University of Groningen Keep your eyes on the goal! The impact of consumer goal pursuit on the effectiveness of subtle marketing cues Sadowski, Sebastian Adam

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Keep your eyes on the goal! The impact of consumer goal pursuit on the effectiveness of

subtle marketing cues

Sadowski, Sebastian Adam

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Chapter

Losses Tune Differently than Gains: How

Gains and Losses Shape Attentional Scope

and Influence Goal Pursuit

Abstract

Research on the asymmetric effect of negative or positive affective states (induced by gains or losses) on the scope of people’s attention, both on a conceptual and perceptual level, is abundant. However, little is known about the moderating effect of anticipating versus actually experiencing gains or losses and about any downstream consequences of these effects on goal-directed behavior. In two studies, we show that gains versus losses induce qualitatively different processes. We demonstrate that anticipation of monetary gains results in a

narrowing of attentional scope while experiencing gains broadens the scope of attention. We find a reversed pattern concerning monetary losses–while anticipation of monetary losses results in broadening of attentional scope, the experience of losses results in narrowing of attentional scope. Additionally, Study 2 replicates these findings, while exploring possible compensatory processes induced by experiencing monetary losses.

Keywords: losses; gains; priming; attentional scope; attentional tuning; compensatory responses

Based on Sadowski, S, Fennis, B.M., & van Ittersum, K., Losses Tune Differently than Gains: How Gains and Losses Shape Attentional Scope and Influence Goal Pursuit, currently being revised for resubmission

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"The question is not what you look at, but what you see." Henry David Thoreau ( [Journal, 5 August 1851])

Do people process information differently depending on their current affective state induced by gains or losses? Do they miss the forest for the trees as a function of feeling positive due to expecting or experiencing gains, or, conversely, negative when they anticipate or actually experience losses? As previous research shows, people can either process

information at a fine-grained, constricted, detailed level or at a more global, broader level. This narrowing versus broadening of attentional scope is known as ‘attentional tuning’ (Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price 2011). In the present paper, we focus on examining how people’s attentional scope, both on a conceptual and/or perceptual level (Posner and Presti 1987), is modulated by their affective state. Moreover, we examine the downstream consequences of such attentional tuning for goal pursuit. Interestingly, existing research appears equivocal on this issue, with some studies showing how one’s attentional scope can be a function of one’s current affective state (Fredrickson and Branigan 2005), while others do not (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010). Moreover, several studies highlight the role of affective valence per se, while others stress the role of motivational intensity, regardless of affective valence. Finally, studies have typically focused on the effects of either positive or negative affective states (using gains or losses as means), but failed to explore both simultaneously. As a result, current understanding of the underlying process of attentional tuning remains limited (Fredrickson and Branigan 2005; Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010; Gable and Harmon-Jones 2008; Gasper and Clore 2002; Gasper 2004; Isen and Daubman 1984).

Hence, our main objective is to address this issue by dissecting the roles of affective valence and motivational intensity and hence to investigate the impact of both positive and negative affective states on attentional tuning while accounting for differences in such

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intensity. Moreover, we extrapolate our findings to subsequent goal pursuit, documenting how downstream consequences of anticipation or experience of gains or losses affect people’s motivated judgment and decision-making.

4.1 Gains, Losses, and Attentional Scope

While the literature posits that there may be a relationship between affective states, the motivational underpinnings of these affective states, and concomitant attentional processes, there is a clear lack of convergence with respect to the underlying mechanism guiding the phenomenon of attentional tuning. The conventional account, proposed by Gasper and Clore (2002), suggests that affective valence is a critical precursor to narrowing versus broadening of people’s attentional scope, such that positive affective valence broadens and negative affective valence narrows such scope. Nevertheless, this perspective has been recently challenged by Gable, Harmon-Jones, and colleagues (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones 2008; 2010; Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price 2011). They propose that motivational intensity (i.e., the urge to move toward/away from a stimulus) is the critical factor underlying

attentional tuning. In particular, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010; 2011) investigated the influence of motivational intensity of particular positive affective states, i.e. monetary gains, on attentional scope, while keeping affective valence constant. They demonstrated that states of higher motivational intensity, i.e., when people anticipate monetary rewards, produce a more narrowed attentional scope compared to states of lower motivational intensity, i.e., when people actually experience such monetary rewards. Hence, this particular stream of investigation suggests that it is the urge toward or desire for the gain rather than the actual experience of the gain that induces the phenomenon of attentional tuning, rather than the affective valence per se. The rationale behind this phenomenon entails that the increased motivational intensity as a function of gain anticipation narrows the attentional scope to aid in reward acquisition. This narrowing of attentional scope ensues at both a perceptual and a

