In perspective of an involved observer:

In perspective of an involved observer:

How moral-disagreement affects do-gooders’ anticipated

resentment and argumentation strategy

Tobias Meyer

Faculty of Economics and Business

University of Groningen

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Master of Science

Marketing Management

II

In perspective of an involved observer:

How moral-disagreement affects do-gooders’ anticipated

resentment and argumentation strategy

Master Thesis

Completion Date: 16.06.2016

Department of Marketing Faculty of Economics and Business

Author

1

supervisor

2

supervisor

Tobias Meyer (S2981335) Dr J.W. Bolderdijk Prof. dr. ir. K. van Ittersum t.meyer.2@student.rug.nl j.w.bolderdijk@rug.nl k.van.ittersum@rug.nl

Abstract

Psychological literature supports the view that observers generally support consumers who act ethically out of moral concern. However, such “do-gooders” are not always appreciated. Especially in the presence of involved peers who did not choose to act morally themselves, do-gooders run the risk of being derogated.

Whereas existing papers investigated this phenomenon out of the peers’ position (observer), this thesis focuses on the perspective of the do-gooder (actor). Based on the hypothesis that do-gooders anticipate higher resentment and subsequently avoid the use of moral arguments in the presence of others who did not choose morally, a lab experiment was conducted. Participants were asked if they would sign a petition supporting the promotion of organic products – thus it gave them the opportunity to take a moral stance. Participants who indicated they would sign the petition served as do-gooders and they were led to believe they had to discuss the reasons for signing the petition with a fellow participant. In a between-subjects design, the other participant was introduced as a person who signed the petition or as a person that did not sign the petition.

Results show that do-gooders anticipated significantly less affection and respect by persons who would not sign the petition, but this did not lead them to avoid the use of moral arguments. In contrast, although not mediated by anticipated resentment, do-gooders made increasing use of moral arguments when facing a person who did not sign. Therewith, this paper states that a higher anticipated resentment does not per se lead to less moral arguments by the do-gooder. I conclude that the avoidance of moral arguments might only occur if the do-gooder has strong emotional ties with involved observers and is scared about social consequences.

IV

Preface

Growing up in the countryside of Northern Germany, three things were characteristic of my youth: Football, beer and meat. Whereas the first mentioned just brought me into stadiums and bars, the third one delivers the fertile soil for this thesis – thanks to my teammates, who always ordered their burgers without salad, and my vegetarian friends from university, who screamed when they saw a sausage in their fridge.

In the villages where I spent my youth it is a quite common phenomenon that people who are acting morally superior are derogated by less moral acting persons. For example, people who do not drink alcohol have a very hard time justifying their decision when at a party: “Are you the driver or what’s wrong with you?” People who do not eat meat are asked wheter they are sick or why they do not eat meat, which is “the most natural thing to do.” From time to time you even see people with shirts claiming “Vegetarian: An old word for lousy hunters.” To be honest: For the first 20 years of my life, I did not worry too much about the above-mentioned examples. “That’s the way it has always been,” I said to myself, and simply accepted it.

VI

Table of Figures

1 Conceptual Model. 5

2 Petition – More Organic Food Alternatives in Supermarkets. 7

3 Observers Moral (Dis)agreement Manipulation. 7

4 Mean Rankings of Moral Arguments. 12

Introduction

On the 13th of August 2013 I first landed in Accra, Ghana. Plastic-waste, open canalisation and animals searching for food in the canals – these pictures are still fresh in my mind and were the starting point for the decision to become vegetarian. Retrospectively, my decision was driven by both selfish and moral reasons: I realized that excessive meat consumption was neither good for my health, nor for the health of planet earth. Also from today’s perspective it is discussable about which arguments dominated.

However, to justify my changed lifestyle, I noticed the use different arguments depending on the persons I was talking to: Talking to my football teammates, who were eating meat on a daily basis, I highlighted the benefits of being vegetarian for my personal health. Talking to my ecologically sensitive friends from university, I was emphasizing the positive environmental outcomes of being vegetarian. But what let me use different arguments when I was facing different people? Did I anticipate their reaction? Was I too scared to deliver the complete story to people who obviously denied choosing a more environmental friendly lifestyle?

