Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture
University of Groningen (Home)
University of Udine (Host)
August 2015
Establishing Islamic schools
in a secular age
Secularization, tolerance towards religion and the political
debate on Islamic primary education in the Netherlands
MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Coen Veerman hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Establishing Islamic schools in a secularizing age: Secularization, tolerance towards religion and the political debate on Islamic primary education in the Netherlands between 1980 and 2015., submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Signed Coen Veerman
Inhoud
Establishing Islamic schools in a secularizing age ... 4
1. The secularization paradigm: a working thesis to explain intolerance towards religion? ... 10
Secularization ... 11
Doubting secularization and deconstructing the paradigm ... 12
Secularization and intolerance towards religion ... 16
Tolerance ... 17
The secularization paradigm ... 21
The secular and the religious ... 24
2. Research design ... 31
3. Modernization, secularization and tolerance in historical perspective ... 34
Religious pluralism, secularization and the re-formation of the religious ... 35
The settlement: Pillarization and equal funding of education ... 38
Adjusting the settlement: Depillarization, secularization and tolerance ... 40
Conclusion ... 43
4. Islamic education and the political debate ... 45
The right and possibilities to establish an Islamic school ... 46
Towards a new settlement? Immigration, secularization and intolerance ... 48
Doubts, reservations and toleration: The political debate on Islamic schools ... 53
1990s: The Islamization of the debate ... 60
Conclusion ... 66
5. Legal intolerance towards Islam? ... 69
Establishing Islamic schools in a secularizing age
The Netherlands is rather tolerant. The question is whether we accept that undemocratic Islamic movements are increasingly dominating these [Islamic] schools and whether citizens should pay for that. Indeed, I am against Islamic schools, governed by conservative Muslims who want to return centuries back in time. Why do we tolerate the separation of boys and girls in classes in a modern society? What gives them the right to value women and homosexuals as inferior beings? The Dutch urge to avoid everything that has to do with political Islam is getting extremely frustrating. Dutch politicians are hiding themselves. They are not capable of discussing the question to what extent political Islam fits in the Dutch system. An Islamic school only has the right to exist if women can teach there without a veil, and a homosexual can become its director.1 (Z. Arslan, Institute for Multicultural Issues, 1998)
The above citation is illustrative of the fierce tone of the public debate on the existence of Islamic education in the Netherlands in the late 1990s. From the first proposals to introduce Islamic schools, until the situation today, where there are 49 Islamic primary schools, the idea of Islamic education has been faced by ongoing doubts and reservations. While in the 1980s the debate was predominately concerned with how to avoid segregation, from the 1990s onwards the point of discussion was focused on the religious content of their teachings. In the 1990s, the conservative-liberal party (VVD) opened the debate on the content of Islamic education, arguing that the values taught by these schools would be an affront to ‘our’ modern values, and a danger for the country’s democracy.2 In their view Islamic education prevents integration of Muslims into Dutch society,
as these schools are threatening the positions of homosexuals, reproducing the inequality between men and women already present in many Muslim families, and possibly teaching children to avoid
1 “Debat over Islamitische Basisschool Draait Volgens Moslim-Deskundigen Te Veel Om Cijfertjes; ‘Politici Hebben Geen Oog Voor Islamitische Arena’ | Onderwijs,” De Volkskrant, accessed June 19, 2015,
http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-onderwijs/debat-over-islamitische-basisschool-draait-volgens-moslim-deskundigen-te-veel-om-cijfertjes-politici-hebben-geen-oog-voor-islamitische-arena~a474957/.
2 J. T. Sunier, “Naar Een Nieuwe Schoolstrijd?,” Bijdragen En Mededelingen Betreffende de Geschiedenis Der
non-Muslims.3 While the social democratic PvdA has been strongly opposed to this kind of rhetoric in the 1990s, in practice they slowly started to support bills restricting educational freedom. Indeed, from 2006 onwards, the Dutch Parliament voted with wide majorities for the introduction of bills setting limits to the religious freedoms and privileges of religious education, concerning the right of establishment for religious schools, the freedom of selecting their pupils and teachers and the freedom to formulate their own curriculum.4
A careful reader has noticed a sudden jump from the debate of Islamic education to restrictions on the freedom of religious education in general. Indeed, this is where some of the central issues of this thesis show up. To what extent could the debate on Islamic education be linked with legal changes concerning the freedom of religious education in general? Moreover, if both would be related, does that in practice mean the influence of Islamic practices would be more restricted than other religions? Obviously, both developments cannot be seen as separated from one another. In fact, in the Netherlands it would be impossible to value different religions separately, due to the strong settlement of the equality principle in its legal system. Therefore, in order to find increasing legal restrictions towards the free exercise of Islam, one must search for legislative changes concerning the free practice of education and religion in general. Moreover, it has to be explained whether these changes could be related to the specific discourse on Islamic education or the discourse about Islam in general, and to what extent these laws affect the free exercise of Islam specifically.
Casanova is a well-known scholar in the field of the sociology of religion. He studied philosophy in Zaragossa, Catholic theology in Innsbruck and sociology in New York, and is currently Professor at the University of Berkeley. His most famous thesis is that Western European society has had the false impression that modern societies will secularize automatically meaning that religious ideas, believes and practices decline at the cost of worldly ideas, beliefs and practices in a modern society. Casanova calls this widely shared assumption the secularization paradigm. This had some major consequences on the way Western Europe deals with religion. Society has
3 August Hans den Boef, Nederland Seculier: Tegen Religieuze Privileges in Wetten, Regels, Gewoonten en
Attitudes (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2003), 98–100.
been "interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm and is therefore accompanied by a ‘secularist’ self-understanding that interprets the decline [of religion] as ‘normal’ and ‘progressive’—that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a ‘modern’ and ‘enlightened’.”5
This self-understanding automatically turns religion into the backwards, anti-modern other, This creates a great pressure towards the modernization of religion. In Western Europe means the privatization of religious practices, which ensures that particularly public religions are pressured to modernize. This pressure would make it difficult for societies to keep a legal framework that is tolerant towards public minority religions, particularly when this concerns imported religions like Islam, which have not been part of the construction of this legal framework that settles the separation of Church and state.6 Islam does not make a clear distinction between these spheres, at least, not to the extent Western Europe does, which would be a cause for concern in the eyes of Europeans. Moreover, “Muslim organized collective identities and their public representations become a source of anxiety not only because of their religious otherness as a non-Christian and non-European religion, but more importantly because of their religiousness itself as the other of European secularity.”7 In this regard, restrictions on religious rights and the debate on Islam cannot be seen separately, as both would have been strongly influenced by the secularist self-understanding deriving from the secularization paradigm.
