China – The Unbreakable Wall for Democracy?

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China – The Unbreakable Wall for Democracy?

Evaluation of the European Soft Approach in the Field of Human

Rights Promotion

University of Groningen IRIO Master’s Thesis

Gergely Zsolt Koppány Address: Munkácsy Mihály utca 44. Nagykovácsi, 2094, Hungary

Tel.: 0036709454948

gergo.koppany@gmail.com

Student number: 1940465 Thesis supervisor: Dr. Joost Herman

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List of acronyms

ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe CCP Chinese Communist Party

CFSP Common Security and Foreign Policy CoE Council of Europe

CSO Civil Society Organisation EC European Community

ECHRD EU-China Human Rights Dialogue ECHRS EU-China Human Rights Seminar ECHR European Convention on Human Rights ECJ European Court of Justice

EEAS European External Action Service EFP European Foreign Policy

EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights EInDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights EP European Parliament

EPC European Political Cooperation EPE Ethical Power Europe

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ESS European Security Strategy

ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement

EU European Union

EUSA European Union Studies Association GBCC Great Britain China Centre

ICC International Criminal Court

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICT International Campaign for Tibet

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Ruanda

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IOC International Olympic Committee

IR International Relations

MEP Member of the European Parliament NGO Non-governmental Organisation NPE Normative Power Europe

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PAP People’s Armed Police

PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China PSC Political and Security Committee

RAEM Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities UN United Nations

UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization TAR Tibet Autonomous Region

TIG Tibet Intergroup

WUC World Uighur Congress

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1. Introduction - The Emerging Sino-European Axis

Since Chinese people had ‘stood up’ on 1st October 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become a significant world player which stance has to be taken into account whatever decision is made in global politics. The Chinese mediator role in the six-party talks with North Korea and with Iran has already shown its key position in international affairs. In 1975 the European Union (EU) and China established diplomatic relations1, which culminated in 2003 when the Sino-European cooperation developed to a strategic partnership2; it was a “great leap forward”.

However the hot-and-cold relationship is an unequivocal consequence of the different systems and cultural backgrounds. The high level of economic interdependence often mitigates the political differences: China is the second largest trade partner of the EU, and at the same time most of the Chinese exports arrive in the EU.3 Therefore analyzing their partnership is significant from the point of view of international relations (IR) and provides a great amount of unexploited field for research. On the other hand, doing business with the EU is always complicated as it is a deviant political creature without sovereignty over its member states. Hence the global actorhood or rather international role of the EU has become one of the most debated issues in the academic literature.4 Accordingly, investigating how the EU is capable of pursuing its foreign policy goals in third countries without significant military potential may contribute to the extension of the Community’s global activity. All these affairs beg the question, “What kind of function will the EU be able to perform in the 21st century?” Moreover the fast-developing Sino-European relationship has transformed into one of the most important in international affairs and may serve as a source of stability in the multipolar world, as David Shambough noticed.5 Besides, the EU Delegation in Beijing is one of the largest, which underscores the significance of the Sino-European relationship. Since 1998 the leaders of the EU and the PRC have met in ambitious annual summits which have been accompanied by several sectoral dialogues and seminars. However, this relationship is a

1_{Lingliang, Zeng (2009), A Preliminary Perspective of Negotiations of EU–China PCA: A New Bottle Carrying}

Old Wine or New Wine or Both?, European Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2009, p.121.

2

Scott, David (2007), ‘China and the EU: A Strategic Axis for the Twenty-First Century?’, International Relations Vol. 21(1) pp. 23-45.

3_{In 1975 the bilateral trade was only $2,4 billion, while in 2008 the trade volume reached $425,6 billion (Chen,}

Xin (2009), ‘Policy Evolution of the China-EU Trade and Economic Relationship’, Available at: http://ies.cass.cn/en/UploadFiles_8765/201003/2010030813451355.pdf, Accessed: 11th July 2010).

4_{Orbie, Jan (2006), ‘Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates’, Cooperation and}

Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association Vol. 41(1) pp. 123–128.

5_{Shambaugh, David (2005), ‘The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s Rise’,}

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rather fragile one, as it has been indicated by several thorny issues: the arms embargo imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown, the EU’s enormous trade deficit6, access to the Chinese market, market economy status, climate change and serious human rights abuses. For instance in 2008 several dialogues were stalled and the annual summit was postponed due to the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama who is regarded as a separatist conspirator masterminding unrests in Tibet, for example, the one in March 2008.7 The main European concerns are related to a series of severe human rights violations, which are considered a sovereignty issue by Beijing.

1.1 The EU as a “good international citizen”

Europe is often seen in Asia as only a trade partner with little political influence on the region in contrast with the USA which is conceived as a superpower by Chinese policy-makers.8 Although the USA is not a credible international norm-setter as the path of safeguarding its sovereignty has been chosen instead of strengthening global governance. Furthermore the fact that the USA leans on military power, which is not always in compliance with international law, may strengthen this assumption. As a result both the American soft and hard power has weakened; hence the USA is losing its legitimacy to dominate the world.9

Unlike the USA, the EU aims to promote an effective multilateral system, strengthen global governance, uphold and develop international law based on the UN Charter.10 Thus the EU intends to strengthen its normative profile in IR. The EU’s legitimacy to act as a norm-setter stems from the success of integrating almost all European states into one international organization creating a 500 million people single market and giving a quarter of the world’s GDP. It can be concluded that despite its trend setting capacity, the role of the EU in Asia is often undervalued.11 Although it is worth mentioning that the ‘gentle power EU’, which

6

Europe's trade deficit in 2009 was €128 billion; it shrank for the first time in years. (‘EU-China trade in facts and figures 2010’, Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/352& type=HTML, Accessed: 11th May 2010).

7_{China Daily (2008), ‘China postpones EU summit over Dalai Lama visit’, Available at:}

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-11/27/content_7244157.htm Accessed: 15th June 2010.

8

Wisenbach, Uwe (2009), ‘The EU and China – reconciling interests and values in an age of interdependence - The dilemma between economic interests and human rights’, Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/ seoul/06522.pdf, Accessed: 12th June 2010.

9

Ibid., p.3.

10_{‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy (2003), Available at:}

http://www.consilium.europa .eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, Accessed: 5th March 2010.

