Is contract completeness the effectiveness
factor of cross-sector partnerships?
‘A research into measuring the roles of trust and innovativeness
on the relation between contract completeness and partnership
effectiveness’
Ingrid Siepel University of Groningen Msc in Business Administration
Strategy and Innovation Faculty of Economics and Business
Title: Is contract completeness the effectiveness factor of cross sector partnerships?
Subtitle: ‘A research into measuring the moderate roles of trust and
innovativeness on the relation between contract completeness and partnership effectiveness’
University: University of Groningen
Faculty: Faculty of Economic and Business
Study Program: Master of Science in Business Administration (MScBA) Specialization: Strategy and Innovation
Date:
Author: Ingrid Siepel Student number: s1582771
Email address: ingrid_siepel@hotmail.com 1st supervisor: Ivan Orosa Paleo
2nd supervisor: Hendrik Snijders Organization: ICCO
Department: Sustainable Fair Economic Development (SFED) Address: Joseph Haydnlaan 2a
3533 AE Utrecht Nederland
Abstract
Purpose - This article examines the influence of trust and innovativeness on the relationship between contract completeness and partnership effectiveness. Effectiveness in this research is divided into output-, quality-, organization and planning-, interpersonal communication- and cooperation effectiveness.
Design/ methodology / approach – The data is collected from 26 ICCO partnerships who work together to accomplish a better economic position for people in developing countries. In order to assess these relations a hierarchical multiple regression analysis is executed.
Findings - This research found that contract completeness and trust interacted to affect the effectiveness of a partnership, in such way that the positive moderating role of trust decreases the relation between contract completeness and partnership effectiveness. This research also found positive influences of innovativeness and trust on some partnership effectiveness aspects.
Originality / value - This study is original in applying and combining economic, business and psychological theories on the cross-partnership realization in the development cooperation sector. Until now business research about these subjects has been done only rarely in the development cooperation branch.
Keywords - Contract Completeness, Cross-sector Partnership, Effectiveness, Trust, Innovativeness
Table of Content
I. Introduction 5
II. Research Background 7 III. Relevant Definitions 10
IV. Literature Review 11
Contract completeness and partnership effectiveness 11 Innovativeness and partnership effectiveness 13
Trust and partnership effectiveness 15 Innovativeness as moderator17 Trust as moderator 18 V. Methodology 21 Procedure 21 Participants 22 Instruments 22 Data analysis 25 VI. Results 25
Correlations and descriptive statistics 25 Testing the hypothesis 26
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 33
Research findings 33
Strengths, limitations and future research 36 Practical implications 37
References 39
I. Introduction
Since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, cross-sector partnerships have become important instruments to address problems of global development and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in which the contribution of companies is seen as crucial (Van Tulder, Kostwinder, Kolk, 2008). Kofi Annan declared during that conference:
The Summit represents a major leap forward in the development of partnerships with the UN, governments, business and civil society coming together to increase the pooled resources to tackle global problems on a global scale.
In this research the factors influencing the effectiveness of these kinds of partnerships, the cross-sector partnerships, are analyzed. According to Van Tulder et al. (2008) a cross-sector partnership refers to a voluntary collaboration between actors from different sectors of society, like civil society, state and market. These partnerships aim to achieve a shared objective or a specific goal by combining financial and non-financial resources of the partners concerned, wherein these parties share risks, responsibilities, means, competences and profits. According to Tennyson (2004) the idea is that only with comprehensive and widespread cross-sector collaboration, the sustainable development initiatives are imaginative, coherent and integrated enough to tackle the most intractable problems.
A disadvantage of these cross-sector partnerships is that the different actors, with their own individual goals and perspectives, work on the joint project, where risks, responsibilities and costs are divided between partners. The separated interests of the actors can be in contradiction with each other and a partner can place its own interests above the general interest. According to the principle-agent theory, when in complex long term projects several important contradictions are present, opportunistic behaviour can arise (Williamson, 1997). Williamson defined opportunism as the problem of 'self-interest seeking with guile'. Possible expressions of opportunism can be: not complying with promises made, disguising, misleading or distorting. Organizations involved in these kind of partnerships need to safeguard their effectiveness against opportunism with control mechanisms like contracts (Heide en John, 1988). This research investigates the completeness of contracts, which means the degree to what extent clauses and appointments are described in the contracts. Contract completeness can contribute partnership effectiveness, because partners define functions and responsibilities clearly which allow them to monitor the results easily.
This research paper theoretically and empirically examines the relationship between trust, innovativeness and contracts completeness on partnership effectiveness, and subsequently how innovativeness and trust influence the relationship between contract completeness and effectiveness. The following research question is drawn up: What is the relation between contract completeness and the effectiveness of cross sector partnerships and what are the roles of trust and innovativeness on that relation?
In order to answer this question, questionnaires and interviews are conducted from 16 ICCO partnerships. With this data collection a correlation analysis and a hierarchical multiple regression analysis is completed. In the next section background information about ICCO and the problem and research situation are presented. Moreover, in the third section the research definitions are specified. Then, in the fourth section, the expected relationships between contract completeness, trust, partnership effectiveness and innovativeness are described. The fifth section contains a description of the methodology and in the sixth section the results are presented. This thesis will finish with a conclusion and discussion about the research.
II. Research Background
Cross-sector partnerships became important in 2002 on the World Summit on Sustainable Development. It was in 1992 on the UN Conference on Environment and Development, the Rio Earth Summit, that these partnerships were established as means of achieving imaginative, coherent, and integrated collaborations to tackle the most intractable sustainable development problems (Tennyson, 2004). The acceptance of cross-sector international partnerships as a mechanism for global development projects is growing. It is increasingly apparent that such partnerships have potential for addressing complex social problems (Battisti, 2009).
Due to the diversity of the national and international partners involved, the construction of cross-sector partnerships is a complex and uncertain process involves different issues of cultural diversity. It is not always a process that follows rational principles, because it is influenced by emotions and unconscious dynamics (Battisti, 2009). Trust and distrust are one of these emotions between the partners. For the purposes of this research, trust is the belief that a partner will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the partnership, as well as not take unexpected actions that will result in negative outcomes for the partnership.
