https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399718761651 Administration & Society 1 –26 © The Author(s) 2018 DOI: 10.1177/0095399718761651 journals.sagepub.com/home/aas Original Article
From Poker Games to
Kitchen Tables: How
Social Dynamics Affect
Frontline Decision
Making
Nadine Raaphorst
1and Kim Loyens
2Abstract
Existing research on bureaucratic encounters typically studies how bureaucrats’ and clients’ characteristics influence frontline decision making. How social interactions between street-level bureaucrats and between officials and citizens could directly affect case-related decisions largely remains an underexplored field of study, despite the fact that new forms of governance introduce social dynamics in the form of trust and collaboration as tools to increase legitimacy. Relying on in-depth qualitative data of the Belgian labor inspectorate and the Dutch tax authorities, this study scrutinizes how decisions about cases could be affected by their immediate social context.
Keywords
street-level decision making, bureaucratic interactions, social dynamics, law enforcement
1Leiden University, Den Haag, The Netherlands 2Utrecht University, The Netherlands
Corresponding Author:
Introduction
The relationship between frontline officers and citizen–clients has always been at the core of street-level bureaucracy literature (Bartels, 2013). It has gained importance with the introduction of New Public Management reforms—aiming to increase performance and legitimacy—that have led to the reformulation of the bureaucratic encounter as a businesslike arena, where officials are responsive to citizens’ (or clients’) needs and demands (Vigoda, 2002). Citizens then become more involved in the process of public service delivery. Post-New Public Management movements, based on notions of par-ticipatory governance, even point to a more horizontal relationship, where officials collaborate with citizens and other stakeholders to deal with com-plex problems (Bartels, 2013; Vigoda, 2002). The process and outcome of frontline decision making has hence come to depend on interactions between officials and citizens (Bartels, 2014). Such trends are visible not only in pub-lic service delivery but also in pubpub-lic organizations preoccupied with law enforcement like tax and inspection authorities (e.g., Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009). Inspectors, typically perceived as “state-agents” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000), are, for instance, encouraged by their organizations to nego-tiate with citizen–clients about settlement agreements. This brings the social interaction between officials and citizens to the center of frontline decision making. Research on how social dynamics of such an interaction affect deci-sion making is, however, scarce (Bruhn & Ekström, 2017).
on frontline decision making is, however, an underexplored theme within the literature.
Thus, in the call for more responsiveness, horizontal relationships with citizens and other professionals are introduced into public organiza-tions, implying negotiation with clients and collaboration with peers. Whereas the street-level bureaucracy literature has described how front-line decision making is embedded in official–client and collegial interac-tions, it mainly focused on either client or official characteristics (e.g., Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). What has thus far largely remained out of sight is the impact of social dynamics in which street-level bureau-crats operate, involving interactions with clients and peers, both in uni- and multidisciplinary teams (but see Rutz et al., 2017). This is striking, given that such complex social dynamics in frontline decision making are becoming increasingly important in governance nowadays (Bartels, 2013; Yang, 2005). To address these gaps, this article aims to answer the following research question:
Research Question: How could a frontline official’s immediate social
context affect decision making about specific cases?
The aim of the article is to generate insight in the different ways in which social interactions could directly affect decision making, that is, not by look-ing at socialized rules, shared cultures, norms, and beliefs, but at how deci-sions about specific cases are shaped by their immediate social context. We thereby not merely look at the role of social context in substantive consider-ations about a case, but also at how relational aspects of these interactions, that is, what happens “in-between” (Bartels, 2013, p. 475) the involved actors, could affect decision making. Comparing different social frontline constellations of two inspectorates (labor inspectorate and tax authorities), and relying on the methods of storytelling and observations, this article ana-lyzes how frontline officials’ immediate social context could affect case-related decision making. The data gathered in these two originally independent case studies are used because they allow us to compare different frontline social constellations.
The Social Context of Frontline Decision Making
Within public administration, different streams of literature focus on the social context of street-level bureaucracy. We shortly discuss the socializa-tion, professionalism, and accountability literature, which all focus on how frontline officials’ social context may indirectly affect decision making. We argue that more insight is needed in how street-level bureaucrats’ social con-text may affect case-related decisions directly, that is, how decisions may also be shaped by situational social dynamics of an interaction that could go beyond officials’ reasoning and considerations about a case.
The socialization literature shows that attitudes and identities of new-comers to public organizations become more homogeneous over time (Moyson, Raaphorst, Groeneveld, & Van de Walle, 2017), by which they become organizational members (Oberfield, 2014). Officials learn the ropes of the job by relying on their (in)formal networks of colleagues for informa-tion and social support (Hatmaker, Park, & Rethemeyer, 2011), and com-munication with colleagues increases uniformity in law enforcement (Van Kleef, 2016). Learning is primarily about acquiring information about the organization, the technicalities of the task, and appropriate behaviors (Hatmaker et al., 2011). In line with this approach, recent studies have begun to analyze the role of social network structures and composition in street-level innovation and performance (Maroulis, 2015; Siciliano, 2015). The professionalism literature adds that the transfer of knowledge and expertise is facilitated by professional associations, institutional arrangements, and shared education (Schott, Van Kleef, & Noordegraaf, 2016). Studies have also concluded that professional norms shared by frontline officers affect street-level decision making (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Sandfort, 2000). Both literatures offer valuable insights in, respectively, the impact of social networks on learning processes of newcomers and the role of profes-sional norms. However, their scope is too limited for the purpose of this study, given their focus on the homogenizing influence of peers or on simi-larities across officials. Differences in decision making between officials remain underexplored. Moreover, the focus is mostly on the structural aspects of peer networks and on more generic outcomes such as perfor-mance, innovation, and learning. How social interactions could directly affect decision making about specific cases is not explored.
