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THE PLATFORM ECONOMY

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THE PLATFOR M ECONOMY

Unravelling the Legal Status of Online Intermediaries

Bram Devolder (ed.)

Cambridge – Antwerp – Chicago

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Th e Platform Economy. Unravelling the Legal Status of Online Intermediaries

© Th e editor and contributors severally

Th e editors and contributors have asserted the right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identifi ed as authors of this work.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, without prior written permission from Intersentia, or as expressly permitted by law or under the terms agreed with the appropriate reprographic rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction which may not be covered by the above should be addressed to Intersentia at the address above.

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Intersentia v

PR EFACE

‘Th e internet in its nature shocks real-space law. Th at’s oft en great; it is sometimes awful. Th e question policy makers must face is how to respond to this shock. Courts are policy makers, and they too must ask how best to respond. Should they respond by intervening immediately to remedy the “wrong” said to exist? Or should they wait to allow the system to mature and to see just what harm there is?’

Lawrence Lessig, Th e Future of Ideas (2001)

Today, platforms such as Uber, Airbnb and TaskRabbit enable millions of people to become part-time entrepreneurs and top up their incomes by engaging in online transactions. Economies of scale empower them to compete with well-established incumbents. For every brokered transaction, these online intermediaries charge a service fee. Why own a fl eet of cars, if you can disrupt incumbent taxi companies and generate 2 billion USD quarterly net revenue by facilitating transactions between drivers and users? Why operate a hotel, if you generate 1 billion USD quarterly net revenue by brokering between tourists and home owners or tenants?

By dramatically reducing transaction costs and enabling millions of small- scale transactions globally, platforms are fundamentally disrupting the existing balance between customers and suppliers. Existing legal frameworks fail to coherently address this paradigm shift that blurs established lines between traditional legal categories, such as business and consumer, personal and professional, and worker and contractor. Traditional regulation, which focuses mainly on balancing the interests of two contracting parties, is now confronted with a three-sided contractual relationship between a platform, a supplier and a user. Legislators, judges and lawyers across the globe are struggling to determine the legal status of online intermediaries. Is regulatory intervention needed to reap the potential benefi ts of the platform economy or to mitigate the potentially negative consequences of regulatory disruption? Can platforms be held liable for the proper execution of services provided by others? Does existing national regulation impose disproportionate market restrictions on innovators? Should we rethink labour protection and social security to address the potential loss of social protection of non-standard workers? How can revenue law be improved to tackle elaborate (international) schemes to avoid direct and indirect taxation?

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vi Intersentia

On 20  December 2017 (C-434/15) and 10  April 2018 (C-320/16), the Court of Justice of the European Union passed two landmark cases on the legal status of ride-hailing platform Uber. Th e Court established that Uber does not merely provide an online intermediation service, but rather off ers a full transport service. Without Uber there would be no market for non-professional drivers using their own vehicles. Moreover, the platform exercises a decisive infl uence over the conditions under which drivers provide their service. Th ese rulings address the very core of several highly debated questions on the legal status of online intermediaries.

In the wake of the fi rst ruling, on 19 February 2018, a group of scholars with an expertise in diverse areas of law gathered for a conference at KU Leuven aimed at mapping out the broader consequences of the position taken by the CJEU. Th e ideas presented at this conference and further developed during the subsequent peer-review process, ultimately resulted in thirteen thought-provoking contributions that make up the chapters of this volume.

Th is volume consists of four parts. Th e fi rst part addresses key issues that transcend specifi c areas of law. When faced with the emergence of platforms such as Uber, legislators have to consider if regulatory intervention is needed.

Th e second part of this volume specifi cally focusses on the challenges for EU law. Having issued rulings on Uber, the CJEU is now facing a new request for a preliminary ruling on the legal status of Airbnb (C-390/18). Th e time is right to assess the current state of aff airs and to identify the challenges that lie ahead for the platform economy in the EU. Th e third part of this volume tackles the impact of the platform economy for social law. Th e fl exible way in which platforms connect supply and demand blurs established lines between self-employed workers and employees. Courts are struggling with applying the “binary logic”

of traditional labour law regulations to gig work. Th e question arises whether we need to rethink labour protection and social security to address such non- standard work. Th e fi nal part of this volume focusses on revenue law. Platforms rely ponderously on intangibles and oft en operate on a global scale. Th ey tend to continuously push the boundaries of direct and indirect taxation. Th is part maps out the challenges for international corporate taxation and value added tax and discusses recent (EU) proposals to tackle those challenges.

