1 Title: Transnational Caviar Diplomacy: Governing and Embracing Practices and
Narratives of an Ambiguous Azerbaijani ‘Diaspora’
Name: Nick Miltenburg
Student number: 10073876
Programme: Sociology: Migration and Ethnic Studies
Date: 19-7-2016
2
Transnational Caviar Diplomacy
Governing and Embracing Practices and Narratives
of an Ambiguous Azerbaijani ‘Diaspora’
4
Transnational Caviar Diplomacy
Governing and Embracing Practices and Narratives of an
Ambiguous Azerbaijani ‘Diaspora’
Supervisor: Mrs. dr. S. (Simona) Vezzoli Second reader: Mrs. dr. S. (Sonja) Fransen
Written by: Nick Miltenburg
10073876
nickmiltenburg@msn.com
Student at: Master’s Programme Sociology: Migration and Ethnic Studies Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam
June 2016
Source of image on front page: http://michaelczinkota.com/2014/03/diaspora-marketing-from-international-marketing-10th-edition/
5
Preface
The concept of transnationalism has fascinated me since the start of my Master’s programme Migration and Ethnic Studies. During one of the interviews I had for this research, one of the respondents explained her view on transnational identities in such a metaphorical way, that it stayed with me throughout the entire writing process of this thesis. She had arrived in the Netherlands in the year 2000 and was fascinated by the size of the trees she encountered, something she wasn’t used to in Azerbaijan:
“I love trees. I have never seen such beautiful trees as here. We have fruit trees, but trees like the ones here, whose roots grow above the ground, I’ve never seen before. When I arrived here I used to wander amongst these trees. Always I was watching at these trees and roots. Eventually, I started to compare myself to these trees. It was as if they embrace the soil with such a force, as if they were afraid to be blown away by the wind or a storm. It made me think and believe that I should stick to my roots, else I will get lost in the Netherlands. If you don’t stick to your own culture and roots, then you are nothing. Then you are chased away by the wind.”
Transnational identities still are a misinterpreted phenomenon. Transnationalism seems to become an increasingly important topic in public opinion as the world is globalising. Loyalties to both home and host state are more and more seen among migrant communities. Among people in the receiving society this seems to be misunderstood and they demand allegiance to either of the two societies. This study provided me with a much more nuanced view on transnationalism and learned me a lot about the way in which the state is tapping into this process. I hope the readers of this thesis will come to a shared understanding on transnationalism, as this phenomenon will probably become more common in the coming decades.
I wish to thank Simona Vezzoli in the first place. As my supervisor, she helped me to focus, structure and organise this thesis. Her helpful thoughts and critical notes helped me very much forward. Furthermore, I wish to thank my second reader Sonja Fransen for her remarks on my thesis proposal. Most importantly, I want to thank the people that welcomed me at their events and those that contributed to this thesis in the form of interviews or by providing me access to their network.
6
Summary
The study of diasporas has gained increasing attention in recent years among scholars (Délano and Gamlen, 2014). This attention has coincided with a significant shift in the meaning of the term diaspora, from one primarily focused on victim communities unable to return to the homeland, to practically any dispersed group of people (Vertovec, 1999a). Not only scholars have recognised this shift, also sending-state governments seem to have largely agreed on the fact that diasporas can be beneficiary to the home-state society in a multitude of ways. This phenomenon is clearly visible in the increasing number of diaspora institutions around the world. About three decades ago a mere fifteen to twenty diaspora institutions could be counted, among those are dedicated parliamentary seats, interdepartmental committees, and even full-fledged ministries. Nowadays more than half of all the states – around 110 – have such an institution. To an increasing extent, governments are attempting to influence their transnational subjects not only through clear-cut policies such as the extension of citizenship rights but also through more tacit framing policies (Gamlen, 2014b).
This study has focused on the Azerbaijani diaspora institution, also known as the State Committee on Work with Diaspora, which was established in 2008. The country has proved to be an interesting case-study. Azerbaijan can be seen as a particularly strong state, with a long record of human rights violations and political oppression. Within Azerbaijan, various studies (Alieva, 2006; Langerak, 2014) and reports (Government of the Netherlands, 2013; EIU, 2016; Rijksoverheid, 2016) have shown how the government is using a subtle combination of co-optation with pro-government civil-society bodies and repression of political opposition. In so, they have attempted to eliminate critique on the Aliyev family, which has been in power since its independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is a strategy which is determined by the European Stability Initiative as caviar diplomacy: “[it] includes a systematic approach to build up friends, to invite people in large numbers. [...] It involves a lot of very aggressive lobbying, promising and then offering positions as lobbyists to people who held very important positions in the Council of Europe before, to send a clear signal” (ESI, 2012, p. 19).
The question arises whether this caviar diplomacy strategy has been rolled-out transnationally through what Gamlen (2014a; 2014b) and Ragazzi (2009) have theorised with concepts of tapping, embracing, and governing. Tapping primarily focuses on the state its rational pursuit for financial resources of transmigrants. Embracing are those (policy) strategies aimed at re-incorporating presumed members of the nation outside the borders.
7 The concepts of governing can be understood in the Foucauldian sense of the word, focusing on the self-discipline of transnational subjects of the sending-state.
The results of this study are based on a combination of the following qualitative methods: (1) a review of Azerbaijani government documents, (2) nine semi-structured and in-depth interviews with members of diaspora organisations and key informants, (3) participant observation at six events, (4) around ten informal conversations, and (5) an analysis of a number of news reports by both state and opposition media channels. This study has found that the Government of Azerbaijan is framing a ‘fifty million strong’ transnational ethnic community of Azerbaijanis, in an attempt to embrace a rather ambiguous group of people. It activates a discourse based on an ancestral link to present-day Azerbaijan, and focus on the ideology of ‘Azerbaijanism’, which constitutes the perception of cultural unity and devotion to ‘the motherland’. In various speeches by President Ilham Aliyev and in numerous government documents, a recurring narrative surrounding historical events has been found. This narrative focusses primarily on the Armenian Other and the violated territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The Government depicts Azerbaijani diaspora organisations with an important role in bringing over the Azerbaijani truth, countering the strong Armenian diaspora lobby which is blamed for false reporting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
This narrative is, to some extent, incorporated by various organisations in the Netherlands. However, this study has shown the strong existing divide based on ethnic subcategories and political dispositions. Moreover, this research has revealed a discrepancy between embracing narratives and embracing (policy) practices. The narrative of a ‘fifty million strong’ diaspora is by no means reality. The way in which the ‘diaspora’ is organised portrays the significant internal variety of ‘the Azerbaijani diaspora’. Moreover, pro- and anti-government organisations are keeping each other in a figurative stranglehold strengthening the divide. This is partly fostered by the Azerbaijani Government as they only work together with diaspora organisations supporting the political agenda of the Aliyev family into a transnational variety of caviar diplomacy.