Translated towards the debate on Islamic education, the secularization paradigm would restrict the possibilities of religious education in general, but will particularly put pressure on the religious freedom of Islam.8 However, one must be careful not to use the term intolerance too easily. The Islamic fusion of religion and politics could pose a severe threat to the functioning of the state, which could makes the functioning of Islamic education a legitimate concern. It would
5 José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,” in Religion, Globalization, and
Culture, ed. Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (Brill Academic Publishers), 109, accessed January 4, 2014,
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/10.1163/ej.9789004154070.i-608.39.
6 José Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,” in Religion in the New Europe, ed. Krzysztof Michalski (Central European University Press, 2006), 31.
7 Ibid., 31–32.
legitimately question what is taught on these schools. Taken further, it can raise fears about the desire to Islamize or at least 'religionize' politics within the European society itself, and using education as a means to lay the ground for such changes amongst younger generations. Clearly, it would be highly ideological to reduce these concerns to intolerance a priori.
Moreover, the whole hypothesis relating the restriction on the freedom of Islam to the process of secularization seems to be far-distanced from reality. The theory does not consider the idea that the restrictions on these religious practices could be a reaction to problems that have little to do with the existence of secularity. A more feasible explanation for the introduction of legal changes seems to be a reaction to violent attacks globally propagated and conducted by fundamentalist Islamists and the supposed failed integration of Muslims in society. Since the Rushdie affair, 9/11, the murder of Theo van Gogh, the Charlie Hebdo attacks and other recent terrorist incidents, an increasing number of people became skeptical about the integration of Muslims in society. Some even believe that Islam forms a direct threat to the functioning of society.9 Additionally, the fact that Islamic practices are becoming increasingly visible on the streets supports people in their belief that there is little hope for improvement. Examples are the the increasing appearance of mosques and of the Islamic headscarves, which are even worn by fourth generation immigrants.10 In this sense, it makes little sense to argue that Western European society could not deal with the public character of Islam due to their secular self-perception, if the issue is that Western Europeans are particularly fearful of violence and change. A counterfactual question could ask if the religiosity of Islam would be perceived as problematic, if all Muslims were entirely peaceful.
Indeed, I do believe that Casanova’s thesis is too reductionist to fully correspond with reality. However, he still raises an interesting point concerning the secular expectation in Western Europe. When looking into the Islam debate in the Netherlands, Islamic extremism is often
9 Timothy John Garton Ash, Facts Are Subversive: Political Writing from a Decade without a Name (London: Atlantic, 2010), 200; Jocelyn Maclure, Charles Margrave Taylor, and Jane Marie Todd, Secularism and Freedom of
Conscience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 4–5.
compared to a nationalist perception of secularism and modernity.11 A widely heard argument in the educational debate is that Muslims pupils should be taught along modern and secular values, so that they will less radical and antagonistic towards other ideas.12 This does not means that secularization should be seen as an exclusive explanation for position of Islam in society. Instead, the position of tolerance towards Islam is closely intertwined with all kinds of other context-related structures, such as the way society deals with the fear of Islamic violence. In this sense, it could still be relevant to question to what extent the alleged secular self-understanding in the Netherlands influences the legal position of religious freedoms and to see whether religious privileges are still as widely accepted as before, and what this implies for legal tolerance towards Islam in particular.
However, these questions cannot be properly answered without understanding the dynamic boundaries between the secular and the religious, and how these dynamics influence the shifting bounds of religious rights. Casanova’s theory does not seem to provide a sufficient perspective to answer to this demand. He a priori links the existence of a secularist self-understanding to the marginalization of religious rights, which does not allow a critical reflection on the relation between the secular and the religious. In order to take a critical approach to Casanova, I will adopt Asad's perspective on the relation between the secular and the religious. Asad is a leading anthropologist, who is famous for its contribution to the question how the secular and religious influence each other. According to his view, secularization is “neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred), but a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life.”13 For Asad, the secular
and the religious are dynamic historical constructs. Secularization does not inherently lead to the marginalization of religion, but changes the relation between both. The secular and the religious are inseparable, but they (re)-define each other in complex ways, not always in binary terms. In order to understand the transformation of religious rights, it is important to understand both the
11 Sunier, “Naar Een Nieuwe Schoolstrijd?,” 553. 12 Ibid., 654–655.
historical and current dynamics of the boundaries between the secular and the religious. Concerning the way secular Western European countries treat the exercise of Islam in their societies, he argues that secularism could both lead to tolerance and intolerance, depending on the political orientation of the state (liberal or nationalist).14 Of course, in practice most legal systems are a compromise, as some restriction towards religions is necessary to ensure tolerance towards others. This flexible approach is particularly relevant for the Netherlands, as it has been established on the foundations of a strong culture of debate and compromise, formulated in the legal arrangements of the country.15
From this dynamic perspective, this thesis analyzes to what extent the political debate on Islamic schools in the Netherlands can be explained through Casanova’s theory of a Western European secularist self-understanding, and to what extent does this debate influence the legal tolerance of the free exercise of Islam in education.
The reason for taking the debate on Islamic schools as the central case has to do with it being a clear example whereby dominant secular values seem to be at odds with the constitutionally established religious rights and privileges. Article 23 guarantees equally public funding for both public schools and denominational schools. Introduced in 1917, the law symbolizes the traditional importance of religious rights, as it allows religions to establish their own education.16 Yet, since the 1990s onwards, there have been critical voices towards this law, as it would too much space to spread the traditionalist ideas of Islam. Firstly, the law could lead to the indoctrination of non-liberal values, as schools are allowed to refuse the acceptance of children and teachers because of religious values, such as homosexual teachers. Secondly, in the case of Islamic education, it will prevent integration of Muslims into Dutch society, as these schools may reproduce inequality between men and women already present in many Muslim families, threaten the positions of homosexuals, and possibly teach children to avoid non-Muslims.17 Hence, the case
14 José Casanova, “Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms,” http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2007/10/25/secular-secularizations-secularisms/, The Immanent Frame, (2007).
