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The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/45536 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation

Author: Molenmaker, Welmer E.

Title: The (un)willingness to reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation

Issue Date: 2017-01-19

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The (un)willingness to reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation

Welmer E. Molenmaker

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This research was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, Grant No. 404-10-026) awarded to Eric van Dijk and Erik W. de Kwaadsteniet.

Copyright © Welmer E. Molenmaker, 2016 ISBN: 978-94-6182-718-0

Layout and Printing: Off Page, Amsterdam

Photos: Tokyo, September–October 2014, by Welmer E. Molenmaker.

www.wemolenmaker.com

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The (un)willingness to reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van

de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C. J. J. M. Stolker,

volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op donderdag 19 januari 2017

klokke 15:00 uur

door

Welmer Eduard Molenmaker geboren op 10 december 1984

te Obdam

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Promotor

Prof. dr. E. van Dijk

Co-promotor

Dr. E. W. de Kwaadsteniet

Promotiecommissie

Prof. dr. C. K. W. de Dreu Prof. dr. W. W. van Dijk

Prof. dr. I. van Beest Universiteit van Tilburg

Dr. L. B. Mulder Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

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Voor mijn ouders en Eliza

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“I’ve seen things you people wouldn’t believe. (…) All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.”

Roy Batty – Blade Runner

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Chapter 1

General introduction: Why study the willingness to sanction 11 in social dilemmas?

Chapter 2

On the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish 27 non-cooperation: The moderating role of type of social dilemma

Experiment 2.1 33

Experiment 2.2 39

Chapter 3

The impact of personal responsibility on the (un)willingness to punish 47 non-cooperation and reward cooperation

Experiment 3.1 54

Experiment 3.2 60

Experiment 3.3 63

Chapter 4

The willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation 77 before versus after the choice behavior: Sanctioning the past, the present, or the future

Experiment 4.1 84

Experiment 4.2 91

Experiment 4.3 (in footnote) 96

Chapter 5

General discussion 101

Appendices 115

References 127

Summary in Dutch (Nederlandse samenvatting) 151

Acknowledgments (Dankwoord) 159

KLI Dissertation Series 163

Contents

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