Beyond the Icarus Syndrome? The Strategic Relevance of Proxy Warfare for the United States Air Force

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Beyond the Icarus Syndrome?

The Strategic Relevance of Proxy Warfare for the

United States Air Force

Timon Osinga S1663275

timonosinga@hotmail.com 03/07/2020

Master Thesis International Relations: Global Conflict in the Modern Era Supervisor: Lukas Milevski

Second Reader: Isabelle Duijvesteijn Word Count excluding bibliography: 13605 Word Count including bibliography: 14933

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S1663275 2 Timon Osinga

Index

List of abbreviations p.4

Chapter 1: Introduction p.5

1.1 Organisational Identity p.6

1.2 Aim and Structure p.8

Chapter 2: Methodology p.9

2.1 Case Studies: Doctrines p.10

2.2 Case Studies: Strategic Vision Documents p.11

2.3 Sub-Questions: Doctrines p.11

2.4 Sub-Questions: Strategic Vision Documents p.13

Chapter 3: Conceptual Background p.15

3.1 Airpower p.15

3.2 USAF Doctrine Development before 2000 p.16

3.3 Proxy Warfare p.17

Chapter 4: The Evolution of USAF Doctrine post-2000 p.19

4.1 2003 USAF Basic Doctrine p.19

4.1.1 Q1 p.19

4.1.2 Q2 p.20

4.1.3 Q3 p.22

4.1.4 Analysis p.23

4.2 2007 USAF Irregular Warfare Doctrine p.25

4.2.1 Q1 p.26

4.2.2 Q2 p.27

4.2.3 Q3 p.29

4.2.4 Analysis p.30

4.3 2016 Irregular Warfare Annex p.31

4.3.1 Q1 p.32

4.3.2 Q2 p.33

4.3.3 Q3 p.34

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Chapter 5: The Evolution of USAF Strategic Vision Documents post-2000 p.37

5.1 2002/2003/2004 Air Force Transformation Flight Plan p.37

5.1.1 Q1 p.37

5.1.2 Q2 p.37

5.1.3 Q3 p.38

5.1.4 Analysis p.38

5.2 2007 The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st -Century Air Force p.39

5.2.1 Q1 p.39

5.2.2 Q2 p.39

5.2.3 Q3 p.39

5.2.4 Analysis p.40

5.3 2015 Air Force Future Operating Concept: A View of the Air Force in 2035 p.41

5.3.1 Q1 p.41 5.3.2 Q2 p.41 5.3.3 Q3 p.42 5.3.4 Analysis p.42 Chapter 6: Conclusion p.44 Bibliography p.48

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List of Abbreviations

AMW – Afghan Model of War CAA – Combat Aviation Advisors CAS – Close Air Support

COIN – Counterinsurgency

CSAF – Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force ISIS – Islamic State

IW – Irregular Warfare

NA – Afghan Northern Alliance

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs SECDEF – Secretary of Defense SOF – Special Operations Forces U.S. – United States of America USAF – United States Air Force UW – Unconventional Warfare

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since 9/11, the United States of America (U.S.) has been engaged in a war on terrorism across the globe. Initially, the U.S. waged this war by deploying thousands of troops to forcefully evict the Taliban and its Al Qaeda sponsors from Afghanistan (Tellis, 2004, 3). Afterwards, the U.S. unilaterally invaded Iraq and destroyed Saddam Hussein’s army (Boyle, 2008, 192). However, these campaigns led to the emergence of numerous other threats such as failed states, new terrorist organisations, and the effects of regional instability in the Middle East. Due to mounting casualties and the lack of clear end-state for the counterterrorism effort, public and political support eroded sufficiently to force a strategic shift reducing the American footprint in the Middle East. (Amadeo, 2020).

In this changing focus, the U.S. expanded the deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to operate with indigenous forces. These indigenous forces, or proxies, perform the brunt of the fighting in combination with SOF troops (Henriksen, 2010, 29) and U.S. airpower has regularly been deployed to assist these proxy forces in their ground operations. This combination of a dominant state sponsoring a proxy actor to achieve the dominant actor’s objectives is called proxy warfare and has occurred throughout history (Hamlin, 2017, 1). However, the 21st century has seen a surge in proxy warfare due to two developments in modern warfare and international relations. Firstly, the Western public has become increasingly hostile towards large-scale military engagements involving counterinsurgency (COIN) and state-building. Secondly, the emergence of China as new superpower and the interdependence between the Chinese and American economies has rendered interstate military confrontation highly unlikely (Mumford, 2013, 77). Proxy warfare offers a strategic approach to exert influence in a region with limited risk of direct confrontation with military units from a peer interstate rival.

In addition, the combination of proxy warfare and airpower has proven successful in recent conflicts (Marshall, 2016, 192). Providing close air support (CAS) for proxy forces proved ground-breaking in the war against the Taliban in 2001. When U.S. SOF began to support the Afghan Northern Alliance (NA), coordinated air strikes on Taliban positions combined with NA ground offensives quickly overwhelmed the numerically superior opposition (Wills, 2006, 39). During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the combination of a proxy force, SOF, and airpower allowed numerically inferior ground troops to actively engage and destroy highly motivated and well-equipped Iraqi ground forces in Northern Iraq (Wills,

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S1663275 6 Timon Osinga 2006, 42; Andres et al., 2006, 143). During the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air campaign in Libya, anti-regime forces effectively used global positioning systems, Google Earth, and a network of spotters to relay target coordinates to NATO mission planners (Mueller, 2015, 62). In the conflict against Islamic State (ISIS) from 2014 onwards, U.S. SOF have effectively cooperated with Kurdish rebels (Sloat, 2019), while coalition air operations, led by the United States Air Force (USAF), provided surveillance, conducted deep strikes against ISIS facilities, and provided CAS.

1.1 The role of Organisational Identity

While the apparent prominence of proxy warfare in contemporary conflicts would suggest that the U.S. armed forces incorporate proxy warfare in doctrinal guidelines, this is not necessarily so. On the one hand, military innovation theory suggests that threat perception and changes in the military balance vis à vis rival powers are the dominant factors shaping force structures, weapon system development, and military doctrines of major powers like the U.S. (Grissom, 2006, 907). Referred to as the ‘civil-military model of military innovation’, it follows the realist assumption that states respond to major security threats posed by other states (Posen, 1986, 231). Since 2014, it can be argued that the U.S. has acted in accordance with this theory because of the return of geopolitics after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the increasing influence of China (Mead, 2014, 73). Examples of the U.S. response to these developments are the ‘AirSea Battle Concept’ which was developed to counter increased Chinese naval activities (Gady, 2015) and ‘Multi-Domain Operations’, which is an effort by the U.S. military to penetrate and disintegrate an adversary's layered and networked arrays of anti-access and area-denial systems by conducting swift and coordinated attacks across all domains (Gouré, 2019). Another strand in military innovation theory emphasises the influence of organisational dynamics such as service culture and service specific interests which come together in service specific identities. Like all military services, the USAF has a strong organisational identity. Coined the “Icarus Syndrome”, it is traditionally dominated by the notions strategic attack and air superiority (Builder, 1993). It champions independence by leaning heavily towards the employment of advanced technology (Farley, 2019, 431), which stems from the fact that the USAF was for a long time the most novel independent service in the U.S. military1 (Dimarco, 2004, 11).

1_{This changed when the United States Space Force was established as independent military branch on 20}

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S1663275 7 Timon Osinga A doctrinal shift by the USAF towards proxy warfare may be limited by so-called ‘systems of denial’ (Hill & Gerras, 2016, 110). This refers to the often implicit and sometimes explicit biases among senior leaders of armed services. As a result, military innovation is sometimes limited by the influence of the service identity, which ensures that future conflicts and military progress are observed through a lens optimised to allocate the greatest importance to itself (Jungdahl & Macdonald, 2015, 469). This is demonstrative of the ‘interservice rivalry model of military innovation’, which focuses on the relationship between different military services in a state. It assumes that resource scarcity induces military services to compete for importance and the allocation of resources (Cote, 1996, 44). Simultaneously, lessons learned and potentially promising innovation can be ignored or their relevance downplayed if these are considered a potential threat to existing force structures (Mahnken & FitzSimonds, 2003, 143).

These two opposing schools of military innovation theory posit two different expectations for the USAF focus on proxy warfare. One the one hand, since the U.S. is shifting back towards peer competitor conflict with Russia and China, the USAF could feel comfortable in this shift because of the traditional, independent role of airpower in interstate conflicts. Such a conflict puts a premium on deep strike, strategic attack, and air superiority. On the other hand, proxy warfare could obtain a major role in future operations because peer-competitors aim to avoid full-scale conflict, instead utilising a proxy to achieve strategic objectives and limit the risk of escalation (Mumford, 2013, 77). These diverging predictions create an interesting playing field to investigate to what extent the USAF recognises the perceived importance of proxy warfare for the future, giving it priority in force planning, thus shedding its treasured traditional identity, or if it prefers a shift back to interstate conflicts. In addition, there are numerous accounts of effective cooperation between a proxy force, airpower and SOF in specific contexts, but studies linking proxy warfare to USAF doctrinal development and its traditional identity are lacking. This thesis will aim to bridge this gap and identify to what extent USAF vision is still dominated by its traditional identity by assessing to what extent the USAF considers proxy warfare a pillar of future military operations. It will do so by answering the following research question:

To what extent does the United States Air Force consider proxy warfare a major component of future military operations?

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S1663275 8 Timon Osinga 1.2 Aim and Structure

Considering the relevance of proxy warfare in contemporary military operations, the first aim of this thesis is to discover what value the USAF allocates to proxy warfare for future military operations. However, answering the research question will also allow to observe the propensity with which the USAF is dominated by its traditional identity. Importantly, the two diverging theories of military innovation do not serve as theoretical framework for this thesis. Rather, these theories present contrasting predictions for the value that the USAF attaches to proxy warfare, which will be tested. Hypothesis 1 leads to the assumption that the USAF is not primarily guided by its traditional identity because it grasps the value of airpower in proxy warfare, which are the ‘subordinate’ functions of mobility, CAS, and reconnaissance:

The USAF considers proxy warfare a major component in future operations because of the increased relevance of proxy warfare in recent operations.

Hypothesis 2 induces the assumption that the USAF is largely governed by its traditional identity because it neglects the value of airpower in proxy warfare, opting instead to turn to interstate conflicts and regular warfare which regard the traditional notions of airpower – air superiority and strategic attack – as highly valuable:

The USAF does not consider proxy warfare a major component in future operations because of the return of conventional, interstate threats.

This thesis will not feature a dedicated literature review. Instead, the literature review will be incorporated in both the methodology and the conceptual background. The methodology will first elaborate on the case studies chosen for analysis, before detailing how these documents will be analysed. Following, the conceptual background will offer a brief outline of airpower, USAF doctrine development before 2000, and proxy warfare. Then, the case studies will be performed, which will allow for a conclusion and reflection.

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Chapter 2: Methodology

The research question will be answered by conducting textual analysis of two types of sources which are typically considered to contain information concerning the organisational perception regarding the primary roles and missions, and an organisation’s expectation concerning its role in future conflicts (Hallion 1992; Jackson 2013; Priebe et al 2018). These sources are, first, doctrines, and, second, strategic vision documents. Tracing the evolution of the content of these sources may indicate whether they reflect recent operational experiences and developments in the international security environment, and which of those have been assigned priority. Conducting textual analysis of these sources enables the evocation of meanings in specific contexts, and to observe how the text legitimises its viewpoints (Pälli, Tienari, & Vaara, 2010, 925).

It is worthwhile to study past and present official doctrines to answer the research question because doctrines are a useful indicator of the organisation’s terms and processes and provide the ‘officially sanctioned approach’ to military operations (Jackson, 2013, 6). This ensures that doctrines generally reflect the best practices, lessons learned and the culture of a service (Priebe et al., 2018, 2). Given that the culture of the USAF is characterised as technologically driven and focused on the decisive nature of airpower, doctrines present an opportunity to assess if this culture predetermines the USAF position on proxy warfare (Flores, 2011, 4). Additionally, performance gaps in ongoing operations are often a powerful stimulant for doctrinal adaptations.

Although doctrines represent in principle, a snapshot of the culture, best practices, and vision of an organisation, they are not all-encompassing. A common critique is that doctrines quickly become outdated due to the need for states to adapt to fighting new enemies in changing circumstances (Høiback, 2011, 880). Moreover, doctrines do not set out long-term priorities in the development and acquisition of weapon systems. Therefore, three strategic vision documents will be scrutinised to supplement the doctrinal analysis. Analysing strategic vision documents complements doctrine by providing an officially endorsed perspective on organisational future, priorities, threat perception, and main roles in achieving national security (Hallion, 1992, 119). These documents effectively determine how the USAF will structure itself and fight future conflicts by determining what types of capabilities it will invest in (Cohen, 2017, 3).

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S1663275 10 Timon Osinga 2.1 Case Studies: Doctrines

Since proxy warfare has become so prevalent in recent decades due to societal and technological developments in Western countries, this thesis will focus on USAF doctrines from the 21st century. Specifically, it will textually analyse the USAF doctrines of 2003, 2007 and 2016. These doctrines are chosen because they were written in response to and during conflicts where proxy forces were routinely utilized to obtain objectives. While other doctrines are also available, these are less viable for the object of this research for various reasons.

The 1971 doctrine is dominated by operations in the nuclear spectrum and only offers brief accounts of other uses of airpower and does not delve into proxy warfare. The 1992 doctrine abandons the nuclear emphasis but retains the focus on interstate conflicts2. The 2000 doctrine loses value for this thesis because it focuses on military operations other than war and is primarily concerned with deploying security troops to aid civilian populations (USAF, 2000, 16).

Meanwhile, the doctrines of 2003, 2007 and 2016 provide a sufficiently broad scope for a valuable case study. The doctrine of 2003 represents the culmination of experiences from the war in the Balkan in the late nineties, as well as initial observations on the war in Afghanistan. Unlike the 2000 doctrine, the 2003 doctrine is air force basic doctrine, discussing the full spectrum of airpower functions. It is specifically written to address the changing nature of war, with evolving contingency operations and the maturation of information technology (USAF, 2003, i.). The 2003 doctrine offers significant value in observing the lessons learned by the USAF after the initial stages of the war in Afghanistanbecause these contingency operations frequently involved proxy forces.

The 2007 doctrine is dedicated entirely to Irregular Warfare (IW). IW involves a non-state actor which avoids the strengths of a conventional, technologically superior enemy by selectively using weapons and tactics (Gray, 2007, 39). This is representative of the need for the U.S. armed forces to adapt to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were fundamentally asymmetrical conflicts. This narrow focus ensures that the 2007 doctrine is a relevant source to assess if the USAF considered proxy warfare relevant for future conflicts in 2007.

Finally, the 2016 doctrine is an annex dedicated to IW and combines the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq with the lessons of recent conflicts in Libya and Syria. Due to the narrow

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S1663275 11 Timon Osinga focus on IW and the reflection on recent conflicts which featured significant proxy warfare, it also provides a valuable source of information for this thesis.

Choosing one USAF basic doctrine and two IW doctrines was a conscious decision because the basic doctrine provides evidence of the basic thinking on U.S. airpower, which defines what the USAF considers its primary roles and reflects changing strategic and operational contexts. Meanwhile, the two IW documents will potentially offer more detail on operations with proxy forces. The fact that the USAF regularly publishes IW doctrines suggests that IW is considered a cornerstone in future warfare. Since proxy warfare is commonly viewed as a major component of IW (Lindsay, 2013, 5), it can be discerned if proxy warfare is also considered a major factor in future operations.

2.2 Case Studies: Strategic Vision Documents

For the 2003 USAF basic doctrine, the corresponding strategic vision document which will be analysed is the Air Force Transformation Flight Plan (2002, 2003, and 2004). The comparable strategic vision document for the 2007 IW doctrine is The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st

-Century Air Force (2007). Finally, the 2016 IW annex is represented by the Air Force Future Operating Concept: A View of the Air Force in 2035 (2015). The 2015 strategic vision document retains contemporary value because it is the foundation of the concept ‘multi-domain operations’, which, as current Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force (CSAF) General David L. Goldfein noted in a speech in 2019, is a response to “a world of shifting threats and geopolitics and the re[-]emergence of China and Russia, [which] requires a shift to [an] integrated, total force approach” (Pope, 2019).

2.3 Sub-Questions: Doctrines

To determine what value the doctrines, and thus the USAF, allocate to proxy warfare, three sub-questions will be posed to the three doctrines:

Q1: What tasks does airpower need to perform to allow a proxy force to operate effectively? Q2: What tasks does a proxy force need to perform to allow airpower to operate effectively? Q3: What conditions must be met to allow for an effective partnership between a proxy force

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S1663275 12 Timon Osinga The common answers to the questions can be derived from the so-called ‘Afghan Model of War’ (AMW). Although opinions on its validity vary, the AMW refers to experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq where indigenous allied forces replaced conventional U.S. ground forces by exploiting U.S. airpower and small numbers of U.S. SOF (Biddle, 2006, 161). This model proposes that specific tactical and operational techniques of airpower, SOF and proxies can be a powerful combination. These techniques as presented in the model must be incorporated in the doctrines to sufficiently answer the question.

Therefore, the doctrines are analysed at the tactical (the employment of USAF assets to accomplish detailed objectives) and operational (the proper organisation and employment of air forces in the context of objectives, operational environments, and functional areas) levels of analysis, which reflect the tactical and operational levels of war (Bateman, 2015). Performing the analysis at the operational and tactical level allows for a conclusion at the strategic level, which is the level where political goals, constraints, and available resources determine projected military outcomes and steer the application of military force in a specific direction (Luttwak, 1980, 61).

Q1 aims to assess if the doctrine recognises the potential benefits airpower grants to allow a proxy force to operate effectively to achieve common objectives. The AMW asserts that airpower aids ground forces by its ability to: perform air interdiction attacking enemy positions; provide active and accurate CAS; provide rapid mobility; and aerial reconnaissance (Andres et al., 2006, 134-138). Q2 intends to detect if the doctrine realises the unique beneficial characteristics a proxy force possesses. The AMW indicates that the main advantages of an indigenous force are the ability to rapidly mass forces to engage and capture defended enemy territory (Biddle, 2006, 165), and the capacity to gain accurate intelligence due to their cultural affinity with the region (Byman, 2018). The goal of Q3 is to determine if the doctrine understands the conditions which facilitate an effective partnership between a proxy force and airpower. The AMW stresses that due to technological advancements, SOF are considered the linchpin between airpower and indigenous forces by providing accurate targeting information for orbiting aircraft (Andres et al., 2006, 130). In addition, SOF are responsible for training the indigenous forces to standards which suffice to cooperate with airpower (Rosenau & Gold, 2019, 47).

Afterwards, the analysis section will combine the answers to the sub-questions to assess what value the doctrine allocates to proxy warfare in future military operations. While acknowledging that the tactical and operational standards that a doctrine proposes do not

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S1663275 13 Timon Osinga entirely dictate the organisational focus, observing if the doctrine adequately discusses proxy warfare does offer a snapshot of organisational preference. There is significant difference between a doctrine briefly mentioning an aspect of proxy warfare, and a doctrine actively debating the considerations of airpower in proxy warfare. That difference, the level of attention allocated to proxy warfare, serves as a signifier of the value the doctrine assigns to proxy warfare, thus indicating the propensity with which the doctrine was influenced by the traditional USAF identity.

Therefore, the following distinction will be made after answering the three sub-questions. A doctrine does not consider proxy warfare a factor in future operations if it fails to provide an adequate answer to any question. A doctrine considers proxy warfare a minor factor in future operations if it adequately answers one of the research questions. A doctrine considers proxy warfare a moderately important factor in future conflicts if it adequately answers two research questions. Finally, a doctrine considers proxy warfare a major factor in future conflicts if it adequately answers all three research questions.

2.4 Sub-Questions: Strategic Vision Documents

The analysis of the strategic vision documents will utilise different sub-questions because these documents generally reflect the organisational perspective on the future, priorities, threat perception and main roles of an organisation instead of best practices. The analysis will aim to identify the role of the traditional USAF identity in the documents by answering the following sub-questions:

Q1: What is the aim of the strategic vision document?

Q2: What capabilities does the strategic vision document advocate? Q3: What primary threat perception forms the basis of those force priorities?

Strategic vision documents are ordinarily published by the CSAF and may aim to strengthen the importance of the current functions of airpower or aim to steer the USAF to re-emphasise functions of airpower which are currently considered a lesser priority. Correspondingly, strategic vision documents commonly lay out significant projects currently under development which will structure the future force. Observing the aim, proposed acquisitions and force developments, and threat perception will therefore indicate to what extent the USAF is dominated by its traditional identity. A focus on technologically advanced, strategic capabilities to counter peer-competitor threats signifies a strong pull by the

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S1663275 14 Timon Osinga organisational identity. On the other hand, developments aimed at contemporary operations and focused on the vital capabilities of airpower in proxy warfare – CAS, mobility, and reconnaissance – will signify the weak alignment of USAF vision with the traditional identity.

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Chapter 3: Conceptual Background

Before analysing USAF doctrines and strategic vision documents to observe the value allocated to proxy warfare and the extent of influence by the traditional identity, it is useful to have a broad understanding of airpower, USAF doctrine development, andproxy warfare. This section will therefore first attempt to define airpower, before outlining the development of USAF doctrine during and shortly after the Cold War. Then, it will conceptualise proxy warfare. 3.1 Airpower

Reflecting the Clausewitzian statement that war is fundamentally political, airpower is also a thoroughly political subject due to its practical implications (Gray, 2012, 7). Although that complicates articulating an accurate definition of airpower, Gray posits the following definition: “airpower may be defined as the ability to do something strategically useful in the air” (Gray, 2012, 8). While widely appreciated, this definition is predominantly focused on the strategic usefulness of airpower. To put that into perspective, the USAF defines airpower as: “the ability to project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives” (USAF, 2015a). This definition is both broader by encompassing (cyber)space and because it refers to achieving strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Since this thesis will analyse USAF doctrines and strategic vision documents, it will follow the USAF definition of airpower.

Airpower’s initial function during the First World War was reconnaissance. However, aviators swiftly realised that obtaining air superiority should be airpower’s primary function because it facilitates other uses of airpower (Henriksen, 2018, 84). When control of the air is achieved, aircraft can engage enemy forces in interdiction and provide CAS to support friendly ground troops (Jordan, 2008, 207). During the interbellum, the need to conceive of air forces as independent military services sparked theorizing on how airpower could be deployed independently (Stephens, 2018, 26). The result was strategic airpower theory which advanced the offensive and independent use of airpower to achieve victory by destroying the enemy’s infrastructure and inducing fear in the enemy’s population (Meilinger, 2018, 37). Strategic airpower theory attained prominence during the Cold War because nuclear weapons dramatically increased destructive capability.

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S1663275 16 Timon Osinga 3.2 USAF Doctrine Development before 2000

During the Cold War, the USAF lacked a system to process lessons learned and analyses in official doctrine. Instead, doctrines generally reflected the opinion of the commanding senior officers (Drew, 1995, 1-3). Consequently, doctrines regularly contained statements which were not backed by evidence and only minute detailed changed while core USAF values remained constant (Watts, 1984, 106).

This observation becomes painfully evident when various doctrines are scrutinised. The 1971 USAF basic doctrine, written at the height of the Cold War, emphasises the critical function of airpower in defending the U.S. through nuclear deterrence. This shows in the identification of four variations of modern conflicts: conventional operations, low intensity nuclear operations, high-intensity nuclear operations and special operations (USAF, 1971, section 1-4). In all but special operations, airpower is considered to operate independently and decisively. In comparison, the 1992 USAF basic doctrine, published after the Gulf War, shifted focus from nuclear deterrence to the application of airpower with technological superiority (USAF, 1992, 93). However, it resumes with the notion of the independent nature of airpower:

“In Desert Storm, airmen saw how aerospace power could be used independently to secure control of the aerospace environment and to attack Saddam Hussein’s ability to control his

forces” (USAF, 1992, 128).

Partly due to contemporary strategic considerations, the Cold War emphasis on interstate conflicts also stems from the questioned value of airpower in IW (Osinga, 2012, 451). It is sometimes argued that modern airpower fails to perform adequately in IW because technologically advanced air platforms do not perform well when confronted with small, mobile platforms (Van Creveld, 2011, 53). However, proponents claim that airpower retains value in IW because of the non-lethal functions of airpower (Schwartz, 2011, 128-129). Regardless, airpower has obtained a dominant role in modern warfare due to the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), which refers to the use of advanced information technologies to enhance warfighting capabilities (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, 185), and enables detecting, tracking, and if necessary engaging small mobile targets, an important capability in IW.

In fact, after 9/11, the USAF finally started to appreciate ‘subordinate’ functions of airpower because Operation Enduring Freedom highlighted the value of airpower in IW. After the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in 2006 collaboratively published the first COIN manual in

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S1663275 17 Timon Osinga 20 years3, the USAF was displeased with airpower’s subordination to an annex and the reliance on heavy American boots on the ground, and surprised in light of the intense air-land cooperation as witnessed in the AMW. In response, the USAF proposed exploiting airpower to achieve operational security in COIN, underscored by airpower’s crucial role in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (Dunlap, 2008, 43). Evidence of this debate is the ongoing assessment of the future platform for CAS. While the USAF initially proposed replacing the reliable and robust A-10 with the technologically advanced F-35 (Correll, 2019), the U.S. Congress refused this, and the USAF has since shifted to a search for light-attack aircraft (Giangreco, 2016). This debate centres around contrasting visions of the role of airpower, with the U.S. Army complaining about a lack of USAF dedication for CAS, and the USAF complaining about the misuse of airpower in the subordinate role of CAS (Pietrucha, 2016).

3.3 Proxy Warfare

While the term proxy warfare has increasingly been used in the 21st century, its origins likely date back to the conception of warfare itself. However, proxy warfare was ill-researched during the Cold War because proxy wars were overshadowed by the grander struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Mumford, 2013, 1). Furthermore, data was limited because of the covert nature of most proxy strategies (Hughes, 2014, 15).

Fortunately, there is substantial contemporary literature on the concept. Proxy warfare is commonly considered to be rooted in the concept of ‘limited war’, which requires the belligerents to choose not to fight at full capacity to prevent the conflict from gaining in intensity or expanding in space and time (Freedman, 2014, 8). Accordingly, proxy warfare can be described as: “the physical manifestation of a dominant actor (the principal, or sponsor), operating by, with, and through a non-dominant actor (the agent, or proxy) against an adversary to achieve the dominant actors’ military objectives” (Fox, 2019a, 49). Another definition designates: “the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome” (Mumford, 2013, 11).

These definitions both showcase that the sponsor’s objective in the conflict is the central purpose of the relationship. The weakness in these definitions is that they fail to engage in the strength of the relationship while this can dictate the chance of success of a proxy strategy. A strong relationship entices the proxy to actively seek the dominant actor’s objective because

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S1663275 18 Timon Osinga they possess strong common variables. A loose relationship signals the weak alignment between two actors, risking failure of the strategy (Orton & Weick, 1990, 203). Notably, proxy warfare is not a specific type of warfare. Instead, it operates in the proxy environment which is driven by political interests and is either relational or exploitative, which leads to a limited duration of the partnership (Fox, 2019b, 5).

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Chapter 4: The Evolution of USAF Doctrine post-2000

4.1 2003 USAF Basic Doctrine

The 2003 USAF basic doctrine reflects the military deployments in the wake of the twin tower attacks. The foreword expresses the changing nature of warfare and the need for airmen to recognise the ever-changing contingency operations which the U.S. was then involved in:

The nature of war has changed and so has the Air Force. Although our fundamental beliefs remain sound, the evolution of contingency operations, the rapid maturation of space and information warfare, and the leveraging power of information technology have transformed

the effectiveness of air and space power” (USAF, 2003a, i).

The doctrine additionally asserts that it resembles the baseline for future thinking on military affairs from fifteen years and beyond. This section will analyse this doctrine by answering the three sub-questions, before deciding what value the doctrine allocates to proxy warfare. 4.1.1 Q1: What tasks does airpower need to perform to allow a proxy force to operate effectively?

The 2003 doctrine contains numerous statements stressing the strategic independent value of airpower. The doctrine asserts that while airpower may pursue tactical and operational objectives:

“Air and space power is inherently a strategic force and an offensive weapon” (p.ix). This conviction is driven by a ‘new view of conflict’, which reduces the necessity for massive numbers of U.S. ground troops by the effective application of airpower. It emphasises that:

“the prompt, continued, aggressive application of air and space power in the opening phase may actually constitute the conflict’s decisive phase” (p.17).

The phrase “decisive phase” reflects the doctrine’s conviction that airpower can be the decisive factor in a conflict without the need for deploying ground troops. This was extracted from the lessons of the Gulf War where a massive air campaign engaged and destroyed sufficient enemy targets to allow for a low-casualty ground campaign, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, in which airpower was pivotal in determining the outcome of the conflict (Lambeth, 2001, 1).

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S1663275 20 Timon Osinga When discussing the organisational functions of airpower, the doctrine proposes a list of vital functions based on significance. The primary function of airpower is to:

“gain and maintain general air and space supremacy, defeat enemy air and space forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air and space superiority”

(USAF, 2003a, 37).

This is followed by the need for airpower to provide strategic defence and strategic air and missile warfare. All these statements above indicate that the 2003 doctrine is primarily concerned with the strategic application of airpower.

However, the doctrine does recognise the potentially crucial functions of airpower in support of ground forces. When viewing the list of organisational functions, the support of ground forces can be found in fourth place, behind strategic air and missile warfare. It states that the USAF is responsible:

“To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air and space support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of

enemy land forces and communications” (p.37).

Evidently, the USAF does recognise that ground forces may be critically supported by airpower. It even specifies the varying forms of support that airpower may provide. However, this function of airpower is only pictured as the fourth function of airpower, behind air superiority and strategic attack. This is reminiscent of the conviction that airpower is a strategic and offensive weapon capable of independently defeating the enemy. That showcases the traditional notion of USAF identity, and fails to acknowledge the significance of airpower in IW. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 2003 basic doctrine fails to adequately answer Q1. 4.1.2 Q2: What tasks does a proxy force need to perform to allow airpower to operate effectively?

As outlined when discussing Q1, the doctrine is primarily guided by airpower’s ability to defeat the enemy independently. As a fourth function of airpower, it details the support to ground troops. However, the doctrine is also recognisant of the need for ground forces to obtain ground objectives. It confesses that:

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S1663275 21 Timon Osinga “As a maneuver element, it [Airpower] can be supported by surface forces in attaining its

assigned objectives” (p.16).

Interestingly, this reverses the traditional notion that airpower is primarily useful to support ground forces. This could indicate that it is an initial reflection on Operation Enduring Freedom, where the AMW performed admirably. This subtle difference showcases that the doctrine values airpower as coequal to ground forces:

“The 1991 Persian Gulf War, has proven that air and space power can be a dominant and frequently the decisive element in combat in modern warfare. Air and space power is a maneuver element in its own right, coequal with land and maritime power; as such, it is no

longer merely a supporting force to surface combat” (p.16).

Evidently, the doctrine contains contrasting elements on the value of ground forces. On the one hand, the perception that ground forces can support airpower in obtaining objectives signifies a recognition of the validity of the AMW. On the other hand, it maintains that the independent attack by airpower can prove the decisive factor in the initial phase of a conflict.

When discussing the counterland function of airpower, the doctrine distinguishes between the independent interdiction of enemy ground targets and CAS. These are distinguished by the role of ground forces in coordinating with airpower:

“Although historically associated with support to friendly surface forces, counterland operations may encompass the identical missions, either without the presence of friendly surface forces or with only small numbers of surface forces providing target cueing” (p.44). This could entail another initial reflection on the AMW, considering that SOF provided the target coordinates to friendly air forces. However, it considers interdiction more important than CAS because of the challenges associated with it, cautioning that:

“the risk of fratricide, and the proliferation of lethal ground-based air defenses make close air support especially challenging” (p.45).

Nevertheless, the doctrine does profess that CAS is a potentially important function of airpower: “provide[s] a tremendous tactical advantage when supporting ground forces” (p.45).

Evidently, the doctrine recognises the potential importance of airpower in destroying ground targets. It also showcases that the doctrine reverses the traditional notion of airpower in

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S1663275 22 Timon Osinga support of ground forces, pertaining that ground forces can aid airpower in achieving objectives. It can therefore be inferred that the doctrine is still convinced of airpower’s ability to independently determine the outcome of conflicts, but it recognises that ground forces can increase the strategic value of airpower in its counterland functions based on initial observations from the AMW.

All things considered, it can be concluded that the 2003 basic doctrine adequately answers Q2 because it incorporates numerous statements that reflect initial observations of the AMW. As such, it recognises that ground forces can raise the strategic value of airpower in its counterland functions.

4.1.3 Q3: What conditions must be met to allow for an effective partnership between a proxy force and airpower?

The doctrine dictates two core takeaways from the American effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. Firstly, the doctrine realises the significance of SOF, declaring that SOF can:

“conduct the following special operations functions: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, psychological operations,

and counterproliferation” (p.53).

Moreover, the doctrine also acknowledges facilitating factors for SOF. Specifically, the doctrine states that SOF differ from conventional forces in the:

“degree of physical and political risk, degree of overtness, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational

intelligence and indigenous assets” (p.53).

This clarifies that the doctrine accepts that a proxy force may provide a force multiplier for SOF. Indigenous forces are considered vital in allowing SOF to operate independent of friendly support, for extended periods of time with high risks and political, environmental, and operational constraints.

Secondly, the doctrine translates the potential of the combination between SOF, airpower and a proxy force to an opportunity to harness military power to achieve policy objectives in a different approach. It mirrors the AMW which this thesis uses as a model to assess if the doctrines value proxy warfare highly for the future:

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S1663275 23 Timon Osinga “air and space power’s ability to concentrate in purpose—whether or not massing in location

or concentrating in time—challenges traditional understandings of precision and creates opportunity for a different approach to harnessing military power to policy objectives” (p.80).

In conclusion, it can be argued that Q3 is adequately answered by the 2003 basic doctrine. The AMW posits that SOF are the linchpin in the effective blend of airpower and a proxy force. The doctrine affirms this and recognises that SOF are dependent on indigenous forces for effective operations, while also highlighting SOF’s function of coordinating airstrikes.

4.1.4 Analysis

To adequately answer Q1, the doctrine would have to describe the primary functions of airpower in accordance with ground forces such as CAS, interdiction, reconnaissance, and mobility. The 2003 doctrine does not hit the mark in that respect. While recognising the operational utility of counterland operations by airpower, it stresses that airpower is best utilized when deployed offensively to achieve strategic objectives. It allocates only secondary importance to CAS and the coordination with ground forces. Therefore, Q1 is inadequately answered.

For Q2, the doctrine would have to detail advantages a proxy force provides for airpower such as cultural intelligence and the ability to mass forces to take ground objectives. The doctrine effectively incorporates initial lessons learned from the AMW in various statements. Therefore, Q2 is adequately answered.

Finally, adequately answering Q3 requires the doctrine to discuss the role of SOF in providing targeting coordinates for airpower and training indigenous forces. The doctrine successfully does so. It claims that SOF are the cornerstone of the combination between airpower and a proxy force, underlining SOF’s role in coordinating airstrikes. In addition, it recognises the AMW as a new framework of deploying military force. Finally, the doctrine determines that indigenous forces are crucial for SOF because of the ability to obtain accurate intelligence.

Overall, it can be concluded that the 2003 USAF basic doctrine considers proxy warfare a moderate factor for future military operations because it adequately answers Q2 and Q3. It can therefore be deduced that the traditional USAF identity enacted moderate influence on this

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S1663275 24 Timon Osinga doctrine. The emphasis on the strategic value of airpower in its counterland functions represents a significant shift from the doctrines before 2000.

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S1663275 25 Timon Osinga 4.2 2007 USAF Irregular Warfare Doctrine

The 2007 USAF IW doctrine is written in the context of U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. It justifies its existence and specifies its scope in the foreword:

“Irregular warfare is sufficiently different from traditional conflict to warrant a separate keystone doctrine document. While the fighting experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should

weigh heavily in the development of our doctrine, we intend this doctrine document to be broad, enduring, and forward-looking, rather than focusing on any particular operation,

current or past” (USAF, 2007, foreword). It duly designates that airpower is especially important in IW:

“We must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities and contributions to the irregular warfare fight, with its unique attributes and requirements. Employed properly, airpower (to include

air, space, and cyberspace capabilities) produces asymmetric advantages that can be effectively leveraged by joint force commanders in virtually every aspect of irregular

warfare” (foreword).

It makes a useful distinction between IW and Unconventional Warfare (UW). IW is defined as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the

relevant populations” (p.2). Meanwhile, UW is defined as:

“A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external

source” (p.2).

Furthermore, the doctrine elaborates that airpower can operate in the context of three core activities in IW (p.5). U.S. Air Forces can wage IW as part of a COIN effort, as support to a COIN effort by a foreign government, or as support to an insurgency. In the latter case, the doctrine asserts that:

“supporting an insurgent movement against a legitimate government is authorized when conducted for national defense … or when in accordance with a United Nations Security

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S1663275 26 Timon Osinga This indicates that the doctrine deems support for a proxy a legitimate option to achieve political goals. This section will aim to observe if this translates into the consideration of proxy warfare as a major factor in future military operations by answering the three sub-questions.

4.2.1 Q1: What tasks does airpower need to perform to allow a proxy force to operate effectively?

The doctrine commences with an appreciation of airpower’s exponential value in IW, stating: “The Air Force’s ability to operate in the air, space, and cyberspace domains provides our

fighting forces with a highly asymmetric advantage over IW adversaries” (p.1).

The doctrine argues that airpower can be a force multiplier both independently and in joint operations, and both in lethal and in non-lethal applications. This exposes the full spectrum of military air operations in IW. However, the doctrine frames these operations in the context of a COIN campaign in support of a partner government:

“Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly support ground operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and coordination. In other situations, Air Force

capabilities may be used to achieve effects interdependently” (p.10).

The doctrine also devotes attention to the role of U.S. airpower in support of an insurgency. The doctrine stresses that both the independent, joint, lethal, and non-lethal applications of airpower are valuable in the support of an insurgency. Airpower is regarded as the quintessential means of using military force in support of an insurgency:

“The ability to mobilize, deploy, employ, and redeploy US forces and capabilities allows airpower to deliver timely effects while minimizing our footprint and not highlighting US involvement when required. These effects can be lethal or non-lethal. In addition, these

effects can be sustained for a long period with less risk to military forces” (p.15). The minimal footprint of U.S. forces is a significant factor because the doctrine explains that the introduction of a large foreign force may exacerbate local circumstances while providing the insurgency or COIN adversary with a new major target for attacks and propaganda. Additionally, the doctrine explicitly articulates that airpower can perform multiple roles in UW due to its flexibility:

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S1663275 27 Timon Osinga “actions as insertion, extraction, and resupply of ground contact teams, direct-action forces, surface-force advisors/trainers, and guerrilla/partisan forces. Air Force capabilities may also be employed to support escape and evasion networks and intelligence networks; provide aerial delivery and resupply to US and indigenous/surrogate forces; carry out reconnaissance

and surveillance; provide C2 platforms; and furnish aerial cover and fire support for specific contingencies” (p.18).