To support these complex emotional processes, contracts can be used. A contract is an agreement between two or more parties, especially one that is written and enforceable by law and it varies from totally incomplete to totally complete (Hart, 2003). Following the contract theory (Hart, 2003) a complete contract is a contract where all parties can specify their respective rights and duties for every possible scenario in the future. Considering the fact that it is impossible to foresee the whole future and it is impossible to write a complete contract, contracts are usually partly incomplete. This research will measure to what extent contract completeness is determinative for the advantage of the effectiveness of the partnership.
The original role in those partnerships of ICCO was the ‘donor’ role, which is a one-way partnership where ICCO mainly was the investor. Self regulation of business and the decreased regulation influence of the government changed this role of ICCO. Business organizations, social organizations and civil society became more involved in development cooperation and the Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) started to grow. The research of Tulder, Muller and de Boer (2004) shows sixteen various types of roles the NGO or business organization can have. Appendix I shows an overview of some possible cooperation opportunities and roles that business organizations can have in the partnership.
Today, other organizations like multilateral institutions, partner (NGO) organizations, developing corporations, research institutes and civil society are becoming more involved and ICCO acts more in the ‘broker’ position. In their strategies they will act as a stimulator, an intermediary and a facilitator of the initiatives of others partners. The different stakeholders have their own motivations to engage in partnerships, their roles in it differ too. Their roles can be defined as follow: 1) linking operational management, core activities and investment decisions to poverty alleviation, 2) being innovative and 3) to become more aware of poverty alleviation and the relationship with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
how to benefit from Corporate Social Responsibility. The universal definition of CSR includes a manager’s duty or obligation to make decisions that nurture, protect, enhance and promote the welfare and well-being of stakeholders and society as a whole (Jones, George & Hill, 2000).
III. Relevant definitions
According to Peters (1997) contracts are complete in the sense that the value of the contract to any trader who accepts it, is determined entirely by the terms of the contract. More complete contracts are more complex contracts, which describe the whole product, process and situation which require longer periods of writing (Gifford, 1999). Following the contract theory (Hart, 2003) a complete contract is a contract where all parties can specify their respective rights and duties for every possible scenario in future. Considering the fact that it is impossible to foresee the whole future and it is prohibitively to write a complete contract, contracts are usually incomplete. In this research the degree of completeness is the degree to what extent clauses and appointments are described.
Innovativeness is the way and degree to which partners search for new innovations and services. According to Wijnberg (2004), an innovation comprises something new, which is presented in such a way that the value will be determined by the selectors. Following Garcia and Calantone (2002), innovation is an iterative process initiated by the perception of a new market and/or new service opportunity for an invention which leads to tasks striving for the commercial success of the invention. According to this definition, innovativeness in this research is the extent to which an innovation influences the marketing resources, technological resources, skills, knowledge capabilities or strategy of the partners.
is measured in this research, also the psychological conscience of the positive intentions and behaviours of the partner (Sitkin et al, 1993) like for example strive for good results in the cooperation, is taken into account. For the purposes of this research, trust is the belief that a partner will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the partnership, as well as not take unexpected actions that will result in negative outcomes for the partnership.
A partnership is a tailored business relationship based on mutual trust, openness, shared risk and shared rewards that results in better business performance than would be achieved by the partners working in the absence of the partnership (Lambert, Emmelhainz and Gardner, 1999). One of the forms is the cross-sector partnership. For the purposes of this research, effectiveness of these cross-sector partnerships is the fundamental aspect to determine success of such partnerships. The Business Dictionary defines effectiveness as the degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent to which targeted problems are resolved. According to Berkowitz (2007) effective partnerships offer a host of benefits that include information sharing, joint investigations, specialized training and additional resources. For the purposes of this study, the variable ‘effectiveness’ has been operationalized as a construct including the subcategories ‘output effectiveness’, ‘quality effectiveness’, ‘planning and organization effectiveness’, ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’ and ‘cooperation effectiveness’. The following theoretical discussion, and the subsequent operationalization of ‘effectiveness’, are based on the effectiveness scales of Manz and Sims (1987), Ancona and Caldwell (1992), Cox (1995) and Pearce and Sims (2002).
IV. Literature Review Contract completeness and partnership effectiveness
Governance mechanisms are safeguards and act to minimize conflicts of interest and are designed to guide behaviour towards desired objectives of the partnership (Williamson, 1985), in the sense that writing down formal appointments decreases the asymmetric information problems between partners caused by effort aversion, different goals and different time horizons. Contracts can be formal mechanisms that serve as administrative or symbolic substitutes for trust. This is especially applicable in situations where personal contact is not always feasible and trust not always available, like in cross-sector partnerships (Zucker, 1986). Therefore, the expectation is that contracts contribute ‘planning and organization effectiveness’ and ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’.
Effective planning and organization encompasses the degree of complying the goals, strategies and actions to ensure the partnerships survival and growth. These objectives comply more easily if they are described in more detail. More complete contracts are more detailed contracts, which describe the whole product, process and situation which require longer periods of writing (Gifford, 1999). According to Peters (1997) contracts are complete in the sense that the value of the contract to any trader, who accepts it, is determined entirely by the terms of the contract.
H1a: Contract completeness increases the planning and organization effectiveness (PE) of partnerships.
The subcategory ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’ consist of all the aspects of partner interaction and contact between members of the partnership. The effectiveness depends on the frequencies of contact, the communication method, and the skills of the partner like listening, asserting and persuading. Contracts can possibly influence this communication effectiveness because of the described desired directions and the decrease of the described asymmetric information problems (Gallini & Wright, 1990).
Beside this, contracts are a communicative method to structure objectives and verifiable information and use that information as a performance measure system, which also will improve the ‘quality effectiveness’. ‘Quality effectiveness’ is the extent to which leading and operating activities, aimed at continually improving performance, fulfils its intended purpose (Cua, McKone & Schroeder, 2001). The advantage of registering information in contracts is that the performance and the value drivers can be measured in a formal way.
H1c: Contract completeness increases the quality effectiveness (QE) of partnerships.
As a result of this measurement system, partners can make their decisions more rapidly and take the right actions easier, which assured more results. This possibly causes an expansion of the results and outcomes of the partnership, the so-called subcategory ‘output effectiveness’. Also the agency theory, one of the most important theoretical paradigms in management and business studies, is focused on deriving optimal incentive contracts in various control environments to create ‘output effectiveness’ (Indjejikian 1999; Lambert 2001).