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conceptual level—people not only focus predominantly on central rather than peripheral contextual cues, but they also form a narrower, more constricted range of associations in long-term memory (Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork 1994; Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011). The lowered motivational intensity experienced after the reward has been successfully attained, on the contrary, promotes a broadening of attentional scope, both on the perceptual and conceptual level. Broadening of attentional scope is thought to assist people in the search for new opportunities present in the environment, allowing at the same time for shifts in the attentional scope from the center to the periphery (Harmon-Jones et al. 2011).

While these studies constitute an important step forward, it is striking to note that to date they have been largely confined to addressing differences of motivational intensity within the spectrum of positively valenced affective states. Hence, it is unclear if, and to what extent, similar processes may occur for negatively valenced affective states of differing motivational intensity. In the present work, we aim to fill that void and will zoom in on both positive and negative affective states of varying motivational intensity induced by the anticipation versus the experience of monetary gains versus losses.

There are different reasons to assume that the effects of gains and losses on attentional scope may not be symmetrical. Indeed, the phenomenon of loss aversion—the idea that ‘losses loom larger than gains’—already suggests such an asymmetry (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson and Gilbert 2006; Zhang and Fishbach 2005). Nevertheless, the literature does not appear unequivocal about how anticipation or experience states of losses may interact to affect attentional scope. At least two contrasting perspectives may be forwarded.

First, the relative steepness of the loss as opposed to the gain curve as postulated by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1980) would lead to the

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compared to monetary gains. Thus, regardless of anticipation or experience states, one would expect that losses yield a narrower scope of attention than monetary gains. Furthermore, when contrasting their anticipation with experience, and based on the same premise, we might expect that the difference in scope between anticipation and experience of monetary losses may be larger than that difference would be for monetary gains—anticipation would lead to a narrower attentional scope for losses than for gains, while experience would lead to a broader attentional scope for losses than for gains. Hence, this account would imply observing an ordinal interaction between type of outcome (gains vs. losses) and goal state (anticipation vs. experience) on attentional scope, with more pronounced effects expected for goal state under losses compared to gains. In addition, when we consider attentional tuning as a motivational process (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010; Gable and Harmon-Jones 2008; Juergensen and Demaree 2015; Kotynski and Demaree 2017) one may expect it to translate into on-task, goal-directed behavior. Hence, we may then expect that ensuing goal pursuit would mainly be in the service of either maximizing gains or minimizing losses. This first perspective would imply that both types of goal pursuit should be mainly observable under conditions of narrowed attentional scope, and since that effect might be more pronounced for losses than for gains, it should be particularly salient when people anticipate rather than actually experience losses.

But this is only one possibility. A second, rival perspective might be proposed as well —one that would actually lead to an opposite prediction. If loss aversion is perceived as a mere affective forecasting error (Kermer et al. 2006), then the anticipation of such losses might indeed evoke stronger effects on the attentional scope than the actual loss experience. However, if experiencing losses indeed ‘hits harder’ than experiencing gains and also hits harder than merely anticipating losses, which the loss aversion notion may also suggest, then our previously presented reasoning may actually flip and yield the opposite expectation.

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Hence, it may well be that in the loss, rather than in the gain domain, it is not the anticipation but, rather, the actual experience of a loss that may trigger narrower scope of attention (see Table 1 in Appendix A for overview of the expectations).

Several traces of recent evidence seem to point in that direction. Indeed, Andrade and Iyer (2009) have recently demonstrated that the typical response to the actual experience rather than anticipation of loss is qualitatively different to that following the experience rather than anticipation of gains. Their research focused on sequential gambling following an outcome planning (anticipation) and experience state. They demonstrated that while the anticipation versus the experience of gains did not affect peoples’ gambling strategy, it proved consequential for losses. More specifically, after experiencing, rather than merely anticipating losses, people’s gambling strategy became markedly riskier. One of the explanations for this finding the authors allude to is the so-called ‘hot-cold empathy gap’ (Loewenstein 1996), or the human tendency to underestimate the impact of ‘hot’ emotional states when they are merely anticipating, rather than experiencing them (and so when they are in a relatively ‘cold’ state). The actual ‘hot’ experience subsequently produces a motivated overreaction in an attempt to restore a state of homeostasis.

