The Measurement and Antecedents of
Corporate Foresight
Author: Tymen Jissink
Student number: s2229765
E-mail: info@tymenjissink.nl
Word count: 13738 words (excluding references and appendices)
University: University of Groningen
Faculty: Economics and Business
Master: Strategic Innovation Management
Supervisor: Dr. K.R.E. Huizingh
Second supervisor: Dr. ir. M.W. Hillen
Date: 11-07-2013
Co-author: Marije Bakker
Student number: s1528939
Shared sections: Sections 2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3
The Measurement and Antecedents of Corporate Foresight
Tymen Jissinka,∗
Marije Bakkerb,∗
Dr. K.R.E. Huizinghc, Dr. ir. M. W. Hillend
aS2229765; Masters student MSc BA Strategic Innovation Management bCo-author; S1528939; Masters student MSc BA Strategic Innovation Management
cFirst supervisor dSecond supervisor
Abstract
Corporate foresight refers to an organizational phenomenon that provides an organization with an under-standing of possible and desirable long-term futures through acquiring, interpreting, and diffusing informa-tion from the organizainforma-tion’s environment. This study has examined corporate foresight as an organizainforma-tional- organizational-level phenomenon from both a process and systems approach perspective. The process approach intends to depict corporate foresight as a staged process consisting of several activities. The systems approach intends to depict corporate foresight as an organizational system consisting of elements that allow an organization to perform corporate foresight. While little research to date has aimed to quantitatively examine corporate foresight as a phenomenon, this study has developed and pre-tested measurement models for both process and system approach to assist future researchers with for future quantitative research. Furthermore, while corporate foresight may be beneficial for any type of organization, there may be antecedents which deter-mine the need or increase in use of corporate foresight by an organization. Also, little research to date has aimed at identifying and examining these antecedents, this study researches what the antecedents of corporate foresight are, and proposes relationships and measurements for these antecedents. This study provides a comprehensive survey and potential data collection approach to assist future researchers with. Corporate foresight, its two approaches, and its antecedents are discussed, as are theoretical and managerial implications, limitations, and future research avenues.
Keywords: corporate foresight, strategic orientation, entrepreneurial orientation, market orientation, technology orientation, learning orientation, environmental uncertainty, environmental dynamism, environmental complexity
1. Introduction
Given that there are no statistics on the future, companies may find themselves in a difficult position as in to what direction to steer the organization, and with that the decision making processes associated with it. Foresight activities have gained importance as a strategic decision-making tool (Becker, 2002;Cuhls, 2003). Foresight aims to give a clearer view on possible and preferable futures, and with that the long term challenges and opportunities associated with those futures. In turn, organizations can choose to act upon the interpretations of those futures. Foresight in this sense has been portrayed in the literature as both strategic foresight (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008;Vecchiato,2012b;Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b)
and corporate foresight (Becker,2002;Daheim and Uerz,2006,2008;Gruber and Venter,2006;Rohrbeck, 2011,2012;von der Gracht, Vennemann, and Darkow,2010;Will,2008), and these terms have been used interchangeably in the literature. Since both terms are identical and this study focuses on an organizational level perspective, we have used the corporate foresight term.
Regarding both the definition and meaning of corporate foresight, most scholars have yet to reach a consensus. Several researchers conceptualize corporate foresight as a process in which foresight activities take place, while others refer to a system of capabilities for corporate foresight. The process approach emphasizes on stages and activities for corporate foresight (Horton,1999;Voros,2003). The systems ap-proach conceptualizes corporate foresight as an overarching futures orientation with distinct capabilities in place (Ratcliffe,2006;Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008). While both approaches have been considered dis-tinct in literature, there are no validated measurement models available.Rohrbeck and Gemuenden(2008) developed a measurement model for the systems approach but called for more qualitative and quantitative research to refine the model for further research. For the process approach however, no measurement model exists. Therefore, an in-depth study should be performed to refine and create measurement models for both approaches.
Furthermore, research has lacked to provide a comprehensive view on the antecedents of corporate fore-sight. While many studies portray corporate foresight as an organizational phenomenon that may always be beneficial, the question arises whether organizations need, or can sustain corporate foresight. Research on the antecedents is largely scattered and each study focuses on different aspects. For instance, a large sur-vey on corporate foresight in European organizations byBecker(2002) revealed two internal antecedents of corporate foresight; having an ’innovation-leader’ strategy, and having long development cycles. Other internal antecedents, such as having future-oriented management, may also be considered (Andriopoulos and Gotsi,2006;Day and Schoemaker,2005). With regard to external antecdents, studies cite the organi-zation’s external environment as antecedent, for instance operating in a complex and high rate-of-change environment (Becker,2002;Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b). In order to move forward in the research field of corporate foresight, and especially quantitatively, we must carefully examine each antecedent in relation to corporate foresight.
This study will provide clearly defined conceptualizations of both approaches of corporate foresight. From this, measurement models will be provided to measure each corporate foresight approach to assist future quantitative research. Furthermore, a comprehensive list of antecedents is examined and propositions are given related to the direction of their relationship with corporate foresight. As such, this paper will provide answers to the following research questions:
Research question: What is corporate foresight, what are its antecedents and the direction of their relationships with corporate foresight?
Consequently, the main research question leads to the following three sub-questions:
Sub-research question 1: What are the two approaches of corporate foresight and how can they be measured?
Sub-research question 2: What are the antecedents of corporate foresight and how can they be measured?
Sub-research question 3: What is the direction of the relationships between the antecedents and corporate foresight?
2. Corporate foresight 2.1. Background
Coates(1985, p. 30) provides a broad definition of foresight: "foresight is the overall process of creating an understanding and appreciation of information generated by looking ahead". Martin (1995) provides a more focused definition of foresight, specifying that foresight is a process aimed at systematically interpret-ing longer-term futures of fields such as science, technology, economy, and society to identify opportunities that provide the greatest benefits.
While these definitions may also fit traditional forecasting approaches, it must be noted that foresight is not similar to forecasting, as forecasting is focused on predicting the development of a known trend or issue (Cuhls,2003). Rather, foresight aims to identify new emerging issues for which no previous data is available, and thus forecasting is not possible (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008). Another significant difference is the existence of one possible future, as assumed by forecasting (Cuhls,2003). Foresight, however, argues that many possible futures can exist (Martin,2010).
2.2. Foresight in organizational context
Two popular terms of foresight within organizations are those of strategic foresight and corporate fore-sight. Both terms are used interchangeably in the literature and are related to the French term la prospective, which refers to the study of possible and desirable futures and the actions linked to anticipate such futures (Coates, Durance, and Godet,2010). Anticipation in this sense refers to two attitudes; pre-activity and pro-activity (Godet and Durance,2011). Pre-activity refers to anticipating foreseeable changes in the business environment in order to prepare for those changes. Pre-activity includes activities such as forecasting, future studies, and scenario planning (Godet and Durance, 2011). Pro-activity refers to how an organization in-vokes desirable future changes through its own actions, such as delivering innovations to gain market share (Godet and Durance,2011).