In the fi rst chapter of this volume, Alain Strowel and Wouter Vergote asses the conditions under which it would be desirable to administer the behaviour of platforms. Acknowledging that platforms come in many shapes and forms, they fi rst propose a typology of diff erent platforms, before limiting the scope of their contribution to global profi t-seeking platforms that grant access to goods and/or services off ered by third parties such as online markets or “collaborative economy” platforms. Th e authors subsequently provide the

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Preface

Intersentia vii

reader with an understanding of the economics of digital platforms in order to identify which markets driven by platforms could require policy intervention.

Th e authors conclude by introducing various examples of regulatory disruption by the platform economy that are discussed more extensively in other chapters of this volume. Th e main argument developed in this chapter is that regulatory interventions should be based on a sound economic analysis of the markets.

In their terms and conditions, platforms such as Uber and Airbnb generally claim that they merely intermediate between independent contracting parties and that only the service provider can be held liable vis-à-vis the user for the ill- performance or non-performance of the underlying service. In reality, however, some platforms are very much involved in the supply of underlying services to users. In the second chapter of this volume, Bram Devolder identifi es three situations that may impose limits de lege lata on the validity of the contractual framework presented in the said terms and conditions. A fi rst situation where the online intermediary may be exposed to contractual liability is when the platform qualifi es as the employer of the service provider. Secondly, even if there is no employment relationship between the platform and the service provider, the way in which a platform presents itself to the user, may give consumers a legitimate expectation that the platform acts as a service provider. Moreover, the CJEU rulings on Uber foster the argument that the economic reality may be taken into account to determine whether the platform is the dominant contracting party in the supply of the underlying services. In addition, this chapter discusses a recent proposal de lege ferenda to introduce a specifi c contractual category for collaborative platforms that takes into account the triangular relationship between the three protagonists in the collaborative economy. Th ere may, however, be limits to these limits to freedom of contract. Safe harbour regimes in both the EU (Art. 14 E-Commerce Directive) and the US (Section 230 CDA) grant immunity from liability claims to online intermediaries that do not take up an active role regarding the provision of the underlying services but rather serve as a passive bulletin board. Th ese liability exemptions were designed at a time when online platforms did not have the characteristics and scale they have today and it may, as a consequence, not always be clear to what extent they apply to collaborative platforms. On a spectrum between an active intermediator and a passive bulletin board, Uber seems to be positioned more closely to the fi rst category. Airbnb, on the other hand, seems to be positioned more in the centre of this spectrum.

Another key question that arises in the context of the platform economy concerns law evasion. In the third chapter of this volume, Nicolas Van Damme argues that Uber evaded the Brussels Taxi Regulation by off ering a ride-hailing

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viii Intersentia

platform for non-licensed drivers (UberPOP) and that it in fact still evades that regulation by off ering a ride-hailing platform for drivers that operate under a limousine license (UberX). More generally, he demonstrates that no autonomous conception of law evasion is conceivable under Belgian law and that law evasion is to be assimilated to a violation of the law in view of its letter and its spirit. Even if Uber evades the law, however, such evasion could be justifi ed if the evaded law of a member state is contrary to a higher norm of EU law. Th e author argues, with caution, that the numerus clausus principle of the Brussels Taxi Regulation does in fact fail to meet the proportionality test of the freedom of establishment (Art. 49 TFEU).

A perspective that is all too oft en overlooked in EU and US scholarship, is how Chinese governments regulate the platform economy, and sharing economy platforms in particular. Some of the biggest internet companies are based in China and these companies are investing heavily in the sharing economy. Th e Chinese central government and the local governments, have been experimenting with diff erent regulatory responses to the growth of this business model that may inspire regulators across the globe. In the fourth chapter of this volume, Liyang Hou fi rst describes some of these responses in specifi c sharing industries including sharing bicycles, catering sharing, fi nance sharing and webcasting. Th e author then focuses on how both the Chinese central government and the local government in Shanghai have introduced regulation on ride-sharing. He concludes that the rather prudent attitude of Chinese regulators might suffi ce for the time being, but that more research on the destructive features of the sharing economy is necessary before introducing more comprehensive regulation of the growing industry.