More direct support for this contention comes from recent work by Yechiam and Hochman (2013) who have shown that following the actual experience of losses, increased arousal is observed. Although arousal and motivational intensity are separate constructs, they often coincide, such that when people are highly motivated to achieve something or prevent something from happening, the increased motivational intensity is typically evinced by increased arousal levels (Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price 2013). According to Yechiam and Hochman (2013), arousal resulting from the experience of losses increases on-task attention. Interestingly, the extent of this increase is larger for the actual experience of losses compared to an equivalent experience of gains. Consequently, this increased on-task attention allocates

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more resources to task-related and less to unrelated events and manifests itself in a greater likelihood of responding in a manner that is in line with the requirements of the task, geared towards restoring or undoing the loss.

Translated to the current perspective, and integrating these with the findings by Gable and Harmon-Jones (2011) for gains, these findings would imply that the pattern for losses would be the reverse, compared to the pattern expected for gains. That is, in line with Gable and Harmon Jones (2011), for gains one would expect anticipation to yield increased narrowing in attentional scope compared to actual experience. For losses, in contrast, one would now expect that actual experience would yield increased narrowing in attentional scope compared to mere anticipation. In sum, these predictions would imply observing not an ordinal, but a disordinal, crossover interaction where the direction rather than the strength of the effect of anticipation versus the experience of the type of outcome on the attentional scope would be modulated as a function of gains versus losses. Moreover, regarding possible spillover effects of experience of losses on subsequent goal pursuit, we might expect that any goal pursuit in the service of either maximizing gains or minimizing losses should be mainly observable under conditions of narrowed attentional scope. However, in contrast to the former perspective, since the effect for losses might be reversed in contrast to the anticipation versus the experience of gains, it should be particularly salient when people experience rather than merely anticipate losses.

To recapitulate, in the present work, we explore two competing hypotheses regarding the differential influence of monetary losses, compared to gains, on the attentional scope and its downstream consequences for goal pursuit. When following prospect theory’s postulate of loss aversion, the pattern of anticipating versus experiencing losses should be comparable to that observed for gains, only ‘steeper’, as in more pronounced. Hence from that perspective, and in line with Gable and Harmon Jones’ (2011) findings for gains, the anticipation of losses

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should similarly induce a narrower scope of attention than the experience of losses, and the difference between anticipation and experience of losses should be larger than for gains. To the extent that any downstream consequences for task-related goal pursuit are observed, these should be compatible with this position, and hence, on-task attention and goal pursuit aimed at restoring the status quo should be more pronounced for losses than gains and mainly be observed when anticipating, rather than experiencing losses.

The alternative perspective, rooted in the recent work on the behavioral and attentional consequences of experiencing losses, would yield the expectation that compared to gains, the pattern for losses would reverse, i.e., a narrower attentional scope when people experience, rather than anticipate losses, and consequently, more vigorous goal pursuit aimed at minimizing loss experience, as opposed to loss anticipation conditions.

4.2 Present Research

We test our hypotheses in two lab experiments. In the first experiment, we investigate how the anticipation versus experience of monetary gains or losses modulates attentional scope, both on the perceptual and conceptual level. Aligning with previous research, we use mean reaction times during the Navon task to measure attentional scope, on both the perceptual and conceptual level (e.g., Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, and Denzler 2006; Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010, 2011; Hicks, Friedman, Gable, and Davis 2012).

The second experiment examines the spillover effects of attentional tuning, induced by either anticipation or experience of either gains or losses, on consecutive goal pursuit. To this end, we evaluate the effectiveness of goal-relevant primes delivered either in the central or peripheral scope of vision. In this way, we assess whether people who have already experienced losses engage in compensatory processes, but only if these processes are facilitated by the currently activated attentional scope.