8
Maps
Figure 1 | Azerbaijan
Source: CIA Factbook
Figure 2 | Map locating Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions
9
Table Of Contents
Preface 4
Summary 5
Maps 7
1 Introduction and Problem Statement 9 2 Theorising Diasporas 14
Characterising and defining the ‘diaspora’ 14
Diaspora typologies 17
Diasporas from a constructivist perspective 18
Transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below 20
Transnational Migrant Politics 22
Explaining homeland-oriented political organisations 23
3 Political and Historical Context 26
Azerbaijan on the crossroad of superpowers 26
Recent upheaval of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 26
The Aliyev family 27
A diversified migration history 28
4 Methodology and methods 30
Methodology 30
Methods of data collection 32
Data analysis 33
Ethics and limitations 35
5 Government Narratives and Discourses 37
Embracing narratives 37
Constructing a national identity 39
6 Azerbaijani Organisations in the Netherlands 43
Fragmentarily Organised 43
State influence and the formation of two parallel ‘diasporas’ 48
7 Conclusion and discussion 56
Answering the questions 56
Suggestions for further research 60
Bibliography 61
Appendix 69
Interview guide 69
10
1|
Introduction and Problem Statement
The start of 2016 coincidently turned out to be a challenging period to research politically sensitive topics in a Turkish context. At the end of March, German satirist and comedian Jan Böhmermann sparked commotion in German and European politics as President Erdogan of Turkey attempted to trial him on the basis of insulting a befriended head of state.1 A couple of weeks later, Dutch columnist Ebru Umar got arrested in Kusadasi,
Turkey, assumingly because of critical Tweets about Erdogan which were said to be reported by Dutch-Turks to the Turkish embassy in the Netherlands.2 This ignited a fierce
debate in the Netherlands on the figurative ‘long arm’ of Erdogan and the limits to transnational identities. Numerous Dutch-Turks were be interviewed on national television to investigate whether they would either felt part of Turkey or would adhere to the norms and values inherent to the Dutch society.
At a demonstration on Museumplein in Amsterdam against the occupation of the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia, organised by one of the organisations included in this research, a controversial Dutch news channel called PowNed – who are known for their assertive interview style – came to interview people to consult their view on the arrest of Ebru Umar.3 Tension arose among the protestors, as that same
dichotomous question would be asked: either the President of Turkey or our own prime-minister Mark Rutte. President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, however, was not even considered an option. The anecdote portrays a particular misunderstanding that exist in public opinion on transnational identities. Similarly so, the media at this instance were rather insensitive for the multi-layered identities of the demonstrators. It depicts the societal importance of studying diasporic communities and the phenomenon of transnationalism even more deeply.
This societal importance is simultaneously picked up by sending-state governments. So-called ‘diasporas’4 are more and more seen as financially and politically beneficiary to
1 See, for example, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36043495>.
2 See
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/24/dutch-journalist-ebru-umar-arrested-in-turkey-for-criticising-erdogan> for an explanation by The Guardian (retrieved 28 April 2016).
3 For the video by PowNed of the demonstration:
<https://www.powned.tv/artikel/arrestatie-ebru-umar-is-goed> (retrieved 28 April 2016).
4 The word ‘diaspora’ is written within inverted commas as the use of the term is highly debated. This will
be further explained in the theoretical framework. I will use inverted commas when the term diaspora is used as if it is a distinct homogenous group (a ‘diaspora, the ‘diaspora’, the Jewish ‘diaspora’) following Brubaker (2005). I will refrain from using inverted commas as much as possible as it will obstruct the readability.
11 the home-state economy or government. In line with this understanding, an increasing number of diaspora institutions have been established in the rational pursuit of governments around the world to reach out to their presumed expatriates. Among these institutions, dedicated parliamentary seats, interdepartmental committees, and even full-fledged ministries can be found (Gamlen, 2014b). Diasporic communities have gained increasing attention in recent decades by scholars among several disciplines such as Geography, International Relations and Sociology (Délano and Gamlen, 2014). These communities are seen to organise themselves in various types of organisations which have become an integral part of civil society of the host-state. Contrary to, for example, neighbourhood associations or voluntary organisations, diaspora organisations possess a transnational character. Ghorashi (2007) noted in her article the important role diasporic organisations can play in the construction of an imagined community in the host-state by assisting in shaping new forms of migrant identities. Diasporic organisations are seen as mediators between the host- and the home-state, simultaneously serving migrant groups with a platform from where they can find people with a similar mind-set or worldview (Van Gorp and Smets, 2015). Studies have attempted to explain the emergence and existence of immigrant organisations (Vermeulen, 2006), the use of social capital by members of diasporic organisations to support the integration in the destination society (Somerville et al., 2008), the effect diasporic communities have as agents for development (Kleist, 2008; Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2016), and the role they play as transnational political actors (Smith, 1999; Turner, 2008; Feyissa, 2012; Burgess, 2014). Studies on diaspora institutionalisation are primarily focused on theorising the phenomena and attempt to explain its global rise (Gamlen, 2014b; Délano and Gamlen, 2014). However, up till now, a link between diaspora institutionalisation and its possible effect on the way in which diasporas organise themselves in the host-state seems to be largely untouched.
This brings me to the main goal of this thesis, which is to link the theoretical discussions on diaspora institutionalisation with the discussion on transnational politics and provide preliminary answers on the effect diaspora institutionalisation ‘there’ (that is, the sending-state) can have on the actual manifestation and organisation of diasporic communities ‘here’ (that is, the receiving-state). In so, I wish to answer to the call by Massey (1999) for more research on sending-country policies, while at the same time focus on the effect these sending-country policies can have on migrant communities on the receiving end of the spectrum.