public-administrative accountability, including performance indicators, managerial oversight, and the rule of law; and (c) participatory accountabil-ity, including citizens and interest groups. These fora form a “complex insti-tutional web” (Hupe & Hill, 2007, p. 290), in which street-level bureaucrats are confronted with different, possibly contradicting, demands from actors they are accountable to (Behn, 2001). In specific situations, street-level bureaucrats either try to find a workable balance between them (Thacher & Rein, 2004), or consider the demands as possible repertoires they can choose from, thereby strengthening their discretion. This literature thus provides a general framework of actors to whom street-level bureaucrats are account-able, but does not offer any insight in how case-related decision making is shaped by these accountability fora, and to whom street-level bureaucrats feel accountable (if they indeed do so). Hence, more insight is needed into the underlying processes that explain how actors surrounding street-level bureaucrats shape frontline decision making about specific cases.
With regard to interactions among coworkers, Keiser (2010) shows that, even without a high level of interaction between street-level bureaucrats, individual street-level bureaucrats’ decision making is shaped by their per-ceptions of how other colleagues would make the decision. It is held that expectations or knowledge that other organizational units would overturn particular decisions discourages street-level officials to make such decisions. Furthermore, in line with street-level bureaucracy studies, Rutz et al. (2017) show that inspectors working individually sometimes consult colleagues for advice or specific know-how. They also show that teams with shared discre-tion have a greater acdiscre-tion repertoire and mandate, because inspectors can make use of other inspectors’ authority and abilities. That study mainly shows how inspectors purposefully rely on coworkers to act both consistently and responsively.
This current study builds on these studies by exploring how social context, including more situational social dynamics, could affect case-related deci-sion making in different frontline social constellations (i.e., encounters with citizens, informal networks, interorganizational teams).
Description of Research Contexts
This article shows the results of two case studies, respectively, conducted in a Belgian labor inspectorate and the Dutch tax authorities. Focus is on cross-context, and not cross-country comparison, exploring how interactions with citizen and peers affect case-related frontline decision making.
Case Study in a Belgian Labor Inspectorate
Inspectors in this agency work alone, with a colleague (in complex or sensitive cases) or in interorganizational teams. They do inspections within a specific district, allowing them to build a strong working relationship with the entrepreneurs there. Inspectors are involved in two types of interorgani-zational team work: (a) antifraud teams with labor inspectors from the five Belgian labor inspectorates who focus on undeclared work violations only and (b) interdisciplinary teams with representatives of different enforcement agencies, such as the police, the tax inspectorate, the food inspectorate, and the labor inspectorate, in which each inspector focuses on his own specialty. While the former type of team cooperation is aimed at increasing consistency of decision making across organizations, the latter type aims at enhancing efficiency and decreasing the frequency of inspections. Notwithstanding interorganizational cooperation, each case file is dealt with by inspectors with individual discretion.
Case Study in the Dutch Tax Authorities
The second study is conducted within the Dutch tax authorities, and focused on frontline tax officials who audit the tax returns and bookkeeping records of small- and medium-sized businesses. They have face-to-face interactions with entrepreneurs, mostly “on-site.” To enhance compliance, the Dutch tax authorities have adopted a policy promoting responsive law enforcement (Gribnau, 2007) in which officials are encouraged to approve bookkeeping records instead of disapproving them (i.e., by not correcting every gap, but making future agreements with entrepreneurs) and have more leeway to take into account contextual elements, such as the demeanor of entrepreneurs.
Method
In both case studies, qualitative methods were used. The labor inspection study had an ethnographic design using observations (of inspections and [in] formal meetings), informal conversations, and semistructured interviews with labor inspectors and managers over a period of 18 months. This article draws upon a doctoral study on decision making of labor inspectors and police officers (Loyens, 2012). Four Flemish regional offices were selected that varied in size and type of districts (urbanized or not). Within these offices, all inspectors and their supervisors were invited for an interview. Only one inspector refused cooperation, because of a lack of time. Of the 18 inspectors and four managers who were interviewed, 11 were women and 11 were men. The average age was 45, varying between 26 and 60. The central goal was to explore how inspectors deal with and reason about dilemmas in decision making. Observation and conversation data were written down in detailed field notes, whereas formal interviews were audio recorded and tran-scribed verbatim. For the purpose of this article, the dilemmas in which cli-ent–inspector and collegial interactions were important for case settlement were selected. The data were reanalyzed for the purpose of this article by means of topic and analytical coding (Richards, 2005). Topic coding aimed at sorting out the various types of interactions that influenced decision making in the selected cases. Three types of social interactions were distinguished, being (a) interactions between a client and one or more than one inspector of the studied agency, (b) an antifraud team of labor inspectors of the five Belgian labor inspectorates, and (c) an interdisciplinary team of inspectors and street-level bureaucrats of other agencies. The analytical coding process started with open coding of characteristics of these interactions and decision-making outcomes or processes; codes were, for example, “negotiation,” “meaning of rules,” “social bond,” “adapting to the team,” and “(in)consis-tent decision making.” Codes about interaction characteristics and decision making were then related, and ways in which social interactions shape deci-sion making were identified.
probing for respondents’ ideas about abstract concepts. The respondents were selected on theoretical grounds: They have considerable discretionary space to interpret rules and make decisions, and have face-to-face encounters with citizen–clients as part of their job. Moreover, one of the respondents is also involved in a project entailing multidisciplinary collaboration. This sample allows us to study how social dynamics may affect case-related decision making.