15 Hans Knippenberg, “The Changing Relationship between State and Church/religion in the Netherlands,”
GeoJournal 67, no. 4 (January 1, 2006): 317–30.
16 Ibid., 322–323.
offers an example of how the Dutch Parliament tries to balance religious rights with individual rights after being confronted with Islam in a secular age.
In politics and the media, tensions between religious and secular forces are highly prevalent. In particular, the relation between individualistic modern norms and Islam is currently a major issue. This discourse is particularly relevant as it touches upon the balancing of fundamental rights. How to balance between individual rights, such as non-discrimination based on personal characteristics, and groups rights, such as the collective freedom of religion. This thesis aims to clarify some of the structures underlying this tension, by exposing the historically formed dynamics of this issue. The findings of this thesis can contribute to the academic and public debate on the relation between secularization and religious tolerance. The Netherlands provides a valuable case study in this respect, as it “combines a multi-confessional tradition with strong secularization and large-scale immigration of adherents of non-Christian religions. As an open, internationally oriented society and one of the founding members of the European Union, the Netherlands, moreover, has always been sensitive to international developments, both at the global and European level.”18
1. The secularization paradigm: a working thesis to explain intolerance towards religion?
According to Casanova, in the twentieth century, Western European societies have undergone a rapid, drastic and seemingly irreversible process of secularization.”19 This secularization success has led to the formation of a secularization paradigm. The most important premise is that modernization leads to secularization. This linkage with modernity would have severe consequences for religion: The assumed idea of the normality and modern that is linked with the secular would leave little legitimate space for religion, as it turns the religious into a backward and fundamentalist other. Moreover, “the assumed normality of belief in the inevitability of
secularization tends to reproduce itself, as well as to appear increasingly irreversible.”20 This again,
increasingly would increasingly fuel intolerance towards religion, particularly public religions like Islam. However, what does Casanova exactly mean with secularization, the secularization paradigm, and intolerance towards Islam? Moreover, how does he relate these issues?
First, this theoretical chapter provides a thorough explanation of Casanova’s theory, by elaborating on his understanding of the concepts of secularization, secularization paradigm. Secondly, it provides a theoretical perspective on how the relation between the secular, the religious and intolerance towards religion must be perceived. The last part of the chapter illustrates the method of this thesis in relation to the theoretical considerations.
Secularization
To be able to discuss the theory of Casanova critically, one must understand what he means by secularization. Therefore, it is important to note his distinction between secularization, secular and secularism. According to him, the three concepts are “obviously related but used very differently in various academic, social, political and cultural contexts.”21 Generally, the three concepts could be differentiated as follows: The secular is an epistemic category. It “grasps a realm or reality differentiated from the religious.”22 The meaning of the concept could be endlessly debated. For
instance, one could argue that the secular is an essential category pointing out the non-religious in society, or one could observe, such as Talal Asad does, the secular as a historical construct that is constantly subject to change. Secularism is a normative concept that refers to a secular worldview. Secularism could be apprehended consciously and unconsciously as the normal, modern or good structure of society.23 Secularization points at a pattern. It is a theory that assumes a process in history where the secular sphere is increasing, at least in particular place and period. Hence, when talking about secularization, Casanova refers to a historical pattern in society where the influence,
20 José Casanova, “Poland’s Christian Mission in Europe,” Project Syndicate, accessed November 23, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/poland-s-christian-mission-in-europe/english.
21 Casanova, “Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms.” 22 Ibid.
practices and belief in religion are decreasing. In academic literature, this has often been viewed as a general theory of human development.24 Casanova distinguishes three different secularization theories that are frequently understood as mutually influential.
Privatization of religion, meaning religion will increasingly be an individual belief or activity. It is regularly understood as a (global) trend and as a normative condition for a modern liberal democracy.25
Institutional differentiation, meaning the emancipation of secular spheres. For instance, since the Enlightenment secular institutions such as science and the state won influence at the cost of religious institutions. This is the classic theory of secularization descending from medieval Christendom, which “[…] refers to the transfer of persons, things, meanings, etc., from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession, or control.”26 Religious decline, meaning the general decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern
societies. While this is the most recent version of the thesis, it is widespread and often used in contemporary academic debates.27
Casanova uses these distinctions as it allows for independent examination of the three theories based on a comparative historical analysis. More importantly for this thesis, however, is his notion that for all these theories some scholars presume a link with modernity.
Doubting secularization and deconstructing the paradigm
For years, secularization of society has been a widely confirmed theory among many academics in and outside Western Europe. According to Inger Furseth, “the secularization thesis has been one of sociology's most enduring, theoretical frameworks".28 Lately, the theory is increasingly
24 Ibid.
25 Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization,” 7. 26 Ibid., 7–8.
27 Ibid., 7.
being criticized29, yet it “remains relatively uncontested in the social sciences [as a] defining characteristic of processes of modernization.”30 The idea that secularization is an inherent part of
modernity has already been prevalent in the sociology of the nineteenth century. Weber considered rationalization as an important factor leading to the ‘Entzauberung der Welt’ and Durkheim saw a relation between secularization and the modern division of labor leading to the disintegration of social cohesion formerly provided by the church. More systematic theories have been developed by Thomas Luckman, Bryan Wilson and perhaps most influentially, Peter Berger. Berger argued that secularization is closely linked to the pluralization of society, which is an inherent part of modernity. This pluralization would inevitably lead to the de-objectification of traditional worldviews such as religion.31
From the 1980s onwards, the relation between secularization and modernity has been doubted due to a re-emergence of religious movements and practices in several parts of the world, such as the re-emergence of Islam in Iran (1979) and Catholicism in Poland (after 1989).32 Stark argues that even the US has not been secularizing. In fact, the US has become only more religious the last hundred years.33 Since approximately the 1990s, the idea grew that secularization should not even be conceived as a proper structure for the Western European development.34 Particularly
29 Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.,” Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 (September 21, 1999): 251; Philip S. Gorski and Ateş Altınordu, “After Secularization?,” Annual Review of Sociology 34, no. 1 (2008): 55–85; Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization” And many others.