Considering the statements displayed above, the doctrine values airpower highly in any IW effort. It specifically articulates that all forms of IW are legitimate means to achieve strategic objectives. When discussing the role of airpower in the support of an insurgency, the doctrine accepts proxy warfare as a legitimate and viable option for utilizing military force to achieve policy objectives. Therefore, the 2007 IW doctrine answers Q1 adequately.

4.2.2 Q2: What tasks does a proxy force need to perform to allow airpower to operate effectively?

The section which details the support to an insurgency again proves a worthwhile avenue to investigate in search of an answer to this question. The doctrine considers indigenous forces critical in any IW effort because a key adversary strength is the ability to hide within the populace, which counters many key advantages of traditional military power. Consequently:

“Interpersonal relationships built through sustained interaction with the populace and partner operations with indigenous forces are critical to understanding the nature of the conflict and

ultimate victory in the IW fight” (p.11).

The doctrine also investigates what operational functions indigenous forces can perform for U.S. airpower and U.S. ground forces. It compares the use of indigenous forces to achieve U.S. strategic objectives to using non-indigenous forces to achieve those same objectives. It claims that indigenous forces are preferable in an IW effort because:

“Insurgents will likely have better knowledge of the physical, cultural, religious, and social environment, as well as the political landscape” (p.12).

“Non-indigenous forces often “stand out” and present lucrative targets” (p.12). “Non-indigenous forces often do not understand the language and lack wide-area situational

awareness in a high threat environment. Additionally, air forces may lack critical “ground truth” to find targets and avoid collateral damage or unintended consequences” (p.12).

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S1663275 28 Timon Osinga “Security concerns often force US and coalition forces to mass, preventing smaller, less

intrusive exposure to the civilian population” (p.12).

Since this is considered to contribute directly to achieving U.S. strategic objectives, it can be deduced that the doctrine recognises the strategic value of a proxy. Strengthening this proposition is the capacity of proxy forces to gather tactical and operational intelligence. Specifically, because IW regularly entails close contact with a population that is often partially hostile in difficult terrain, local security forces are identified as a vital source of intelligence in any IW effort:

“Emerging threats may appear in areas where the US has not invested significantly in either resources or cultural expertise. In order to increase overall situational awareness, information

should be fused from multiple sources and disseminated to appropriate levels. Often local security forces and the affected population are the best source of information” (p.17).

In addition to the acquisition of intelligence by indigenous forces, the doctrine also declares that indigenous forces can assist in lethal applications. This showcases that the USAF considers proxy forces a significant aspect of IW operations. It is also asserted that airpower can be a crucial force multiplier for these surrogate forces:

“Indigenous/surrogate forces delay and disrupt hostile military operations, neutralize key targets, destroy enemy lines of communication, disrupt/isolate enemy resources and C24 nets,

develop intelligence collection sources and methods, and establish networks and contacts for unconventional assisted recovery operations. Integrating traditional Air Force capabilities

provide significant advantages to these UW forces” (p.64).

This provides ample evidence that the USAF 2007 IW doctrine considers proxy warfare a critical component in IW, and that it believes that airpower can and must integrate with indigenous forces. Therefore, and considering that the doctrine outlines various operational functions a proxy force can perform for the U.S. and in conjunction with airpower, Q2 is adequately answered.

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S1663275 29 Timon Osinga 4.2.3 Q3: What conditions must be met to allow for an effective partnership between a proxy force and airpower?

Since the doctrine dedicates itself entirely to the conduct of airpower in IW, it is not surprising that the doctrine identifies two conditions which must be met for an effective partnership between airpower and a proxy force. Firstly, it argues that IW calls for continuous, flexible, and integrated planning and execution to respond to challenges within grander strategies. Specifically, in any IW effort:

“Due to the localized nature of most IW enemies and specifically insurgencies, decentralized execution is vital to the successful integration of airpower” (p.66).

It is argued that the planning structure must be heavily adaptable to the operational environment and local circumstances, while simultaneously integrating interagency force capabilities.

The second factor that the doctrine identifies for the effective partnership between airpower and a proxy force is SOF. The doctrine pertains that SOF are still primarily responsible for UW, but that USAF forces must begin to acknowledge its relevance:

“While traditionally a SOF responsibility, UW is an operating arena of growing significance to Air Force general purpose forces” (p.64).

SOF are regarded as the crucial factor linking airpower and proxy forces because effective CAS is historically dependent on reliable communications:

“Air Force forces have historically provided capability to coalition ground forces with CAS only where a qualified terminal attack controller is available. In some circumstances, a ground-based controller embedded with PN5 forces may be required to determine the situation

and ensure compliance with the rules of engagement” (p.45).

Moreover, due to the often-remote locations of IW operations, the doctrine recommends that U.S. personnel embedded with proxy forces should be specifically organised, trained, and equipped to operate for extended periods of time without support:

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S1663275 30 Timon Osinga “Air Force elements conducting IW activities within the affected state itself (e.g., battlefield Airmen embedded with indigenous resistance forces) should be tailored so that they possess

reachback capability for limited logistics support, intelligence, communications, and air mobility” (p.73).

Ostensibly, the 2007 IW doctrine considers SOF the linchpin between airpower and a proxy. In addition to the planning requirements that IW dictates, it is advocated that SOF provide the crucial connection between a proxy force and U.S. airpower. Therefore, the doctrine adequately answers Q3.

4.2.4 Analysis

To adequately answer Q1, the doctrine would have to highlight that airpower presents a powerful force multiplier for a proxy because of its ability to perform air interdiction and CAS, provide mobility, and reconnaissance. The doctrine adequately answers this question because it devotes an entire section to the role of airpower in efforts to support an insurgency. It explicitly details the various roles airpower can perform to allow a proxy force to operate most effectively.

For Q2, the doctrine would have to discuss the potential capabilities of a proxy such as capturing ground objectives and gathering intelligence. Again, the doctrine successfully answers this question. It precisely discusses the various functions indigenous troops can perform, such as destroying key targets, disrupting hostile military operations, and acquiring accurate intelligence due to their affinity with the area of operations.

Finally, to adequately answer Q3, the doctrine must discuss SOF as a bridging factor between airpower and indigenous forces. While the doctrine outlines the need for centralised control and decentralised execution, the doctrine targets SOF as primary factor facilitating the effective partnership between airpower and a proxy. Therefore, Q3 is also adequately answered.

All in all, the USAF 2007 IW doctrine adequately answers all three questions. It can therefore be concluded that the doctrine considers proxy warfare a major factor for future military operations. This reflects the dominant focus of the U.S. armed forces at the time, which were still actively engaged in IW in the Middle East. This initial conclusion indicates that the USAF was not significantly affected by its identity when articulating the 2007 IW doctrine.

