Master Thesis SIM

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Master Thesis SIM

Quid pro Quo: Reciprocity in Strategic Alliances

By

DANIELA CAZACOV

University of Groningen Faculty of Economics and Business

February 2016

Supervisors: Isabel Estrada Vaquero

Florian Noseleit

d.cazacov@student.rug.nl Student Number 2851938

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Abstract

Reciprocity is described in various social fields of research, but it has limited implications outlined in the strategic alliances literature. Drawing on a collection of 85 articles that includes 25 theoretical and 60 empirical studies, and with a main theoretical grounding on social exchange theory (SET) and transactions cost theory (TCT), this systematic literature review pilots on the objective of providing clarifications regarding the definitions, measures and relevant antecedents and implications of the concept of reciprocity in strategic alliances. The provided results shape a framework that outlines the elements of mutual dependence, strategic compatibility, interpersonal attachment, transparency and market size, as drivers of a reciprocal relationship and relational bonds, cooperation, solidarity, incentive alignment and firm performance, as implications of it. Trust, information exchange, frequent interactions and reputation are underlined as shaping a relationship of mutual influence with the concept of reciprocity. The study concludes with discussion on the relevance of findings and recommendations for future research directions.

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of reciprocity describes a relation of mutual dependence or influence, or if I might proverbially outline it: “Do unto others as you would have them do”, commonly known as the Golden Rule of morality. Implications of rights, obligations and norms of behavior regarding the concept of reciprocity have been studied in various researches in the fields of sociology, psychology, game theory and in political or personal relationships. Research regards the concept of reciprocity as focused on individual interactions, gift giving (Dolfsma, 2009), moral hazard (Castillo, 2010), or on various economic implications (Danthine, 2007). However, there seems to be scarce information on reciprocity implications for strategic alliances, a field that is of interest for the development of this particular study. This fact shapes a noticeable research gap and I was therefore, motivated to develop a systematic literature review regarding alliances, with the purpose of fulfilling the need of expanding comprehension of this specific concept. I believe it would provide novel, theoretical aspects regarding the reciprocity phenomenon and would also serve as an incentive and a theoretical background for future empirical studies. Moreover, it would offer more insights in the field of collaborative relationships between firms and the reasons behind reciprocal relationships, by suggesting changes that need to be done regarding the organizational, managerial and financial perspectives of the systems. Subsequently, this would help constantly develop necessary knowledge management, which is a key research area within the alliance literature (Meier, 2011).

Studies support the fact that reciprocity is a core concept in strategic alliances, as their objective focuses on a mutual business orientation and attainment of goals (Carlson, 2011) and their

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5 between the partners and that it is enhanced by the use of social interaction mechanisms. Other studies mention the notion of trust, necessary for the development of a link between the companies involved in strategic alliances (Das, 2002) and some focus on the presence of important values like reliability or reputation, needed to create an alliance (Crescenzi, 2012). All these aspects need detailed evaluation, so as to define a clear linkage between the existent proofs that the literature has developed so far and the necessary future possibilities to further develop them.

Additionally, the norm of reciprocity has an important role in innovation strategies, as the combination of existing knowledge is the basis of innovative processes development and of sustainable relationships based on R&D collaboration. Reciprocity in cooperation leads to an enhanced firm ability to generate innovative development projects and compete successfully, by offering and gaining access to required knowledge and sharing mutual views on incentives (Cantner, 2011). Research shows that reciprocity positively influences the level of performance of new product alliances, considering that a highly reciprocal relationship, combined with a high level of strategic compatibility between the partners, leads to joint decision making processes and successful achievement of mutual goals, therefore influencing alliance performance (Carlson, 2011). New product alliances have been conceptualized by Rindfleisch (2001) as a type of collaboration among organizations, that is used to jointly acquire and utilize know-how and information related to the R&D of new product or process innovations. The study mentions that more firms choose to get involved in these type of alliances, considering that there is constant increase in the R&D costs and in global competition between firms.

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6 This study is structured as follows: section 2 of the paper introduces main theoretical foundations of the concept of reciprocity in strategic alliances and section 3 describes the methodology of our review and systematic approach. The results and synthesis are provided in section 4 and the discussion on the findings, conclusions and future research perspectives in section 5.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Social Exchange Theory

Most of the articles studied in this systematic literature review focus on the implications of social exchange theory (SET), which outline a series of interdependent interactions that shape obligations and transactions that have the potential to generate high quality relationships based on the mutual commitment of the partners to the cooperative relationship (Cropanzano, 2015). Social exchange is commonly defined as the setting where partners tend to prove their trustworthiness by making investments in each other (Lui,2006) and provide incentives and rewards for the actions of the other involved actors. Muthusamy (2005) supports this finding, mentioning that social exchange relationships cannot assure equivalent returns, so that it requires reciprocal gratitude and trust in order to constantly develop the relationship. This condition benefits the coordination processes, strengthens relational ties and is enhanced in the presence of reciprocal norms, thus having a positive impact on high levels of information exchange and firm performance (Muthusamy, 2007).