11_{Ka Lok Chan, Kenneth (2008) EU in China: Images, Visibility and the Prospects of Soft Power, Available at:}

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supports multilateralism12, as well as Chinese foreign policy doctrines, might be more enticing than the hegemonic endeavours of the USA.

In 2007, negotiations were launched on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to replace the obsolete 1985 Agreement on economic and trade cooperation.13 According to the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) website, the main priorities of the EU policy towards the PRC are to:

- broaden and deepen dialogue with China, both bilaterally and on the world stage (e.g. working together on global challenges such as climate change);

- support China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights;

- encourage the ongoing integration of China into the world economy and trading system, and support the process of economic and social reforms;

- raise the EU’s profile in China, to aid mutual understanding.14

The promotion of human rights is one of the main foreign policy objectives of the EU as it can be derived from key European documents ranging from the Treaty of Rome to the recent Lisbon Treaty15 and to the use of human rights clause in its international agreements16 both with developed and developing countries. Promoting these norms is crucial in the European China policy too, as the latest policy paper, the ‘Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities’ indicated it in 2006:17

“Democracy, human rights and the promotion of common values remain fundamental tenets of EU policy and of central importance to bilateral relations. The EU should support and

12

Balducci, Giuseppe (2008), ‘Inside Normative Power Europe: Actors and Processes in the European Promotion of Human Rights in China’, EU Diplomacy Papers, 8 / 2008, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, p.4.

13_{Smith, Michael and Xie, Huaixian (2009), ‘The EU and ‘Strategic Partnership’ with China: How Much}

Strategy? How Much Partnership?’, UACES Annual/Research Conference Angers, France, September 3-5, 2009.

14_{European Union External Action Service – China, Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/china/index_en.htm,}

Accessed: 17th June 2010.

15

For instance the ESS: “Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” (‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy (2003), p. 11.).

16

The EU uses the ‘human rights clause’ in international agreements to respond human rights violations in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (Smith, Karen E. (2003), ‘European Union foreign policy in a changing world’, Polity, Cambridge, p. 111).

17_{Men, Jing (2008), ‘EU-China Relations: from Engagement to Marriage?’, EU Diplomacy Papers , 7/2008}

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encourage the development of a full, healthy and independent civil society in China. It should support efforts to strengthen the rule of law - an essential basis for all other reform”. 18

The EU dauntlessly intends to engage China to foster the transition to an open society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, the official forum for which is the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue (ECHRD). Although the normative profile of the European Foreign Policy (EFP) is often confronted with the Chinese counterpart’s strategy, which is governed by a realist, sovereignty-driven agenda.19 Beijing considers human rights as an internal matter thus any endeavour purported to change the human rights situation is seen as interference with its domestic affairs. Accordingly, how these two attitudes will be reconciled is crucial from the point of view of a stable relationship.

One of the strongest diplomatic tools of the EU to exert influence on a third country is to offer membership but in case of the PRC, there is no prospect of joining the Integration. Therefore, promoting human rights in China is an extremely difficult task, hence the EU’s achievements in this field can be considered as a gauge of its weight in world affairs and its ability to influence human rights policy in third countries. Despite launching several dialogues, seminars and programmes by the EU which attempted to improve China’s bad human rights records, there was no visible progress according to plenty of analysts.20 At the same time many critics, sitting in the European Parliament (EP)21, deem that the Human Rights Dialogue with China initiated in 1995 is used as a ‘fig leaf’ just to ease the public concern about human rights abuses.22 Hence the presumed gap between the desired outcome and reality suggests that it is worth examining the European Foreign Policy’s effectiveness in the field of human rights promotion in China. The dissertation aims to exemplify the EU’s normative endeavours through three case studies: the issue of death penalty and the case of the Tibetan and Uighur minorities. I deem that these cases may be important indicators how the EU is able to conduct its foreign policy in a normative way.

18_{European Commission, ‘EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities’, Communication of the}

Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (2006), p.4.

19

Wisenbach, (2009), p.1.

20

See for example: Fox, J. and F. Godement (2009), ‘A Power Audit of EU-China Relations’, European Council on Foreign Relations Report.

21_{The EP is the most critical EU institution towards China. It also gave the 2008 Sharakov Prize (devoted to}

honour individuals who combat oppression intolerance and fanaticism) to Hu Jia who is a determined human rights defender held in custody in China. (Xinhua News (2008c), Chinese FM: European Parliament human rights award to Hu Jia wrong, Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200812/18/content_1052531 6.htm, Accessed: 17th June 2010).

22

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Myriad studies discovered the normative or ethical feature of the European Foreign Policy. Since the 1970s many scholars debated about the international role of the EU, but mainly two strands of thought had dominated the dispute: the civilian and military power Europe. Despite the dissents, everybody is in agreement that the EU is something unprecedented in the history of IR. In 2002 Ian Manners created the notion of Normative Power Europe (NPE) which seems to grasp the real nature of the EFP. According to Manners, the debate should go beyond the analysis of state-like features, as the EU is a sort of ideological power. By using the power of norms, the EU is able define what is normal in IR23. The theoretical and analytical toolkit of the NPE theory serves as a framework for the present investigation.

As Manners shows human rights issues can serve as excellent litmus tests for analysing the normative power of the EU. Therefore the NPE will be assessed through the three aforementioned case studies. Furthermore as Keohane paraphrased that the military related issues are prone to divide member states as they have different approaches to freedom, and neutrality etc. While positive symbolic issues like protecting human rights or environment are highly attractive for EU member states and the EU24. These issues may give the Union grounds to emphasize common European values and reinforce its moral role and self-esteem in the world25. Hence the chosen human rights related cases can be considered relevant studies to evaluate the EU’s normative activities.

Therefore my research question is: To what extent is the EU able to exert influence in

a normative way on China in the field of human rights? Furthermore, the analysis will

navigate through three more sub-questions to substantiate the main research theme, such as:

1) What factors - which contribute to the norm diffusion - can be identified in the European human rights policy, which improve China’s human rights records, in case of Tibetan and Uighur minorities, and death penalty?

2) How is the EU’s identity constructed in the relationship with the PRC?

23

Manners, Ian (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, p.236.

24_{Keohane, Robert O. (2002), ‘Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States’, Journal of}

Common Market Studies Vol. 40. No. 4 p.746.

25

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3) To what extent can the EU be considered as a credible norm diffusing agent promoting human rights in China?

