The sense of the Senate.
The implications of the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution for global climate politics.
Masterthesis Jan Minno RozendalVersion 2 – 7/1/2014
Table of Content
Introduction 3
Chapter 1. The Politics of Climate Change 7
1.1 Climate Change and Human Activity 7
1.2 The political spectrum 9
1.3 The road to Kyoto 12
1.4 The US Senate 13
Chapter 2. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution 16
2.1 The Resolution 16
2.2 Introduction on the Senate floor 17
2.3 The Senate Hearings 20
2.3.1 The Subcommittee 20
2.3.2 First Hearing 21
2.3.3 Second Hearing 25
2.4 The Vote on Byrd-Hagel 27
Chapter 3. Kyoto 31
3.1 The Kyoto Protocol 31
3.2 Applying two level game theory 33
Conclusions 37
Abbreviations
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
COP Conference of Parties
EU European Union
ICCP International Climate Change Partnership IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN United Nations
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US United States of America
Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases is widely considered a failure. The agreement has not succeeded in producing significant success in the form of normative changes in its parties in the area of a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.1 One of the often cited reasons for the ultimate failure of the
Protocol is the lack of endorsement of the United States of America (US), an important power in the area of global warming. This importance is manifold. For one, the US is in effect the major emitter of greenhouse gases.2 Second, its government has been the most important funder of scientific research on the subject of
global warming. Third, the US has historically taken on a leadership role in many global issues. One should only think of areas such as international law, politics, defense and social matters, as well as issues regarding the environment like ozone depletion.
To be sure, the US government was present at all major international meetings concerning the issue of global warming. It was a negotiating party at Kyoto in 1997, and it endorsed its outcome. Eventually it would even go ahead and sign the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. However, in the years thereafter it never sought to ratify it. In fact, trying to do so could as well be regarded as a ‘mission impossible’ as the US Senate, the ratifying party under the US Constitution, in the summer of 1997 had already adopted the so-called Byrd-Hagel Resolution. This Resolution in firm terms rallied against any Kyoto-like Protocol, even as the so-called Conference of Parties (COP) at Kyoto itself was only scheduled to start about half a year later.
This paper resolves around a two-fold question, being why the Byrd-Hagel resolution was unanimously adopted by the US Senate, and what impact this resolution then had on the positions and strategy of the US negotiators during the sessions leading up to (the signing of) the Kyoto Protocol. The first part of this question concentrates on the reasons for the staggering 95 – 0 adoption of the Resolution, while the second part tries to take that given outcome to consider what this meant for the position of the US administration and negotiators before and at Kyoto. Sub questions that derive from this two-part main question are: what is global warming in the first place, why is an action-plan on this issue deemed necessary, and why should such an action-plan be international? What has been the American stance on global warming, in particular in the 1990’s? And what is the ratifying process for treaties in the US, what were the objections of the US Senate to the Kyoto Protocol, and how did the Administration respond? And finally: just what exactly happened at Kyoto?
The literature on the subject of global warming, the politics surrounding it and in particular the American position regarding this issue is overwhelming. US politics in regard to the global climate remains to this day a hotly debated issue on which a lot of excellent books and articles focus. Most of this literature tends to point, sooner or later, to the Byrd-Hagel Resolution to be included in the thought process. However, almost all of the literature is just touching upon the Resolution very lightly, and I have yet to find an article
1 C. Napoli, Understanding Kyoto's Failure, Sais Review of International Affairs 32:2 (2012) 184.
2 Total US emissions of such gasses are higher than any country in the world, and the US economy is relatively
to take the Resolution as its central point of focus. This is the reason why I wrote this paper, as I think the Resolution, when carefully examined, tells us a great deal about the relationship between American politics and the issue of global warming. It was only just recent that a group of Norwegian scientists lead by Jon Hovi took the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the importance of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution as the core of their research, leading in some excellent papers that have helped me tremendously when writing this paper. Their project aptly called ‘Bargaining for none participation’ included papers on US leadership, legislation and negotiation tactics.3 Added to that, their efforts finally concluded in an article in which the
researchers took it upon themselves to interview some of the negotiating parties present at Kyoto, which produced some very useful thoughts and insights regarding this matter.4
Apart from the use of a great deal of sources and literature to answer all my questions I will, on a more theoretical level, use the aid of the so-called 'two-level game theory' which was first introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988.5 This theory derives on the idea that international negotiations really happen on two
levels, on two separate but at the same time very connected playing fields. The first level is the international level, in the case of this paper the parties at the roundtable at Kyoto. On that first level a negotiator will look for the best deal possible that will still get the treaty ratified at the home level, which is his so-called ‘win-set’. The second level then is the domestic level, in the case of this paper the US domestic level where the Administration in order for the Protocol to be ratified has to deal with the legislative body of the US Senate. The basic idea is that a party will only sign an international treaty at level 1 if it is convinced it will stand the test at home, at level 2.
This link between domestic and international politics has some consequences. At the international level national governments want to maximize their efforts to broker a deal that will satisfy their constituency, while at the national level they will seek coalitions that will support them. These interest groups are at the same time looking for pursuance of their interests by their leaders on the international level. Some elements on this notion should be considered then according to Putnam. First, that larger win-sets make agreement on level 1 more likely, as the negotiator has a larger mandate at his disposal. Second, that the relative size of the win-sets affect the international ‘distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain’.6 The
reasoning behind this is that a negotiator with a large win-set at home can be pushed by other negotiators to take on a deal which might not be perfect but ‘good enough’, while on the other hand negotiators with small win-sets can use this as a bargaining tool at their advantage.
The size of the relative win-sets is affected by three factors. First there are the preferences and coalitions at Level 2. In our case we should consider how much the US, its constituents, the voting public, the lobbyists, yes the country in general, finds an international deal on the environment of importance. What are the gains for them of an agreement, and what are the costs of a no-agreement? A second factor then are
3 For an overview of the activities of this project group, see: http://www.cicero.uio.no/projects/detail.aspx? id=30117&lang=EN (last accessed 6/30/2014).
4 J. Hovi, D.F. Sprinz and G. Bang, ‘Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German,
Norwegian, and US perspectives’, European Journal of International Relations 18:1 (2012) 129 – 150.