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7 type of exchange is mainly based on intentional behaviors implying morality norms, that lead to reciprocal, reliable and successful functioning of the inter-organizational relationships. Also, research conducted by Bignoux (2006) underlines that economic exchange perspectives focused on the need of immediate profit maximizations added new elements to the measuring of exchanges after being influenced by the social exchange theory, thus including the reciprocity and trust factors as a consequence to its impact on strategic management of alliances. Therefore, considering all the above mentioned arguments, social exchange theory is a relevant theoretical foundation for our particular study.

Transaction Cost Theory

The aspects of transaction cost theory (TCT) also seem to prove relevancy for this systematic literature review, starting from the main idea that reciprocity is found to be a device of contract enforcement, with an important economic impact regarding incomplete contracts (Fehr, 2000). The basic implications of TCT underline that it regards with more caution the aspect of trust developed in relationships and has a strong focus on cost economics, compared to SET, emphasizing that firms that follow its logics are more likely to choose a reputable partner when shaping cooperative relationships (Lui, 2006). This is a consequence of the assumption that actors have a high potential to develop opportunistic behavior, to which this theory underlines as possible solutions the economic commitments of the partners involved, manipulated by the demand of mutual investments of resources. (Young, 1999).

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8 increase in the prices offered by buyers to partners, that subsequently implying a higher quality of the products received, thus having impact on general market outcomes as well. He also finds that reciprocal norms shape incentives for possible cheaters to be more cooperative or at least lower their degree of noncooperation.

Social Exchange Theory (SET) Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) • Interdependent relationships that shape mutual

commitment (voluntary actions)

• Incentives and rewards provided in order to increase trust and reciprocal gratitude

• Implies norms of morality that shape reliable, reciprocal relationships

• High importance given to commitment and trust believed to increase alliance performance and longevity

• Interdependent relationships that shape mutual commitment (imposed actions; hostages) • Emphasize on need of profit maximization • Assumes high possibility of opportunistic behavior of the other actor (caution regarding the aspect of trusting partners)

• Reciprocity viewed as a contract enforceable device and as an incentive for cooperation

Table 1. Theory specifications

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METHODOLOGY

Following Crossan & Apaydin (2010), I have collected, analyzed and synthesized data, processes that resulted in the creation of a framework regarding antecedents and implications of reciprocity, underlining main characteristics of definitions and measures developed in the papers reviewed. The method of a systematic literature review has been chosen as appropriate in order to identify and fill the gaps in the studies developed in the field, considering that a systematic review uses a specific algorithm to perform a search of the literature and critically analyzes it (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). Thus, this form of research aims to identify, evaluate and interpret all available information related to a particular field of interest (Alam, 2015) and involves a number of stages and steps that need to be taken, such as planning, conducting and reporting the results. Important features taken into consideration are the reliability and the complexity of the information provided.

Following these steps in the development of this study, the general research objective of this paper is to expand existing understanding of the phenomenon of reciprocity in strategic alliances. The focus is on emphasizing main reciprocity characteristics of definitions and measurements, the antecedents that make firms appeal to reciprocity, the benefits of creating reciprocal environments in alliances and the solutions used to overcome opportunistic behavior and thus increase the level of reciprocity in strategic alliances. Hence, four research questions have been developed to pivot our study on: How is the concept of reciprocity defined in the alliance literature? , How is the concept of reciprocity measured in the alliance literature?, What are the antecedents/ drivers of reciprocity in strategic alliances? and What are the implications/consequences of reciprocity in strategic alliances?

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10 of the paper, that of analyzing in detail various aspects of the concept of reciprocity developed in the available literature of strategic alliances in the business environment, as mentioned in the research questions of the study.

The reviewed papers were exclusively articles selected from peer reviewed journals, so as to ensure validity of the provided information. The chosen time frame to be used included articles from January 1995 till December 2015 and the only database to elect from was Business Source Premier, considered to be a sufficiently large platform, that comprises all the necessary and appropriate information for our study, thus assuring necessary breadth of the research. However, it is important to mention that by narrowing down the research to only the concept of reciprocity noticed in alliance relationships, I have chosen to focus more on the depth of the subject, rather than the breadth of it, this way presenting detailed insights on the relationships between reciprocity and similar concepts that regard collaboration and are more widely discussed in the alliance literature.

Table 2. Search criteria

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11 of the papers. I also used the filter of “research & development” of “learning and fairness” subject, when the number of articles was extremely big and thus, obviously included topics that were not in our interest.

