COOPERATION IN THE DUTCH CHARITY SECTOR: SOCIAL DILEMMA OR
OPPORTUNITY?
Master thesis, MscHRM, specialization Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Management and Organization
January 5, 2011 Marinca Huisman Studentnumber: 1585312 S. van Haringhouckstraat 18 8701 DZ Bolsward Tel.: +31 (0)6-24 65 24 96 E-mail: marinca@zonnet.nl Supervisor university: L.B. Mulder
Abstract:
1. Table of contents
2. INTRODUCTION ... 5
§2.1 Overview of the Dutch Charity Sector ... 5
§2.2 Social Dilemmas in the Dutch Charity Sector ... 6
3. THEORY ... 9
§3.1 Social Identity of the Subgroup... 9
§3.2 Trust in the Other Group ... 10
§3.3 Environmental Uncertainty ... 11
§3.4 Power and Status ... 12
§3.5 Communication ... 13
4. METHODS ... 14
§4.1 Sampling and Recruitment ... 14
§4.2 Procedure ... 15
5. RESULTS ... 16
§5.1 General Results on Charities’ Intent to Cooperate ... 16
§5.2 Social Identity ... 18
§5.3 Trust ... 20
§5.4 Environmental Uncertainty ... 24
§5.5 Power and Status ... 27
§5.6 Communication ... 30
§5.7 Additional variables ... 31
6. DISCUSSION ... 33
§6.1 Discussion of Results ... 34
§6.2 Limitations & Further Research ... 39
7. CONCLUSION ... 40
8. REFERENCES ... 41
2. INTRODUCTION
Many situations in this society are characterized by people making choices between either acting in their own or acting in general interest. For instance, going to work by public transport/ bicycle to spare the environment and limit traffic jams or going to work in one‘s own car. These situations are called social dilemmas. Social dilemmas come in many shapes and volumes and are studied by various disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, mathematics, ecology and economics. Insights derived from this research show that different processes play a part in the decision to act in group interest (cooperate), or to act in one‘s own interest (defect). For example, trust in other‘s cooperation intentions or a long-range versus a short-range perspective. In this thesis, the role of these decision-making processes will be explored in the Dutch charity sector.
§2.1 Overview of the Dutch Charity Sector
The Dutch charity sector is a very diverse sector. Over 120 organizations are united in the charity branch organization ‗Vereniging Fondswervende Instellingen‘, ranging from health organizations to international aid to environmental organizations. The total number of organizations in the Dutch charity sector is even higher, as there are many small organizations not joined in the branch organization. Within this sector, a special department is installed for Dutch health organizations within the charity sector: ‗Samenwerkende Gezondheidsfondsen‘ (SGF). This collaboration of multiple health organizations improves knowledge sharing and expertise among health charities and discusses general (transcending) topics. The SGF was founded in 2002 and consists of 18 health foundations, annually raising a combined 180 million euros. The SGF enhances cooperation with the installation of 4 sub-groups, discussing the topics ‗scientific research‘, ‗prevention‘ and ‗quality of life for patients with certain diseases‘. Collaboration efforts are currently discussed, although the actual realization of initiatives is in progress.
known example being the ‗LekkerLangLeven‘ campaign. This collaboration between Nierstichting, Hartstichting and Diabetes Fonds is established to fight comorbidity. Moreover, the health sector also collaborates with many stakeholders, each with their own interests, for instance patient organizations and medical professionals. The charity sector is a complex sector where many actors are involved and many factors can influence the decision to collaborate or defect. To gain more insight in the different situations that can pose a social dilemma for Dutch charities, these situations will be explored in the next paragraph.
§2.2 Social Dilemmas in the Dutch Charity Sector
A well-known example of a social dilemma is expressed by Hardin (1968) in ‗The drama of the commons‘. His example entails a group of herdsmen on a shared piece of land. As rational beings, the herdsmen try to maximize their own gain by purchasing an extra piece of cattle. However, when all herdsmen purchase an extra piece of cattle, soon the land will be exhausted, making all the herdsmen suffer. From this example, it is important to draw two interferences. Firstly, ―the social pay-off to each individual for defecting behaviour is higher than the pay-off for cooperative behaviour, regardless what others do. And secondly, all individuals in society receive a lower pay-off if all defect than if all cooperate‖ (Dawes, 1980: 170).
This was demonstrated through sharpened legislation from the Dutch government. The Dutch population was getting tired of being asked for time and money by commercial and non-commercial agencies. Therefore, renewed legislation installed a register where Dutch citizens could subscribe to prevent organizations from calling them. Companies that did not consult the register and used telemarketing on people enlisted in the register were penalized. Currently, 5.217.199 phone numbers are registered.1 Hence, irritation, or perhaps lack of
goodwill, is definitely present in the Dutch population.
When Dutch charity organizations target potential donors or volunteers too often without the chance to let irritation recover, the whole sector suffers, as annoyance and fatigue increases in the Dutch population. Moreover, goodwill decreases, making people less inclined to provide funds and attention for charity. It may be individually rational for a charity organization to gather as much time and money as possible, but the resource pool collapses if organizations reap more items than the replenishment rate of the pool (Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000).
Furthermore, patients frequently suffer from multiple diseases and are prone to information overload due to the many communication efforts by charities and other (internet) sources available. Finally, the care standards developed for patients and health professionals could in high quantities cause more confusion than comprehension.
All in all, charities benefit by individually targeting as many people as possible. However, if all charities individually optimise their gains by targeting large numbers of the Dutch population, the whole sector possibly suffers and resources might get exhausted.
The advantages of working together became apparent when charities cooperated on one fundraising instrument: the inheritances. Charities noticed that efficiency could be improved by doing the finalization of transactions together. As has been demonstrated by Chua (2003), charities could develop economies of scale by collaborating. Moreover, cooperation between charities avoids excessive and possibly wasteful competition for funds (Chua, 2003).