The interviewed tax officials work in different tax offices across the Netherlands. Of the 18 interviewed respondents, 15 are male and three are female. Eleven respondents have been in service for more than 30 years, one for 18 years, and six have been in service for less than 10 years. The inter-views were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interview tran-scripts were reanalyzed, looking specifically at stories that bear witness to the role of social interactions in case-related decision making. These could be stories in which specific interactions were retold, or in which officials explic-itly reflected on the social character of decision making. The stories were analyzed according to the thematic narrative analysis approach as delineated by Riessman (2008, p. 54). The focus is on what is being said, rather than how language is used within those stories. The analysis started with an open coding process, from which different general themes emerged, such as “delib-eration with colleagues,” “interactions with colleagues,” and “negotiation with clients.” The stories within these general themes were coded as “recog-nizing subjectivity” and “problematizing inconsistency or subjectivity” when respondents themselves reflected upon these matters. The stories were further analyzed and compared to look at how social interactions could affect deci-sion making about specific cases.
To enhance intercoder reliability, the researchers both coded data they col-lected and a part of the data colcol-lected in the other case study. Interpretations of the data were discussed in four coding sessions, and subsequently refined. Even though the data for this study were collected independently and for dif-ferent purposes, both studies are comparable because they contain inductive and in-depth data about how officials’ social context, in different frontline constellations, could affect case-related decision making. See Table 1 for a summary of the case descriptions of both studies.
Findings
Individual Inspections
Discussing and negotiating with the client: “It’s a game.” Within both
organiza-tions, settlement agreements are seen as a means to enhance entrepreneurs’ compliance. Settlement agreements allow more leniency, provided that entre-preneurs agree to do it right in the future. In practice, it is often used in “ambiguous” situations, where there is room for different interpretations or not enough evidence. Oftentimes officials need to negotiate with entrepre-neurs to come to such an agreement. The following story excerpt underlines the importance of social dynamics for the final decision tax officials make:
Yeah, you have to prepare very well, and to discuss with specialists here at the office. You have to have a good story there. Because if you are there, and they have a rebuttal, and you start stuttering and stammering, then it’s not going well. Then it becomes difficult to still . . . because it’s a game, and they also feel if you’re not standing strong. Then they will open their bag of tricks . . . So it went well. I prepared very well [laughs]. If something like that happens, I want to know everything of it. Then I’ll have a conversation with them, and if they
Table 1. Description of the Cases.
Belgian labor inspectors Dutch tax officials Inspectee Small-, medium-, and
large-sized entrepreneurs Small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs Discretion In case of undeclared work
or violation of wage and labor conditions law, they can make a report to law enforcement, propose a settlement agreement, or give a warning
In case of fiscal gaps or violations of fiscal laws, they can impose tax corrections and fines and propose settlement agreements Context of
inspection Individual inspectors, who sometimes involve colleagues Interorganizational
teams with broad tasks (undeclared work and wage and labor conditions) Interorganizational teams
with narrow tasks (undeclared work)
Mostly individual officials, who sometimes involve colleagues
Interorganizational team with shared objective (combating organized crime)
Educational backgrounds of inspectors
Vocational, higher professional, and academic education in fields as economy, law, social work, and criminology
Vocational, higher
Table 2. Summary of the Main Empirical Findings.
Social constellations Type of social dynamics Illustrations Encounter with
entrepreneur Negotiation: outcome dependent on on-the-spot interaction
Feeling of bond or hostility: evaluation of relationship affects treatment
Negotiation as a game: ‘ . . . because it’s a game, and they also feel if you’re not standing strong. Then they will open their bag of tricks’ (Dutch case); a “poker game” in which a “poker face” is essential (Belgian case)
Negotiate to obtain greater financial benefits, but for whom: “. . . or we do it by means of the anonymous tax rate, but that is of course a much higher correction” (Dutch case); “. . . she will pay social security taxes for two months and these employees received their money,” which is “more important than being able to collect a fine” (Belgian case)
Experience of relationship: “It depends on your relationship, right? If I have a good relationship with you . . . well, then I’m the first to say that it is correct, and it influences how you treat someone” (Dutch case); wanting to get back at a ridiculing client, an inspector “pulled out all the stops” (Belgian case)
Individual officials within informal collegial networks
Consultation: relying on peers to get an “intersubjective” account
Consult colleagues: “You get a judgment supported by colleagues” (Dutch case)
Unidisciplinary, interorganizational team with narrow tasks and individual discretion
Social pressure and social ties: different interpretation and implementation of rule depending on team constellation
Break the rules if the others are not looking: “If there are, for example, eleven employees of whom ten are registered and one is not, then I dare say to the employer: ‘Write his name down on the list as well.’ But I will not tell the others. I can tell my colleague [person working in the same agency], but not those guys from the [other labor inspectorate], because they will start bossing me around and tell me I have to make a report” (Belgian case)
come with things and we have no answer at that moment, yeah, then they did better. I’ve no problems with that.