The observer's perspective: Putting down morally motivated others

For several years literature on psychology has neglected the negative outcomes for the social reputation of people acting ethically, so called “do-gooders.” Contrarily, the majority of research states positive social consequences for moral-acting people (Gouldner, 1960; Griskevicius et al., 2010; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006), especially when they act ethically out of moral reasons rather than out of self-interest (Lin-Healy & Small, 2012). For example, those who behave pro-socially are awarded high status (Willer, 2009) and their good actions often result in recompense (Horne, 2009).

2 childhood, coming up short in comparison with a peer decreases one’s affection for a generous individual (Tasimi et al., 2015). In line with this, Herrmann et al. (2008) documented the widespread existence of sanctioning people who behave pro-socially. By introducing a public goods game to sixteen different countries, the authors have found that the sanctioning of pro-social-acting people exists throughout all cultures and can be as tremendous as sanctioning free riders. These findings are surprising considering the positive effect of moral behavior for other individuals and society in general, and lead to the questions of why and when morally acting people are denigrated.

A new research stream: Do-gooder derogation

A relatively new research stream investigates why people are “putting down moral motivated others” (Minson & Monin, 2012: 1), which is referred to as do-gooder derogation. Following this stream, peers (in this paper, also referred to as “observers”) tend to vilify do-gooders as consequence of a shortcoming in social comparison with the moral actors (Minson, 2007). Central for the comparison is the observer`s self-concept, “the individual`s belief about himself, including the person`s attributes and who and what the self is” (Baumeister, 1999: 456). When a do-gooder implicitly threatens the observer`s self-concept, the observer tries to defend their self-concept, and do-gooder derogation is likely to occur (Minson & Monin, 2012). Underlying the derogation of do-gooders is the moral reproach that peers anticipate when being confronted with moral-acting people. In a study, meat eaters rated vegetarians less positively after imagining vegetarians’ moral judgment of meat eaters. The anticipated judgment was higher than the actual judgment (Minson & Monin, 2012) – in actuality, vegetarians do not look down upon meat eaters, but meat eaters think so nevertheless.

Involved observers tend to derogate do-gooders

justifies their decision to promote a non-packaging grocery store with moral arguments, is applauded and imitated by observers who were not asked to promote the store themselves. In contrast, people who deny promoting the store themselves like the do-gooder using moral arguments less. Therewith, evidence is given that observers do not per se dislike do-gooders, but especially involved observers dislike do-gooders who play on moral arguments.

Taking these findings back to the introductory example, my intuitive decision to avoid moral reasons when justifying my vegetarian lifestyle to my teammates seems well founded. Probably I expected a socially awkward situation when playing on moral arguments against my teammates who denied acting ethically themselves. When talking to my friends from university instead, there was little reason for me to anticipate resentment when playing on moral arguments, as all of them were living a more environmentally friendly lifestyle. But can this observation be generalized?

The actors’ perspective: Moral arguments as threat to observers’

self-concept

Psychological research gives little answers, since the above-mentioned studies focus on the observer perspective of gooder derogation, but they have not investigated wheter do-gooders are able to anticipate the reactions of observers. This thesis aims to fill this research-gap and hypothesizes that do-gooders anticipate resentment from involved observers who denied acting ethically, and subsequently, decrease the use of moral arguments when justifying their actions. I outline my reasoning below.

Do-gooders’ anticipation of being resented

4 I argue that the threat superior actions pose to others is pronounced for moral domains, because people are especially sensitive to criticism about their moral identity (Monin, 2007; Monin et al., 2008; Minson & Monin, 2012). As morality is central to their self-concept (Ybarra et al. 2012), do-gooders’ standpoint against (common) immoral behavior shows disapproval of the ones not doing so. Therewith they question other people's sense of being good and moral people (Steele, 1988; Cramwinckel et. al, 2013), which consumers care deeply about maintaining (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Literature has shown that superior-acting people have concerns about the mixed aspects of their superior status (Exline & Zell, 2012), ranging from self-oriented and other-oriented concern to concerns about their relationship with the outperformed (Koch & Metcalfe, 2011). Given, that people are aware of potential social consequences that may ensue from one’s observable actions (Holmes et al., 2002), I argue that do-gooders also anticipate that their own moral actions could result in less liking and respect (referred to as “anticipated resentment”) by observers.

