Leliveld, M.C.
Citation
Leliveld, M. C. (2009, January 29). Ethics in economic decision-making.
Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series. Kurt Lewin Instituut, Amsterdam. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13442
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Endnotes
1 The omission bias implies that people prefer harm caused by omissions to harm caused by acts (e.g., Asch, et al. 1994; Baron & Ritov, 1994; 2004;
Ritov & Baron, 1992; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).
2 Note that these empirical chapters can be read independently of each other as they are based on articles which have been published (Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2008a), are accepted for publication (Chapter 3; Leliveld, Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Tenbrunsel, 2008), or have been submitted (Chapter 4;
Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2008b). Consequently, the chapters have some overlap, especially in the General Introductions and General Discussions.
3 At this point, it might be useful to compare our taking UBG with the Power-to-take game (PTT game, e.g., Bosman, & Van Winden, 2002; Van Winden, 2007). In this game, two players, who both have their endowments, are assigned to either the take authority role or the responder role. Take authorities can take a proportion of the responder’s endowment. Responders can subsequently decrease their endowment. Although the names of the PTT game and the Taking UBG are similar, they are actually very different. First of all, in the PTT game the proposer and the responder both have an endowment instead of a single “pie”. Second, in the PTT game the proposer can only make an offer about the responder’s endowment. The proposer’s endowment is not part of the allocation process. Finally, in the PTT game, the responder can destroy part of his own endowment (and not of the proposer’s endowment).
4 Note that the variance in the symmetric information condition was very small (SD = .64) in contrast to the variance in the asymmetric information condition (SD = 2.09). However, if we analyze the number of participants who misrepresented the value of the chips (yes vs. no) we find the same results. A hierarchical log linear analysis yielded no effect of game type on misrepresentation, F2(2, N = 111)= .40, ns (28.9% in the giving UBG, 33.3%
in the splitting UBG, and 29.4% in the taking UBG used misrepresentation). The analysis yielded only an information effect on misrepresentation, F2(1, N = 111)
= 38.22, p < .001. In the asymmetric condition 56.4% of the participants misrepresented against only 5.4% of the participants in the symmetric condition.
5 Due to a failure in saving the data, we only saved the data of 70 participants for this scale. Still, the effect was already very strong. Combined
with the answers to the open questions, we believe our manipulation of dependency was successful.
6 Although our main focus was to understand the influence of valence on the relative importance of fairness and self-interest, we also studied the mediating effectof fairness and self-interest separately. We analyzed the effect of valence, dependency and their interaction on the self-interest scale, which yielded only an effect of valence, = -.28, p < .01. Then, we performed a regression with valence, dependency, their interaction, the self-interest scale (mediator) and the interaction between the self-interest scale and dependency on the offer. This analysis yielded significant main effects of dependency, = .27, p < .01, self-interest, = -.31, p < .001, and a significant interaction effect of dependency and self-interest, = 34, p < .001. The interaction effect of valence and dependency was no longer significant, = -.15, ns. These results show that self-interest mediated the effect of valence on the offer within the low dependency condition, (analyses within the low dependency condition yielded a Sobel z = 1.90, p = .057). Similarly, we analyzed the mediating role of fairness. Although valence significantly influenced fairness, = .33, p <
.001, in the third step of the mediation analysis we did not find a significant interaction effect of dependency and fairness on the offer, = -.15, ns.
However, the significance of the interaction of dependency and valence decreased, = -.20, p = .035. Separate analysis within the low dependency condition yielded a (marginally) significant full mediation of the valence effect by fairness, Sobel z = 1.79, p = .074, suggesting that fairness motivations also (partially) mediated our valence by dependency interaction. In sum, both fairness and self-interest contributed independently of each other to the valence effect on the offer.
7 A regression of valence on the offer (within the low dependency condition) yielded a significant effect, = .37, t = 2.77 p < .01. A regression of valence on the relative motive scale yielded a significant effect, = .30, t = 2.16, p < .05. A regression of valence and the relative motive scale on the offer yielded a significant relative motive effect, = .60, t = 5.33, p < .001. The effect of valence was no longer significant, = .19, t = 1.72, ns.
8 Note that in the current research we will use compensation only in terms of compensating persons who had no influence on the economic disadvantaged position they are in. We distinguish compensation from rewarding someone for his or her good behavior, which in some situations can be equaled to compensation. That is, when the “good” suffer from the “bad”,
the “good” can be rewarded for their good behavior. However, rewarding someone for his or her good behavior is not the same as compensating someone who did not do anything good or bad, but was merely a victim of another person’s behavior.
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