In addition, Rose-Ackerman (1980) explains cooperation provides advantages for charities with regard to the societal value of one‘s gift. Risk-adverse donors may refrain from giving when they do not know what the gift produces for society. Donors may try to seek out information about various charities, but in practice this is often costly. Hence donors may prefer to give the difficult task of allocating funds among charities to an overall organization. When this overall organization also monitors the donations, the donor obtains a certain ‗ease of giving‘. This could partly explain the high success rate of the Dutch national lotteries (e.g. Postcode Loterij). And donors still have a say in how their money is spent as they can earmark certain causes. Bilodeau (1992) suggested that charities could even trade off a more desirable mix of services for higher contributions.
Nevertheless, in practice this strategy has not been applied yet. Raising funds is the charities‘ exclusive individual domain. And also in the fields of scientific research, communication and prevention charity organizations do not (always) work together this way. These observations raised the question: what makes charity foundations aim for the maximization of their own gains? And what makes charity organizations maximize their common interest?
Consequently, an in-depth look will be taken to disentangle the variables that enhance or deter cooperation amongst different Dutch charity organizations. The main research question in this Master thesis is:
To what extent do the variables influencing the decision-making processes in social dilemmas play a part in the decision for Dutch charity organizations to collaborate?
3. THEORY
In answering this question five variables which are known to have an effect on cooperation rates in social dilemmas are selected; the social identity of the sub group, trust in the other group, uncertainty with regard to the resource pool, power and status of the charity organization, and communication between charities. These factors will now be discussed in detail.
§3.1 Social Identity of the Subgroup
Social identity theory is developed by Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A social identity refers to the strength of ties to a group/ feeling of belonging to a group (Messick & Brewer, 1983). According to the social identity theory, a person has not only one ―personal self‖, but has several selves that correspond to widening circles of group membership (social identities). Different social contexts may trigger different social identities (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory is concerned with why and when individuals identify themselves with social groups and consequently behave as part of a social group, whilst adopting shared attitudes.
the in-group (Tajfel, 1973). This leads to fiercer competition among groups in a social dilemma (the discontinuity effect; Insko et al., 2001). In addition, people of the own group are perceived as trustworthy, cooperative and honest (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brewer, 1979) making the option to cooperate with the in-group more attractive.
It is therefore interesting to study which different subgroups can be distinguished within the charity sector and to what groups the health foundations feel they belong, because processes of in-group bias and inter-group competition may undermine collective interests (Kramer and Brewer, 1984) or spur cooperation intentions when the health foundation identity is (highly) salient. Finally, the social identification theory will be verified for the charity sector.
§3.2 Trust in the Other Group
Trust refers to the extent one believes other groups will cooperate or defect (Kopelman, Weber and Messick, 2002). In mixed-motive situations, such as a social dilemma, trust is considered to be particularly important, as it presents a psychological construct that may help to solve the conflict between own and group interest (Dawes, 1980; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996). Having collective interests in mind is not enough to reach mutual cooperation. One should also trust the other party to cooperate. According to Pruitt & Kimmel (1977), parties should achieve a goal of mutual cooperation accompanied by an expectation that the other will cooperate to establish a relationship of mutual cooperation. Then, when one expects the other to cooperate, people engage in more cooperative behaviour and give more to the other (De Cremer, Snyder & de Witte, 2001).
Cooperative behaviour ordinarily stems from long-range thinking. If the other does not seem ready to cooperate, people respond with short-range defensive mechanisms, i.e. they defect, making cooperation a less viable option (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).
of anonymity. This in contradiction to individuals, who are more concerned with the appearance of looking good, thus not acting in a self-interested and greedy manner. Because of this, groups should cooperate less than individuals (Hoyle, Pinkley & Insko, 1989; Insko et al., 1993). Recently however, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010) have shown in several experiments that the participants think their initial trust is honoured in forty-five to sixty per cent of all cases; in reality this number accounts up to eighty or even ninety per cent. Thus, people can be trusted a lot more than we think.
In this thesis, the influence of trust on cooperation intentions in the Dutch charity sector will be studied. That is, to what extent health foundations work together in certain fields and how much trust health organizations have in other‘s intent to cooperate. This influences the group‘s willingness to collaborate and their dedication to this attempt.
§3.3 Environmental Uncertainty
Wit and Wilke (1998) define environmental uncertainty in terms of information on the task environment, for example information on the size of the common resources, and the number of contributions needed to provide a public good. Environmental and social uncertainty, i.e. information on others‘ cooperation, influences a person‘s willingness to cooperate (Messick et al., 1983; Van der Kragt et al., 1992; Liebrand et al., 1986).
Liebrand en van Lange (1989) explain that in social dilemmas the collective interest often stretches over time. The effects of defective choices are not noticeable short-term. Therefore, the long-term effects do not appeal as much to participants as the short-term benefits. Participants justified that future consequences will probably turn out better than current predictions. Technological advances in the mean time could also prevent the doom scenario from occurring (this is mostly applicable to environmental dilemmas; Liebrand en van Lange, 1989).
defective behaviour, because the relationship between the collective outcome and one‘s own behaviour is uncertain.
Budescu et al. (1990, 1992 and 1995) showed that with increasing levels of environmental uncertainty about the pool size, people‘s harvests increased: they request more for themselves. In this condition, people also expect others will request more and overestimate the size of the resource pool. According to Rapoport et al. (1992), this `environmental optimism' may reflect wishful thinking to justify increased harvests.
Environmental uncertainty could form a threat for cooperation in the Dutch charity sector, because the size of the resource pool (i.e. the part of the Dutch population that is willing and able to give to charity) and its replenishment rate (i.e. fluctuation of the willingness to give to charity) may not be known, increasing the difficulty of solving social dilemmas (Kopelman, Weber and Messick, 2002).