This story shows that tax officials’ decisions largely depend on the involved actors’ reactions and negotiation skills, in addition to the available evidence (which is used as leverage). The respondent even compares it with a game that has to be played out. This game, it is held, is about who has the most convincing account:
You have to convince the entrepreneur of your point of view. If they agree, then they agree . . . Then it could be that they read a section of the law differently. That’s possible. Then they need to convince me.
The labor inspectors also use the game metaphor (particularly poker) to describe interactions with entrepreneurs. In situations where they lack evi-dence to prove their case—which often occurs in presumed overtime viola-tions—labor inspectors try not to show the entrepreneur that they are in the weakest position. To recover as much money as possible for the disadvan-taged employee(s), a “poker face” is essential, although fear and lack of legal knowledge on the part of the entrepreneur are helpful too. In both organiza-tions, the underlying idea is that negotiation results in greater financial ben-efit than a sole reliance on available evidence would generate.
Social constellations Type of social dynamics Illustrations Multidisciplinary,
interorganizational team with shared discretion
Strong social ties: informal meeting to open up more opportunities to solve a case
Informal meeting at the kitchen table: “. . . if we apply it that strictly and formally, then we cannot work integrally” (Dutch case)
Multidisciplinary, interorganizational team with broad tasks and individual discretion
Social pressure: adapting decision to a colleague due to experience of a bond with that colleague
Appreciation of a client’s effort toward your colleague: labor inspector was more lenient, because the food safety inspector was impressed by efforts the entrepreneur made to improve food safety (Belgian case) A favor for a colleague: “I even
called [food safety inspector] that we would not make a report, even though we had found six unregistered workers, because the employer was acquainted with [police officer]” (Belgian case)
How social dynamics shape this negotiation process is clearly shown in the following story from a tax official who received a snitch letter asserting that an entrepreneur fires his employees in the winter, letting them claim unemployment benefits, and, at the same time, letting them do undeclared work within the winter period.
But yeah, there we were, not knowing the amount; I missed a lot of hours, but I couldn’t prove it. You then try to convince them, based on facts and substantiations. So it resulted in a compromise, with which he [the entrepreneur] got away very well. But well, I was proven right . . . It was actually his own fault. We got a snitch letter stating that those people received unemployment benefits, but proceeded their work as painters. So I was substantiating a lot, like: “You have one person on the payroll, and you paint yourself, and I have barely seen those self-employed people, so you did something with those people.” . . . I said: “Your income per hour in the winter is just ridiculous.” And then he said: “But the boys that help me out during the winter . . .” And I thought: “Now I got you!” I said: “You’re standing on thin ice, sir . . . You’re facilitating benefit fraud . . . If the UWV [employee insurance agency] knows about this, then you have a very big problem.” At that moment, he admitted it. So I said: “Tell me what you want: do you want me to correct the boys [employees], but then they have a big problem, because then UWV discovers it [laughs], and then they will also come to you, or we do it by means of the anonymous tax rate, but that is of course a much higher correction.”
Although the tax official did not have enough evidence at the start of the interaction, the entrepreneur accidently admitted the violation, because he was figuratively pushed to the wall. The decision that follows thus results from how both officials and entrepreneurs stand their ground and react to each other.
Labor inspectors also negotiate with employers, but not always in a way that is supported by the agency. The agency’s policy prescribes that labor inspectors always make a report to law enforcement in the case of undeclared work, but encourages them to make settlement agreements in the case of wage and labor condition violations. However, in practice, labor inspectors regularly use undeclared work violations as leverage to make a settlement agreement concerning employees’ wage, as illustrated in the story below:
important than being able to collect a fine [approximately 5000 euro], because she paid social security taxes for two months and these employees received their money.
Hence, bargaining with the employer is considered a strategy to find a solution that is in the best interest of the employee(s), the treasury, or both. Thus, final decisions are dependent not only on officials’ thoughtful consid-erations or agency policies but also on inspectors’ and clients’ on-the-spot persuasion and negotiation skills.
Consulting colleagues to deal with subjectivism. Whereas tax officials view
themselves as professionals, who need a degree of freedom to adjust their enforcement styles to the situation at hand and to make informed decisions, the examples above show the downsides of the discretion inherent to their work. These inspectors are sometimes concerned about inconsistencies in decision making—resulting from the subjective nature of their decisions— which run counter to their strong sense of justice, fostered by the idea that entrepreneurs in similar situations should be treated similarly. The following interview excerpt shows how a tax official experiences a tension between discretion and equal treatment:
We luckily still have freedom. But it remains something very subjective of course, because I’m inspecting with a digital dossier that I need to fill, but what I fill out, remains subjective of course. I can leave something out, or mention something. So if you have an enterprise and you say something to me I don’t think is very kind, then it can have an influence . . . yeah, it is not supposed to be like that, but it involuntarily plays a role. It depends on your relationship, right? If I have a good relationship with you . . . well, then I’m the first to say that it is correct, and it influences how you treat someone. When there are differences of opinion, I think you’re much more inclined to approach each other. Then I won’t easily say like, I will continue my inspection to find something. Then I’m more inclined to say well, okay, possibly there could be something wrong, but I close the book and we shake hands.