The ability to take perspective as moderator

Do-gooders should be particularly concerned about morally disagreeing with observer responses, if they are able to take the other sides’ perspective. A perspective-taking scale will therefore measure if the do-gooder’s ability to take the perspective of others moderates the effect of the observer’s moral disagreement with the do-gooder’s anticipated resentment.

A matter of taste: The do-gooder strategy of self-concealment

resentment by morally disagreeing observers, they tend to conceal the moral nature of their actions.

Conceptual Model

Based on the developed hypothesis, a conceptual model (Figure 1) has been developed, displaying the expected relations.

Figure 1: Conceptual Model.

6

Methodology

Context of the study

To test these hypotheses, a context is needed allowing do-gooders to conceal the moral nature of their actions by using selfish arguments. Although this is the case for the introductory example of being vegetarian, choosing this study field comes with the risk of not finding a sufficient number of participants, as only vegetarians could serve as do-gooders. To avoid this risk, the thesis will focus on a related field that has gained increasing interest, both in society and academia (Thompson, 1998): The adoption of organic products. Several studies investigate why people are buying organic products (Makatouni, 2011, de Magistris & Gracias, 2008). First results indicate a broad range of arguments, ranging from rather moral reasons like environmental consequences to rather selfish reasons like health concerns (Lockie et. al, 2003). Thøgersen (2011) finds that the majority of consumers start to buy green products primarily because of moral reasons, “but subsequent concerns for protecting a smart and rational self-image made them inflate possible selfish reasons when asked to report why they buy green products, such as organic food” (2011: 1071). Therewith the research field of supporting/buying organic products allows finding both selfish and moral arguments and gives a first indication that justifications for supporting organic products might change due to societal reasons.

Procedure

To investigate, whether do-gooders change their argumentation depending on the observer they are expecting, an experiment was conducted in a laboratory (see Appendix 1 for survey). Every participant was asked to read and sign an informed consent form before beginning the experiment. After answering the Items of the Perspective Taking Scale, participants’ were asked if they would sign a petition to promote the spread of organic products in supermarkets. Intending to trigger a high number of participants to sign the petition and therewith allowing them to be do-gooders, the signing process was simplified by two choices: would sign / would not sign.1 _{Participants who indicated they would not sign were excluded, as they did not act} morally superior and therefore cannot act as do-gooders. Participants that would sign were led

1 _{To test if participants are willing to sign the petition a family & friends pre-testing with a}

sample size of 13 was conducted. With a signing rate of 83,33 % a petition aiming at making the Netherlands a greener place was displayed in the experiment (see Appendix 2).

to believe to engage in a discussion with another participant. The discussion partner was either introduced as someone who would sign the petition or would not sign the petition. To prepare for the discussion, do-gooders then were asked to rank arguments for signing (do-gooders’ choice of arguments) and asked to imagine how they are perceived by the other participant (anticipated resentment).

Figure 2: Petition – More Organic Food Alternatives in Supermarkets.

Independent Variables

Observers’ moral disagreement

After indicating whether they would sign the petition themselves, the participants who did sign (69,34%, our “do-gooders”) were led to believe that they have to discuss their reasoning with another participant (our “observers”). To manipulate the observers’ moral (dis)agreement, the discussion partner was either introduced as a person that would have signed the petition (Condition 1, Moral Agreement, n=57) or a person that would not sign the petition (Condition 2, Moral Disagreement, n= 55), see Figure 3. Demographics of the observers were held constant.

8

Anticipated resentment

Do-gooders then were asked to imagine how the discussion partner sees them. The measurement of anticipated resentment is an adapted version of the scale of Monin et al., 2008. Participants were assured that this data would not be forwarded to the discussion partner. First, participants were asked to imagine how much they will be liked by the discussion partner on an 11-point scale from dislike very much (1) to like very much (11) (M = 6.97, SD = 1.78), and how much they will be respected by the discussion partner on an 11-point scale from despise very much (1) to respect very much (11) (M = 7.78, SD = 1.72).

