Child Soldiers: The Impact of Transitional Justice on Reintegration: a Case Study from Colombia

(1)

1

Child Soldiers: The Impact of

Transitional Justice on Reintegration:

a Case Study from Colombia

Name of the student: Annika Täuber Student-number : 2133490

Programme: NOHA 2015/2016

Supervisors: Nadine Voelkner (RuG) and Pedro Enrique Valenzuela Gruesso (Javeriana) Date: 31.December 2015

(2)

(3)

3

Abstract

(4)

4

List of Abbreviations

ACR Colombian Agency for Reintegration

AUC United Self Defense Forces of Colombia / Autodefenas Unidas de Colombia

AZAPO Azanian Peoples Organization

CNRR National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation

CPWG Child Protection Working Group

CRC Convention on the Rights of a Child

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

ELN Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional

ICBF Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familar/ Colombian Family Welfare Institute

ICC International Criminal Court

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IDCR Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution

IHL International Humanitarian Law

ILO International Labour Organisation

IRIN Integrated Regional Information Network

LRA Lord`s Resistance Army

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

SNARIV National System for Assistance and Reparations of Victims

UN United Nations

(6)

6

1. Introduction

The nature of armed conflict has seen considerable changes during the last decades. While during the time preceding 1945 one could rather observe international armed conflicts the post WW II period was rather characterised by internal armed conflicts. Due to this changing nature of conflict, battlefields have moved from international borders closer to people’s homes with civilians increasingly becoming the victims of armed attacks (UNICEF, 2009, p.4). This changing nature of conflict as well as the proliferation of lighter, easy to carry weapons has contributed to the increasing conversion of normal children into soldiers (UNICEF, 2009, p.8). Children do not only observe the destruction of their houses, the displacement of their families and become witnesses of physical violations against their family for reasons of gender or ethnicity, but frequently become themselves victims of forced marriage, abduction, rape or forced recruitment into armed groups. It is hard to say how many children are currently members of armed groups and engaged in armed conflict. According to estimates, around 300 000 children are involved in approximately 30 conflicts worldwide (UNICEF, n.d.).

One country where children have been used as child soldiers since more than 20 years by now is Colombia. The armed conflict in Colombia already began in the mid 1960s. It can be characterised as an intractable, low intensity, multi-party conflict between the governments of Colombia supported by paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)/ United Self Defense Forces of Colombia and peasant guerrilla groups like the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC). Publicly the war is often viewed as being solely about drugs, but it is also about class, economics and power (Briggs, 2005, p.41). The conflict has seen widespread abuses of human rights and severe violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) by and against children (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, p. 99).

(7)

7 used captured or surrendered child soldiers to gather information on opposition forces for intelligence purposes (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, p .99).

Former Colombian child soldiers reported that they were not only forced to watch captives being tortured by pushing needles under their nails, severing fingers and arms and cutting their faces, but they were also made to shoot captives as a test of valour. Some child soldiers were also involved in the assassination of political figures or their own comrades. If they lost a weapon, they had been forced to fight without one until they could recover a replacement from the enemy. Children who tried to desert were shot, especially if they had taken their weapons with them. The same fate awaited children who fell asleep during their guard duty. The children got their hands tied by nylon cords and were then taken outside the camp where they had to wait until the squad had dug a grave for them (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.7-8). These kinds of experiences will have a long- lasting impact on the future development of children and their physical and emotional well-being.

The Colombia conflict is among the longest of human history. Various rounds of peace talks between the Colombian government and illicit armed forces have failed in the past. However, since September 2015 the government seems to be close to a peace deal with the FARC (Neuman, 2015). A central part of the negotiations has been the question of Transitional Justice and how to address the atrocities committed during the armed conflict. Both parties have stated in March that “this issue was the hardest to negotiate”(Vulliamy, 2015). Transitional Justice is considered a key step for successful peace building as it enables countries to achieve justice and reconciliation for past crimes and to establish peace, a democratic society and the rule of law (Villalba, 2011, p.2-3). The concept becomes particularly interesting with regard to child soldiers as this group possesses an ambiguous role under international law and therefore portrays an interesting challenge for Transitional Justice. One the one hand, ex-child-soldiers are victims as the recruitment of children under a certain age-limit is prohibited by international law, on the other hand child combatants are perpetrators as they have been involved in committing atrocities. Thus, under Transitional Justice, these children are eligible to receive compensation for their time with armed forces. However, are they also supposed to be punished for the crimes they committed? And how could reparations and punishment influence the reintegration of former Colombian child soldiers into society? The latter question is crucial as a successful reintegration of former combatants is a prerequisite for a stable and long-lasting peace.

(8)

8 implemented DDR-programmes in the past. The experiences gained from the already existing programmes could now serve as a valuable indicator for what a future Transitional Justice system should entail.

Therefore this thesis sets out to evaluate the existing mechanisms by asking as main research question “How do established structures of Transitional Justice support the reintegration of former child soldiers in Colombia”. An exhaustive literature review suggests that although a vast amount of literature about child soldiers has been published in the past, only view scholars have paid attention to the correlation between Transitional Justice and reintegration outcomes for child soldiers.

(9)

9 publication, the scholar elaborates on how to address the crimes committed by child soldiers from a moral and practical perspective.

This thesis aims to make a contribution to closing the existing gap in literature by taking Fisher´s approach one step further, namely by not only elaborating on how to deal with atrocities committed by child soldiers, but also by investigating the impact of accountability on the reintegration of former child soldiers in the concrete case of Colombia. By doing so, the thesis reacts to the request of Clara Sandoval Villalba from the Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution of the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway to create a more open discussion and exchange of experiences about different peace-building initiatives, such as Transitional Justice and DDR (Villalba, 2011).