to be as objective as possible,” “we are humans.” The inspector acknowl-edges that “[a]nother colleague would maybe have made different deci-sions.” These examples clearly show how inspectors experience that relations with citizens, that is, feelings of friendship or hostility, could affect their inspection style and decision making, standing in the way of being “as objective as possible.” When this subjectivism is experienced as a problem, officials use different strategies to make decisions less subjec-tive. Besides relying on overall inspection guidelines (tax officials), and official-specific “rules of thumb” to safeguard equal treatment across cases (labor inspectors), officials also rely on their peers to reach a widely sup-ported decision.
That is the hard part . . . when do you have enough assurance, when have you done enough work? Yeah, that’s hard to tell, that’s different for each inspection. In case of doubt, you need to consult with your colleagues, just briefly talk about it . . . you get a judgment supported by colleagues. That’s enough then. Professional judgment, that’s what it is called.
Consulting one’s colleagues is a strategy that is often mentioned by tax officials. By attuning their decisions to colleagues’ opinions or assess-ments, officials feel their case is stronger and less subjective. One respon-dent refers to this practice as making “intersubjective” judgments, which are shared among colleagues. Such consulting practices can also help to prevent “tunnel vision” by letting “a colleague objectively assess whether you’re still on the right track.” One respondent argues he looks for “like-minded colleagues,” who do not correct everything, and do “not want to go to extremes.” This suggests that “intersubjectivism” is sought by con-sulting colleagues who share the same inspection attitudes and practices. The studied labor inspectors are not so much concerned about reaching a widely supported decision. Only newcomers in the job regularly consult with other inspectors, but quickly learn the importance of developing a personal inspection style, as one of the newcomers explains:
Team Inspections
Breaking rules if others are not looking. The social context, and thereby also the
decision making, changes when street-level bureaucrats are part of teams. The labor inspectors under study monthly participate in regional antifraud inspections, in teams consisting of inspectors of the five Belgian labor inspec-torates. Given that inspectors are encouraged to always make a report to law enforcement in the case of social fraud, similar enforcement can be expected when labor inspectors work alone or in these unidisciplinary teams. How-ever, observations showed that differences in social context lead to different decisions. Particularly, social dynamics shape how the “strict enforcement” rule is interpreted and enforced. A labor inspector explains that the law is strictly enforced in team inspections, but not in individual inspections, because then inspectors believe they can be more lenient.
The agreement in these anti-fraud teams is to adapt a kind of zero tolerance policy [consistent with agency’s policy]. This means that even if an employer registers the employee the day after the inspection, we make a report to law enforcement. In regular inspections . . . , you can—and I have already done that—be more lenient by offering him to drop the charge if he registers the employee correctly afterwards. If he registers the employee, also for the day of the inspection of course, then I will not make a report. If he does not do so, I will make a report.
Observations of antifraud team and individual inspections confirmed that the social context surrounding the case shape the meaning and weight of the “strict enforcement” rule. In team inspections, inspectors, for example, ask the question “Who will make the report?” rather than “Who will take this case?” when violations are detected, implying that making a report to law enforce-ment is considered the only acceptable response. In interviews, labor inspec-tors explained that, when working in an antifraud team, the “strict enforcement” rule is seen as a formal instruction that should be followed or, as mentioned above, an agreement they have made with other agencies. However, if they work alone, individual discretion prevails and the same rule is considered a mere guideline or recommendation. The different interpretation could be explained by inspectors trying not to appear “soft” in front of colleagues from different agencies, as is illustrated by the following interview excerpt, where two inspectors from the same agency make a secret deal with an employer during an antifraud inspection, because they think he deserves leniency:
well.” But I will not tell the others. I can tell my colleague [person working in the same agency], but not those guys from the [other labor inspectorate], because they will start bossing me around and tell me I have to make a report. But if two inspectors of our agency are present, we can make a deal . . . We do that without letting the others know. We do it sneakily.
Also the more distanced relationship between inspectors and clients in team inspections could explain the difference. In individual inspections, inspectors might deliberately use leniency to foster the long working rela-tionships with entrepreneurs and thereby aim to increase compliance.
Using strong social ties to get things done. Dutch tax officials also participate in
interorganizational cooperation. The so-called “take-away team” involves professionals from different agencies (including the tax authorities) to com-bat organized crime and confiscate criminal assets. To enhance cooperation, they have found a way to collaboratively work around laws that are experi-enced as restricting the possibilities to combat crime. In so-called “kitchen table conversations” confidential information is openly shared:
You really have to have your case covered, because otherwise . . . if you are in front of the judge, and he asks: “Inspector, how did you get these police reports?.” “Yeah, I got these at the kitchen table.” Well yeah, then the judge will say it is illegally obtained evidence. Then it’s done, then you’ll never be vindicated.