30 Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization,” 9.
31 Peter L. Berger, “A Sociological View of the Secularization of Theology,” Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 6, no. 1 (April 1, 1967): 10.
32 Casanova, “Poland’s Christian Mission in Europe”; Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic
Revolution in Iran (Oxford University Press, 1988).
33 Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.”, 252–266.
the lasts remarks have been creating doubts about the existence of a correlation between modernity and secularization.
For these reasons, Stark, presumably the most prevalent skeptic of the secularization theory, proposes to bury the whole theory underground, as secularization would be an academic term that does not correspond to reality at all.35 Conflictingly, anthropologists Norris and Inglehart
confirm a correlation between secularization and modernity, but argue that the modern world does not seem to secularize as the fertility rates in developing countries outnumber fertility rates in developed countries and due to immigration from developing to developed countries.36 The
problem with their method, however, is that it generalizes the historical situation. Europe is modernizing and secularizing. Therefore, secularization constitutes modernization. However, the broad existence of examples of modern countries that have never been secularizing makes this thesis difficult to uphold. Therefore, the occurrence of historical correlation between modern countries and secularity does not mean both are inherently linked. Hence, Casanova concludes that the link between both has to be seen as a historical construct instead of a scientific theory or a human development.
Casanova by no means denies that Western Europe experienced high secularization rates in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the contrary, secularization has been present, particularly concerning privatization of religion and institutional differentiation. He only denies that there is an inherent relation between secularization and modernity. Rather than explaining secularization in terms of a human process of development (referred to as modernization), it should be explained as the triumph of ‘the knowledge regime of secularism.’ Moreover, “the internal variations within Europe can be explained better in terms of historical patterns of church-state and church-nation relations, as well as in terms of different paths of secularization among the different branches of Christianity, than in terms of levels of modernization.”37
Yet his conclusion went further than falsifying this presumed correlation. He wonders why so many people accept this theory even though the evidence is lacking. According to his view, the
35 Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.”, 252–266.
36 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3–33.
reason for this is that the theory is interwoven with all kinds of other values deriving from the the Western European Church/state relations. Indeed, according to Casanova, secularization would be a European construct. This historical process of secularization created a self-understanding that “interprets the decline [of religion] as normal and progressive – that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a modern and enlightened European.”38 This “assumed normality of belief
in the inevitability of secularization tends to reproduce itself, as well as to appear increasingly irreversible.”39 Hence, people still accept the presumed relation between secularization and
modernity because the historical process of secularization in Europe created the idea that this a progressive development.
Casanova grasps an essential point about the origins of secularization; it is historically constructed in conjunction with a wide range of normative assumptions. Gorski & Altinordu strongly agree that secularization has clear roots in the Western European tradition (not to be confused with the Eastern Orthodox tradition). “The etymology of secularization and kindred terms (secular, secularism, secularist, etc.) derives from the Latin word saeculum, meaning a century or age.”40 In the writings of Augustine, the word pointed at the present world in opposition to the hereafter. In the Middle Ages it “referred to a monk’s renunciation of the rule of his order [...] and more specifically to his transfer to the worldly or the secular clergy [...].”41 Clearly, the word bears a distinction between the sacred and the profane world, but is at the same time part of religion itself. The term acquired a political meaning since the Reformation. In this period, Church property was often misappropriated under the pretense that worldly property belongs to worldly leaders. Hence, it stood for illegitimate expropriation or irreligious behavior, but at the same time symbolized increasing rationality. This meaning touches upon its modern meaning, with its clear-cut connection to modernization and liberation of various social institutions, including the Church
38 Ibid.
and the clerical influence.42 The word secular has always been normative term that may be interpreted very differently depending on one’s worldview:
“Supporters of secularism […] saw themselves as champions of liberation and reason and viewed (and still view) their opponents as reactionaries and bumpkins. Opponents saw themselves as defender of sacred tradition and common sense and viewed (and still view) their opponents as wicked and arrogant. […] the divide between secularists and their opponents did not, and does not align neatly with the divide between professing believers and atheists. There always were, and still are, believers who espouse secularism in the name of tolerance and peace and unbelievers who oppose it in the name of order and stability. Nonetheless, the church/state struggles […] did impart new meanings to the concept: liberation and tolerance on the one hand, atheism and libertinism on the other.”43
Perhaps this historical analysis of secularization goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, the central point is that secularization is closely linked with the Western European Christian tradition of a separation between Church and state. Since the Enlightenment the term has been linked with tolerance and liberation on the one hand, and with repression and intolerance towards religion on the other. Clearly, secularization cannot be seen separately from this historical development. This makes this term not just context-related, but also subject to power relations. This is where Casanova’s link between secularization and religious tolerance comes to the fore.
Secularization and intolerance towards religion
The abovementioned chapter demonstrates the origins of the word secular, and how this term relates to the development of the religious in the Western European Christian tradition. Both spheres are undeniable historical constructs that define power relations. For instance, some people, the secular could mean tolerance, for the other it could mean intolerance. So far, I agree with Casanova’s theory. Yet, this thesis aims to clarify to what extent the political debate on Islamic schools in the Netherlands can be explained through Casanova’s theory of a Western European secularist self-understanding, and to what extent this debate influences the legal tolerance of the free exercise of Islam in education. Therefore, it needs to be explained how the secular and the religious relate to each other. Moreover, is has to be demonstrated how these dynamics influence the shifting bounds of the legal position of religious rights, which might lead to tolerance or
intolerance. Casanova’s theory provides an insufficient approach to tackle these issues properly as it does not provide a proper approach to judge his thesis. Moreover, some of his presuppositions do not seem to grasp the complexity of reality. Firstly, tolerance is perceived as the absence of restrictions. Secondly, the term paradigm provides little space for change or different explanations. Thirdly, the way he understands the dynamics between the secular and the religious is too simplistic; it does not. This chapter enquires these three points.