After analyzing the title and the abstract of the papers and going through the text to ensure appropriability, the final sample presented 85 articles. Out of these, 25 had a theoretical approach and 60 an empirical one, thus balancing the type of the reviewed articles and offering a wider background to focus on when executing the research, with details regarding necessary theories, but also important empirical findings.

Table 3. Final review sample

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12 the business environment or economics and was not focused on other, not relevant, fields of interest. Hence, inspired by Meier (2011), I have mentioned below the table that specifies the inclusion and exclusion criteria used when selecting papers.

Table 4. Inclusion/ Exclusion criteria regarding the final sample

This part of the study is followed by the one of results review and that of discussion and conclusions. Thus, important methodological aspects and processes described in this section will be used in providing relevant information regarding definitions, measurement, antecedents and implications of reciprocity and in shaping a framework that synthesizes the main findings of this systematic literature review.

RESULTS REVIEW

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How is the concept of reciprocity defined in the alliance literature?

The alliance literature studies do not seem do settle for only one commonly agreed upon definition of reciprocity, although there have been trials. Therefore, this part of the study has the objective of filling this gap in the literature and provide a reciprocity definition.

The study of Das (2002) offered the most relevant definition for our study, mentioning that reciprocity is the expectation of quid pro quo exchanges within the group and that generalized reciprocity is a group-based exchange relationship in which members expect quid pro quo exchanges within the group, but not necessarily with any specific member. They mention that reciprocity is a voluntary act and that actors should rely only on the highly trustworthy partners in order to avoid the possibilities of opportunistic behavior. The needed specification here is that quid pro quo propensities refer to the tendency to provide a positive treatment to a partner when positive treatment is received and to provide negative treatment when the received was negative as well. Dalziel (2009) supported this statement, by emphasizing that reciprocal commitment is what creates future bindings based on past or present taken actions. Furthermore, reciprocity has been defined as a social norm based on behavioral reactions to perceived settings (Falk, 2005; Cantner, 2011; Hoppner, 2011).

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14 Some other authors, like Cropanzano (2005) and Falk (2005), emphasize that reciprocal exchange reflects the fact that one party's actions are contingent on the other's behavior and when at least one participant makes a move, new rounds of exchange are initiated if the other reciprocates, in this way clearly highlighting the core ideas of social exchange theory that specifically involves a series of interdependent interactions that generate obligations.

Cropanzano (2005) also added that the quid pro quo style develops when the regarded benefit to gain is less particularistic and more concrete and because it can be exchanged in the short-term, it creates enduring social patterns, earlier mentioned in the social exchange perspective. Dolfsma (2009) followed the same logic when defining that gift giving may be a strategic action meant to create an obligation for the exchange partner to reciprocate, implying that the aspect of trust created between the partners is what actually leads to the expectation of a counter-gift. Characterized by the basic three principles of “give, receive and reciprocate”, his study argues that the sequence of gift exchange is a way of reaffirming relations.

Muthusamy (2005) similarly shapes the aspects of reciprocal commitment considered as a sense of duty of an equivalent return offered to the other partner. Because of the fact that the partners have a tendency to not be sure about the consequences of all of their actions, the commitment is amplified by the constant reinforcement of feelings, by sharing a large amount of information, so as to develop a better suitable outcome for both parties.

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15 Sarkar (2001) analyzes the aspects of reciprocal behavior from the resource perspective, emphasizing that reciprocal commitment is the degree to which both partners are willing to invest resources into the alliance, thus that the principle reflects the idea of rewarding reactions from others. As the level of confidence increases, the effects positively affect reciprocal commitment and long-term relationships, with a chance of enhancing partner interdependency regarding complementary resources. Following the same direction of thought, studies of Dacin (1999) and Simsek (2003) mention the significance of relational embeddedness in shaping reciprocity, as it positively impacts relational ties and co-evolutional processes.

Luo (2002) went even further and analyzed international strategic alliances, focusing on reciprocal commitment as being the keystone of success and the foundation of the link between trust and performance. The findings of the study show that repeated and long-term interactions create attachments relationships, in which case the reciprocal commitment implications may lead to actions taken in order to adapt to the other partner’s needs, strengthening thus the cooperative relationship.

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16 Another study that marks TCT logics in reciprocity conceptualization, is developed by Kranton (1996), who analyzes it through the perspective of enforced agreements to give goods, services, information, or money in exchange for future compensation, therefore emphasizes the importance of higher utility gained from a reciprocal exchange. One of her main conclusions is that reciprocity is connected to the preferences of the actors and to the considered benefits to be gained in the future, bringing to the table the aspect of actors that are not cooperative, but know each other very well and hence, can enforce a reciprocal behavior.

Noteworthy to mention is that an important aspect regarding the conceptualization of reciprocity, is the tit for tat strategy, that has similar implications of the concept of quid pro quo, mentioned earlier. The tit for tat exchange (TFT) was defined by Bignoux (2006) as a social control mechanism by which partners are allowed to punish or reward each other. In addition to that, Scholz (2009) specifies that the tit for tat strategy provides a basis for the development of cooperation where the predictions of the future payoffs are fundamental.

The same idea follows the perspective of Klapwijk (2009), who underlines the reciprocation process as a very precise one, considering that actors tend to reciprocate the degree of cooperation that they have received in previous interactions with the partners. Thus, the consequences of past connections influence the partnership performance in the long run.

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17 the partners behaving a bit more cooperatively than the other one did in the past, is the needed solution in order to overcome noise.

To sum up, there is no generally accepted definition on the concept of reciprocity, however it has various implications and shapes different perspectives regarding mutual exchange in alliances and networks. As noticed, the reviewed studies seem to shape reciprocity as a norm that mentions quid pro quo (tit for tat) exchanges, social patterns based on mutuality, common goals, collective thinking regarding objectives of the alliance, voluntary acts of reciprocating benefits, moral obligations and future compensations as elements important to be considered in order to gain success and increase firm performance when in a strategic alliance.

In order to bring contributions to the literature, I have created a more common, generalized definition of reciprocity, following the aspects developed in the past studies. Therefore, as a conclusion to this part of the study, I state that Reciprocity is a form of moral obligation (Fremeaux, 2011) of alliance partners to voluntarily involve in frequent interactions regarding strategically beneficial actions (Tsaur, 2011) and mutual, trustworthy agreements (Carlson, 2011), with the intent of pursuing common alliance goals (Heidl, 2014), obtain higher utility through future compensations (Young, 1999), increase levels of trust (Muthusamy, 2007) and knowledge transfer (Rindflesich, 2001) and engage in quid pro quo exchanges of resources (Das, 2002), emphasized by the contingent implications of giving-receiving established relationships (Molm,2007) between the cooperative actors.

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Table 5. Definitions of reciprocity

How is the concept of reciprocity measured in the alliance literature?

Muthusamy (2005) has empirically analyzed strategic alliances between US business firms from various industries and focused his research on the positive correlation that reciprocal commitment has with knowledge transfer and trust, so he developed a scale for measuring interfirm reciprocity, thus providing new perspectives of possibilities of developing analysis. Reciprocal commitment between partners is considered a significant explanatory factor of interfirm learning, considering that once the level of resource dependence on the other partner increases, the interdependence of the partners is emphasized and the connection between them gets stronger, being influenced by a sense of duty and moral obligation.

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20 that needs to be mentioned here is that the author mentions that the collaboration between parties is enhanced, as the committed resources are more noticeable. The results of this empirical analysis show that social exchanges, therefore, the concept of reciprocity, are positively related to interfirm learning in strategic alliances.

Wincent (2010) focused on collecting data regarding network nodes and has also empirically found that the aspect of generalized reciprocity leads to an increase in the firm performance. The generalized reciprocal commitment regards exchanges that are received from another network actor than the one to whom they were offered and underlines the fact that all the actors involved in the network of relationships have a clear impact on the functionality of the system and that there has to be a collective thinking developed in order to obtain mutual beneficially results. Therefore, generalized reciprocity might involve time lags between actions and reactions, but also repeated interactions that signal willingness and readiness of exposure to possible opportunistic risks. It is believed that a collective dedication to the principles of reciprocity will lead to avoiding opportunism at the macro scale and will eventually reduce transaction costs.

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21 that generalized reciprocity is positively associated with the firm performance, with implications for advantages gained from the decision upon positioning in networks.

Reciprocity also refers to the giving of benefits to a partner as a return for the benefits received, as mentioned in the laboratory experimental study of Molm (2007), who used a sample of students that engaged in reciprocal exchange following as subjects. Starting from that idea, she specifies that there is a stronger solidarity built between partners that reciprocate on a constant basis and she distinguishes between an instrumental and a symbolic value of reciprocity. The first type does not necessarily develop affective bonds and trust aspects, but has a clear focus on the utilitarian benefits of an alliance and the second one is more focused on emphasizing the importance of communication channels and their way of proving trustworthiness.

In the empirical part of the study, she analyzes if actors value the act of reciprocity and does that by providing them two alternatives of exchange, one with a partner who constantly proves reciprocal behavior and the other one with an actor that intermittently reciprocates (only half of the times). The testing of the behavioral patterns observed involves measures of sentiments of trust (sentiment analyzed by seven-point bipolar semantic differential scales and trust measured by a three-item scale) and behavioral preferences (frequencies observed of choosing either the first or the second possible partner). These measurements were afterwards used to explain the predictability of the types of reciprocity appeared on a regular or random period of time. Results have shown that actors expressed more positive sentiments towards the partners that reciprocated in a constant mode, compared to the partner with an intermittent style of reciprocation.

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22 possibilities represented the setting for actors to decide between: giving a fixed amount of money to the other actor or giving no points at all (an aspect worth mentioning is that the points given to the other actor, if any, were not subtracted from the focal actor’s own points and the decisions were taken simultaneously by all the actors, without knowing the number of points they could give to others, but only the number of points possible of being received). After each exchange, participants were informed about the update of the number of their total points, so as for them to be informed on possible patterns of mentality developed in the other participants in the study.

A two-item scale was presented so as to measure feelings of commitment (distinguishing between uncommitted or committed subjects), but also to analyze the type of relationship that was created between the partners (either direct or indirect). In order to analyze the feelings that the actors involved, the subjects were asked to complete a multiple-choice questionnaire and choose between that statements of “We were competitors, working against each other”; “We were separate individuals, each working for ourselves”; “We were separate in individuals, but working together”; or “We were a group, a team, working together” (Molm, 2007).

The answers provided for these questions allowed the researches to make conclusions about the way that actors understood and viewed interdependence in the created group. The same answers were used for calculating the level of solidarity in the group. Additionally, the level of commitment developed in the exchange experiment was relevant for analyzing measures of exchange frequency. Results show that generalized exchange increases the level of feeling of commitment to the group, compared to reciprocal direct exchange, without being influenced by the frequency of exchange or other characteristics of the network, like size, level of information and other variables.

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23 parties. In this study, the concept of reciprocal commitment is measured on a five-point scale form not true to very true, regarding aspects of continuous commitment to the alliance from the side of the foreign party, contributions made to the alliance by the party or mutual help that the parties offered to each other. Some of the statements used in the questionnaire in order to asses those aspects are: “The degree of foreign party’s ongoing, continuous commitment to the alliance”, “The foreign party always provides more contributions to the international strategic alliance after local party did so” or “Both parties take specific steps to mutually helps each other to ensure alliance success”. Results have shown that reciprocal commitment has a positive influence on increasing the of trust building processes between parties, acting as a moderator that strengthens the power that trust has on impacting firm performance.

Ho (2014) has also researched on the subject of knowledge transfer in international strategic alliances, but in an ICT industry, based in the Taiwan setting. She concluded that reciprocity is a variable that positively influences the level of learning between the partners. Again, the reciprocal commitment does not have a clear measurement, but it is shown that it determines the amount of knowledge acquisition by the reciprocal behavior developed by the firm in knowledge application and that a lack of it would discount cooperative objectives between the partners involved. The main conclusion of the study is that reciprocal commitment positively influences the impact of knowledge protection on absorptive capacity and further, on alliance performance.

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24 you” and mentioning that if the impact of generosity was highly acknowledged and respected, reciprocal strategies would not be impacted by the negative outcomes of noise. A positive item was “If the other started to deliver the parcel slower, I immediately decided to deliver slow as well,” and a negative item was “My decisions were not influenced by the behavior of the other” (Klapwijk, 2009), thus showing extreme options of reciprocation. He also analyzed the tendency to reciprocate by using a behavioral measure and a self-report measure, complemented by a reciprocity index computed for each participant (by averaging the absolute differences between the cooperation level of the other and the cooperation level of the participant), implying that the higher participants scored on this index, the lower was their reciprocal behavior. Results show that the majority of the participants behaved in a reciprocal manner and findings show that in a world where noise is taken into consideration, strict reciprocity is not necessarily advisable, however the fact that actors tend to show generosity is a good solution in fighting against negative outcomes of the noise setting.

As noticed, reciprocity has a clear connection with trust, firm performance, solidarity, frequency of interactions and knowledge transfer processes developed between cooperative parties. As discussed above, reciprocity was measured as the sum of resources committed and resources perceived to be committed by the other partner and also the mean of exhibited collaboration tendencies. Also, by using scales regarding trust, knowledge transfer, mutuality in committing resources to the other partner, continuous commitment to the alliance or partners’ inclination to reciprocate actions.

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What are the antecedents/drivers of reciprocity in strategic alliances?

A significant amount of studies underlined so far mention that there is a positive relationship between the increasing level of trust between partners and the level of reciprocity, therefore I will prioritize the implications of trust when focusing on main antecedents of reciprocity.