The informal meeting makes things possible that are not possible if rules were strictly followed. The participants justify this practice by referring to the common objective of combating crime, for which the “take away” team car-ries joint responsibility. Social ties with other involved actors also facilitate the obtainment of permits to use information from other organizations:
We actually always get the permission, . . . , because the prosecutor is [name] from the parquet in [city in Brabant], who also knows us, and also regularly joins our kitchen table. So he knows when we come with this request, then something is the matter.
The respondent seems to imply that the prosecutor grants these permits based on strong ties with the team; because he personally knows the members and even joins the informal meetings, it is suggested, the prosecutor can rely on the judgment of the team. Hence, strong social ties between members, as well as the common objective to combat crime, are used as justifications for these “informal” practices.
Adapting decision to team to maintain relationship. Multidisciplinary team
cooperation between food inspection, police, and labor inspectorate is, in the Belgian case, not based on shared discretion. In joint inspections, different agencies enforce different regulations; inspectors are thus formally indepen-dent. However, their decisions as part of such teams are oftentimes infor-mally influenced by colleagues’ decisions. In one case, a labor inspector treated a recidivist employer leniently, because a food safety inspector was impressed with his efforts to meet food safety regulations, even though social fraud recidivism is in other cases dealt with by making a report to law enforce-ment (consistent with agency’s policy). It is striking that the labor inspector emphasizes the employer’s goodwill based on efforts in compliance to rules that her inspectorate is not even responsible for, while the employer fails to correct social fraud, which is considered a very serious violation.
whether or not to file a report to law enforcement. They decided not to do so, because they did not want to offend their colleague (the police officer). Instead, they made a deal with the employer to give a warning if he would register his employees retrospectively.
[Name of police officer] said: “Let’s inspect that establishment.” He knew the owner and was sure that everything was perfectly in order. We [labor inspectors in the team] said: “Are you sure [name of police officer]? Do you really want to do this?” When we entered, we saw them smoking in the establishment [which is a food safety violation]. And no-one of the employees was registered. No-one no-one. He did not speak again all evening. I told him: “We will not make a report.” I even called [name of food safety inspector who was present] that we would not make a report, even though we had found six unregistered workers, because the employer was acquainted with [name of police officer]. I would offer the employer to register them retrospectively and not file a report. But then, the employer had only registered his employees for two hours in the whole month, while the inspection itself had already lasted for more than two hours. So then we [labor inspectors in the team] decided to make a report anyway.
Although this case ended in the labor inspectors making a report to law enforcement, which would, given the agency’s policy, have been the obvious decision in the first place, this case shows how strong ties and social pressure within interdisciplinary teams can affect the kind of decision being made. Because the same individuals are over a longer period of time responsible for a specific district, there is indeed a chance that inspectors or police officers inspect establishments owned by friends of acquaintances. Dutch tax offi-cials, to the contrary, are prohibited to inspect acquaintances and inspectees living in the same town or area as the inspector is residing.
The experience of social ties by officials, thus, affects decision making about specific cases. In both of these examples, the official felt obligated to adapt his or her decision to a colleague, because of an experience of a social bond with that same colleague. What is notable in these examples is that the respondents chose for a more lenient treatment than they would have done if they were to decide about this case alone.
Discussion
Our results go further by pointing at the importance of the course of an interac-tion with citizens, depending on negotiainterac-tion and bargaining, and thus how both parties stand their ground, in determining the final decision. As for collegial interaction, the literature has mainly focused on the supporting and advisory role of coworkers (e.g., Hatmaker et al., 2011; Van Kleef, 2016). In line with the professionalization and socialization literature, our results show that street-level bureaucrats consult colleagues with the aim to decrease subjectivism of decision making.
These streams of literature, however, cannot explain the more subtle influence of collegial interaction on frontline decision making shown in our results, for example, that the mere presence of other professionals alters not only the meaning of rules but also how clients are addressed and how inspec-tors perceive and use their discretion. Street-level bureaucracy research should thus broaden its scope by including the influence of these subtle social dynamics on frontline decision making and interactive effects between client–official and various types of collegial interaction. This article contrib-utes to the literature by showing that even in law enforcement agencies, which are highly regulated and where adherence to agency rules and proce-dures is expected, social dynamics within and surrounding public encoun-ters significantly affect decision making at the frontline. A possible explanation is that, despite different organizational contexts, inspectors have to deal with uncertainty about facts, value conflicts and complicated per-sonal and interorganizational relationships, in a similar way as street-level bureaucrats in service-delivery organizations.
Second, how do social dynamics within official–citizen and collegial interactions, which are actively encouraged by new responsive policies, relate to fair decision making? Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) show how frontline workers strive for making fair decisions by relying on their own moral standards. Fairness is a value that is highly important to these workers. In trying to make fair decisions, they rely not only on rules, as could be expected of state agents, but also on clients’ needs and their feelings toward them (either hostility or friendship), which is typical for citizen agents. In particular situations, the inspectors in both cases regularly experi-ence a clear tension between being a state agent and a citizen agent (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Our study has furthermore shown that officials sometimes feel that strong social ties with colleagues get in the way of fair decision making. When the officials in our examples made different deci-sions because they felt pressured by colleagues, they valued maintaining a good relationship with the respective colleague higher than the decision they would deem most appropriate or fair. The social character of decision mak-ing, thus, could bring other values into the decision making process; officials not only look at case-related aspects in making decisions but also take into consideration (what certain decisions would mean for) relations with clients and colleagues.