H1d: Contract completeness increases the output effectiveness (OE) of partnerships.
According to the expectations, the cooperation between partners will also be better. As a result of the signed up responsibilities, tasks and activities, partners know what they can expect and plan the exchange promises more easily. So, the ‘cooperation effectiveness’ will possibly also contribute by contract completeness.
H1e: Contract completeness increases the cooperation effectiveness (CE) of partnerships.
Innovativeness and partnership effectiveness
of the success of the partnership, namely degree to which aims are achieved. Elche and Gonzalez (2008) stated that innovative decisions allow organizations to increase their output performance. This is studied in a case with two groups, one with a high intensity of innovations and one with a low intensity of innovations. The first had a more direct and statistically justified relation between innovation activities and group results.
Furthermore, McKinsey (2009) assumed that market growth, customer satisfaction and meeting new target groups are the three most attentive results of innovation management. Also Stata (1989) and Geisendorf (2009) proclaimed that the application of innovative ideas and learning opportunities improves the performance and effectiveness of partnerships. A contribution of ‘innovativeness’ on ‘output effectiveness’ is expected based on these theories.
H2a: Innovativeness increases the output effectiveness (OE) of partnerships.
An innovative organization needs to be continuously proactive in exploring new opportunities for innovation. They need to have interactive learning by doing processes which needs to be little structured when several partners are involved. Strategies, systems and innovation plans can increase the generation of creative ideas and ensure a more structured implementation. Lewin (1947) introduced the well-known three phase’s model for change and / or innovation planning; unfreezing, moving and refreezing. Also Van der Ven (1980) addressed that innovation success is dependent on the implementation of a Program Planning Model (PPM). When organizations are more innovative, this kind of planning methods will increase, so a rise of the planning and organization effectiveness is expected.
H2b: Innovativeness increases the planning and organization effectiveness (PE) of partnerships.
Innovations do not only create performance results and profit maximization; it also creates an intelligent learning process. It is also the discovery of new and better products or services and the formation of new preferences (Reati, 1994). The importance of an innovation is the extent to which the innovation is connected with improved changes in the relative valuations (Wijnberg, 2004). Because of these improved changes and better results, the ‘quality effectiveness’ will probably be higher as a consequence of innovation.
Innovation is no longer viewed as solely stimulated through a burst of creativity by a talented individual, but is defined as a process among people, structures and interaction processes (Agrell & Gustafson, 1994). To be a creative thinker in the intellectual sense is not enough. To help foster continuous improvements and thus to create effectiveness, the partners will manage their interactive learning and knowledge acquisition (Inkpen, 1998). Through create these unique learning opportunities cross-sector partnerships need to invest in communication skills. Florida (2002) argued that, more than other general investments, the recruitment of creative and social labour force for innovations are the main factor of the success of the interactive learning processes. As a result of these interactive dynamic processes among people the ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’ will be enhanced.
H2d: Innovativeness increases the interpersonal communication effectiveness (IE) of partnerships.
Hitt, Hoskinsson, Ireland and Harrison (1991) and Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) addressed the role of innovation as a motive for mergers, partnerships and acquisitions. These co-operations are found to be increasingly used to absorb complementary external capabilities needed to complete innovations successfully. So, as a result of the innovative performance of the partner the cooperation effectiveness will possibly rise.
H2e: Innovativeness increases the cooperation effectiveness (CE) of partnerships.
Trust and partnership effectiveness
for the partnership. Klein and Rai (2009) suggest that trust creates strategic information flows which can improve partnership-specific performance outcomes, like productivity, effectiveness, cost reductions and better qualitative assets management.
H3a: Trust increases the output effectiveness (OE) of partnerships.
As mentioned before, a tight trustful relationship between partners is a condition for an effective partnership. To create these close relationships, partners need to move towards a state of embeddedness, in other words, a state where the economic activity is embedded in ongoing personal social ties (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). These ties are responsible for the creation of social networks and the transmission of information and gain a unique access to external resources (Granovetter, 1973). Also Schumpeter (1951) used the concept embeddedness to describe how these social structures positively effect the economic position and effectiveness of an organization. Granovetter (1985) extends his reasoning about effectiveness to the issue of trust as an influencing factor to increase these embedded social ties. Trust is crucial for the effectiveness of the partnership because partners will plan and organize more targeted long term actions because of the belief that their partners will not act opportunistically. This is because people base their choices on past successful interactions with partners and continue to deal with those they trust. Based on these statements the expectation is that there is a relationship between trust and the effectiveness subcategory ‘planning and organization effectiveness’.
H3b: Trust increases the planning and organization effectiveness (PE) of partnerships.
A fundamental aspect to create trust can be well-defined shared purposes and right human conditions, like for example a similar willingness to reach goals and a similar motivation for innovation and implementation of the combined vision. Incorporated communication and information processes are important to support these aspects and to maintain a trustful partnership. Otherwise, incorporated communication and information processes will growth as a result of mutual confidence. Earlier research shows that trust is the focal determinant to encourage employees to communicate in a social exchange relationship (Wasko & Faraj, 2005; Wei-Li, Chien-Hsin, Bi-Fen & Ryh-Song, 2009). Therefore, this research measured the possible relations between trust and ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’.
According to Miles and Snow (1986) partnerships with intensive communication flows have more experimentation and learning capabilities and bridge traditional organization boundaries. A famous sentence of Peter Senge about knowledge management supports this finding; ‘Sharing knowledge occurs when people are genuinely interested in helping one another develop new capacities for action; it is about creating learning processes’. Partnerships are highly evolutionary and need to go through interactive cycles of learning, re-evaluation and readjustment to be effective (Doz, 1996). According to these theories this study supposes an influence of trust on ‘quality effectiveness’.
H3d: Trust increases the quality effectiveness (QE) of partnerships.
Steyn and Kahn (1990) and Stasser, Stewart and Wittenbaum (1995) proclaim that partners can increase their cooperation effectiveness when they share their unique knowledge and coordinate their information processes as a result of interpersonal trust. On the other hand, existing research of Stasser et al. (1995) concluded that when relations can benefit from pooling partners’ unique knowledge, they often do not benefit because information is held by only one partner. Distrust between partners can be an antecedent of this, due to drawing the partners’ intention to be reliable and honest in doubt. In other words; distrust decreases knowledge and information sharing and thus the effectiveness of the cooperation.