5 R.D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization 42:3
(1988) 427 – 460.
the institutions at level 2. Of particular interest is the US process of ratifying a treaty. We should in this regard think of the principle of needing a two-thirds majority to ratify a treaty, but also elements like party discipline. The third and final factor to be considered should be the negotiators’ strategies at level 1. As we noted a large win-set may cause a negotiator to take on a much ‘softer’ agreement that he was initially aiming for. He should then take on a strategy that will still get him the best deal possible.7
As the theory goes, if the win-set of all negotiating parties overlap, a deal will be brokered. This means that negotiators are aware of other parties’ win sets as well, and they will acknowledge the position of the other parties’ negotiators. There still is however always the chance of failing to ratify such a deal, which Putnam calls ‘defection’. Such defections are either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary defection means a party will sign a treaty but not live up to it as it is not enforceable. The involuntary defection means that a party signs with ‘good will’ but is unable to ratify the treaty at home, and therefor can’t deliver on its initial promise.8
This theory then gives us some food for thought. Given the fact that the US did sign the Kyoto Treaty at level 1 but never even bothered to seek its ratification at level 2, we can claim that the Clinton Administration was defecting from the Protocol. But was this defection by the US negotiators voluntary or involuntary? To answer this question, I will use the ideas of the two-level game to consider why the basic concept of this theory was not infallible on this particular subject and how defection became a reality.
As one of the Senators during the Congressional deliberation on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution mentioned correctly: proper science should always precede proper policy. In the first chapter of this paper I will therefore, albeit shortly, turn to the science of global warming. Although ultimately not the subject of this paper, I feel it should be the starting point for any meaningful deliberations on the political side of the issue. Some elements, such as the global spectrum and the scientific consensus on the matter, are vital for a sound political analysis and should therefore be addressed. After having done so, I will turn to the politics, creating a timetable of two intertwined issues: how the global community and the global policymakers reacted to the issue of global warming, as well as focusing more carefully on the American points of view and subsequent (in)actions that were taken. In short, what is the politics of global warming in the first place? And while this paper ultimately is on American politics, American mechanisms and American viewpoints, on an issue such as global warming the global picture should be clear at all times, although I will at times refrain from discussing it at length. I will then end this first chapter at the US Senate, and turn the focus particularly on its ratifying rights and duties, specifically on treaties concerning the environment and global warmth. This ratifying process is as noted an important element in the theory of two level games, as it in part decides the size of the win-set at level 1.
The second chapter of this paper will be an in-depth description and analysis of what is now come to be known as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. I will focus on every step that was taken along the way on adopting this resolution, from its plain text and introduction to its consideration and debate, and finally its vote on the Senate floor. I have done so to try and get every aspect of the resolution out in the open. I have taken up the
task to do this as meticulous as possible, as to focus on all the points and issues that were raised in the Senate in this process. As I mentioned, the Resolution is rather well-known in literature, but it is often just named as 'a reason Kyoto has failed'. In this chapter I have tried to make that one-liner into sound analysis, to look for the core of the objections of the US Senate as to why they adopted the Byrd-Hagel resolution by that unanimous and bipartisan vote.
The third chapter of this paper will focus on the Kyoto treaty itself and its negotiation process. I will look at the outset the Clinton Administration had from the start right until the final outcome of the treaty. To be sure, I will do this mostly while addressing the American point of view. However, when considering the concept of two-level game theory international negotiators and their positions play a role as well. I will then try and apply Putnam’s theoretic basis to the actions just before and at Kyoto, looking at any shifts that might have occurred concerning US policy and US negotiation tactics and leverage. I will then end this paper with my final conclusions.
Chapter 1. The Politics of Climate Change
We must leave this earth in better conditions than we found it - George H.W. Bush, 1992.9
1.1 Climate Change and Human Activity
The climate on planet earth is and has always been changing and fluctuating. There never was and never will be such a thing as a ‘steady state’, a natural infinite balance that makes this planet eternally habitable for such plants, insects, animals or human beings that we have grown accustomed to. Temperatures go up and then drop, not only on a day to day basis but also as part of trends in the long run. Ice ages alternate with hot spells, both having left their mark on the environment as we currently know it. In fact, climate change has altered the earth in every possible way, continually changing the ever adapting flora and fauna on the surface and influencing for a great deal which creatures roam the earth, where, in which numbers and in what way. In this sense, climate changes have brought serious implications to the evolution of human kind as well, as apelike creatures millions of years ago had to adapt to new, dryer, circumstances where, for instance, they had to walk for much further lengths than they were used to earlier on. An activity so it seems best done when using two instead of four legs. In addition, climate changes have most certainly caused floods and droughts in the near east some 10,000 years ago, which caused numbers of people to regroup and live together at the same place, which ultimately led to a more organized and concentrated way of living and the subsequent building of the earliest forms of states.10 Causing these natural fluctuations in climate are for
example atmosphere-ocean interaction, land surface-atmosphere interaction, the (in)activity of volcanoes and the (in)activity of the sun, for instance in the fluctiations of the number of sunspots.11
As stated these natural climate changes that occur all the time have caused numerous hot periods on the one hand and ice ages on the other. One such cold period, currently also known as the ‘little ice age’, occurred from about the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. There is still ongoing debate as to how severe, and in fact, how global this ice age, if one can even call it that, really was.12 However, it is an interesting
thought that this period of cooling, which at least to some extend was making parts of Europe suffer from cold, made the inhabitants of this part of the earth look for extra heat. This could be subsequently found by the burning of fossil fuels, an energy-inducing method which as the world would soon realize might be useful in other applications as well.13
The Industrial Revolution which started in England in the eighteenth century by this burning of fossil
9 Statement made by then President George H.W. Bush at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. See: Report of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Volume III: Statements made by Heads of State or Government at the Summit segment of the Conference (New York 1993) 77.
10 U. Luterbacher and D.F. Sprinz, ‘Problems of Global Environmental Cooperation’, in: U. Luterbacher and D.F.
Sprinz, eds., International Relations and Global Climate Change (Cambridge and London 2001) 3.
11 See for more on this the website of the World Meteorological Organization:
http://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/understanding_climate.php (last visited 6/30/14).