Consequently, it will be studied how much environmental uncertainty on the number of volunteers and donors is present in the Dutch charity sector and whether this influences the decision for charity organizations to cooperate. The risk of exhaustion of the resource pool will also be assessed, as this will influence the health foundations‘ perception of the problem.
§3.4 Power and Status
The power and status of actors in a social dilemma context can have a significant effect on how both individuals and their actions are perceived (Kopelman, Weber and Messick, 2002). Members of a high-status subgroup allocated more resources to their subgroup than members of a low-status subgroup (Wit, 2000).
Mannix (1993:16) found ―power imbalances can be detrimental to group outcomes, because power imbalances appear to encourage competition and a focus on individual outcomes resulting in less integrative agreements‖.
reach agreements on resource distributions. Also, ―power imbalanced groups made less efficient use of available resources and these groups included fewer people in the exploitation of resources. Hence, they drove the necessity to compete for individual revenues‖ (Mannix, 1993: 16).
Yet, when someone in a powerful or dominant position shares profits equitably, this was perceived as a sign of goodwill, furthering cooperative behaviour and the development of trust (Thibaut & Riecken, 1955).
Given the size differences between health organizations within the charity sector and how this may influence the intent to cooperate, the relative power of the different health organizations will be evaluated. Furthermore, insights on power differences and whether this impacts cooperation between health foundations will be derived.
§3.5 Communication
A period of discussion among participants in a social dilemma yields positive cooperative effects (Bicchieri, 2002). This positive effect stems from several causes. In the first place, group discussion enhances group identity or solidarity (Dawes, van de Kragt & Orbell, 1990).
Secondly, group discussion elicits commitments to cooperate (Dawes et al., 1990). According to Orbell et al. (1988), the most important effect of communication is that discussion results in commitments and on average people followed through with their commitments. That is, people honoured their commitments even if there was no chance of getting caught cheating. Of course, promises and commitments are binding only in the presence of reciprocal promises and commitments (Atiyah, 1981).
Furthermore, communication offers an opportunity for moral suasion and an opportunity to gather information on the choices others will make (Messick & Brewer, 1983).
In this thesis, the extent and content of communication between the different charities will be explored. Moreover, questions will be posed on whether commitments are established in this communication and how this influences cooperation within the Dutch charity sector.
4. METHODS
2The research described in this thesis started in July 2010 with a literature study on social dilemma‘s and variables influencing the decision making process in social dilemmas. In August and September 2010 health foundations were approached by telephone for their cooperation. A brief introduction to the topic ‗social dilemmas‘ was provided and the organizations that displayed interest received the research proposal of this thesis by e-mail. Finally, in October and November 2010 qualitative interviews with key players in the Dutch charity sector were undertaken.
§4.1 Sampling and Recruitment
Ten charity health organizations participated in this survey, ranging from small (revenues less than €10 million a year), medium size (revenues from €10 million- €20 million a year) to big (revenues of over €20 million a year). X males and Y females were interviewed (total = 11 interviews), all superiors and management team members of the participating organizations. Hence, all informants have influence on the decision to participate in a collaboration effort between their organization and other health organizations. The interviewees stem from the business units fundraising and prevention. These two departments are compared, as collaboration efforts on prevention seem to prosper within the branch organization SGF, while fundraising represents the area with the least collaboration efforts so far. This establishes a good frame for comparison.
Table 1: sample characteristics REMOVED (Table available on request)
For the interviews on collaboration efforts in prevention organization members of X small and Y big companies were interviewed. The interviews on cooperation in fundraising were conducted with organization members of X small, Y medium and Z big organizations. In this thesis solely collaboration efforts between health foundations are discussed; collaboration with intermediary parties were excluded because these might have different dynamics.
§4.2 Procedure
The study involved an audio-recorded in-depth interview facilitated by an interview schedule where keywords of interviewee‘s responses were written down. Interviews were as non-directive as possible. Ten interviews took place in the health foundation‘s office. Two interviews were scheduled by phone, due to practical reasons. During the interview no third parties were present. The interview‘s duration ranged from forty-five minutes to seventy-five minutes. The interviews were taped and an interview report was provided to the interviewee to check the accuracy of the information. Anonymity of the interviewees was guaranteed to spur a climate of openness. Yet, the possibility of supporting findings with quotes from the interview report was mentioned to the interviewees.
The interview questions evolved around the topics social identity, trust, communication, power & status and environmental uncertainty (see appendix 1). Per variable, three or four questions were asked. The interview had two introduction questions to gain insights in past collaborations between health foundations and their motives to operate together or independently. Furthermore, the interview had two final questions to assess factors influencing cooperation not yet mentioned in the discussion of the five chosen variables.
5. RESULTS
The main findings from the interviews will now be presented. Firstly, the mentioned areas of cooperation and the stated motives for engaging in collaboration will be specified. Furthermore, the most important findings will be discussed, followed by an in-depth look into the five research variables to examine whether these variables enhance or deter the intent to cooperate for charity health organizations.
Collaboration in the field of prevention mostly takes place within the branch organization (SGF) where the political lobby is managed and knowledge sharing is spurred. Moreover, there is a large collaboration (LekkerLangLeven) between the organizations Hartstichting, Nierstichting, and Diabetes Fonds; because in the diseases they are battling, overlapping factors can be distinguished. The Hartstichting also drives the platform ‗vitale vaten‘.
Overall to the areas fundraising and prevention four organizations started the project ‗Huis voor de Gezondheid‘, where a number of health foundations are seated in the same building and intend to jointly steer some internal processes. Another well-known overall example is the campaign ‗orgaandonatie‘ (i.e. donation of organs).
No structural collaborations in the field of fundraising are undertaken in the health charity sector. Incidental collaboration takes place mostly spurred by a (commercial) third party, e.g. the campaign ‗nalaten‘ (i.e. inheritances), a ‗give-card‘ or ‗give-text message‘, or the collaboration with the lotteries.