H3e: Trust increases the cooperation effectiveness (CE) of partnerships.
Innovativeness as moderator
A comparison can be made between partnerships with a more complete contract and an efficient mechanistic organization (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Both represent a bureaucratic form of organization with high levels of standardization, formalization and specialization. These features of standardization impede the process of adjustment to the dynamic industry (Adler, Goldoftas, Levine, 1999). When the partners in a cross-sector partnership have a higher degree of contract completeness, changes in strategies, plans and decision are more difficult. According to Sharfman and Dean (1997) unless the decision-making process itself is flexible, it is unlikely the organization can be flexible enough to adapt to changes. Flexibility is of great importance for organizations in unstable environments, like cross-sector partnerships, which fit better with more flexible and less tightly structured task designs Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006).
Organizations in more stable environments use this predictability by structuring, while organizations in unstable and dynamic environments seek a flexible structure to cope with uncertainty via innovation and adaption. A higher degree of contract completeness gives the partners a strict direction in the future with less flexibility, therefore innovation can be problematic. Based on these theories, the following hypothesis is drawn up.
H4: Innovativeness moderates the positive relation between contract completeness and partnership effectiveness, in sense that a high amount of innovativeness weakens this relation and that a low amount of innovativeness reinforces this relation.
Trust as a moderato
Vlaar, van den Bosch and Volberda (2007) proclaimed that contracts loose their administrative function as a result of trust. This is because partners in trustful corporations make and evaluate their appointments more obviously as a result of the frequent verbal, face to face or written communication. Furthermore, Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger (2008) investigated that market participants with high general trust will be less likely to adopt formal contracts to control social uncertainty than market participants with low general trust. Following Mohr et al. (1994), this contract rejection can arise due to fear of social relation damage. Contractual clauses may signal distrust and reduce individuals’ willingness to cooperate (Sitkin et al. 1993). The adoption of legalistic remedies as impersonal substitutes for trust like formal rules, institutionalized mechanisms and contracts are frequently ineffective (Granovetter, 1985) and decrease the intrinsic motivation embodied in a committed relationship (Fehr & Gächter, 2000).
These theories pointed out that when trust between the partners is high, the positive relation between contract completeness and effectiveness will be weaker. This means that the degree of writing down formal appointments can be lower with the same level of partnership effectiveness in a trustful relationship. Also, when there is a lack of trust, contract completeness will be more necessary to create the same level of effectiveness.
In the relations where distrust is presented, the partners will not achieve its potential and partners will be tempted to act in their own best interest. If one of the partners acts opportunistically, the relationship will suffer and results into negative effectiveness (Mohr et al, 1994). In this situation, contracts can be used as a legalistic mechanism, which serves as a symbolic substitute for trust (Zucker, 1986). Mesquita and Brush (2008) proclaimed that when the level of trust is eliminated, contracts need to be more complete to effectively govern them. This is because more complete contracts are more customized, complex and anticipate with accuracy the many contingencies which may arise during the relationship. Based on the discussion above, the following hypothesis is formulated.
Innovativeness Contract Completeness
Partnership Effectiveness
Trust
OE QE PE IE CE
I T
Output Effectiveness Planning and Organization Effectiveness
Cooperation Effectiveness
Quality Effectiveness Interpersonal Communication Effectiveness CC H1d H1c H1a H1b H1e H4 H5 H3a H3d H3b H3c H3e H2a H2c H2b H2d H2e
Based on the hypothesis above, this study has two aims. The first aim is to determine the influence of contract completeness, innovativeness and trust on the effectiveness categories of partnerships. These relationships will be studied considering five components of partnership effectiveness, namely output, quality, planning and organization, interpersonal communication and cooperation effectiveness. The second aim is to investigate the impacts of innovativeness and trust on this relation. Figure 1 depicts the conceptual framework of this study.
V. Methodology Procedure
In order to test the previous hypotheses, interviews and questionnaires are conducted at the Dutch NGO ICCO, an organization for development cooperation. The sample consist of partnerships who work together to accomplish a better economic position for people in developing countries by supporting economic activities that are sustainable and fair. To get an overview of the relevant worldwide cross-sector partnerships coordinated by the department Sustainable Fair Economic Development (SFED), a report of these complex composed partnerships was created from the ICCO’ management and information system. The following subjects and aspects are measured; name of the partnership and partners, the responsible officials, project numbers, countries, sectors, goals, starting dates and presence or absence of contracts. This report provided 48 partnerships as potential candidates for the research. An introduction letter and subsequent presentation for each partnership informed the potential respondents about the nature of the research.
Participants
After the selection process, 26 partnerships out of the 48 partnerships are chosen as suitable for this research. The remaining 26 partnerships are located in 42 different countries. From this 26 partnerships, 16 partners and ICCO employees responded to the questionnaire (response rate: 61.53%). 51 employees involved at these 16 partnerships are approached to take part in the survey, from which 38 officials work for ICCO and 13 officials work in business organizations. From this amount, 21 ICCO employees (response rate 55.26%) and 4 business partners (response rate: 30.77%) have completed the questionnaire. With 25 out of the 51 involved officials the total response rate is 49.02%. There were 14 male participants (56%) and 11 female participants (44%) with an age ranging from 27 till 59 years old (M = 45.03) (table 1). 8% of this respondents has a HBO degree and 92% is WO graduated.
Table 1 Percentage response rate male / female
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent Male 14 56,0 56,0 56,0 Female 11 44,0 44,0 100,0 Valid Total 25 100,0 100,0 Instruments
Contract completeness. For the variable contract completeness a contract study and a clause research were conducted. By counting the different contract aspects the answer categories are, after recoding, classified into a five point Likert scale, going from more incomplete contracts (1) to more complete contracts (5).
interrelationships that exist among a large amount of variables. The rotated component matrix showed that four subgroups could be distinguished (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). It analyzed, with the help of correlations, in which degree the variables could be classified into groups (divergent and convergent validity). Items with high cross load were removed. The questions are coupled on group level, on relational level and on individual level, like ‘in this partnership …’, ‘the partner…’ and ‘I trust…’. The answer categories have a five point scale, going from entirely disagree (1) till entirely agree (5). The Cronbach’s α for this scale is .94, which is high. The Cronbach’s alpha analyzes whether the different items all measure the same construct and gives the degree of internal consistency (reliability). A valid alpha needs to be higher than .60.