12 See the report of the Working Group of the International Panel of Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/070.htm (last visited 6/30/14).
fuels, specifically coals, increased at the same time the level of greenhouse gasses such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide into the air. And especially since the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution spread all across the globe, first particularly in Europe and the US and then later on in other areas of the world as well, the concentration of these gases increased more and more rapidly which it continues to do so until this very day. At the same time, this increase in levels of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere met with an increase of the global temperature and is therefore altering the global climate. This link is not surprising when we consider the fact that greenhouse gases absorb thermal radiation from the surface of the earth and keep it within the atmosphere, basically the same way your average greenhouse keeps the heat inside to benefit crops in growing in an otherwise too cold of an environment. So now the change in climate altered from a natural phenomenon in, at least in part, a human-induced or ‘anthropogenic’ phenomenon.
Although there are differences in where and to what extend these rises in temperature occur, in fact in some places they don't seem to currently appear at all, the average surface temperature of the earth has risen by about 0,7 degrees Celsius since the late 18th century.14 This rise in temperature at some places is
creating a new balance, or imbalance if you will, which might, and as scientific consensus has it, has caused a great deal of strain on this planet already. Extreme weather conditions, very hot summers, severe droughts but also floods and devastating hurricanes have been linked to the climate change that was caused by a rise in temperature which was initiated, at least in some respect, by a rise in levels of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere by human activity. In short: there is an overwhelming scientific consensus that the climate change and rise of temperature of this day is not that strictly natural phenomenon that the earth has seen over billions of years, but at least partly an effect of human-induced action that is making its mark or ecological footprint on the world of this and future generations. Apart from obvious results such as rise of oceanic water level as a result of melting of the icecaps there are even more serious and damaging, albeit also more speculative, results that might occur, like for instance a change in oceanic circulation.15
The scientific consensus for concern on these matters might be overwhelming and clear, the exact implications of global warming are foggy at the same time. For instance: just how much of the current rises in temperature are human-induced? And how much of a problem is this really? And even if the answers to these first question on both occasions would appear to be ‘significant’, what can we exactly do to turn things around, if there is even such a possibility? The answers to these questions may be in part scientific, but even more so political. An ‘ideal scenario’ on such a subject would be one in which the scientific answers are clear and global political action was undertaken immediately. This was for instance the case with the very real and very global problem of the depletion of the ozone layer, which then saw a swift solution in the clear action-plan at the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987. The action action-plan in this protocol was to specifically set up a severe global limitation on chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s), a limitation which was then met en kept. Added to that, it is particularly noteworthy for this paper that the United States
14 T.M.L. Wigley, The Science of Climate Change, in: E. Claussen, ed., Climate Change. Science, Strategies, &
Solutions (Arlington 2001) 6.
15 See for some possible effects: J.F.B. Mitchell et al, Extreme Events due to Human-Induced Climate Change,
took a leading role in both the scientific research as well as the international debate and action plan resolving this environmental problem.16
The climate, however, despite the aforementioned scientific consensus that a global action plan had to be adopted likewise in order to possibly restore some balance, has proven to be a much more troublesome area to find an equal political consensus as to how such an action plan should take shape. Questions arise such as what responsibilities should be taken, when and perhaps most importantly: by whom exactly. How should tasks on this subject be divided and just how much of a hurry needs to be taken. There is by no means consensus on these questions. Some politicians, and particularly in the US, have even suggested that the idea of a human-induced climate change is not a proven scientific fact. Some politicians even go as far as to calling it a ‘hoax’, and that therefore any action on trying to get a grip on climate change is futile at best, counterproductive at worst, and unnecessary by default.17 Moreover, any such action on the matter would
definitely be a costly affair, with unclear outcomes. With doubts like that any political, let alone any international or global political, action-plan would be difficult to create. However, the science on the subject of climate change was gaining momentum at the end of the twentieth century, causing some breakthroughs on the international, political agenda.
1.2 The political spectrum
In 1979 the first World Climate Conference (WCC) took place in Geneva, Switzerland. It was chaired by Robert M. White, former chief of the US Weather Bureau. During this Conference many thoughts were exchanged on the subject of both ‘how the climate was affecting mankind, as well as how mankind was affecting the climate.’18 In its final declaration, the Conference stated that ‘it is urgently necessary for the
nations of the world (…) to foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.’19 In its wake, the Conference adopted the World Climate Program to promote
studies on the subject. The four points of action were: to determine the physical basis of the climate system that would allow increasingly skilful climate forecasts; to develop evermore useful applications of climate information benefiting economic efficiency, the human health of communities, food production and the prudent use of water resources; to determine socio-economic impacts and national vulnerabilities to climate variations and change; and finally to develop and maintain an essential global observing system fully capable of supporting the other three objectives.20
16 For an overview of viewpoints and the active leading role by the United States on this matter, see: R.E. Benedick,
‘Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer’, International Negotiation 1:2 (1996) 237 – 246.
17 A noteworthy politician in this regard is the Republican Senator of Oklahoma Jim Inhofe, who recently wrote a book
about this deeply rooted skepticism. J. Inhofe, The greatest hoax. How the global warming conspiracy threatens your
future (Washington 2012).
18 W.W. Kellogg, ‘The World Climate Conference: A Conference of Experts on Climate and Mankind, Held in Geneva,
Switzerland, during 12 – 23 February 1979’, Environmental Conservation 6:2 (1979) 162.
19 For a short history of the WCC, see:
https://www.wmo.int/pages/publications/bulletin_en/archive/58_3_en/documents/58_3_zillman_en.pdf (last accessed 6/30/14). The quoted text is mentioned on that document on page 4.
20 The entire text of the World Climate Program is available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/wcp.html (last
In short, raising awareness, monitoring and scientific research on the subject of climate change became more and more important and it was a matter of time before the politics would follow suit on the matter. The subject then gained some more momentum at and after the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere of 1988, which brought scientists and politicians together in an combined effort to combat global warming. Co-sponsored by the United Nations Environment Program and presided by H.E. Stephen Lewis, Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations (UN), it called in its final statement, among other things, for support for the proposed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which was “to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts.”21 The first reports from the new Panel would soon follow in
1990.