In his opinion on the Uber Spain case (C-434/15), Advocate-General Szpunar points out that ‘classifying Uber as a platform which groups together independent service providers may raise questions from the standpoint of competition law’. In the fi ft h chapter of this volume, Friso Bostoen elaborates on the highly topical issue of restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance, mergers and unfair competition in the context of peer-to-peer platforms.

While competition law enforcement is increasingly targeting the platform economy, peer-to-peer platforms have generally managed to stay out of the spotlight. Th e author argues that this might be explained in part by an (implicit) recognition that peer-to-peer platforms increase consumer welfare, even when such welfare sometimes seems to detract from that of the peers.

Another explanation might be that the traditional framework of competition law does not apply easily to peer-to-peer platforms. Nevertheless, the author believes that competition law is fl exible enough to address manifest anti- competitive behaviour.

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Intersentia ix

Another area of EU law that is disrupted by the rise of the platform economy is the consumer acquis. Whereas EU consumer law focuses heavily on a two-party relationship between a seller and a buyer, the platform economy popularizes a triangular contractual relationship, which raises a plethora of questions. In an attempt to address these questions, a group of 35 researchers from 10 diff erent EU countries started draft ing European Model Rules for Online Intermediary Platforms within the context of the European Law Institute. Marie Jull Sørensen, who is an active member of the ELI working group, discusses the main ideas set forth in this Model Rules Draft in the sixth chapter of this volume.

One of the main arguments that convinced the CJEU to hold that Uber provides a full transport service, is that the platform exercises a decisive infl uence over the conditions under which drivers provide their service. Th e Court fi nds inter alia that Uber exercises a certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct. Advocate-General Szpunar further explains in his opinion that: ‘while this control is not exercised in the context of a traditional employer-employee relationship, one should not be fooled by appearances.

Indirect control such as that exercised by Uber, based on fi nancial incentives and decentralised passenger-led ratings, with a scale eff ect, makes it possible to manage in a way that is just as – if not more – eff ective than management based on formal orders given by an employer to his employees and direct control over the carrying out of such orders.’ In the seventh chapter of this volume, Valerio De Stefano and Mathias Wouters examine the impact that the CJEU rulings may have on traditional methods to distinguish between an employment contract and a contract for services. Th ey also point out the strong parallels between the criteria adopted by the CJEU in the Uber cases on the one hand, and the traditional criteria to identify an employment relationship on the other hand. Th e authors conclude by suggesting two possible ways to move past the traditional employee / self-employed divide. A fi rst approach is to rely on basic principles included in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. It would be incoherent to limit social human rights exclusively to workers having the status of an employee. A second approach builds upon the CJEU’s fi nding that intermediation services such as the one provided by Uber form an integral part of the overall service. Qualifying some forms of platform work as private employment services schemes may open the way to provide at least some platform workers with existing labour law protection.

Th e greater fl exibility of “atypical work” in the platform economy also challenges social security regimes. In the eighth chapter of this volume, Paul Schoukens, Alberto Barrio and Saskia Montebovi examine how diff erent systems in Europe (Germany, France, Th e United Kingdom, Th e Netherlands, and Belgium) try to incorporate platform work in their national social security laws. Th ey

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fi nd that minimum thresholds of diff erent types are introduced to exempt or exclude platform workers from compulsory social insurance, or to restrict access to benefi ts. Th ey conclude that a comprehensive strategy needs to be developed to fundamentally rethink the current design of work-related schemes, starting from the realities in which platform workers function – an approach that does not seem to be followed by most national systems at the moment. In the ninth chapter of this volume, Yves Stevens further elaborates on the challenges for social security by scrutinizing the specifi c situation in Belgium. Th e author concludes that the platform economy ‘is both a paradox and a dilemma from a social protection point of view’. Th e paradox is that new types of platform work seem to contradict the very essence of social protection schemes and necessitate to alter social security. Th e dilemma for society is that everybody wants to use platforms but not everybody will or is willing to work in them.

To the extent that platform workers would be qualifi ed as independent workers rather than as employees, they risk losing the limited liability exposure, the fair wage and the limited working time that labour law provides for. In the tenth chapter of this volume, Wouter Verheyen and Fiona Unz argue that this does not mean that such workers necessarily end up ‘in the far west of contract law.’

Th ey establish that on specifi c issues, transport law could provide an equivalent protection mechanism to that of labour law. In practice, however, platform workers that qualify as independent contractors will not benefi t from such equivalent protection, because the scope of most protective instruments is not fi t for the specifi c characteristics of their work. Th e authors conclude that legislative intervention is necessary to provide adequate protection and that minor legislative changes could already allow for a signifi cant improvement of the platform worker’s position.

Th e platform economy is testing the limits of the current international tax framework. Digital companies such as platforms oft en manage to escape taxation at the location where the underlying services are provided, as existing legislation generally requires a degree of physical presence in a market country for that country to have taxing powers. Moreover, certain countries apply a benefi cial tax treatment to income from intangibles. Platforms rely heavily on intangibles and oft en operate on a global scale, which allows them to escape high tax burdens. In the eleventh chapter of this volume, Dina Scornos and Niels Bammens tackle the outdated nature of certain concepts of international corporate income tax and focus on which state should be entitled to tax the income generated from operating a digital platform. Th eir contribution analyses two proposals that the European Commission published on 21  March 2018: a short-term solution of introducing a new digital services tax (DST) and a long- term solution (that should replace the short-term solution) of amending the

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Intersentia xi

traditional concept of permanent establishment in order to capture signifi cant digital presence (SDP) in a market country. Th e authors also comment on the recent OECD report Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS. Th e chapter concludes that it remains to be seen whether countries will reach a consensus-based solution, given the particularities of the digital economy, the degree to which the digital economy is interwoven with the ‘traditional’ economy and the confl icting interests of the countries involved.

Th e rise of digital platforms does not only challenge international corporate income taxation, but also the application of existing VAT rules. In the twelft h chapter of this volume, Eduardo Traversa and Marie Lamensch establish that variations in the VAT treatment of transactions performed by and through digital platforms may signifi cantly impact the profi ts generated by intermediation between a supplier and a customer. Accordingly, VAT plays an important role in the design of digital platforms strategies regarding the structuring of the relations with both clients and providers. However, the EU VAT Directives and related case-law off er insuffi cient guidance to guarantee a coherent and comprehensive VAT treatment of transactions involving platforms across the Member States. Th e new collection and reporting obligations for platforms that the EU VAT legislator recently imposed, are considered insuffi cient because there remains uncertainty regarding its scope of application and such approach creates a substantial additional compliance burden for the platforms. Th e authors conclude that the development of a EU external policy is a necessary step in the European tax harmonisation process. In doing so, European states should be able to reap the fruits of globalization and allow their social systems to remain fi nancially sustainable. In the fi nal chapter of this volume, Kenneth Vyncke illustrates the challenges for VAT legislation through an analysis of Uber’s approach to VAT. According to the platform, it is not required to charge VAT on the taxi services provided to the passengers, only on the agent services rendered to its driver. Th e author identifi es three potential threats that could undermine Uber’s approach to VAT and concludes that this approach may successfully be challenged. In line with the rulings of the CJEU on Uber, there are strong arguments that suggest that Uber itself supplies the taxi services to the passengers and should collect VAT on the fares paid by them.

Th e emergence of the platform economy has challenged diverse areas of the law. In formulating adequate responses to the many questions surrounding the legal status of online intermediaries, policymakers should not in any way feel restricted by the pre-existing boundaries of their discipline. More than ever, an intra- and interdisciplinary perspective is imperative, as solutions developed in

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one domain may guide the discussion in another. Th e CJEU rulings on Uber strikingly illustrate this. By holding that Uber off ers a full transport service rather than a mere online intermediation service, the Court did not only address a question on the limits of the freedom to provide services in the European internal market. Th e view taken by the Court also sparked new arguments in ongoing debates regarding the legal status of intermediaries in other areas of the law, including competition law, contract law, consumer law, labour law and revenue law. Th e intra- and interdisciplinary debate refl ected in this book brings us one step closer to unravelling, once and for all, the thorny knot of formulating an adequate response to the many questions that the platform economy has brought about – until the next big thing shocks real-space law.

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Intersentia xiii

CONTENTS

Preface . . . v

PART I. KEY LEGAL ISSUES: REGULATORY DISRUPTION AND REGULATORY OPPORTUNITIES . . . 1

Chapter 1. Digital Platforms: To Regulate or Not to Regulate? Message to Regulators: Get the Economics Right First, then Focus on the Right Regulation Alain Strowel and Wouter Vergote . . . 3

1. Introduction . . . 3

2. Defi nition of digital platforms . . . 7

2.1. Distinction between community exchanges and digital platforms . . . 7

2.2. Typology of platforms . . . 9

2.3. Discussion of legal defi nitions . . . 12

3. Some preliminary thoughts on the economics of online platforms . . . 15

3.1. Th e economic nature of (online) platform markets . . . 15

3.1.1. Platforms as two- or multi-sided markets . . . 15

3.1.2. Platforms and network eff ects . . . 16

3.2. Market power in platform markets . . . 16

3.2.1. Market power and bi- or multi-sided markets . . . 16

3.2.2. Swift ness of market expansion . . . 17

3.2.3. Enhanced competition through platform partnerships . . . 18

3.2.4. Big data, price discrimination and privacy . . . 19

4. Legal challenges, possible responses and areas for focusing the regulatory eff orts . . . 20

4.1. Preliminary issues . . . 21

4.1.1. Th e landscape of the regulatory authorities: need for redesign? . . . 21

4.1.2. Th e role of the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the regulation of platforms . . . 22

4.1.3. Ex ante v. ex post regulation: what is more eff ective and should be preferred? . . . 23

4.2. Identifying the areas and the level of competence for possible regulatory intervention . . . 24

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4.2.1. Market access and other constraints for operating services in the sharing economy: a role for local and

national authorities . . . 24 4.2.2. Protective laws: their preservation and adaptation are

mainly in the hands of national authorities, but EU law

could rule at the margin . . . 25 4.2.3. Competition law: an extended toolbox exists, but could

be better used by competition authorities to ensure a

timely enforcement of competition rules . . . 25 4.2.4. Tax law: adaptations are needed to tackle the digital

economy issues exemplifi ed by the digital platforms . . . 26 4.2.5. Laws on data (ex post and ex ante regulation): a thorough

defi nition of the conditions for accessing and protecting data is needed . . . 27 a) Taking into account the role of data (collection and

sharing) in the ex post analysis . . . 27 b) Th e ex ante regulation of data . . . 28 c) Conclusions . . . 29 Chapter 2.

Contractual Liability of the Platform

Bram Devolder . . . 31 1. Introduction . . . 31 2. Contractual relations between three protagonists: dissonance

between terms and reality? . . . 32 3. Limits to freedom of contract: where terms meet reality . . . 35 3.1. Th e employer paradigm: signifi cant control by the platform . . . 35

3.1.1. Reclassifi cation of the contractual relationship between

platform and provider: from intermediation to employment . 35 3.1.2. Contractual employer liability for employee performance

of underlying services . . . 45 3.2. Th e information paradigm: legitimate consumer expectations

as to the legal capacity of the platform . . . 47 3.2.1. Wathelet: (offl ine) intermediary that fails to meet its

information duty qualifi es as ‘seller’ . . . 48 3.2.2. Intermediaries and the consumer acquis: towards a

European doctrine on trust? . . . 51 3.2.3. Legitimate consumer trust in online platforms . . . 54 3.3. Th e economic reality paradigm: active involvement by the

platform in provision of underlying services . . . 61 3.3.1. European Commission: platforms only rarely meet the

demanding requirements to qualify as provider . . . 62

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3.3.2. Court of justice: Uber provides an overall transport service . . 64

3.4. Limits to freedom of contract de lege ferenda . . . 69

4. Safe harbour provisions: limits to limits of freedom of contract . . . 71

4.1. Challenging liability exemptions for online intermediaries in the EU and the US . . . 72

4.1.1. Electronic Commerce Directive . . . 72

4.1.2. Communications Decency Act . . . 74

4.2. EU Electronic Commerce Directive does not cover Uber . . . 76

4.3. US Communication Decency Act may (not) cover Airbnb . . . 79

5. Conclusion . . . 83

Annex 1 . . . 84

Annex 2 . . . 86

Chapter 3. Law Evasion in the Platform Economy: Th e Uber Case Nicolas Van Damme . . . 89

1. Introduction . . . 89

2. Law evasion in general: defi nition . . . 91

2.1. Internal and external approaches towards law evasion . . . 91

2.1.1. Internal approach towards law evasion . . . 91

2.1.2. External approach towards law evasion . . . 93

2.1.2.1. Subjective external approach . . . 94

2.1.2.2. Objective external approach . . . 95

2.2. Refutation of the external approach . . . 96

2.2.1. Lack of autonomy of the objective external approach . . . 96

2.2.2. Uselessness and impossibility of determining the evasive intent . . . 99

2.2.2.1. Quantitative approach . . . 99

2.2.2.2. Qualitative approach . . . 102

2.3. Conclusion . . . 105

3. Law evasion in the platform economy (the Uber case) . . . 105

3.1. Evasion of primary Uber law . . . 105

3.1.1. Transport services . . . 105

3.1.1.1. (Ir)regular transport . . . 105

3.1.1.2. Taxi services . . . 107

3.1.1.3. Rental of cars with drivers . . . 109

3.1.2. Law evasion? . . . 110

3.1.2.1. UberPop: no licence needed? . . . 110

3.1.2.2. UberX: does the ‘Limousine licence’ suffi ce to avoid the legal constraints imposed on taxis? . . . 112

3.1.3. Contrariety of the evaded law with European Union law? . . . 115

3.1.3.1. Freedom to provide services (Art. 56 TFEU) . . . 115

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3.1.3.2. Freedom of establishment (Art. 49 TFEU) . . . 117

3.2. Evasion of secondary Uber law . . . 123

4. Conclusion . . . 124

Chapter 4. Regulating the Sharing Economy in China: A National Report Liyang Hou . . . 125

1. Introduction . . . 125

2. An overview . . . 126

2.1. Defi nition . . . 126

2.2. Economic impact . . . 127

3. Regulatory landscape . . . 129

3.1. Regulatory principles . . . 129

3.2. Specifi c regulations . . . 130

4. Regulation on ride sharing . . . 135

4.1. Regulation adopted by the central government. . . 135

4.2. Local regulation adopted in Shanghai . . . 137

5. Conclusions and beyond . . . 138

PART II. PLATFORMS AND EU LAW: WHERE ARE WE NOW AND WHAT LIES AHEAD? . . . 141

Chapter 1. Competition Law in the Peer-to-Peer Economy Friso Bostoen . . . 143

1. Introduction to the platform economy . . . 143

2. Overview: antitrust law in the platform economy . . . 147

2.1. Restrictive agreements in the platform economy . . . 147

2.2. Abuse of dominance in the platform economy . . . 149

3. Narrowing down: competition law in the P2P economy . . . 151

3.1. Introduction . . . 151

3.2. Th e scope of antitrust law: do P2P economy participants qualify as ‘undertaking’? . . . 152

3.3. Restrictive practices: can platform pricing mean cartel pricing? . . . 156

3.4. Abuse of dominant position: exploiting peers and excluding competitors? . . . 162

3.4.1. Exploiting peers . . . 162

3.4.2. Excluding competing platforms . . . 163

3.5. Under the surface: entanglement with other platforms . . . 164

3.5.3. Th e global ride-hailing wars . . . 164

3.5.4. Anti-competitive eff ects of ride-hailing mergers and horizontal shareholding . . . 166

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3.5.4.1. Mergers . . . 166

3.5.4.2. Horizontal shareholding . . . 167

3.5.4.3. Conclusion . . . 169

3.6. Th e limits of antitrust in the P2P economy: ‘unfair competition’ does not necessarily infringe competition law . . . 170

4. Conclusion . . . 172

Chapter 2. Draft Model Rules on Online Intermediary Platforms Marie Jull Sørensen . . . 173

1. Introduction . . . 173

2. Regulatory frame . . . 176

2.1. Contract law or regulation of platforms? . . . 176

2.2. Regulatory techniques (detailed law vs. general clauses, legal certainty vs. fl exibility, statutory law vs. self-regulation) . . . 178

3. Scope . . . 180

3.1. Th e platforms . . . 180

3.2. Th e subject(s) of protection . . . 181

4. Means . . . 182

4.1. Information duties . . . 182

4.2. Liability . . . 183

4.3. Technical duties . . . 184

5. Sanctions . . . 185

6. Concluding remarks . . . 186

PART III. PLATFORMS AND SOCIAL LAW: RETHINKING LABOUR PROTECTION AND SOCIAL SECURITY TO ADDRESS NON-STANDARD WORK? . . . 187

Chapter 1. Th e Court of Justice of the EU, Uber and Labour Protection: A Labour Lawyers’ Approach Valerio De Stefano and Mathias Wouters . . . 189

1. Introduction . . . 189

2. Uber Systems Spain . . . 191

3. Uber and the indicia of an employment contract . . . 193

3.1. Th e CJEU’s infl uence on the Belgian classifi cation method . . . 193

3.1.1. A ‘general classifi cation method’ and a ‘sector-specifi c classifi cation method’ . . . 193

3.1.2. Uber in front of the Belgian courts . . . 194

3.1.3. Th e substance of this ‘specifi c classifi cation method’ and its importance. . . 195

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3.2. Rebuttable presumptions and intermediate categories . . . 197

4. Blurring the lines between agencies and employers . . . 202

4.1. Th e concept of decisive infl uence v. the concept of control and dependency . . . 202

4.2. Th e right to control and degree of dependency . . . 204

4.3. Th e CJEU’s view on decisive infl uence . . . 208

5. Moving past the employee / self-employed divide . . . 211

5.1. Basic principles . . . 211

5.1.1. Fundamental principles and labour rights . . . 212

5.1.2. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining . . . 215

5.2. Labour market intermediaries . . . 220

5.2.1. ‘Intermediation services’ . . . 220

5.2.2. Private Employment Agencies Convention . . . 221

6. Conclusion . . . 225

Chapter 2. Social Protection of Non- Standard Workers: Th e Case of Platform Work Paul Schoukens, Alberto Barrio and Saskia Montebovi . . . 227

1. Introduction . . . 227

2. Atypical work and social protection . . . 228

2.1. Defi nition of standard or typical work . . . 228

2.2. Atypical forms of work . . . 231

2.2.1. Internal developments . . . 232

2.2.2. External developments . . . 232

2.3. Consequences for social security law . . . 233

3. Platform work as atypical work form and social security . . . 235

4. Incorporating platform work in national social security law (some examples of national systems) . . . 238

4.1. Germany . . . 238

4.2. France . . . 240

4.3. Th e United Kingdom . . . 244

4.4. Th e Netherlands . . . 246

4.5. Belgium . . . 249

5. Platform work as exponent of marginal work, or the use of minimum thresholds and its consequences for social security law . . . 250

5.1. Type 1: Th resholds limiting access to social security for administrative (control) reasons . . . 250

5.2. Type 2: Th resholds limiting the scope of social security schemes for the support of (fl exible) work forms . . . 251

5.3. Type 3: Th resholds for limiting the obligation to contribute to a social security scheme . . . 252

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Contents

Intersentia xix

5.4. Type 4: Th resholds establishing the minimum income of self-

employed . . . 252

5.5. Minimum thresholds in a platform economy . . . 253

6. Conclusions: How platform work may challenge social security systems . . . 254

Chapter 3. Social Security and the Platform Economy in Belgium: Dilemma and Paradox Yves Stevens . . . 259

1. Introduction . . . 259

2. Platform workers in Belgium . . . 261

2.1. Th e overall system: self-employed unless proven otherwise . . . 261

2.2. Platform workers: an exception in social protection through fi scal measures . . . 266

3. Platform economy as an element of fl exibility . . . 268

3.1. Platform work is an endurance test for social protection . . . 268

3.2. Flexibility versus certainty . . . 269

3.3. Time fl exibility and the freedom to work or not to work. . . 270

4. Shift s in Belgian social security . . . 272

4.1. Social security shift s due to increasing forms of more unstable employment . . . 272

4.1.1. Worn-out debate: employed or self-employed? . . . 273

4.1.2. Changes within the social security scheme for employees . . . 275

4.2. Shift s in social security benefi ts and the activation of benefi ts in the era of platform economy . . . 279

5. New economy: new social security? . . . 281

6. Th e eclectic man . . . 285

7. Conclusion . . . 286

Chapter 4. And What About the Gig Worker? Transport law as a lifeline to gig workers falling outside labour law protection Wouter Verheyen and Fiona Unz . . . 287