12 The case of Azerbaijan, as a country with a particularly strong state, can assist in finding answers. As a Caucasus case, Azerbaijan seems to be understudied, contrary to Armenia and Georgia, which both have considerably large politically active diaspora communities. The Armenian ‘diaspora’ is particularly well-equipped and has shown to be able to successfully lobby for political action at different institutional levels (e.g. Panossean, 2003; Koinova, 2010). In recent years, Azerbaijan has established an increasingly prominent role in the international arena by hosting various large-scale events and exporting significant quantities of oil. This is simultaneously seen with an growing record of human rights violations and political repression. Various reports (EIU, 2016; Government of the Netherlands, 2013; Rijksoverheid, 2016) and studies (Alieva, 2006; Langerak, 2014) have shown how the Aliyev family is attempting to stay in power while tensions rise as oil revenues decrease. Apart from imprisoning opposition members and repressing free media, the Government is seen to co-opt with civil-society bodies supporting the political agenda of the family. This combination of repression and co-optation has shown to be effective in its attempt to minimalize the influence of critical NGOs by monopolising the position of pro-government organisations. It is what the European Stability Initiative (ESI) has called caviar diplomacy, named after the delicacy where the country is famous for:
“Caviar diplomacy includes a systematic approach to build up friends, to invite people in large numbers. Dozens of members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) are invited to Baku by pro-government NGOs or by the government directly every year. […] It involves a lot of very aggressive lobbying, promising and then offering positions as lobbyists to people who held very important positions in the Council of Europe before, to send a clear signal - if you are on our side, you might become a well-paid lobbyist."5
Azerbaijan is a member of the Council of Europe (COE), since 2001. The COE can be seen as the most prominent club of democratic European nations. However, a lack of a sizable opposition and the fact that the Aliyev family is in power since 1993 places question marks at the level of democracy of the country. Among diplomats, the term caviar diplomacy was used to refer to the array of gifts presented to them at events in Baku in an attempt to shift their opinions (ESI, 2012).
5 See, <http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-baku-caviar-oil/25162410.html> (retrieved 20 June 2016)
13 The Government of Azerbaijan has established its own diaspora institution in 2008 in the form of the State Committee on Work with Diaspora (SCWD) in an attempt to activate its ‘diaspora’ and establish an evenly strong diaspora lobby as its neighbouring countries. The question arises whether this strategy is also implemented transnationally. Using the theoretical discussion on tapping, embracing, and governing, as pioneered by scholars such as Gamlen (2014a; 2014b) and Ragazzi (2009), I wish to show the existing discrepancy between the embracing narratives as used by the Government of Azerbaijan, and the actual embracing practices and its effect ‘on the ground’. This research will show how the Government is not only using co-optation strategies with civil-society bodies in Azerbaijan, but attempts to simultaneously affect diaspora organisations abroad in a pursuit to alleviate international support for Azerbaijani internal affairs.
The number of Azerbaijani overseas is estimated – according to the Azerbaijani Government – to be around 41 million, diffused over seventy countries. This is almost five times the actual population of Azerbaijan, which is likely to be around nine million (Rumyansev, 2010). By framing a homogenous ‘fifty million strong’ ethnic community of dispersed Azerbaijanis, the Government is attempting to embrace an ambiguous group of people with significant within-group differences. The protracted conflict with Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is simultaneously used to strengthen the national unity by narrating about the ‘Armenian Other’. Despite the ideal of the Government of a united ‘diaspora’, I will show how this presumed transnational ethnic community of Azerbaijanis is organised along ethnic and political lines displaying the disunity of the ‘diaspora’. The comprehensive literature on transnational migrant politics, with Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) as one of the most influential scholars in the field, will be used to grasp why these people partake in transnational politics, how they shape their activities and what they wish to accomplish.
The guiding question of this research therefore is as follows: ‘What are the motivations and ethnic and organisational characteristics of Azerbaijani diaspora organisations in the Netherlands and what shapes these characteristics?’ This question has been subdivided in the following questions:
1. What type of diaspora organisations could be discerned? Are there any differences in the organizational structure, ethnic composition or political narratives?
2. To what extent and with what means has the Government of Azerbaijan tapped, embraced, and governed the ‘diaspora’ in the Netherlands, and how did this change over time?
14 3. Has the intervention of the Azerbaijani state in Azerbaijani diaspora organisations
in the Netherlands influenced these organisations? If so, how?
These questions will be answered with the use of a brief document analysis, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and the analysis of a number of news reports.
This thesis is outlined as follows. First, an overview will be given of existing theories and literature on diasporas and diaspora institutionalisation. A discussion of definitions and a taxonomy will be provided in order to be able to broadly discern the various types of diasporas. I wish to show how a ‘diaspora’ is a socially constructed concept influenced by social and political entrepreneurs and that the ‘diaspora’ can be best used as an idiom or stance, as Brubaker (2005) suggested in his article. Hereafter I will explain the literature on transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below, where I will broadly outline the framework of Gamlen (2014b) of tapping, embracing and governing. This, in turn, has its effect on the political activities of diasporas which will be explained by means of Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2003) extensive work on transnational migrant politics.
Chapter three will discuss the political and historical context in which this study has been conducted. The political situation in Azerbaijan will briefly be outlined and the genesis of the conflict will be explained.
Chapter four will explain the methodologies and methods used to generate the results, which will be given in chapter five and six. First is delineated what narratives and discourses are commonly seen in Azerbaijani governmental documents. This is crucial to understand the actual effect of embracing and governing practices on Azerbaijani diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. Hereafter I will show the existing differences in narratives between the strongly divided pro- and anti-government organisations.
The end of this thesis will provide conclusions derived from the Azerbaijani case and discuss, contest or adjust the theories outlined in chapter two. I will argue that the concept of transnationalism is too narrowly focused on the nation-state by explaining the incommensurability of its definition with the case of Turkish-Azerbaijanis. Moreover, I will discuss the narrow focus of the undifferentiated concept of embracing by showing the discrepancy between embracing narratives and embracing practices.
15
2|
Theorising Diasporas
This chapter will give an overview of the broader theoretical discussions to which this research wishes to contribute. First, an overview will be given of the transition the term diaspora has undergone. Within a couple of decades, the connotations associated with diasporas have radically shifted from that of a forcefully displaced community of victims to practically any dispersed group of people. Hereafter, the various attempts at creating typologies will be outlined to provide a stepping stone from where to analyse diasporic activity. From here I wish to go deeper into how diasporas come into existence as a distinctive group in society using a constructivist perspective. Despite the idea of a homogenous transnational community based on ethnicity, diasporas are seen to create boundaries with the help of social and political entrepreneurs, determining who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ on other factors than ethnicity alone. A particular political entrepreneur is that of the home-state government, which is creating the boundaries in what is depicted as transnationalism from above. The creation of these boundaries are done by the previously mentioned diaspora institutions through tapping, embracing and governing policies. Finally, I will outline the way in which transnational migrant politics is taking shape by explaining the ‘why’, the ‘how’, and the ‘then what’.