This international gain of momentum on the issue of climate change was met with developments that occurred at literally the same time within the US domestically. As noted, the country had always been a huge contributor to the science of climate change, as it funded many of the research on the subject. Moreover, as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases it was widely expected to take on a certain ‘frontrunner’ role when dealing with problems arising from greenhouse gas emissions, considering its huge emission rates. In effect, the US might even have to demonstrate a certain feeling of ‘guilt’ for any international climate change negotiations were to be successful.22
To start off, a US domestic debate was commencing fully in the hot summer of 1988. With soaring temperatures that really spoke to a great deal of the public, the US Senate held hearings on the matter of climate change and temperature rises, in the same month that the Toronto Conference was held. The hearings were conducted, among others, by two champions of the global climate change movement in the United States, being Senators Al Gore and Timothy Wirth, both whom would prove to be key players of the debate in the US. Particularly telling at those hearings was the testimony by Dr. James E. Hansen of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) who claimed that global warming was a very real and scientifically undoubted issue, an ominous statement picked up by many of the major news outlets.23It was
clear now that the US had to take some action on the subject of climate change as it also, and perhaps most importantly, appealed to many voters during the 1988 election. So, while the subject had been of no importance to the Reagan administration of the 1980’s, the nominated and future president George H.W. Bush made a statement during his campaign for the 1988 elections claiming that ‘those who think we are powerless to do anything about the greenhouse effect are forgetting about the White House effect.’24
Bush got elected, and as president he travelled to Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992, where the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or ‘Earth Summit’ was held. But despite the promises during his campaign to tackle the issue, the US in the end proved to be particularly lacking in enthusiasm to set clear and ambitious goals in Rio. At the end of the Conference, however, 27
21http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last accessed 6/30/14).
22 P.G. Harris. Sharing the costs of climate change: an assessment of American foreign policy, Cambridge review of
International Affairs 12:2 (1999) 290 – 291.
23 P. Shabecoff, ‘Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate’, New York Times 6/24/1988.
24 G..H.W. Bush, ‘Campaign speech’, Lake Erie, 1988. Found at: A.D. Hecht, ‘Resolving the Climate Wars’, Climate
principles were laid down in the ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’. In particular Principle 7 should be observed more closely: ‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.’25
Two points stand out. First, that developed countries were given a great deal of responsibility for the solution to the problem and second the somewhat vague idea of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. What these responsibilities exactly were, and what actions should be taken within which time-frame, was all left out of the Rio declaration. This was for the most part because the US did not want any obligatory rulings and was focusing on voluntary targets. This vague promise for a better environment without at the same time committing to any real and objective targets was met with disappointment on many places of the world, while at the same time sparking enthusiasm in the US Senate which ratified the treaty within months, making the US the fourth country to do so.
It was another result of the Rio Earth Summit that in the end proved to be of much more value, being the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This body of the UN was submitted to the task of taking the general principles of Rio and transforming them into more accountable actions in the coming years. The Convention stated in article II that ‘the ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’26 Added to that, in its principles the UNFCCC stated that it
recognized the idea of the aforementioned ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, and that therefore ‘the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’27
The vague wording of ‘taking the lead’ and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ however proved to be a problem for actually implementing any goals, targets or timetables. The voluntary basis of the outcome at Rio gave countries little incentive to actually take on any meaningful action regarding the subject. To get any result in the near future, two issues had to be addressed. The first of these was the creation of a clear idea of who takes responsibility for what. The second question that derives from that is in which specific ways actions should be undertaken by these responsible parties, and in what timeframe.
25 See for the entire list of principles: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (last accessed
6/30/14).
1.3 The road to Kyoto
The parties that were present in Rio and that signed the documents including the 27 principles were committed to the UNFCCC which came into action in 1994. It’s objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’28 One of the commitments made was to be a present member at the so-called Conference of Parties
(COP) of the Rio Declaration that would take place every year. Meanwhile in the United States, an important change of power had taken place, with the Bush ticket beaten in the 1992 election by the Bill Clinton – Al Gore ticket. As we had seen before, particularly Vice President Gore was a champion of the movement to cut greenhouse gases and remains to this day an adamant advocate for global action, including a leading role for the US therein.
The Bush administration's focus at the Rio Earth Summit on voluntary goals, and objections to targets and timetables therefor changed significantly when Clinton rose to power in 1993. This change of ideas is seen in four places. First off, the new administration accepted the findings of the IPCC that climate change is a problem, and caused at least in part by human activity. Furthermore, it acknowledged that the US had a disproportionate share in the emissions of greenhouse gasses. Then it also demonstrated a will to make policies to reduce those emissions. Finally it accepted the need for targets and timetables. By adopting this new course the Clinton administration was making sure that the question whether to reduce GHG emissions was changed into the question of how and why such reductions could and should be made.29
With this new frame of mind the United States entered as a Party in the first Conference of Parties, or COP1, which was to be held in Berlin in 1995. After negotiations the Conference accepted what is now known as the 'Berlin Mandate', which stated as follows:
‘The process will, inter alia:
(a) Aim, as the priority in the process of strengthening the commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other Parties included in Annex I, both
- to elaborate policies and measures, as well as
- to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
taking into account the differences in starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort, and also the process of analysis and assessment referred to in section III, paragraph 4, below;
(b) Not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but
28 See for a further look into the background of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php (last accessed 6/30/2014)
29 S. Agrawala and S. Andresen, 'US Climate Policy: Evolution and Future Prospects', Energy & Environment 12:2&3
reaffirm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to advance the implementation of these commitments’30
This clear distinction between responsibilities concerning quantified limitations within a certain timeframe of on the one hand ‘Annex I’ and on the other ‘non-Annex I’ parties, which translates into a distinction between developed (Annex I) and developing (non-Annex I) countries was a new strain of thought impossible to fathom under the Bush sr. regime at the Rio Conference, which had pushed for voluntary, somewhat vague responsibilities and nothing more than a general distinction of ‘taking the lead’ for the developed nations. The distinction has at its base the idea that non-Annex I countries are particularly vulnerable to the possible impacts of climate change, such as severe droughts.31 Exactly how the wording of
this notion of distinction was ultimately adopted in the Rio Conference and subsequent documents has been open for debate for some time now.32
The second Conference of Parties (COP2), a year later at Geneva, saw the next shift in policy from the United States administration. In the Ministerial Declaration at the end of the Conference, Under Secretary for Global Affairs, the aforementioned Timothy Wirth, affirmed new policies that were threefold. The first part was that the US accepted the science of the IPCC. Secondly, it rejected uniform policies in favor of flexibility. Finally, it called for ‘legally binding mid-term targets.’33 This call for legally binding targets was
another step away from the Bush policies, although the initial call for short-term targets (which were focused on the year 2000) now had made place for mid-term targets (more focused on 2010). The new policy meant that the US in 1997, while anticipating Kyoto, was now pushing for medium term targets and a long-term goal more than short term targets. Furthermore, it put an emphasis on flexibility, for instance by pushing for multi-year averages. It also called for inclusion of all greenhouse gases in the upcoming Protocol. Finally, it called for some form of inclusion of developing nations in the debate.34 This last point appeared to be yet
another shift in policy as it clearly went against the ideas of the aforementioned Berlin Mandate. This apparent and surprising change of heart was however swiftly conducted after the US Senate was pushing for its own say in the global climate change debate.