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4.3 Experiment 1 4.3.1 Method

4.3.1.1 Participants and Design

For the first experiment, we recruited 123 students (54.5% male; Mage = 21.42, SD =

2.82) to participate in a lab study that was said to test the performance in a game during which they needed to conduct the flankers task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974)—indicating the direction of a middle arrow in an array of arrows. Three participants did not follow specific instructions; therefore we ended up with 120 usable responses. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses) × 2 (goal state:

anticipation vs. experience state) between-subjects design with the breadth of attentional scope as the main dependent variable. Participants obtained money or research credits for participation and they were informed that there was a possibility to earn extra money (max. €4.80) during the study based on their performance is the game.

4.3.1.2 Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to participate in two types of games—either in a ‘win’ game or a ‘loss’ game. The game consisted of two types of trials: non-neutral and neutral. In each non-neutral trial in the ‘gain’ condition, participants had the opportunity to win an additional €0.10 up to a total of €4.80 upon finishing the study. Conversely, participants assigned to the loss condition started off with €4.80 at the beginning of the experiment and they were informed that they needed to do their best to keep as much money as possible till the end of the study. In each non-neutral trial participants assigned to the loss condition could lose an additional €0.10. In the neutral trials, performance on the flankers task did not determine any additional gains or losses. The order of the trials was randomized across participants.

In accordance with previous manipulations of anticipation and experience states (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011), we induced both anticipation and experience states by

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altering the order of the tasks that participants were conducting in each of the 48 trials of the game. Each trial consisted of the following fixed elements:

A. Expectancy cue: at the beginning of each trial, participants were instructed and exposed to one of two possible symbols: a neutral symbol (i.e., a spades symbol) indicating that in the coming trial no monetary gains or losses should be expected; or a non-neutral symbol designating the possibility of winning or losing money (depending on the condition) in the coming trial (i.e., a clubs symbol);

B. Navon task (Navon 1977): the focal task for measuring our dependent variable (see below for details). In each trial, participants saw a large letter composed of smaller letters (e.g., a large P composed of small B’s) and were asked to identify in a randomized order as fast as possible either the large letter (global target letter; responses collected for 24 trials) or the small letter (local target letter; responses collected for 24 trials) by pressing an assigned key on the keyboard. We collected reaction times in each trial of the game which, in line with previous research (cf., Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011), were subsequently used to assess the breadth of attentional scope. This task was presented as unrelated to the flankers-task game in which participants were trying to either win additional money or avert any additional monetary losses, but they were informed that they should perform it as quickly and accurately as possible.

C. Flankers task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974): As stated, participants were made to believe that their final pay-offs (as a function of the gain or loss condition they were in) would depend on their performance during this specific task. In order to gain additional money or prevent possible losses, participants were instructed to indicate the direction of a middle arrow presented in an array of arrows by pressing assigned keys as quickly and accurately as possible;

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D. Obtaining feedback about the outcome of the trial: participants received in each trial information on the screen about any changes in their total monetary gains.

In order to increase the realism of the game and avoid unwanted habituation responses, one-third of the total number of trials disconfirmed the initial expectation evoked by the expectancy cue (see Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, and Hommer 2000). Thus, 8 out of 24 potentially winning versus potentially losing trials yielded no additional monetary gains versus losses when these were expected to occur. In order to keep the affective valence constant across conditions, and due to their expectancy disconfirming nature, these 8 trials were not included in the analyses. Moreover, the 24 neutral trials were also excluded from the analysis, since participants did not experience any gains or losses in these particular trials resulting from their performance. As a result, our analyses focus on the 8 trials that were potentially winning versus potentially losing (depending on condition) with the identification of the local letter as the key target response. We controlled for the reaction times on the 8 remaining ‘potentially winning versus potentially losing’ trials in which the global letter was the response target.

Participants assigned to the anticipation condition completed the Navon task after they saw an expectancy cue, but before they engaged in the goal-relevant flankers task allowing for additional monetary gains and before they received feedback about any potential gains or losses. Participants in the experience condition first conducted the flankers task after they saw the expectancy cue, obtained feedback about their monetary gains or losses, and only

afterward performed the Navon task (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010; 2011).

Despite the fact that participants were made to believe that gains or losses in the non-neutral trials depended on their performance, in reality, 24 non-non-neutral trials were assigned beforehand as gain or loss trials in which participants were either winning or losing, irrespective of their reaction times. Nevertheless, accuracy was always of primary

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relevance—providing a wrong answer on the flankers task in non-neutral trials never led to monetary gains in the ‘gain’ condition and resulted in additional losses in the ‘loss’ condition. 4.3.1.3 Dependent Measure

We used reaction times during the Navon task to measure attentional scope. Reaction times (RTs) to local target letters were used as a measure of attentional scope, while controlling for reaction times to global letters, with faster (lower) RTs indicating narrower attentional scope (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011).