Tolerance
In order to demonstrate how the secularization paradigm relates to intolerance towards Islam, Casanova provides his own understanding of tolerance. However, this understanding does not correspond to the day-to-day reality of the concept. When discussing intolerance, Casanova defines it as “the restriction of the free exercise of religion”.44 This should be interpreted in legal terms. Hence, intolerance towards Islam would mean the existence of (legal/social) restrictions preventing the organization of Islamic practices. For Casanova, it does not seem to matter what the context of these restriction are.
"One is not likely to hear among liberal politicians and secular intellectuals explicitly xenophobic or anti-religious statements. The politically correct formulation tends to run along such lines as ‘we welcome each and all immigrants irrespective of race or religion as long as they are willing to respect and accept our modern liberal secular European norms’.”45 Indeed, even if the intention sounds liberal, the act would still be intolerant. For instance, a politician argues that an Islamic school should be closed as Islamic schools propagate to attack homosexuals. Could this politician be called intolerant? The common sense answer would presumably be negative. However, from Casanova’s definition of tolerance, it could easily argued that the proposal is intolerant towards Islam, as it aims to restrict the possibilities of Islamic schools.
Based on his definition, Casanova argues that states have different ways of dealing with religion according to the particular institutional state structure of the “separation of church and state and the patterns of regulation of their own religious minorities.”46 One of his examples are
44 Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,” 2004, 13. 45 Ibid., 12.
France’s political culture presupposes a strict separation between state and religion (laicité), whereby the state encourages the privatization of religion and pressures religious groups to form official institutions that are easy to control. In this sense, France would be intolerant towards religion as it sets boundaries on the free organization of religion. The traditional state-church structure of the Netherlands would be less intolerant, as it allows Dutch Muslims to organize their own organizations and institution (under some state-regulation). Yet lately the Netherlands would have become increasingly intolerant “in the name of protecting its liberal tolerant traditions from the threat of illiberal, fundamentalist, patriarchal customs reproduced and transmitted to the younger generation by Muslim immigrants.”47 Casanova argues that in comparison to the US, European states are more intolerant towards religion, as European states involve themselves more with religious affairs.
Hence, the status of legal tolerance towards religion has much to do with the political culture of a state. He perceives a state that sets boundaries to the practices of organized religions as less tolerant than states that guarantee its full freedom. This is clearly valued in negative terms, as he talks about the ‘intolerant tyranny’ of Western European secular societies that would value religious norms as “reactionary, fundamentalist, and anti-modern” opposed to “progressive, liberal, and modern’ values.”48
However, viewing intolerance towards religion or Islam only in terms of legal restrictions seems to be out of balance with reality of the term. It implies that there could be something like an entirely free exercise of religion, but this does not exist anywhere in the world. Toleration means, conditionally, permitting something that one actually disapproves, and only applies when one has the position to disallow something. Toleration must therefore be se in the light of verbs such as "to bear or endure" or "to nourish, sustain or preserve." When talking about a government tolerating a certain religion, it means that the state gives the permission of this religion to exist and to practice their religion according to their own wishes, despite the fact that their uses are apprehended with
47 Ibid., 12.
disapproval on any ground.49 However, toleration cannot exists without certain restrictions, as a state cannot be tolerant towards the intolerant. This paradox of toleration is vividly described by Karl Popper. “Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.”50 Therefore, if tolerance towards religion is to be considered as a positive value, it is
a right balance between allowing the free exercise of a religion and restricting the freedoms that could lead to intolerance on their part. Indeed, as stereotypes are irrational they do not provide the right grounds to judge this balance. Therefore, in order to evaluate the extent of tolerance towards, it is important to understand the existence of negative stereotypes. Moreover, it needs to be judged how different fundamental rights are balanced. For instance, according to Casanova’s theory it would be intolerant abolish female circumcision if this would be a religious practice. However, tolerating this would be highly intolerant towards women. Therefore, a reasonable balance needs to be made between different kinds of rights, based on rationality and proportionality.
Another important consideration Casanova’s theory neglects, is that intolerance towards Islam is not the same as intolerance towards Muslims. The difference is that intolerance towards Islam is aimed on the religious practices, such as religious slaughter, while intolerance towards Muslim could be aimed at all kinds of activities, such as not allowing them to go to a swimming pool. Intolerance towards Islam is usually intolerance towards Muslims, but intolerance towards Muslims does not have to concern Islam.
Moreover, Casanova’s statement about the existence of an intolerant tyranny of the secular in Western Europe does not seem to correspond with the complex reality regarding the position of Islam in society. In practice the relation between the ‘secular Europeans’ and the ‘religious Muslims’ seem to be way more diverse and moderate. When looking into the statistics, the PEW Global Attitudes Survey demonstrates that after a period increasing negative stereotypes of
49 Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 5–6.
Muslims between 2004 and 2008, these stereotypes have been decreasing ever since 2008 (unfortunately numbers of earlier years are not available). Between 2004 and 2008, the rates of people who considered Muslims as unfavorable increased by an average of 6% to 34% in Germany, France, and the UK. Yet, in 2015, these rates decreased again to 24%. Moreover, the rates in European countries usually not considered as Western are, with an average of 53%, less favorable towards Muslims. Even in comparison with the US, the numbers are not very different.51 Contrary to this trend, the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) reports that crimes against Muslims have been increasing in France and England from 2009 to 2013. In Sweden crimes even increased by 69%.52 Additionally, when considering legal changes in Western Europe, one could see a severe amount of restrictions on the free practice of Islam, such as the abolishment of ritual slaughter in the Netherlands, the banning of wearing the veil in public in France and of course the changes that will be discussed in the later chapters. Yet, whereas some perceive these restrictions as intolerance towards Islam, others see this as a necessary means to protecting animal rights or woman rights.53 This is a matter of political perspective and balancing rights. On the contrary, there is much disagreement on how to deal with privileges. For instance, in Britain legislation has been introduced banning encouragement to religious hatred and special government funding has been provided particularly for Muslim organizations.54 The question is whether this should be seen as
51 Pew Research Center, “Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe,” Pew Research
Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 2008,
http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/unfavorable-views-of-jews-and-muslims-on-the-increase-in-europe/; Pew Research Center, “Chapter 3. Anti-Minority Sentiment Not Rising,” Pew
Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 2015,
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/chapter-3-anti-minority-sentiment-not-rising/.