Chaturvedi (2009) underlines that rational reciprocal commitment developed in the beginning of relationships is dependent on rational trust, as an increase in the emotional content of trust is shown to lead to emotional implications for commitment. This is considered a consequence of the signaling processes that gets more acute and therefore, helps creating a more trustworthy cooperative environment. Additionally, trust development has been mentioned as being implicit in the gift exchange theory, analyzing the idea that once a gift is given, the other actor tends to build trust in the fact that the action will be reciprocated at a moment in time (Dolfsma, 2009). Trust is mentioned as having an important impact on the creation of a reciprocal context in the study of Carlson (2011), adding to that the importance of strategic compatibility (common goals and orientation of the partners), which emphasizes the chemistry of the relationship and makes the coordination of the alliance more facile. High levels of strategic compatibility are shown to increase the level of the relationship’s success by implementing reciprocity norms, as this would be a setting in which reciprocity is required and is predicted to bring beneficial outcomes.

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27 behavior. Berg (1995) supports this idea, by stating that a presence of social history makes the relationship predisposed to implementing reciprocal norms. Hu (1997) also analyzed factors that influence reciprocity and argued that emotional connectivity of partners helps maintain reciprocity, emphasizing beneficial perspectives of cooperative attitudes and mutual understanding.

Noteworthy aspects of the implications of interdependence of the partners regarding reciprocity, have been emphasized in the study of Jiang (2008), noticing that symmetrical positions in which partners mutually depend on each other lead to reciprocation of expectations. Therefore, the alliance performance and success are strongly influenced in a positive way by the mutual forbearance when it comes to possible environmental and market changes. Adding to that, Zeng (2003) specifies that the tendency of alliance partners to shape each other’s behavior has an indirect impact on the alliance outcome. When the communication level is high and there is a setting of a long-term relationship, the period offered to the partners to reciprocate actions and to reward cooperation is increased, therefore a positive context for the creation and maintenance of the norm of reciprocity seems to be long-term collaboration and symmetrical interdependence of the partners. Suarez-Villa (1998) also mentions that transactions that are not based on a hierarchical relationship lead to a better functioning reciprocal transactions. Moreover, the balance created in the reciprocal dependence of resources exchanged will bring economic rewards, a consequence that becomes even more obvious when there are detected past relationships between the partners (Li, 2008). It appears that personal ties and common views on the strategic direction of the alliance, combined with constant cooperation between the actors, lead to the creation of relational capabilities that increase firm performance and reduce potential opportunistic behavior as the stability of the alliance becomes more vivid. This idea is similar to that in the study of Wincent (2010), that mentioned that strong ties are a beneficial factor in creating reciprocal partnerships, as they enhance the transfer of knowledge between actors.

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28 possibility of interaction with more actors. Also, Kanagaretnam (2010) shows that transparency (complete information) leads to increasing levels of trustworthiness.

In addition to that, studies show that the possibilities of creating reciprocal commitments enrich when partners lack opportunistic behavior. Therefore, I view opportunism as a barrier to creating relationships based on fair mutual exchange and I have analyzed the literature to find solutions to fight it. Opportunistic behavior is one of the most feared outcomes to deal with when it comes to business partnerships, as it implies that actors might present a self-interest behavior and the worst cases, even appropriate core technologies ignoring the interests of the other partners, thus showing a non-reciprocal behavior that might lead to risky future settings for the long-term survival of the alliance (Walter, 2014).

The reviewed studies have provided various solutions for inhibiting opportunistic behavior. A commonly used mechanism is the application of sanctions (Weber, 2006) and penalties (Takahashi, 2000; Das, 2002) applied in order to punish actors that proved a detrimental behavior that possibly “injured” their partners. An efficient mechanism in fighting opportunistic behavior was underlined by Zeng (2003), who mentions that some partnerships might function on a basis of economic hostages, that lock-in the partners’ capabilities and stop them from relying on other possible business partnerships than those provided by the alliance. An important mentioning here is that hostages may also imply evident disadvantages for the development of the firms involved and their level of innovation.

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29 1996) and that they help avoiding opportunistic behavior. This finding is also resulted from a fear of the partners regarding decreases of their reputation, as that might endanger future cooperation with other actors (Deeds, 1996).

Moreover, the implications of interdependence regarding partnered firms help decrease information asymmetries (Jiang, 2008; Wathne, 2015), increase the level of exchange of needed resources, raise the level of commitment to the alliance (Young, 1999) and develop a better and more efficient communication channel (Walter, 2014). The analysis of selfish players developed in the study of Ambrus (2010) emphasized that researchers should pay more attention to the intention hidden underneath the contribution of a player. The author suggests that a partner is ready to reciprocate an action because he is interested in the fairness proved by the other actors, as that may have good impact on his own performance in the long run. A similar contribution to this field of the literature is brought by Kadefors (2005), who developed an analysis of the seller-buyer relationships, stressing the fact that actors do not only consider the price of the resources exchanged, but also take into consideration the attitude and competence of their partners, this assuring the existence of fair relationships. This logic seems to follow a pattern of tit for tat strategy, also discussed in the paper of Li (2012), which specifies that partners are allowed to punish non-cooperative behaviors by choosing to prove the same tendencies in future interactions.