§5.1 General Results on Charities‘ Intent to Cooperate
From the interviews, it became clear that the traditional fundraising instruments where deemed unfit for cooperation. When the charity organizations raise funds autonomously they gather more money than when they raise funds together. The differentiation towards the Dutch general public results in more revenues from the market.
collection amounts €10 million. When one says: ‖We are going to do a joint collection‖, then this mutual collection will gather perhaps €2,5 million. Consequently, you will have to share this €2,5 million in five, thus the revenue per organization shrinks enormously. Truthfully, the differentiation between charities in the front-office makes you can gather much more from the market than when this was done together‖ (organization 7).
―Collaboration with other health charities is about relevance. Is it rational to cooperate? I think this is a tough matter to tackle, because every organization has its own stakes and interests and we are all acting in the same domain. Everybody will do their best to commit the donor to their cause. Cooperation in fundraising is only rational when two items fit together. When health is involved, people usually give to a cause due to a personal commitment… Yet, people often give to multiple charities, thus we are not always in each other‘s way‖ (organization 6).
Charities stated new fundraising methods and the rise of new media may change the intentions to cooperate; collaboration could then be an option health charities are willing to consider. Equally, the organizations stated that the need to cooperate is changing. Previously, there was an open competition market. Yet nowadays, the charity market is becoming one of repression. This results from withdrawal of government grants and the realization among charities that donors‘ trust, i.e. the trust the Dutch population puts in charity organizations, is transient.
Consequently, because the market is getting more repressive, organizations can only grow at the expense of other organizations. When charity organizations cooperate they can gain a competitive advantage. As stated by respondents, however, in fundraising this is a controversial point of view, as fear exists for loss of revenues by leaving known paths, reducing resources for the charity supporters. In brief, the social dilemma is growing due to changes in the market. Yet, at the same time charity organizations still collect enough funds to give precedence to their own policy plans. Cooperation is not always the best option, because revenues are higher when organizations work autonomously. These revenues are not just expressed in money, but also in brand awareness, better conditions or excess to files.
§5.2 Social Identity
The interviewed charity organizations identify mostly with their own organization. Moreover, a number of health charities also identify with the category of ‗health foundation‘, hence a subgroup within the charity sector raising money to fight health causes. The participants of the ‗LekkerLangLeven‘- campaign and the participants of the ‗Huis voor de Gezondheid‘ portrayed the highest involvement with the group ‗health foundations‘. Physical closeness and content-wise involvement were said to raise the organization‘s insights in each other‘s routines and agendas. In that manner they gained understanding for each other. The opinions on whether this high involvement leads to being more active in the health sector were mixed. A high involvement plays a role in the decision to be active in the health foundation sector. However, which factor is cause and which is consequence, is unclear.
―Of course (organization x) feels itself much more (organization x) than SGF. Foundations have their own identity and people are much more engaged in their own foundation. However, when multiple health foundations attend a meeting, for instance for the prevention consult, people feel the overall identity. For example, people stand up with: ‗I have a question on behalf of the SGF‘ or ‗I would like to contribute this on behalf of the SGF‘, ― (organization 1).
The own organizational identity is labelled as a key asset in the charity sector and people do not want to lose this identity in collaboration.
―I question whether trust is the bottleneck (note from author: as to why there is little collaboration in the field of fundraising). I think it has to do with: Can we still hang on to our points of view? Because it is very different when one engages in what is needed for cancer patients and their fellows and that issues, than what is needed for Astma in the Netherlands‖(organization 5).
The health foundation identity is triggered when one is confronted with this identity in the daily routine. Currently, the branch organization is active on overall themes, thus this presence is not being felt in the daily routine. This could partly explain less commitment to the health foundation identity.
―Content-wise you are your own specialist and that is what we depend upon. Hence, you should sense the additional effect/ value of the sector. We do see something, but these are mainly the big lobby projects. While, when you need support, this is a specific topic; you get this information from other organizations‖ (organization 10).
Identification with one‘s own charity is felt strongest in the lower levels of the organization. Consistent with the overall themes, which are mostly dealt with on a board level, on that higher level, commitment with health foundations is highest.
most involved and when you reach lower levels this involvement lessens‖ (organization 5).
A frequently mentioned identity is the segmentation according to function, thus marketers, scientists, PR-officers, and a distinction according to size.
―I think the amount of commitment also has to do with the job function one practices. I, as prevention worker, am very much faced with health in general, yet I can imagine this being different for marketers as this profession can be practised in multiple organizations. I have less connection with other charity organizations‖ (organization 2).
The health charities declared preservation of identity to be an important variable in the decision to cooperate. Especially in fundraising, it is crucial not to lose the own identity as this determines the brand value a charity has. The charities fear losing their own identity when engaging in a collaboration. Hence, the organizational identity reduces the intent to cooperate amongst charities.
In sum, the interview results showed that health foundations identify in first place with their own organization as they are mostly confronted with this identity in their daily course of action. This holds true particularly for lower organizational levels. However, some charity health foundations did identify with the broader category of health foundations. Identification with the health foundations seemed to help in showing initiative for the sector. However, the exact direction of this relationship was not disclosed in the interviews.
§5.3 Trust
For fundraising, there seemed to be no trust in the other‘s intent to cooperate for the existing set of fundraising instruments, because cooperation might be at the expense of one‘s own merits. The collection in Limburg, where local authorities allowed solely one collection week a year, was an example often mentioned. In this collection week, revenues are slightly higher than in regular collection weeks, yet these revenues have to be shared between all participating charities. The revenues from this joint collection week thus cannot compare to the revenue-levels in other parts of the country.
For new fundraising instruments, the health charities said that cooperation is possible when creating a win-win situation for both parties. Then a clear message should be available for the donors as to why they should give to this cooperation. According to the health charities, new collaboration actions should be additional to the current set of fundraising instruments in order to prevent degradation of the own revenues and the own label. Trust in other charity organizations is especially important, because this mutual trust reflects upon the trust Dutch society has in charity organizations.