The NPE works through ideas and opinions, and aims to move beyond the state-centred analysis through better understanding of the EU identity. Thus evaluation of the EU political self-representation constitutes a central part of the research in order to assess how the EU is able exert influence on China. According to Thomas Diez the EU’s identity is constructed against the ‘other’ which will also be tested in the aforementioned cases26. Analysing the EU’s self-representation and identity also enables us to decide whether the Union behaves as a credible norm diffusing agent or not. If the EU attempts to ‘lead the world by example’ credibility is a crucial factor. In Manners’ view the EU influences the IR by ‘what it is’ and not by ‘what it does’.27 Hence to decide whether the EU is able to act as a norm diffusing agent in the relationship with China it is indispensable to conduct a discursive analysis. Then it is necessary to identify the main factors – defined by Manners - in the EU policy through which the norm diffusion may take place in order to examine how the EU attempts to export norms to China. All these sub-themes contribute to answering the main research question; “To what extent is the EU able to influence China’s human rights record by its normative power”.

1.2 Research Design

The research is based on secondary sources but it also examines a large amount of primary sources to analyse how the EU’s identity is constructed. Additionally the study provides a qualitative investigation to answer the research questions. The first section summarizes the theoretical developments and evolution of the concept of the ‘normative power’ and pays attention to different ways through which the norm diffusion can take place as defined by Ian Manners. Besides the theoretical and analytical framework, the most important criticisms of the NPE theory will be paraphrased. This is necessary as the NPE theory and its constructive criticisms serve as a theoretical tool to conduct the research.

The second section is devoted to the case studies. The EU promotes its norms through development aid, CFSP and the Copenhagen membership criteria. I will focus on the CFSP level and I will take the example of three aforementioned case studies which are going to be

26_{Diez, Thomas (2005), ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative Power}

Europe'’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005; p. 614.

27

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trimmed down; I will pay greater attention to the execution of Akmal Shaihk and the riots in Tibet in March 2008 and in Xinjiang in July 2009. These cases are indicative of a general pattern as regards the EU’s attitude towards China as they cover a wide range of human rights issues. I will investigate responses (both rhetorical and substantive) of the EU and member states given to human rights abuses in the three cases which may reveal how credible the promotion of the normative agenda is in the case of China. Every chapter analyses how the EU represents itself against the ‘other’, how it seeks to spread moral values and whether the EU appears to be credible in exporting norms to China or not. The factors (elaborated below), which contribute to norm diffusion will be identified and analysed in the course of the aforesaid cases. At the end of every section sub-conclusions will be drawn to summarize my partial results.

The third part discusses and analyses my findings and tries to answer the main research question. In the section the EU’s self-representation and norm diffusing factors identified in the three case studies will be compared and examined. Furthermore the EU’s achievements are assessed in order to evaluate the normative power of the EU. In this study I would like to contribute to the debate concerning the EU’s international role by analysing one of the most important relationships in IR from the NPE point of view.

2. “Leading the world by example”

As not being a territorial state like the USA or China, the EU is not likely to become a great- or superpower in a traditional manner.28 Then what kind of power is the EU? How can it exert influence on its milieu if multiple interests are coming from 27 capitals? In this section the concepts which move beyond the borders of nation state will be introduced with emphasis on the NPE theory. Then the main critics of the conception will be presented as Manners seminal article sparked a vivid academic debate. It is indispensible to bring forward these re-conceptualizations to examine the EU’s international role and impact and to assess how the Union as a whole represents itself against China.

2.1 A Different Kind of Power

28_{Miliband, David (2007), ‘Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower - speech to the College of Europe’,}

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The events of the 1970s inter alia; enlargement, Henry Kissinger’s famous complaint about the lack of central telephone number if he wants to talk to Europe, the Davignon Report which initiated a loose foreign policy coordination (European Political Cooperation, EPC) begged unanswered questions concerning the international role of the EU.29 As a first reaction, Francois Duchene coined the notion of civilian power (despite the fact that this label was not used in his writings) which kicked off the buoyant academic discussion.30

According to Duchene, the European Community (EC) is able to contractualize its relations on the basis of treaties and conventions; therefore it conducts external relations with civilian means.31 He argued that the EC cannot be a military power (this was not the idea of the founding fathers) additionally it prefers to use economic and political rather than military means to achieve its aims.32 In 2000 Romano Prodi, the incumbent Commission President at this time underpinned Duchene’s concept by saying that: “we must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security”.33 Later on Johan Galtung considered the EC such an alliance, which is able to influence the world with its ideas.34 Thus the early debate about the EU’s role in the world was about whether to abandon the toolkit of the Westphalian system and move beyond the member state to define a new kind of power of the Community.

In contrast, in the 1980s35 Hedley Bull, the prominent member of the English School argued in his famous article, titled ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ that the Community has to develop a military capacity in order to be taken seriously in world affairs. Bull reckoned that the nation state did not lose its importance in international relations and compares the notion of civilian power to the idealism of the 1920s and 1930s. “Europe is

29_{King, Toby (1999), ‘Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure for Post-modern}

Diplomacy’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10 No. 2, p.316.

30_{Laïdi, Zaki (2008b), ‘EU foreign policy in a globalized world : normative power and social preferences’,}

Routledge, Abingdon, p. 38.

31_{Laïdi, Zaki (2008a), ‘Norms over force : the enigma of European power’, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.}

36-37.

32_{The expression was created by François Duchêne in the 1970s. He “urged the Community to be an exemplar}

of a new stage in political civilisation. The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power” (quoted by Smith, Karen E. 2005, ‘Still ‘civilian power EU?’, European Foreign Policy Unit, Working Paper 2005/1, London School of Economics, p.3).

33_{Prodi, Romano (2000), ‘2000-2005 Shaping the New Europe’, European Parliament, Speech 00/41,}

Strasbourg, Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/00/41&format =HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, Accessed: 11th May 2010.

34_{Whitman, Richard (1998), ‘From civilian power to superpower? : the international identity of the European}

Union’, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, p.11.

35_{The period was characterized by the invigorating cold war tensions due to the instalment of euro-missiles and}

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not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one”36 without significant military power. The end of the bipolar world rendered these conceptions obsolete and more up-to-date theories were born on both sides.

