And Protest Outcomes In China: The Case Of The 2011 Wukan Rebellion',
What causes this growing discontent? As aforementioned, the HRS is one of the main causes for rural-to-urban migration; still, rural migrants are discriminated and stigmatized. Add that there are some 274 million rural migrants working in cities in 2014 and one can understand that social instability is hard to prevent in such a staggering amount of migrants and the lack of compassion towards these migrants.110 Additionally and as aforementioned, corruption of local officials is also subject of demonstrations and expressions of discontent.111 But, as is eloquently described by Yongshun Cai,112 “In China, perhaps the most important opportunity for civil resistance is the discrepancies between high-level and low-level governments. Specifically, local governments are more concerned with local development and policy implementation, which might result in ignoring of citizen’s interests; the central government is more concerned about social stability and regime legitimacy.” 113 Discrepancy between governmental levels, lack of
opportunities to reach for higher bodies of government as a ‘normal citizen, and poor implementation of protective laws such as anti-corruption laws and measures are among major issues in the Chinese society and lead to major social distress, as will be elucidated in further detail in especially the third chapter. 114 What the aforementioned brings about is crippling legitimization of the CCP, which will be examined in the following.
Chinese nationalism and the CCP
As is touched upon in the introduction as well, much of the politics in China revolves around the legitimacy of the CCP. Performance legitimacy is the most important factor shaping not only the historical governmental developments of China, but also remain to shape contemporary politics. The performance legitimacy is ‘given’ to the CCP through the ‘Mandate of Heaven’,115 which
entails a Confucian notion of power legitimacy of the Chinese emperors obtained by successful
110 See China Labour Bulletin, 'Migrant Workers And Their Children', last modified 2015, accessed May 15, 2015,
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/migrant-workers-and-their-children.
111 Ibidem.
112 Yongshun Cai is a Stanford University graduate, and a professor in topics related to issues in the law, government
and society of China.
113 Quoted in Yongshun Cai, 'Managing Social Unrest', in China Into The Hu-Wen Era : Policy Initiatives And
Challenges, Wong John and Lai Hongyi (Ed.), 1st ed. (New Jersey: Hackensack, 2006), pp. 381
114 See e.g. Shenjing He and Desheng Xue, 'Identity Building And Communal Resistance Against Landgrabs In
Wukan Village, China', Current Anthropology 55, no. 9 (2014): pp. S131; Chengri Ding, 'Land Policy Reform In China: Assessment And Prospects', Land Use Policy 20, no. 2 (2003): pp. 110-114; Justin Yifu Lin, 'Reforms And Agricultural Growth In China', The American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (1992): pp. 37-39; Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang, 'After The Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China's Future?', Survival 56, no. 3 (2014): pp. 164
115 Actually, I state historical patterns to be shaped by performance legitimacy, but until the rise of the Western Zhou
rebel leaders. The bestowed legitimacy had to be demonstrated to bring good leadership by appeasing the populace with their reign by various omens and would the reign be deemed unjustly, popular rebellion against the kingship was permitted.116 Bad omens historically came in the form
of natural disasters, but also bad income or other social problems could be constituted to the unjust reign of an emperor.117
In the contemporary legitimization of the CCP, Chinese nationalism, as a new ideology to strengthen the position of the CCP polity, is highly evident. It is argued by Ane Bislev and Xing Li118 to be a political construct that encompasses an unifying ideological mechanism. This ideological mechanism is constructed from having the identity of being a Han-Chinese that as mentioned in the introduction account for more than 80% of the population of China; as well as territorial integrity. It is often connoted as being more similar to the Western vision of patriotism, so the love for one’s country, rather than nationalism: nationalism used in the Chinese language is described by Bislev and Li describe as the historical versions of nationalism or nationalism in general (so nationalism in other countries, not specifically Chinese nationalism).119
Chinese nationalism also brings a historical awareness. What comes along with this historical awareness is a victimized identity, inter alia due to the Century of Humiliation, but also the damage the reign of Mao Zedong brought. It was during this time that China’s position as the Middle Kingdom diminished and forcibly put China back down and off its regional hegemonic position.120 Mao’s reforms brought about more issues, in particular the Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap forward brought about a severe famine between 1959 and 1961, during which over 30 million Chinese died.121 In order to retain the CCP’s political clout, these wrongdoings by Mao
were to be forgotten and replaced by his good deeds and created a Mao-Cult. Edward Friedman posits that this identity is shaped by the policy to obfuscate Mao’s negative doings by denoting the
116 Elizabeth J. Perry, 'Challenging The Mandate Of Heaven: Popular Protest In Modern China', Critical Asian Studies
33, no. 2 (2001): pp. 163-164
117 Dingxin, Zhao, 'The Mandate Of Heaven And Performance Legitimation In Historical And Contemporary China',
American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009): pp. 416-433.
118 Ane Bislev is an Assistant professor at the Department of Culture and Global Studies at Aalborg University,
Denmark. Xing Li is Professor at the Department of Culture and Global Studies at Aalborg University, Denmark. Both are specialized in Chinese Politics.
119 See Ane Bislev and Xing Li, 'Conceptualizing The Cultural And Political Facets Of “Chinese Nationalism” In An
Era Of China’s Global Rise', International Communication of Chinese Culture 1, no. 1-2 (2014): pp. 21-33; In Chinese nationalism is minzu zhuyi, wherein minzu is translated as tribe or civilization. Patriotism is aiguo zhuyi, wherein aiguo is translated as love for one’s country. The latter term encompasses ‘Chinese nationalism’ more adequately than the former does. In this paper therefore, Chinese nationalism refers to patriotism.
120 See for an overview: David Scott, China And The International System, 1840-1949 (Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 2008). Cited from
121 Lili Wu, 'Cultural Revolution (China)', in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia Of Social And Political Movements,
Snow David A. et al. (Ed.), (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). Accessed online: April 9 2015:
