The equality principle in Turkey

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The equality principle in Turkey

A discrimination factor for the Kurds?

Master thesis Tialda Richt Sterk

International Relations and International Organization

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

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The equality principle in Turkey

A discrimination factor for the Kurds?

Name: Tialda Richt Sterk Studentnumber: S2071584

University: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Course: International Relations and International Organization (IRIO)

Supervisor: Dr. E.A.V. Matthies-Boon Version: Final

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I. Abstract

The purpose of this study was to find out to what extent the equality principle in Turkey can be seen as a discrimination factor for the Kurds in Turkey. To answer this question both political and cultural discrimination that takes place against Kurds were examined, preceded by a chapter about terminology and the theoretical framework. For political discrimination, a closer look into exclusionary national ideologies and discriminatory political institutions was taken. The perception of the Kurds on the latter is also shown. Cultural discrimination includes education, culture, media and the use of language in official domains like public administration and language use in courts. As a theoretical framework the debate about first, second and third generation rights was used. As a methodology a literature research was done. In addition, a quantitative field research in the East of Turkey was conducted by talking to several persons and organizations.

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II. Acknowledgements

This thesis would not be the same without the help and support of many people.

First of all I would like to thank my supervisor; Vivienne Matthies-Boon for her concrete input and support. Especially the out of the conventional International Relation box thinking, helped me a lot.

The most special input came from my field research in Turkey. There, I spoke to many people who made the topic and the problematic situation very clear to me. In particular, I would like to thank Mehmet Vefa Aydemir. Without him this trip and the information I received would not have been possible. He was a dedicated tour guide, travel mate, translator but also became a very valuable friend. Furthermore I need to thank Abdullah Demirbaş, mayor of the Sur district of Diyarbakir, Tahir Elçi, the organization Kurdi Der, and the human rights organization Insan Haklari Derneği for their openness and time. Furthermore I would like to thank Metin Irmak and Evelyn Offerman for their hospitality and information.

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III. Introduction

Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that “Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk”. As such, every Turk has the same rights and the same duties. The equality principle is also enshrined in the pre-amble of the Constitution where it is stated in the second paragraph that everyone is “an honorable member with equal rights of the family of world nations”.

Atatürk, the founder of Turkish nationalism had an immense influence on the introduction of the equality principle. Out of the chaos of the declining Ottoman Empire he tried to create a strong nation-state, with one language, one culture and above all, one identity. Everyone living on Turkish territory should be a Turk, think like a Turk and behave like a Turk. Atatürk and his ideas still play a big role in current Turkey and most Turks are devoted to him. This devotion is fueled in many ways. From primary school children are taught that they should be proud of their country and that they should love Atatürk. On the anniversary of the death of Atatürk, songs with lyrics like “Turk be proud, work and have confidence”, “It is a blessing to be a Turk”, “Atatürk, we love him so much”, are sang (VPRO, documentaire ‘In Turkije’, 27 March 2011). On the 29th of October the foundation of the Republic is celebrated. The streets are colored in red and white, the colors of the Turkish Republic and on the local market flags with Atatürk are sold out in no time. Nationalistic songs sound from the speakers. On Turkish bank notes you see the face of Atatürk, every village has a statue of Atatürk, and in every public place you will see a portrait of Atatürk hanging from the wall.

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7 have changed due to accession negotiations with the European Union, this is still not easy. According to the Turkish authorities, there is no such thing as a Kurdish people. People living in the Kurdish populated areas were referred to as mountain Turks. A Kurdish identity formally does not exist in Turkey; everyone ought to be a Turk. As such, everyone has the same rights. This is also the reaction of many Turks in the West when talking about the Kurdish issue: “what do they want more, they have everything, they can have a job, go to court, found political parties and they can use their own language” or: “we are all children of Atatürk”1. The last remark meaning that it does not make a difference in identity that you are Kurd or Turk.

It is often been noted in literature that it is logical that the attempt to assimilate the Kurds has led to nationalism, but this statement is often weak when it comes to substantiation. However, it could be that Turkish nationalism created a kind of paradoxical situation. I.e. that in order to create unity – a concept related to that of a nation-state – the Turkish authorities created something they just did not want, namely a different identity. That trying to create equality created inequality. Therefore the main question that needs to be answered in this thesis is: to what extent is the equality principle in Turkey a discrimination factor for the Kurds living in that country?

The quote “we are all children of Atatürk” contains a notion of civic nationalism, which is not based on ethnic differences. It also contains a notion of first generation rights (political and civil rights) and second generation rights (economic and social rights), but it is low on the so called third generation rights like collective, group and minority rights.

The first chapter of this thesis will look deeper into the development of the so called third generation rights, or more specifically, minority rights. It will explain further why identity plays a role in conflicts and that it is not just first and second generation rights that matter. That citizens have equal rights forms the basis of universal liberalism, but the notion that everybody is entitled to the same rights does not mean that everybody is equal; there should also be room for differences. The relation between the nation-state and equality will be pointed out. Key concepts like national identity and the difference between nation and states will be explained. In the first chapter also the international

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8 perspective on minority rights will be discussed. The emergence of minority rights will be described, which also includes the emergence of first, second and third generation rights. The shortcomings of first and second generation rights will also be pointed out.

The second chapter will be dedicated to civil and political rights in Turkey, or the so called second generation rights. Here the equality principle and several provisions in laws on the equality principle will be studied. In order to show how this equality principle developed in relation to nationalism, a paragraph will be dedicated to this. In this paragraph also the background of the conflict between the Turks and the Kurds will be described. It shows that the exclusionary national ideology of the Turks has fueled in turn the rise of Kurdish nationalism. The Turkish army as well had a big influence in fuelling the conflict, so their role will also briefly be outlined. In the second paragraph I will take a closer look to political discrimination. Which kind of political maneuvering within the Turkish state takes place in order to withhold the Kurds from fully participating in political life? Which parts of the law work exclusively for the Kurds in Turkey? More importantly, I will also analyze if the Kurds themselves perceive political discrimination as such.

The third chapter will look deeper into the so-called third generation rights, of which specific minority rights are a part of. Specific minority rights are important in order to ensure real equality. Especially in Turkey, the equality principle that is in place does not cater for specific protection for the Kurds in Turkey. I will specifically study whether or not Kurdish language can freely be used in the general sense of the word. Then I will look if Kurdish in education, media and culture can be used. In the formal domain, I will analyze to what extent Kurdish can be used in public administration like municipalities and in court. I will also briefly see if it is used in social and economic life. A specific provision to guarantee the use of a minority language in several domains and the free dissemination of the culture can be seen as a third generation right.

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9 reports and newspaper articles. Second, I did a field research in Turkey. I went to Turkey in the period from the 12th of October 2011 till the 2nd of November 2011 to talk to several people and organizations, in order to find out which issues still are important for the people on the street. In the period from the 17th of October till the 21st October I visited Diyarbakir, the unofficial capital of the Kurdish area. In the literature the focus lies often on the armed conflict with the PKK, often ignoring underlying but burning identity issues. I also wanted to have a real feeling with the topic I wrote about and not just experience it from secondary sources like books. Where possible, the talks I had with people and organizations are used in this thesis. I am very aware of the fact that anecdotal evidence is not always reliable. I solved this to combine anecdotal evidence with material that I found in the literature. Furthermore I talked to organizations that considered reliable, like a big human rights organization and an international human rights lawyer

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IV. Chapter 1: Minority Rights and equality

1.1. Nation-state and equality

The idea of a nation-state is a relatively new concept. Nation-states are the result of nationalism which started with the French revolution (May, 2001: 5) with its principles of equality, citizenship and inalienable rights. Before going deeper into the relation between a nation-state and equality, first the terms nation, state, nationalism and collective identity will be explained. This is necessary because those concepts are often misunderstood and used incorrectly.

A state has been defined as an entity with political sovereignty over a clearly designated territory, with a monopoly on the use of legitimate force (Giddens, 1984; Oommen, 1994 as quoted by May, 2001: 55). A state is also the seat of a government. Furthermore, a state is generally recognized by other states as an independent and sovereign entity (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 12).

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11 peculiarly its own” (Plano & Olton, 1969. c.f. Hutchinson & Smith: 1994: 36). When these different definitions of a nation are compared, it can be said that a nation has at least four different aspects: a historic territory, a common culture and common myths, a sense of connectivity or belonging, and a shared economic or political life. As said at the beginning of the paragraph, the definition of a nation is rather vague and can be applied to a lot of groups living within or across states. Because no minimum number is involved, it can be applied to both small and bigger groups. What makes the concept even more difficult is that the same characteristics for defining a nation are used to identify ethnicity. Both use common language, culture, religion, shared history and sometimes territory. It is argued that all the nations have an ethnic core (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 9-10). To discuss the differences and similarities between a nation and ethnic group is a very interesting subject, but is, for the scope of this thesis, too wide. In short, the difference between ethnicity and nation is often sought in political terms. A nation is more political significant as it has an element of other-identification in it and therefore implies political recognition (ibidem). On the other hand, ethnicity is sometimes more politically and sometimes more culturally defined.

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12 nationalism, whereby a nation-state is based on an ethnic conception. For ethnic nationalism the significance of birth, common descent, genealogy, popular mobilization, native languages, customs and traditions are seen as important (Smith, 1991: pp.9-12, c.f. Kirişci & Winrow: 7). The emphasis on culture and language is rooted in the German Romantics where language, blood and soil were seen as the constitutive elements of the German “Volk” (May, 2001, 58). Ethnic nationalism is exclusive for groups that are not members of the same ethnicity as the dominant group, whereas civic nationalism is inclusive to all groups. In practice the boundaries between the two kinds of nationalism are not always clear. In addition, it must be noted that in reality ethnicity is never absent from the civic realm, but it rather reflects the dominant ethnicity. The orthodox liberal theory, which is reluctant to give positive discrimination to minorities, has as its result that majorities make the decisions in the nation-state (ibidem: 122). As we will see further on, this is especially the case in Turkey.

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13 solidarities (Anderson, 1991: 133, c.f. May, 2001: 131). Connectivity and the feeling of belonging is a common feature that is very central to a national identity. This connectivity is visible in many different ways. It can be connectivity in the field of ethnicity or common ancestors, history, living in one state, sharing a common economy, or an imagined connectivity. Therefore connectivity, whether imagined or real, is the most important aspect of a national, collective identity. The feeling of connectivity is closely related with the feeling and need of belonging, which can be fulfilled by the nation. It is argued that because globalization feelings of connectivity transcend the nation state, and thus bypass national identity, but this is too easy to conclude. Of course people move between cultures, but still cultural membership remains very important to someone’s identity, because it is very fundamental to someone’s identity (Tamir, 1993; Taylor, 1994, c.f. May, 2001: 123). May (2001: 123) says it very apposite: national identities cannot simply be exchanged like last year’s clothes.

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14 Like noted earlier, nation and state do not always coincide. In fact, in practice a natural nation-state rarely exists. There are only a few natural nation-states where there are no significant number of ethnic minorities, like Japan or Iceland. In most cases, there are more nations living in a state, so the state is in reality much more diverse than the concept of the nation-state might let you believe. Therefore, it can be concluded that the idea that nation and state coincide is predominantly a political one and it does not reflect reality. For example, in France the idea of a nation-state is very strong. This is among others expressed in article 2 of the French constitution, which stipulates that the language of the Republic is French. In fact however, in France there are groups who can say to be a separate nation due to their separate language, historical territory, culture and identity. Examples are the Basques, Bretons and Occitans. But in the political idea, in the nation-state there is no room for ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences. Often a minority is seen as a threat to the unity of the state. The result of the political view on the concept of a nation-state is that a nation-state becomes ethnically exclusive and culturally and linguistically homogeneous. This makes the nation-state the natural enemy of minorities (Gelner,1998: 67, c.f. May, 2001: 7). Linguistic minorities need to speak the central language of the state and need to adopt also the dominant culture. This often means that they should abandon their own language and culture. In other words, linguistic and cultural assimilation is required of them. Equality for all is the key word of the nation-state, but this kind of equality does not leave enough space for diversity. The exclusion or assimilation of minorities has led to two main developments in the last century. Firstly, minorities that are excluded do not accept the nation-state indoctrination anymore and want to use their right to form an own nation-state, or demand a larger representation within the existing system. Examples are the minorities living in Spain that fought hard for their now semi-autonomous regions, the Germans in South Tyrol and the Slovenes in Italy. The second development, which can be seen partly as a consequence of the first, is that international organizations have given more attention to minority rights. Paragraph 1.2 will outline the development of international minority protection.

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1.2. International perspective on minority rights

Nowadays, many international organizations are concerned with minority protection and minority rights. To name just a few: the United Nations - including UNESCO -, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and even to some extent the European Union. Especially in Europe2, minority protection is more advanced than elsewhere, because of several important developments that took place in this continent. Wars, migration, the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro Hungarian Empire and various nationalist movements (Thornberry & Amor Estebanez, 2004: 10) had immense effects in Europe. This produced states with an ethnic, cultural and religious mosaic (ibidem). However, minority protection in Europe cannot be seen separately from international minority protection because of the influence they had on each other. Firstly, the emergence of minority rights will be described. In this respect, I will outline the so-called first, second and third generation rights, because they are an indication that the development minority rights went on. I will especially highlight the emergence of third generation rights. Secondly, I will link the first, second and third generation rights directly to international treaties on minority protection. This way it becomes clear why there was a need of third generation rights. In this section minority protection within the Framework of the League of Nations, the United Nations and the Council of Europe is addressed.

1.2.1. Emergence of minority rights

The central idea of the nation-state is that in order to have stability and peace, a state should be homogeneous in ethnicity, language and culture. Minorities living in a state are often seen as a threat to the unity of the state and should therefore be assimilated. However, this thought started to change after the Second World War. Also the war in the Balkans affected the thinking that in order to have peace and stability,

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16 ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities should be recognized, protected and promoted within a state. The preamble of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities illustrates this: “considering that the upheavals of European history have shown that the protection of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace in this continent”. This is based on the thought that minorities that are recognized are less likely to challenge the authority of the state. Equal citizenship (as part of the first generation rights) and economic and social rights (second generation rights), were not seen as sufficient anymore for the protection of minorities. Instead, different identities and diversity ought to be promoted. This constituted the basis of third generation rights, which specifically include collective- and minority rights.

Before going on to write about international organizations and minority protection, I will first explain what is meant with first, second and third generation rights and to what background they came into being. First generation rights are political and civil rights. Personal liberty and the protection of the individual against the violations and abuse of a state are the starting points of these rights (Compass, Council of Europe). They originate from the French Revolution (Wellman, 2000: 640). Most of the first generation rights are enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (ibidem: 639). Second generation rights are social, economic and cultural rights. They can be seen against the background of the Russian revolution opposing to capitalist exploitation of workers and social inequality (ibidem: 640). Cultural rights also include the non-discrimination principle and equality for minorities in comparison to the majority population. Later in this chapter, however, we will see why this second generation rights are not enough to ensure real equality for minorities. The second generation rights are specified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) (ibidem: 639). Third generation rights contain collective and group rights.

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17 autonomy’ (c.f. May, 2001: 110). Third generation rights evolved out of the Asian values debate where collectivism and communitarianism was preferred over individualism and liberalism. In orthodox liberalism, collective and particular minority rights are seen as the opposite of the traditional liberal values of individualism and universal citizenship rights. Orthodox liberals believe that if one would deviate from the universal political citizenship and individual rights, this would lead directly to apartheid (ibidem: 95). Recognition of minorities is seen as a step towards fragmentation (ibidem: 95 &104). As I noted already earlier, this thought is reflected also in political nationalism. One would think that for the recognition of minority rights a deviation from the liberal thought should be made. This is however not necessarily needed because liberalism can also be approached from a pluralist point of view where a more dynamic concept of equality is applied. As we will see later, Will Kymlicka, an expert on multicultural citizenship, defends minority rights from a liberal perspective.

1.2.2. Minority rights and international treaties

So far first, second and third generation rights have been discussed from a theoretical point of view and in an abstract way. In the continuing paragraphs I will directly link the discussion about this generation rights to the developments of minority rights in international organizations and international treaties. This way, the difficulties with first and second generation rights related to minority protection will also become more obvious.

A start with the protection of minorities was made within the Framework of the League of Nations.3 After the First World War the League of Nations made the protection of minorities a major part of its program. Some key elements in the League of Nation system were: an attempt to guarantee the rights of minorities for humanitarian and pragmatic reasons, the threat to world peace presented by the mistreatment of the groups, treaties and declarations providing rights for all inhabitants of the states, rights for all nationals, and specifically nationals belonging to ‘racial, religious or linguistic minorities’, and autonomy rights for groups concentrated in particular regions

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18 (Thornberry & Amor Estebanez, 2004: 11). The League of Nations System ended because the Second World War started.

The Second World War had a huge influence on the protection of minorities. After the Second World War international organizations produced standards and mechanisms in order to protect minorities. The Charter of the United Nations is the most fundamental standard and stipulates that human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be secured for all, without distinction on grounds of “race, sex, language or religion”. This constitutes the basis for many treaties dealing with minority protection. The human rights principle is based on the idea that people with a particular linguistic, cultural or religious background have the same rights and opportunities as everybody else through the traditional freedoms of opinion, expression and association as people belonging to a majority population (Woehrling, 2005: 19). Within the traditional human rights approach, there are more instruments that cater for minority protection, like article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which states that:

“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”

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19 granting individual rights, the claims of self-determination of groups would be less likely (Smith: 305). Also the UN Declaration on the rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, focused on individual rights of ‘persons belonging to a minority’ (Thornberry & Amor Estebanez, 2004: 15) and not on collective rights. This relates back to what I mentioned earlier as the orthodox liberal approach.

However, orthodox liberalism and the annexed first and second generation rights came under fire, because they put into perspective the special needs that minority cultures and languages might have by applying the universal principles of human rights properly (Woehrling, 2005: 19). Article 27 of the ICCPR is still a first generation right and does not constitute positive recognition of minorities and their identities. The traditional human rights idea is highly based on equality, but it avoids formal recognition in particular situations for minorities. A more dynamic concept of equality that could also make special arrangements for the minorities in order to ensure actual equality was therefore needed (Woehrling, 2005: 19). The principle of non-discrimination alone was not enough anymore. Indeed the subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights4 distinguished between the concepts ‘prevention of discrimination’ and ‘protection of minorities’. The prevention of discrimination is defined as “the prevention of any action which denies to individuals or groups of peoples equality of treatment which they may wish”. In turn, protection of minorities is defined as “the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which distinguish them from the majority population” (UN Doc. E/CN.4/52, Section V, c.f. Thornberry & Amor Estebanez, 2004: 13). The two different definitions clearly indicate the difference between first, second and third generation rights. Furthermore it illustrates the discussion within the UN on this topic. We see here that prevention of discrimination is still a first generation right and protection of minorities starts to look like a third generation right, which includes a form of positive discrimination.

The discussion on third generation rights continued. Despite several attempts to give a legal status to minorities, concrete results were not achieved. Still no evidence was

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20 found that members of minority groups could fully exercise their individual rights and freedoms (Woehrling, 2005: 23). Frustrated by the lack of success with the collective guarantee approach to minorities, with giving protection through individual rights, another solution was looked for. The third generation rights approach consists of promoting respect for cultural diversity and developing the concept of cultural rights so that society respects certain cultural values. This approach is about recognition of social diversity and not primarily political (Woehrling, 2005: 20). Kymlicka (1995: 36-37) defends this pluralist approach from liberalism. He rejects the idea that giving more rights to one group is necessarily illiberal. He notes that granting cultural or language rights to minority groups does not inevitably lead to the case that minority groups will dominate other groups, but in turn puts them on a more equal footing with the dominant group because minorities are vulnerable (c.f. May, 2001 120). He furthermore notes that the desire of national minorities to maintain their culture is not based on the desire of cultural purity, but stresses the desire to continue developing that culture in the same way as the members of a majority culture do (Kymlicka, 1995: 105 c.f. May, 2001: 124). This in turn actually helps to promote the liberal equality principle.

The idea that social diversity should be recognized and that the culture and language of minorities should be promoted and protected has led to the development of two European treaties within the framework of the Council of Europe. The first one is the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (hereafter: European Charter) that protects languages rather than persons or individuals. A second important treaty on the protection of minorities is the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (hereafter: Framework Convention), also of the Council of Europe. Later, I will apply some elements of the Framework Convention and the European Charter on the situation of the Kurds in Turkey. For example in chapter 3, I will have a look to what extent education in their mother tongue is given and if Kurdish can be used in public administration. Both are elements which are described in the European Charter as well as the Framework Convention. Neither the European Charter nor the Framework Convention has been ratified by Turkey yet.

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21 future and it deals with real equality of minorities in relation to the majority. The Framework Convention is about acknowledging the existence of national, cultural or ethnic minorities and giving them a certain political status that secures those minorities some particular advantages to promote their particular culture and language within a state that has a different culture and language (Woehrling, 2005: 19). As said before, the Framework Convention aims at achieving ‘stability, peace and democratic security’ by recognizing minorities. Cultural diversity should be seen not as a factor of division, but as enrichment of the society (cited from the Preamble). Other than the European Charter, the Framework Convention deals with issues like non-discrimination and effective equality for individual persons that belong to a minority group and not with the protection of languages as such. Parties that sign the Framework Convention undertake to promote the full and effective equality of persons belonging to minorities in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life together with the conditions that will allow them to express, preserve and develop their culture and identity (flyer Framework Convention). This does not mean that language is not important in the Framework Convention. On the contrary, the Framework Convention contains a lot of the so called ‘linguistic freedoms’, like the use of the minority language in private and public, as well as its use before administrative authorities, use of one’s name in the minority language, topographical names of the minority language and the display of information of a private nature in the minority language. An important part of the linguistic freedoms in the Framework Convention is education in the minority language. This includes learning of and instruction in the minority language and the freedom to set up educational institutions. Article 12 mentions for example that the education system of the state should “foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities”. Furthermore the Framework Convention explicitly prohibits forced assimilation of national minorities.

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22 minority. These are also the same indicators that describe if a people form a nation. More concrete this means: the group should be different from the majority on the basis of their own language, culture, history and hence, their own identity. Furthermore a common territory plays a role; and that they are traditional inhabitants of a region.

It must be said, however, that despite the quite concrete protection mechanisms of for example the Council of Europe, it is still a duty of a Member State to actually implement the treaties by amending national legislation. Furthermore, an international organization can condemn a member state for not sufficiently protecting their minorities, but cannot intervene in the politics of member states themselves.

1.3. The Kurds in Turkey: what kind of minority?

In this section it will be investigated whether or not it can be said that the Kurds in Turkey are a separate nation. If this is the case, then we can also say that they are a national minority living within Turkey. Given the vagueness of the concept, this can be tricky, but I will use the following characteristics to identify if the Kurds can be seen as a separate nation: a shared language, religion, culture, shared territory and a common history. In the sections above we have also seen that a collective identity is important in defining if a group is a nation or not. The collective identity will be investigated by self-identification and other-self-identification. Self-self-identification can be investigated by asking the question whether or not the Kurds in Turkey perceive themselves as having a separate identity. Other identification is determined by how international organizations and states perceive the Kurds in Turkey. In the section below I will take a closer look on the question whether or not the Kurds in Turkey share a common territory, have a common language, a common culture, religion, and to what extent they are self- and other-defined.

1.3.1. Demography

With an estimated 25 to 30 million Kurds living in Iraq, Syria, Iran, the former Soviet Union and

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23 Turkey, the Kurds can barely be called a minority population. The Kurds, however, never formed a state of their own. Exact numbers of the Kurds in Turkey are not known, because Turkey does not take into account ethnic or linguistic background in their demographic data. The estimation is that about 11 to 15 million Kurds live in Turkey on a total population of 74 million people (International Crisis Group, 2011: 1). In other words, more than half of the total Kurdish population lives in Turkey. The Kurdish people in the Middle East are the biggest nation without a state in the world (International Crisis Group, 2011: 2). In comparison to other minorities living in Turkey, like the Laz or Circassions, the Kurds are the second largest ethnic community in Turkey (Natali, 2005: 83).

1.3.2. Territory

The Kurds in Turkey live predominantly in the East of Turkey with Diyarbakir as their unofficial capital. Not only Kurdish people live in the East of Turkey. An estimate is that about 18% of the inhabitants of what is unofficially called Kurdistan are not ethnic Kurds (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 71). They are for example Turkish civil servants, soldiers and peasants from the West. Inhabitants of Kurdish villages have been deported to the West (Intermediair, 27 May 1988) and instead Turkish families were transported to the East (Natali, 2005: 79). These resettlement policies started around 1934, when the so-called settlement law was adopted.5 Other ethnic groups like the Circassians, Laz and Turkish people were settled in the Kurdish districts (Van Bruinessen, 2000: 8). The resettlement policies are not the only reason that Kurdish people moved to the cities in the West, like Istanbul. The Turkish army structurally burned down 3.428 villages and hamlets, leaving people with no house or place to stay anymore. Furthermore, the fighting forced about one million Turkish Kurds from their land. Other sources state that there are 4,5 million internally displaced persons as a result of the fighting (International Crisis Group, 2011: 4). Moreover, Kurds moved to the West to improve their economic situation, e.g. to find jobs. A result is that Istanbul, with a total population of 16 million has an estimated population of 1,5 to 3 million Kurds. This makes Istanbul the city with

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24 the largest Kurdish population (Randal, 1997: 304). Despite the resettlement policies and other migration reasons, the east of Turkey is still seen as ‘Kurdistan’, although the word does not officially exist within Turkey. The Kurds do not have their own country, but it can be said that they share a common territory where they traditionally have lived (as shown in the illustration above). Kurds in general share an affinity with the territory known as Kurdistan (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 25).

1.3.3. Self-identification and other-identification.

It is never easy to draw conclusions for an entire group, because naturally differences exist within it. In Turkey, no quantitative research is done on self-identification. That makes it more difficult to define for the Kurds in Turkey. While some Kurds may have integrated or have been assimilated into the Turkish society, others may be very aware of their Kurdish identity. As I explained already in paragraph 1.1, it is also possible to have a multiple identity, i.e. to feel both Turk and Kurd. From the talks I had in the east of Turkey and from anecdotal evidence in the existing literature however, a general picture can be drawn.

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25 action to preserve their identity. Especially after the establishment of the Kurdish national movement, their self-identification started to change again. A lot of Kurds who previously said that they were Turks now started to redefine themselves as Kurds (ibidem: 10).

Van Bruinessen, chair of the comparative study of contemporary Muslim society and publisher of many articles about the Kurdish issue, wrote that Kurds themselves are generally aware that they belong to a separate ethnic group (ibidem: 1). Being different than the majority is already important for the self-identification. The Kurds perceive themselves as being different than for example the Turks and the Christian minority living close to them (ibidem). When you would ask the Kurdish people what constitutes their identity, most Kurds would mention language and religion first (ibidem). In the talks I had in Turkey, I never heard about religion being a defining factor, but that language is the most important factor for the Kurdish identity was undeniably confirmed.

We can be very short about other-identification. Within Turkey, the Kurds simply do not exist as a separate group: everyone in Turkey is Turkish. Outside Turkey however, the Kurds are perceived as a separate group. This can be illustrated by mentioning that the European Union and the Council of Europe both urge Turkey to solve the Kurdish issue and mention the Kurds as a minority in the state that should be recognized. Moreover, other countries as well as authors and academic writers implicitly mention the Kurds as a distinct group.

1.3.4. Language

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26 language, theorizing that both Turkish and Kurdish belonged to the same language family and that Kurdish is actually derived from Turkish. This is the so-called Sun Language Theory. However, in spite of what the Turkish authorities might want to let people believe with the Sun Language Theory, both Kurmanji and Zaza are Iranian languages (Van Bruinessen, 2000: 1). The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1970’s had its influence on unifying the language. Communication was often difficult because of the different dialects and therefore the nationalists attempted to make Kurmanji the standard Kurdish (ibidem: 9). The language was disseminated through secret Kurdish language courses and newspapers.

No research has been done on how many people exactly speak Kurdish or Kurmanji. Language surveys do not take place. The mayor of the Sur district in Diyarbakir made a language survey however, which is no less than exceptional. The results are that 72 % of the population of the Sur district in Diyarbakir speak Kurdish (Diyarbakir Sur Municipality, Report on current issues, May 2011).

1.3.5. Religion

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27 1.3.6. A shared history

It is not clear when exactly the ethnic label ‘Kurd’ came into existence (ibidem: 5). The Kurdish history and especially the literature about it, is dominated by Kurdish nationalism that came into existence after the foundation of the Republic in 1923. During the biggest part of the history Kurdistan was divided in small princedoms (Intermediair, 27 May 1988). With the arrival of the Ottoman Turks in the 14th and 15th century, those princedoms were made part of the Ottoman Empire. In the following two centuries the Kurds were living in prosperity and Kurdish culture and art could flourish. With the decay of the Ottoman Empire this blooming period also ended. Traditionally, Kurdish society is dominated by a tribal culture. There are hundred different tribes that vary in size (Intermediair, 27 May 1988). The tribal leader had political power, and in many cases also possessed of a lot of land. Farmers lived as serfs and there was a kind of feudal system (ibidem). Until 1925 the sheiks, religious leaders that were said to have supernatural power, fulfilled an important political role. Their influence cut through the traditional tribal culture. They were also able to unite rivaling tribes (ibidem).

The formation of the Turkish Republic had big consequences for the traditional Kurdish tribal culture. The Kemalist elite stressed the formation of the Turkish nation-state and modernization or ‘westernization’ of society. Therefore traditional social structures were dismantled at the expense of the economical and political position of the tribal leaders in the countryside (Soeterik & Topbac, 1993: 5). Because of the secular principles, the Islam was subordinated, which was also a shock for the Kurdish population (ibidem: 5-6).

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28 Despite that tribe-membership is not a wild-card for being Kurdish, the tribal history is very important for the history of the Kurds. The Kurds existed already for a long time on their territory, at least over 2500 years (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 3). Therefore Kurds also have a common history, which is different than that of the Turks. The history of the past 100 years is dominated by uprisings to protect the threatened Kurdish identity, but it should not be forgotten that the Kurds have a much longer history.

1.3.7. Common culture

The nation-building strategy of Turkey had a big influence on the decline and revival of Kurdish culture. This may sound very paradoxical, but due to repression by the Turks, Kurdish culture became even more important. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish government exercised a harsh nation-building policy. Ethnic diversity was seen a threat to the integrity and unity of the state. The Kurds, because of their numbers, were the biggest threat to this integrity and therefore they needed to become Turkish. Their culture and language also ought to be Turkish. That led to the suppression of cultural symbols by the central authorities. In 1970, when the Kurdish nationalist movement became stronger, the Kurdish traditional culture was reinvented. This also meant a more unified Kurdish tradition, influenced by that of the Kurds in Iraq (Van Bruinessen, 2000: 3). The culture existed in books on Kurdish history, literature, cultural and political magazines. Kurdish national music was re-invented and people started to wear Kurdish clothes again, based on the traditional uniforms of the Kurds in Iraq (ibidem: 10). The Celebration of Kurdish New Year, Newroz was also introduced in Turkey. This was the Iraq Kurds national holiday, but was not known in the Kurdish Turkish tradition before (ibidem).

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29 singing songs in Kurdish. The men and women danced traditional Kurdish dances, where the man that was leading was holding the Kurdish flag. The women wore typical Kurdish dresses with a lot of colors and shimmers. Kurdish music was sold in music shops and one could listen to Kurdish music in the touring car buses coming and going to the Kurdish area. The colors of the Kurdish flag, green, yellow and red, can also be seen as a symbol of the Kurdish culture. Kurdish literature also exists, although not to a great extent, because this is still seen as illegal by the Turkish authorities. Furthermore few people are able to write or read the Kurdish language. However Abdullah Demirbaş, the mayor of the Sur municipality, published a few books in Kurdish for children6. Kurdi-der, an organization that is aiming to make teaching material for schools, also makes Kurdish textbooks. There is also an illegal Kurdish newspaper, called Azadiya Welat.

1.4. Conclusion of the chapter

First of all, several crucial concepts have been defined and explained in this chapter. The differences between a nation, state and nation-state have been identified. A nation-state has a notion of equality in it, but in reality this equality principle does not ensure actual equality for all inhabitants. Often, national minorities are forced to assimilate in the nation-state by forcing them to adapt to the dominant majority. Furthermore the fundamental elements of a collective or national identity are extracted from the existing literature. Connectivity in terms of culture, language, shared history and territory is defined as the most fundamental element of a national identity.

Secondly, we had a closer look at the international perspective on minority rights. First and second generation rights proved not to be sufficient to ensure real equality to national minorities either. Therefore, a start was made with the so-called third generation rights. The idea that in order to have stability and peace a homogeneous nation-state was needed, changed into the idea that recognizing minorities and harmonious relations between minority and majority groups caused stability and peace. This contrasts with the idea of a nation-state, where universalism and homogeneity are the most important issues

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30 that stand out. A state is almost never naturally a nation-state, that is to say, where nation and state coincide. More often, a state exists of more nations. Within a nation-state the ‘problem with minorities’, which can in my opinion better be called the problem with majorities, is usually solved with forced assimilation, or by creating a new national identity. The equality principle is highly present in the liberal first and second generation rights. Collective and minority rights as third generation rights came up later as a reaction to the insufficient protection that first and second generation rights gave to minorities. In order to ensure actual equality, a more dynamic notion of equality was needed. Therefore a concept of positive discrimination was needed. The Framework Convention and the European Charter are two treaties that give the most concrete framework to protect, preserve and promote national minorities and linguistic minorities.

Third, a specific look was taken whether or not the Kurds in Turkey can be defined as a separate nation or not. Following the elements that can define a nation, we can answer this positively for the Kurds in Turkey. Taking into account the regional varieties and the notion that also the Kurds are not one, united group, we can however notice that the Kurds are distinct when it comes to language, culture and history. The Kurds also traditionally share a common territory. The only thing that is not different is the religion, both Kurds and Turks are predominantly Muslim. The self-identification and other-identification strengthen the idea that the Kurds in Turkey form a separate nation7 in Turkey and therefore are a national minority. As said in the introduction of this chapter, the difference between a nation and an ethnic group is difficult to tell. Therefore the Kurds can also be called an ethnic minority. Because their language is different from that of Turks, the Kurds can also be seen as a linguistic minority. It is therefore logical to conclude that special minority rights should apply for the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Applying the Framework Convention could be a step in this direction.

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V. Chapter 2: Civil & political rights in Turkey

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2.1. Exclusionary national ideologies

Like already noted in the introduction, the start of the Republic of Turkey also marked the beginning of Kurdish nationalism. In the media, the conflict between the Kurds and Turks is often associated with the PKK, but the establishment of the PKK can only be seen against a larger background and the history of a conflict of over more than 100 years. In order to have a good overview of the start of the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state, we must go back to the First World War.

During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire chose the side of the Axis powers and hence fought against the allied forces like Great Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. The Kurdish people first served the Ottoman Empire, but in 1916-1917 the Kurdish tribal leaders contacted the Russian forces with a proposal for cooperation against the Ottoman armed forces. The aim was to achieve an independent Kurdistan. This cooperation never actually went into force, but to be on the safe side the Ottoman army deported 700.000 Kurds to Turkish villages in order to assimilate the Kurdish people (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 19).

After the First World War in 1918, the Kurdish populated area came under British, Russian and French control. It was inevitable that the Ottoman Empire would be split. In the treaty of Sèvres, which was signed in 1920 between the Ottoman government and the allied forces, it was set that this split would occurr. It promised the Kurds local autonomy and more importantly, it suggested a state for them under certain conditions (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 68). The treaty however never went into force and Kurdish political autonomy did not actually come about. This was among other things the consequence of the emergence of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later better known as Atatürk. This former military officer led the Turkish war of independence and on the 29th of October 1923 founded a new Republic with Ankara as its capital.

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33 ethnic equality of all its inhabitants and so the Kurds from then on ought to be Turkish in ethnicity and identity. Under the influence of European nationalistic movements and publications, the idea came up that a modern state should also be a nation; a community of people with a common origin, language and culture. Ethnic minorities were seen as a threat to the idea of the nation-state (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 16)

Between 1925 and 1938, sixteen (Soeterik & Topbac, 1993: 8) revolts took place among the Kurds that felt betrayed (Intermediair, 27 May 1988). The revolt of Sheikh Sa’id (1925), the one of Ararat (1929-1930) and in Dersim (1937 -1938) were the most important ones in number of victims, but also because in those revolts specific Kurdish nationalistic demands were made (Soeterik & Topbac, 1993: 8). The revolts were all crushed by the Turkish army (Intermediair, 27 May 1988). All revolts were followed by the deportation of many Kurds to other parts of Turkey. An estimation is that during the 13 years of revolt, 1,5 million Kurds have been deported or killed (Cited by Kendal Nezan 1980: 68, c.f. Soeterik, 1993: 10). The phase where Sheiks and the Kurdish tribal chiefs initiated the revolts was over after the death of Atatürk, but the death of Atatürk did not mean more liberalization for the Kurds.

Under the regime of Atatürk a policy of assimilation of the Kurds was already into effect, but after the death of Atatürk in 1938, the harsh assimilation policy based on Kemalistic principles continued. The revolts that took place actually fuelled the idea that an assimilation policy for the Kurds was necessary. It became official policy to deny the Kurdish existence. Kurdish people were referred to as ‘mountain Turks’ and later as ‘people from the East’. The words Kurd and Kurdish were prohibited, as were Kurdish family names and village names. Speaking the Kurdish language, publishing in Kurdish or the dissemination of the Kurdish culture, was also forbidden. People could face long prison sentences when they undertook activities against the ‘indivisibility of the Turkish state’. This concept can by interpreted rather broadly, but concretely all political expressions of Kurdish nationalism were forbidden (Soeterik, 1993: 9).

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34 This ethnic identity had a broader support than before the Second World War and would sometimes clash with the traditional tribal culture that the Kurds since then had.

In 1960, the Turkish military overthrew the existing regime with a military coup. The military wanted to return to the basic ideas of Atatürk and the ideas of the harsh assimilation policy of Atatürk. One of the first things the army did was to introduce a law to give all the villages Turkish rather than Kurdish names (c.f. Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 107 & Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 74). Nonetheless, the Constitution of 1960 was quite liberal, giving people more civil rights, gave greater autonomy to universities (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 107), freedom of expression and freedom of assembly (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 75). Despite the political liberalization, in 1966 the army established a special anti-guerilla movement to fight the – at that time – non-existent Kurdish anti-guerilla movement (ibidem: 76).

Social unrest like demonstrations, political executions and labor strikes that were fuelled by an economic recession, lead to another military coup in 1971. In the seventies the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) also saw the light. The Kurdish minority was frustrated by not being able to express their own identity and to use their own language. This climate fuelled the establishment of the more radical PKK. The Kurds were disappointed by the Turkish political parties when it came to the solution of the Kurdish issue. Beside new leftist parties also new (Turkish) militant extreme nationalistic right wing parties were founded, which dreamt of a big Turkish Empire in which there was no place for the Kurdish people. By the end of the seventies there were a lot of violent conflicts between those radical right wing groups and radical left wing groups (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 79). Weak governments could not get a grip on the situation or change it. This political unrest eventually led to a new military coup in 1980.

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35 ethnicity were always forbidden, but now it was even more harshly punished. The new Constitution put a focus on the Turkishness of Turkey and the unity of the nation and its territorial integrity (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 111) Furthermore, the new Constitution limited freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom of association and scientific research (Marcus, 2007: 83). The argument of security and unity of the state was often mentioned to restrict activities that would possibly undermine the power of the military. The military, that always saw itself as the protector of the thoughts of Atatürk, was in favor of returning to strict Kemalistic policies. The Kurds were not only suppressed by law or political means, the Turkish military also used a lot of violence against the Kurdish population. Because of the immense violence that was used by the Turkish military to suppress Kurdish nationalism and because of the resistance of the Turkish authorities to find a political solution, a situation was created in which the Kurdish people looked for alternatives. It is under these circumstances that the PKK came about.

2.1.1. PKK

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36 After the military coup in 1980, Öçalan went to Syria to seek refuge there. Damascus helped the PKK by sheltering, training and equipping the PKK (Ergil, 2000: 127). The PKK gained a lot of support by the Kurdish population and hence grew rapidly in size and popularity. Sari Baran, a former PKK militant told that “people were ready, there was a leaning in favor of armed struggle” (c.f. Marcus, 2007: 78). However people were also afraid and hopeless because of the repression and the military coup in 1980. On the other hand there was not only hopelessness, but also anger towards the state for mass arrests, torture and threats that took place by the Turkish army. This made people in turn ready for revenge (ibidem).

In 1984, the PKK’s first terroristic attack took place. According to the PKK they declared war against what they called the ‘Turkish occupation of Kurdistan’ (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 80). In the years that followed, a lot of violence between the Turkish army and the PKK took place, resulting not only in deaths on both sides, but also in the loss of many civilian lives. The battle between the PKK and the Turkish military resulted in an estimated 40.000 deaths (Marcus, 2007: 1), including human rights violations by both parties.

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37 for the conflict. The attacks that took place in the province of Hakkâri on the 19th of October 2011, which resulted in the death of 26 Turkish soldiers and many more PKK militants, show that the conflict is still very much a topical issue.

2.1.2 The emergence of Turkish ethnic nationalism and the equality principle

Kurdish nationalism cannot be regarded separately from Turkish nationalism and Turkish nation-state building. Indeed it has been noted that the Turkish nation-state formation has assimilated a lot of Kurds, but also created a kind of separate Kurdish identity (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 89). I will now have a more in-depth look into the emergence of Turkish nationalism and the accompanying equality principle that was applied. We will see that this equality principle is not neutral to ethnicity, as it uses the Turkish ethnicity as its starting point. To prove this, I will discuss if Turkey exercises or is still exercising civic or ethnic nationalism.

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38 On the other hand, it can be argued that Turkish nationalism is based on a notion of ethnic nationalism, like explained already in the first chapter. The kind of nationalism Atatürk had in mind was based on cultural inheritance, like historical affinity, common morality, loyalty to a common political entity, a common homeland, common roots and decent, and a common language (Heper, 2008: 83-84). As we saw in the first chapter, common roots, decent and a common language are factors that define ethnic nationalism in the definition of Smith. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Turkish government started a process of nation-state building in Turkey. Claiming to have a different nationality was seen as a threat to the unity of the Republic. The Kurds also needed to be Turkish in language and culture and the Kurds were – as mentioned earlier – officially referred to as ‘mountain Turks’. All symbols of the Kurdish ethnic identity were suppressed. This was supported by a new theory that tried to prove that Kurds were actually Turkish, but had by historical accident lost their language (Van Bruinessen, 2000: 8).

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39 role and a Turkish ethnic identity should now replace religion as a common binding element between the Kurds and the Turks. Atatürk furthermore wanted to modernize, or by some authors referred to as Westernize, the Turkish Republic. This meant restructuring society without regard for traditional structures like that of tribalism of the Kurds. As we saw in the paragraph about exclusionary national ideologies, the artificial way of imposing Turkish language and identity has led to revolts, mostly among the Kurdish speaking population.

Another example of the focus on Turkish language and ethnicity was the so called settlement law that was adopted in 1934. This law divided Turkey into three zones: one zone that was inhabited by people that spoke Turkish and who had a Turkish culture and history. In the second zone lived people that did not speak Turkish, but belonged to the Turkish culture. In this zone, in order to achieve assimilation into the Turkish culture, resettlement policies were imposed,. The third zone was closed to any form of civilian settlement and was uninhabited for security reasons (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 99). The second zone was usually used for Kurdish and Arabic speaking people and one goal of the law was to assimilate those groups into Turkish citizens. According to a deputy at that time, the law aimed to create “a country which would speak one single language, think and feel alike” (c.f. ibidem). The policy of Atatürk aimed at melting the inhabitants of the Republic together into one nation with pride and self-consciousness. An example is that Atatürk used expressions and slogans like ‘we are all Turks’, ‘one Turk equals the whole world’ (ibidem: 98), and ‘happy is one who can say is a Turk’. The last sentence even formed the basis of the current oath that pupils must say every day on primary school.

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40 sponsored by the state (ibidem). Other plans that dealt with the issue of the assimilation of the Kurds suggested the strategy of forced intermarriage between Kurds and Turks or sending Kurdish kids to Turkish boarding schools. After the introduction of the multi-party system, the Kurdish issue became more an issue of the military and not only of the government anymore. Because the army still has a huge influence in current Turkish politics, their role will be discussed as well. I will try to do this briefly, because one could write a whole book about the influence of the military in Turkey.

2.1.3. The role of the Turkish army

The army played and plays an important role in the Kurdish issue and traditionally had a lot of influence on the politics of Turkey. In 1992, it was even said that “Turkey was a military state” (Gencer, c.f. Kirişci, 2001: 16-20). The army always has been a kind of state within the state, being able to impose their will or influence on the government, either formally or informally. In this respect Ergenekon is also important to mention. Ergenekon is an ultra nationalistic organization of (ex-) militants, politicians and journalists that was also seen as a state within a state. Ergenekon was involved in combating the PKK. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has had three military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980. There was also a ‘postmodern’ coup in 1997, which peacefully removed the Islamic Welfare Party (Heper, 2005: 36). The current Constitution of the Republic of Turkey is written after the military coup of 1980. The army ensured its position in this Constitution, transferring the power to a National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established by the army after the coup of 1960 as an advisory organ to the government, but developed into an organ without whose mandatory opinion practically no administration was possible (Heper, 2005: 36). Needless to say, the government did not have much choice to obey to the Turkish army. The army had own courts where also civilians could be tried, which gave the army also influence in the judicial system (Rouleau, 2000: 107).

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41 (Amain & Kielstra, 1992: 75). The hate of the army top against everything that is Kurdish forms a constant factor in the Turkish politics since the twenties (ibidem: 74). The army is known for their violent and harsh repression of the PKK leaders and followers. Towards Kurdish citizens who were suspected of having bonds with the PKK terrible crimes were committed, but also against ordinary Kurdish citizens. Because of the force used by the PKK, the Turkish military establishment was given carte blanche in Kurdistan (Natali, 2005: 107). A reaction of the Turkish army against the violence of the PKK was the foundation of Jitem, a secret anti-terrorism and intelligence service. Jitem committed more than thousands of murders against citizens that were thought to have bonds with the PKK and Kurdish intellectuals, but also committed random killings against citizens. More than 1200 people are still missing, but already a lot of them have been found back in wells or other anonymous graves (Wordt Vervolgd, Geerdink, 30 September 2009).

The violence and counter violence of the army and the PKK also fuelled the growth of Kurdish national consciousness (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997: 112). Especially at the end of the 1990’s the violence between the Turkish army and the PKK exploded. The army closed off entire areas and could quietly go about their business. However, some documentation has been done. A Dutch newspaper reports a lot of cruelties that took place after the military coup of 1980 towards villagers: Kurdish people were humiliated by being forced to walk around naked in the village and perform different games. Because pride is very important for Kurdish people, this was perceived as highly humiliating. Years later, people had still not overcome the shame caused. Men and women suspected of Kurdish nationalism were caught and tortured and raped in expectation of their trial. The verdict was already written for them (NRC, 9 October 1982). Among others, entire villages and farmlands were burned and there were programs that tortured Kurdish insurgents and massacred civilian populations (Human Rights Watch 1990, Marcus 1994; 19, Jongerden 2002, c.f. Natali, 2005: 108). Numbers highly differ, but it estimated that approximately 1.800 Kurdish villages and 6.150 communities were evacuated or destroyed by the Turkish security forces8. The idea behind burning

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42 down villages and communities was to prevent the inhabitants to aid the PKK in the mountains. It is estimated that between 378.555 to three million persons fled from their villages (Day, MERIP, spring 2012). In massive numbers people moved to the big cities like Diyarbakir or Istanbul. A report from the Turkish bond of architects and building experts stated that in five years the city of Diyarbakir doubled its number of inhabitants (NRC, Kutschera, 28 November 1998).

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2.2. Discriminatory Political Institutions

There is no discrimination against individual Kurdish persons (Ergil, 2000: 126). People of Kurdish origin are found in the army, court, government, political parties and other organizations where they can enter also into high positions. In the parliament of 2007-2011 the Justice and Development Party (AKP party) of Prime Minister Erdoğan were 60 Kurdish deputies and five ministers of Kurdish origin (International Crisis Group, 2011:19). In principle, Kurds are not excluded from political life. In Turkey, there is an equality principle in place which is enshrined in the Constitution. Article 10 of the Constitutions stipulates that “all individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.”

The equality principle in Turkey

The equality principle in Turkey

A discrimination factor for the Kurds?

Master thesis Tialda Richt Sterk

International Relations and International Organization

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

The equality principle in Turkey

A discrimination factor for the Kurds?

Table of Contents

I. Abstract

II. Acknowledgements

III. Introduction

IV. Chapter 1: Minority Rights and equality

V. Chapter 2: Civil & political rights in Turkey