Changes in CEO Compensation Contracts
Explanations for Executive Contract Changes in The Netherlands between 2003 and 2008
Daniel den Hengst
April 2009
Changes in CEO Compensation Contracts
Explanations for Executive Contract Changes in The Netherlands between 2003 and 2008
Groningen, April 2009
University of Groningen, The Netherlands Faculty of Economics and Business
Department of International Business and Management
Document Type: Master Thesis
Author: D. (Daniel) den Hengst Student Number: 1405942
Email: danieldenhengst@gmail.com Supervisor: Dr. K. (Kees) van Veen
1Second Supervisor: Mr. F.A.A. (Florian) Becker‐Ritterspach
2The author is responsible for the content of this thesis; the copyright associated with this thesis resides with the author
1 Dr. K. van Veen is Associate Professor in International Business & Management, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Changes in CEO Compensation Contracts
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Abstract
This master thesis about executive compensation takes a bright new approach to identify practices in executive contract changes and uses these to investigate how well current theory is able to explain CEO contract changes. After examining changes in CEO’s contracts between 2003 and 2008 at 20 of the largest listed Dutch companies in detail, the following conclusions are presented: First, a high number of gradual changes influenced almost every contract component, nearly always favoring the executive. Due to nature of the changes in total level of composition, pay‐performance relation and contract components, it seems that Managerial Power Theory is better at explaining executive contract changes than Agency Theory. This implies that CEOs have substantial power to influence their own pay package. The amount and size of changes is also influenced by company performance, perceived fairness of contracts and difficulties in finding a new CEO.
Keywords: Executive compensation, Contract Changes, Corporate Governance, Managerial Power
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I would like to thank my supervisor, Kees van Veen, for his constructive comments and support to convert my personal interest and enthusiasm into the eagerness to investigate (on a scientific level) what is going on in the executive compensation field. Furthermore I would like to thank the other reviewers of this paper, in particular Jan den Hengst, for the received comments and suggestions. Most important however, was the moral support and unconditional belief in me of my family and friends.
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