Characterising and defining the ‘diaspora’
The definition of a ‘diaspora’ has changed profoundly in the previous decades. The term diaspora used to be associated with rather negative connotations of displacement, persecution, oppression and the like (Vertovec, 1999a). After the Second World War, scholars usually referred to the Armenian and Jewish diaspora, both carrying the negative association of forced displacement (Cohen, 2008: p. 21). Nowadays, this negative connotation has mostly disappeared, and a ‘diaspora’ is often simply seen as a scattered population whose origin lies within a smaller geographic area. This definition, however, does no longer suffice and is in need for further delineation. One of the earliest and best known definitions of a ‘diaspora’ is that of Safran (1991). Safran (1991, as cited in Reis, 2004) has attempted to define the ‘diaspora’ on the basis of various characteristics. According to him, a group of people can be considered a ‘diaspora’ when (1) there is a dispersal from an original area towards two or more foreign regions, (2) the members of the community constitute a collective memory, (3) they share the belief that its members are not completely accepted in the host community, (4) they have a common hope of
16 returning to the origin country, (5) the members are committed to the restoration of the home country, and (6) a strong ethnic group consciousness exists which is based on a sense of distinctiveness. These basic characteristics can be seen as a good starting point, but clearly poses problems when studying contemporary diasporas. Safran’s strong focus on ethnicity and a belief of a shared history in identity formation has been contested and accused of essentialism by some (e.g. Tölölyan, 1991; Vertovec, 1999a; Brubaker, 2005).
More contemporary is Vertovec’s (1999a) work who defined a ‘diaspora’ as “practically any population that is considered 'deterritorialised’ or ‘transnational’ – that is, which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe” (Vertovec, 1999a: p. 1). Even though this definition still is very broad, it steps away from the ethnic bias of Safran’s (1991) definition by seeing diasporas as transnational communities, focussing on consideration and self-identification, which implies that every group of people which sees itself as a ‘diaspora’ can be counted as one. This definition is also a step aside from the negative association of forced displacement, as it just considers diasporas as people with cross-border networks residing in a country other than their home country.
Vertovec (1999a) has discerned three meanings of the concept diaspora. The first is what he calls a ‘diaspora’ as a social form, which implies “an identified group characterised by their relationship-despite-dispersal” (p. 3). It can be seen as the most classical form, as much of the literature on this category has been focused on the Jewish ‘diaspora’ and the later associated Armenian and African populations. The second meaning of diaspora takes a more constructivist approach by explaining it as a state of mind or sense of identity, in what is called ‘the diaspora consciousness’ category. The third type of diaspora is conceptualized as a mode of cultural production, which is commonly used by anthropologists, and can be seen as “the production and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena” (Vertovec, 1999a: p. 19). It is important to acknowledge that diasporas are by no means static, and should be seen as expressions of varying identities. These identities can change over time and space, and can be applied in different variations and different contexts. A singular identity does not exist as an individual often portrays a diffuse set of identities.
On the other hand, the use and definition of the term diaspora has undergone such a radical shift and simultaneous broadening of definition, that there exists a danger of the term becoming useless (Sartori, 1970, cited in Brubaker, 2005). Not only does the term
17 loses its “discriminating power – its ability to pick out phenomena, to make distinctions” (p. 3), the contingent risk of confusing it with related terms such as immigrant, expatriate, or overseas community, lurks (Tölölyan, 1991: p. 4). Therefore, the most useful definition of a ‘diaspora’ for this research are the three criteria Brubaker (2005) has outlined, as he argues from a constructivist view, but at the same time attempts to demarcate. According to him, a ‘diaspora’ is in the first place characterised by its (1) dispersion, as it is a straightforward notion and very often used. The term dispersion consist of a strong affiliation to the nation-state, but Brubaker (2005) argues that dispersion within state borders may also suffice. The second (2) criterion is that of a homeland orientation. Here, Brubaker combines four of the six criteria by Safran (1991) into one criterion which is defined as having an “orientation to a real or imagined ‘homeland’ as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty” (p.5). Placing ‘homeland’ within inverted commas makes it possible to divert from the previously mentioned nation-state orientation. The last criterion (3) he proposes is that of boundary maintenance, which involves the preservation of an identity opposing the host-society. This final criterion has to be seen as essential to diaspora formation, as this is what makes it possible to speak of a ‘diaspora’ as “a distinctive ‘community’, held together by a distinctive, active solidarity, as well as by relatively dense relationships, that cut across state boundaries” (p. 6). Brubaker’s (2005) definition is useful as it allows for constructivist notions of the imagined community and self-ascribed or ‘considered’ definition of a ‘diaspora’, but at the same time reduces the concept to three workable criteria.
The last mentioned notion of self-ascribed membership of diaspora communities makes it difficult to count or quantify the size of diasporas. Usually, when is attempted to count diasporas, ancestry is seen as the main determinant creating a more primordialist understanding of the term. But whom to count as part of the ‘diaspora’ and who decides who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ is often rather ambiguous. The use of the term diaspora produces the idea of an homogenous entity. However, within group differences make it hard to talk of a homogenous group. Generational differences or the difficulty of defining controversial terms such as ethnicity, race or nationality make it problematic to talk of a ‘diaspora’ (Brubaker, 2005). Brubaker (2005) argues that the term diaspora is therefore often characterised in substantialist terms as an entity. He proposes to use the term solely as an adjective:
[…] rather than speak of ‘a diaspora’ or ‘the diaspora’ as an entity, a bounded group, an ethnodemograhic or ethnocultural fact, it may be more fruitful, and
18 certainly more precise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on (Brubaker, 2005: p. 13).
This is in line with what he calls the problem of ‘groupism’, of attributing similar characteristics to ‘groups as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed’ (Brubaker et al., 2004; p. 31-32). In order to overcome the problem of groupism, Brubaker (2005: p. 12) argues to see diaspora solely as a claim, stance, idiom and the like.
Diaspora typologies
Even though constructing a taxonomy or typology of diasporas is highly inexact because of its mutable character, it is useful to discern broadly the various existing diasporas as an analytic tool (Cohen, 2008: p. 160). As explained, the notion of the victim diaspora – that of refugee communities, which can be considered as the (1) first category – has gradually changed, and more optimistic conceptions have emerged. Cohen (2008: p. 18) has delineated four more types of diaspora in his book: (2) labour diasporas constitute people that move in search for work, (3) imperial diasporas, which emerge as a result of imperialism and colonialism, (4) trade diasporas as an interrelated net of commercial communities as a result of a trade network, and (5) deterritorialised diasporas, which is probably the most ambiguous type, as it comprises ethnic groups that lost or never had an institutionalised territorial homeland (such as the Kurds or Sikhs), but still construct their identity and subjectivities to this territory (Cohen, 2008). The taxonomy is far from being a clear delimitation but might prove to be a useful stepping stone from where to analyse diaspora communities. It is important to note that a ‘diaspora’ might have characteristics of either of the five types.