4.3.2 Results

To test our interaction between gains versus losses and anticipation versus experience states, we conducted a 2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses) × 2 (goal state: anticipation vs. experience state) analysis of variance on mean reaction times to local target letters (8 trials), while controlling for reaction times to global target letters (8 trials). A significant crossover interaction between anticipation/experience states and gains/losses emerged (F(1, 115)=4.15, p=.04, η2_{= .04; see Figure 1). The disordinal pattern showed that while the strength of the}

effect of anticipation versus experience on the attentional scope as a function of gains versus losses did not differ between conditions, the direction did. More specifically, participants in the gain anticipation state responded faster to the local target letter (M=1177.81ms,

SD=192.68ms) than partcipants in the gain experience state (M=1250.97ms, SE=248.92ms). In case of losses this pattern was found to be reversed, i.e., participants provided quicker responses to the local target letter when they had already experienced a loss (M=1182.64ms, SD=361.44ms) as opposed to participants who were anticipating a possible monetary loss (M=1248.20ms, SD=559.37ms; see figure 4.1).

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Figure 4.1 Mean reaction times (in milliseconds, ms) to local target letters during Navon task over 8 trials, using mean reaction times to global target letters as a covariate (8 trials). Error bars denote one standard error around the mean.

4.3.3 Discussion

The results of experiment 1 replicate previous research by demonstrating that attentional scope narrows during the positive affective states of high motivational intensity, i.e., during the anticipation of monetary gains (cf. Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010, 2011). Moreover, we extend previous research by providing support for our alternative expectations regarding the attentional tuning induced by the anticipation versus the experience of losses. When it comes to monetary losses, we observe narrower attention when one actually experiences, rather than merely anticipates losses. This suggests that the experience of realizing that one has been unable to successfully avert a (monetary) loss, yields increased motivational intensity compared to the anticipation of such a loss.

In our second experiment, we extend these findings by examining the impact of loss induced attentional scope for subsequent goal pursuit. That is, we will link the present effects on global versus local attentional scope to their perceptual and motivational downstream

1050 1100 1150 1200 1250 1300 gain loss R es p on se T im e (m s) anticipation experience

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consequences. Thus, we broaden our theater of operations, investigating more closely the scope of conceptual attention in addition to perceptual attention.

Our second experiment aims to replicate and extend these findings. First of all, if loss experiences stretch to narrowing of attentional scope on a perceptual level, then goal-relevant stimuli (primes) delivered in the central field of vision should receive more and in the peripheral scope of vision should receive less attention. Hence, we aim to demonstrate that people in the loss experience state, due to their narrowed attentional scope, will be mainly receptive to goal-relevant stimuli displayed in the central rather than peripheral scope of vision. Further in line with the observation that narrowing attentional scope may be indicative of increased motivational intensity, we posit that the experience, rather than anticipation of monetary losses, will induce motivated responding, compensating for the experienced loss. Hence, under these conditions, people should show increased sensitivity to primes that are related to loss compensation or restriction, but only if such stimuli are presented within the range of temporarily maintained attentional scope, i.e. in the central field of vision.

In Experiment 2 we primed people with thrift-related concepts (e.g., sales, promotion) that we expected to be goal-relevant mainly for people who have experienced losses, rather than gains since the former would motivate people to avoid any additional losses. More specifically, we investigate how such thrift-related primes affect willingness-to-pay for a set of daily-used products. We expect thrift-related priming procedures to affect the willingness-to-pay mainly for people who have experienced losses, and particularly when delivered in the central rather than peripheral field of vision.

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4.4 Experiment 2 4.4.1 Method

4.4.1.1 Participants and Design

227 student participants (52% male; Mage = 21.76, SD = 3.21) were recruited to take

part in a lab experiment that was advertised as two unrelated studies about games and memory. Participants received money or research credits for participation. Additionally, they were informed that there was a possibility to earn extra money (max. €4) during the study. Participants were randomly-assigned to conditions in a 2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses) × 2 (goal state: anticipation vs. experience state) × 2 (location of the prime: central vs. peripheral) between-subjects design with the willingness-to-pay (Euro) for a set of daily-used products as the main dependent variable.