1.4 The US Senate
The purpose of the Kyoto Conference of 1997 was to come up with an international treaty. However, for any international treaty to come into action it must be ratified by the nations that are parties to the treaty. This ratifying process will most of the time be seen laid out in a constitution. However, constitutions and ratifying
30 For the entire mandate, see: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf (last visited 6/30/2014).
31 For more on this distinction, see: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last accessed 6/30/2014) 32 Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments
under the Climate Regime, Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 9:2 (2000) 120.
33 The Geneva Ministerial Declaration can be found at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/15a01.pdf pages 71 – 74
(last accessed 6/30/2014).
34 This new element will be further discussed in chapter three, as part of the Clinton speech of October 22, 1997, just
processes are different for most countries. For some, ratification is merely a semi-automatic ‘habit’ which doesn't cost much fuss, negotiation, deliberation, energy or time. In other words, the ‘negotiators’ at the international level are in these cases supported in a great deal by the ‘observers’ at the national level. As we have seen in the theory of two-level games, this means there is a big ‘win set’ for the negotiators as they can trust the treaty will be ratified at their home country.
However, things are different in the United States, where constitutionally and historically checks and balances have to make sure that not one body is becoming too powerful. In the US Constitution it therefore states that the President ‘shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.’35 The idea behind this is threefold. First, the
President can make use of the advising role of the Senate. Second, presidential power is checked and balanced by the legislative power of the Senate. Third, all individual States have a say in international treaties which is an important safeguard for the sovereignty of the respective States.36 Added to that, in order
for legislation to work domestically any new law has to be passed by a majority at both the Senate as well as the House of Representatives. This is because the US Constitution states that all legislative power is vested in the US Congress, comprised of the Senate and the House of Representatives.37
This constitutional separation of powers between the executive and legislative branch has been of great importance to the debate in the US on the subject of policies on climate change.38 As we can muster,
this system of checks and balances will on the whole reduce the win-set of US negotiators at international negotiations. The institutions of level 2 are of importance as they effect the size of the win-set at level 1. Three considerations should be made on this respect. First off, we should start by acknowledging the fact that the Senate indeed has the power to make treaties redundant. If the Senate does not show any will to ratify a treaty it is in fact a dead letter in the US. Added to that the ratification has to be done by a majority of no less than two thirds of the Senate. And although most of the times the Senate might be willing to accept an international treaty, history has shown that particularly treaties on the subject of environment and climate change have suffered from reluctance to be ratified in the Senate.
Secondly, contrary to many other countries the US President might have a hostile Congress against him, which makes the ratification much harder as the Administration does not automatically have a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In fact, in 1997, with the Democrat Bill Clinton as President, both Houses were in the hands of the Republican party. And the awareness of this fact alone might even cause ‘green’ Democrats to vote against any treaties on the subject of the environment, as they know that the treaty will not be ratified in the first place. So why stick your neck out and antagonize your constituency?
Because the third thing we have to keep in mind is that Senators are not just members of a Party, they are representatives from a State, in fact: two of each state. This means their constituencies matter to them,
35 United States, Constitution, Article II, Section II.
36 See for further explanation http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm (last visited
6/30/14)
37 United States, Constitution, Article I, Section I.
38 S. Agrawala and S. Andresen, US Climate Policy: Evolution and Future Prospects, Energy & Environment 12:2&3
even more so than the party line or any obligations they may or may not feel to the Administration. The voters have a very direct power to put the Senators in or out of office so they will make sure to represent them properly and adamantly. When it comes to the issue of fighting global warming at the cost of local jobs, the choice of any representative will not surprisingly often be the latter.39
This then all touches on the awareness in Kyoto of the fact that ratification might be a problem in the US. This should have been apparent to both the team of US negotiators as well as the teams from all the other parties, perhaps most notably the European Union (EU). Because of such problems to ratify any international treaty, in particular on the subject of the environment or global warming, the ‘win set’ for the US negotiators was considerably smaller than that of many of the other parties involved. This was particularly the case in Kyoto, where the mere theory of a difficult US ratification process became a very
practical issue, as the US Senate had previously that year adopted the so-called Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
39 In fact, as Agrawala and Andresen point out, his ‘green’ commitments might have caused Al Gore to miss out on the
Chapter 2: The Byrd-Hagel Resolution
This Resolution is not a treaty killer, but a treaty enhancer – Senator Robert C. Byrd, 1997.40
2.1 The Resolution
The 105th Senate of the US had a division of 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. In it, Robert C. Byrd had
been a Senator for the Democratic Party since 1959 for the State of West Virginia, which is noteworthy a coal manufacturing State. Senator Chuck Hagel was a Republican from Nebraska, which has some of the biggest car manufactures in the country. Together, they combined efforts in the summer of 1997 to bring to the Senate a resolution anticipating the Kyoto negotiations which were scheduled later that year, the resolution that was aptly named after its two main sponsors: the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. It was submitted as a so-called 'sense of the state' resolution, which does not so much create law but provides an ‘opinion’ on certain matters, as to how they would want the administration to tackle certain issues. Without being legally binding they are, of course, clear signs for the US administration as to how the US Senate feels regarding certain issues. When it comes to international negotiations such as was going to take place in Kyoto, a ‘sense of the Senate’ can also be a clear sign to foreign governments and negotiating teams. They can, in effect, ‘enhance’ or ‘decrease’ a win set during international negotiations.