Second, they were asked how they think their personality would be rated by the discussion partner on 7-point semantic differentials from +3 to -3, with the first end of the scale being -3 (e.g. intelligent) and the latter one being +3 (e.g. stupid). Personality characteristics included intelligent stupid, strong – weak, confident – insecure, active – passive, kind – cruel, nice – awful, warm – cold, honest – dishonest, fair – unfair, pleasant – unpleasant, independent – dependent, generous – stingy, mature – immature and high self-esteem – low self-esteem. Following the study of Monin et al. (2008), anticipated resentment was measured in three components. The first one includes liking and respect and is labelled “attraction” (M = 7.38, SD = 1.75, Cronbachs a= .786). The second, labelled “soft skills,” includes the personality characteristics: kind, nice, warm, honest, fair and pleasant (M = 2.95, SD = 0.84, Cronbach`s a = .908). The third, labelled “cognitive strength,” includes the personality characteristics: intelligent, strong, confident, active and high self-esteem (M = 3,11, SD = 0.84, Cronbach`s a = .878). The latter are the result of a factor analysis. The factors explain 65,37% of the variance of the personality characteristics’ items (see Appendix 3).

Perspective-taking

I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments,” “I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both,” (reversed) “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other guy's’ point of view,” “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective,” “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision” and “When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself in his shoes’ for a while.” Participants ranked them on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from “does not describe me” (1) to “describes me very well” (5). Together, the items from the perspective taking scale (M = 3.61, SD = 1.59, Cronbach`s a = .639).

Dependent Variable

Selfish vs. moral arguments

To evaluate whether arguments change when facing persons who deny acting morally, do-gooders’ choice of arguments were measured in two ways: First, do-gooders were asked to rank six arguments for signing the petition before meeting the discussion partner “to guarantee a fluent and efficient discussion.”2 The moral arguments were: Organic food is being produced in a way that animal’s rights have been respected (M = 2.47, SD = 1.433), organic food reduces the amount of chemicals that run-off into lakes and watercourses (M = 2.94, SD = 1.268) and organic food reduces the use of herbicides and pesticides in agriculture (m) (M = 3.10, SD = 1.41) The selfish arguments were: Organic food is healthier to consume than conventionally grown food (M = 2.51, SD = 1.45), organic food tastes better than conventional food (M = 5.08, SD = 0.99) and organic food makes you feel good (M = 4.90, SD = 1.382). They could rank these arguments by drag-and-drop. Taken together, the three moral items form the “moral arguments” (M = 2.84, SD = 0.812), and the three selfish items form “selfish arguments” (M = 4.16, SD = 0.812).

Second, do-gooders also stated their motivation on a 7-point semantic differential, ranging from (1): “I don`t care as much about the ethical aspects, but I like organic products because they taste better / are healthier” to (7): I don`t care as much about the taste/health, but I like organic products because they are an ethical, conscious choice” (M = 4.71, SD = 1.67).

2

10 A Spearman's Correlation (see Appendix 4) was run to determine the relationship between the ranking of moral and selfish arguments and the semantic differential motivational statement. Results show a moderate, positive monotonic correlation between ranking and the semantic differential was found to be: (rs = .47, n = 112, p < .001).

Manipulation Check

To verify that participants really believed that there would be a discussion with another participant, and whether they read the information regarding the other participant carefully, a manipulation check was included. People were asked, if their discussion partner is female (which was not the case), if their discussion partner would sign the petition (which depended on the condition) and if they were under the impression that their argumentation would be forwarded to their discussion partner, when making the argument ranking.