Thus, the conceptual framework of this thesis is based on the correlation between the two concepts of Transitional Justice and DDR. The thesis assumes that Transitional Justice influences the reintegration of child soldiers in two ways, once through the justice process and once through the reparation process. The justice process might hold child soldiers accountable for the crimes they committed while being members of the armed forces. This might be morally significant for the victims as it gives them the satisfaction to see that committed wrongs are addressed and punished. In consequence, holding child soldiers accountable under a judicial process can either benefit their reintegration as victims feel that justice has been done or it can harm reintegration as former child soldiers are criminalised, which might result in fear, distrust and anger from side of the receiving communities towards these agents. Secondly, the reparation process has the potential to favour the reintegration by providing the necessary means to overcome the challenges child soldiers face upon reintegration. However, if the receiving communities get the impression that only the child soldiers are compensated while they self have also suffered from the impact of war, reparations can also negatively influence reintegration. Based on these considerations the thesis will investigate how the established structures of Transitional Justice have supported the reintegration of former child soldiers in Colombia. Thereby, not only the reparations and punishments as such are of interest, but particularly the receiving communities/victims view of these measures.

Concerning methodology the thesis takes a qualitative approach. Information is mainly obtained through an extensive literature review. Secondary sources, legal texts and policy briefings serve as primary found of information. Additional insights are obtained through material provided by and an interview conducted with the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familar (ICBF) - in English the Colombian Family Welfare Institute- the institution responsible for demobilised children.

(10)

10 political concept, while humanitarian action claims to be apolitical as it is founded on the four humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Nevertheless, one can discover clear parallels between the scope of Transitional Justice and the one of humanitarianism. For example the concept of ‘justice’ plays an important role for both. Transitional Justice aims to provide ‘justice’ to victims of gross violations of international humanitarian law, by truth-finding, holding perpetrators accountable and paying reparation. With regard to humanitarians the concept of ‘justice’ forms the underlying basis for their work. Although the term ‘justice’ is not necessarily directly mentioned in the code of conducts of humanitarian organisations, the humanitarian principles of impartiality, meaning that aid is solely provided on the basis of need, regardless of race, belief or nationality, and neutrality, meaning that humanitarian actors must never take side in a conflict, clearly reflect the idea that humanitarian aid should be provided to everyone in need on a ‘just’ basis. Another commonality of Transitional Justice and humanitarian action is their interest in peace. The raison d’être of Transitional Justice is to contribute to the establishment of peace, democracy and the rule of law. This is also in the interest of humanitarianism as war causes unnecessary human suffering. Thus, one can say that Transitional Justice per se is not a classical humanitarian task, but it shares a have common ground with humanitarian action. DDR-programmes neither seem to be a typical operational area of humanitarians at the first sight as disarmament and demobilisation also have a political connotation. However the reintegration of child-soldiers is a clear task for humanitarians as it clearly falls under the realm of child protection. The concept has been specified by a group of Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs), UN-agencies and academics, the Child Protection Working Group (CPWG). According to their definition, “child protection” refers to the “prevention of and response to abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence against children”(Child Protection Working Group, 2012, p.13). As the recruitment and use of children as soldiers certainly portrays a form of abuse, exploitation and violence, humanitarians have to ‘respond’ with tailored reintegration programmes for former child-soldiers. Their reintegration has proven challenging in many countries and has consequentially put children at risk. Improvements in this field need to be made, among others through better coordination between Transitional Justice and DDR. Due to the impact Transitional Justice might have on the reintegration of ex-child-soldiers, there is a need for “increased consultation and coordination between child-protection agencies and Transitional Justice” as argued by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (Aptel and Ladisch, 2011). The case of Colombia is particularly interesting as the country already implements DDR-programmes and Transitional Justice mechanisms during an armed conflict.

(11)

11 and Child Soldiers in greater detail. Based on these concepts, the theoretical framework will then be established. Chapter 4 outlines the legal framework provided by international law concerning child soldiers. The legal framework serves as a reference point to identify differences between internationally recognised norms concerning former child soldiers and the Colombian approach. International Law takes the stand that compensations facilitate reintegration. If this assumption is true in the case of Colombia will be proven by this study. In total, 3 legal aspects will be addressed: the use of child soldiers under international law, the right of former child soldiers to be compensated for the abuse they suffered, and the legal accountability of child soldiers. After these rather theoretical considerations, the thesis will look in chapter 5 closer into the case of Colombia. A brief description of the context will be given, before the existing Transitional Justice mechanisms in Colombia will be outlined. Subsequently an overview will be provided about the rights of children that have been violated through the recruitment into armed forces in Colombia. Afterwards the thesis will elaborate on Colombia´s way towards reintegration. The thesis will investigate how reparations received by former child soldiers have influenced their reintegration into society. Moreover, the impact of accountability on reintegration will be assessed. Finally, chapter 6 will draw a conclusion concerning the impact of existing Transitional Justice mechanisms on the reintegration of former child soldiers based on the findings of this study.

2. Methodology

(12)

12

3. Concepts & Theoretical Framework

This section aims to provide the reader with detailed definitions of the relevant concept as well as with an explication of the theoretical framework underlying the thesis. First, the notion of Transitional Justice will be explained. The thesis will elaborate on its components, its advantages and the criticism it caused. Next, the concept of DDR-programming will be explained before the thesis turns its attention to the notion of ‘child soldier’. Finally the theoretical framework will be established based on these concepts.

3.1. Transitional Justice

(13)

13 The International Centre for Transitional Justice defines ‘Transitional Justice’ as “set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms” (n.d.b).The centre emphasizes that “Transitional Justice” should not be seen as a ‘special’ kind of justice, but rather an approach to achieve justice during the transition process from a war-torn state towards a society characterized by peace (International Center for Transitional Justice, n.d.c). The UN´s approach is similar, but it less detailed with regard to the concrete components of Transitional Justice. It defines the concept as the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (Anon, Guidance Note of the Secretary-Geneal: United Nations

Approach to Transitional Jusitce, 2010, p. 2). Both definitions face the shortage that they fail to

address the relationship between Transitional Justice and international law. Moreover, both do not specify when a process of Transitional Justice should take place. The question remains for example if a conflict must already have come to an end before a process of Transitional Justice can be launched or if Transitional Justice mechanisms can already be implemented during an armed conflict. A third definition is provided by Christine Bell, professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Edinburgh. She claims that “Transitional justice does not constitute a coherent ‘field’ but rather is a label or cloak that aims to rationalize a set of diverse bargains in relation to the past as an integrated endeavour.” According to her point of view, Transitional Justice has three meanings: First and foremost it refers to “an ongoing battle against impunity rooted in human rights discourse”. Secondly, it describes a set of conflict resolution techniques related to constitution making. And thirdly, it constitutes a tool for international state-building in the aftermath of mass atrocity (Bell, n.d. cited in Kersten, 2012).