4.4.1.2 Procedure

In line with the previous study, for the games-part of the study, participants were asked to play a game during which they were expected to do their best to either win (gain) or keep (loss) a certain amount of money. Participants assigned to the gain anticipation versus experience condition were told that they would be able to gain extra money up to a maximum of €4.00. In contrast, participants assigned to the loss conditions learned that they would start the game with €4.00 and could lose an additional €0.40 in each trial. Similar to Experiment 1, participants played 10 rounds of the flankers task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974; see Experiment 1 for details) and were asked to respond as quickly yet accurately as possible in order to beat the average reaction times obtained during the same task by students from their university during a pre-test (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2010; 2011). In reality, gains or losses were not determined by participants’ performance—certain trials were programmed as winning or losing trials in order to keep the total monetary compensation stable across the conditions. As a result, each participant left the lab with an additional pay-off of €2. The sequence of trials was randomized across participants. Funneled debriefing indicated that participants were not suspicious about our manipulations related to gains versus losses. Similar to Experiment 1,

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the order of the tasks differed across conditions. For the participants assigned to the experience condition, the flankers task (including giving participants feedback about their performance) preceded the goal prime task (labeled as the memory task), while for participants in the anticipation condition, the order was reversed and the memory task preceded the flankers task.

During the ostensible memory task, aimed to prime participants with thrift-related concepts, participants were exposed to 24 words. These words were flashed for a brief moment (0.5 s) on the screen. We varied the location of the words as a between-subjects factor. For half of the participants, words were presented in the central scope of vision; for the remaining ones, words were presented in the peripheral scope of vision (in the corners of the screen). The order of words was randomized across participants. Six words (promotion, sale, discount, bargain, reduction, deal; Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008) that were shown during the memory task constituted the goal-relevant primes. The 18 remaining words were neutral words selected from the Affective Norms of English Words (ANEW; Bradley and Lang 1999; e.g., bench, procedure, pollen, oil).

4.4.1.3 Dependent Measure

Afterwards, participants were asked to indicate their willingness-to-pay (Euro) for several daily-used, unbranded, products—a bottle of water (0.5l), bread (1 loaf), orange juice (1l), bananas (1kg), a black mug and an apple pie; Festjens, Bruyneel, and Dewitte 2014; Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec 2003. All willingness-to-pay values were summed, and a log transformation was performed to account for the skewness of the distribution (Stevens 2002). The order of products for which the willingness-to-pay was requested was randomized. Funneled debriefing indicated that none of the participants indicated awareness of any connection between the memory task and the willingness-to-pay questions.

To comply with the cover story, we concluded this task with a short memory test during which participants were asked to list words that were flashed previously on the screen.

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4.4.2 Results

To test whether primes are especially effective when they are delivered in accordance with currently maintained attentional scope, we conducted a 2 (monetary outcome: gains vs. losses) × 2 (goal state: anticipation vs. experience) × 2 (location of the prime: central vs. peripheral) ANOVA on the aggregated willingness-to-pay measure collected for the six unbranded products (see Table 2 in Appendix A for details). The main effect of location of the prime on self-expressed willingness-to-pay measures emerged (F(1, 219)=4.79, p=.03, η2

=.02). Participants exposed to primes located in the center of the screen indicated a lower willingness-to-pay (M=0.96, SD=0.15) in comparison with participants exposed to primes in the periphery of the screen (M=1.00, SD=0.16). Of more interest was the observation that the two-way interaction between the anticipation versus experience states and the location of the primes (central vs. peripheral) was marginally significant (F(1, 219)=3.42, p=.07, η2_=.02).

Although three-way interaction between anticipation versus experience states, gains versus losses and the location of the primes (central vs. peripheral) did not reach statistical significance (F(1,219)= 1.17, p=.28), the a priori hypotheses justified probing the two-way interaction as a function of the anticipation versus experience of monetary losses versus gains.