The Resolution was then anticipating the arrival of an agreement at the COP3 of December 1997 in Kyoto. This third Conference of Parties had been scheduled two years earlier at COP1 by the Berlin Mandate. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution stated that it took note of the division into Annex I and non-Annex I Parties of the Berlin Mandate, as well as its call for ‘legally binding emission limitation targets as well as timetables’. The Resolution had also noted a statement by the Department of State that ‘ additional steps to include limitations on Developing Country Parties' greenhouse gas emissions would not begin until after a protocol or other legal instrument is adopted in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997’, which was against the Senators idea of a truly global solution to climate change. Finally, the sponsors submitted the following Resolution unto the Senate floor:
[I]t is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would--
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States; and
(2) any such protocol or other agreement which would require the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification should be accompanied by a detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol or other agreement and should also be accompanied by an analysis of the detailed financial costs and other impacts on the economy of the United States which would be incurred by the implementation of the protocol or other agreement.41
The Resolution has some interesting aspects to it. First off, it is anticipating on a future protocol, not so much reacting to one. This might be seen as a clear sign that it was introduced to play some role in the negotiation process at Kyoto. Second, its central point is that the non-Annex I parties should be a part of the deal as they had to ‘reduce or limit’ their emissions, which as we shall see later on is a somewhat vague concept. Even more so is the third aspect worth mentioning, being the wording of ‘serious harm to the economy of the United States’, which could basically mean anything.
2.2 Introduction on the Senate floor
On June 12, 1997 the two Senators who were head sponsors made their introductory remarks while presenting the above mentioned Byrd-Hagel Resolution on the Senate floor.42 In his opening statements,
Senator Byrd made aware of 18 co-sponsors and was urging others, on both sides of the isle, to join them.43
The jest of the issue at hand by Byrd was then to address 'the clear need for the participation of developing nations in the ongoing negotiations'.44 This is therefore a call to returning to the goals set in Rio in 1992
when that treaty called for the signatories to adopt policies and programs to limit their greenhouse gas emissions on a strictly voluntary basis. This would have to result in a mitigation of emissions to 1990 levels, a goal, as Byrd stated correctly, which had not been achieved by the US nor by the vast majority of the developed nations.45 In other words, Senator Byrd is focusing on two things here: the voluntary status of any
policy or program and the global participation, which at its turn goes against the division of Annex I and non-Annex I parties as laid down in the Berlin Mandate. These then are the two major concerns for the Senator.46
The issue at hand for Byrd then is not skepticism towards the science of global warming or even an unwillingness to make a cutback of greenhouse gasses. On the contrary, in his opening statement Byrd is indeed acknowledging the fact that global warming is for a great part caused by fossil fuel combustion. He is therefore hailing the aforementioned champion on this subject, Vice President Al Gore, for his commitment on this important subject. However, the move from voluntary to mandatory goals and the leaving out of the
41 Senate Resolution 98. For the entire text, see: http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html (last accessed
6/30/2014).
42 For the entire text of this introduction, see: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/R?r105:FLD001:S05624 (last
accessed 6/30/2014).
43 Which many finally did with a total of 64 co-sponsors signing the Resolution. 44 US Congress, Congressional Record 105th Congress (1997 – 1998), s5623.
45 Only countries such as Great Britain with many closing coalmines, Germany while closing former East-German
heavy industry and Russia which saw a huge decline in industry while transitioning to capitalism made the cut.
developing nations in the proposed Kyoto Seminars is impossible to swallow for the Senator, who in part blames the non-Annex parties themselves. In his eyes the developing world should take on its own share in the responsibilities in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This responsibility indeed needs to be taken as without it, goals of any global treaty on emission reduction will be frustrated as the amount of carbon dioxide which will be produced by the developing world is expected to exceed such production of the industrial OECD nations by the year 2015.47 This exemption of large developing countries is mainly a problem for
Byrd when considering big developing countries like China, India, Mexico and Brazil. In particular China would be the most clear example of a developing nation that, according to Byrd, should be on board when it comes to cutting greenhouse gases. But as Senator Byrd put it: ‘China has resisted all efforts to include her as a responsible party in the renegotiation of the Rio Pact.’48
This troublesome exclusion of the non-Annex I parties then has three downsides according to Byrd. First, that without participation of such parties the process of climate change will continue to spiral out of control. Second, the technological advances in techniques to reduce fossil fuel combustion cannot be put to use at much lower cost in exactly those nations that are not in the Annex I category. This notion takes the stand that the lowest cost possible for an emission reduction is the truly global approach to the problem of greenhouse gasses. The third downside to the exclusion of these developing nations is that industries will move their facilities from developed to developing nations to escape any controls on greenhouse gas emissions. Such industries will move beyond borders or go overseas as this is cheaper for them. This will cost a lot of American jobs, as they will move overseas as well, an issue that the Senator ‘has seen too much of already in West Virginia.’49 This local aspect of his own State then touches on the importance of the
pressure of the constituency continuously felt by US Senators. In short, Byrd states that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to the Rio Pact or to any other agreement which would cause new commitments on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions, unless such a deal also has those specific goals and commitments for non-Annex I Parties.
So far Senator Byrd had focused on the first part of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. However, an additional problem for Byrd is that it is unclear to him what new laws will we required to implement the expected agreement at Kyoto. Therefore, the Resolution also requires that any Treaty signed by the US, when it is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, is to be accompanied by an explanation of necessary adjustments on legislation or regulatory actions, as well as an in-depth analysis of the financial costs and impact on the US economy. This then touches on the second part of the Resolution, which consists more of a technical than principal objection. Furthermore, it is his idea that the importance of the Senate and its responsibilities call for having a voice on these matters, not just at the end of the negotiations, but at the start as well.