Despite all the differences of these definitions, they agree in one point, namely that Transitional Justice refers to a process which aims to address the legacy of gross human rights violations. This conception of Transitional Justice will be used throughout the thesis. As Transitional Justice addresses violations of very fundamental rights, the process seems to be both, a legal and moral obligation for a country in the transition-phase from war to peace.

(14)

14 (General Assembly, 1948, Art. 4 and General Assembly, 1984, Art.4); secondly, the right of victims to receive adequate reparations for the harm suffered as outlined in 2005 in the General Assembly Resolution on the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law requires persecution of the perpetrators (General Assembly, 2005, Art.1); and thirdly accountability for past crimes is often seen as crucial step to prevent such atrocities from re-happening (Villalba, 2011, p.4).

However, the necessity of Transitional Justice is not uncontested among experts. Some claim that the justice process can constitute a hindrance for peace and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. They maintain that states are not capable to undergo such a process appropriately due to the circumstances the states are in and they point out that international law gives space for amnesties not without reason. For them, peace is the highest priority even at the expense of justice. Therefore they argue it is better to grant amnesty to former perpetrators in order to allow a society to move forward even if this means breaking the international obligations to investigate, prosecute and punish (Villalba, 2011, p.5). In the past two judicial decisions have been made in favour of this argumentation. One was the ruling of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 1996 in the case Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others. The Court ruled that “[I]n order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. [...]With this Constitution and these commitments we, the people of South Africa, open a new chapter in the history of our country (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1996, para. 3). Another, more recent example is the decision of the Supreme Court of Brazil to maintain the Amnesty Law from 1979, which protects officials accused of human rights violations during the military regime in Brazil (1964-1985) from judicial persecution (Schneider, 2011, p.39).

(15)

15 Transitional Justice approach dominated by Western ideas. His point of view is understandable. Transitional Justice methods imposed top-down on a population are prone to fail. Local ownership and participation are needed to achieve a real change in society and to allow for reintegration of former warriors. However, an international institution might not always be harmful, but it might be more appropriate in situations where the conflict has not yet come to an end, where the violating regime is still in power or where one side to the Transitional Justice procedure shows more commitment to comply with standards of international criminal justice than the other side as argued by Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder (2004, p.349). Nevertheless, no matter if a Transitional Justice procedure is undertaken by a national or an international court, the approach must be culture sensitive and adapted to local customs. This underlines the necessity to include national consultations as component of any Transitional Justice process.

Another point of criticism of the Transitional Justice concept is its usefulness as the causal connection between justice and prevention is still under doubt. A study undertaken by Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink based on a data set on human rights trials in 100 countries in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy or from armed conflict to peace comes indeed to the conclusion that human rights trials have a positive effect on human rights protection (2007, p.1). Moreover, in subsequent studies the scholars find further evidence in support of a causal link between justice and prevention. Their findings show among others that “countries with prosecutions of human rights violations tend to have lower levels of repression than countries without such prosecutions” and “prosecutions of human rights violations have a strong and statistically significant downward impact on levels of repression” (Sikking and Kim, 2013, p. 279/280). Vinjamuri and Snyder in contrast argue that “[s]ome of the writings of these advocate-scholars have treated the benefits of war crime trials as an assumption rather than an empirical proposition to be tested rigorously” (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004, p. 359). They maintain that “the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities according to universal standards— risks causing more atrocities than it would prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities” (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003, 4).

(16)

(17)

17 almost 10% of the total population were killed within a few days in 1994. The country itself was bankrupt. Often the international community steps in in these situations as happened for example in Chile when the United States supported financially the creation of a health programme targeting the victims (Lira, 2011, p.6). Another difficulty that might arise with regard to reparations is to decide on the right approach. Are collective reparations focusing on rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of no-repetition more helpful than individual compensations? As in so many things in life the answer lies probably in the right balance. Collective remedies are important to raise awareness within the affected society and to promote human rights. This is the basis for peace and democratic state based on the rule of law and human rights. However, there is the risk is that collective remedies might easily lose their reparative objective and might rather be perceived as developmental or humanitarian in nature (Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, para.37). Individual compensations in comparison have the advantage that they really pay attention and address the individual fate of each victim and are therefore maybe more adequate.

(18)

18

3.2. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

This section aims to introduce the reader to the concept of DDR-programming. The abbreviation DDR refers to the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The concept forms part of the UN’s multidimensional approach to post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction (United Nations, 2006, p.1). To this end the purpose of DDR is to provide security and stability in post-conflict settings in order to allow a country to recover from the impact of armed conflict. The term disarmament stands for the systematic collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and frequently of the civilian population, too. It also takes in the development of arms management programmes. Demobilization refers to the formal and controlled dismissal of active combatants from armed groups and forces. An important component of demobilisation is reinsertion. The term alludes to the assistance offered to ex-combatants during the demobilization phase but before the start of long-term reintegration. It is a kind of transitional support to ensure the coverage of the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families. It can include food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. It contrast to long-term social and economic process of reintegration, reinsertion is a short-term material or financial assistance to meet immediate needs. It can take up to one year. Reintegration finally is the process ex-combatants undergo in order to re-gain civilian status, sustainable employment and income. It is basically a social and economic process of unlimited duration, which primarily takes place on the local level (General Assembly, 2006, p.8). As reintegration in comparison to disarmament or demobilisation cannot be imposed on a society, it is often considered the “weakest link in the DDR chain” (Sami Faltas, n.d. cited in Kirsten Fisher, 2013, p.8).

DDR processes have frequently been criticised in the past for making disarmament a pre-condition for demobilisation and for receiving reintegration support (Villanueva O´Driscoll, Loots and Derluyn, 2013, p.117). However, this approach has proven problematic as not everyone who has been member of an armed group has necessarily borne a weapon. A case in point would be spies or persons dedicated to intelligence services. Some have recommended to include the realm of “rehabilitation” into DDR, thus converting DDR into DDRR. However, this suggestion did not find broad approval. Among others, it was criticised that the inclusion of rehabilitation would give a “pathological connotation” to the concept.

(19)

19 monitoring it. Lastly, support by key international actors is needed for the development of mediation mechanisms and the exertion of coordinated economic, political and security pressure to achieve the implementation of DDR in the broader peace context. Examples for commonly used mechanisms include high-level security commissions to support the implementation of DDR as well as bilateral or multilateral security forces with the necessary mandate and the political will of the international community to enforce the peace agreement (Ball and van de Goor, 2006, p.5).

In summary, DDR can be understood as consisting of three components: the systematic collection of all sorts of arms, the formal dismissal of former combatants from armed groups and the formal process undergone by ex-combatants to prepare them for a life as civilian.

3.3 Child soldier

This section is dedicated to inform the reader in greater detail about the concept ‘child soldier´. For this purpose the term will firstly be clearly determined. Afterwards, in order to allow for a better understanding background information about the use of child soldiers will be provided.

(20)

20 ratified by all with the exception of the United States and South Sudan, the age limit of 18 can be considered as binding under customary international law with regard to the definition of childhood (No Peace without Justice and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2002, p36). However, states still have their own laws to define when a person is old enough to marry, vote or be held legally responsible for criminal acts (Aptel and Ladisch, 2011, p.8).

Departing from the point of view that a ‘child’ is every person under 18, a child soldier or a child associated with an armed force or armed group is according to the Paris Principles “any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities” (UNICEF, 2007, p.7).

Child soldiers are not a new phenomenon. During the middle Ages noble children were sent to become the knaves of knights. In this position they accompanied their instructors to the battlefield and participated actively in the fights. In Nazi-Germany the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) trained kids from 14 years onwards to fight. Especially towards the end of the war, many teenagers were used as anti-aircraft auxiliaries or in the home guard. As mentioned in the introductory part, it is hard to say how many children are actively engaged with armed groups nowadays as numbers constantly change (Child Soldier International, n.d.). UNICEF estimates that more than 300 000 children are involved in around 30 conflicts worldwide, although the principle that children should not be engaged in armed conflict is today, at least officially, almost universally accepted (UNICEF, n.d. and Child Soldiers International, 2012, p.15). However, in reality, children can still be found in governmental military forces. Between 2010 and 2012, the armies of ten countries, namely, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, United Kingdom and Yemen employed children and let them participate in hostilities. If one broadens the focus and also includes further official elements under states´ responsibility like state-allied armed groups, one counts even 17 states who have made use of child soldiers during this time period, namely the aforementioned, plus Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Iraq, the Philippines, Rwanda and Thailand. Three other countries, Colombia, Israel and Syria did not formally recruit children, but nevertheless used them for military purposes such as intelligence services or as human shields (Child Soldiers International, 2012, p.11). Thus, one can see a discrepancy between the reality and the theoretical legal framework concerning the use of child soldiers, which will be outlined in the following chapter.

3.4. Theoretical Framework

(21)

21 encompasses a justice process providing the framework for judicial prosecution of perpetrators of gross human rights violations, a reparation process to remedy the victims of these acts, a truth process to carefully investigate the atrocities committed and an institutional reform process to avoid the re-occurrence of these kinds of crimes (Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2009, para.4). Despite the importance of all this elements for the successful transition of a society from war to peace, this thesis will solely focus on the first two elements, the justice process and the truth process, as these two components directly influence DDR. With regard to DDR, the thesis will leave disarmament and demobilisation aside and will solely concentrate on the reintegration part - “the weakest link in the DDR chain” (Sami Faltas, n.d. in Fisher, 2013, p. 8).

The correlation between the two is relevant for several reasons. Both concepts share the long-term goal of peace and reconciliation. However, their co-existences might also cause tensions as their ways to peace differ (United Nations, 2009, p.2). While DDR intents to achieve peace through successful reintegration and forgiveness, Transitional Justice attempts to establish peace by asking for accountability and justice. In addition, the two concepts possess different target groups. While DDR-programmes are primarily directed towards former combatants, Transitional Justice also addresses victims and the society in general. The lack of coordination between the two might result in unequal outcomes, for example, that victims receive less attention and less compensation for the harm they suffered than the former ex-combatants responsible for the damage. This disequilibrium might cause incomprehension and frustration from victims’ side and contributes to the criticism that Transitional Justice rewards violent behaviour. It seems therefore necessary to address this imbalance through increased coordination and collaboration between DDR and Transitional Justice. In consequence, this might help to increase the legitimacy of DDR in the eyes of affected communities through accountability, truth-seeking and institutional reform (United Nations, 2009, p.3-4).This again might augment the willingness of victims to receive ex-combatants back in their communities (United Nations, 2009, p.2).

(22)

22 too narrow, waste already limited resources and reinforce divisions and animosity between groups. In consequence, holding child soldiers accountable under a judicial process can either benefit their reintegration as victims feel that justice has been done or it can harm reintegration as former child soldiers are criminalised, which might result in fear, distrust and anger from side of the receiving communities towards these agents. Secondly, the reparation process has the potential to favour the reintegration by providing the necessary means to overcome the challenges child soldiers face upon reintegration. However, if the receiving communities get the impression that only the child soldiers are compensated while they self have also suffered from the impact of war, reparations can also negatively influence reintegration. Based on these considerations the thesis will investigate how the established structures of Transitional Justice have supported the reintegration of former child soldiers in Colombia. Thereby, not only the reparations and punishments as such are of interest, but particularly the receiving communities/victims view of these measures. For a graphical illustration of the correlation between Transitional Justice and reintegration, please look at Graphic 1.

Graphic 1: Theoretical Framework

This chapter has provided definitions of the three concepts underlying this thesis, `Transitional Justice`, `DDR programming´ and ´Child Soldiers`. Transitional Justice has roughly been defined as a process which aims to address the legacy gross human rights violations and breaches of international law’. Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes encompasses the systematic collection of all sorts of arms, the formal dismissal of former combatants from armed groups and a formal process undergone by ex-combatants to prepare them for a life as civilian, while child soldiers

(23)

23 refers to “any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities” (UNICEF, 2007, p.7). At the end, the theoretical framework of this thesis was established based on the defined concepts. It was argued that transitional justice can influence reintegration in two ways, once via the judicial process and once via the reparation process.

4. Child Soldiers under International Law

As mentioned in the previous chapter, child soldiers are a common component in nowadays conflict. Being used as porters, spies, suicide bombers or sex slaves often has a long-lasting impact on the further lives of ex-child-combatants as the experiences they make frequently affect the children´s physical, mental and social development. In order to limit the impact, International law provides guidelines about how to deal with child soldiers. This chapter establishes the legal framework provided by international law concerning child combatants. On the one hand it gives insight into the legal basis for the use of child soldiers. On the other hand it provides guidelines for compensating and sentencing child soldiers.

4.1. The Use of Child Soldiers

(24)

24 under 15 years to not directly participate in hostilities (General Assembly, 1989, Art. 38 (2)). The African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child also obliges its members to abstain from recruiting child soldiers and to take all necessary measures to guarantee that no child directly participates in hostilities. However, the African Charter draws the age-limit by 18 instead of 15 (Organisation of African Unity, 1990, Art.22 (2)).The same applies for the Convention on the Worst Form of Child Labour, which also prohibits the forced or compulsory recruitment of children for armed conflicts (International Labour Organisation, 1998, Art. 1, 2 and 3 (a). They are joined by the Rome Statute of the ICC, which considers the conscription or the enlistment of children under the age of 15 into national armed forces or the active use of them in hostilities in international and non-international conflicts as war crime (General Assembly, 1998, Art. 8.2(b) (xxvi) and Art. 8.2(e)(vii))). Thus, it becomes clear that there exists a general agreement on the prohibition to use children as combatants in armed conflict under international law. However, there is disagreement about the applicable age-limit as some legal documents put the age-limit for the recruitment and use of children as combatants by 15 years, others by 18.

(25)

child-25 combatants should still benefit from the special protection applicable to children, whether or not they are prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977a, Art. 77(3)).

(26)

26 International, 2012, p.49). With regard to obligatory recruitment the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict therefore asks state parties to ensure that persons under 18 are not compulsory recruited into their armed forces (General Assembly, 2000, Art.2). Progress can be discovered in this field. More and more countries abolish conscription completely (Child Soldier International, 2012, p.50). Those who hold it up established in their vast majority the age-limit at 18 years or above (International Labour Conference, 2012, §492). Some countries, among them CAR, Sri Lanka and the United Republic of Tanzania have recently changed legislation to forbid the forced or compulsory recruitment of under-aged persons for use in armed conflict (International Labour Conference, 2012, §490). Nevertheless, in some countries, for example Dominican Republic, Guinea or Niger, legislation still allows the compulsory recruitment of children under 18. In others, compulsory recruitment of under-aged persons might generally be prohibited; however it becomes legal under certain circumstances. Cases in point here are Cape Verde or Mozambique. Both states allow in times of war compulsory recruitment of persons younger than 18 (International Labour Conference, 2012, §491). Moreover, one has to be aware that despite all these progresses, children are still recruited and forced to participate in hostilities by national armed forces or illegal armed groups in many countries, among them CAR, Iraq, Pakistan and Colombia (International Labour Conference, 2012, §492, 495 and 496). With regard to voluntary recruitment, the Optional Protocol demands state parties to raise the minimum age for conscription into national armed forces from 15 as set out in art. 38.3. of the CRC to 18 as the convention requests special protection for all under-aged persons (General Assembly, 2000, Art.3.1). Upon accession or ratification of the protocol, each state party shall put up a binding declaration that sets forth the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into its national armed forces and shall present the control mechanisms it has established to ensure that such recruitment is voluntary and not forced or coerced (General Assembly, 2000, Art.3.2). Reasons generated to justify the lifting of the age limit from 16 to 18 included the following: firstly, a minimum age below 18 for recruitment would run counter the established standards on the minimum age for employment in dangerous or unhealthy occupations; secondly, it is sometimes hard to determine whether recruitment was really voluntary; by prohibiting the recruitment of under-aged persons in general, one avoids that under-aged combatants are legally attacked during armed conflict and eliminates the temptation to use the military capacities of under-aged military members; last but not least the lifting was vindicated by the damaging effect the involvement in armed conflict can have on the physical and mental well-being of children (Child Soldier International, 2012, p.52).

(27)

27 of Child Labour and the Rome Statute of the ICC prohibit the use of child soldiers. Due to the widespread acceptation and ratification of these treaties, the prohibition to use children as combatants can also be considered customary international law. However, there is a discrepancy within the different treaties concerning the age-limit. Some treaties prohibit the recruitment of persons under 15, others the enlistment of persons under 18. Moreover, the treaties prohibit the ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation of children in hostilities, yet what this means is up to interpretation. For those children, who have been recruited and used in hostilities despite the prohibition, international law demands special protection in case of war captivity or court-martials. Despite the universal acceptation of the prohibition to use children in hostilities, a row of countries still recruits under-aged persons. Those states, which still allow the recruitment of persons under 18, often establish protection measures to ensure that the children do not directly participate in hostilities. However, the effectiveness of these measures must be doubted. Therefore, it is argued that the only effective way of protecting children is excluding them from being recruited at all. For this reason, international law demands the exclusion of any person under 18 from recruitment into armed forces, regardless if conscription takes place on a forced or voluntary basis.

4.2. Compensation for Former Child-Soldiers

(28)

28 restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition as has already been explained in greater detail in the chapter dedicated to define the concept of Transitional Justice (General Assembly, 2005, Art. 18). The question here again is what constitutes appropriate reparations. How can the sexual abuse of a child be redressed? How can a lost childhood be retrieved? The institution responsible for determining the scope and extent of any damage, loss or injury is the ICC (General Assembly, 199, Art. 75.1). Thereby the Court might face the aforementioned challenges with regard to reparations, namely, having too many claims and too limited resources to respond to them, as well as the difficult task to decide between allowing for individual or for collective reparations, or both (Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, §27 and 35). When deciding about reparations for former child soldiers, it should not play a role, whether recruitment has taken place on a voluntary or a forced base. The reason for that is simple. Reparations, which do not make this distinction, rather have the potential to maximise the positive impact of these awards on the reintegration success of ex-child soldiers, while minimising the negative impact of stigma and blame often found within return communities. Moreover, not distinguishing between voluntary and forced recruitment with regard to reparations, gives consideration to the fact that joining an armed group voluntarily is often considered the only way for children to survive, especially for orphans. Poverty, ethnic rivalry and ideological motivation are among the key-drivers for recruitment of child-soldiers. However, joining an armed force out of desperation can at the most be called semi-voluntary, if not even forced recruitment. Thus, the line between signing up out of free will and coercion is very thin (Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, § 54-56).

In addition, when deciding about reparations the Court shall take the cultural, ethnic and social environment of the former child soldier into consideration. Child soldiers are often not the only under-aged victims of the armed conflicts in their home communities. Experience has shown that benefits, which are only available for former child-soldiers but not for other children affected by the armed conflict but living in the same community, often create tensions within the communities and therefore hinder reintegration. For this reason, DDR-programmes are more and more often community based in order to lessen distrust and create tolerance among the different conflict affected groups. Evidence has been found that this collective reparation facilitates reconciliation and reintegration ( Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, § 62-66).

(29)

29 HIV-infection or pregnancy, which will further result in stigmatization, social exclusion, as well as emotional, financial and material insecurity (Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, §.92-93).

One can roughly distinguish three different kinds of reparations child soldiers might receive: financial compensations, social service packages and symbolic reparations. Money payments have long been the most common form of remedy. However, they cause some difficulties. One is that money payments often made in lump-sums to former child soldiers can be perceived as a reward by the receiving community. This can increase tensions and create conflict between the former child combatants and their home communities. Another difficulty arising from money payment is that they are frequently diverted from their intended use. Money paid as compensation to former child combatants often ends up in the hands of the parents, who will not necessarily use it in the interest of the child, but rather to sustain the family or pay off debts (Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, § 97-100). Thus, it is questionable if the money will really be used for its intended purpose. Social service packages might include a variety of benefits; one of them is access to social services to help to restore family relations. These might have been disrupted by the armed conflicts in varies ways. Children might blame their parents for failing to protect them against recruitment or parents might be confronted with a loss of authority. Another example might be access to education in form of secondary schooling or vocational training. This form of compensation can be very effective as it allows making up for years of missed schooling and enables former ex-combatants to generate an income in the future and become a useful member of society. However, providing education might be hard to realise in a country which has been affected by war as school buildings might be destroyed, teachers killed, etc. Another service that is usually included in the social welfare package is the access to health care and psycho-social support facilities. Many former child soldiers suffer from illness, malnourishment, as well as drug- or alcohol addiction. Mental health problems and traumas are also a common phenomenon among former child soldiers and demand attention and cure. However, the problem with all these social services is that they are quite cost-intensive (Birchall, Franq and Pijnenburg, 2011, § 106-108, 118, 120 and 122). Thus, it might be hard to grant them to all the victims. Last but not least, there exist symbolic reparations, such as the conviction of the perpetrator (Birchall, Franq and Pijnenburg, 2011, § 136).

(30)

30 common forms of reparation with regard to former child soldiers were explained in greater detail. One can distinguish financial payments, social service packages, including access to education and vocational training, access to health care and psycho-social and support, as well as symbolic reparations.

4.3. Legal Accountability of Child Soldiers

It has been explained that the recruitment of children less than 15 years constitutes a war crime based on the Rome Statute. Therefore, former child soldiers are eligible to reparations according to the General Assembly Resolution on the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Genera Asembly 2005, Art.15). However, the role of child soldiers under international law is quite ambiguous. The children have been victims of illegal recruitment into armed forces on the one hand on the other hand, however, they have also been involved in serious crimes such as abduction, bombing and killing. How should one deal with this double role? Can child-soldiers be hold legally responsible for the crimes they committed?

(31)

31 jurisdiction over persons who were under 15 years old at the time when the assumed crime was committed, but persons, who have been accused of gross violations international law, and are between 15 and 18 years old, shall be “treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child” (Security Council, 2002, Art. 7.1). Yet, as the Statute provides that the court shall pursue those persons, who bear the “greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law”, persecution of under-aged, seems unlikely (Security Council, 2002, Art. 1.1). This, plus the exclusion of children from the jurisdiction of the ICC and the fact that no person under the age of 18 has yet been prosecuted by the ICTY or the ICTR suggest that child-soldiers are predominately seen as victims and are therefore not persecuted by international courts (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1998, Preamble).

(32)

32 recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society” (General Assembly, 1989, Art. 40.1). To this end state parties shall ensure that these children are considered innocent until proven guilty, that they are informed promptly and directly of the accusation against them, that they receive legal and appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of their defence, that they have a fair hearing in front of an independent, impartial judicial body, that they are not compelled to confess guilty and that they have their privacy fully respected (General Assembly, 1989, Art. 40.2(b). If considered guilty, certain minimum standards concerning sentencing of under-aged apply. The CRC for example prohibits the capital punishment or life imprisonment with possibility of release for child offenders (General Assembly, 1989, Art. 37(b)). Imprisonment should only be used as method of last resort and for the shortest period of time (Analysis: Should Child Soldiers be Prosecuted for Their Crimes, Anon., 2011).

One could ask why former child soldiers should be persecuted at all. According to the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) of the UN, justice systems have difficulties to determine whether former child soldiers should be considered as victims or perpetrators and if they are in consequence accountable for their acts or not (Analysis: Should Child Soldiers be Prosecuted for Their

Crimes?, Anon., 2011). The answer to this question can be decisive for the future development of a

country. Treating former under-aged recruits as victims shows that a country acknowledges the fact that many child soldiers are forcefully recruited. Being threatened by the murder of their families, being put under drugs, or being brainwashed, one can argue that these children did not have another option than to obey the recruiters. Many also join ´semi-voluntarily´, namely due to economic reasons. Underdevelopment, poverty and the lack of alternatives are key-drivers in the recruitment of child soldiers. Thus, one can claim that treating former child-soldiers purely as victims is only fair, as they did not have another option to survive.

(33)

33 Villanueva O´Driscoll, Loots and Derluyn, 2013, p.121). Furthermore, how could one justify that a former child soldier, who might have participated in murder, bombing, kidnapping, etc. remains unpunished, while any regular kid, who has reached the national age-limit for legal responsibility, would be persecuted for stealing or murdering? Can difficult living circumstances and desperation be a sufficient excuse for joining an armed group? One can argue that human beings still have a free will, no matter if forcefully recruited or being pushed into an armed group by economic necessity. Supporters of this statement would thus state that every child soldiers had the choice to refuse to kill. Concerning the legal accountability this would clearly mean that former child soldiers are perpetrators and no victims and should in consequence be persecuted for the crimes they committed.

However, to what extent do child soldiers really have a free will? Can one expect from a 12-year old boy to disobey the order to kill knowing that he will be shot in consequence? - Hardly. Nevertheless, the Statute of the ICTR declares that the “fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires” (Security Council, 1994, Art.6.4). For former child soldiers this would in consequence mean that they should be persecuted, but when proven guilty the mitigating circumstances should apply. Moreover, wherever possible, alternatives to judicial proceedings in accordance with international legal standards should be applied as requested by the CRC and the UN Beijing Rules (General Assembly 1989, Art. 40.3(b) and General Assembly, 1985, Rule 11.1). Alternatives include among others, different dispositions like care, guidance and supervision orders, counselling, probation, foster care, as well as education and vocational training programmes (General Assembly, 1989, Art.40.3(b)).

(34)

34 their suffering recognized (No Peace without Justice and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2002, p.23).

Nevertheless, when considering sentences, the most important thing is probably that courts take cultural factors into consideration. Ethical groups or tribes may have a different perception of justice and what constitutes and appropriate reparation than is provided by national legislation. To this end it is crucial to bear cultural diversity between regions, as well as between population groups or tribes in mind as what might be considered appropriate in one context, might not necessarily been viewed as adequate reparation in another setting. There is in that sense no ‘one size fits all’ reparation. Accepted forms of compensation might include official apologies, symbolic punishments by the society or gifts from the perpetrator to the victims for example in form of animals (Birchall, Francq and Pijnenburg, 2011, §69).

To summarize, persecution of under-aged persons does only take place in a limited scope under international law. Persons younger than 15 are not at all held legally responsible for crimes they committed under international law. The ICC does not have jurisdiction over persons aged younger than 18. The ICTR and ICTY in contrast, do not explicitly exclude persons under 18 from jurisdiction. However, to date nobody under 18 has been held responsible by these institutions. The Special Court for Sierra Leone allows for persecution of under-aged between 15 and 18, but as it only pursues those, who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes, it remains improbable that under-aged former child soldiers will be persecuted by an international court. Nevertheless, they might be held accountable by a judicial body of their national state. Proceedings and sentences have to follow international minimum standards. Wherever possible, alternatives sentences to imprisonment should be searched and sentences should be cultural sensitive and in conformity with the CRC.

5. Colombia

After having explained the relevant concepts and having discussed the legal framework provided by international law concerning child soldiers, the thesis now moves away from the theoretical discussions towards the concrete case of Colombia. It will investigate to what extend existing Transitional Justice Mechanisms have influenced the reintegration of former child soldiers in this particular country.

5.1. Context

(35)

35 and peasant guerrilla groups like the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC). The last two ones, the ELN and the FARC were founded in 1964 and 1965 by communist insurgents in order to fight against the conservative government of Colombia and wealthy landowners (Brigggs, 2005, p.41). The AUC, a paramilitary alliance, was only founded in 1997 by local landowners and businessmen in response to guerrilla actions aiming to gain territorial control, but its roots go back to the early 1980s (Jaramillo, Giha and Torres, 2008, p.9). The paramilitaries claim that they only became active due to the failure of the central government to act. However, sources indicate that the paramilitaries were from the very beginning closely connected to the drug sector. The AUC quickly expanded its activities across Colombia. The organisation claimed to fight guerrillas, but in reality the civilian population became the principal target of paramilitary violence (Saenz, 2007, p.52).

The first decade of the conflict, today known as “La Violencia”, was the most violent phase. It was formally ended in 1958 by the National Front Agreement. Tensions, however, continued. In the 1960 radical liberals and other leftist groups started guerrilla operations. In response to these violent insurgents, the Colombian state declared permanent martial law and brought parts of the country under military administration. Martial law was lifted in the 1980s and peace negotiations with various guerrilla groups, who were willing to end armed struggle in exchange for amnesty began. Despite various successful negotiations, the conflict per se did not end. In the 1990s, violence escalated again to levels that have not been seen since the 1950s. The unexpected expansion of the conflict coincided with the raise of the Andean region as exporter of illicit narcotics, such as coca paste and cocaine. The expansion of the illegal drug trade fuelled the Colombian conflict though the provision of new forms of income for illicit armed forces. Particularly the FARC and paramilitary groups used their control over coca and cocaine producing areas for their financing. Due to the new forms of income, recruitment, armed action, military capacity and violence increased in the country. Moreover, a new class of economic elites and rural landowners emerged as the money gained from drug trade was laundered through investments in the countryside (Saenz, 2007, p.51-52).

(36)

36 demobilization ceremonies took place and more than 18 000 weapons were turned in. (Jaramillo, Giha and Torres, 2009, p.13).This collective demobilization was accompanied by a national process of individual demobilization and reintegration of combatants, who decided on their own to return to civilian life, without any existing peace agreement between their armed group and the Colombian government (Jaramillo, Giha and Torres, 2009, p.4). Various rounds of peace talks with other actors have failed in the following years. However, since September 2015, the Colombian seems to be close to a peace deal with the FARC, raising hopes that the Colombian conflict will soon come to an end (Neuman, 2015).

Until today it is unclear how many minors have been used as child soldiers during the armed conflict in Colombia. Figures differ between the government, NGOs and other agencies. One source estimates that around 7 500 children were recruited by all parties to the conflict between 1985 and 2014 (Florey, 2015). The Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, a network of international non-governmental organizations, claims the figures to be higher. It assumes that between 11 000 and 14 000 children have been used as soldiers (Watchlist of Children and Armed Conflict, 2004, p.3). UNICEF counts around 7 000 children (Saenz, 2007, p.54). Human Rights Watch expects that more than 11 000 children have been used as soldiers (2003, p.21). These numbers might seem to be quite low in comparison with other countries. However, the number of child combatants in relation to the total number of combatants in the Colombian conflict is worrisome. It is estimated that children represent between 16% to 34% of all combatants (Saenz, 2007, p.49-50). According to the ICBF, 5554 of these children have officially disarmed between 1999 and June 2014 as illustrated by Graphic 2 (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familar, 2014, p.4).

Graphic 2: Number of demobilized minors in Colombia per year (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familar, 2014, p.4). 10 100 196 394 775 684 526 396 380 415 315 338 282 264 342 137

Number of demobilized minors

(37)

37

5.2. Existing Transitional Justice Mechanisms

This section sets out to identify existing Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Colombia. As the armed conflict in Colombia is still on-going, the country has not launched an official Transitional Justice programme yet. Some might even doubt if this will ever happen as Transitional Justice seems to constitute a big obstacle in the peace-negotiations. The chief negotiator of the FARC, Iván Márquez, takes the stand that Colombia cannot launch a Transitional Justice programme, because the peace-negotiations are not about the transition from a dictatorship to a democracy, but about an internal conflict between the civil society and the state. He adds that with regard to justice, mechanism based on acts of grace and amnesty should be chosen as they are the way to create understanding (Gaona, 2015). The debate if and how Transitional Justice will take place in Colombia is not only led between the negotiating parties, but is also commented on an international level. Conor Murphy, deputy of the Irish-Republican Party Sinn Fein in the British Parliament, recognises that the topic of justice is doubtlessly the most difficult in the whole negotiation process, because both parties have to find a way to leave the conflict behind and to provide a sense of justice to the victims. Therefore, it is essential to create a mechanism that regulates reparation payments to victims. Moreover, he adds that reconciliation needs to take place on the basis of truth and respect for human rights (Gaona, 2015).

The implementation of a holistic, nation-wide Transitional Justice Programme in Colombia is hindered by the fact that the various fighting groups have negotiated and will negotiate separate peace agreements with the government. This increases the likelihood that principles of justice, truth and reparations will not be universally recognised across agreements, resulting in different approaches and plurality in reparation procedures (Jaramillo, Giha and Torres, 2009, p.8). Reparation programmes implemented until today have faced the additional challenge that they were limited to the victims´ of the particular group that has signed the peace agreement. This resulted in serious injustice between different victims´ groups, distorting the purpose of reparations (Jaramillo, Giha and Torres, 2009, p.8).This is worrisome as unmet expectations with regard to DDR and Transitional Justice might create a barrier to justice and peace as argued by the ICTJ (Jaramillo, Giha and Torres, 2009, p.9).

(38)

38 sentencing for those whose contribute to truth-finding and reparations to victims. Justice and Peace courtrooms were installed in the Higher Tribunals of Medellin, Barranquilla, Bogota and Bucaramanga. They are responsible for reparation hearings, formalising charges and reading sentences. By June 2013, around 2000 former paramilitaries had undergone a proceeding by Justice and Peace tribunals, but only 14 of them had received a sentence at the end (International Center for Transitional Justice, n.d.a, § Background: Demobilization of paramilitary groups, Justice and Peace Law, Victims’ Law, and peace talks with the FARC). Other institutions established by the Justice and Peace Law include the Justice and Peace Unit of the Attorney General’s Office, which is responsible for the investigation and charge of postulates, the Justice and Peace section of the Inspector General’s Office, which, as representative of the society, ensures compliance with the constitution, as well as the free legal aid section of the National Ombudsman’s Office, which offers public defenders to the accused. Moreover, Law 975 set up the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation (CNRR). It has been formed by representatives of government bodies, oversight bodies and civil society organizations, and had the task to design and implement a reparation model. It was replaced by new institutions in 2011 established by the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (International Center for Transitional Justice, n.d.b, § 2005: Institutional Framework for criminal prosecution under Justice and Peace Law and The Na tional Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation, CNRR). When launched, the Justice and Peace Law was confronted with wide criticisms, as the public feared that AUC members would not be held accountable for abuses and other criminal acts (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, p.99).

(39)

39 sets up rehabilitation measures such as psychosocial assistance, integral health care and other measures which help the victim to function in their families as well as in their cultural, professional and social environment. Moreover, it generates an institutional framework for land restitution and satisfaction measures, including public recognition, construction of monuments and the establishment of the National Day of Remembrance and Solidarity with Victims, which is celebrated on April 9t_{(Internatioanl Center for Transitional Justice, n.d.b,§ 2011: Law 1448 of 2011, or the}

“Victims’ and Land Restitution Law”).

Child Soldiers: The Impact of Transitional Justice on Reintegration: a Case Study from Colombia