These additional simple effects tests within the gain and loss condition showed that the goal state × location of the prime interaction was significant within the loss condition (F(1, 223)=4.26, p=.04). More specifically, within the loss condition participants in the experience state were particularly susceptible to goal-relevant, thrift-inducing primes that were delivered in the central scope of their vision, indicating as a result lower willingness-to-pay (M=0.93, SD=0.21) in comparison to primes delivered in the peripheral scope of vision (M=1.04, SD=0.14); F(1,219)=6.15, p=.01, η2_{=.03. In contrast, no significant difference was}

found between the effectiveness of centrally (M=1.00, SD=0.13) and peripherally (M=0.98, SD=0.21) delivered primes in the loss anticipation condition (F(1, 219)<1), see figure 4.2.

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Conversely, in accordance with expectations, the goal state by the location of the prime interaction failed to reach significance in the gain condition; F(1, 223)<1, see figure 4.3.

Figure 4.2 Log10 of willingness-to-pay measures in the loss condition. Error bars denote one standard error around the mean.

Figure 4.3 Log10 of willingness-to-pay measures in the gain condition. Error bars denote one standard error around the mean.

0,8 0,85 0,9 0,95 1 1,05 1,1 anticipation experience L og10 W il li n gn es s- to-p ay peripheral central LOSS 0,85 0,9 0,95 1 1,05 1,1 anticipation experience L og10 W il li n gn es s- to-p ay peripheral central GAIN

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These findings support our expectations that compensatory responses following the experience of monetary losses are determined by the attentional tuning process. Participants were found to be responsive to goal-relevant stimuli that could assist them in the restoration process only if they were delivered within their temporarily maintained attentional scope. As we showed in experiment 1, loss experience states induce local attentional focus, resulting in narrowing of one’s attentional scope. Therefore, goal-relevant primes related to the thrift concepts are more likely to affect attitudes when they are centrally as opposed to peripherally located, due to the narrower attentional scope.

4.5 General Discussion

By means of two lab experiments, we confirmed our notions regarding the influence of monetary losses on the attentional scope and possible spillover effects of this phenomenon on compensatory responses following the experience of monetary losses. We demonstrated a disordinal interaction between monetary losses versus gains and the anticipation versus experience states. We showed that the experience, rather than the anticipation of losses, results in a narrowing of attentional scope. Subsequently, the experience of monetary losses that produced a narrowing of attentional scope instigates spillover effects onto goal pursuit aimed to counteract any future losses. Only participants who have experienced monetary losses were found to be more responsive to goal-relevant primes delivered within the currently maintained attentional scope.

Our findings support the recent stream in the literature concentrating on the qualitative difference between anticipation and experience of losses (Andrade and Iyer 2009; Andrade, Claro, and Islam 2014; Boyce, Wood, Banks, Clark, and Brown 2013). Despite the fact that loss aversion has been proven to be an information processing bias that falls under the umbrella term of affective forecasting errors (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, and Gilbert 2006), our findings support the alternative account presenting loss aversion as a phenomenon

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that occurs also in the experience state. More specifically, we show that immediate cognitive reaction to loss experience—narrowing of attentional scope—occurs when losses have been experienced, but not when they are merely anticipated. The literature on affective forecasting errors oftentimes incorporates longer temporal perspectives on loss experience, taking into consideration people’s lack of awareness of cognitive mechanisms (e.g., rationalizations, Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, and Wheatley 1998) attenuating the detrimental impact of negative affective states over a longer time frame. Such mechanisms constitute a part of the psychological immune system (Gilbert et al. 1998), operating frequently without conscious awareness. Nonetheless, research also shows that, for instance, experienced losses in income significantly diminish subjective well-being (Boyce et al. 2013). These findings challenge the traditional account presenting loss aversion as a phenomenon occurring particularly for the anticipation, but not the experience of losses. Additionally, the fact that people show an increased tendency for risk taking after a loss experience (Andrade and Iyer 2009), but not while anticipating losses further corroborates the presence of loss aversion in the loss experience state. Riskier choices are aimed at restoring the homeostasis shaken after the loss experience. Thus, despite the fact that people tend to anticipate that losses are difficult to cope with, sometimes they significantly mispredict their instant emotional and following cognitive reactions. In this research, we specifically examined what happens to instant cognitive reactions—how attentional scope gets shaped by the anticipation and experience of both gains and losses. The immediate narrowing of attentional scope could be discerned as a functional psychological mechanism, aimed at circumventing any potential future losses, which, on the basis of experience are seen as hurtful and consequently undesirable.