However, when studying diaspora organisations in the receiving country, such a distinction does not suffice as it is very much focused on the characteristics of a ‘diaspora’ in terms of their reason to emigrate. Diasporas are not only characterised by their reason to leave the country, but are also characterised by their position in the host community. Vertovec and Cohen (1999) have shaped five forms of diasporas as seen on the receiving end of the spectrum (Cohen, 2015: p. 354):
1. Diaspora as social form: closely linked to social capital theory, as this form of diaspora is attempting to maintain transnational networks through creating a collective identity. 2. Diaspora as consciousness: this sees a ‘diaspora’ as a way of representing complexity
19 3. Diaspora as a mode of cultural production: which describes how cultural objects,
images and meanings have transcended national boundaries.
4. Diaspora as political orientation: this category is comprised of transnationally active migrant communities.
5. E-diasporas: a recently added category, as an increasing attention goes to communities that use the internet to organise themselves.
This taxonomy is more useful when studying diaspora organisations in the host community and will therefore be mainly used in this thesis as it more accurately explains the particular characteristics that shape these organisations. A diaspora organisation can be composed of people with differing migration backgrounds but at the same time share common characteristics such as those outlined above.
Diasporas from a constructivist perspective
The creation of typologies raised concerns among scholars such as Adamson (2012) as the idea of the connection to a homeland or a host community does not always seem to hold. According to her, all attempts at creating typologies have failed in their effort to overcome essentialist notions of diasporas as transnational ethnic groups presuming ethnic homogeneity. Adamson (2012) therefore provides a useful discussion on what she calls a constructivist approach to diasporas. From a constructivist point of view, a ‘diaspora’ is determined by a shared or collective identity. This socially constructed character is shaped through strategic framing based on the idea of a joint migration past, shared political affinities, a common history, and the like. This results in a world view only shared by those that had similar experiences with creating a new identity, opposing those without these experiences in the host community; they have another lived experience and habitus:
“Because the exile sees things both in terms of what has been left behind and what is actual here and now, there is a double perspective that never sees things in isolation. Every scene or situation in the new country necessarily draws on its counterpart in the old country. Intellectually, this means that an idea or experience is always counter posed with another, therefore making them both appear in a sometimes new and unpredictable light” (Said, 1994, p.60, as cited in Adamson, 2012).
20 What Edward Said aptly summarises is how this shared mental worldview can create a feeling of collectivity or groupness in such a way that a transnationally organised ‘imagined community’ is created (Adamson, 2012). Anderson’s (1991) famous notion of the imagined community is still widely used to describe the way in which people participate in group formations through the use of nationalist notions. In this theory, members of a nation have a common understanding of a community without the need of knowing each other. Diasporas or transnational communities are, in that sense, shaping imagined communities across state boundaries. Diaspora organisations are representing these imagined communities into more tangible communities of practice (van Gorp and Smets, 2015).
Diaspora communities are thus not seen as primordial entities that simply emerge out of a natural setting, but are rather built upon narratives and discourses which construct the sense of a bounded group. These communities are shaped by a process of merging of previously dispersed social networks into a single category. This category is connected by a collective identity shaped by strategic social construction and framing in a process which is better known as identity politics. The group is created with the help of a political entrepreneur, which attempts to construct identity categories that in turn are used to shape transnational imaginaries. The entrepreneur attempts to craft a shared identity for the members of the group which can function as a boundary mechanism (Adamson, 2012). This identity can be based on essentialist notions such as ethnicity or nationality, but can also be based on ideologies such as socialism or nationalism.
Nationalism as an ideology proves to be very fruitful in creating a group boundary and collective identity. Its mobilising success has earlier shown to be used by political entrepreneurs to foster new migrant identities. Many political entrepreneurs in the past have used nationalism as a tool to activate passive social networks to create diasporic movements or lobby groups (Adamson, 2012). Previously diversified groups – ethnically, regionally, political, religious – in the origin state can start to feel united after they have arrived in a host society. For example, someone who identified him or herself as either Cantonese or Sichuanese might characterise him or herself as Chinese after arriving in Europe. Gellner (1983) provides in his book one of the most telling examples of the use of diaspora nationalism among Zionist political entrepreneurs, who were able to connect dispersed Jewish communities through the framing of an invented homeland and language, eventually leading to a transnational movement that has been able to acquire its own territorial state. The use of the term diaspora has therefore changed from “a descriptive to a prescriptive term – a category taken up by political entrepreneurs to organise internationally-dispersed
21 communities of ‘immigrants’ or ‘ethnic minorities’ in ways that allow for identification, coalition-building and political action, which can take place across national borders on a global, as well as a national and local, stage” (Adamson, 2012: p. 36).
Transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below
The diaspora taxonomy as outlined in the previous paragraph provides a useful starting point from which to study diasporic communities. However, the term diaspora is just a term signifying the group itself, and does not provide a helpful tool to better understand what diasporic communities do. The fairly recent scientific discussion on transnationalism offers a fruitful way to analyse the diasporic activities of Azerbaijanis and their organisations and provides initial answers as to why and how diasporas conduct transnational activities. The discussion on transnationalism arose in the previous three decades which are generally seen as a period characterised by a rapid increase in technological advancement, making it easier and more prevalent for (ex-)migrants to act in both the host- and home state. As coined by Glick Schiller et al. (1992), transnationalism studies the complexity of migrants’ cross-border identities and define the term as “the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement” (Glick Schiller et al., 1992, p. 1). Transnationalism and diasporas are often seen as two sides of the same coin; many diasporic communities are seen to partake in transnational activities. However, a diaspora community can be transnational to varying degrees and transnationalism is not necessarily monopolised by diasporas. Therefore transnationalism has to be seen as a characteristic of a diaspora as some diasporas can be more transnational than others.