While pre-activity is concerned with anticipating changes in the environment, these changes to futures can originate from related, but also unrelated environments (Daft, Sormunen, and Parks,1988;Hambrick, 1982). As such, organizations that use corporate foresight should not be limited to narrow or shallow views of the future (Voros, 2003). Corporate foresight goes beyond that and should be understood as a broad approach to gain an understanding of possible and desirable futures, either in related or unrelated environments (i.e. PEST environments) (Horton,1999;Jain,1984;Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008).
In this study, pro-activity (i.e. specific actions to invoke desirable future changes) is not included in defining corporate foresight. Scholars, (Gruber and Venter,2006;Horton,1999;Vecchiato,2012b;Voros, 2003; Will, 2008), argue that corporate foresight should be kept distinct from organizational responses —responses that may be the result from insights gained through corporate foresight. Mintzberg(1994) supports this argument by treating strategic thinking, of which corporate foresight is argued to be part (Voros, 2003), and strategy development and -planning as separate. As such, corporate foresight is an input into strategy-making which, in turn, directs strategic planning and action. This means that corporate foresight only enriches the context in which strategic decisions are made (Voros,2003). It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine specific actions that can be generalized to any type of organization that performs corporate foresight. For example, Godet and Durance(2011) argued that delivering innovations to gain market share as an action from corporate foresight should be included as part of corporate foresight (i.e. pro-activity). However, this is not an action that may be found in any organization that performs corporate foresight. Furthermore,Rohrbeck and Schwarz(2013) found evidence of a multitude of contributions that corporate foresight provides, but these are largely related to supporting decision making, rather than direct actions. Therefore, we argue that specific action steps should not be part of the conceptualization of a generalized view of corporate foresight and it therefore only includes the pre-activity attitude, which is gaining an understanding from futures (Godet and Durance,2011).
and activities that aim to create insights of possible and desirable futures, and facilitate organizational responses to these insights (Horton,1999;Martin,1995;Voros,2003). Corporate foresight as a systems approach refers having a futures orientation together with matching capabilities and capacities that aim to create an understanding of futures, and facilitate organizational responses to these futures (Hines,2002; Ratcliffe,2006;Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008;von der Gracht et al.,2010). While these two forms of conceptualizing corporate foresight may seem very different, they are similar in a few aspects (Godet and Mack,2011). Both approaches aim to create an understanding of possible and desirable futures, to anticipate and prepare for those futures and provide input into decision-making. The difference can be found in the locus of the strength of corporate foresight in the organization; going through certain activities/steps, or have a system of capabilities in place. In this study both approaches will be treated as separate approaches that aim to achieve the same goal. As such, we define corporate foresight as follows:
Corporate foresight refers to an organizational phenomenon, as either a process- or a systems ap-proach, which provides an organization with an understanding of possible and desirable long-term futures through the acquisition, interpretation and diffusion of future-related information, orig-inating from the organization’s related and unrelated environments, to facilitate organizational responses towards those futures.
2.3. Process approach
Martin(1995, p. 140) referred to foresight as "[..] a process, not just a set of techniques". As such, foresight cannot be defined as being a one-time event or action. Rather, foresight is a process that broadens the perceptions of those involved through the scanning of possible futures, and the interpretation and diffusion of those futures (Slaughter,1996). In this respect, a process approach to foresight implies that the activities carried out as part of foresight can be placed within stages of the process. Two main views on how such a process would look like are presented byMartin(1995) andHorton (1999), with the latter being geared towards organizational implementation.
Martin(1995) argued that foresight is a three-stage process: 1. Pre-foresight —tasks to be undertaken before foresight can begin
2. Main-foresight —perform analyses, agree on the most promising future options and disseminate the results
3. Post-foresight —the process of implementing the results of foresight (i.e. specific actions) Similarly,Horton(1999) argued for a similar foresight process:
1. Input —information collection activities
2. Interpretation —analysis of the collected information and the creation of future views
3. Output —diffusion of the results in a way they can be used by the end-users of the process (no specific actions)
Figure 1: The three stages of organizations as interpretation systems (Daft and Weick,1984, p. 286)
While both models ofMartin(1995) andHorton (1999) seem similar, the latter has been constructed with organizational implementation in mind. The foresight process ofHorton(1999) is a more generalized view of foresight as performed by organizations, something this study aims to use. It focuses more on the extent to which foresight insights are diffused throughout an organization, assimilated, and committed to by those who carry out resulting actions. Therefore, the model ofHorton(1999) better fits our definition of corporate foresight. We have further investigated the three stages identified byHorton(1999) and identified key activities and their corresponding characteristics that capture the essence of the foresight stage it reflects. 2.3.1. Input stage
The input stage refers to what extent an organization engages in activities for collecting information. This stage essentially evolves around the concept of environmental scanning, which refers to the process of how information from the environment becomes known to the organization (Hambrick,1982). Overall, this stage results in a wide range of future-related information that provides input for the interpretation stage to uncover ’what really is going on’ in the environment (Voros,2003). Key activities that take place in this stage are the following:
• Acquire future-related information: While perhaps an obvious activity, it is the essential activity that is central in this stage. Acquiring future-related information, such as information on future themes, opportunities, and threats for the organization is the starting point of corporate foresight (Horton, 1999).
• Search for information from a broad range of areas: An organization should scan for useful information in current, adjacent, and unrelated business areas (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden, 2008). It relates to the breadth of environmental scanning, which refers to the extent an organization scans in unrelated environments (Horton,1999). As organizational boundaries become increasingly more fuzzy (Conway and Voros,2003), it seems ever more important to acquire information from a wide range of areas. • Select relevant environmental fields: An organization should select relevant environmental fields (i.e.
political, economical, socio-cultural, and technological) which it wants to include. Detecting and learn-ing weak signals from a multitude of different environmental fields can provide a rich information-set that can be useful in the foresight process (Daft et al.,1988). However, selecting only relevant fields is needed for organizations to overcome potential information overload and the wastage of resources spent acting upon unimportant weak signals (Day and Schoemaker,2005).
• Seek access to information from many sources: Information about the environment should be scanned through a great number of sources. Not only should an organization consider its internal network of sources (Hamel and Prahalad,1994), but also a wide range of external sources should be emphasized upon (Day and Schoemaker,2005).
2.3.2. Interpretation stage
The interpretation stage refers to the extent the organization engages in activities for filtering, analyzing, interpreting, and translating foresight information (Horton,1999). Information gathered in the previous stage is the input for this stage.Horton(1999, p. 7) refers to this stage as being "[...]the key step and is [at] the heart of the foresight process". Overall, this stage results in views of possible and preferable futures and strategies or actions that can be taken at that moment to address those futures (Horton,1999;Slaughter, 1996). Several key activities take place in this stage:
• Filter acquired information: Information gathered in the previous foresight stage must be filtered for the specific question an organization aims to address with its foresight process. Filtering aims to make the available information better understandable by the organization through simplification and removal of any jargon (Horton,1999).