52 Ojeaku Nwabuzo and Alice Le Dret, “Racist Crime in Europe: ENAR Shadow Report 2013-2014” (Brussels: European Network Against Racism (ENAR), 2014), 10–11, http://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/shadowreport_2013-14_en_final_lowres-2.pdf.
tolerance towards Islam, or as intolerance towards groups without these privileges. Clearly, these facts do not demonstrate a tyranny of the secularist European self-understanding that is preventing any legitimate space for Islam or Muslims in society. Moreover, from this perspective, it is impossible to generalize about the extent of intolerance towards Islam in Western Europe at al.
In this thesis, I will judge the extent of tolerance towards Islam by analyzing the particular political debate on Islamic education, the particular arguments that are given in the proposed bills, and the effects on the free exercise of Islam. This allows me to analyze the arguments that are used in the debates. Is the debate on Islamic education fueled by negative prejudices, or are most arguments rather reasonable? Moreover, analyzing the proposed bills allows me to see how Parliament balances different rights, to what extent the bill affects Islam practices and whether the bill is focused Islam alone or on other religions as well. Only by paying attention to all relevant details, one could sufficiently decide upon the extent of intolerance towards Islam in this specific a certain specific case.
The secularization paradigm
Casanova argues that a Western European secularist self-understanding fuels the legal intolerance towards religion, and in particular Islam. This self-understanding would be resulting from the secularization paradigm. Yet, this understanding is rather problematic from an epistemic point of view. The idea of a paradigm is drawn from Kuhn’s epistemology, which, in a scientific theory is defined as a "universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners.”55 However, the concept of paradigm
has been used in a sociological perspective as well, which points out a common perception of reality, which influences the way society interprets the surrounding world, including all the ideas, practices and believes that come with it. This is how Casanova uses this theory. He points at the existence of a commonly shared Western European perception that a modern society secularizes, which, again, would, among other ideas, creates a vision of religion as a backwards phenomenon.
However, using a paradigm as a sociological theory provides little space for change, different explanations and different ideas. Moreover the idea that the secularization paradigm
would be commonly shared in Western Europe, does not seem to be logical in societies where so many people still define themselves as religious.
First, the term paradigm cannot be used to enquire the changing way Western European society perceives its religious minorities. The problem is that if the secularization paradigm would be sharedamong all people in Western European, this makes a changing way of perceiving the practices of religious minorities. The paradox is that Casanova’s whole theory presupposes different and changing attitudes towards religion and secularization. He argues that the dominance of the intolerance towards religion is increasing by this paradigm. However, if the paradigm would decide my intolerance towards Islam, how can this same paradigm make me increasingly intolerant? This presupposes a paradigm shift. Yet, Casanova theory gives no information of how the paradigm is shifting, or how it could shift.
Berger demonstrates how this could work. He argues that ideas and human activity continually influence one another dialectically – “activity produces ideas, which in turn produce new forms of activity.”56 This process forms a person’s ideational complex. The extent to which this ideational complex corresponds with ideas and practices of others establishes its plausibility structure, which is “the condition within which the ideas in question have a chance of remaining plausible.”57 The bigger the plausibility structure of an ideational complex, the higher the chance that it is taken for granted.
“If such infrastructures are strong and enduring, then the theoretical constructions grounded in them take on an objective reality close to that of natural phenomena – they are taken for granted with the same unquestioning certitude given to the ‘facts of life’ encountered in the physical universe. Again, this holds for religious ideation as much as for any other.” 58 Yet, in a modern pluralist society, one is likely to be confronted with different ideas and practices undermining this taken-for-granted certainty. This confrontation touches upon the objective status of this reality, which will result in doubts and questions. “What was previously ‘known’ becomes, at best, ‘believed’, […] an ‘opinion,’ or even a ‘feeling.’ In other words, the particular contents of consciousness that used to be taken for granted as ‘knowledge’ are progressively
56 Berger, “A Sociological View of the Secularization of Theology,” 10. 57 Ibid., 11.
objectivized.”59Hence, when confronted with practices and ideas that do not relate to one’s taken-for-granted ideational complex, its plausibility structure will decrease. This may or may not (depending on other factors) result in a change of belief. Clearly, Muslims in the West do not seem to share the idea of inevitable disappearance of religion, because if they did their religiosity would not be perceived as a problem. As Muslims are a part of society, their behavior and ideas will also influence the beliefs of others. If the activities of Muslims are not secularizing and ideas are circulating that, they are not inclined to do so either, could this make someone believe that secularization does not constitute modernity. Indeed, where Muslims would not secularize fast enough or at all, there would be reason to doubt the whole paradigm. Hence, the whole idea that the secularization paradigm structures the Western European common identity must be a myth.
Another example could be helpful to illustrate my point. According to the secularization paradigm, everyone in the Netherlands is convinced that its modern society would automatically secularize. Yet, one study reveals that Muslims in the Western Europe became more religious. This would directly put the secularization paradigm under pressure. The whole Islam debate is based on the possibility that interference could prevent the development of extremist religious behavior, which in the case of the secularization paradigm would not be an option by definition. Hence, the paradigm does not allow the appearance of different groups with different ideas about these matters. However, it is obvious that a multiculturalist has different ideas about the relation between secularization and modernity, than a liberal, a conservative or a Muslim
However, this does not mean that the existence of a secular self-perception cannot be used as a way to understand the way a society deals with its religious minorities. Yet, these ideas must be seen in the light of different context related discourses influencing one another. The secularist self-perception of a multiculturalist would be rather different from the secularist self-perception of a nationalist. A different understanding of the relation between the secular and the religious will lead to a different way of structuring these dynamics in society. For instance, the Dutch educational sector is structured around the existence of different religious schools, while this would be unthinkable in France. Yet, this does not mean that French people, by definition, have a stronger secularist self-perception. It only tells us that the French idea differs from the Dutch idea about the status of education. Should education be seen as a public practice, or as a private practice? If it is
a public practice, does that mean that religious practices have to be allowed and to what extent. A particular secularist self-understanding is only one-way of looking at this issue; other could be the perception of the government, ideas of privatization, or an Islamic self-perception. The following chapter explores more deeply how the secular could influence the religious.