―This mutual trust reflects the trust society/ the Dutch population has in the charity market. The trust you have in each other emanates to the market you serve‖ (organization 5).
―For one thing you need to attain your goals as a fundraiser; your focus is on the short term. On the other hand, there are the other goals you could obtain (Note of author: in the field of cooperation): those are not on your immediate task list. Therefore, by being near each other, pulling the walls down, you are making a first step. First, you need to create understanding: what are you doing? What am I doing? You need to get to know each other‖ (organization 9).
―There definitely is trust in example x, otherwise we would not be working together. However this trust is something you need to build up to expand the collaboration. The intentions are always good, on both sides; otherwise you would not be working together. Yet trust is something that needs to develop. It is not just present from the start. It is an item that also has to do with personality, some people are faster than others in starting to trust someone (…) Cooperation still is a human job‖ (organization 6).
Both in prevention and fundraising choosing an overall goal was emphasized, i.e. a goal on a highly strategic level, because that is where common interests lie. ―An overall goal that transcends the different target groups needs to be present, so that people can give to a concrete project or solution‖ (organization 2).
With regard to agreements, charities trust the other to honour commitments. However, reaching a cooperation agreement gets harder when one is nearing the front office.
―In general, at formalized meetings agreements are honoured. I cannot say whether this also holds true for informal contacts. I gather that we have nothing to blame each other‖ (organization 4).
―There is a difference between front and back office (…) When one gets closer to the front office, it sticks at general agreements. Closer to the execution, more individual interests show up and consequently people tend to choose those‖ (organization 7).
In the committee prevention, the casualness of some appointments stood out. Although the health charities state their commitment to the defined ‗key topics‘ for the coming years and the established budget for these activities, the exact contribution, more specifically the amount of time from every health charity, is not fixed. The principles are laid out in the policy plans, yet there is no plan for the situation where extra activities need to be executed. Consequently, a clear distinction can be seen between health charities that keep their efforts to the minimum and charities that are willing to take that extra step. Mostly the bigger health foundations are active in the vanguard, because it is easier for these foundations to clear man hours for extra activities (this is also discussed in §4.5 Power & Status).
Besides the number of employees, also the kind of employees plays a role in collaboration: cooperating with pro-social people can make trust grow.
―When you are cooperating, you are forming, just like politics, a coalition. Therefore, you need to moderate one‘s demands; you need to compromise. You need to be prepared to give up a little of the own interest in turn for the greater cause. When there are people that state ‗yes‘ and act ‗no‘, who are in fact letting their own interest prevail, it will not work. You can then see the mistrust grow. The personal factor, having people capable of doing this, that is very important‖ (organization 2).
The aforementioned data show that there is mutual trust in the charity sector, because in existing collaborations trust has been built and agreements are honoured. Reaching a (collaboration) agreement is less straightforward, as a result of lower yields in a collaboration, fear of losing the own identity, lack of time and need to keep initiatives going, and dependence upon the persons participating in the collaboration, i.e. pro-self or pro-social.
§5.4 Environmental Uncertainty
None of the charity health foundations think the donor or volunteer pool will get exhausted. However, they believe that a different approach is necessary to ensure new accretion. In gathering new collectors, the need for cooperation might be rising in the future, given the decreasing number of collectors per organization. Volunteers could be activated for short-term activities.
―I see we are all struggling more to recruit volunteers, especially for the positions where one needs to be active year in and year out for an organization. I do not think the entire pool will run out. I also see movements engaging youngsters, who are willing to put their shoulder to the wheel. However, this is done in another way, it is another kind of commitment. It is all changing. Just like the donors: the traditional giving versus the new giving‖ (organization 9).
Equally, in the donor pool new persons will always be engaged as a donor. Especially, because the diseases the health foundations are battling are not exterminated by far. Thus, there still is a stream of patients and their fellows.
However, the manner in which donors are reached is changing; the response rates on direct marketing are changing and new media are available. Furthermore, the fundraising departments are professionalizing, hence hiring more professional marketers.
―The methods used, for instance segmenting a database, are utilized much more effectively. And besides direct marketing other means arise. As a charity foundation we check: what is appropriate for us? So are the supporters aged 50+ also behind the Internet or are we then missing out on a certain group of people? We are exploring how these means could be used to reach our target group‖ (organization 10).
When environmental uncertainty is viewed as a broader term, thus as the uncertainty on costs and revenues of (fundraising) actions, then environmental uncertainty is high and plays a part in the decision to defect. This is especially the case for the new media from which little information is present on how to apply social media and what investment are required.
entirely, this is less certain. And also: how will our supporters perceive this? This domain is most important to you, so before you let someone enter here, you need to have thought this true thoroughly and know for a fact that this is appreciated‖ (organization 6).
―You need to be very clear on what your goal is, because we might have mutual interests, yet does the donor also see it this way? And what does a donor do thereafter? Suppose we decide: we are going to do a joint research project on multiple diseases. Instead of five mailings a year for our cause, we now do four mailings for our cause and one for this joint cause. What does the donor do in the next mailing? Does he/she give just as much or does he/she say: ‖I have already given to that other cause the previous time‖. So: does this joint project cannibalise on the own revenues? It is a matter everyone struggles with, because we know little about it. Actually, this is an interesting research question, because with that information you might convince people to do business together. At the same time one should ask oneself: what happens if we do not work together? Because then you could lose direction completely. That people simply say: ‗That is how we are going to do it here‘. That is also a dilemma‖ (organization 2).
―Nowadays, I feel the charities give a lot. Charity organizations take part in the committee and contribute financially, so they bring a lot to the table in this collaboration. Nevertheless, I think they will be more committed when you give them something in return, show them what they can gain from participation‖ (organization 1).
In brief, there is little uncertainty on the resource pools of donors and volunteers, yet there is a lot of uncertainty on how to reach these target groups through the arrival of new media. Next to this, there is much uncertainty on the costs and benefits of new fundraising methods and the relatively new cooperation within the committee prevention. This deters charity organizations from working together.