Innovativeness. By comparing the factor structures of the different innovativeness items of Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (2005), the following items are adapted for this research; ‘the partner works closely with the target group in exploring and developing new concepts’, ‘there is a supportive climate to communicate about new ideas and improvements’, ‘the partners have an effective mechanism for managing process change from idea through a successful implementation of that idea’ and ‘the partner provides time and resources for employees to generate, share, exchange and experiment innovative ideas and solutions’. The Cronbach’s α for innovativeness is .85, which is acceptable.
Table 2 Components and factor analysis variables
Factor
1 2 3
Trust
The partner acts completely according the shared goals .92 -.08 .12
I trusted that partners’ knowledge about the project was credible .90 -.07 .18 I confidently rely on the information that other partners bring to the discussion .89 -.16 .13 I trust the partner completely that he comply his appointments .92 .02 -.14
I have much faith in the partners’ expertise .79 -.36 .03
The partner does everything to reach the shared goals .89 .06 -.15
The partner is entirely reliable, solid and incorrupt .94 -.03 -.21
Output effectiveness
The partner delivers its commitments on time .78 .01 -.06
The partner is highly effective at idea generation .75 -.15 -.46
The partner is highly effective at implementing solutions .47 -.75 -.36 Quality effectiveness
The quality of the output is very high .65 .46 -.48
We use evaluation formats and monitor the quality of processes continually .76 -.51 -.11 There is a effective way of learning from the process evaluations .46 -.72 .06 Organizing and planning effectiveness
The partner develops workable plans .86 -.20 .31
The partner develops detailed plans .80 -.08 .12
Interpersonal communication effectiveness
The partners communicate their activity progress recurrently. .68 .46 0.8 The partners communicate with a minimum of once a year their results to stakeholders .58 -.59 .42 The partners show sufficiently that solving problems is important .65 -.58 -.32 The partners respect each others’ visions, approaches and opinions .58 .29 -.69 Cooperation Effectiveness
The partnership is effective .75 -.10 -.27
Cooperation goes exactly this way positive such as I had expected in advance .81 .01 -.05
The partnership has progression .59 .52 -.03
The partnership is successful .71 .18 -.58
Innovativeness
The partner works closely with the target group in exploring and developing new concepts .87 -.16 -.24 There is a supportive climate to communicate about new ideas and improvements .62 .53 -.36 The partners have effective mechanism for managing process change from idea through successful
implementation .58 -.36 -52
The partner provides time and resources for employees to generate, share/exchange and experiment
innovative ideas/solutions .56 .15 .67
Data analysis
In order to assess the impact of contract completeness on the different aspects of effectiveness, a moderated hierarchical multiple regression analysis is executed. Before starting the regression analysis, the scale average of the variables was calculated and standardized. Then the three steps of the regression analysis were completed. The control variables -‘lifetime partnership in years’ and ‘involvement at the partnership in years’- were imported in the first step of the analysis. The predictors were standardized with z-transformations to prevent multi-co-linearity problems between predictors and their products. The standardized predictors ‘trust / innovativeness’ and ‘contract completeness’ were entered into the second step. In the third step the product of the standardized independent and the moderator variable, the so called interaction term, was inserted. The regression analysis is repeated for both moderators and for all of the five dependent sub variables of effectiveness.
VI. Results Correlations and descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables of the conceptual model of this research. In line with expectations, the control variable ‘duration of the partnership in years’ correlates significantly β positive with ‘organizational and planning effectiveness’ (r = .46, p < .05). This indicates that the longer the partnership exists, the more effective the organizational and planning processes are, including for example binding appointments between partners. The first hypothesis, for which the correlation between ‘contract completeness’ and the aspects of partnership effectiveness is measured, is not supported by the sample (r = .08, -.04, .05, -.10, .11, p < n.s.).
aspects of effectiveness are also significant β, like between ‘quality effectiveness and organization’ and ‘planning effectiveness’ (r = .68, p < .01), between ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’ and ‘organization and planning effectiveness’ (r = .71, p < .01), between ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’ and ‘cooperation effectiveness’ (r = .49, p < .05) and the correlation between ‘interpersonal communication effectiveness’ and ‘cooperation effectiveness’ (r = .63, p < .01). This correlation overview indicates also the significant β relations between ‘output effectiveness’ and the other effectiveness aspects (r = .59, p < .01, r = .65, p < .01, r = .55, p < .01, r = .63, p < .05). This indicates that there is a connection between ‘developing workable detailed plans’ (organization and planning effectiveness), complying appointments / implementing solutions (output effectiveness) and high quality processes (quality effectiveness). Hypothesis 3 can be rejected because none of the effectiveness variables are positively significant β correlated with trust.
Table 3 Results Pearson Correlation Analysis
Testing the hypothesis
In order to test the main and interactive effects of ‘contract completeness’, ‘trust’ and ‘innovativeness’ on the different subcategories of effectiveness, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis is conducted (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). In table 4, using ‘output effectiveness’ as dependent variable (step 1), ‘contract completeness’ and ‘innovativeness’ are added to the model (step 2), followed by their interaction term (step 3). After this first table all the other aspects of effectiveness are used as dependent
Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Duration partnership in years
2 Complicity in years -.08 3 Innovativeness -.10 .27 4 Trust .24 .05 .01 5 Contract completeness -.22 -.25 .11 .24 6 Output Effectiveness .15 .17 .61 ** .05 .10 7 Quality Effectiveness .43 .35 .49 * .00 .05 .59 ** 8 Organization Effectiveness .46 * .02 .46 * -.00 .08 .65 ** .68 ** 9 Interpersonal Effectiveness .43 .09 .57 ** .34 -.04 .55 ** .41 .71 ** 10 Cooperation Effectiveness .16 .44 .67 ** .21 .11 .52 * .63 .49 * .63 **
variables in the first step (tables 5 till 8). The tables 9 till 13 reflect the results of a separate analysis in which the variable ‘trust’ is applied as the independent variable.