At the beginning of the 1990s Maull redefined the notion of civilian power through analyzing Germany and Japan. He deemed that the notion means preference to peaceful conflict settlement and the use of binding multilateral framework to organize international relations.37 Later on Christopher Hill in his much-cited article elaborated on the possible roles of Europe in the new world order and dealt with the existence of the “capability-expectation gap”.38 The expression was created to depict the gap between the EU’s capabilities which are actually able to perform and the capabilities which have been talked up both internally and externally.39 The next landmark was the Maastricht Treaty which dealt with the issue and created the second pillar of the EU to give a “sort of single voice” to twelve member states. Nevertheless the EU was not able to develop a real Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thus the high expectations disappointed those who considered the CFSP as a strategy which was supposed to move beyond the original civilian power concept.

Due to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which adopted guidelines to develop the Rapid Reaction Force40, the realist view got a new impetus as the work of Adrian Hyde-Price indicated. In contrast Robert Kagan’s famous article underpinned that Europe is different than the contemporary powers. According to Kagan the “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”41 as Europeans moved away from using power and prefer the consensus-seeking diplomacy. While the US still believes that international relations are characterized by the Hobbesian portrayal and the different mechanisms used fit to this view. However according to Kagan the EU’s pacifism in IR is not a choice of Europe, rather a necessity as it does not possess the sufficient military capabilities

36_{Bull, Hedley (1982), ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market}

Studies, Vol. 21 Issue 1/2, p.151.

37_{Zaki (2008a), p.37.} 38

Hill, Christopher (1993) ‘The Capabilities-Expectations Gap – Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No 3. pp. 305-28.

39_{Ibid., p.306.}

40_{Dover, Robert (2007), ‘The EU’s Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies’, in: Michelle Cini, European Union}

politics (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press, 2007. p.244.

41_{Kagan, Robert (2002), ‘Power and Weakness, Policy Review’, No. 113 (June and July 2002), Available at:}

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to behave differently.42 It is still debated whether the militarization of Europe would result in a decline of the civilian power Europe profile or not.43

Three decades later, after Duchene’s remarkable analysis in 2002, Ian Manners formulated the concept of Normative Power Europe on the analytical basis of civilian power which proved to be an influential theory concerning Europe’s place in the world.44 Manners’ seminal article sparked a vivid academic debate which is still going on. In his concept the “ideological power” receives great emphasis. Manners tries to move beyond the state-centred analysis and focuses on the identity of the EU in order to abandon the question whether the EU is a global actor or not which according to him is not the point. He believes that the EU is able to exert an influence by its preference to overarching norms. Since the creation of the concept plethora of studies have gone to press dealing with the topic. The next section elaborates on the concept of NPE then presents its main critics and limitations.

2.2 Normative Power Europe – “the greatest power of all”

As it was mentioned before, Ian Manners coined the notion of NPE, which triggered a vivid academic debate vis-à-vis the international role of the EU. His article was chosen as one of the five pieces of the most influential and important academic work by the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) in 2007 released in the past ten years.45 Moreover the Commission President, José Manuel Barroso also “broadly agrees” with Manners’ concept: “we are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world”.46 David Milliband, the former British Foreign Secretary also endorses the notion and he calls it ‘model Europe’ in his speech in Bruges; “in the way it dispenses its responsibilities around the world; it can be a role model that others follow”.47 This section reviews Manners’ concept and points out his main findings.

42_{Ciambra, Andrea (2008), ‘’Normative Power’ Europe: Theory and Practice of EU Norms. The Case of}

Macedonia’, Jean Monnet Working Papers 64, p.3.

43

Akbaba, Sertan (2009), ‘Measuring EU Actorness Through CFSP and ESDP: Civilian Power EU’, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, p.21.

44_{Manners, (2002).}

45_{DIIS (2007), ‘EU article by DIIS researcher one of the five most important’, Available at:}

http://www.diis.dk/sw37279.asp, Accessed: 12th June 2010

46_{‘José Manuel Barroso = Political Scientist, John Peterson interviews the European Commission President’, 17}

July 2007, Complete Transcript, Available at: http://www.eu-consent.net/library/BARROSO-transcript.pdf, Accessed: 14th May 2010

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According to Manners’ definition, the normative power is the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’.48 He borrows and develops the idea of Robert Rosencrance who reflected that a continent, previously the heaven of imperialism is now spreading universal normative standards, thus the EU’s “attainment is more normative than empirical”.49 The NPE is viewed as a sort of ideological power, idée force or “power over opinion”.50 The EU has normative goals which can be best described by Arnold Wolfers differentiation between ‘milieu’ and ‘possession’ goals.51

Manners considered the debate about the military vs. civilian power Europe outdated as the EU has taken the path of supranationalism. Earlier both Duchene and Bull insisted on the status quo in IR therefore they could not abandon the nation state as the centre of the analysis. Besides that, Duchene identified civilian power mainly with economic influence while according to Bull, the military power Europe is in accordance with its physical capabilities.

In contrast, in Manners’ view the EU has rather an ideational impact on other members of the international community. The NPE intends to shift our focus from empirical research on the EU and its policies to symbolic factors. Hence Europe’s normative power stems from ‘what the EU is’ and not from ‘how it behaves’ or ‘what it does’.52 Manners foresaw the future criticism that Europe is an imperialist power therefore he elucidated why Europe is different. He explains that the EU is a peculiar combination of “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution” where the normative difference comes from, consequently the NPE exceeds the Westpahilan traditions.53 The normative basis of the Union is stemming from the treaties, declarations and conventions set up during the sixty years of its existence. Manners names five core norms which are diffused by the EU inter alia peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.54 Furthermore the EU’s particular profile is constructed by the notions of pooled sovereignty, transnational representation in the EP and the European solidarity.55 The EU does not only have normative goals but it intends to

48_{Manners, (2002)., p.239.} 49_{Laidi, (2008b), p.39.} 50 Manners, (2002), p.239. 51

Milieu goals are aimed to change the wider environment of the international landscape (for common good) while in the pursuing of possession goals actors are governed by short term self-interest (Smith, Karen E., 2003, p.10)

52

Manners, (2002)., p.252.

53_{Ibid., p. 240.}

54_{These values received great emphasis for instance in the following documents: Declaration on European}

Identity (1973), Copenhagen criteria (1993), ESS (2003).

55

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achieve them in a normative way, which constitutes the largest difference between the US and Europe.

As Manners suggests the EU’s normative power stems from six factors56 through which it is capable of promoting its norms:

- Contagion (unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors),

- Informational diffusion (result of a range of strategic communications),

- Procedural diffusion (involves institutionalization of a relationship between the EU

and a third party),

- Transference (the diffusion takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trades, aids

technical assistance through either substantive or financial means),

- Overt diffusion (occurs as a result of physical presence of the EU in third states and

international organisations),

- Cultural filter (affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms. It is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion). Manners mentions China as an example where this method of diffusion is at work spreading democratic norms.57

The NPE theory refers to the soft approach of the EU, which often proved to be more successful than hard power. So can we state that the NPE is on a par with Joseph Nye’s soft power? Nye was examining the foreign policy of the USA and made a distinction between soft and hard power. He reckons that soft power is based on attraction and cooptation and its resources are culture, values, and institutions.58 However Manners and Diez argues that normative power is not interchangeable with soft power as the latter is empirical rather than theoretical.59 In their view while normative power is not about possession goals, the American

56_{Although according to criticisms these items lack conceptual clarity.}

57_{Manners, (2002), p.244-245. See also: Whitman, Richard (2002), ‘The Fall and Rise of Civilian Power}

Europe’, Australian National University National Europe Centre Working Paper 16, p.14-15.

58_{Nye Jr., Joseph S. (2005), ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics’, Public Affairs, New York,}

p.6.

59_{Diez, Thomas and Manners, Ian (2007), ‘Reflecting on normative-power Europe’ in: Felix Berenskoetter and}

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soft power can be considered as a means to serve national interest; ‘it can be wielded for both good and bad purposes’.60 Therefore the NPE is a different kind of power than the one defined by Nye.

Manners, in his original article, exemplified the NPE concept through the EU’s efforts to abolish death penalty internationally. In the case study he eliminates the imperialist concerns as the EU also condemns the policies of other developed OECD countries, like Japan and the USA, and not only states with different cultural background, like China or Saud-Arabia.61 Besides the author reckons that the EU acted in compliance with its normative rather than instrumental interest when it was reluctant to give terrorist suspects over to the US who would have faced death penalty despite the fact that it would have benefited from the extradition.62

He regards the normative power as “the greatest power of all” and closes his article as follows: “the notion of the EU representing a normative power in world politics is not a contradiction in terms”.63 This does not mean that he neglects the significance of military and civilian power but according to Manners the normative power conception has a greater magnitude when analysing the international role of Europe. In conclusion the EU’s distinctive profile enables it to redefine what can be normal in international relations. Hence, the promotion of European norms became a preponderant feature of the EFP and the EU attempts to incorporate them into every international agreement.

2.3 Critics and Limitations of the Concept – A Messianistic Project?

Manners’ idea was critically commented by myriad academics. The following passage analyses the main criticisms and limitations of the NPE concept. I have divided the critics into two main groups. The first one deals with the question of the concept’s neutrality while the second part concentrates on the realist critique and the problem whether the development of European military potential discards the NPE or not.

Helene Sjursen deems that the NPE concept is normatively biased and suffers from conceptual clarity due to the lack of criteria according to which the EU’s normative nature

60

Ibid., p.179.

61_{Manners (2002), p.253.}

62_{The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights also prohibits the extradition of detainees to third}

countries where they may face death penalty.

63

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might be decided.64 According to her, the notion of NPE reflects a predetermined positive attitude towards the Union therefore it is not capable of critical assessment of EFP.65 Similarly to Hill, Nicolaïdis and Howse criticizes that the EU projects an ideal picture to IR, not what it really is. The EU is unable to engage in reflexivity66 thus what it is trying to export is ‘EUtopia’, an ideal model.67 Similarly Tuomas Forsberg deems that the NPE concept is capable of capturing the essence of the EFP but the conception depicts an ideal type to which the EU attempts to approximate.68 Besides, Sjursen proposes to identify the circle of norms which are to be promoted in order to find out the assumed transcultural validity of EU-diffused norms and refute the accusations referring to the ‘mission civilisiatrice’ (civilizing mission).69 Subsequently Manners suggests that the externally promoted norms are endorsed by the UN Charter thus he represents the EU as such an entity which acts in accordance with it and which may help to dismiss the credibility concerns.70

Add to this, Thomas Diez was arguing that as being a biased concept, the NPE composes the EU identity as well as an identity of EU’s others which consequently turns third parties to non-normative others. According to Diez the ‘EU constructed its identity against others in the outside world’ and attempts to influence ‘others’ by spreading particular norms.71 Diez enumerates different kinds of ‘othering’ which means four ways of portraying the ‘self’ compare to the ‘other’; firstly the other can be represented as an ‘existential threat’ (issues are turned into security threat), secondly as an ‘inferior’ (self is depicted as superior to the other), thirdly as ‘violating universal principles’ (stronger version of the second strategy, the self gains universal validity), and finally as ‘different’ (no value-judgement on the other).72 Diez deems that the other is depicted as ‘violating universal principles’ in most of the time, thus the same might be expected in case of China. Diez concludes that the normative power is not an objective category; it is rather a practice of discursive self-representation.73

Furthermore this phenomenon is obvious in the Copenhagen criteria which emphasise ‘what the EU is’ and the conditions binding on others; what they have to become if they

64

Sjursen, Helene (2006b), ‘The EU as a “Normative” Power: How Can This Be?’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, p. 236.

65_{Sjursen, Helene (2006a), ‘What Kind of Power?’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, p. 173.} 66_{As the EU often neglects problematic issues within its borders.}

67

Nicolaïdis, K. and Howse, R. (2002) ‘ “This is my EUtopia...”: Narrative as Power’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 767–92.

68_{Forsberg, Tuomas (2009), ‘Normative Power Europe (Once More): A Conceptual Clarification and Empirical}

Analysis’, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Tampere, p. 2.

69

Sjursen, (2006a), p.177.

70_{Manners, Ian (2008) ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs 84(1), p.66.} 71_{Diez, (2005), p.614.}

72_{Ibid., p. 628.} 73

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desire to join the Union. For instance, minority rights which previously did not belong to the EU’s normative basis are strongly emphasised in the criteria.74 Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli exemplifies the trend through the case of ICC and the Kyoto Protocol where the EU represents itself as a vanguard compared to the US which is in the laggard position in the struggle for global solution to human rights protection and global warming. Their findings underpinned Manners’ theory and the study concludes that the two cases present “evidence of an emerging EU identity as a credible normative power”.75

On the other hand, other actors use normative rhetoric and act in compliance with some sort of normative basis such as the USA or the Vatican, thus the EU is not the first normative power in history. There has been some common criticism that in the same line of reasoning the USA can be considered as a normative power too, but recently the different attitude towards international law and the often used force makes her different in this sense from Europe.76 Furthermore according to some scholars it is hard to believe that the EU’s normative interests can be permanently accommodated with normative goals which doubt is strengthened by the common charge of double standards.77 As Richard Young shows in his study the EFP is not always governed by the advocacy of civil society and ethical aims.78 Diez considers that the US has also appeared to be a normative power in significant parts of its history thus he calls for greater reflexivity in the academic discussion.79 Michael Merlingen regards the NPE as a two-edged sword, as at a macro-level the EU’s norm diffusion does improve people’s life but at a micro-level “it also creates patterns of arbitrary domination between internationals and locals”. 80 So the normative record of EU is far from perfect, too.

Another strand of criticism holding great sway is the realist apprehension of Europe. Adrian Hyde-Price offers a neo-realist analysis of Europe in which he reasons why the Europeans might not “come from the Venus”. In his view the NPE concept neglects the significance of economic and military power as prominent tools of member states. In reality the EU is used by its most influential member states to pursue their economic and strategic

74_{Ibid., p.630.} 75

Scheipers, Sibylle and Sicurelli, Daniela (2007), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 45., Number 2., p. 452.

76_{Diez, (2005), 635.} 77_{Forsberg, (2009), p.5.} 78

Youngs, Richard (2004), ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 4, pp. 415-435.

79_{Diez, (2005), p.635.}

80_{Merlingen, Michael (2007), ‘Everything is Dangerous: A Critique of Normative Power Europe’, Security}

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interests.81 Thus the state-centred analysis is inevitable to get a real picture of IR. In Hyde-Price’s eyes the EU does not define the IR by ‘what it is’ rather by ‘what it does’: it shapes the external milieu by both soft and hard power inter alia “political partnership or ostracism; economic carrots and sticks; the promise of membership or the threat of exclusion”.82

Starting with St Malo in 1998, the EU started to gradually acquire military capabilities through the ESDP framework which was indicated by the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 200383 and various committees such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC).84 It divided the academics whether the existence of European military power ruins the normative profile of the Union or not.

Karen E. Smith85 and Jan Zielonka86 represent the standpoint which holds that a European army would be harmful for the distinctive image of the EU, what is more, it would lead to the demise of the civilian power Europe. While Diez deems that the possession of normative power can coexist with other sorts of power such as economic and military influence. Thus the military power does not contradict the NPE, but it is important to note that the Union risks a lot: the more it uses military power the less it reclines upon the power of norms.87 Manners in his later writings reckons that the militarization of the EU does not mean a decline in its normative character unless it is without critical reflexion. Therefore the EU’s “conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction capacities” were born in the ethos of normative power rather than ‘the pursuit of great power’ status thus it does not undermine the NPE.88 To put it simply the use of military power in line with the UN Charter does not contradict the NPE. Although, it is worth mentioning the Kosovo War in 1999 which was also approved by the EU and was without a UN mandate.89

In recent years Manners’ idea – as it has been shown - contributed to the birth of countless articles about the issue which even make it more difficult to clarify the concept. For

81_{Hyde-Price, Adrian (2004), ‘The EU, Power and Coercion: From ‘Civilian’ to ‘Civilising’ Power’, CIDEL}

Workshop Oslo ‘From Civilian to Military Power: the European Union at a Crossroads?’, p.12.

82_{Hyde-Price, Adrian (2006) ''Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', Journal of European Public Policy,}

13: 2, p.227.

83_{Tonra, Ben (2003), ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive}

Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 41. Number 4. p.732.

84_{Dover, (2007), p.241.} 85

Smith, Karen E. (2000), ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’, The International Spectator, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, pp. 11-28.

86_{Zielonka, Jan (2008),’Europe as a global actor: empire by example?’, International Affairs 84: 3 (2008) pp.}

471–484.

87

Diez, (2005), p.621.

88_{Manners, Ian (2006) ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’, Journal of European}

Public Policy 13(2), p.194.

89_{Whitman, Richard (2006), ‘Road Map for a Route March? (De-)civilianizing through the EU’s Security}

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instance, Lisbeth Aggestam added the notion of Ethical Power Europe (EPE) to the academic debate. According to her, the NPE concept was built upon the declining utility of military power in IR, thus the EPE better comprehends the EU’s demeanour in light of the recent developments. Hence, she attempted to transcend the civilian/normative power Europe debate by shifting the attention from ‘what the EU is’ (institutional build-up) to ‘what the EU does’ (behaviour) and shedding light on the importance of member states.90 The only discrepancy within the theory is that it does not succeed in concentrating on the EU’s behaviour, but the debate is about whether the EU is an ethical power or not.91 Similarly Giuseppe Balducci discovers the internal diversity of the NPE, and emphasises the crucial role of member states’ differing policies, attitude and the limits of normative power while analysing the EFP towards China.92 Contrary to this view Scheipers and Sicurelly examines if the EU loses credibility in case inconsistency prevails in foreign policy. Their answer is “no” as inconsistency is considered as a part of the assumed collective identity.93

The academic literature lacks a comprehensive study which analyses whether the EU conducts its foreign policy in compliance with such norms thus Tocci’s conclusion saying “the EU mostly has normative interest but sometimes it has not” should satisfy us.94 The human rights promotion of the EU is at a turning-point now, as the EU’s normative achievements are quite visible in the new member states and countries with possible membership status but aside from a couple of success stories (death penalty, International Criminal Court, Kyoto Protocol, dependent African countries) the EU’s attainment in other parts of the world can be considered more modest.95 It was demonstrated by, for instance, Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd through the EU’s limited influence on Russia’s human rights record in the course of the Russo-Chechen conflict.96 Therefore it is worth examining the normative power of Europe in case of China.

2.4 “The Art of Seduction”

90_{Aggestam, Lisbeth (2008), ‘Introduction: ethical power Europe?’, International Affairs 84: 1 p.3.} 91_{Forsberg, (2009), p.8.}

92

Balducci, Giuseppe (2007), ‘Normative Power or Paradox Europe? Preliminary findings from an ongoing fieldwork’, Wei Hai, China.