1. Introduction . . . 287

2. Liability of the gig worker . . . 289

2.1. Contractual liability of gig workers . . . 290

2.1.1. Contractual liability in case of crowd logistics contracts . . . . 290

2.1.1.1. Th e potential protection of gig workers under transport law: What does it off er? . . . 291

a) Limited liability . . . 292

b) Wide list of exonerations . . . 293

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xx Intersentia

c) Erga omnes protection and two-sided

mandatory law . . . 294

2.1.1.2. Th e actual protection of gig workers under transport law: Does it apply? . . . 295

2.1.1.3. A critical view: Th e rationale justifying the application of transport law to gig workers . . . 296

2.1.2. Contractual liability in case of crowd mobility contracts . . . . 297

2.1.2.1. Th e potential protection of gig workers under passenger rights law: What does it off er? . . . 299

a) Establishing liability: Th e rules promoting predictability . . . 300

i) Air . . . 300

ii) Sea . . . 302

iii) Road . . . 303

b) Limiting the carrier’s liability . . . 304

i) Air . . . 304

ii) Sea . . . 305

iii) Road . . . 305

2.1.2.2. Th e actual protection of gig workers under passenger rights law: Does it apply? . . . 308

a) Air . . . 309

b) Sea . . . 309

c) Road . . . 311

2.1.2.3. A critical view: Th e rationale justifying the application of passenger rights law to gig workers . . . 312

2.1.2.4. Conclusion . . . 314

2.2. Extra-contractual liability. . . 315

2.2.1. Th e potential protection of gig workers under transport law: What does it off er? . . . 315

2.2.2. Th e actual protection of gig workers under transport law and a critical view . . . 317

3. Gig workers’ working times . . . 318

3.1. Th e potential protection of gig workers under transport law driving and rest period legislation: What does it off er? . . . 319

3.2. Th e actual protection of gig workers under transport law driving and rest period legislation: Does it apply? . . . 320

3.3. A critical view: Th e rationale justifying the application of driving and rest period legislation to gig workers . . . 321

4. Conclusion . . . 321

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Contents

Intersentia xxi

PART IV. PLATFORMS AND REVENUE LAW: PUSHING THE

BOUNDARIES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXATION? . . . 325

Chapter 1. International Corporate Taxation of Digital Platforms Dina Scornos and Niels Bammens . . . 327

1. Introduction . . . 327

2. Th e defi ciencies of the current international tax framework . . . 329

2.1. Background . . . 329

2.2. Overview of the main issues . . . 331

2.2.1. Physical presence as a requirement for source state taxation . 331 2.2.2. Th e treatment of services under tax treaties . . . 332

2.2.3. Conclusion . . . 334

3. Pending proposals and potential solutions . . . 335

3.1. Th e EU proposals . . . 335

3.1.1. Th e short-term solution: the Digital Services Tax (DST) . . . . 336

3.1.1.1. Introductory remarks . . . 336

3.1.1.2. Personal scope: Taxable persons . . . 337

3.1.1.3. Material scope: Taxable revenues . . . 340

3.1.1.4. Place of taxation . . . 341

3.1.1.5. Chargeability and rate . . . 344

3.1.1.6. Compliance obligations . . . 344

3.1.1.7. Interim conclusion . . . 348

3.1.2. Th e long-term solution: the concept of ‘signifi cant digital presence’ . . . 349

3.1.2.1. Introductory remarks . . . 349

3.1.2.2. Personal scope: Taxable persons . . . 349

3.1.2.3. Material scope: Taxable revenues . . . 354

3.1.2.4. Compliance obligations . . . 356

3.1.2.5. Interim conclusion . . . 356

3.2. Action 1 of the OECD/G20 BEPS project . . . 357

3.2.1. Background and 2015 report . . . 357

3.2.2. 2018 interim report . . . 358

3.2.3. Interim conclusion. . . 360

4. Conclusion . . . 360

Chapter 2. Collecting Value Added Tax in the Platform Economy: Overview of the Fundamental Issues and Recent EU 2018 Developments Edoardo Traversa and Marie Lamensch . . . 363

1. Introduction . . . 363

2. Selected basic VAT conceptual issues . . . 364

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xxii Intersentia

2.1. VAT liability of platform activities and underlying supplies . . . 364

2.2. Extent and location of VAT liability of platforms . . . 366

2.2.1. Extent of VAT liability . . . 366

2.2.2. Location of VAT liability . . . 368

3. Recent EU legislative developments involving platforms . . . 369

3.1. Digital platforms liable to collect VAT on underlying supplies of electronic services since 2015 . . . 369

3.2. Digital platforms might become deemed suppliers in intra-EU distance sales (as of 2021) . . . 372

3.3. Digital platforms may become deemed suppliers in B2C imports . . 374

3.4. Record keeping . . . 376

4. Conclusion and fi nal remark . . . 376

Chapter 3. Uber’s Approach to Value Added Tax: Testing the Limits of the European VAT Legislation Kenneth Vyncke . . . 379

1. Factual background . . . 379

2. VAT framework . . . 380

3. Uber’s approach to VAT . . . 381

4. Potential threats . . . 383

4.1. VAT status of drivers: self-employed drivers? . . . 383

4.2. VAT status of uber: disclosed agent? . . . 390

4.3. Contractual terms: correspond with practical reality? . . . 394

5. Conclusion . . . 398

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