For the purpose of this study it is interesting to distinguish between transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below, also known as state-led or migrant-led transnationalism. Transnationalism from above is a phenomenon that has coincided with the neoliberalization of the economy and the increasing demand on transmigrant’s remittances. Transnationalism from above opposes transnationalism from below in that it is the government of home states initiating transnational activities. Origin states are to an increasing extent seen to incorporate their transnational subjects into what Smith and Guarnizo (1998) call a trans-territorial nation-state. They distinguish between ‘homeland policies’, created to foster the idea of a later return, and ‘global nation policies’, focussing on an attempt to motivate the migrant to not completely lose affiliation with the origin state based on the principle of a common homeland (Martiniello and Rath, 2012).
22 These policies can be shaped in various ways, from extending citizenship rights such as dual-citizenship or providing voting rights to expatriates.
However, this process of extending rights to transnational subjects makes states increasingly vulnerable to human agency. Migrants are placed in the position where they have dual political identities, which demands more time to delve into both political systems, creating multiple possibilities for the ability to act individually. In so, migrants can be more likely to resist as well as oblige to subordination by both states. The possibility arises that migrants are subordinated or empowered by two different states (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). It is what Gamlen (2014) has discussed extensively in various studies on the way in which diasporas are being institutionalised, which can be seen as one of the most straightforward forms of transnationalism from above. If diaspora construction is seen as a form of self-identification in the host society, state-led construction of diasporas can be seen as a way to frame or embrace an expatriate community. Nowadays, an increasing number of governments institutionalise its ‘diaspora’ through specially dedicated ministries, departments, interdepartmental committees, and the like. About three decades ago a mere fifteen to twenty diaspora institutions could be counted. Nowadays more than half of all the states – around 110 – have such an institution (Gamlen, 2014b). To an increasing extent, governments are attempting to influence these transnationals not only through clear-cut policies such as the extension of citizenship rights but also through more tacit framing policies (Gamlen, 2014b). As explained in the previous paragraph, diasporas are seen as constructed groups of people influenced by political entrepreneurs. These political entrepreneurs can take shape in the form of a member of the ‘diaspora’ in the host country, but can also be epitomized by state officials or prominent individuals. To come back to Brubaker (2005), it is these people that create the idioms, stances, and claims that shape and construct the identities of a population into ‘a diaspora’.
In an attempt to conceptualize and explain this phenomena, Gamlen (2014b) has proposed to study diaspora institutions by using the concepts of tapping, embracing, and governing. The more economic approach of tapping explains the rational pursuit of the state for economic gain through engaging diasporas and ‘tap’ their financial resources. The
embracing literature is much more focused on policies aimed at re-incorporating presumed
members of the nation outside its own state borders. Gamlen (2014b) suggest a third approach, by seeing diaspora engagement policies as a way of governing in a Foucauldian sense. Even though the concept of governmentality is usually focused on explaining the self-discipline of subjects in origin states, transnational governmentality studies the way in
23 which origin states attempt to influence its transnational subjects or ‘build’ a ‘diaspora’, in so extending its figurative arm across nation-state boundaries. By using framing and ruling ideas, self-discipline and consent are becoming dominant among those governed, even outside the borders of the origin state (Ragazzi, 2009; Gamlen, 2014). However, the idea of tapping, embracing and governing should not reduce the agency of migrants ‘by presenting them as weak players easily modified by their surrounding political institutional environments’ (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Personal beliefs can be as important, or even more important, than the influence of the state.
Transnational Migrant Politics
The previous paragraphs discussed the contested use of the term diaspora and the way in which diasporic communities are shaped and influenced. This paragraph will focus more on existing studies on diasporic activities and their role in civil society in an attempt to better understand the different levels of analysis in what Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) has discerned as ‘the why’, ‘the how’ and the ‘then what’. Why diasporic communities are mobilised has been discussed in the previous paragraph concerning the influence of sending state governments. This paragraph will focus more on ‘how’ people participate, and ‘then what’ the actual impact is on both home and host states.
Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) has written extensively on transnational migrant politics and provides a good overview of the various discussions in the field. Migrants’6
transnational politics can largely be divided between broad and narrow political practices (Itzigsohn et al., 1999, cited in Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Broad political practices are understood as those migrants that only participate in events or meetings, while narrow practices have a higher level of institutionalisation and includes those migrants that are more actively carrying out their political affinities through membership of organisations or lobby groups.
Five forms of transnational migrant politics could be discerned. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: p. 762) distinguishes between immigrant politics, homeland politics, emigrant politics, diaspora politics and translocal politics. Immigrant politics can be seen as the activities conducted by migrants in order to improve their own situation in the host society. Immigrant politics becomes transnational when the home country government is getting involved by supporting the immigrants. Homeland politics are those political activities of
6 I use the term ‘migrant’ here for the sake of my argument with which I mean those people with a
24 migrants to change policy in their home country. This can be both domestic as well as foreign policy, and can be in support of the opposition as well as the seated government.
Emigrant politics is understood to be those activities conducted by migrants to get their
transnational status acknowledged by demanding various rights from their home country government. Diaspora politics can be seen as a form of political practice conducted by those that are unable to participate in the political system of their homeland, such as stateless groups. The final category is what Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) calls translocal politics, which includes hometown organisations for example, as some of these try to better the situation of local communities through empowerment.
Explaining homeland-oriented political organisations
The category of homeland politics is best applicable to this research and therefore this section will provide more elaboration on this category. Citing Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), “Homeland politics denotes migrants’ and refugees’ political activities pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland. That is, it includes both opposition to and support for the current homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals” (p. 762).
Moving on to the next level of analysis of Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) her framework tries to give a deeper understanding of ‘how’ migrants participate in homeland political practices and what explains their level of political participation. According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) the level of political participation relies strongly on both financial and social assets available within the community. Social capital is needed in both the home and host country to be able to make use of both countries opportunity structures, but also to understand the administrational requirements of local governments. Homeland-oriented political organisations make use of sister organisations elsewhere and often rely on their networks for financial support in order to be able to mobilise people for activities such as demonstrations or mass meetings.
Important to mention is the vital role the host state plays in setting the boundaries of what political practices are allowed and what is prohibited. Organising demonstrations always have to go via the municipal government and is only allowed when permission is granted, underscoring the need for a network in the host state. The stronger and more extensive these networks are, the better organisations are able to use the opportunity structure of the host state. At the same time, global institutional structures have the ability to facilitate transnational political practices. Intergovernmental actors or larger NGOs using discourses of human rights – such as the UN, Amnesty International or the European
25 Council – are seen to work together with smaller organisations in their attempt to promote democratisation and human rights. Moreover, the organisations are seen to change their narratives in line with internationally accepted discourses of human rights in order to gain more support for their political agendas (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).