93_{Scheipers and Sicurelli, (2007), p.438.}

94_{Tocci, Natalie et al (2008) ‘The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor’, in Tocci (ed.) Who is}

a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

95_{Forsberg, (2009), p.14.}

96_{Forsberg, Tuomas and Herd, Graeme (2005), ‘The EU, Human Rights, and the Russo-Chechen Conflict’,}

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This part presented the main theoretical and analytical framework which will be used in the dissertation. Firstly it introduced the academic debate started in 1970s which culminated in the birth of the NPE theory. To sum up, according to Manners the EU’s identity is constituted in a normative way in addition the Union has normative interests. The EU behaves in accordance with universal norms with third countries and uses normative instruments making itself attractive to others. Moreover the NPE is able to achieve normative ends as it is defined to be a sort of ‘power’.97

The creation of the EU indicated that the toolkit of the Westphalian state-centred analysis is not suitable anymore to investigate the new conception of the European ‘pooled’ sovereignty. Hence new theories, which put more emphasis on collective identity and normative features of the EFP, may help us to fully understand the EU’s behaviour. As it was introduced the NPE concept has become one of the most disputed theories in academic circles. These critics have focused on two main issues: firstly one strand of academics reckons that the concept is biased and depicts the EU as a positive power and secondly, it is disputed whether developing EU military capabilities undermines the EU’s normative portrayal or not. The questions of how the EU constructs its identity against China, and how it attempts to spread moral values by ‘what the Union is’ will be further elaborated on by using Manners’ NPE theory and its critics’ findings. I expect that that the following case studies will point out that the EU is able to fulfil its normative role in a credible way in the relationship with China. In order to conduct the research, selected press releases, official statements and speeches will be investigated to find out the EU position and self-representation in human rights issues towards the PRC.

3. Death has no appeal

Manners in his original article demonstrated the power of norms through the EU’s international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty. One of the greatest achievements of all time that Europe created a de facto death penalty free zone from Iceland to Vladivostok – with the exception of Belarus.98 Thus the EU as the only international actor stands firm against death penalty and attempts to lead the world by example.

97_{Forsberg, (2009), p.10.}

98_{The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area - Background Paper 2009, Available at:}

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In this section first I am going to give an overview about the EU’s commitment to promoting the universal abolition in order to constitute its identity concerning the death penalty in general. Then the situation in China will be briefly reviewed using reports of independent NGOs and the EU Annual Reports on Human Rights. Afterwards both rhetoric and substantive efforts will be analysed to identify the norm diffusing factors and the European ‘self’ in the course of the condemnation of the recent execution of Akmal Shaikh. It is inevitable to demonstrate the case study in order to evaluate the questions, “To what extent is the EU capable of norm diffusion and how does the Union’s distinctive normative profile appear?”.

3.1 Simon Says “kill less, kill carefully”

The EU is the main front-line fighter for the worldwide abolition of the death penalty although it is worth mentioning that using death penalty is not prohibited by international law. The global trend goes towards abolition which is indicated by several Protocols ranging from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to the Statute of ICC, to the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Ruanda (ICTR) which exclude death penalty as an imposable punishment.

The push for abolition is one of the cornerstones of the Union’s human rights policy; in addition the EU is the leading donor and sponsor of the efforts of civil society organisations (CSO) in this area. Since 1997 there was no execution within the borders of members of the Council of Europe (CoE), which includes all the EU member states, too.99 This achievement gives the EU credibility promoting the abolition of death penalty all over the world. Furthermore, both organizations made the abolition of capital punishment as a precondition of accession. Where the death penalty still exists, the EU insists on progressively restricting its use and that it be carried out in accordance with the international minimum standards, international human rights law and asks for maintaining transparency through disclosed information about cases where capital punishment is applied.100

99

Fact Sheet on Death Penalty’, October 2008, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/ factsheet_death_penalty_en.pdf, Accessed: 12th June 2010.

100_{Minimum standards are: for example that death penalty cannot be imposed for non-violent crimes, the scope}

of capital punishment should not exceed the crimes with lethal or extraordinarily grave consequences, the penalty cannot be imposed to juvenile perpetrators, pregnant mothers and mentally handicapped persons, the punishment should inflict minimum suffering and it shall not be carried out publicly. (’EU Guidelines on the

Death Penalty: revised and updated version’, Available at:

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It was only in 1983, when in the context of CoE, with the 6th Protocol101 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which “expressed a general tendency in favour of abolition of the death penalty” in peace time102, the abolitionist tendency was enshrined into international law. In 1989 the UN dealt with the issue by adopting the second optional protocol to the ICCPR. Article 2 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights also prohibits the use of capital punishment: “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed”.103 Besides the strong political commitment and putting pressure on retentionist countries the EU has allocated more than €15 million and launched over 30 projects since 1994104 in the framework of the EIDHR and later the EInDHR105 to strengthen the abolitionist tendency by raising public awareness, informing the public and supporting strategies to replace death penalty and promoting appropriate legal support to death row inmates and training defence lawyers.106 Abandoning death penalty is one of the thematic priorities of the EInDHR, which provides Community funding for human rights promotion in non-EU countries.107

According to Manners, three factors; the role of the CoE, the end of the cold war, and the confidence crisis after the Maastricht Treaty contributed to the fact that the abolition of death penalty became a norm in Europe.108 The Amsterdam Treaty confirmed member states’ devotion to eradicating capital punishment. Subsequently, other EU institutions also expressed their commitment; for instance, the EP by issuing the European Declaration on

101_{The protocol is ratified by all member states of the EU. (‘Additional Protocols to the European Convention on}

Human Rights (ECHR)’, Available at: http://www.humanrights.ch/home/en/Switzerland /European-Conventions /ECHR-optional-protocols/idcatart_154-content.html, Accessed: 12th June 2010).

102

The 13th Protocol to the ECHR which contains the abolition of the capital punishment in all circumstances entered into force in 2003 signed by all EU member states with 23 ratifications. (Ibid.).

103_{‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000)’, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu}

/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf, Accessed: 18th April 2010, p.9.

104_{In the period 2007-2010 the EU earmarked €8 million to 16 projects to abolish death penalty globally.}

(European Commission, ’Death has no appeal - Almost 70 states worldwide still apply the death penalty - The European Union is fighting to put an end to this practice’, Available at: http://www.eurunion.org /legislat/deathpenalty/dpleaflet.pdf, Accessed: 25th June 2010).