Plan of Data Analysis

Results

Participants

261 students of a European University completed the experiment on “organic food promotion,” which was part of a series of unrelated studies. Eighty participants indicated they would not sign the petition and were excluded and debriefed as they did not act morally superior and therewith could not act as do-gooders. 181 of the participants initially decided to sign the petition (69.34%). However, sixty-nine of them were excluded because of failure in at least one of the manipulation checks (57), or failure in the attention check (2). Therewith 112 participants served as do-gooders. Hence, 112 participants are included, of which 73.21% are female and 26.91% are male. The age ranked from eighteen to thirty-one, with an average age of twenty-two. Fifty-seven participants were randomly confronted with the profile of a person showing moral agreement (Condition 1: Moral Agreement, n= 57), whereas the other fifty-five were confronted with the profile of a person showing moral disagreement (Condition 2: Moral Disagreement, n=55).

Direct Effects

Moral disagreement

The Analysis of Variances shows a direct effect of observers’ moral (dis)agreement on do-gooders’ anticipated respect and liking, F (1,101)3 _{= 13.197, p < 0.001. Do-gooders, who}

expected a discussion partner that would not sign, anticipated being less liked and respected (M = 6.79, SD = 1.61) than by a discussion partner that did sign (M = 7.87, SD = 1.41). No direct effect could be found in terms of soft skills, F (1,101) = 0.47, p = .50, and cognitive strength, F (1,101) = 0.33, p = .86. Therewith do-gooders do not anticipate that a discussion partner who would not sign the petition evaluate them worse in terms of their soft skills and cognitive strength, but anticipate to be less liked and respected by them.

3

12 51,75! 61,43! 46! 48! 50! 52! 54! 56! 58! 60! 62! 64! Moral!Arguments! Observers$Moral$ Agreement$ Observers$Moral$ Disagreement$ Choice of arguments

An Analysis of variances shows no direct effect of observers moral (dis)agreement on do-gooders choice of arguments – measured in terms of do-do-gooders overall motivational statement – , F (1,110) = 0.664, p = .417, η² = 0,007. A Mann-Whitney Test reveals this finding for do-gooders ranking of moral arguments. The median of moral arguments did not decrease for do-gooders who expected a discussion partner that would not sign, Mdn = 2.67, U = 1296, N = 112, p = .107. Also, when looking at single arguments “animal rights”, Mdn = 2, U = 1606, N = 112, p = .234, “water protection”, Mdn = 3, U = 1249, N = 112 , p = .057 and “agricultural preservation”, Mdn = 3, U = 1448, N = 57, p = .477, no changes in the median can be observed.

However, in analyzing the mean rank of moral arguments given by do-gooders (see figure 1), a surprising tendency can be observed. Contrary to expectations, do-gooders who expected a discussion partner that did not sign, rank moral arguments as more important.4

Figure 4: Mean Rankings of Moral Arguments.

This tendency is consistent through all single arguments (see Appendix 5). Also, when looking at the 7-point semantic differential, asking do-gooders for their overall motivation, F(1,110) = 0.664, p = .417, do-gooders who expected a discussion partner that did not sign tend to play more on moral arguments (M = 4.84, SD = 1.60) relatively more than participants who expected a discussion partner that did sign (M = 4.58, SD = 1.74).

Moderated Mediation

As the observers’ moral (dis)agreement did not significantly affect do-gooders’ choice of arguments, neither for the overall motivation statement nor for the ranking of arguments, no statistically significant relation between moral (dis)agreement exists. This implies that do-gooders’ anticipated resentment cannot be a mediator. Still, it is of interest to evaluate, if the conditional process analysis reveals the significant effect of observers’ moral (dis)agreement on do-gooders’ anticipated resentment. Results indicate, that whether the discussion partner would sign the petition (b= .97, p = .0015) significantly affects do-gooders’ anticipation of resentment, F (3,99)5= 4.53, p = .0051, R2 = .1539. This effect does (marginally) depend on the do-gooders’ abilities to take perspective, b = .45, p = .086. Thus, especially do-gooders who are able to take the others’ perspective, anticipate resentment on behalf of discussion partners that did not sign. That do-gooders anticipate resentment however, has no statistically significant influence on their choice of arguments (b = .12, p = .27 for overall motivational statement). Overall, it can be concluded that there is no significant effect of the observers’ moral disagreement on gooders’ choice of arguments – neither direct, nor mediated by do-gooders’ anticipated resentment, F (2,100) = 0.9754, p = .3806, R2 = .0191. This finding is consistent with the non-significant results of do-gooders ranking of moral arguments, F (2,100) = 1.69, p = .1889, R2 = .033 (see Appendix 6).