These findings have practical implications. Prior research has shown that “procedural constraints on the exercise of discretion” (Loyens & Maesschalck, 2010, p. 68), could increase consistency in decision making, but that this, at the same time, could hamper frontline officers to be “responsive to individual need” (Evans, 2016, p. 13) and decrease their motivation. Our study shows that officials sometimes rely on their informal collegial network to make their decisions less subjective, particularly in ambiguous situations. In trying to reduce personal bias, they “sought to act ethically in their official role” (Evans, 2013, p. 754). We believe more can be gained from strengthening openness among street-level bureaucrats about dilemmas they experience in dealing with discretion, with the aim to find common solutions. However, our results also suggest that citizens (entrepreneurs in this study) are not pas-sively subjected to inspectors’ decisions about their case, but are active play-ers who in negotiation stand up for their own interest. In the negotiated order, citizens are thus reflexive, trying to make sense of the inspectors’ response and “adapt the system and make it work for them” (Evans, 2007, p. 226). Recognizing the agency of inspectees in the negotiation process draws atten-tion to ways in which collaborative governance has affected inspecatten-tion work.
Conclusion and Recommendations for Future
Research
By relying on in-depth interviews and participant observation, this study has analyzed how social dynamics in official–citizen interactions and in collegial interactions may affect case-related decision making. Our study indicates that social dynamics could play a determining role in frontline decision making in several ways. In negotiating with clients, final decisions are dependent not only on officials’ thoughtful considerations but also on both parties’ on-the-spot per-suasion and negotiation skills. The unfolding of an official–citizen interaction thus plays an important role in case-related decision making. This study has furthermore found that officials try to make their decisions less subjective by relying on their colleagues’ judgments. Besides deliberate consultation, this study has found that social ties with colleagues could also more implicitly affect decision making, leading to a different decision than the individual offi-cial would or could have taken. Sometimes, this is experienced as positive, as is the case with the informal “kitchen table” meetings, where strong social ties open up opportunities to better solve a case. Sometimes, this is experienced as problematic, when, for instance, social pressure leads to a decision that runs counter to officials’ own idea of what is the appropriate decision.
how they feel enabled or constrained by social dynamics. The study has indicated that bureaucrats meaningfully deploy social dynamics to “get things done.” As such, they can be seen as “socially skilled actors” (Moulton & Sandfort, 2017, p. 145) who use their agency to shape social dynamics, such as social pressure and cooperation, by relying on tactics such as deploying good relationships with col-leagues, or aligning judgments with those of colleagues (see also Wagenaar, 2004, p. 652). Because of our focus on the micro aspects of social dynamics, we could not analyze processes of change or stability more generically. Future research could analyze the impact of social dynamics on decision making from a macro perspective, by looking at variations in decision making across different groups or teams (see, for example, the multilevel analytical framework proposed by Moulton & Sandfort, 2017).
The main disadvantage of this study is the use of independent case studies with no prior aim to compare. At the same time, using these particular case studies, in different countries and sectors, offered the opportunity to find overall patterns of social dynamics in street-level bureaucracy. Future research on street-level bureaucracy should more often apply a comparative case design to study the impact of different contexts on frontline decision making. Our study could be further extended by examining how frontline officials balance the different values, including those stemming from social interactions, in case-related decision making. Future street-level bureaucracy research could also develop and use research designs that allow for better studying the role of social dynamics in frontline decision making. Participant observation allows for studying how social interactions—and also the more subtle social dynamics such as social pressure—play out in practice, whereas narrative analyses of transcripts of interactions not only would enable study-ing what policies, rules, and values are evoked and reshaped in real-time interactions (e.g., Bartels, 2014; Bruhn & Ekström, 2017) but also how citi-zen–clients actively negotiate the responses of officials (e.g., Evans, 2007). Social network analyses could be performed to, for instance, study the influ-ence of frontline officials’ informal network structure and composition on, for instance, officials’ willingness to reach “intersubjective” accounts.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
References
Bartels, K. P. R. (2013). Public encounters: The history and future of face-to-face contact between public professionals and citizens. Public Administration, 91, 469-483.
Bartels, K. P. R. (2014). Communicative capacity: The added value of public encoun-ters for participatory democracy. American Review of Public Administration, 44, 656-674.
Behn, R. D. (2001). Rethinking democratic accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Brehm, J., & Gates, S. (1997). Working, shirking, and sabotage: Bureaucratic
response to a democratic public. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bruhn, A., & Ekström, M. (2017). Towards a multi-level approach on frontline inter-actions in the public sector: Institutional transformations and the dynamics of real-time interactions. Social Policy & Administration, 51, 195-215.
Evans, T. (2007). Confidentiality in mental health services: A negotiated order?
Qualitative Social Work, 6, 213-229.
Evans, T. (2013). Organisational rules and discretion in adult social work. British
Journal of Social Work, 43, 739-758.
Evans, T. (2016). Professional discretion in welfare services: Beyond street-level
bureaucracy. London, England: Routledge.
Gribnau, H. (2007). Soft law and taxation: The case of the Netherlands. Legisprudence,
1, 291-326.