§5.5 Power and Status
There are many differences between small and big charity organizations with regard to capacity, human capital, and finance. A lot of organizations in the committee prevention have limited capacity; they cannot clear enough working hours to execute committee plans. It is easier for bigger health charities to pick up extra activities, due to their larger capacity. Therefore, when no clear agreements are made, mostly the bigger health charities take the lead and keep processes going.
―What proceeds in the committee is that when something needs to be done there are lots of participants that do not have the capacity or berth to clear people or working hours. Consequently, often the big foundations execute the activities‖ (organization 2).
However, because the big charities mainly take the lead, the smaller charities might feel they have less input and therefore less say in collaboration processes. The impression could be that there is more to gain for some organizations.
―You try to let all health foundations be equal, yet I know for sure the feeling is there: bigger organizations can get more done, it is mostly in the interest of the big parties‖ (organization 1).
―When you take a look at the hegemony of the KWF, it is so big. They try to be courteous about it, but merely the fact that they are so big and have such a big market share, makes their influence enormously. When they grow with 2%, that same part accounts for 20% of our growth. They are working on problems we are not even accrued to‖ (organization 7).
―Yes, there is a big difference between small and big foundations and KWF is the absolute maverick. When you organize something together with the other foundations before you know it KWF is the flag under which the ship sails. That organization attracts the attention, so when there are no agreements on this beforehand, it can come out being an advantage or a disadvantage…You see the ease at which big foundations can clear capacity. As a small organization you are frequently in the position that you need to leave matters to others. Only, before you know it others take the rear or strongly determine direction. Then you wonder: is this path really desirable/ also in our interest? (…) Thus the big charities can show more capacity and they get attention more easily. This is not a bad thing, but big and small charities need to be aware of this. Good agreements beforehand and denomination of the differences is essential, otherwise a collaboration will never be successful‖ (organization 2).
Furthermore, lack of capacity prevents from keeping cooperation processes going and implementing initiatives.
are not picked up: they fall into oblivion. I think there was not enough man power, too little capacity to put to the table‖ (organization 1).
For the bigger charities the difference between small and big was not really an issue, although they did recognize smaller organizations sometimes feel less influential. Moreover, for bigger foundations it is not always attractive to cooperate, because they already raise big sums of money by themselves. The biggest charity raises €95 million a year, the smallest foundations raise €2 to €3 million a year. From the interviews it became clear that this requires a will to share from the bigger parties.
―There has always been a healthy competition, thus you monitor other parties. In my opinion, this is very good and healthy, because you learn other‘s strengths. However, is this really about power? In my personal opinion, the charity sector is too soft for power struggles. Of course, we are harvesting the same pool, but we are also talking with each other, have discussion groups and share knowledge‖ (organization 6).
―I think knowledge gives authority; not a dominant position. For instance, KWF performs really well in fundraising, so we can learn from this. This is different from ‗when they go left, we automatically tag along‘ ― (organization 5).
When the market leader does not participate proactively in an initiative, it is less attractive for a commercial party to cooperate with smaller charities. In mutual initiatives the big parties sometimes lean back, in the manner: ‗when something concrete happens, let us know‘. The big charities‘ income is so high that they sometimes have little to gain from cooperation. Adjacent to this, big organizations need to take their label into account. When one has established an A-level brand, you are not willing to join any given initiative.
collaboration is less for big foundations, because the contribution of the small parties does not always have additional value.
§5.6 Communication
Lots of communication takes place between health foundations, both formally and informally. This entails people holding similar positions, but also the CEO‘s know how to reach each other. Communication content and frequency were said not to obstruct cooperation.
―Knowledge sharing is done easily, no problem. In the field of fundraising this is difficult, yet on all other areas we are willing to share information with the other health foundations. Communication lines are short. You can always approach someone when you would like to know something. You can even approach the CEO‘s; I do not have to make an appointment. You can always walk by, there are no hurdles‖ (organization 1).
The speed of decision-making is a factor that deters the intent to cooperate due to a big number of people from the department communication engaging in bilateral meetings and the size of some organizations.
―I have noticed that in general we agree with each other. However, a lot of discussion takes places on details, how to formulate issues and what name is appropriate. There is disproportionately much attention on communication and templates and less on content. For instance, huge discussions take place on whether the name of a project is really the best name or how to communicate to a high-risk group. That is a pitfall. Because there are many people from the communication departments present in meetings, these meetings are more about ‗how‘ to communicate than on ‗what‘ to communicate...Content wise we are open for collaboration and we believe in a good ending. However, we do not have confidence that this will proceed swiftly.‖ (organization 3).
organization you can switch operations more easily. Yet, when finance is concerned it is harder for small organizations to do something independent from the policy plans‖ (organization 1).
Health foundations appear to get on well together and discuss a lot of matters. Most organizations are easy accessible for the other health charities and they know each other well. The speed of reaching an agreement has an adverse effect on cooperation, because it takes a while before a project takes off. However, when agreements are made, people and organizations follow through with their commitments.
§5.7 Additional variables
Besides the variables discussed, other factors came up in the interviews that have an influence on cooperation intentions in the charity sector. Apparently, a lack of need for cooperation makes health organizations mostly interested in, or preoccupied with, the own health foundation. According to the health foundations their policy plans are the guiding principles and there is (almost) no deviation from these. Current fundraising activities raise enough means to finance current affairs: ―When we ask, we get‖ (anonymous). There thus seems to be a lack of need to work together.
Furthermore, a lot of interviewees mentioned lack of time as a reason not to work together; one wants to spend the scarce available time to the own goals. Moreover, lack of time prevents from looking outside the organization‘s boundaries and lack of time prevents from keeping cooperation processes going. ―It was sometimes hard to make appointments and then be there. You would get homework and one needed to check their organization. Some could find this time more easily than others. And there needs to be some kind of use to your organization. It has not been aborted out of resilience. However, practice was obstinate and it is tough to keep processes going‖ (organization 4).
senses the presence of an overall force in their daily routine. A lack of presence from an overall organization abstains employees from identifying with the other health foundations. Moreover, the absence of a strong leader slows cooperation processes down.