Figure 5: Conceptual Model: Significant Effects.

5 _{Hayes Process Matrix excluded eleven participants, originally indicating they would sign the petition} because they decided they would not sign the petition after being exposed to the other participant. Therefore, they were not asked to evaluate the other participant, but debriefed, which is interesting.

*significant for p < .001 **significant for p < .1

14

Discussion

This paper added a new layer to the research stream of do-gooder derogation by first exploring the issue from the actors’ perspective. A conceptual model was developed and tested, proposing that the observers’ moral (dis)agreement and do-gooders’ abilities to take the observer’s perspective determines the do-gooders’ anticipated resentment, which, in turn, affects the do-gooders’ choice of arguments. It was proposed that do-gooders anticipate higher resentment and subsequently avoid the use of moral arguments in the perspective of observers showing moral disagreement.

Facing moral disagreement

Study results indicate that do-gooders indeed anticipate significantly higher resentment in anticipation of a morally disagreeing observer. Therewith this paper confirms the first finding of Monin et al. (2012), that not only do involved observers anticipate resentment in expectation of do-gooders, but also do-gooders anticipate resentment in expectation of an observer who has denied acting morally. Taking this back to the introductory example, my fear of an awkward situation when talking to my teammates about becoming vegetarian can be explained by the anticipation of less liking and respect from them.

Surprisingly, this finding was only marginally significant moderated by the do-gooders’ ability to take the perspective of others. This might be explained by the relatively small sample size (n=112) and the inadequate reliability of the perspective-taking scale (Cronbach´s a = .639).

Playing on moral arguments in the perspective of moral disagreement

Contrary to expectations, expecting resentment from the discussion partner did not lead gooders to use less moral arguments. In contrast, although not statistically significant, do-gooders made increasing use of moral arguments when anticipating a morally disagreeing observer. Therewith do-gooders behaved differently in the experiment than I did when facing my football mates, leaving the question of why this occurred unanswered.

contrast to me facing my teammates, there were no emotional or social ties connecting them and subsequently little incentive for the do-gooders to see social consequences when playing on moral arguments So, although do-gooders were aware that a morally disagreeing observer would like and respect them less, one explanation for keeping the moral arguments could be that they simply did not care what the other participant thought about them. Second, in contrast to me facing my teammates, do-gooders only saw the demographics of the other participant (name, age, gender) making it much harder to develop empathy. Still, the above explanations can only account for why do-gooders did not change their argumentation, but hardly explain the trend of these do-gooders making increasing use of moral arguments when anticipating a morally disagreeing observer.

Therefore a third explanatory approach needs to be considered: Do-gooders might want to convince the morally disagreeing observer by playing on moral arguments. So instead of concealing their moral intent, do-gooders especially play on their moral motives to convince the morally disagreeing observer. When faced with an external threat or evaluation, individuals may be motivated to prove to others that they were not wrong in an earlier decision (Staw, 1981). As moral arguments are, to some extent, accountable for, playing on them might be a better way to prove that the decision for signing was correct than playing on selfish arguments, which are of personal nature. For example the moral argument that organic foods contain less pesticides is verifiable by facts. In contrast, the selfish argument those organic foods taste better, is an argument that only counts for individuals that think so. Thus, playing on moral arguments when expecting a moral disagreeing observer can also be seen as an attempt of do-gooders to prove their moral actions as correct.

However, since there has been no other evidence given yet, the simplest explanation is that my personal experience was an individual case that is not generalizable.

Limitations

16 before, in the lab experiment, do-gooders did not speak face-to-face with the morally disagreeing observer. Also the functional and emotional ties, that normally exist when engaging in a discussion with another person, were not reflected by the experiment. Thus, the social consequences of do-gooders choice of arguments were not as present as in a natural situation. Furthermore, it is questionable to what extent the same results would occur when presenting different demographics to the do-gooder, as the demographics of the observer were held constant and only moral dis(agreement) was manipulated.