Interestingly, our results are compatible with Wachtel's (1967) curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relation between attention and performance, since our findings show the adaptive value of excluding irrelevant cues in the peripheral field of vision for participants in the loss

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experience condition, but also the reverse. That is, the inverted U-shaped relation implies that performance will first improve because irrelevant cues are shut out, but subsequently may deteriorate as goal-relevant cues also become ignored. We observe the latter phenomenon in the loss anticipation condition where target words were presented peripherally and, indeed, proved not to influence subsequent task performance (i.e., the WTP ratings). Thus, people tend to disregard goal-relevant primes if they appear beyond their currently maintained attentional scope, despite the fact that the primes can assist them in their subsequent goal pursuit.

Additionally, our research contributes to the discussion regarding the processes that guide the attentional tuning phenomenon. At first blush, our results could be seen as contradicting Levine and Edelstein's theorizing (2009). Levine and Edelstein (2009) classified emotions into two major categories: (1) pre-goal emotions (e.g., desire or anger), reflecting the appraisal that goal-directed actions will need to be taken in the near future, and (2) post-goal emotions (e.g., happiness or sadness), indicating that successful goal attainment or goal failure has already occurred. Building up on this framework, follow-up research showed that pre-goal emotions induce attention narrowing, whereas post-goal emotions evoke attention broadening (Kaplan, Van Damme, and Levine 2012). In line with this research stream, we could expect that pre-goal negative states (e.g., loss anticipation states) will consequently lead to attention narrowing, whereas post-goals negative states (loss experience states) will elicit broadening of attentional scope. Nonetheless, as we demonstrated, our perception of the attentional tuning process should not be plainly one-dimensional. Losses should be considered as unique experiences that attune the attentional scope in its own distinctive way because of the specific effects they exert on motivational intensity. As a result, we corroborate the findings of Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010) and

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demonstrate that motivational intensity should be perceived as one of the most relevant factors influencing the scope of attention.

The phenomenon of attentional tuning induced by either gains or losses helps also to qualify the priming effects introduced so far in the literature. Up to now, the extensive scope of experimental designs implemented in previous research delivered primes in the parafoveal (i.e., peripheral) scope of vision (e.g., Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Custers and Aarts 2007; Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011), especially during subliminal procedures, due to the fact that such stimuli are processed minimally and outside of conscious awareness (Nelson and Loftus 1980). Nonetheless, a narrow attentional scope triggers a tunnel vision effect, as a result of which people are unable to sufficiently attend to peripheral cues (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011; Wadlinger and Isaacowitz 2006). Therefore, people with an activated narrow attentional scope are unable to process peripheral priming procedures and as a consequence, peripherally delivered primes are not effective. Hence, such motivated tuning should be perceived as yet another factor moderating the effectiveness of priming procedures.

Future research can take into consideration additional relevant factors that can play a role in the particular theatre of operations of gains and losses and attentional scope. We believe that additional moderating variables that have the potential to shape the attentional scope in the anticipation and experience states of gains and losses could be: magnitude of monetary pay-offs (Estle, Green, Myerson, and Holt 2006), uncertainty tied to the monetary pay-pay-offs (Weber 1994), or supraliminal or subliminal exposure to reward or loss cues (Bijleveld, Custers, and Aarts 2010). Last but not least, we believe that an interesting research avenue worth pursuing would be paved by taking the attentional tuning process to the field and demonstrating what specific real-life consequences this phenomenon could entail.

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Appendix A Table 1

Summary of hypotheses regarding the influence of monetary gains versus losses on attentional scope

Earning potential

Goal state

Goal anticipation Goal attainment

Proposition 1

Gain Narrow Broad

Loss Narrower Broader

Proposition 2

Gain Narrow Broad

Loss Broad Narrow

Note. The table summarizes expectations of the influence of both earning potential (gain vs. loss) and goal state (anticipation vs. experience) on attentional scope.

Table 2

Willingness-to-pay (Euro) measures for daily products (Experiment 2)

Willingness-to-pay Product M SD Mug 1.99 1.44 Bananas (1 kg) 1.70 0.92 Bottle of Water 0.72 0.45 Bread (loaf) 1.21 0.62 Oranges (1 kg) 1.68 0.74 Apple Pie 3.18 1.51