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On the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Policy Instruments for the Procurement of
Environmental Services
Dijk, J.J.
2015
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citation for published version (APA)
Dijk, J. J. (2015). On the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Policy Instruments for the Procurement of
Environmental Services. VU University.
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Contents
List of Figures xiii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The bigger picture 2 1.2 Principal-agent problems and solutions 4 1.3 Experimental economics 6 1.4 Research questions 9 2 An Overview of Policy Instruments 13 2.1 Introduction 14 2.2 Categorizing the policy instruments 17 2.3 Assessment criteria for the policy instruments 22 2.4 Case study: Eco-friendly riverbanks 24
2.5 Conclusion 35
3 The Menu of Contracts Approach 37 3.1 Introduction 38
3.2 The model 43
3.3 Optimal conservation when land quality is predetermined 47
3.3.1 Land quality investment 47
3.3.2 The complete information solution 49
3.3.3 Is((!!∗!, !!∗!),(!!∗!, !!∗!))incentive compatible? 50
3.3.4 Graphical analysis when land quality is predetermined 53 3.4 Optimal conservation when land quality is endogenous 55
3.4.1 Land quality investment 55
3.4.2 The complete information solution 56
3.4.3 Is((!!∗!, !!∗!),(!!∗!, !!∗!))incentive compatible? 58
3.5 Empirical validity of the key assumptions 60
3.6 Conclusion 64
3.A Appendix 66
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4.4 Conclusion 95
4.A Appendix 97
5 Wildlife Corridor Auctions 115 5.1 Introduction 116 5.2 A corridor auction model 119 5.3 Simulation framework and scenarios 127 5.4 Simulation results 130 5.5 Conclusion 139
5.A Appendix 140
6 Trust and Control 149 6.1 Introduction 150 6.2 The game and the experimental design 153 6.3 Experimental results 158 6.4 Conclusion 171 7 Conclusions and Discussion 173
References 182