The review of solutions found to be effective in fighting opportunistic behavior concludes with sanctions, hostages, emotional connectivity, prior and continuous interactions, centrality of position in the network and the density of network, information symmetry and interdependence of partners. These factors shape a reciprocal behavior that helps avoiding the chance of exposing to risks the alliance performance and longevity.

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Table 7. Antecedents of reciprocity

What are the implications/consequences of reciprocity in strategic

alliances?

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32 providing proof of a relationship based on fairness. Thus, by increasing and trust, respectively, reciprocity becomes an inter-organizational routine, positively influencing the partnership on a constant basis.

The analysis of exchange networks provided by Chung (1996) foregrounds the idea that reciprocity has the aim of building trust and that it influences the development of a relationship of cooperation in time, as economic exchanges might lead to reciprocated actions in the long run, allowing some sort of insurance in case of unpredicted or unwanted possible settings. These results suggest that some actors might survive unpleasant times by being helped by their partners, as an action of reciprocation. Molm (2010) supported the relationship between these concepts, arguing that reciprocity developed in exchanges leads to the development of relational bonds between firms, characterized by trust and commitment, with increased levels of solidarity. The party that was trusted defined reciprocity as being the “echo of trust” in the study of Kanagaretnam (2010), with the specific implication of a complete information setting, is relevant for the development of relationships. Furthermore, Tsaur (2011) highlights the mediating effect of reciprocity on the relationship between personal ties and performance and showed that frequent interactions shape higher commitment as the personal relationships strengthen and the information exchanges increase, thus influencing firm performance. Todeva (2005) supports the idea that the successful implementation of an alliance is based on various rules and if there is an emphasis on reciprocity and trust in that phase, with the solidification of the relationship, the connections get more stable and mutually controlled.

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33 Furthermore, Garcia-Canal (2003) shows that the reciprocity reinforces incentives to continuous cooperation with partners, as it regards ways of reacting after understanding the pattern of behavior of the other actor. Empirical findings of Luo (2002) emphasize that commitment is a moderator for the trust-performance relationship and as relationships develop over time with a pattern of reciprocity, there can be observed an increase in the level of attachment based on the care felt from the other actor, thus leading partners to make more effort in satisfying the other’s needs and wishes. Muthusamy (2005) has focused his study on reciprocal commitment and found that it has a self-amplifying effect on the contributions brought from both parties and that it enhances the transfer of knowledge between them, supporting interfirm learning. It tends to lead to a joint mentality regarding objectives and actions, and as there is no exact way of assuring reciprocation, it needs high levels of trust developed in order to collaborate. Kumar (2013) also spotlights the fact that a commonly agreed upon macro culture of an industry increases reciprocity levels, that help to overcome coordination problems. Additionally, Phelps (2010), mentions that trust and reciprocity shape a motivation to share and teach in the cooperative relationship developed and the previous findings of Simsek (2003) suggest that reciprocity allows the luxury of proving trust and intentions, therefore serving a vital lubricant for any collaboration (Suarez-Villa, 1998).

Lastly, Sarkar (2001) analyzes the case of high partner diversification and mentions that the benefits of reciprocity are subtracted from the differences in resources and capabilities of the firms. The match between partners, proven by resource complementarity, implies that reciprocal commitment leads to aligned incentives and confidence enhancement in long-term relationships.

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Table 8. Implications of reciprocity

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

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35 and develop a systematic literature review, so as to bring theoretical and practical contributions to the alliance field. This review includes 60 empirical and 25 theoretical studies that contribute to an expanded understanding of the focal phenomenon of this study, as they fulfill the purpose of assessing detailed information regarding the definitions, measurements, antecedents and implications of the norm of reciprocity developed in strategic alliances.

After reviewing the studies mentioned in the sample, I noticed that the reciprocity concept does not benefit of a commonly accepted definition, therefore, as a first theoretical contribution of this review, I have developed a general reciprocity definition, one that synthesizes the most relevant variables and dimensions discussed in the literature and serves as a theoretical basis of future research, so as to be refined through constant improvement.: Reciprocity is a form of moral obligation (Fremeaux, 2011) of alliance partners to voluntarily involve in frequent interactions regarding strategically beneficial actions (Tsaur, 2011) and mutual, trustworthy agreements (Carlson, 2011), with the intent of pursuing common alliance goals and benefits (Heidl, 2014), obtain higher utility through future compensations (Young, 1999), increase levels of trust (Muthusamy, 2007) and knowledge transfer (Rindflesich, 2001) and engage in quid pro quo exchanges of resources (Das, 2002), emphasized by the contingent implications of giving-receiving established relationships (Molm,2007) between the cooperative actors.