• Interpret implications: After having properly filtered information available, interpretation activities can start. Interpretation refers to the creation of understandings from environmental information and its implications for the future from the viewpoint of an organization (Horton,1999;Oner and Gol,2007). • Involve many different people: Related to interpretation activities, an organization should focus on involving a diverse set of people. Interpretation specifically asks for those involved in the foresight process to be open-minded and think outside-the-box (Horton,1999). As such, this stage should be considered as a participatory stage, which allows for the free flow of communication and creativity of people, resulting in more successful foresight outputs and less narrow and/or shallow views of the future (Ratcliffe, 2006;Voros,2003). Thus, through the involvement of many actors (i.e. R&D, marketing, engineering functions) and thus variety of inputs, the quality and richness of the foresight outputs can be increased (Day and Schoemaker,2005;Porter, Van Der Duin, et al.,2004).
• Create multiple future views: Interpretation activities should result in outlooks on multiple possible futures. As no state of the future is certain, multiple alternative futures can expand the perception of what possibilities lie ahead for the organization (Voros,2003).
• Create potential suitable responses to futures: After having created multiple possible futures, an orga-nization should come up with a clear list of strategies or actions that aim to address the futures that have been revealed (Horton,1999).
2.3.3. Output stage
The output stage relates to the extent the organization engages in activities to diffuse foresight insights and consequently trigger organizational responses (Horton,1999;Martin,1995). Overall, this stage results in the diffusion of foresight results to the extent that they reach relevant actors throughout the organization and that they are committed to act upon the results. The following activities relate to this stage:
• Communicate foresight results: Insights generated at the previous foresight stage should be communi-cated to a wider audience throughout the organization, for it to have an effect on and commitment of decision-makers (Horton,1999;Martin,1995).
• Involve relevant decision-makers in diffusion process: Involving relevant decision-makers in the process of diffusing foresight results may ensure higher commitment of those decision-makers to contribute to and use the foresight results (Becker,2002).
• Create understandable foresight results: Foresight results by themselves must be understandable. Mar-tin(1995) referred to this as the communicability of the outcomes of the foresight process. Having foresight outcomes that are easily understandable by a wider audience, increases its use (Ratcliffe, 2006).
• Diffuse foresight results as triggers for response: Foresight results should be diffused in such a way that the insights themselves and the way they are communicated act as triggers for organizational responses. Presenting foresight results as uncertain futures should trigger an organization to act upon those uncertainties (Horton, 1999). As futures are inherently unpredictable, so are the results of the foresight process. As such, the foresight results should have the uncertainty of the future at its center —it must be seen as possible future courses of action, rather than prediction of what is to come (Horton,1999).
2.4. Systems approach
Next to a process approach to corporate foresight, other scholars argue that corporate foresight goes beyond being a set of approaches and techniques used to create an understanding of possible futures and how to respond to those. Rather, corporate foresight is conceptualized as an overarching futures orientation of the organization, paired with strong foresight capabilities (Becker,2002; Hines,2002;Ratcliffe,2006; Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008;von der Gracht et al.,2010). As such, these scholars refer to corporate foresight as an organizational orientation with underlying capabilities, or even an organizational "way of life" (Hines,2002).
From this ’systems perspective’, Rohrbeck and Gemuenden (2008) have formulated a best practices framework of corporate foresight based on qualitative studies. This framework has also been used in subsequent studies (Rohrbeck, Mahdjour, Knab, and Frese,2009;Rohrbeck and Schwarz, 2013). In this framework, corporate foresight is argued to be influenced by several capabilities in the areas of information usage, method sophistication, people & networks, organization, and culture. These capabilities reflect an or-ganization’s corporate foresight system concerning its strength in identifying, interpreting, and responding to discontinuous change (Hines,2002). Overall, the five capabilities as identified byRohrbeck and Gemuen-den(2008) highlight the main dimensions of corporate foresight, as such that an organization should aim to fulfil the capabilities as best it can. However, as all are essential for an effective implementation of corporate foresight (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008), resources should be properly assigned to all of them. The five capabilities are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.1. Information usage
Information usage refers to the capability of organizations to sense weak signals in the external environ-ment (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008). This capability shows similarities with the first stage (input) of the process approach. More specifically, the information usage capability refers to how an organization is able to gather insights from a broad range of environmental fields and the intensity to which an organization can scan these fields. Scanning from a broad range of fields can be achieved by devoting resources to scan a multitude of business fields (e.g. related and unrelated) and environmental fields (e.g. political, economic, technological, social) (Jain,1984). The intensity to which these are scanned is related to the use of varying information sources, and whether these are personal, restrictive and/or exclusive in nature (Rohrbeck et al., 2009).
2.4.2. Method sophistication
(Vecchiato,2012a). More specifically, method sophistication is related to the extent methods used are so-phisticated enough to incorporate specific future-related information, and how these methods fit in a specific business issue and -context. As such, methods should be able to incorporate market- and technological in-formation, as these are considered the main areas of corporate foresight (Becker, 2002). Furthermore, methods should be sophisticated in such a way, that it is possible to incorporate different time-horizons; i.e. short-term and long-term developments of a specific change. When methods fit a specific objective or business issue, and also the organization’s current business context (e.g. dynamic environment), they may be considered sophisticated (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008).
2.4.3. People & networks
The people & networks capability refers to specific characteristics employees involved in foresight activ-ities should possess (Rohrbeck et al., 2009). This capability is related to the reasoning that value is only created when collected information is interpreted by employees who then channel it to the decision makers of the organization (Rohrbeck et al.,2009).
Several employee characteristics are influential to this capability. The first being broad knowledge, reach-ing beyond one’s own domain, as this facilitates a quick understandreach-ing of a wide range of topics and over-comes the obstacle of specialized knowledge as dominant logic in the foresight process (Prahalad, 2004; Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008). Secondly, having strong internal and external networks, as internal net-works increase the diffusion rate and external netnet-works can deliver new and diverse information (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008;Rohrbeck et al.,2009). Third, being seen as credible and respected inside the orga-nization, as these signal a professional status which is needed for corporate foresight (Hines,2012). Lastly, being good communicators, to the extent that they can communicate foresight related information through both formal and informal networks (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008).
2.4.4. Organization
The organization capability refers to the extent to which the organization has formal and/or informal approaches to manage foresight information (Rohrbeck et al.,2009). The organization of corporate foresight can often be separated into a formal and an informal approach. Although being separate approaches, it is argued that an organization should employ both approaches together to have the best organization capability (Rohrbeck et al.,2009).
Formal organization of corporate foresight is related to top management being committed to, triggering, and directing foresight activities (Daheim and Uerz, 2006). As such, corporate foresight is a formally im-plemented approach which is triggered by top management to fulfil a specific business issue. Furthermore, formally implemented corporate foresight uses formal communication channels to disseminate foresight results (Rohrbeck,2011).
Informal organization relates to how foresight activities are triggered bottom-up by every employee in the organization encouraged to detect and communicate weak signals from the environment (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008). Moreover, informal organization allows for continuous foresight activities being in place (e.g. environmental scanning), as these can be done everywhere in the organization to help the whole organization make sense of the future (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008;Rohrbeck et al.,2009). As Costanzo(2004) found, informal and loose organization of certain foresight processes aided in creating a continuous evolving strategic foresight. Finally, informal networks are used to rapidly diffuse relevant foresight information (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008).
2.4.5. Culture
Culture as a capability refers to the extent to which the corporate culture is supportive to future-related scanning, interpretation and communication activities. According toRatcliffe(2006), foresight requires a transformation of corporate culture. Failure to perform and implement corporate foresight often occurs as organizations fail to recognize the magnitude and duration of effort that is required to implement a future oriented approach (Ratcliffe,2006;Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008).
environment and its way of doing business (Ratcliffe,2006). Second, a culture encouraging the building of strong external networks, networking and cooperation can sometimes be more important than the tasks of corporate foresight itself (Cuhls,2003). A strong external network would reduce the suspicion of external information, which would make the information more usable (Rohrbeck et al.,2009). Third, information related to foresight should be shared freely across functions and hierarchical levels in the organization. This ensures that the actions of all the organization’s departments are based on the same expectations of future developments (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden, 2008). A lack of willingness to share information can create a major obstacle for corporate foresight (Rohrbeck and Gemuenden,2008). Lastly, the culture should encourage every employee in the organization to be receptive to weak signals from the environment, as weak signals can often signal change early (Rohrbeck et al.,2009).
3. Antecedents of corporate foresight
While corporate foresight as an organizational phenomenon could be beneficial for any type of organi-zation, there may be certain aspects at play that dictate whether an organization logically needs or has to perform corporate foresight. This study builds upon the findings ofBecker (2002), who uncovered both internal and external antecedents of corporate foresight. We keep the same dichotomy between internal and external antecedents of corporate foresight.
Internal antecedents found byBecker(2002) were 1) innovative strategic orientation, and 2) long prod-uct development cycles driven by industry type. The first, having an innovation-leader strategy, refers to a strategic orientation being an antecedent of corporate foresight. Strategic orientations have been referred to as the reflection of an organization’s philosophy of how to do business through a set of values and beliefs that guide the attempt of an organization to achieve superior performance (Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). Other scholars similarly refer to certain strategic orientations as an antecedent of corporate foresight as well (i.e.Daft and Weick, 1984; Day and Schoemaker, 2005; Hambrick, 1982; Rohrbeck,2011). While these scholars adopt different descriptions of strategic orientations, this study used the generic strategies byMiles, Snow, Meyer, and Coleman Jr(1978) to provide a generalizable view on certain strategic orientations as antecedents of corporate foresight. While other generic strategies can be considered, such as those byPorter (1980), the Miles and Snow typology is highly suitable in the current research context as it focuses on the dynamics and uncertainty of environmental change (Miles et al.,1978). In extension,Gary(2009) proposed to examine the extent to which the generic strategies by Miles and Snow were related to corporate foresight. Next to the Miles and Snow typology, three other types of strategic orientations have been included in this study: entrepreneurial orientation, market orientation, and technology orientation. Research has found that corporate foresight is very much embedded in entrepreneurial activities, and is still very much focused on market- and technology aspects (Becker, 2002). The second internal antecedent identified by Becker (2002), having long product development cycle times, is not included as an internal antecedent in study. It is rather surprising why it was classified an internal antecedent, asBecker(2002, p. 8) actually puts it as "industries characterised by long product cycles [...]". Therefore, it raises the question as to why Becker included it as an internal antecedent, when it is driven by the industry. Therefore, we have classified this antecedent as external, rather than internal according toBecker(2002). Next to the internal antecedents identified by Becker(2002), we have included another based on literature. Learning orientation, which refers to a set of organizational values which influence a firm’s propensity to create and use knowledge (Sinkula, Baker, and Noordewier,1997), was included. Scholars have argued corporate foresight to be em-bedded in the ’learning-cycle’ concept byDaft and Weick(1984) and therefore a learning orientation would be an antecedent.
not been included as antecedents in this study. Similarly, organizational culture has been frequently cited as an internal antecedent as well (i.e. Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2006; Daheim and Uerz, 2008;Day and Schoemaker, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2006), in which cultural aspects such as freely sharing information about developments in the external environment, willingness to listen to these developments, and challenging of basic assumptions and consider alternatives, are part. While literature has raised the importance of cultural aspects for corporate foresight, the cultural aspect have been embedded in the ’culture’ capability of systems approach to corporate foresight. Therefore, cultural aspects have not been included in this study as antecedents. Furthermore, while organizational size has been mentioned byRohrbeck(2011) as being an internal antecedent, it has been included as a control measure in this study.
In sum, strategic orientations (Miles & Snow typology, entrepreneurial orientation, market orientation, and technology orientation), and learning orientation have been included as internal antecedents.
External antecedents found by Becker(2002) were 1) unpredictability of events in the external envi-ronment, 2) complexity of the relation between technology and social/cultural context, 3) opening up the organization to the external environment as a starting point for co-operation and innovation transfers, and 4) uncertainty in the environment as to what organizational responses to develop. The first, unpredictabil-ity of events in the external environment, has been included as an external antecedent. We have, however, classified it as environmental unpredictability (as part of environmental dynamism) as commonly done in literature. The second, complexity of the relation between technology and social/cultural context, has been included as well. Similarly, we have opted to use the term environmental complexity here as being a com-monly used term in literature. The third however, open up the organization to the external environment as a starting point for co-operation and innovation transfers, is not included. This antecedent is rather poorly described byBecker(2002), and can both be classified as an internal or external antecedent in the sense that an organization wants to open up the organization externally (i.e. for open innovation), or as an external antecedent through the external environment demanding ’opening-up’ in order to be successful. Due to this ambiguity, this antecedent has not been included in this study. The fourth, uncertainty in the environment as to what organizational responses to develop, has been included as well. Similarly, we have classified this as environmental uncertainty, as organizations were found to use corporate foresight to reduce uncertainty from the environment pertaining to what direction the organization should take (Becker,2002;Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b). Next to the external antecedents identified byBecker(2002), we have included an-other based on literature. Environmental rate of change (as part of environmental dynamism) has been given much attention as being an important antecedent to corporate foresight (Costanzo,2004;Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b), which therefore have been included in this study.
Table 1: Antecedents of corporate foresight from literature
Antecedents Authors
Internal factors
Management
Future oriented Andriopoulos and Gotsi(2006);Becker(2002);Daheim and Uerz(2008);Day and Schoemaker (2005);Hamel and Prahalad(1994);Ratcliffe(2006)
Organisational features
Size Rohrbeck(2011)
Culture Andriopoulos and Gotsi(2006);Daheim and Uerz(2008);Day and Schoemaker(2005); Rat-cliffe(2006)
Learning orientation Blackman and Henderson(2004);Bootz(2010);Burt and Van der Heijden(2003);Palma et al. (2006)
Strategic orientation Andriopoulos and Gotsi(2006);Becker(2002);Daft and Weick(1984);Day and Schoemaker (2005);Fuller and Warren(2006);Hamel and Prahalad(1994);Rohrbeck(2011)
External factors
Environmental dynamism (un-predictability & rate of change)
Becker(2002);Costanzo(2004);Day and Schoemaker(2005);Rohrbeck(2011);Vecchiato and Roveda(2010b)
Environmental complexity Becker(2002);Day and Schoemaker(2005);Rohrbeck(2011);Vecchiato and Roveda(2010b) Environmental uncertainty Becker(2002);Vecchiato and Roveda(2010b)
Development cycle time Becker(2002);Daheim and Uerz(2008);Rohrbeck(2011)
3.1. Internal antecedents
3.1.1. Miles & Snow generic strategies
Daft and Weick(1984) argued the existence of two types of organizations related to the usage of cor-porate foresight; proactive and passive organizations. Proactive organizations exhibit traits such as actively scanning its environment, test and challenge assumptions, and seek to shape its own environment. Pas-sive organizations do not actively search for information in its environment but accepts what it is given, and it sees the environment as given rather than manipulatable. Both types of organizations are similar to the ’prospector’ and ’defender’ generic strategies, as identified byMiles et al.(1978). Similarly,Hambrick (1982) used the generic strategies from Miles and Snow and concluded that strategic differences between ’prospector’ and ’defender’ organizations occurred primarily through the internal processes of analysing and interpreting information from the environment. Research has typically considered both prospector and de-fender types as being two extremes (Hambrick,2003).
Recent research has also identified strategic orientations as antecedents for corporate foresight (Becker, 2002;Rohrbeck, 2011). Becker(2002) refers to an ’innovation-leader’ strategy as a motive for corporate foresight, while Day and Schoemaker (2005) and Rohrbeck (2011) refer to a strategy characterized by innovation and growth. Both strategic orientations share many similarities with the ’prospector’ strategic orientation by Miles and Snow, of which, amongst others, a list of traits is given inTable 2. Prospectors aim to create future views beyond their own business area to identify opportunities (Slater and Mohr, 2006). Prospectors thus incorporate futurity in their decision making processes. In contrast, defenders are less inclined to create future views and are less future oriented in their decision making, but still exert some amount of environmental scanning and interpretation. With regard to the other two types, the reactor type is not associated with any form of a consistent business type, while the analyser is considered a hybrid of both prospector and defender. We would therefore expect that prospectors, analysers, and defenders are positively related to corporate foresight. As reactors have no intention of introducing futurity into their decision making but rather react to changes as they come their way, we would expect reactors to be negatively related to corporate foresight.
P1a. Prospector, analyser, and defender strategic orientations have a positive effect on corporate foresight.
P1b. A reactor strategic orientation has negative effect on corporate foresight.
Table 2: The Miles and Snow’s generic strategic orientations and its traits (O’Regan, Ghobadian, and Gallear,2006)
Strategic Orientation Main focus Traits
Prospector Entrepreneurial, innovation and new op-portunities oriented
External orientation, environment scanning, maximize new opportunities. Innovation to meet market needs. Flexibility and freedom from constraining company rules and regula-tions. Welcome change and see their environment as ’uncer-tain’
Defender Defending existing market. Targets a narrow market segment (may be a niche market). Uses a variety of means to de-fend existing market
External orientation, environment scanning, maximize new opportunities. Innovation to meet market needs. Narrow range of products/services Internal orientation, efficiency of existing operations. Uses well established ideas/methods and avoids unnecessary risk. Centralized control and a functional structure are common
Analyser Hybrid of Prospector and Defender types Operates well in both stable and dynamic markets. Thorough analysis. Uses efficiency and increased production in stable markets and innovates in dynamic markets
Reactor Reacts to change Short term planning, reacts to others actions. Change
in-evitably presents some difficulties
3.1.2. Entrepreneurial orientation
products, and be more proactive than competitors towards new market opportunities (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). An integral part of highly entrepreneurial firms is their proactive behaviour to identify new opportunities and manage risk-taking (Covin and Miles, 1999). Furthermore, entrepreneurial organizations are more willing to commit to and engage in creative processes and experi-mentation —in other words, they are more open to new ideas and change (Lumpkin and Dess,1996;Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, and Frese,2009).
AsGodet and Durance(2011) andCoates et al.(2010) argue, two important attitudes are needed for corporate foresight: 1) take risks as futures are inherently uncertain, and 2) as corporate foresight is con-cerned with desirable and probable futures, an organization can construct its own desired future through pro-activity. Research byBecker(2002) argued that corporate foresight seems inevitable for entrepreneurial and innovation-oriented organizations, as their strategies force them to constantly monitor innovation activ-ities of their competitors to pro-actively respond to these to secure or strengthen the future competitive posi-tions. Similarly,Hamel and Prahalad(1994) argue that a high priority should be placed on entrepreneurial foresight in competing for the future. Therefore, it is expected that entrepreneurial orientation is positively related to corporate foresight:
P2. Entrepreneurial orientation has a positive effect on corporate foresight 3.1.3. Market Orientation
Market orientation is an organizational culture that fosters behaviour aimed at efficiently and effectively creating superior value to customers (Narver and Slater,1990). A market oriented firm is one that shows a commitment to a set of processes, values, and beliefs that reflect the philosophy of basing decisions on customers and competitors. These decisions are based on a deep understanding of customer’s preferences and behaviour, and competitor’s abilities and intentions (Day,1994). Through this, a market oriented firm aims to satisfy customers better than its competitors.
As market orientation aims to get a deep understanding of both customers and competitors, corporate foresight can be needed to gain such deep understandings (Rohrbeck,2008). As meeting the needs of con-sumers is essential for innovation success, it is not sufficient to only identify current needs. Firms risk losing the foresight of innovating creatively when they solely focus on satisfying current needs from customers and may lead to short-sightedness, as consumers are inherently short-sighted (Hamel and Prahalad,1994). As corporate foresight is able to take in a multi-perspective view through the incorporation of information from many different environmental fields, it is able to identify changes in consumers’ values, lifestyles, and consequently their behaviour (Vecchiato and Roveda, 2010a). Through analysing exogenous factors such as government regulation, technology, and competitors through corporate foresight, a market oriented firm can identify consumer’s future needs and preferences (Huston,2004;Kohli and Jaworski,1990;Ruff,2006; Vecchiato and Roveda,2010a).
Similarly, corporate foresight may be very beneficial to create a deep understanding of competitors ( Bren-ner,1996). While corporate foresight does not only aim to uncover potential future intentions of competi-tors (i.e. related to technologies), it can also assess competicompeti-tors’ ability to acquire and interpret market-information (Makadok and Barney, 2001;Norling, Herring, Rosenkrans, Stellpflug, and Kaufman, 2000). As such, corporate foresight allows to create an understanding of competitors’ market-oriented performance and what its future moves may be. Indeed, research byBecker (2002) found that corporate foresight is widely used as a means to gain market-related information and understandings. Therefore, it is expected that market orientation is positively related to corporate foresight:
P3. Market orientation has a positive effect on corporate foresight 3.1.4. Technology Orientation
firm opts to use the latest technologies in its products/services, and as such is committed to R&D and ac-quisition of new technologies (Gatignon and Xuereb,1997). Furthermore, "creativity and invention are the organizational norms and values that guide its activities and strategies" (Zhou et al., 2005, p. 46). Not surprisingly, technology oriented firms aim to invent something drastically new, and therefore, employing state-of-the-art technologies and introducing breakthroughs becomes a strategic and cultural priority (Hamel and Prahalad,1994;Zhou et al.,2005).
As technologies can be both seen as drivers of and driven by change in social and economical areas, cor-porate foresight can provide valuable input into decision-making (Becker,2002). Through identification of possible future emerging technologies and technology developments, corporate foresight can better support decision-making about future R&D activities (Rohrbeck,2008). Identifying new technologies through scan-ning and observing current technological developments, and determiscan-ning opportunities and implications can be done through corporate foresight (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2006; Martin, 1995;Rohrbeck, 2008; Vecchiato and Roveda,2010a). As such, a technology-oriented firm is able to prepare for new technical opportunities, as well as monitor current developments and prevent technical surprises (Rohrbeck,2008; Slaughter,1998). Therefore, it is expected that a technology-oriented organization is more inclined to use corporate foresight:
P4. Technology orientation has a positive effect on corporate foresight 3.1.5. Learning orientation
A learning orientation refers to a set of organizational values that influence a firm’s propensity to create and use knowledge (Sinkula et al., 1997). A learning orientation enhances an organization’s capacity to revisit its current theories in use as guides for decision-making, and thus the degree to which proactive learning takes place (Baker and Sinkula,1999;Sinkula et al., 1997). One of the fundamental values of a learning orientation is its commitment to learning, which influences the extent to which an organization is promoting a learning culture (Sinkula et al.,1997). This core value is argued to be a prerequisite for an organization to improve its understanding of its environment (Sinkula et al.,1997). While all organizations attempt to learn when changes in the environment force them to do so (i.e. adaptive learning), it is the organization that learns and adapts for the future (i.e. generative learning) when its current business is going well that will be the long-term winners (Sinkula et al.,1997;Slater and Narver,1995).
As corporate foresight is associated with uncertain futures, it triggers the fear of "engaging with the outside, and fear of the future" (Burt and Van der Heijden,2003, p. 1019). Furthermore, as corporate fore-sight is essentially a learning process aimed at collective interpretation of information about the future and choosing appropriate actions for it, an organization’s ability and willingness to learn becomes an important prerequisite (Blackman and Henderson, 2004;Conway and Voros,2003). Also, as corporate foresight is based on the learning cycle as proposed byDaft and Weick(1984), we expect that a learning orientation will be positively related to corporate foresight:
P5. Learning orientation has a positive effect on corporate foresight 3.2. External antecedents
3.2.1. Development cycle time
P6. Development cycle time has a positive effect on corporate foresight 3.2.2. Environmental dynamism, complexity, and uncertainty
Literature has long emphasized environmental uncertainty to be an issue decision-makers in organi-zations have to deal with to create a successful future path for the organization (Vecchiato and Roveda, 2010b). Environmental dynamism and complexity have been referred to as being the two factors that create an uncertain environment (Duncan,1972;Verdu, Tamayo, and Ruiz-Moreno,2012). When the environment becomes increasingly uncertain (i.e. more dynamic and complex), decision-making is reliant on beliefs and mental models to handle this uncertainty. Having beliefs and mental models in place allow for having a frame of reference to base decision-making on (Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b). Such mental models thus give a simplified representation of the uncertain environment (i.e. small worldviews (Levinthal,2011)). In order to handle high amounts of environmental uncertainty, corporate foresight can be considered a relevant means to create and update mental models (Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b), as its focus is on analysing and interpreting an organization’s environment. AsDuncan(1972) argued, environmental uncertainty is depen-dent on environmental complexity and dynamism. Therefore, these factors may be considered antecedepen-dents of corporate foresight.
Environmental dynamism has been argued by Miller (1993) to consist of two characteristics that are treated distinct from each other; the rate of change (turbulence) and the unpredictability of change (Anand and Ward,2004). While both characteristics are part of dynamism, there is a difference in their relation to corporate foresight. First, a high rate of change would imply a continuous stream of changes being brought about in the environment. As such, changes arise quickly and decisions to respond to these changes can be considered short-term (Vecchiato and Roveda,2010b). As argued byCostanzo(2004), corporate foresight is of importance for an organization when it wants to keep up with the high rate of changes being brought about in its business environment. Indeed,Costanzo(2004) found that foresight was needed in high rate-of-change environments to deal with short-term matters and keep up with these short-term changes. Yet, contrasting to this, scholars argue that corporate foresight is meant to concentrate in a serious and systematic way on the longer term of futures without being dominated or hindered by short-term problems or changes (Martin,1995). Indeed,Becker(2002) argued that industries with low rates of change (i.e. chemical and pharmaceutical industries), were found to be relying more on corporate foresight than those who did not have these low rates of change. Given these mixed findings, we cannot propose that the rate-of-change of the environment is either positively or negatively related to corporate foresight. Rather, we would propose that the rate-of-change is non-significantly related to corporate foresight:
P7. Environmental rate-of-change has a non-significant effect on corporate foresight
Second, contrasting to the rate-of-change, the unpredictability of the organization’s external environment can be considered an antecedent of corporate foresight. When an organization is faced with an external en-vironment that is unpredictable, it must respond differently to such an enen-vironment (Daft and Weick,1984). Therefore, corporate foresight is needed to "construct, coerce, or enact a reasonable interpretation [of the environment] that suggests some next steps" (Daft and Weick,1984, p.287). It is thus through the envi-ronment being unpredictable, that it calls for a much more qualitative approach rather than quantitative. The latter is still something most business favor, even when faced with great uncertainties (Becker,2002; Ratcliffe,2006). Corporate foresight as a more qualitative oriented approach is better able to handle the un-predictability, as it is contrasting to the creation of predictions that quantitative (mathematical) approaches often aim to do (Becker,2002). Indeed, it was found in the study byBecker(2002) organizations use corpo-rate foresight as an ’early warning system’ for surprise events, i.e. to prepare for unpredictable events in the environment. As such, it is arguable that through the unpredictability of the environment an organization is more inclined to use corporate foresight as a means to interpret the external environment to consequently coerce or enact the interpretation (Daft and Weick,1984). It is therefore expected that a higher level of environmental unpredictability influences the extent to which an organization performs corporate foresight:
Environmental complexity is related to difficulty of understanding the factors in an organization’s exter-nal environment that are related to decision-making (Duncan,1972). In a sense, the complexity is related to the extent of heterogeneity in the environment; having many dissimilar actors (i.e. customers, consumers, competitors) or factors would lead to a more complex environment (Verdu et al., 2012). Furthermore, interdependence among organizations’ decisions has been argued to be part of environmental complexity (Levinthal,1997). Due to this interdependence, futures become difficult to predict and remain uncertain as firms’ decisions are dependent upon others’ decisions (Siggelkow and Rivkin,2005). Having many interde-pendent factors at play in the external environment that affect decision-making in an organization leads to difficulties in the gathering of sufficient and necessary information and cause-and-effect analysis (Sia, Teo, Tan, and Wei,2004). It thus leads to imperfect knowledge about the external environment (Verdu et al., 2012). Therefore, an organization would be required to extensively search for information in a wide range of factors of its external environment that make up the complex environment (Hambrick, 1982). Those organizations that operate in simple environments have less of a need to extensively research its external environment; it may even lead to resource wastage (Day and Schoemaker,2005). Corporate foresight thus has a great potential to raise awareness and generate much better knowledge about the interdependencies among the dissimilar factors in an organization’s external environment. Corporate foresight can provide long-term challenges and opportunities by interpreting the complex environment in order to provide an organization with the insight of how to shape the future (Becker,2002). As such, corporate foresight can help to handle uncertainty in the environment due to the complexity (Becker,2002;Vecchiato and Roveda, 2010b;von der Gracht et al.,2010). Therefore, it is expected that a higher level of complexity in the organi-zation’s external environment positively influences the extent to which an organization performs corporate foresight:
P9. Environmental complexity has a positive effect on corporate foresight
While Duncan (1972) argued that complexity and dynamism are the two factors that influence envi-ronmental uncertainty, they should be treated interdependent when it comes to envienvi-ronmental uncertainty. Duncan’s findings indicate that higher levels of environmental complexity did not have an impact on uncer-tainty, unless higher complexity was paired with higher levels of dynamism. This indicates that complexity and dynamism are contingent upon one another as a means to create environmental uncertainty. As Vec-chiato(2012b) argued, corporate foresight is used to handle environmental uncertainty. As such, we expect that a higher level of environmental uncertainty (i.e. the interaction effect of dynamism and complexity) will lead to a higher level of corporate foresight to cope with the uncertainties:
P10. Environmental uncertainty has a positive effect on corporate foresight 4. Methodology
4.1. Corporate foresight scale development
To measure corporate foresight, we build upon the systems approach framework by Rohrbeck and Gemuenden (2008), and create new scales for the process approach, as literature lacked any scales for the process approach.
diffuses the insights and learns from them. The items asked on a seven-point Likert scale ("strongly disagree" / "strongly agree") to what extent respondents performed certain activities. As such, the process approach measurement model for corporate foresight features a 15 item scale, intended to be of reflective nature.
For the systems approach, we used the framework by Rohrbeck and Gemuenden (2008) that views corporate foresight consisting of five distinct capabilities. This framework is used in subsequent studies (Rohrbeck et al.,2009;Rohrbeck and Schwarz, 2013). As this measurement model was not created with large-scale empirical analyses (e.g. factor and regression analyses) in mind, we performed an exploratory factor analysis on a prior dataset as used by both (Rohrbeck et al.,2009;Rohrbeck and Schwarz,2013) as a first step into refining the measurement model. We performed a principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to identify the number of factors and item factor-loadings (n=83). The analysis showed some problems with the items and their loadings onto the constructs. Appendix Ashows the results of this analysis. Results indicate that ’method sophistication’, ’people & networks’, and ’culture’ represent factors with items that load onto the desired factor. However, some items did not load onto a single factor as wanted. First, ’information usage’ shows a split view, but when we removed items that referred to scanning of specific environmental fields1, the remaining items loaded onto a single factor as intended. Secondly, ’organisation’ was rather troublesome. However, when we removed items that referred to specific links of corporate foresight with departments2, we found a split in organizing foresight. We interpreted the results of the ’organisation’ dimension in such a way, that 1) foresight is instigated by issues that are enforced through top management, and 2) foresight is instigated and maintained by employees themselves, causing for a continuous and bottom-up instigated foresight activities. They seem to be contrasting views on organizing foresight.
We consequently used the results from the PCA to refine the measurement model of the systems approach of corporate foresight by Rohrbeck and Gemuenden (2008). The resulting measurement model of the systems approach, which can be found inAppendix E, is a highly modified and revised model based on the PCA analysis and several feedback sessions with Dr. Rohrbeck and Dr. Huizingh. Overall, all items had been reworded for the final questionnaire. More specific changes to each of the dimensions are as follows. First, ’information usage’ had its items removed that referred to specific environmental fields, but kept the remaining four items which the PCA analysis showed to have high factor loadings. Second, ’method sophistication’ had items removed that referred to communication aspects of foresight methods. Third, ’people & networks’ had been renamed to ’people’, focusing only on characteristics of employees involved in foresight activities. Fourth, ’organization’ had been split into ’formal organization’ and ’informal organization’, as the PCA analysis showed a clear split in organizing forms. New items had been made for these two new factors. Items referring to specific links with other departments had been removed. Lastly, ’culture’ had been largely left untouched, with only the items being reworded. All in all, the revised measurement model for the systems approach of corporate foresight featured 27 items.
4.2. Pilot study
The entire questionnaire as used in this study was pretested with informants (i.e. academics, innovation managers) from universities and participants of the previous survey ofRohrbeck et al.(2009). The pretest was executed by Dr. Rohrbeck and K. von Weydenberg. Five participants were asked to comment on their ability to understand and answer the questions from the complete questionnaire. Their feedback was processed by interviews after the participant had filled out the questionnaire. Some changes were made after this pretest to the questionnaire with regard to wording and formulation. These changes and their reasoning can be found inAppendix B. For example, the participants were confused by the word ’organization’, as some viewed their own unit as an organization, rather than the whole firm as we intended to measure. Also, the words "external environment" received similar feedback, as some participants indicated that their external environment was considered everything outside their own department. As such, items were reformulated
1Research byBecker(2002) has found that virtually no organization performs scanning on all the environmental fields. As such, it is unwise to take in items that refer to each environmental field.
that we made clear that organization related to the whole firm, and the external environment related to everything outside the firm’s boundaries. After the pretest, the revised questionnaire was sent for proof reading by a native English speaker. Several small textual errors were corrected after the proofread. 4.3. Proposed setting and data collection
Initially, we intended to measure the extent to which the identified antecedents were related to corporate foresight. Unfortunately, we were unable to gather enough responses (N>60) for our research due to time constraints. Nevertheless, we will discuss our data collection approach. We combined a direct approach of gathering responses through e-mail and telephone with an indirect approach of contacting potential respondents through LinkedIn.
Regarding our sample scope, we intended to create a sample with organizations that had a focus on innovation. For this, we introduced a screening question that asked respondents whether their organization had introduced three or more product/service innovations in the last five years. Furthermore, as we aimed for innovative organizations, we only intended to receive responses from those that may be familiar with corporate foresight activities. As such, managers and directors from the realm of innovation, strategy, and corporate development were of interest. To achieve this, we asked respondents to fill out their function title. This also allowed us to identify higher-ranking respondents in the case of multiple respondents per organization.
For our direct approach, potential respondents were contacted first through e-mail, and followed up two weeks later by e-mail and/or telephone. The first mailing included a cover-letter as an explanation of our research; this cover-letter can be found inAppendix D. Potential respondents were provided by Dr. Rohrbeck, consisting mostly out of previous participants in his research on corporate foresight.
For our indirect approach, we used LinkedIn groups. LinkedIn provides us with a wide network of groups that share a particular interest, focused on professional usage and networking. As members in LinkedIn groups share a common interest in a particular topic, it allowed us to quickly approach a great number of relevant respondents. Furthermore, social networks such as LinkedIn are particular appropriate for our research context, as organizations with foresight activities tend to frequently use the internet for information gathering (Rohrbeck et al.,2009). Additionally, people involved in corporate foresight tend to have a broad external network and may therefore be more active on on-line social networks. To find the most appropriate LinkedIn groups, we searched with keywords such as "strategic innovation AND future", "strategic innovation AND foresight", and "strategic AND future AND planning" in the title and group description. Groups were deselected for 1) being a duplicate of another group, 2) being unrelated to the survey context, 3) being unrelated to managerial aspects of the survey context, 4) having a bias towards a company, industry, or region, and 5) having too few members (i.e. 5 members minimum). A full list of identified LinkedIn groups and their inclusion/exclusion reasons is provided inAppendix C, after having done a search on the 15th of May, 2013. After identifying four potentially relevant LinkedIn groups, we posted a message in these groups on the 26th of May 2013, informing the group members of our research together with a link to the online survey. A second posting was done 1.5 weeks after the initial posting, on the 6th of June, 2013.
4.4. Measurement of constructs
The questionnaire built for the purpose of data collection for this study and the study ofBakker(2013) consists of existing scales from the literature and the newly developed and revised scales for corporate foresight. The complete questionnaire as used in our survey with all the items for the measures can be found inAppendix E.
4.4.1. Dependent variables
4.4.2. Independent variables
Environmental dynamism (unpredictability). Three items of the five-item measure for environmental dy-namism with emphasis on the unpredictability aspect of dydy-namism should be used. The items ’actions of competitors are generally quite easy to predict’, ’product/service demand is easy to forecast’, and ’customer requirements / preferences are easy to forecast’ from the scale by Green, Covin, and Slevin (2008) for environmental dynamism measure the extent to which unpredictable changes occur in the environment. Environmental dynamism (rate-of-change). For the purpose of examining the rate-of-change aspect of envi-ronmental dynamism, we propose to use both the market turbulence (Han, Kim, and Srivastava,1998) and technology turbulence scales (Citrin, Lee, and McCullough, 2007). Both measures indicate the extent of environmental turbulences pertaining to the market and technology in a business environment (Han et al., 1998), and is therefore suitable for our research on corporate foresight (Becker,2002).
Environmental complexity. A five-item scale bySia et al.(2004) was used for environmental complexity that measures the extent to which an organization’s environment leads to difficulties in gathering sufficient and necessary information about the environment and whether changes are analysable and predictable. The items for this scale have been slightly changed to accommodate for the seven-point likert scale. Both environmental scales measure the perceptions of the environment.
Environmental uncertainty. As argued byDuncan(1972) complexity and dynamism are the two factors that influence environmental uncertainty. As such, we propose to create an interaction term of environmental dynamism (unpredictability and rate-of-change), and environmental complexity (Lumpkin and Dess,2001). Development cycle time. We created a categorical item to measure the typical development cycle time for organization’s new products/services. The item is based on findings byBecker(2002) with regard to the time-horizons in years that organizations use for corporate foresight.
Strategic orientation. A categorical item is used, based on theMiles et al.(1978) strategy typology (prospec-tors, analysers, defenders, and reactors). The measure ask respondents to identify a strategy type that most closely resembles its own organization’s strategy and was adapted fromSnow and Hrebiniak(1980), and has been used in many studies (e.g.Wang(2008)).
Entrepreneurial orientation. A three-item scale byZhou et al.(2005) to measure entrepreneurial orientation has been included.
Technology orientation. A four-item scale byZhou et al.(2005) has been included to measure technology orientation.
Market orientation. We included a six-item scale byBaker and Sinkula(2007) to measure market orienta-tion.
Learning orientation. We used the sub-construct ’commitment to learning’ of the learning orientation mea-surement model (Pesämaa, Shoham, Wincent, and Ruvio, 2013), in order to measure an organization’s propensity to learn. The sub-construct commitment to learning uses an four-item scale bySinkula et al. (1997).
4.4.3. Control variables
Organizational size and age. Size, in full-time employees, has been included to account for the effect of having more organizational resources at disposal, which are argued to be needed to implement corporate foresight (Rohrbeck et al.,2009). Similarly, the age of the organization has been included.
Industry. Industry been taken into account, as some industries (e.g. chemicals, automotive) are inherently more inclined to use corporate foresight than others due to their long-term nature of developments (Becker, 2002;Daheim and Uerz,2008).
Competitive intensity. The intensity of competition has been added as a control variable, as (Horton,1999) argues that (industry) competitiveness can be one of the reasons for engaging in corporate foresight. Two items fromAuh and Menguc(2005) and two items fromZhou et al.(2005) allow us to measure competitive intensity.
Technological sophistication. We have included a measure to examine an organization’s environmental tech-nological sophistication. Literature has used this to determine whether the organization operates within a high- or low-tech industry, and has been argued to be a fundamental environmental dimension that has important implications for managing an organization (Covin, Prescott, and Slevin,1990). Furthermore, as the research byBecker (2002) was based on mostly high-tech organizations, this control variable should negate this bias.
Market turbulence and technological turbulence. These variables are not used in this study as controls. Both variables were found to measuring environmental rate-of-change. Therefore, we proposed to use both market turbulence and technological turbulence as indicators for environmental rate-of-change as done in the study byHan et al.(1998).
5. Discussion 5.1. Findings
This study started with the finding that not all scholars agree upon the conceptualization of corporate foresight as an organizational phenomenon, and upon which antecedents this phenomenon relies. There-fore, it was necessary to review the available literature on corporate foresight to provide a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon and its antecedents.
On corporate foresight, a thorough literature review showed us that the two accepted approaches to cor-porate foresight, the systems- and process approach, shared the same intent as to what corcor-porate foresight as an organizational phenomenon intends to achieve. It is that both approaches aim to gain understand-ings of possible and desirable futures and to anticipate and prepare for those futures by giving input into organizational decision-making. It is therefore that this study has treated both approaches similar (i.e. they both represent corporate foresight), but that both approaches differ much content-wise. Where the system approach focuses on specific elements of a corporate foresight system within an organization, the process approach focuses on activities that should be performed. As there is no evidence on what would be ’best’ or whether the two approaches are complementary, we defined corporate foresight as an organizational phe-nomenon that is either process- or systems based. Furthermore, while some scholars had included specific actions in defining corporate foresight, we argued with future quantitative research and better generaliz-ability in mind, specific actions should not be included in the definition of corporate foresight. Having the scope of corporate foresight defined, it allowed us to devise measurement models for both approaches for future validation and testing.