Groeneveld, S., & Van de Walle, S. (2011). Introduction. In S. Groeneveld & S. Van de Walle (Eds.), New steering concepts in public management (pp. 1-8). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.
Hatmaker, D. M., Park, H. H., & Rethemeyer, K. (2011). Learning the ropes: Communities of practice and social networks in the public sector. International
Public Management Journal, 14, 395-419.
Hupe, P., & Hill, M. (2007). Street-level bureaucracy and public accountability.
Public Administration, 85, 279-299.
Hupe, P., Hill, M., & Buffat, A. (Eds.). (2015). Understanding street-level
bureau-cracy. Bristol, UK: Policy Press.
Keiser, L. R. (2010). Understanding street-level bureaucrats’ decision making: Determining eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program. Public
Administration Review, 70, 247-257.
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public
services. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Loyens, K. (2012). Integrity secured. Understanding ethical decision making among street-level bureaucrats in the Belgian Labor Inspection and Federal Police. Doctoral dissertation, Leuven, KU Leuven.
Loyens, K., & Maesschalck, J. (2010). Toward a theoretical framework for ethi-cal decision making of street-level bureaucracy: Existing models reconsidered.
Maroulis, S. (2015). The role of social network structure in street-level innova-tion. American Review of Public Administration, 47, 419-430. doi:10.1177/ 0275074015611745
Mascini, P., & Van Wijk, E. (2009). Responsive regulation at the Dutch food and con-sumer product safety authority: An empirical assessment of assumptions underly-ing the theory. Regulation & Governance, 3, 27-47.
May, P. J., & Winter, S. C. (2011). Regulatory enforcement styles and compliance. In C. Parker & V. L. Nielsen (Eds.), Explaining regulatory compliance: Business
responses to regulation (pp. 222-244). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2000). State agent or citizen agent: Two nar-ratives of discretion. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 329-358.
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2003). Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories
from the front lines of public service. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Mccallin, A. (2001). Inter-disciplinary practice—A matter of teamwork: An inte-grated literature review. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 10, 419-428.
Moulton, S., & Sandfort, J. R. (2017). The strategic action field framework for policy implementation research. Policy Studies Journal, 45, 144-169.
Moyson, S., Raaphorst, N., Groeneveld, S., & Van de Walle, S. (2017). Organizational socialization in public administration research: A systematic review and direc-tions for future research. The American Review of Public Administration. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0275074017696160
Nielsen, V. L. (2007). Differential treatment and communicative interactions: Why the character of social interaction is important. Law and Policy, 29, 257-283. Noordegraaf, M. (2011). Risky business: How professionals and professional fields
(must) deal with organizational issues. Organizational Studies, 32, 1349-1371. Noordegraaf, M. (2016). Reconfiguring professional work: Changing forms of
pro-fessionalism in public services. Administration & Society, 48, 783-810.
Oberfield, Z. W. (2014). Becoming bureaucrats: Socialization at the front lines of
government service. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Pollitt, C. (2013). Context in public policy and management: The missing link? Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Raaphorst, N. (2018). How to prove, how to interpret and what to do? Uncertainty experiences of street-level tax officials. Public Management Review, 20, 485-502.
Richards, L. (2005). Handling qualitative data: A practical guide. London: SAGE. Riessman, C. K. (2008). Narrative methods for the human sciences. London, England:
SAGE.
Rutz, S., Mathew, D., Robben, P., & de Bont, A. (2017). Enhancing responsiveness and consistency: Comparing the collective use of discretion and discretionary room at inspectorates in England and the Netherlands. Regulation & Governance,
11, 81-94.
Sandfort, J. R. (2000). Moving beyond discretion and outcomes: Examining pub-lic management from the front lines of the welfare system. Journal of Pubpub-lic
Administration Research and Theory, 10, 729-756.
Schott, C., Van Kleef, D., & Noordegraaf, M. (2016). Confused professionals? Capacities to cope with pressures on professional work. Public Management
Review, 18, 583-610.
Siciliano, M. D. (2015). Professional networks and street-level performance: How public school teachers’ advice networks influence student performance. American
Review of Public Administration, 47, 79-101.
Thacher, D., & Rein, M. (2004). Managing value conflict in public policy. Governance,
17, 457-486.
Van Kleef, D. (2016). Changing the nature of the beast: How organizational socializa-tion contributes to the development of the organizasocializa-tional role identity of Dutch veterinary inspectors. Doctoral dissertation, Leiden, Leiden University.
Vigoda, E. (2002). From responsiveness to collaboration: Governance, citizens, and the next generation of public administration. Public Administration Review, 62, 527-540.
Vinzant, J. C., & Crothers, L. (1998). Street-level leadership: Discretion and
legiti-macy in front-line public service. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Wagenaar, H. (2004). “Knowing” the rules: Administrative work as practice. Public
Administration Review, 64, 643-655.
Yang, K. (2005). Public administrators’ trust in citizens: A missing link in citizen involvement efforts. Public Administration Review, 65, 273-285.
Author Biographies
Nadine Raaphorst is assistant professor at the Institute of Public Administration,
Leiden University in The Netherlands. Her research focuses on street-level bureau-cracy, frontline decision making, and stereotyping by frontline workers.
Kim Loyens is assistant professor at the Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht
