FINAL DRAFT

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Pakistan’s Double Agenda:

A Study of Islamabad’s Post 9/11 Afghanistan Policy

FINAL DRAFT

MA Thesis

By Mark Stokreef (s1466496) MA IRIO (International Security)

E-mail: m.stokreef@gmail.com Supervisor: prof. dr. Jaap de Wilde

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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Revealing a Janus-faced state

On November 26th 2011 a NATO assault killing 24 Pakistani army personnel at the Salala military checkpoint – located between Jalalabad and Peshawar close to the Afghan-Pakistan border – sparked tremendous political upheaval in Pakistan. This unfortunate incident was just one in a series of events between Pakistan and the United States in which the two declared allies grew more distrustful to each other. After 9/11 Pakistan and the United States had entered into a strategic alliance in which Pakistan gave the United States and NATO logistical support and access to key intelligence in order to fight international terrorism in exchange for massive military and economic aid. However, in recent years signs have come to surface indicating that Pakistan had continued covert support to the Afghan Taliban forces by providing them weapons, intelligence, and a sanctuary on Pakistani territory.1 American officials have increasingly become aware of this and started to speak out that Pakistan is playing a double game regarding its foreign policy in Afghanistan. For instance, during an address to the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22, 2011, American top military official Admiral Mike Mullen stated: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistani Army and ISI – jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan's opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence. […] By exporting violence, they have eroded their internal security and their position in the region.”2 NATO concerns about the increase of terrorist activities coming from the Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistani border were also fed by statistics. During the period of 2003 to 2006, terror attacks triplicated in the provinces surrounding Kabul, which is adjacent to the Pakistani FATA province, while in the Afghan southeastern provinces of Oruzgan, Kandahar, and Helmand the Taliban attacks multiplied by 11 times (see Figure 1 on the next page). In other words, to say the least, the Pakistani government has played a dubious role in the failure of NATO’s reconstruction of Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime.

1

Sam Collyns, “Afghanistan: Pakistan accused of backing Taliban,” BBC News South Asia, can be accessed through: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15445047 , visited on December 1, 2011.

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Figure 1: Terrorist attacks in the provinces of Afghanistan, January 2002—mid-April 2007.3

Thus, accusations of Pakistani support to the Afghan insurgency strongly suggest that the Pakistani government has consistently been double-playing the Americans. On the one hand, the Pakistanis had been pleasing the United States through its role as a strategic ally against Islamic terrorism. At the other hand, however, the Pakistani government has been very reluctant to effectively engage in counterterrorism operations due to a complex set of factors. Therefore the central question that will guide this study is: How did the Pakistani

government end up pursuing a double-faced Afghanistan policy? It is intriguing to find out

how Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy was the product of an effort by the military regime of Pervez Musharraf to consolidate its power position while balancing international and domestic threats. Although a lot has been written about this topic, it was often written from an American perspective. This study intends to elucidate the double agenda from a Pakistani perspective.

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In order to answer this question Chapter 2 will start by unfolding the methodology capable of explaining Pakistan’s government precarious position. This methodology has foreign policy behavior as object of study, thereby taking neoclassical realism as point of departure and adding insights of Regional Security Complex Theory and Robert Putnam’s two-level game approach to the framework. Subsequently, the methodology will be applied to the case of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy in the following chapters. Chapter 3 will explain that the international system of South Asia is perceived by Pakistan as a realist region. It will also draw attention to the main security dynamics relevant for the Pakistan’s post-9/11 Afghanistan policy such as the persisting patterns of enmity versus India and Afghanistan. But also the troubled American-Pakistani relations will be brought to the fore. Chapter 4 will then deal with the question how Pakistan’s state structure is affecting the Afghanistan policy. The prominent role that the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) play in issues of national security is essential in order to explain the double Afghanistan policy. The fifth chapter will deal more specifically with the essential international and domestic threat perceptions that guide Pakistan’s double agenda and how these threats are balanced against each other. India, separatist movements and the major secular parties (PPP and PML-Q) constituted the major threats in the eyes of the Musharraf regime, while – quite ironically – the fundamentalist Islamic MMA alliance was used as a coalition partner and foreign policy instrument. And finally, Chapter 6 will go into detail on how Pakistan has negotiated on the international level with the United States. During negotiations, Musharraf’s regime skillfully turned its vulnerability into a bargaining asset.

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Chapter 2 – The Methodology: Establishing a coherent framework for

foreign policy behavior

This chapter aims to elaborate the methodology used for this study. In order to grasp the factors and processes that lay behind Pakistan’s foreign security policy it is useful to design an analytical tool that can trace the complex two-way dynamics of international and domestic factors that influence it. Thus, the task of this chapter is to come up with a comprehensive framework for foreign policy behavior that integrates international systemic and domestic influencing components. Three theories lay the foundation of the methodology: firstly, neoclassical realism forms the basis of the framework, completed by Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory. With these theories, three levels of analysis are combined: respectively, the international; the domestic; and the individual level.

Even though existing international relations literature offers fruitful efforts for explaining foreign policy behavior with approaches such as Innenpolitik and defensive realism, their explanatory power is limited because they both lack either the international domain or the domestic domain in their analyses. Innenpolitik theories view foreign policy as being driven only by unit-level forces, thereby neglecting influence of the international domain. Defensive realism, on the other hand, does the opposite since it argues that states are part of the international system – consisting of unitary and rational states – which drives a state’s behavior.4

Besides the need for incorporation of both domestic and international factors into the framework for foreign policy analysis, it is notable to recognize that the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalization. For instance, transnational nonstate actors are now playing a bigger role than before. Arguing this, Jonathan Friedman has captured the features of the 21st century world by stating that we are living in a world “where polarization, both vertical and horizontal, both class and ethnic, has become rampant, and where violence has become more globalized and fragmented at the same time, and is no longer a question of wars between states but of sub-state conflicts, globally networked and financed, in which states have become one actor, increasingly

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privatized, amongst others.”5 However, the relative power of the state is still considered far more important than nonstate actors in foreign policy analysis, since states are the actors that make and implement it.

The integration of the theories into a single framework is a project that has the capacity to keep the systemic and unit level factors of neoclassical realism intact while considerably expanding explanatory power for distinct countries’ foreign policies. The basis for the framework neoclassical realism builds on the systemic structure and introduces unit-level intervening variables that affect the way systemic features are perceived and constrain state behavior. Subsequently RSCT adds value by emphasizing the regional prevalence and social construction of the international system. Although RSCT is not designed for foreign policy as such, it has the ability to map out the international regional structure, perceptions of it, and the influence of interstate rivalries that often carry an ideological element in it. Conclusively, the two-level game approach fills in the gaps of neoclassical realism and RSCT by offering a theory of international negotiations. The two-level game is able to show the complex dynamics of the simultaneous pressures from domestic and international dynamics during diplomatic negotiations between state leaders. By having a focus on the individual level of foreign policy making, the two-level game approach can explain how a state conducts negotiations as a Janus-faced entity. The synthesized framework can thus work toward finding an answer to the question how the Pakistani government manages to survive by simultaneously making compromises with the United States and powerful domestic forces. All things considered, the hope is to construct a framework that provides a more complete explanation for complex foreign policy driven by internal and external factors.

In the remainder of this chapter a brief discussion of the three separate theories and their theoretical claims will be presented. Subsequently, the theories will be decomposed in order to arrange the relevant variables and processes at work in foreign policy making. The analytical categories of the systemic features are first dealt with. Secondly, the state structure as intervening variable is explained. Thirdly, it will be shown how the perceptional factors affect policy making, and finally the two-level game of negotiation concludes the framework. Eventually the framework will be put into a figure showing the causal logics capable of explaining certain foreign policy outcomes.

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2.1. Short description of the three theories

Neoclassical realism

Since neoclassical realism is designed as a theory for foreign policy analysis, it makes sense to let it serve as the central framework for the methodology of this study. When the theory was conceptualized after the Cold War it gained significant popularity among IR scholars.6 Although there is no unified version of the theory, writers that are considered to be neoclassical realist do share a set of assumptions. Neoclassical realism basically takes the international system as setting the parameters and scope for state behavior and adds unit-level variables such as state structure, leadership perceptions of relative distributions of power, and perceptions of domestic threats to their approach. Thus, neoclassical realists share the neorealist vision that a state’s foreign policy is “primarily formed by its place in the international system and in particular by its relative power capabilities.”7

However, the relative distribution of power does not express itself in foreign policy outcomes on a one-to-one scale, because it has to be translated through intervening unit-level variables. Thus, neoclassical realists diverge from neorealists because they are skeptical of the neorealist notion that the international distribution of power alone can explain the behavior of states. They emphasize that the systemic factors have to be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.8 The causal logic of neoclassical realism thereby “places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior.”9

This logic also implicates that states are not seen as unitary actors all over the world with similar sets of interests. State strength differs from state to state and it is defined as the ability of a state to mobilize and direct the resources at its deposal in the pursuit of particular interests.10 In other words, different types of states possess different capacities to translate the various elements of national power into state power. This helps to explain why different states or a single state at different times, pursue distinct international strategies while facing similar threats.11 Therefore, neoclassical realism hovers between determinism of neorealism and

6

John Baylis and Steve Smith, ed. The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003, p. 99.

7

Walter Carlsnaes, “Current Approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis, Approaches Based on a Structural Perspective,” from Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 2002.

8

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998, 146.

9

Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition,” in Ira Katnelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), p 211.

10

Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998, p. 5.

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voluntarism of classical realism by simultaneously attaching value to the systemic level, state structure, and leadership perceptions as determinants of state behavior. Another important in neoclassical realist thinking assumption is that the state, embodied in the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE), is primarily committed to advancing the security or power of the entire nation.12 Neoclassical realists believe that international anarchy and the distribution of power condition the pursuit of security. They assume that “politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty.”13

A point of criticism towards neoclassical realism is that the link between objective material power capabilities and policymakers’ subjective assessment of these capabilities stays a bit vague. It does not explain in great detail how this logic works. This gap of explanatory deficit can be filled up by the behavioral approach of the two-level game which accounts for the actual short term decisions in greater detail with the inclusion of individual level and psychological factors. This is important because the inclusion of individual level factors affects how political actors may perceive their own and other state’s capabilities and how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy.14

Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is constructed as a framework to map out the main security dynamics within regions of the world.15 RSCT diverged from the earlier devised Classical Regional Complex Theory by also operationalizing the societal, economic, and environmental sectors into the security debate besides the traditional political and military sectors. Moreover, RSCT also opens up the space for nonstate actors. The definition of a regional security complex (RSC) fully captures this more nuanced view by describing it as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”16

This means that most of the security interaction is interdependent in a security

12

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 56.

13

Ibid., p. 4.

14

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), 168.

15

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1998; and Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003.

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complex. RSCT mixes materialist notions of security with ideational aspects. It looks at distributions of power among territorial units and the social construction of patterns of amity and enmity which together constitute a regional security complex.17 Moreover, the constructivist method of the securitization theory is able to explain how actors perceive the international system and how certain issues are securitized.

The main argument of RSCT is that the regional level of analysis is dominant for international security affairs in comparison to the global, interregional, and national level. The general picture of a RSC shows the conjunction of two levels: the interplay of global powers at the system level, and clusters of close security interdependence at the regional level. Thus RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance and penetrate in other regions, and the subsystem level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region. The premise that “most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones” explains the dominance of the regional level.18 Regionalist dominance was strengthened after the Cold War ended, since effectively ending systemic global bipolarity, the post-Cold War period led to the reduction of superpower interference in regions all over the world. The United States had fewer incentives to interfere in Third World regions because they no longer had to fight proxy wars against its former rival the Soviet Union. As a result of this, local powers had more space to maneuver relatively independent from interfering superpowers.19 Although 9/11 posited a renewed incentive for the United States to expand its interference by initiating the War on Terror; this did not lead to a significant change in the systemic dominance of the regionalist level in international politics.

17

Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991, p. 211.

18

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1998, p. 16.

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Two-level game

In 1988 political scientist Robert Putnam developed a model for international negotiation analysis.20 In his publication, Putnam argued that negotiations can be conceived as a two-level game, meaning that negotiators simultaneously have to strike deals at the international and the domestic table. At the international table (Level I), negotiators are attempting to bargain a tentative agreement that is as favorable as possible to their domestic constituents. Whereas at the domestic table (Level II), negotiators must secure ratification by its constituents in order to get the agreement accepted. In this entire process, negotiators are thus strategically positioned between the two political arenas in which they try to maneuver simultaneously while keeping both sides satisfied.

Putnam has devised several concepts that make it possible to grasp the complex dynamics of international negotiation. First of all, the success of a possible agreement depends on the existence of a “win-set.” A win-set is defined as the set of all possible international (Level I) agreements that would “win” (gain the necessary majority among its constituents) when voted up or down.21 So a win-set is the overlap between perceptions of acceptable outcomes at both levels of negotiation. Without that overlap, no final international agreement is possible, either because the domestic constituency will not approve the agreement made at the international level or because what is acceptable as defined by the involved domestic actors proves unacceptable to other involved country or countries.22

Secondly, negotiators also rely on strategies and tactical skills in the pursuit of a workable agreement. Diplomatic strategies and tactics are constrained by what other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify. The outcome of international negotiations may depend on the strategy a statesman chooses in order to influence his own and his counterpart’s domestic political bodies.23

For instance, a statesman may misrepresent his domestic win-set in order to bargain a better deal. Thus, there is a central role for the statesman as strategic actor. This process can result in political moves that are rational for the statesman himself but may look irrational to the others at the international table.

20

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization Vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 427

21

Ibid., p. 436.

22

Brigid Starkey and Mark A. Boyer, International Negotiation in a Complex World, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p. 104.

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2.2. The synthesized framework

The international system

The deconstruction and construction of the methodology for this study starts by uncovering the systemic factors that set the parameters for international behavior of states. The systemic pressures and systemic incentives are relevant because they shape the broad delineations and general direction of foreign policy. As a point of departure it is important to determine how states perceive the international system in which they operate and how the features of the international system narrow down the foreign policy choices available to a certain state. The features of the international system are the first influential factor on foreign policy choices. As put by Gideon Rose: systemic factors are significantly limiting the options “of foreign policy choices considered by a state’s leaders at a particular time.”24

These factors include anarchy, regional security complexes, and the distribution of power conditioning the pursuit of security. Securitization theory is a helpful instrument to see how the international actors have defined and given meaning to the systemic features.

In this section, firstly attention will be drawn to the way in which systemic anarchy and perceptions of anarchy are affecting state behavior. Whether states perceive each other as friends or foes has a profound effect on the perception of anarchy and state behavior. A realist perception of anarchy – resulting from mutual enemy role identities – is for example able to accommodate interstate wars, not least because of the absence of a supranational authority and the presence of pervasive uncertainty about other states’ intentions. In realist perceived regions where raw power plays an important role, this perceived systemic uncertainty can be countered by forging alliances according to balance-of-power logics. The current situation on the North American continent provides a clear case of a region in which more Kantian concepts of anarchy rule since Mexico, Canada, and the United States do not hold enemy views of each other. This Kantian perception of anarchy effectively leads to a peaceful situation without military build-ups along the border and minimal threats of violent interstate conflict. The structure of the security complex will explain the essential security dynamics of the region featuring the relative power distributions among the states, patterns of enmity and amity, and the produced system polarity and alliances. The interference of great powers into

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regions is explained by the territorial overriding mechanism of penetration. Finally, although being active in the margins, international institutions and security regimes are capable of affecting the security dynamics in a region as well depending on the regional structures.

Table 1: Pillar 1 of the framework for foreign policy analysis

1. Anarchy as ordering principle

In order to know how states perceive the international system the principle of anarchy is the first thing to look at. In essence, anarchy as an ordering principle means that there is no overarching world government arbitrating when disputes between states take place. Yet the neoclassical realist approach views anarchy as socially constructed by stating that “the world states end up inhabiting […] is indeed partly of their own making.”25

That means the content and connotation of anarchy depends on the perceptions from the actors. It also implicates that anarchy is a variable and that perceptions of anarchy affect the regional structure. These perceptions have grave consequences for the international behavior of states.

25

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), p. 153. The international system

Main features:

1. Anarchy as ordering principle: Perceptions of anarchy  rendering self-help or friendly relations 2. Regional security complexes: Power

distributions among principal states + patterns of amity and enmity  regional system polarity and great power interference

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The view of anarchy as a variable runs largely parallel to Alexander Wendt’s argument that “anarchy is what states make of it.”26

Wendt devised three different types of socially constructed international structures (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) that capture the structures and role identities in which states can perceive other states as, respectively, enemies, rivals, or friends.27 This typification is useful for explaining how states operate and perceive others in certain regions. In a realist (Hobbesian) system structure, the use of violence by enemies is then only limited by a lack of capabilities. Whereas when states view each other as friends (Kantian), cooperation is more likely. In this way the system structures function as a package of norms. Norms create expectations from other actors and prescribe appropriate state behavior.28 Thus, the argument that perceptions of anarchy define international relations means that states can act according to realist, or more liberal logics. For example, South Asia can be characterized as a realist region since the principal states Pakistan and India tend to perceive each other as threatening and share distrust about each other’s intentions. These international structures are relatively durable and often reinforced by hostile perceived actions of other states. However since it is socially constructed, on the long run a Hobbesian structure can evolve into a Kantian structure if the states decide to change their behavior by consistently striving for friendly relations and rapprochement, and if subsequently the opposing states respond to it in the same manner.

Security turns into an important systemic concern when states attach the connotation of pervasive uncertainty to the principle of international anarchy. In this way, the perception of anarchy affects interest formation of states in such a way that military and political security can be regarded as a priority over other issues. The anarchic international structure allows war to occur because there is nothing to prevent it except for self-help measures such as military deterrence and resorting to balance-of-power methods through alliances. Thus, perceptions of anarchy offer the conditions to generate a self-help environment.

26

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, International Organization, 1992, Vol. 46, No. 2.

27

Ibid., p. 247.

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2. The regional security complexes (RSCs): Relative distributions of power, and patterns of enmity and amity

Regional security complexes (RSCs) function as subsystems which “have structures of their own and are durable rather than permanent features of the anarchy overall.”29

RSCs modify and mediate the action and interaction of its units. The effect an RSC has is that it expresses itself in regional system polarity and alliances which guide foreign policy to some extent. Essentially, RSCs are formed by on the one hand the relative distribution of power among the principal states, and on the other hand the patterns of enmity and amity. Thus, RSCs are not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power, but the formation and operation of RSCs hinges on systemic patterns of enmity and amity as well.

Distributions of power and shifts in relative power set the basic parameters for a state’s grand strategy. The relative material power of states in a region is an important factor that guides a state’s foreign policy, but it is not determinative and some autonomy is left for acts of securitization by states. On the long run, reactions to shifts in material capabilities can also come in the form of “exogenous shocks […] such as the unexpected escalation of a crisis.”30

Shocks like these can make leaders mindful of the cumulative effect of long term power shifts. Systemic threats are typically characterized by interstate rivalry such as in the case of Pakistan and India. Competition occurs between the major regional players for hegemony over the region. Perceptions of power distributions and threats will be further explained in the section called Pillar 3: Perceptions of unit-level intervening variables.

Patterns of amity and enmity take the form of subglobal geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence. These patterns are influenced by factors such as history, culture, religion, and geography. The specific pattern of who fears who or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions. Moreover, the patterns are “much stickier than the relatively fluid movement of the distribution of power.”31

Interference of great powers from outside the region is explained by the mechanism of penetration.32 This can also happen in the form of security alignments such as the US-Pakistan

29

Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991, p. 209.

30

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge UP: 2009, p. 29.

31

Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991,, p. 191.

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and China-Pakistan alliances. The concept of the insulator state accounts for states that are in between two regional complexes, such as Afghanistan.

3. International institutions and security regimes

The influence of international institutions and security regimes on foreign policy depends largely on the perception of the system. In Kantian systems international institutions and regimes can be effective since states are more inclined to comply with them. In international systems which are perceived as inhabited by Hobbesian actors institutions and regimes have only marginal influence on foreign policy decisions, because they feel sovereignty and territorial integrity can more adequate protected by enhancing material capabilities. Yet, international organizations and co-operational regimes still have to potential to serve as a platform in which states can settle minor discordances.

State structure as intervening unit-level variable

As argued in the previous section, the impact of relative power capabilities “is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.”33

Unit-level variables constrain and facilitate the ability of all types of states to respond to systemic imperatives. International imperatives are distilled through the domestic political domain “which can lead to variations in the way states respond to common international pressures.”34

Thus, the causal chain linking relative material power and foreign policy outputs is one of extensive complexity. The intervening unit-level variables can be divided into state structure, leaders’ relative power assessments and threat perceptions, and pressure from domestic actors. This automatically means that the state is not seen as a unitary actor but the “black box” is so to say opened up.

Before going further with the analytical concepts, it is useful to determine the definition of the state and what is meant by it in the remaining chapters. A state is defined as a set of institutions, placed within a geographically bounded territory that at least claims a

33

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), 146

34

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monopoly on legitimate rule within that defined territory.35 In terms of foreign policy making, the state is viewed as epitomized by a foreign policy executive (FPE) which consists of the head of government, plus the ministers and officials charged with the devising of foreign policy.36 The terms state and FPE will be interchangeable used in this study meaning the same thing.

State structure is the first factor that has an intervening effect between the international system and the foreign policy outcomes. Imperatives from the international system have to be translated through the medium of state power into foreign policies. Thus, state structure “is a variable that severely affects policy decisions.”37 For instance, the more the elements of the state structure constrain the freedom of the FPE, the more the autonomy of the FPE is limited in its ability to respond in kind to perceived shifts in power distributions. In this way state strength may limit the efficiency of responses by states to systemic imperatives like external material threats. However, when there is a high degree of external vulnerability, that can give far greater autonomy to the FPE and extractive capacity than when the degree of external threat would be lower.38

State strength is defined as the ability of a state to mobilize and extract resources from society.39 Mobilization of resources works through the control over economic activities and

35

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge UP, p. 25

36

Ibid., p. 25.

37

Peter B. Evans, et al. Eds. Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 4.

38

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP: 2009, p. 211.

39

Ibid., p. 38.

State structure / state power

The ability to mobilize and extract resources depends on:

 Political institutions

 State-supported nationalism and ideology

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reallocation of resources. And resource attraction refers to the conversion of societal wealth into military power through taxation, requisition, and expropriation.40 The first analytical components of state power are the politico-military institution of the state, and the second set of components is the state-supported nationalism and ideology. Domestic political institutions like the legislature, the constitution, or political bodies such as the military can have impact on security policy choices. In general, “the more influential actors will be those that can veto government policies, or those that can help shape the definition of national interests.”41

The assignment of tasks and responsibilities concerning security issues is often arranged in the constitution. For instance, in Pakistan the military has the constitutional right to veto in those matters.42 The decision making environment in which these institutions operate with the state administration helps to better understand how policy decisions are constituted.43 Institutional arrangements affect the ability of FPEs to extract and mobilize resources from society. The second set of determinants of state power is state-sponsored nationalism and ideology. The ability to mobilize and extract resources is affected by how leaders use these nationalism and ideology as instruments for that purpose. Doing so, leaders are attempting to raise and maintain support for national security strategies.44 State-sponsored nationalism tends to enlarge social cohesion and the tendency of people to identify with the state and state nationalism can subsequently facilitate leaders’ attempts to mobilize and extract resources for national security strategies. In consequence the state-society relationship is enhanced.

40

Michael Mastonduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Towards a Realist Theory of State Action”, International Studies Quarterly, 1989, vol. 33, p. 458.

41

42

M. R. Kazimi, A Concise History of Pakistan, New York: Oxford UP (2009), p. 253.

43

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Perceptions as intervening variable

1. Leaders’ perceptions of distributions of power and threats

The leaders of the state, interchangeable called the Foreign Policy Executive, operates at the intersection of domestic and international politics. Therefore, the FPE is portrayed as “Janus-faced” in the complex threat identification model.45

Those leaders focus on the systemic balance of power where states compete with each other, and are also concerned with the domestic balance of power where substate groups compete for power.46 Deriving from this logic state leaders can act on one level, while the objective is to influence the outcome on another level.47 Put differently, “it is possible that the interpretation of international threats may have a lot to do with the composition of the governing coalition.”48

In this way, foreign policy behavior can be severely influenced and constrained. Please note that in order to deduce national interests and make threat assessments the FPE usually has better access to intelligence about other countries’ capabilities and intentions. Yet in reality decision makers carry out their work in contexts of clouded rationality and imperfect information.

States are the primary actors to define and perceive material power distributions and security threats. Shifts in the regional distribution of power can lead to new opportunities and

45

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 43.

46 Ibid., p. 46. 47 Ibid., p. 51 48 Ibid., p. 172 Perceptions

1. Perceptions of distributions of power (balance of power); threat perceptions (assessments of other states’ intentions); Domestic threat perceptions;

Private policy preferences of leaders

2. Pressure by domestic actors (opposition parties, interest groups, media, public opinion)

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threats for states. However, it is hard to test material power, since different elements of power possess different utilities at different times, and “the relations to material resources can be capricious [because] signals get confused among allies, rivals, and domestic audiences.”49 Hence foreign policy makers do not balance against aggregate shifts in material power alone, but they also define threats based on specific components of another state’s power.50 Put simply, different components of power pose different threats to other states. Specific components might include shifts in territory, population, ideology, industry, land-based military, or naval and air power.51 This social construction of security leads to say that “security is what actors make of it.”52

Stephen Walt adds to this line of thought by stating that states do not balance against power, but against threats. Thereby Walt also refers to “perceived intentions” located in domestic political factors of another state.53

This means that the threat to a government does not need to stem from a physically foreign military menace per se, but a threat may just as well be derived from the ideology of a foreign state. For instance, because of Iran’s anti-Israeli public statements, Israel has more reason to feel threatened by Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions than let’s say Chili.

Systemic polarity does not tell the whole story about foreign policy motivations. Threats can be derived from the domestic sphere as well. Whereas the systemic level represents the threat perceptions of relative distributions of power and other states’ intentions, the domestic level shows that threats may come from domestic separatist groups or internal factions within the political system such as the military. In the latter case, the leaders may be more preoccupied with regime survival rather than survival of the state. The FPE may have a considerable domestic political impetus, such as preserving its own power seat, which could change policy decisions significantly. When leaders feel their grip to power is sliding away they may be more reactive to domestic pressures and hence may pursue more jeopardous foreign policies in order to stay in power. The diversionary war theory carries the same argument by contending that leaders do not only wage war for internationally strategic reasons. For domestically threatened leaders fearing a coup d’état may start a war in order to tighten their hold on power.54 For instance, an interstate conflict can divert attention and

49

William Curti Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 306-307.

50

51

Ibid., p. 55.

52

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998; and Barry Buzan, and Waever, Regions and Powers, 2003, p. 48.

53

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 265-266

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create domestic solidarity because of the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.55

This effect can expand power of the state over society and be intended to weaken domestic opposition. Such domestic strategic intentions are likely to play a part in the content and conduct of foreign policies.

2. The influence of other domestic factors

Although usually the politico-military institutions are habitually in charge of national security matters, the influence of domestic substate actors can still be significant. The FPE is often forced in the position where it needs to bargain with domestic actors in order to secure the procurement of important national security goods to implement policy.56 Political parties, government coalition partners, the legislation, interest groups, and media and public opinion are examples of such actors. Although domestic actors do exert significant influence over foreign policy issues, their influence is usually greater over other areas of policy making because security policy making is often reserved to the FPE which has better access to secret information on national security.

55

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International negotiations as foreign policy instrument

International negotiations as a two-level game can account for external and internal dynamics influencing foreign policy making. It explains how a negotiating side can use political developments in the domestic sphere as bargaining assets on the international negotiation table.

Two-Level Game

International negotiations can be conceived as a two-level game. The FPE, in this case the negotiator, is “Janus-faced” in the sense that he simultaneously has to play the cards on the international and the domestic table.57 He is forced to balance and mediate between international and domestic pressures in this process. By forming coalitions, domestic groups put pressure on the government to take on favorable policies. And internationally, negotiators try to maximize the ability to please domestic pressure and they want to minimize the detrimental consequences of foreign actions.58 In this tricky situation, negotiators “face distinctive opportunities and strategic dilemmas.”59 When negotiators are working out a tentative agreement during the negotiations on the international level, they already know that the agreement needs to be ratified by their constituents on the domestic level. So in order to find a workable agreement, the win-sets of both levels need to overlap. A win-set for the domestic level consists of all possible international agreements that would gain a majority

57

Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, et al., Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkely: University of California Press, 1993, p. 15.

58

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, 434.

59

Ibid., p. 459.

International negotiations as a two-level game

1. Domestic coalition building for ratification and domestic preferences 2. Bargaining strategies / tactics

3. Private policy preferences of negotiators 4. International pressure (reverberation)

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among the domestic constituents when ratification is endeavored.60 If ratification fails it can lead to the collapse of negotiation. It is important for all parties that all actors that participate in the negotiations have to take an agreement home that will be ratified. Therefore, the negotiator “attempts to build a package that will be acceptable both to the other side and to his bureaucracy.”61

The most important factors that determine the size of a win-set and bargaining strategies are domestic coalitions and preferences, domestic institutions, and negotiators’ private policy preferences. Concerning the domestic coalitions and preferences, the size of the win-set depends on the cost of ‘no-agreement’ following the hypothesis that the lower the cost of ‘no-agreement’, the smaller the win-set is. Another aspect of the domestic coalitions affecting the win-set is the relative size of isolationists versus internationalists within the constituents and their preferences. If preferences among the constituents are heterogeneous, as in an internally divided government, it is more likely that an international deal can be arranged, because international negotiators from other states may also try to look for allies at the opponent’s domestic table. Governments may seek to expand another state’s win-set by offering foreign aid or establishing contact with opposition parties. Thus heterogeneous preferences at the domestic level may improve the likeliness of an international agreement. Moreover, if a domestic win-set is perceived to be small it may be a tactical bargaining advantage for the negotiator, because he can use the prospect of rejected ratification to enhance the agreement. Following the same logic, when domestic political preferences are homogeneous with a relatively big perceived win-set, then there is chance he will be pushed around more by fellow international negotiators.62

The second set of determinants of the win-set is domestic political institutions. Ratification procedures affect the win-set size. Here two-level game joins up with the state structure as an intervening variable. The greater the autonomy of the negotiators from their domestic constituents, the larger the likelihood of achieving international agreements is. Paradoxically, the stronger the state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the weaker its international bargaining position. For instance, because of the “effective veto power of a small group, many worthy agreements have been rejected, and many treaties are

60

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 436

61

Ibid., p. 434.

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never considered for ratification.”63

In this case, a domestic weak position of a government may be used for bargaining strategy. A tiny win-set can be a bargaining advantage if a negotiator argues that a proposal would never get accepted at home.64 It is assumed that perfect information about the size of a win-set does not exist. Thus, negotiators operate in a world of blurred rationality. For instance, uncertainty about domestic politics and the win-set can be both a strategic bargaining device and an obstacle in international negotiations. Usually, negotiators know more about their own domestic win-set than the opponent knows. A lack of information about another’s domestic win-set can be exploited by the negotiator by threatening that a tentative agreement will be rejected during the domestic ratification phase. So a negotiator can deliberately misrepresent its domestic politics in order to improve its bargaining position.

Thirdly, the chief negotiator can play role independent from the state it represents in negotiations. In some cases a negotiator has private preferences and motivations autonomous from his constituency. He may want to enhance his personal standing on the domestic level by increasing his political resources or minimize political losses. Moreover, a “chief negotiator whose political standing at home is high can more easily win ratification of his foreign initiatives.”65

Reverberation entails that foreign pressure aims to expand domestic win-sets and thereby facilitates agreement. Foreign pressure can be used by a government to pursue domestic goals. One form of foreign pressure is the use of international side-payments to attract marginal supporters is a well-known practice in negotiations.66 Side-payments function to facilitate the ratification process. For instance, this foreign pressure can be exerted by wooing opinion leaders, offering foreign aid to friendly but unstable governments.67 The hope is then to expand the win-set of the other by relaxing constraints that might otherwise prevent the government from cooperation with their governments.68 However, international pressure may also create a domestic backlash. The chance of domestic backlash is especially present if the source of foreign pressure is perceived as an adversary rather than ally by domestic audiences. If public opinion is mobilized and the attitude of political groups is changed, then

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it can lead to a shift in domestic politics that changes the possible compromises and give-and-take policies.69

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Chapter 3 – The Pakistani security complex and the realist perception

of the system

The first step in studying Pakistan’s foreign policy is determining how the international system is perceived by Pakistan and the actors involved in the region. The central argument is that the international structure of the region primarily functions according to Hobbesian (i.e. realist) logics. Depending on the patterns of enmity or amity and relative material distributions, states perceive each other as enemies or friends through socially constructed role identities. The bottom line is that a Hobbesian perception of anarchy combined with enemy role identities leads states to perceive military power of enemies as threatening to its national security. Consequently this paves the way for an international environment in which power politics prevails and states resort to self-help. Secondly, it is important to find out the most relevant actors and relationships in the regional security complex surrounding Afghan-Pakistani area. Therefore the major security dynamics on the global, interregional, and regional, and domestic level in the Pakistani-Afghan area will be set out. Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, the United States, and China are considered to be the most vital actors that form the regional security complex. Especially, the Indian-Pakistani rivalry in the complex is relevant because indirectly it gives ample substance to Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. As neighbor on the western border, Afghanistan is also viewed as important to Pakistan’s national security. Therefore Pakistan mainly responds to perceived threats posed by India and

The international system in the region surrounding Pakistan

1. Anarchy as ordering principle: Perceptions of anarchy rendering a self-help environment

2 Afghan-Pakistani-Indian Security Complex: Power distributions out of balance; patterns of enmity  Indian-Pakistani bipolarity; and US interference 3 Security regimes NPT and CBTB not

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Afghanistan. In addition to states, substate militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network play a prominent role in the security dynamics connected to Pakistan.

3.1. The Hobbesian perception of anarchy in the region

Anarchy is the central concept determining the characteristics of the international structure. The way anarchy is perceived depends on inter-subjective understandings by states and how states perceive the Self and the Other through socially constructed role identities. These identity formations are capable of producing different understandings of threats from a single issue. It explains, for example, why Indian nuclear weapon capability is perceived as more of a threat to Pakistan than for example to Russia. Enemy role identities indicate “a distinct posture of orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence.”70

Almost needlessly to say, states will respond sooner with force to enemies than to friends. The South Asian region is primarily dominated by enemy role identities between India and Pakistan and can be marked as Hobbesian international structure. The Pakistan-India rivalry has been the dominant shaping force for the Hobbesian international system in South Asia. This perception of South Asia as a Hobbesian system has severe implications for Pakistan’s foreign policy because the system functions as package of norms. The most important realist norms in South Asia are defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and acceptance of military conflict as a way to resolve disputes. However, the South Asian realist structure gives also space for bilateral cooperation as can be seen in the case between Pakistan and China that have constructed friendly role identities. Thus various perceptions of anarchy represent various social structures. This shows that through the social construction of role identities and actual behavior forms of international structures are produced and reproduced by states. Hence the Wendtian argument “Anarchy is what states make of it.”71

The Afghanistan-Pakistan-India triangle is primarily guided by a Hobbesian perception of anarchy because of the enemy role identities (Self and Other) between these countries. Historical, cultural, and ideological ideas of identities of the Self and Other are essential for understanding the perception of anarchy. The identity roles of the Self and the

70

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 258.

71

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Other are constructed through ideological splits and historical skirmishes. Pakistan’s effort to establish Islam as state ideology was important for strengthening its national identity. In order to establish national identity, the Islam has been used as an instrument to stir up the perceived threat of the Hindu-dominated India. This made sense because Pakistan was founded as a Muslim state for all Muslims in South Asia, whereas India was meant to be a secular state open to a diverse set of religious groups, yet dominated by a Hindu majority. India’s secular, federal constitution led many Pakistanis to believe that India was striving for reuniting the Indian subcontinent. On the other hand, Pakistan’s utterances in its constitution of being a homeland for Muslims added to the Indian fears that their “own fractious patchwork of ethnic groups and religions would break apart.”72

A good example of an event in which enemy role identities and the Hobbesian anarchy were apparent and reinforced was the war of 1971 and the subsequent secession of Bangladesh. In that war, India supported Bangladesh in its struggle for independence and this reaffirmed Pakistan’s belief that India posed a threat to Pakistan’s national survival. Reversely, India was confirmed in its belief that Pakistan formed a threat to India’s internal peace and stability as Bengal refugees were streaming into their country.

The Hobbesian perception of anarchy as a “state of war of all against all”73

renders realist norms which are produced and reproduced by states. Norms can be defined as “inter-subjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be,” yet those norms do not directly determine outcomes.74 The most important norms that these states share are the following: survival and national security as primary state interest; preservation of principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-interference by foreign powers in domestic affairs; there is a pervasive uncertainty of other states’ intentions; material and military power capabilities are vital for defending national security; and balancing against dominant powers is a good way to guard national security. To recap, Pakistan’s foreign policies were in general centered on preservation of national sovereignty, survival, relative material and military capabilities, and forming strategic external alliances in order to balance against perceived threats.

72

Barry Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 102.

73

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1651), 86.

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Sovereignty and non-interference remain guiding principles for securitization in South Asia. In the media, the Pakistani government refers to American drone strikes against terrorist objectives on Pakistani territory as violation of its sovereignty. Earlier in 2012 for instance, after a US drone strike in North Waziristan that killed at least 10 people, the Pakistani Foreign Office issued a statement declaring that the drone strikes “violate Pakistan’s sovereignty [and] territorial integrity.”75

Though in March 2012, prior to this drone attack, the Pakistani parliament had approved a call for an end to drone strikes on Pakistani territory.

The realist perception of anarchy has also demonstrated itself firmly in the prevailing fixation on material power. The states within the system attach great value to the distribution of power within the system because they see it as only varying variable that ultimately determines international outcomes. The perception of the regional distribution of power is important for understanding foreign policy decisions. Pakistan has an interest in empowering its relative military capability, because it expects India and Afghanistan to hold hostile intentions. In 2011 for instance, Pervez Musharraf claimed that India still formed an existential threat to his country and blamed it for Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon program. Musharraf explained that “the orientation of 90 per cent of Indian troops is against Pakistan. We cannot ever ignore India, which poses an existential threat to Pakistan.”76 Therefore, Pakistani build-up of a defensive structure and weaponry is an appropriate and expected method in order to deter Afghanistan and India from violating its sovereignty and endangering its independence.

Building up a defensive structure as protection against superior military capabilities and preserving the balance-of-power to enhance national security can also be done by entering into alliances. Pakistan’s sense of regional insecurity is primarily driven by their concerns about India’s and Afghanistan’s ambitions in the region. To secure its own territory and balance against Indian military superiority and deter India attack from using outright violence, Pakistan has formed a long-standing alliance with China and a strategic alliance with the United States. The United States has been an important external supporter that prevented the Pakistani government from collapsing, and secured its survival in relation to the India threat. The US has predominantly been sending amounts of military and economic assistance. The US-Pakistani alliance can be seen as an alliance of convenience as opposed to an alliance of

75

DawnNews, “US drone attacks violate Pakistan’s territorial integrity: FO”, DawnNews Agencies, May 5th 2012, can be accessed through http://dawn.com/2012/05/05/us-drone-attacks-violate-pakistans-territorial-integrity-fo/.

76_{Press Trust of India, “India is an ‘existential threat to Pakistan, says Musharraf”, March 26, 2011,}

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conviction. Balance-of-power thinking still prevails in Pakistan’s foreign policy as Pakistani navy admiral Asif Sandhila stated in February 2012 that Pakistan’s navy was “taking measures to restore the strategic balance” in the South Asian region.77 Thus the region continues to be dominated by realist power politics since it still is “largely a story of securitizations about military power, weapons, and political status.”78

3.2. The security dynamics in the Afghan-Indian-Pakistan triangle

Outlining the security complex of South Asia considerably enables one to understand the national security position of Pakistan. By applying RSCT, the major participants and security relations between those actors can be sketched in a playing field consisting of the entire security complex. It is crucial to reveal the security interaction between all players in the Afghan-Pakistan security complex in order to explain Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions.79 Essential to the formation of regional security complexes are patterns of enmity and amity as well as relative distributions of power. The systemic Indian-Pakistani rivalry and Pakistan’s strategic alliance with the United States exemplify the most important security dynamics shaping Pakistan’s post-9/11 Afghanistan policy. Moreover, the covert usage of the Afghan Taliban as policy instrument to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan must be borne in mind because all connections between the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Taliban had not been cut off after 9/11.

The Afghanistan War is the context in which interests of global, regional, and domestic security complexes have crossed each other. Starting at the regional level, India and Afghanistan are identified as the essential actors that share a high degree of security interdependence. With these countries Pakistan has developed patterns of enmity. Conflicting territorial claims and disputes since Pakistan’s inception have contributed to the threat perceptions between the countries. As a result the Pakistani state views itself as flanked by two potential countries that pose a threat to its survival.80 At the global and interregional level,

77

Ansari Usman, “Experts Way of Pakistan Nuke Claims: Few Details Available on Naval Strike Capability”, May 26, 2012, accessible through: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120526/DEFREG03/305260001/Experts-Wary-Pakistan-Nuke-Claims?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE.

78

Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 124.

79

The definition of a regional security complex is “group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” See Buzan, 1991, p. 190.

80

FINAL DRAFT

Pakistan’s Double Agenda:

A Study of Islamabad’s Post 9/11 Afghanistan Policy

FINAL DRAFT

Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction: Revealing a Janus-faced state

Chapter 2 – The Methodology: Establishing a coherent framework for

foreign policy behavior

Chapter 3 – The Pakistani security complex and the realist perception

of the system