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36 (Klapwijk, 2005). Hoping that these collection of results will have continuous regard in future research, I state that it shapes relevant managerial implications, as it implies relevant variables to consider when implementing firm strategies, analyzing outcomes of actions and shaping functional patterns and decision making processes of organizations.

Lastly, this review synthesized findings that refer to antecedents (drivers) and implications (consequences) of reciprocity in strategic alliances, by summarizing them in a relevant reciprocity framework (Figure 1). Main results show that the elements of mutual dependence, strategic compatibility, interpersonal attachment, transparency and market size, are main antecedents of a reciprocal relationship and that the elements of relational bonds, cooperation, solidarity, incentive alignment and firm performance, are main implications of it. Trust, information exchange, frequent interactions and reputation are underlined as shaping a relationship of mutual influence with the concept of reciprocity (Figure 2), a finding that helps us highlight variables that are not just shaping reciprocal norms, but are also shaped by it.

Figure 1. Framework of reciprocity1

1

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37 Figure 2. Mutual influence between reciprocity and its factors

The grouping in endogenous and exogenous factors regard those elements that outline factors that have an origin in the relationships developed between the alliance partners and those that develops from an external source to the relationship. Disputes may be created regarding the attribution of reputation firm performance to the exogenous factors, but in my view, these elements are rooted in contexts developed previous to the alliance, therefore they shape their relevance prior to the firm becoming an alliance partner in a specific setting. However, I do not deny the fact that they are variables of constant development, thus an alliance setting might influence their enhancement. Various aspects of this possible debate may serve as possible future research directions, as authors do not seem to provide a clear, irrefutable background of considerations.

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38 included in the framework provided, but the expressed connections between reciprocity and all the factors mentioned are relevant for understanding them, as they relate to main elements described in the measurements of reciprocity part of this study. As previously mentioned, the lack of a clear conclusion regarding measurements of reciprocity emphasizes new research gaps for the alliance literature and need future consideration.

The synthesized results were presented in a tables that summarizes the main findings (Table 9) and contributes to facilitating access to relevant studies regarding reciprocity. The emphasized findings increase understanding of the effects of implementing and maintaining reciprocity in strategic alliances, but also in clarifying the logics behind its functioning. Thus, managerial contributions are mainly emphasized, as alliance partners may now be more motivated in observing the importance of specific organizational or relational variables, in order to increase reciprocity, or may actually enhance reciprocal behavior, in order to have an impact on the previously mentioned factors, depending on the purpose of the alliance. I believe that the provided results will help shape new strategies applied in the processes of business development, as alliance partners will now have the proof of the secret successful recipe regarding factors that influence and are being influenced by reciprocity, as developed throughout the theoretical and empirical field of the world of reciprocity.

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39

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40

Limitations and future research directions

Limitations of this research start with the use of a limited number of studies, considering the time frame of research and literature available. Also, some of the empirical studies are cross-sectional (Muthusamy, 2005; Muthusamy, 2007; Weber, 326; Walter, 2014), thus offering restricted information on the implications of the concept and only few of the studies in the review analyze multilateral partnerships (Das, 2002; Li, 2012; Heidl, 2014) and those are also limited to a trilateral relationship, because of lack of information in the alliance literature. Therefore, I emphasize the necessity of developing studies on alliances between more than three partners, as a recommendation for future research.

Another limitation is the fact that most of the articles reviewed ignore the importance of contextual factors when developing research and are limited to simple, dyadic relationships, that disregard the importance of a joint view on organizational, environmental and relational contexts, considered altogether (Garcia-Canal;2003; Todeva, 2005; Muthusamy, 2007; Buckely, 2009; Ho, 2014; Du, 2014). This makes me believe that firms are examined from a limited perspective and is mainly influenced by the logics of social exchange theory, disregarding important causality when shaping outcomes of relationships. Thus, I believe that future research is needed in order to have a clearer perspective of alliance functioning, relational embeddedness and mutual influence of firms, in order to shape more in depth studies that are relevant for theoretical considerations of reciprocity, but also practical applications.

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41 definition and emphasizing the variables considered regarding reciprocity measurements, are worthy to appreciate, but further development and interest is needed, so as to lead to implications for an exact measurement of reciprocity in strategic alliances. Thus, the framework of antecedents and implications provided in this study may serve as the basis for future studies, that would emphasize a clearer impact of factors on reciprocity development and would ease the implementation of fairness and commitment norms in strategic alliances, as partners would know how exactly to quantify its impact on alliance performance.

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Master Thesis SIM