The deliberations continue with the Republican Senator Larry Craig of Idaho, who takes issue in the handling of the Clinton administration's on the subject of Global Warming. His objections are mainly based on the transition from the voluntary approach to a legally binding one, and the fact that this transition was
47 The OECD nations are the developed countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 48 Congressional Record, s5623.
not approved beforehand by US Congress: '[T]he administration has not sought, and certainly not received, consensus support from the Senate on its new approach'.50 Furthermore, on the contrary of Byrd, he doubts
there even is such a thing as a dangerous global warming in the first place, and takes issue with the fact that the Administration is denying that scientific consensus on this issue is far from achieved. According to Craig, scientists are still debating the human influence on the increase in temperature. Finally, he takes issue with with the lack of analyses of the anticipated impact of the proposal. He questions how much difference the expected treaty would have on global temperatures, and how much it would cost, and why the Administration is not clear on this issue. It is his view that this touches on the democratic position of the Senate and its consulting role in international treaties.51
This advisory role of the Senate is also of importance to Senator Chuck Hagel, cosponsor to the Resolution. It is his idea that waiting for the negotiations to complete and not respond until then would not properly meet the constitutional responsibilities of the Senate, as these responsibilities are not just to give consent to treaties but also to advice the President on these matters. Therefore he intends to have two senatorial hearings that will be discussed at length later on in this paper on which Hagel promises to ask fair questions on which he expects honest answers.52 He foresees the impact of the Kyoto protocol as huge on
matters of economy, environment, standard of living, energy, competitiveness, national security and sovereignty. Obviously, the US Senate should then have an important role in this issue, and Hagel states that they should ‘let the world know that the US Senate intends to have a very serious and strong voice in shaping the American position on this global climate issue.’53 This is then a clear message for the negotiators at
Kyoto. In claiming this very active and critical role the Senate would reduce the win-set for the US negotiators in Kyoto, at the same time possibly forcing a better deal because of that.
The Democrat Senator Ford from Kentucky adds to the sense that the developing nations are ‘getting of the hook’. This idea of freeriding is particularly troublesome in issues of the environment.54 In Ford’s
eyes, it is useless or even counterproductive to take another step in this direction, as the global environment will only worsen while the economies of the developed nations suffer great costs as well at the benefit of the developing nations. In particular the US and its citizens will endure a lot from this anticipated treaty as the US will experience the most damaging consequences, which have the potential to be devastating once American companies will shift jobs overseas to countries that don’t have such costly emission limitations. This will be of particular importance to his own state, which has large coalfields and many miners at work. It would mean job losses, foreclosures, higher energy costs and gas prices. In firm terms, Senator Ford concludes: ‘So, here's a quick math review. You've got a treaty with devastating consequences for the
50 Congressional Record, s5624. 51 Congressional Record, s5624. 52 Congressional Record, s5624. 53 Congressional Record, s5624.
54 As Saskia van Wees notes, the incentive to free ride is particularly big in issues of trying to create a cleaner climate as
a state can’t be excluded from the benefits of the efforts of others, see: Saskia van Wees, ‘Understanding the Bargaining and Ratification Processes of International Climate Change Agreements: A Two Level Approach’, Paper presented at
American economy. You end up with virtually no environmental benefit. Stripped down it looks like nothing more than a massive foreign aid package paid for with American jobs.’55
Republican Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan is the last to take the Senate floor to deliberate on this issue. He is repeating the problems he and others have with the exemption of developing nations such as China, India and South Korea, which will pass the developed world soon when it comes to emissions of greenhouse gasses. Furthermore, he doubts the science behind the upcoming Protocol, as in his view scientists are still sharply divided on the question if human activity is actually causing the earth to heat up. So, if the science is unclear while the costs are devastating with jobs going overseas, a proposal is not possible in the eyes of Senator Abraham, at least not until the developing nations, which will be the future’s greatest contributors of greenhouse gasses, refuse to be on board to share even the smallest portion of the burden.56
When analyzing these deliberations, some interesting points appear. There seems to be a difference in opinion over how conclusive the science behind global warming really is. In particular the Republican Senators have some serious doubts in this respect. However, according to head sponsor Byrd the science is sound and any doubts on it is not mentioned in the Resolution in the first place. What most Senators do agree upon are the very likely and clear negative outcomes of the Kyoto treaty for the US and the respective States they represent. If bundled together they are threefold. The first and most important elements are economic, such as loss of jobs (local as well as on national level), severe economic setbacks, a shift of industries to developing nations and a loss of competitiveness. Then there are the political elements, such as loss of sovereignty and a possible threat to national security. Lastly some environmental objections are voiced, as the exemption of non-Annex I countries combined with the shift of industries will cause in a net global environmental setback. These objections however are voiced much less than the economic ones. Besides these elements, objections arise as well on issues such as a belief in future technology to take care of the problem, a sense of feeling neglected as Congress in the current negotiating process but most of all the unfairness of the clear division of voluntary responsibilities, goals and timeframes for Annex I and non-Annex I parties.
2.3 The Senate Hearings57
2.3.1 The Subcommittee
The Subcommittee of International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion of the Committee on Foreign Relations took it upon themselves to have hearings on the subject of Global Warming considering the introduction of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. Once a committee or subcommittee favors a measure they are prone to look for written comments on the measure and to hold hearings to gather information from experts.
55 Congressional Record, s5625. 56 Congressional Record, s5626.
These experts can answer questions from the committee members, after which the committee or subcommittee sends the measure back to the full Senate for voting.58 The subcommittee consisted of Senators
Paul Sarbanes (Maryland, Democrat), Craig Thomas (Wyoming, Republican), John Kerry (Massachusetts, Democrat) and the aforementioned Republican Senator from Nebraska Chuck Hagel, also serving as President to the subcommittee. The purpose of the Subcommittee when conducting these hearings was ‘to create a huge degree of oversight to emphasize the high level of member interest in ensuring that the United States ratify a treaty only if US interests are adequately protected.’59 In order for them to do so, they
scheduled two hearings that included political, economic and environmental specialists to consider the possible implications of the upcoming Kyoto treaty.
Before the beginning of the first session Senator Hagel made clear what in his view was the purpose and importance of the upcoming hearings. The issues that the subcommittee wanted to tackle would affect subjects such as economy, environment, future energy use, energy costs, economic growth, trade, jobs, global competitiveness, national defense and national sovereignty. Interestingly he puts emphasis on that last point, which is directly cutting to the job the Senate has to do to. This is in his words to ‘insure that any agreement negotiated and signed by the administration will be fair to America, the world, and that it will not adversely affect America's global competitiveness, our economy, and will not challenge our national sovereignty.’60 The emphasis on competitiveness, economics and sovereignty for Hagel therefore stands out
over issues of global warming, equity or fairness, which would come to being no surprise considering the name and purpose of the subcommittee.