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S1663275 31 Timon Osinga 4.3 2016 USAF Irregular Warfare Annex

The 2016 IW annex is a document to complement USAF 2015 basic doctrine and is considerably smaller than the 2007 IW doctrine. This difference can be explained by the strategic considerations the U.S. was dealing with at the time of writing. In 2007, the U.S. was still heavily engaged in IW in the Middle East, making IW the prime focus. In 2016, the U.S. was forced to shift back to peer-competitor military operations due to the aggressive behaviour of Russia and China, while still conducting IW with the support to Kurdish rebels against ISIS. The 2016 IW annex:

“provides operational doctrinal guidance for IW and presents fundamental IW principles and core IW activities in the context of challenges to U.S. national security” (USAF, 2016, 26_).

Like the 2007 IW doctrine, it legitimises the formulation of a specific document for IW by exclaiming the difference between IW and regular warfare, describing IW as:

“a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ

the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will” (p.4).

The annex also declares why IW will remain a staple of future U.S. airpower despite renewed challenges by peer competitors. This reflects the experience of unrelenting operations in the Middle East:

“Irregular warfare has been an aspect of conflict throughout history, and will likely continue in the foreseeable future for two primary reasons: stability challenges due to weakly governed nations, and the prohibitive cost of waging traditional war. In many cases, IW-based strategies are a function of limited capability, and are often the only option available to a weaker force”

(p.3).

Similar to the 2007 IW doctrine, the annex also distinguishes between U.S. airpower conducting operations in support of an insurgency and COIN. Subsequently, it defines UW as:

6_{Page numbers are lacking in this document. Instead, the pages referenced to are the pages as the document}

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S1663275 32 Timon Osinga “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground,

auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” (p.6).

This distinction suggests that the 2016 annex will be recognisant of the value of proxy forces in contemporary and future military operations. The following section will assess if that is the case by answering the three sub-questions.

4.3.1 Q1: What tasks does airpower need to perform to allow a proxy force to operate effectively?

The annex frames airpower to provide security and rapid response in support of host-nation governmental forces:

“The speed, range, and flexibility of airpower play a critical role in helping a nation earn and sustain legitimacy with support from its population. Broadly speaking, airpower extends a

nation’s reach and brings rapid response and improved situational awareness” (p.3). Moreover, the annex devotes a specific section to the potential pitfalls of IW. While notifying that objectives should be viewed from the lens of the partner forces and the adversary, the annex also identifies a specific drawback of airpower in IW:

“seemingly tactical actions and decisions may have strategic consequences in IW scenarios even more than in traditional war. For example, indigenous civilian casualties caused by air attack often garner more media attention than do equivalent casualties caused by ground

weapons” (p.16).

This is notable because indigenous populations are naturally the centre of gravity in IW operations. Therefore, collateral damage may reduce U.S. influence and legitimacy, which impedes the achievement of long-term strategic objectives.

Nevertheless, the annex does admit to other virtues of using airpower in IW. Aerial intelligence is considered crucial in any IW effort because target development requires managing the social, political, and economic consequences of military operations while also minimising collateral damage. Therefore, any IW effort should:

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S1663275 33 Timon Osinga It also notes that airpower can deliver combat support to U.S. troops in contact with the enemy. While warning that commanders should consider various risks of combat support in IW such as increasing security requirements, it appraises combat support as a central function of airpower in IW:

“Combat sustainment of forces entails transporting materiel, supplies, and personnel to reinforce units engaged in combat within the operational area. Combat support may transition

from an Air Force support role to the primary application of military force” (p.26). Air mobility is also outlined as prime function of airpower in IW. Specifically, the USAF can rapidly transport personnel and supplies to contested areas. Moreover, it is argued that:

“Air mobility-focused Airmen, integrated with surface forces, often increase the effectiveness of air mobility and resupply operations, as well as mitigating risk in those operations. [And]

specifically trained airlift forces provide airland and airdrop support to special operations” (p.27).

While the 2016 annex evidently devotes significant attention to the various important functions of airpower in IW, a consistent omission in these discussions is the context of proxy warfare. The annex continuously discusses these functions of airpower to support a foreign government in COIN. It fails to accommodate indigenous forces fighting an insurgency in the framework of U.S. airpower support. Therefore, the 2016 IW annex fails to adequately answer Q1.

4.3.2 Q2: What tasks does a proxy force need to perform to allow airpower to operate effectively?

Answering this question proved challenging because the annex does not actively discuss the functions of landpower that indigenous forces can perform in IW. Instead, it principally deliberates airpower’s functions in IW in support of a foreign government in a COIN effort. It devotes much attention to tactics such as Security Force Assistance, which are:

“activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government … to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting

institutions.” (p.9).

The importance of this issue is showcased in the discussion of USAF combat support. When airpower must aid allied forces of a foreign government, airpower may become less

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S1663275 34 Timon Osinga effective because of the need to maintain the foreign government’s legitimacy. It is added that USAF capabilities should be partly committed to establishing a domestic Air Force. This clearly emanates from the focus on COIN operations instead of operations in support of an insurgency. In fact, the annex does not even delve into the potential qualities of a proxy force when discussing UW. Rather, it focuses on the responsibility of SOF to train and assist these indigenous forces in establishing a resistance movement:

“Traditionally, this has been accomplished with special operations forces (SOF) conducting UW to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the non-cooperative state through or with an underground auxiliary, or a guerilla force in a denied

area” (p.14).

Since the annex rejects any potential benefits of operating with a proxy force, it can be concluded that this question is inadequately answered.

4.3.3 Q3: What conditions must be met to allow for an effective partnership between a proxy force and airpower?

While the annex does not actively consider the benefits of a proxy force in IW, the second quote of the answer to 4.3.2 shows that the annex firmly installs SOF as the dominant operators in UW. Akin to the 2007 IW doctrine, the annex also denotes that these embedded SOF should be:

“organized, trained, and equipped to operate for extended periods of time independent of traditional support structures” (p.17).

Where it differs from the other doctrines that were analysed is that it does not necessarily consider SOF to remain the cornerstone of UW operations. Instead, it argues that conventional forces will likely become more common in future operations because:

“non-cooperative states have ever-increasing global connections and interests. The increasingly trans-regional nature of IW may require joint forces [SOF and conventional] to

act against an adversary’s vital interests that may reside outside traditional borders” (p.15). Nevertheless, the document does extensively review the potential of deploying air advisors. Specifically, combat aviation advisors (CAA) are responsible for the conduct of special operations by, with, and through indigenous forces. They are organised, trained, and