Besides these more general drawbacks, a major limitation can be seen in the presentation of arguments. Participants were presented to the given arguments they could rank by drag-and-drop and to a Likert scale for their overall motivation. This implies that do-gooders could not choose their own words for justifying their actions. Therewith it was not possible for them to downplay or exaggerate by phrases like “I think” or “It is definitely.” To choose from given arguments might also imply that do-gooders could not select the arguments causing their action – meaning that possibilities to play on moral or selfish arguments were much more restricted than in a day-to-day situation. Furthermore, the arguments themselves might be seen as selfish for some participants, but as moral for others. The moral argument, “organic food reduces the amount of chemicals that runoff into lakes and watercourses” was classified as important, but could also have been chosen out of selfish concerns like the fear of drinking contaminated water. Therefore the motivation behind ranking moral arguments on top positions might not always have been altruistic.

Managerial Implications

could present organic foods as largely accepted and common in society – e.g. by using bigger spaces in supermarket shelves. Therewith the buying of organic foods would be seen as less extraordinary. In a second step marketers could also focus on communications about organic-food buyers and portraying their reasons for buying. These communications may not only increase non-buyers knowledge about the buyers, but also reduce their prejudices against them (Pettigrow & Trop, 2008) and thus decrease resentment.

However, as results have shown, the anticipation of resentment does not keep organic food supporters away from using moral arguments for their support. The marketer should, therefore, not hesitate to advertise organic foods with moral arguments. Anyhow, when advertising with selfish arguments like “better for your health,” organic foods might gain bigger market shares by convincing non-buyers of the product quality and adding a new layer to the moral superiority factor. Concluding, to address both existing and potential customers, a mix of selfish and moral arguments may be the most convincing strategy.

Future Research Ideas

As this paper was one of the first investigations of do-gooder derogation from the actor’s perspective, the research field is widely unexplored. Therefore future studies are needed to verify that the finding that do-gooders anticipate less liking and respect by morally disagreeing observers does hold for different situations and other study contexts. Potential contexts are manifold, ranging from veganism to giving donations. Exploring these would allow to draw specific conclusions for each field and could also lead to a deeper understanding of the underlying cognitive processes do-gooders deal with when donating or becoming vegan.

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Conclusion

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Mainstream!of!literature!states!that!people!ac5ng!morally!superior!

Observers`'Moral'

(Dis)agreement' DoXGooders`'Choice'of'Arguments'

Observers`'Moral'

(Dis)agreement' DoXGooders`'Choice'of'Arguments'

Observers`'Moral'

(Dis)agreement' DoXGooders`'Choice'of'Arguments'

60,26' 60,82' 57,32' 54,41' 50,91' 55,79' 52,6' 52,02' 55,65' 58,66' 62,29' 57,18' 0' 10' 20' 30' 40' 50' 60' 70'

Health' Feel'good' Taste' Agrigculture' Water' Animal'

Who'is'this'guy?'Probably''

don´t'know'him'and'won´t'

meet'him'again.''

Do!gooders!might!wanted!to!convince!the!other!par5cipant!that!

their!signing!of!the!pe55on!was!correct!

! 

Moral!arguments!are!o\en!accountable!for,!selfish!arguments!are!o\en!only!!

Conclusion:

!

“The!results!provide!empirical!support!that!do*gooders!an5cipate!significantly!

less! liking! and! respect! by! morally! disagreeing! observers! than! by! morally!

agreeing!observers.!!

!

Different! to! expecta5ons,! this! does! not! lead! do*gooders! to! avoid! moral!

arguments! in! perspec5ve! of! moral! disagreement.! In! contrast,! although! not!

mediated!by!an5cipated!resentment,!a!trend!indicates!that!do*gooders!make!

increasing! use! of! moral! arguments! in! perspec5ve! of! morally! disagreeing!

observers.!!

!

Therewith,! this! paper! gives! evidence! that! a! higher! an5cipated! resentment!

does!not!per!se!lead!do*gooders!to!conceal!moral!arguments.!!

!