The secular and the religious
The third criticism on Casanova’s thesis is that the way he understands the dynamics between the secular and the religious is too simplistic; it does not grasp the reality of the complex dynamics or different ideas and practices.
The aim of this thesis is to clarify to what extent the political debate on Islamic schools in the Netherlands can be explained by the Western European secularist self-understanding, and to what extent this debate influences the legal tolerance of the free exercise of Islam in education. If there is a secularist self-understanding, how does this affect the space for Islamic education? Therefore, it needs to be explained how the secular and the religious relate to each other.
According to Casanova, the secularization of Western Europe in the twentieth century has often been falsely "interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm and is therefore accompanied by a “secularist” self-understanding that interprets the decline [of religion] as “normal” and “progressive”—that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a “modern” and “enlightened.”60 This self-understanding automatically turns religion into the backwards,
anti-modern and strange, particularly when it is publicly manifested. This creates a great pressure towards the modernization of religion, which in Western Europe means the privatization of religious practices. Casanova explains this as following,
Internal difference notwithstanding, Western Europe [is] shaped by the hegemonic knowledge system of the secular. As liberal societies, they tolerate and respect individual religious freedom. But due to the pressure towards the privatization of religion, which among European societies has become a taken-for-granted characteristic of the self-definition of a modern society, those societies have a much greater difficulty in recognizing some legitimate role for religion in public life. […] Muslim organized collective identities and their public representations become a source of anxiety not only because of their religious otherness as a non-Christian and non-European religion, but more importantly because of their religiousness itself as the other of European secularity. In this context, the temptation to identify Islam and fundamentalism becomes the more pronounced. Islam, by definition,
becomes the other of Western secular modernity. Therefore, the problems posed by the incorporation of Muslim immigrants become consciously or unconsciously associated with seemingly related and vexatious issues concerning the role of religion in the public sphere, which European societies assumed they had already solved according to the liberal secular norm of privatization of religion.61
Hence, the pressure towards the privatization of religion would make it difficult to keep a legal framework that is tolerant towards its religious minorities, particularly when this concerns foreign and public religions like Islam. Islam does not make a distinction between religion and the state, at least, not to the extent as this separation has been constructed in Western Europe. Moreover, Muslims have not been part of the cultural construction of this legal framework that settles the separation of Church and state, as well as the private and the public.62 This would be a cause of concern in the eyes of secular Europeans. However, these concerns would not only be pointed at the public or foreign character of their religion, but this makes their whole religion a source of concern.63 In other words, the concern would not only be some practices on Islamic schools, but the whole existence of Islamic schools would be perceived as a problem
However, Casanova’s theory does not provide a sufficient perspective to answer the question to what extent the religious is influenced by the secular, but merely provides a rhetorical explanation on how the religious is marginalized by the secular. For instance, his statement that the whole religiosity of Islam is a point of concern merely seems to reflect his opinion or some lose suspicion. Actually, his whole understanding loosely derives from his understanding that the secularist self-perception in Western Europe marginalizes religion and this idea seems to be a-priori. He does not offer much empirical evidence. He only provides some arguments based on his biased understanding of tolerance, that restrictions should be conceived as intolerance. Hence, his theory does not allow a critical reflection on the nature of the relation between the secular and the religious. However, that does not mean that his hypothesis cannot be emphasized
In order to enquire his thesis properly, one must understand the dynamic boundaries between the secular, the religious, and tolerance towards religion. Asad offers a better approach concerning these relations. He argues that religion and secularization are historical constructs and
61 Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,” 2006, 31–32. 62 Ibid., 31.
should always be explained as such. Instead of analyzing secularization as a universal process, one should use the concept to point at a context-specific situation. Moreover, secularization is “neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred), but a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life.”64 Instead, he views the secular and the religious as dynamic constructs.
Secularization does not inherently lead to the marginalization of religion, but changes the relation between both. The secular and the religious are inseparable, but they (re)-define each other in complex ways, sometimes in binary terms but more often in a complex way. “The authoritative status of representations [such as religion] is dependent on the appropriate production of other representations [such as religion, modernity and science].”65 In order to understand the
transformation of religious rights, it is important to understand both the historical and current dynamics of the boundaries between the secular, the religious and other relevant discourses, in other words: the specific context. This means that secularization does not have to lead to the marginalization of Islam, but could change the nature of Islam or affect it only slightly.
Bangstad study on the Islamic community in South Africa provides an example of how the secular can influence Islam in a different way than Casanova argues. This study demonstrates that secularization could also result in the re-Islamization of society. Bangstad observed that Muslims in South Africa became increasingly religious as a reaction to the secularization of society. However, at the same time these Muslims based themselves on liberal principles of the law, the same liberal principles that most religious scholars are condemning.66 Hence secularization does not cause religion to vanish, but both spheres re-define each other in complex and intertwined ways. Secularization does not always marginalize the religious. However, secularization inherently changes its meaning and structure.
64 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 25.
65 Asad, Talal, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” in A Reader in the Anthropology of
Religion, ed. Michael Joshua Lambek (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 113.
66 Sindre Bangstad, Global Flows, Local Appropriations: Facets of Secularization and Re-Islamization among
Moreover, secular regimes are not always antagonistic towards religion. The separation of state and religion could is an example of a compromise between the secular and the religious. Perhaps the following could demonstrate how such a compromise could work in the benefit of two parties. Two brother inherit a company with twenty employees, yet they cannot decide who should be the boss. The both feel like they make a legitimate claim. The result is that they keep on arguing which almost lead to the bankruptcy of the company. Both decides that it cannot go on like this and decided that one brother becomes the external director, and the other the internal director, which solved the conflict. Moreover, the company was able to grow again, which was in the benefit of the whole company. Of course, the relation between the religious and the secular is more complex. However, it should be understood that these are ideas of people, and not some structure that transcend are flying around, as Casanova seems to perceive it.