The final question that needs answering is to what extent diasporic communities affect host and home countries through homeland-oriented politics – the ‘then what’ question to stick with Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2003) terminology. One of the best known theories trying to explain the mechanisms behind homeland politics is that of Anderson (1992). Arguably one of the most influential scholars on nationalism, Anderson (1992) has coined the term long-distance nationalism to explain the phenomenon of migrants becoming engaged in transnational nationalistic activities. According to him, the long-distance nationalist is understood as someone who is:
“[…] technically a citizen of the state in which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat – now only fax-time away” (Anderson, 1992: p. 13, italics in original).
Apart from the fax, Anderson’s notion seems to still be of use in the contemporary context. The transmigrant of today is even better able to keep in contact with its ‘imagined Heimat’ than before. It allows for the transmigrant to participate in politics without feeling the direct results of his or her participation.
The effect of diasporic political activities on the home country has produced interesting studies in various fields of interest, such as in anthropology, international relations and conflict studies. However, the level of influence of transnational politics is hard to measure (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Attempts to do so have often followed the line of reasoning of Anderson (1992), by explaining how diaspora communities participate in ‘virtual conflicts’ through various communication technologies. The experience of diaspora members of these conflicts proved to be different than those in their home country which in turn could obstruct conflict resolution. Diasporic influence in conflict countries has shown to protract and complicate conflicts even further which can be partly explained by politically laden remittances (Demmers, 2002). Other studies (e.g. Feyisa, 2012; Warnecke, 2010) take a more optimistic stance on the influence of diaspora communities on conflicts by providing case studies of how diasporas participate in
peace-26 building processes and increase overall welfare through remittances – a prerequisite for sustainable peace. By using new information channels – which became accessible after they arrived in their new country – they attempt to exert influence on the politics of the home state.
Many states are pursuing such political lobby groups abroad that support their policies, especially in countries that are influential in the international political arena. Even so, some studies have shown that homeland governments not always want their diaspora communities to be politically active as these expatriates are seen to have lost touch with the everyday reality of their homelands. Some research points to the fact that many diasporic groups do not represent the diversity of political affinities of the home state, and often create a lack of accountability as many politically active migrants are political refugees. Moreover, organisations try to speak on behalf of the entire population even though they often represent one particular political party (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).
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Political and Historical Context
The following sections will explain briefly the context in which this study has been conducted. In so, I wish to answer to the call of Castles (2012) for a holistic approach, by examining the broader historical context in which the diaspora organisations and institutions emerged and how (geopolitical) events affected the answers of the respondents.
Azerbaijan on the crossroad of superpowers
The geographical position of Azerbaijan, considering its current diplomatic relations, is somewhat unfortunate. Bordering Russia to the north, Turkey to the west and Iran to the south, Azerbaijan sees itself caught on the crossroad of three major players on the regional and global political arena. Continuing internal disputes in Georgia, and its own territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, causes the country’s only fortunate border to be the long stretch of coast on the Caspian Sea, where numerous oil and gas platforms deliver a substantial share of the country’s wealth.
Azerbaijan had a brief existence as an independent state between 1918 and 1920 before it became part of the Soviet Union as the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR). In 1991, the country regained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union into its current constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (EIU, 2016). Ever since, Azerbaijan is involved in a conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding territories. Despite unrecognised by the entire international community – including Armenia – Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence after a referendum in December 2006 (Government of the Netherlands, 2013). The two countries are attempting to search for a resolution of the conflict under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group – led by France, the United States and the Russian Federation – so far without success.
Recent upheaval of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The Armenian-Azerbaijani war erupted as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a wish of the predominantly ethnic Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh to unite with Armenia. Over 30,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were forcefully displaced from the area (BBC News, 2016). One of the most prominent events for Azerbaijanis during the war is that of the Khojaly Massacre. Various international organisations agree on the fact that during two days in February 1992, Armenian forces have killed several hundreds of Azerbaijanis – the figures range between two-hundred and
28 six-hundred people, however, the most reliable figure seems to be that of 485 losses (de Waal, 2003). In 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed after Russia attempted to negotiate between the two countries. The cease fire proved to be short-lived, as tension between the two persisted and armed conflicts continued. Various resolutions adopted in 2005 by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, as part of the peace process by the Minsk Group, condemned the occupation of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian forces and confirmed the allegations over “ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas” (Council of Europe, 2005) .
So far, the various attempts have had no result as the conflict surges up every now and then. Its most recent upheaval in the beginning of April has been designated as the most violent one since the ceasefire agreement of 1994 (BBC News, 2016).
The Aliyev family
Azerbaijan is of particular interest to the study of diasporas as the country has a bad reputation in the West for its questionable political system. Since it declared its independence from the Soviet-Union in 1991, elections have been accused of fraud and irregularities by international observers. Former President Heydar Aliyev ruled over Azerbaijan SSR since 1969 until his retirement in 1987, and regained his position in 1993. After his death in 2003, the power was passed on to his son Ilham Aliyev after questionable elections. He has remained in power ever since despite predictions of a probable regime change when the socio-economic situation in the country would improve (Langerak, 2014). According to various observers, the last elections of 2013 were characterised by a worsening of the freedom of expression compared to earlier elections. Ilham Aliyev won the elections with 85 percent of the votes, eliminating his direct opponent with a landslide victory (Government of the Netherlands, 2013).
Overall, the economy of Azerbaijan has seen a rapid increase of its GDP due to the rising oil prices of the last two decades. The state has complete ownership over the oil resources through the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), which has made it possible to increase state spending on government jobs, and social benefits and has established an overall increase of welfare, in so eradicating extreme poverty almost completely. The increase of the state budget has simultaneously allowed for the possibility to improve internal security and a rise of the police and military budget. The defence budget of Azerbaijan has steeply increased from 160 million on 2003 to over 3,5 billion in 2013 (Government of the Netherlands, 2013). The strength of these forces was particularly
29 visible in 2013, when protestors were dispersed violently with the use of water cannons and rubber bullets. Journalists, human rights activists and political opposition members are seen to be imprisoned and prosecuted on the basis of arbitrary accusations. Opposition papers, such as Azadliq, received excessively high fines and saw themselves forced to continue their work outside of Azerbaijan. Finally, the Government of Azerbaijan is seen to buy influence at quasi-civil society bodies in so monopolising pro-government organisations in an attempt to weaken critical NGOs and other civil society bodies. This combination of repression and co-optation has allowed for the Government to govern in a climate of fear, silencing potential critics beforehand (Alieva, 2006; Langerak, 2014).