105_{The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EInDHR) was launched in 2006 to replace the}

European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which was operating from 2000 to 2006. The EIDHR works through CSOs and grants aid where no development agreements exist. It complements and assists to implement EU Human Rights Policy globally. (‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)’, EU-China Human Rights Network (2008), Available at: ec.europa.eu/europeaid /tender/data/d92/AOF85192.doc, Accessed: 23rd February 2010, p.3-4.).

106_{European Union Delegation of the European Commission to the USA (2007), A European Day against the}

Death Penalty, Available at: http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2007/2007072.htm, Accessed: 16th June 2010.

107_{‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Evaluation on the Abolition of Death Penalty}

Projects’, Final Report, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/eidhr_ evaluation_ death_penalty_final_report_4april07_en.pdf, Accessed: 19th February 2010, p.8.

108

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Fundamental Rights and the Abolition of the Death Penalty.109 The year 1998 meant a real breakthrough for abandoning the capital punishment; EU Council issued guidelines on death penalty towards third countries (revised in 2008)110, the Austrian presidency consolidated the practice of issuing demarches and began publishing the EU Annual Report on Human Rights.111 Consequently, the widespread use of declaratory measures to condemn countries carrying out executions has become a general practice.

According to Manners, the EU’s normative approach can be observed in the course of engagement with the ‘super-executers’, namely with the USA and China.112 The final destination in the EU’s eyes would be the total prohibition of death penalty. However it is clear that the EU dialogues and initiatives per se will not change, for instance, the American or the Chinese policy towards criminal justice but contributes to a large extent to putting the issue on the international agenda. Furthermore, in accordance with the guidelines where the complete abolition of the capital punishment is not possible, the EU will further encourage third countries to comply with the provisions of ICCPR in collaboration with the CSOs which promote fair and impartial justice. Additionally, the EU sponsored a proposition to the UN concerning the global moratorium on the death penalty which was approved by the 62nd General Assembly113 and adopted by 104 countries partially due to the EU’s two decade long active campaign. Furthermore, in 2007 the European Commission and the EP proposed to hold the European Day against Death Penalty every year on 10th October.114

Several NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, la Communità di San Egidio) have a great role in helping the EU to be a vanguard pushing for global abolition of the capital punishment.115 The Council, the EP, the Commission and also former external relations Commissioners, Chris Patten, Benita Ferrero-Waldner and High Representative Catherine Ashton participated vigorously in the fight against death penalty. Last but not least individual member states also came to the forefront with respect to the promotion of death penalty-free world.116 The EU raises the issue in dialogues and consultations on human rights with third

109_{Ibid., p.247.} 110

’EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty: revised and updated version’.

111

Manners (2002), p.247.

112_{Ibid., 248.}

113_{UN General Assembly (2007), ‘General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for Moratorium on Death}

Penalty’, Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10678.doc.htm, Accessed: 13th June 2010

114_{European Union Delegation of the European Commission to the USA (2007)}

115_{Krause, A. (2000) ‘Life vs. Death: The EU is Pressing the Case for World-wide Abolition’. Europe, No. 401,}

p. 8.

116

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countries. Although “Simon said it”, 714 people were executed in 2009 and 58 countries still retained and applied capital punishment involving the top-executor, China.117

3.2 The execution-happy dictatorship – “Rule by Law”

China executes more people every year than the rest of the world put together118, thus the PRC accounts for approximately 60-80% of all death penalties globally.119 According to the Amnesty International’s estimation - collected from Chinese media - 7000 people were sentenced to death but the punishment was carried out “only” 1700 times in 2009.120 The Chinese authorities are reluctant to publish official statistics on implemented death penalties regarding them as a state secret, thus Amnesty deems that the figures might be higher.121 Other NGOs such as the Dui Hua Foundation estimated that the number of executions was around 5,000 in the same year.122 The situation is aggravated by coerced confessions (which increase the possibility of erroneous executions) and regular “strike hard” campaigns.123

The long historical tradition of imposing death penalty in China goes back to the Shang Dynasty (BC 1700).124 Throughout the history of China the death penalty was used mainly as a deterrent to people, which would keep them from committing crime; “killing one to warn a hundred”.125 After the PRC was proclaimed in 1949 under Mao Zedong’s rule the death penalty has been imposed on “the enemy” for political reasons. During Mao’s tenure

117_{Amnesty International (2010c), ‘The Death Penalty in 2009’, Available at:}

http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2009, Accessed: 12th June 2010.

118

‘Amnesty International - Human Rights in People's Republic of China’, Available at:http://www.amnesty.org/ en /region /china/report-2009, Accessed: 6th March 2010.

119_{According to Amnesty International five countries (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the USA) are}

responsible for 93% of executions occur all over the world. (Amnesty International (2010b), ‘Death Penalty Facts’, Available at:http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/factsheets/DeathPenaltyFacts.pdf, Accessed: 19th April 2010).

120 _Amnesty _{International} _(2010d), _‘Death _Sentences _and _Executions _2009’, _Available _at:

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/001/2010/en/17348b70-3fc7-40b2-a258-af92778c73e5/act500 012010en.pdf, Accessed: 28th July 2010.

121_{According to some scholars this number is simply too great to disclose. (Amnesty International (2010a),}

‘China – Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China’, Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/chi na/report-2009, Accessed: 19th July 2010).

122

Dui Hua Foundation Human Rights Journal (2009), ‘Translation & Commentary: "The Death Penalty: When Will the 'Last Gunshot' Be Heard in China?"’, Available at: http://www.duihua.org/hrjournal/2009/08/translation -commentary-death-penalty.html, Accessed: 17th June 2010.

123_{Guangze, Wang (2007), The Mystery of China’s Death Penalty Figures, Available at: http://www.hrichina.}

org/public/PDFs/CRF.2.2007/CRF-2007-2_Mystery.pdf, Accessed: 25th March 2010. p. 41.

124_{Monthy, Jeremy T. (1998) 'Internal Perspectives on Chinese Human Rights Reform: The Death Penalty in the}

PRC', Texas International Law Journal 33:189, 1998, p.192.

125_{Hong, Lu (2008), ‘China’s Death Penalty: Reforms on Capital Punishment’, EAI Background Brief No. 412,}

China – The Unbreakable Wall for Democracy?