From this perspective, the way secular Western European societies are dealing with Islam in their midst does not to be restrictive or intolerant. It could also be tolerant, depending on the orientation the state (liberal or nationalist), which could quickly change in a democracy.67 In the case of liberal secularism, secularists could seek to make compromises with Muslims. This is a tolerant attitude and decreases the chance of conflict. In the case of nationalist secularism, secularists try to marginalize Muslims, by sending them out of the country or excluding them where possible. This is an intolerant attitude and clearly increases the chance of conflict. Of course, this does not mean that liberal secularists are ready to allow everything, as that will not be in their benefit. Clearly, a state cannot allow violence towards their institutions, or that Islamic schools teach their children to undermine the secular state.
This means that there cannot be a causal structure between secularization and intolerance towards religion, as their relation constantly reacts upon each other. This is the reasons why their relation is historical. From this perspective, Gorski argues that in the US “pluralism, secularism and democracy go hand-in-hand”.68 Moreover, the religious pluralist situation even created
tolerance towards religious minorities, as it undermined the power of organized religions.69 This
clearly makes the historical construction of separating Church and state different from France,
which is not the result of a pluralist religious map, but a dualist situation between Catholicism and secularism. The point being that secularization is not a threat to tolerance by definition. It entirely depends on its context. For this reason, the way that the religious and the secular are historically constructed in the Netherlands is extensively discussed in chapter 3.
Moreover, perceiving the relation between the secular and the religious in a dynamic way provides the space to enquire the actual point of contacts between secular regimes and the religious. Firstly, Casanova’s theory fails to emphasize the role of Muslims as actors in the debates. Tolerance towards religion is not only the results of the a priori ideas of society; it depends upon the actions of religion factions as well. If a large amount of Muslims use violence, this could easily create an atmosphere of conflict. Of course, this violent behavior would have causes too, but that does not reduce Muslims to objects. “The strength of movement leadership and the organizational structure of religious authority may be decisive factors in the incorporation of religious political movements into democratic systems.”70 Hence the pressure to secularize does not always lead to
conflict or intolerance. A strong religious organization could use its agency to integrate into society successfully, despite and perhaps because of the pressure of the secular. My point here is that a well-developed theory should not neglect the role – both positive and negative – of Muslims as subjects.
According to conservatives, one of the main issues of Islam would be that it is at odds with a liberal democracy, as it refuses to separate state and religion. It would refuse to compromise. Of course, this is a broad generalization and does not apply to all Muslims. However, Esposito empirically demonstrated that this statement is largely true. “Most Muslims do not view religious authority and political authority as mutually exclusive and see a role for religious principles in the formulation of state legislation.”71 The problem of this unwillingness to separate both spheres is
that Muslims would undermined the state that is based on this principle. This total refusal to compromise is what we call radical Islam. In some cases, this radicalism could lead to violence, which would endanger the secular principles of society. The idea that Islam inherently refuses any form of compromise is the basis of the extreme right idea that the influence on society has to be
70 Ibid.
reduced where possible. Multiculturalism believes the exact opposite, yet, most political movements find themselves in between these stances.
Clearly, these kinds of conflicts between the secular state and religious minorities are not restricted to Islam. Western societies continue to experience clashes where the religious meets the political. Think about the situation with gay marriage in France a few years ago and the debates on abortion in the US.What this reveals is that tensions often appear when religious values seek, or appear, to exert influence on decision-making, or when the secular state appears to exert influence on establishes religious principles, rights or privileges. These tensions become particularly apparent when the principles of the state are far-distanced from the values of a certain religious minority.
According to Casanova thesis, these kinds of conflicts are increasingly taken place in current Western European societies, as these highly secularized societies created a different view towards religious ideas and practices. Asad theory demonstrates that this does not has to be the case in principle. Wallet gives a clear example of the increased secularization in the Netherlands lead to a different perception towards traditional Jewish practice of ritual slaughter, while at the same time he demonstrates how religious and secular parties interact and react to other events. In the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century ritual slaughter was accepted as a Jewish practice. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, some criticisms of this practice were voiced by animal rights activists, secularist organization and anti-Semites. However, existence of ritual slaughter was, apart from WOII, never a serious concern. Yet, “the wake of 9/11 and the ‘Fortuyn revolt’ led to a new articulation of Dutch identity, which was essentially secular. Religious rites such as Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter consequently were framed in opposition to the newly expressed Dutch identity.” This example demonstrates that the existence of secularization did not lead to the restriction on religious slaughter at firsts. However, when religion became attached to violent fundamentalism, secularism became a part of Dutch identity. This indicates a change from liberalist secularism to nationalist secularism.
2. Research design
This thesis analyzes to what extent the Dutch secularist self-perception influenced legal tolerance towards religious freedoms of Islam in education. This idea is clearly exposed by Casanova, who sees a connection between the construction of the secularization paradigm in Western Europe and decreasing tolerance towards Islam. Intolerance in this case is seen as the direct institutional restrictions on the free exercise of Islamic practices and expressions. However, this theory does not provide a proper theoretical framework to enquire this thesis, as the idea of a secularization paradigm adapted by a society offers not enough flexibility to understand correctly the dynamic of the relation and boundaries of the secular and the religious. In order to be able to engage critically with the concepts that are mentioned is Casanova I stipulated the following theoretical remarks.
Firstly, tolerance is perceived as the absence of restrictions. However, viewing intolerance towards religion or Islam only in terms of legal restrictions seems to be out of balance with reality of the term. It implies that there could be something like an entirely free exercise of religion, but this does not exist anywhere in the world. Toleration means, conditionally, permitting something that one actually disapproves, and only applies when one has the position to disallow something.
Secondly, Casanova uses the term paradigm as a sociological theory. However, the term paradigm implies that the idea underlying this paradigm is shared among all people Western European society makes the existence of doubting secularization impossible. Using a paradigm as a sociological theory provides little space for change, different explanations and different ideas. Moreover the idea that the secularization paradigm would be commonly shared in Western Europe, does not seem to be logical in societies where so many people still define themselves as religious. Therefore, I prefer to look to how different dynamic secularist self-understanding has been created in Dutch society. This provides more flexibility to regards the existence of a plurality of ideas and motivations, which makes it more analytical.