Table 4 Results of Regression Analyses for Output Effectiveness – Innovativeness Output Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .40 .29 .20 Complicity in years .10 -.00 .14
2 Contract completeness -.15 -.03
Innovativeness .62* .42
3 Complete contr * Innovativeness .39
R2 .20 .54* .64
∆R2 .20 .34* .09
*p < .05 **p < .01
Table 5 Results of Regression Analyses for Quality Effectiveness – Innovativeness Quality Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .62* .54* .45 Complicity in years .15 .11 .42
2 Contract completeness .05 .16
Innovativeness .23 -.05
3 Complete contr * Innovativeness .50
R2 .49* .53 .69
∆R2 .49* .05 .15
Table 6 Results of Regression Analyses for Organization and Planning Effectiveness – Innovativeness Organization and Planning Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .38 .28 .24 Complicity in years -.28 -.40 -.31
2 Contract completeness -.05 -.02
Innovativeness .55* .47
3 Complete contr * Innovativeness .16
R2 .12 .39 .40
∆R2 .13 .26 .02
*p < .05 **p < .01
Table 7 Results of Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Communication Effectiveness – Innovativeness Interpersonal communication Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .23 .08 .10 Complicity in years .17 .05 .00
2 Contract completeness .04 .03
Innovativeness .63** .67 *
3 Complete contr * Innovativeness -.08
R2 .12 .47** .47
∆R2 .12 .35** .00
*p < .05 **p < .01
Table 8 Results of Regression Analyses for Cooperation Effectiveness – Innovativeness Cooperation Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .44 .23 .23 Complicity in years .25 .14 .14
2 Contract completeness .21 .21
Innovativeness .64** .64 *
After controlling the covariates in the tables 5 till 8, only table 5 shows significance in step 1 (∆R2 = .49; ∆F = 6.15, p <.05). On the other hand tables 4, 7 and 8 have significant effects after adding contract completeness and innovativeness in step 2 (∆R2 = .34; ∆F = 4.06, p <.05; ∆R2 = .35; ∆F = 2.64, p <.01; ∆R2 = .40; ∆F = 8.67, p <.01). None of the tables present significant in step 3, after the interaction.
Table 9 Results of Regression Analyses for Output Effectiveness - Trust Output Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .40 .42 .48 Complicity in years .10 .12 .13
2 Contract completeness -.09 -.21
Trust -.05 .13
3 Contract completeness * Trust -.30
R2 .20 .21 .24
∆R2 .20 .01 .03
*p < .05 **p < .01
Table 10 Results of Regression Analyses for Quality Effectiveness - Trust Quality Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .62* .68* .71 * Complicity in years .15 .29 .26
2 Contract completeness .04 .00
Trust -.34 -24
3 Contract completeness * Trust -14
R2 .49* .58 .58
∆R2 .49* .09 .01
Table 11 Results of Regression Analyses for Organization and Planning Effectiveness – Trust Organization and Planning Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .38 .37 .44 Complicity in years -.28 -.29 -.35
2 Contract completeness .03 -.08
Trust .05 .31
3 Contract completeness * Trust -.37
R2 .13 .13 .18
∆R2 .13 .00 .06
*p < .05 **p < .01
Table 12 Results of Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Communication Effectiveness – Trust Interpersonal communication Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .23 .12 .22 Complicity in years .17 .09 -.01
2 Contract completeness .17 .02
Trust .37 .73
3 Contract completeness * Trust -.54
R2 .12 .23 .36
∆R2 .12 .12 .13
*p < .05 **p < .01
Table 13 Results of Regression Analyses for Cooperation Effectiveness – Trust Cooperation Effectiveness
Variables 1 2 3
1 Duration partnership in years .43 .33 .54 ** Complicity in years .23 .25 .17
2 Contract completeness .28 .09
Trust .15 .65 **
3 Contract completeness * Trust -.89 **
R2 .33 .40 .81 **
∆R2 .33 .08 .41 **
After controlling the covariates in the tables 9 till 13, only table 10 shows significance in step 1 (∆R2 = .49; ∆F = 6.15, p <.05). Besides this, it can be concluded that none of the tables remains significance in step 2 after adding the variables ‘contract completeness’ and ‘trust’. In table 13 there is a significant effect in the third step and also in the interaction step (∆R2 = .41; ∆F = 24.01, p <.01).
Hypothesis 1. Out of the hierarchical regression analysis results, a hypothesis adoption or rejection can be made. Hypothesis H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d and H1e state the positive influence of ‘contract completeness’ on the different aspects of cross-sector ‘partnership effectiveness’. The results show that this influence did not apply to all the compositions of ‘partnership effectiveness’ (b = -.05, -.02, .03, -.08, -.04, .03, .17, .02, .05, .16, .04, .00, -.15, -.03, -.09, -.21, p < n.s.) but only hypothesis H1e with the composition ‘cooperation effectiveness’ (b = .21, .21, .28, .09, p < n.s.). Because the results are not significant, hypothesis 1 is not confirmed.
Figure 2 Interaction - Effectiveness and contract completeness for low and high innovative partnerships
Hypothesis 3. Hierarchical regression analysis is employed here as well. The influence of ‘trust’ on the ‘partnership effectiveness’ subcategories needed to be assessed to test the hypothesis H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d and H3e. Just like in the first hypothesis, the influence only applies to ‘cooperation effectiveness’ (b = .65, t = 3.61, p > .01), which is significant. Figure 3 outlines this relation that indicates that a high measure of ‘trust’ will have a higher degree of ‘cooperation effectiveness’ of partnerships and low ‘trust’ relationships will have a lower degree of ‘cooperation effectiveness’, confirming hypothesis H3e.
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis suggests that ‘innovativeness’ should moderates the relation between ‘contract completeness’ and the of ‘partnership effectiveness’ in sense that a high amount of ‘innovativeness’ weakens this relation and that a low amount of ‘innovativeness’ reinforces this relation. However, the results show no interaction effect (b = -.00, t = -.01, p < n.s.). Hypothesis 4 is not confirmed.
(b = -.89, t = - 4.90, p < .01). A graph of this relation is displayed in figure 3, with the negative effect of high ‘trust’ and a positive effect of low ‘trust’. As the graph figures, hypothesis 5 is confirmed.