Despite these negative reports, Azerbaijan has been able to put itself on the map as a result of a number of large-scale events such as the Eurovision Song Festival and the first European Olympic Games. However, preventive repression increased simultaneously which can be partly ascribed to decreasing oil prices and an increasing fear of similar uprisings as those seen during the ‘Arab Spring’ (Government of the Netherlands, 2013). Among the prominent critics of the Government is the human rights activist and journalist Leyla Yunus, well-known for her critical journalistic reports prior to the European Olympic Games. In July of 2014, a year before the sport event would take-off, Leyla Yunus was imprisoned for over eight years because of alleged spying for the Armenians and tax evasion. This strategy of creating trials based on false accusations is commonly seen. Four months after the end of the Olympic Games, Yunus was released from prison because of health issues and arrived in the Netherlands in April of 2016, together with her husband, as invited political refugees (Rijksoverheid, 2016a).
A diversified migration history
A common problem faced by migration scholars is that of a lack of trustworthy records on the in- and outflow of people. This is no different for migrants from Azerbaijan, and statistics on the exact number of Azerbaijanis residing in the Netherlands do not exist. This can be attributed to a number of reasons. Varying definitions exist of who to count as Azerbaijani. Moreover, fear among Azerbaijanis abroad to be registered by the authorities makes the statistics even more unreliable. On top of that, were distinctions prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union were rather vague – both Azerbaijanis and Armenians spoke Russian and regularly intermarried. Despite these definition issues, it is estimated that around 18,000 Azerbaijanis reside in the Netherlands (Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009), however, this figure remains controversial.
30 This group of Azerbaijanis is comprised of people with varying migration backgrounds. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet-Union, barely no outward migration has been recorded. In post-Soviet Azerbaijan, various phases of emigration can be distinguished. The first phase (1991-1994) was a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and consisted primarily of Russian and Armenian speakers who moved to other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, thus migrating of the basis of ethno-linguistic factors. The second phase was largely composed of labour migrants and started after the war in 1995 and spiked in 1998 as a result of a severe economic crisis. The current period, after the economic crisis, can be seen as the third phase, when Azerbaijanis started to migrate to the West as labour migrants. Remittances, particularly from Russia, have played an important role ever since and contribute for about 2.8% to the GDP (MPC, 2013). Migration to the Netherlands is partly a result of a considerable number of Dutch companies, which have established themselves in the capital of Baku. Moreover, numerous Azerbaijani students visit the Netherlands every year for their studies among which some are granted a working permits. Additionally, a considerable number of political refugees can be distinguished from the aforementioned groups (Rijksoverheid, 2016b).
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Methodology and Methods
This chapter will provide an explanation on methodology and chosen methods on which the results are based. I wish to explain the way in which engaging and governing practices of Azerbaijani diaspora organisations are best studied. The final section of this chapter will give an overview of the ethics and limitations.
This research has been conducted from mid-March until the end of June. The fieldwork took place primarily in April and May. Most of the interviews were conducted in May of 2016, as it took time to find the gatekeepers, establish contacts, and plan the interviews. The observations and document analysis has been done throughout the entire period of the study. Most of the Dutch-Azerbaijanis living in the Netherlands have settled in The Hague and its surrounding towns. Therefore, much of the research took place in or around this city. Most of the diaspora organisations are also originating from The Hague.
Methodology
This study is approaching the problem as posed in the introduction form a constructivist ontology. According to this approach, there are no objective facts, but reality and knowledge are instead always socially constructed. This is opposed to a realist ontology (positivist epistemology) that considers our perceptions to be real and ground knowledge on these objective facts. This approach helps to understand how subjective notions become objective facts or realities. Social interaction between individuals is constantly altered, re-created and modified. Individuals perceive reality as something ‘out there’, as something in the world on which they have no influence. Social phenomena are perceived by individuals as real and static without them having any influence on it (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Studying topics related to ethnicity are best studied from a social constructivist perspective, as these concepts can be seen as a world view based on a linguistic or mental representation of reality. It is related to what Brubaker and Cooper (2000) have distinguished as categories of practice and categories of analysis. Socially constructed concepts, such as ‘diasporas’ or ‘ethnic Azerbaijanis’, are ‘real’ concepts in so far as they are lived by the people that constitute them. It is important for social scientists not to use these concepts as categories of analysis and consider the internal heterogeneity of categories of practice. In so, the researcher should prevent to reify social constructs as realities.
Difficult to measure concepts such as state influence and the level of agency of a respondents’ choices are hard to quantify. Often, these influences are manifested in tacit,
32 ‘in between the line’, answers to questions. It has to be acknowledged, however, that I operate from a different worldview than that of my respondents. What is perceived as ‘real’ by the members of diaspora organisations may not be ‘real’ from my perspective or vice versa. Real objective knowledge, therefore, does not exist. A qualitative and ethnographic approach enables me to get a better understanding of people’s perceptions of the world. Both interviewing and observation will help to get a better understanding of the lived reality of my research objects. Complete representativeness is therefore unneeded. To give an accurate view of the perceptions of the respondents, quotes are used to portray the realities of respondents in an attempt to minimalize my own influences. Nevertheless, the quotes are selected by the researcher, which is why the resulting analysis will inevitably be an interpretation of the researcher.
By choosing Azerbaijani diaspora organisations as unit of analysis, I provided myself with the ease of finding many politically active people within a short period of time. Simultaneously, diaspora organisations are among the most prominent actors in transnational politics and are thus best suited to study levels of institutionalisation. Choosing diaspora organisations does pose problems with generalisability however. By providing the views of members of diaspora organisations on political topics, a skewed understanding of the degree of political engagement is portrayed. Only those members are included that can be characterised as conducting in ‘narrow’ political practices.7 Therefore
the results cannot be generalised to the wider group of Azerbaijani immigrants.
The research is designed as a comparative case-study – or exemplifying case – as it will provide me with a detailed and intensive understanding of various Azerbaijani diaspora organisations. A qualitative ethnographic approach suits best to get an understanding of Azerbaijani diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. More tacit information is required to answer the research questions and cannot solely be explained by interviewing. More flexible and open interviews allowed me to get to the core of what is at stake. As its numbers are low compared to other migrant groups, hard data and statistics are difficult to come by and are often unreliable. Many organisations have a loose member-base and seem not to work with a database of active members. Therefore, a coherent sampling frame lacked which made snowball sampling the most convenient sampling method. This method proved to be particularly useful in gaining access to members of Azerbaijani diaspora organisations once I got in contact with various heads of organisations who functioned as gatekeepers. However, snowball sampling increases the risk of finding only those people