―There isn‘t a strong project leader saying: ―This is how we are going to do it‖ … Nobody wants to stand up and say: ―we are the biggest partner and it is done the way we want it.‖ For instance, the SGF is a nice overall organization, yet I do not really see them in my work. It is a lobby organization. They probably do much more, however to me they do not have a face (…) Eventually, the occupational groups are putting their mark on a collaboration; they determine the agenda and the health foundations have to adapt to this. The professionals are of course an important group to implement initiatives. When they do not want to execute an initiative, you stand empty-handed‖ (organization 3).
Besides the help of occupational groups, one also needs management support to properly execute initiatives.
Within the occupational groups, and the medical profession in general, lots of specialists can be identified. Having many specialists involved in a process can result in having different islands from which people reign. People might feel they know best in their territory thus impeding cooperation. This line of thought has expanded to the health charities.
―I think this institutional thinking characterizes most of the health foundations, hence talking in the ‗royal plural‘: ―We from the ... (foundation X) feel that... A so called ‗aiming finger‘. People feel they are the authority in a specific area and they thus know better. Perhaps if they all would sit down to discuss it, they probably would figure it out, but this is not done. This thinking in institutions is initiated by fear: fear for the unknown, fear of losing control, that somehow someone else knows better. While technological advancements has made it unimportant who knows more. It is about making the right connections; mobilizing the right networks‖ (organization 7).
―We of course know best, combined with the academic hospitals, what needs to be done for (disease x) patients. We would like to set our own course and hold on to what we feel is important in order to attain our mission‖ (organization 5).
Recapitulating, besides the five research variables, five other variables were identified as opposing the intent to cooperate, namely the lack of need for cooperation, lack of time, absence of a strong leader, the influence of occupational groups, and feeling a sense of own supremacy.
6. DISCUSSION
to cooperate, other findings were less conclusive, hence opening opportunities for further research (which will be discussed in paragraph 5.2).
§6.1 Discussion of Results
With regard to social identity, it appeared that, in general, the health charities identified predominantly with their own organization rather than with the overall group of (health) charity foundations. Nevertheless, in some situations a superordinate identity, i.e. belonging to the group of ‗health foundations,‘ could be triggered. This health foundation identity was mostly triggered in higher levels of the organization, because on this level overall interests are recognized and discussed. Also, cooperation in the existing collaborations was related to identifying with the broader category of health funds.
From the interviews it became clear that preservation of the own identity deters the funds from cooperation. This stems from a fear of losing the own identity in collaboration. This is in line with Tajfel (1973) who states that people tend to exaggerate the differences with the out-group and the similarities with the in-group. In addition, people of the own group are perceived as trustworthy, cooperative and honest making this option more attractive (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brewer, 1979). Hence, making the own group and own identity superior deters from cooperating with outside groups (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Currently, for most organization members the own organization is the in-group most salient. However, for the top management the health foundation identity can be triggered, so a first step in collaboration is especially expected for this higher level of employees. On a high organizational level, overall interests can be detected and managed. Charities‘ boards have the power to control man hours and effort, making lower levels of the organization equally involved, because working on a mutual project enhances the connection people feel between themselves, their organization and the overall group of health foundations.
is a general theme and less effort might be needed to trigger the health foundation identity.
With regard to trust in other charities, this appeared to be higher in the field of prevention than in fundraising. Regarding this latter field, the charities did not have the intention to cooperate and consequently did not think other charities are willing to cooperate on the existing set of fundraising instruments; competition for funds was fierce.
However, in other fields where the charities are indeed working together, trust is present and has grown during collaboration. So, in this area, cooperation seems not to be so much the result of trust, but the other way around: Trust has resulted from cooperation. This is in line with research of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010). They showed that people trusted others less than was justified, and that the only way to increase trust was people cooperating and, as such, experiencing that others are more trustworthy than they thought. Therefore, the charities should look for a way to also cooperate in fundraising. By just doing, trust will grow. This is reinforced through the finding that lack of trust in the other to start a cooperation on the current set of fundraising instruments is not dictated by fear of defection, but fear of lesser revenues when working together, thus the complicating factor are the fundraising yields. New fundraising instruments, where the competition for funds is less fierce, might open new possibilities for cooperation. Moreover, the option to cooperate in the back-office should be explored as this offers the possibility to create economies of scale, for instance in the distribution of collection boxes. In addition, cooperation in the back office only creates the possibility of preserving the own identity as a marketing instrument; thus reduction of costs, while maintaining current revenues.
not knowing whether something falls well with the charities‘ supporters complicates collaboration.
As stated before, theory shows that cooperation is a process that stretches over the long term. This makes it harder to estimate costs and revenues of collaboration, especially when the own effort is unknown, uncertainty deters from cooperation. Thus far, cooperation efforts were mostly incidental. Structural collaboration is relatively new and there is little information on the costs and revenues incurred by cooperation. Therefore, more research is needed on the exact organizational contribution in a collaboration versus the collective revenues gained from a collaboration. This reduces uncertainty and could make the Dutch charities more susceptible to cooperation.
Of course, it is also possible that research is needed on the current resource pools of donors and volunteers, because no one knows exactly how many donors and volunteers are present in Dutch society and due to environmental uncertainty people might overestimate the size of the resource pool (Bilodeau et. Al, 1992). Yet, current results suggest that research is needed on the ways to reach the Dutch population and in particular a younger audience who make extensive use of social media and internet forums. This is an interesting field for exploring cooperation possibilities, as the health charities expressed high uncertainty on these means and it is unwise to study the same options over and over again separately.
With regard to power and status, there are many differences between small and big charity organizations concerning capacity, human capital, and finance. It is easier for bigger health charities to pick up extra activities, due to their larger capacity. It became clear that the small organizations mostly find hindrance from this difference in size between health foundations, as they are running the risk to be less heard and have less input. Moreover, the need to participate in collaboration is less for big foundations, because the contribution of the small parties does not always have additional value.
There is understanding for each other‘s position in the charity sector, hence when collaboration is started health foundations give a lot to this initiative. Health foundations also stated they support other‘s success. It thus appears there is a tension between own and collective interests and power imbalances complicate this struggle, but the mutual understanding provides a possibility to overcome this imbalance.
Theory shows that under a condition where people feel intimidated (because of power or status differences) they resist intimidation by behaving more competitive (Komorita, Sheposh & Braver, 1968). Yet, when someone in a powerful or dominant position shares profits equitably, this was perceived as a sign of goodwill, furthering cooperative behaviour and the development of trust (Thibaut & Riecken, 1955). Therefore, to overcome the power imbalances the Dutch charities should make integrative agreements, because without clear agreements collaboration topples down (as became clear from the example of selective prevention). These agreements should entail an equitable input and equitable output for the charities.
Finally, lots of communication takes place between health foundations, both formally and informally. Communication content and frequency were said not to obstruct cooperation. Health foundations appear to get on well together and discuss a lot of matters. Most organizations are accessible for the other health charities and they know each other well. One negative effect of communication was that it speeded down reaching an agreement (through unequal attention for templates at the expense of content), which had an adverse effect on cooperation as it takes a while before a project takes off. Therefore, diversity could be promoted; i.e. participants from different departments should have a seat in the meetings in order to ensure equal attention for content, shape and usage of resources.
charity organizations is to extend communication to the domain of fundraising, because when agreements are made, these are honoured. In order to do so, revenues for charity organizations must be changing, making the option to collaborate more attractive.
Five other variables than the ones studies were identified as opposing the intent to cooperate in the Dutch charity sector. These were the lack of need for cooperation, lack of time, absence of a strong leader, the influence of occupational groups, and feeling a sense of own supremacy. These variables are regularly discussed in social dilemma literature (for example, Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; de Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2003; van Dijk, Wilke & Wit, 2003; Sattler, 1998; Weber & Murnighan, 2008). This reinforces the impression that the processes in the charity sector could be characterized as a social dilemma and gives suggestions for further research on this topic.
All in all, the processes that play a part in social dilemmas also seem applicable to the charity sector. However, whether decision making in the charity sector generally could be characterized as a social dilemma is less straightforward. Especially in the field of fundraising, when charities raise funds autonomously they generate more income than operating together. So in this sense, mutual cooperation is not more beneficial than mutual non-cooperation.
Yet, there are other areas besides generating revenues, where cooperation can provide an advantage. For instance in the back office, economies of scale could be developed and costs could be split. These options are currently hugely unexplored.
Suggestions for practice entail the advice to explore collaboration possibilities ‘behind the scenes’, hence in the back office. In this way, the own identity is safeguarded and the maximum amount of revenues can be generated from the Dutch donor market. This cooperation needs to be inspired by higher management, because this is where the health identity is most salient, overall interests are recognized, and the power exists to clear capacity and man hours.
communication, the many possibilities to get acquainted with each other and share knowledge, and their initial trust which could grow to a trusting relationship.
§6.2 Limitations & Further Research
The primary focus of this study was to assess whether the decision making processes in the charity sector resemble the decision making processes in social dilemma‘s. Viewing the decision making processes in the charity sector as a social dilemma is a new point of view and this study is a first exploration of this topic. There are some limitations that need to be taken into account and more research is needed to cover the topic completely. One limitation is that findings in the current study are confined to the perceptions of management team members in their particular organization. This view may differ from perceptions of lower level employees or medical professionals, who could provide other variables influencing the intent to cooperate.
A second limitation is that the respondents have been sent the research proposal in advance. Although this is effective in persuading person‘s to agree to an interview, the research variables were mentioned, thus possibly biasing answers. However, no further elaboration on the research variables was provided and the impression exists the research variables were not discussed with third parties in advance.
Some of the interview questions should have been better. For instance, the questions on social identity should have included a question whether a highly salient health foundation identity leads to being more active in the Dutch charity sector to determine the direction of this relationship. Also, the questions on trust did not provide enough information about the influence of this particular variable on the decision making processes. One should keep this limitation in mind when replicating this research.
Moreover, when writing this thesis, no literature was found on why power differences obstruct cooperation. Therefore, an interesting direction for further research is motives and behaviour of dominant and less dominant parties, because this is a first step in overcoming power imbalances and the impact of power imbalances on cooperation. Furthermore a lot more could be learned on new media and how to diminish the current influence of environmental uncertainty in the charity sector.
However it is important to bear in mind that as long as individual gains are highest, opposed to the gains from cooperation, the health charities will never work together. The highest revenues, expressed in income, time, and brand value, helps to let business survive. Yet, in the future traditional fundraising may change, thus opening up a window for collaboration. At that point in time it might be worthwhile to explore options for cooperation again.
7. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, an answer was sought for the question:
To what extent do the variables influencing the decision-making processes in social dilemmas play a part in the decision for Dutch charity organizations to collaborate?
It is adviced to explore collaboration possibilities in the field of fundraising ‗behind the scenes‘, hence in the back office. In this way, the own identity is safeguarded and the maximum amount of revenues can be generated from the Dutch donor market. This cooperation needs to be inspired by higher management, because this is where the health identity is most salient, overall interests are recognized, and the power exists to clear capacity and man hours.
To overcome power imbalances, integrative agreements should be made to secure equitable input of all charities. When engaging in a cooperation the charities can make use of their strengths, thus their knowledge on communication, the many possibilities to get acquainted with each other and share knowledge, and their initial trust which could grow to a trusting relationship.
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