Hagel continues his openings remarks by asking additional questions concerning the subject at hand. They touch on issues like the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, and their respective responsibilities. For instance: How does the Administration think developing countries like China will curb its growth in the future? He is concerned about the shift of policy that was made by the Administration and asks why Congress was not timely informed. Another aspect then touches on sovereignty: How will any treaty be monitored, and by whom? Finally, competitiveness and economy are mentioned when asking how the treaty will affect the US economy, competitiveness, and standard of living of Americans and the future generations.61
He concludes his opening statements with what appears to be a crucial point to the US Senate regarding the possible ratification of international treaties: ‘As this debate moves forward, the U.S. Senate will offer its own unique and important perspective. It is our constitutional responsibility to do so. We should be very clear to the administration, the American public, and governments around the world that the US Senate intends to be very involved and will have a serious, informed, and strong voice in helping shape the American position on this important issue.’62
58 See for more information the website of the US Senate on committees and subcommittees: http://www.senate.gov/general/common/generic/about_committees.htm (last accessed 6/30/2014).
59 United States Senate, Report 105-54, 2. 60 Report 105-54, 9 – 10.
2.3.2 First Hearing
The first hearing of the subcommittee was held at June 19, 1997 and had as panel members Senator Byrd from West Virginia; Congressman Dingell from Michigan; Kevin Fay, the Executive Director of the International Climate Change Partnership in Arlingon, Virginia; Timothy Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Richard L. Trumka, Secretary-Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and Bryce Neidig, President of the Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation.
Senator Byrd, who submitted the Resolution, was the first to be questioned by the subcommittee. He starts his statements by again accepting the science on climate change and commends the Administration for raising awareness. However, the Kyoto protocol in his view has two major flaws, being that it will negatively affect US industry and economy while at the same time not really adressing the issue of the threat to the global environment. Therefore he promotes his resolution, claiming it to be ‘not a treaty killer [but] a treaty enhancer.’63 His main issue is that the developing world must fully participate in the treaty negotiations and
commitments and play a meaningful role in effectively addressing the problem of global climate change. In his eyes, not to include the developing countries was a mistake for two reasons, being that although the industrialized world is the primary contributor to the current problem, that will not be the case in just a few years and furthermore that the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases in the developing world have refused to even discuss commitments upon themselves. He is in particular thinking of China in this respect.64 In short,
while the problem of global warming is in fact global, there is no incentive for developing countries to take on their part of the solution, not now and, perhaps even more importantly, not in the future either. The developing nations would in this sense be a free-rider to the efforts of the developing nations like the US, which would see its industry, jobs and health threatened.
Therefore, in the eyes of Senator Byrd, two crucial actions need to take place to effectively fight the problem of the emission of greenhouse gasses. These are that all nations need to make commitments at Kyoto that demonstrate an action program to tackle this problem and above that they should start acting on those commitments immediately and not settle for vague promises. Byrd then concludes his testimony by stating the importance of the Senate, which should have independent observers appointed to monitor the developments on these issues. On this last point, Congressional observers were present at Kyoto just as they had been monitoring all actions by the Clinton Administration on the subject of global warming rather closely.
Democratic congressman John D. Dingell from Michigan is the next to be interviewed by the subcommittee. In line with earlier statements by Senator Byrd, he also shows awareness of the problem of global warming and the need to actively go forward. He does, however, have six questions as to whether the current climate negotiations by the Clinton administration is taking the right course. The first of these questions concerns the issue what the science really can say and predict about whether there is a problem and how big that problem is. Then he adds why it is necessary to move from voluntary to mandatory reductions.
Thirdly, the US should make sure it is not set up for an economic fiasco, and is the world assuming burdens as well? Then he raises the question if the treaty is really effectively helping the environment if it is not a truly global one. Furthermore, how is this exactly going to work and who is going to enforce it? Finally, he questions why the US should rush into something when it doesn’t have all the facts at hand? He concludes with some advice for the negotiators in Kyoto: ‘I would approach these negotiations the way I would approach a high stakes poker game: with an open mind but not with a blank check.’65 This last point touches
upon the negotiation policy and position of the US at Kyoto, with the Byrd-Hagel Resolution definitely making sure no such blank check (or ‘unlimited win-set’) was present at the negotiating table in Kyoto.
After hearing these objections to the current policies of the Administration, Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Timothy Wirth is called for the Subcommittee. He makes note of the consensus in the science and sets out an action plan for the policy that has three objectives. The first is to seek to establish a legally binding emissions target for developed countries. The second objective is to seek an agreement that maximizes the flexibility for each country to meet this legally binding target. Lastly, his third objective is to recognize the importance of involving all countries in the agreement.66
This third issue is obviously of some importance to the objections in the Byrd-Hagel resolution, and the Under Secretary tries to make his points clear: ‘We recognize the importance of including developing countries in this agreement. Their participation is critical to achieving any kind of lasting success in combating the threat of climate change. (…) [T]he participation of developing countries has been a central piece of our negotiating strategy. We must seek a level playing field in which all countries that contribute to the problem contribute to its solution.’67 To achieve such participation however three steps need to be taken.
First it is important to call on developing countries to continue to elaborate on their commitments in the convention, including by providing information on emissions on an annual basis. Added to that it is crucial to call on the newly developed countries to take on binding legal obligations to reduce emissions. Lastly he calls for the negotiation of a new legal instrument which will include legally binding obligations for all countries, including all developing countries.68
These are in line to the Byrd-Hagel Resolution which he calls ‘very helpful and a very good sign (…) of joining in a very thorough and complete discussion with all of you.’69 However, according to Wirth,
the developed world ‘who has fouled the nest the most’ must take the lead after which the developing nations will soon follow suit. Wirth has confidence this follow-up will indeed happen. He argues that there is an increasing global understanding that action needs to be taken. Furthermore, the technology on the subject will grow in the developed nations that can then be handed over to the developing nations. Lastly the science will continue to help understand the impacts of climate change to any nations in the world. By making these claims Wirth, while not pushing for severe obligations for the developing nations at this moment, is voicing his confidence that these nations will follow the course set by developed nations rather soon, as this will have all kinds of positive outcomes for them. This process will, according to Wirth, happen automatically once the
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