Figure 3 Interaction - cooperation effectiveness and contract completeness with low and high trust relationships
VII. Discussion and Conclusion Research findings
It can be concluded that this study fails to discover a clear significant relationship between ‘contract completeness’ and ‘partnership effectiveness’, as mentioned in hypothesis 1. Some ‘effectiveness’ aspects measures a small negative influence and some aspects measures a small positive influence of ‘contract completeness’. According to Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1995), Uzzi (1997), Poppo et al. (2002), Goo et al. (2009) the expectation was that the use of formal contracts support the partnership as a result of the governance mechanism function of a contract. Other authors like Granovetter (1985), More et al. (1993), Sitkin et al. (1993), Gulati (1995), Fehr et al. (2000) and Jap and Ganesan (2000) argued that contracts may signal distrust of the exchange partner and decreases the partnership effectiveness. Another possible declaration for the negative influence is the presence of transaction costs for negotiating and writing contracts (Eggertsson, 1990). This study confirms both statements, so therefore these conflicting views indicate a need for more research.
The results tables above interprets the significant positive effect of ‘innovativeness’ on four of the ‘effectiveness’ subcategories as is stated in hypotheses 2. This prediction receives only partial support. Hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2d and H2e are supported by the data, in contrast to hypothesis H2c. In majority, this means that when partners develop product-, process-, and / or system improvements, the common objectives should be achieved faster. These results are consistent with previous studies which concluded that innovations make an organization more effective (Elche et al, 2008; McKinsey, 2009; Stata, 1989).
which is also in consensus with the results of the study done by Granovetter (1985). On the other hand, ‘quality effectiveness’ is in this research not caused by ‘trust’. While most organization theorists hold on to the believe that trust plays a significant role in economic behaviour, economic theorists as Petersen and Rajan (1994) maintain that trust minimally affects economic transacting or creates inefficiencies by shielding the transaction from the market. This possibly causes the decrease in the ‘quality effectiveness’.
Furthermore, the results indicate no ‘innovativeness’ interaction on the relation between ‘contract completeness’ and ‘partnership effectiveness’, so hypothesis 4 is not confirmed. Consistent with Kozlowski et al. (2006) this study predicts that a higher degree of ‘contract completeness’ causes less flexibility, which makes innovations more problematic. As a result of that, organizations need to avoid formal contracts if they want to be innovative. Surprisingly, the results show no negative and no positive effect (b = -.00, p < n.s.). A contradicted argument of this prediction comes from the study of Reichman and Franklin (1999). They found that innovation is being augmented by an increase in collaborative agreements since firms seek to access innovation from a wide variety of organizations. Dealing with Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is a critical aspect in these relations and contracts become more important to safeguard these rights. These two contradicted statements can be a possible explanation for the fact that innovativeness does not influence the success of contracts positively or negatively in this study.
determinant of ‘partnership effectiveness’ than ‘contract completeness’ and ‘trust’ (rOE = .62, p < .05; rPE = .55, p < .05; rIE = .63, p < .01; rCE = .64, p <.01).
Strengths, limitations and future research
Out of the remaining 26 selected partnerships, located in 42 countries, 16 partners and ICCO employees responded to the questionnaire. The response rate of 61.53% is relatively high and can be recommended as a strong point. Another strong aspect of this study is the sector diversity of the partnerships in the sample. Also, the variation in countries and business organizations is remarkable. Collecting data from different cultures and contexts have created a more reliable representation of all the partnerships and might extend the generalizability of the results. Another strong aspect of this research is the adaption of three different measure levels (partnership, relational individual) to overcome the problem of common method bias. Many studies struggled with the problem of common method bias; the divergence between observed and true relationships among constructs (Cooper & Schindler, 2005). Furthermore, the strength of this research is the quantity of variables, questions and topics coming up in the interviews and questionnaires. The data include measures of general partnership background, employee characteristics, internal processes, goals, contract management aspects and the MDG contribution of the partnership. Future research can make more analyses and conclusions out of this interesting broad data collection. This study is original in applying and combining economic, business and psychological theories in the development cooperation sector. Research about strategic and business subjects has been done rarely in development cooperation until now; therefore this sector should generate more scientific outcomes about these topics.
the fact that the partnerships are chosen by means of the availability in the Netherlands, rather than chosen at random. This limits the generalizability of the results. Third, self evaluation questions are used to measure some variables. This practice may cause bias due to social desirability, for example partners may overestimate their degree of performance in the total partnership. In future studies an attempt should be made to measure these different constructs more objectively, for example with tangible results like reports and figures. The fourth limitation is that the data gathering took place at one point in time. The data should be more valid when a longitudinal form was used. Longitudinal data permit the measurement of differences or changes in a variable from one period to another, and are used to locate the causes of social phenomena and sleeper effects (Menard, 1991). Another interesting future research could possibility be a study to determine the degree of influence of each ‘effectiveness’ component on the general ‘effectiveness’ variable.
In this research ‘trust’ at least showed a negative influence on the relation between ‘contract completeness’ and ‘partnership effectiveness’. This means that when there is a trustful relationship the completeness of the contract will be less important. It declares nothing about the presence of a contract in general with a minimum amount of clauses. To clarify this, future research should be aimed to test how much influence the presence and absence of contracts has on the partnership effectiveness (instead of the completeness). Future research should determine the break-even-point, thus assess the optimal partnership effectiveness point with the corresponding degree of contract completeness.
Practical implications
contracts’ are legally as valid as a written contracts, but are not very practical (Rousseau, 2005).
Nowadays, a diversity of stakeholders is involved into development cooperation and ICCO strives to operate primary as a ‘broker’. ICCO transformed into a professional intermediary and communicate that role to their environmental surrounding. To prevent against role misunderstandings written contracts should be required. If parties have trouble to foresee the possible contingencies, they need to write contracts that ex-ante specify only the possible contingencies. Because of the available flexibility in the cooperation, needed for innovativeness, contracts in cross-sector partnerships should be less complete. Also the transaction costs contribute to the fact that contracts are incomplete (Williamson, 1998). During the project the partners can re-write and extend the appointments and make the contracts more customized. So, the optimum completeness or incompleteness of a contract depends on the degree of innovativeness and flexibility, the transaction costs and the complexity of the project.
Acknowledgements
I greatly thank A. Engelbertink, I. Orosa Paleo, N. van der Vleuten, A. de Korver, B. Geerlings and P. Veurman for their support during the thesis period. Also many thanks go out to the ICCO employees who participated in this research.
References
Adler, P.S. 2001. Market, Hierarchy and trust: The knowledge economy and the future of capitalism. Organizational Science. 12(2): 215-234.
Agrell, A., & Gustafson, R. 1994. The team climate inventory and group innovation: a psychometric test on a Swedish sample of work groups. Journal of Occupational & Organizational Psychology, 67(2): 143-151.
Ancona, D.G., & Caldwell, D.F. 1992. Bridging the boundary; External process and performance in organizational teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37 (4): 634-665.
Andaleeb, S. S. 1995. Dependence relations and the moderating role of trust: implications for behavioral intentions, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 12(2): 157-173.
Battisti, M. 2009. The Challenges of Cross-sector Partnerships. Journal of Corporate Citizenship. 35: 95-108.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. 1986. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research; conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6): 1173-1182.
Berkowitz, K. N. 2007. The benefits of effective partnerships. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76(10): 1. Chan, V., Musso, C, & Shankar, V. 2008. Assessing Innovation Metrics [online]. Available: http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/McKinsey_Global_Survey_Results_Assessing_innovation_metrics_22 43 [accessed 5 Septembre 2009].
Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. 1983. Applied Multiple Regression/ Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences ( 2nd ed.). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Cooper, D.R., & Schindler, P.S. 2005. Business Research Methods (9th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. Cox, J. F. 1995. The effects of super leadership training on leader behavior, subordinate self-leadership behavior and subordinate citizenship. The Sciences and Engineering, 55(10): 4630.
Cua, K.O., McKone, K.E., Schroeder, R.G. 2001. Relationships between implementation of TQM, JIT and TPM and manufacturing performance. Journal of Operations Management. 19(6): 675-694.
Davenport, T. Prusak, L. 1998. Learn how valuable knowledge is acquired, created, bought and bartered. Australian Library Journal. 47(3): 268-273.
Deinzer, H.T. 1959. Arm’s Length Transactions, Accounting Review, 34(2): 344-346.
Doz, Y.L. 1996. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: initial conditions or learning processes. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 55-83.
Dyer, J.H, & Singh, H. 1998. The relational view; cooperative strategy and sources of inter organizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4): 660-679.
Eggertsson, T. 1990. The role of transaction costs and property rights in economic analysis. European Economic Review. 34(2-3): 450-457.
Eisenhardt, K.M.. 1989. Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of Management Review, 14(4): 532-550.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. 2000. Fairness and Retaliation: The economics of Reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3): 159-181.
Gallini, N.T. & Wright, B.D. 1990. Technology transfer under asymmetric information. Journal of Economics. 21(1): 147-160.
Garcia, R., & Calantone, R. 2002. A Critical Look at Technological Innovation Typology and Innovativeness Terminlogy: A Literature Review. Journal of Product Innovation, 19(2): 110-132.
Gardner, M., Douglas, L., & Knemeyer, A.M. 2004. Supply Chain Partnerships; model validation and implementation. Journal of Business Logistics, 25(2): 21-42.
Gifford, S. 1999. Limited attention and the optimal incompleteness of contracts, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15(2): 468-486.
Goo, J., Kishore, R., Rao, H.R., & Nam, K. 2009. The role of service level agreements in relational management of information technology outsourcing; an empirical study. MIS Quarterly, 33(1): 119-145. Granovetter, M.S. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6): 1360-1380. Granovetter, M.S. 1985. Economic action and social structure; The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 481-510.
Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 85-112.
Hagedoorn, J., Duysters, G. 2002. The effect of mergers and acquisititions on the technological
performance of companies in a high-tech environment. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management. 14(1): 68-85.
Hart, O. 2003. Incomplete contracts and public ownership, remarks, and an application to public- private partnerships. Economic Journal, 113(486): 69-76.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. 2004. Foundation of Incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66(226): 115-138.
Heide, J.B., & John, G. 1988. The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding transaction-specific assets in conventional channels. Journal of Marketing, 52(1): 20-35.
Hitt, M.A. Hoskinsson, E.R. Ireland, J.S., Harrison, J.S. 1991. Effects of acquisitions on R&D inputs and outputs. Academy of Management. 34(1): 693-706.
Indjejikian, R., & Nanda, D. 2003. Reply to: Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 35(3): 437-441.
Inkpen, A.C. 1998. Learning and knowledge acquisition through international strategic alliances. Academy of Management Executive, 12 (4):69-80.
Jap, S.D., Ganesan, S. 2000. Control Mechanisms and the relationship life cycle: Implications for safeguarding specific investments and developing commitment. Journal of marketing research. 37(2): 227-245.
Jones, G.R., George, J.M., Hill. C.W.L. 2000. Contemporary Management. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Klein, B. Crawford, R., Alchian, A. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law & Economics. 21(2): 297-326.
Klein, R., & Rai, A. 2009. Inter-firm strategic information flows in logistics supply chain relationships. Management Information System Quarterly, 33(4): 735-762.
Kozlowski, S.W. J., & Ilgen D.R. 2006. Enhancing the effectiveness of work groups and teams. Psychological science in the public interest, 7(3): 77-124.
Kyvelou, S. & Karaiskou, E. 2006. Urban development through PPPs in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Management of Environmental Quality: an international journal, 17(5): 599-610.
Lambert, R.A. 2001. Contracting Theory and Accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1-3): 3-87.
Lambert, D.M., Emmelhainz, & M.A., & Gardner, J.T. 1996. Developing and Implementing Supply Chain Partnerships. The International Journal of Logistics, 7(2): 1-17.
Lawrence, R.Z., Blanke, J., Doherty, S. & Drzeniek Hanouz, M. 2008. The Global Enabling Trade Report [online]. Available: http://www.weforum.org/documents/getr08_browser/index.html [accessed 11 Novembre 2009]
Lazzarini, S. G., Miller, G.j., & Zenger, T.R. 2008. Dealing with the Paradox of Embeddedness, the role of contracts and trust in facilitating movement out of committed relationships. Organization Science, 19(5): 709-728.
Lewin, K, 1947. Frontier in group dynamics. Human Relations. 1(1): 5-41.
Lewin, K. 2003. Measuring transactive memory systems in the field; Scale development and validation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(4): 587-604.
Manz, C.C., & Sims, H.P. 1987. Leading workers to lead themselves: The external leadership of self-management work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(1): 106-129.
Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., & Schoorman, F.D. 1995. An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3): 709-734.
Menard, S. 1991. Longitudinal Research, Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
Mentzer, J.T., Min, S., & Zacharia, Z.G. 2000. The nature of inter-firm partnering in supply chain management. Journal of retailing, 76, (4): 549-569.
