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3,01 [d = 0, d d = -1, d d = -1, d Forced resignations ( n = 66) OLS model Market model CAAR

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Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix A

Details of studies who performed research on management changes

Authors (year) Research period Research country Main results Pre-event company performance

Dedman and Lin (2001) 1990 - 1995 United Kingdom Declining ROA for the three years before the CEO departure Kang and Shivdasani (1996) 1985 - 1990 Japan Negative abnormal return during period [-220 to -20]

Denis and Denis (1995) 1985 - 1988 United States Negative abnormal return of -11,40 % during period [-251,-2]

Denis and Denis (1995) 1985 - 1988 United States Declining ROA for the three years before the CEO departure Weisbach (1988) 1977 - 1980 United States Poor stock performance during period before management change Warner et al. (1988) 1963 - 1978 United States Negative abnormal return of -5,01 % during period [-12, -7 months]

Resignations whole sample

Dedman and Lin (2001) 1990 - 1995 United Kingdom Significant abnormal return of - 0,72 % on announcement day Kang and Shivdasani (1996) 1985 - 1990 Japan Significant abnormal return of 0,52 % during period [-1 to 0]

Denis and Denis (1995) 1985 - 1988 United States No significant market reaction Mahajan and Lummer (1993) 1972 - 1983 United States No significant market reaction

Bonnier and Bruner (1989) 1969 - 1983 United States Significant abnormal return of 2,48 % during period [-1 to 0]

Weisbach (1988) 1977 - 1980 United States Significant abnormal return of 0,35 % during period [-1 to 1]

Warner et al. (1988) 1963 - 1978 United States No significant market reaction

Furtado and Rozeff (1987) 1975 - 1982 United States Significant abnormal return of 0,95 % during period [-1 to 0]

Forced resignations

Cools and Van Praag (2003) 1991 - 2000 The Netherlands No significant market reaction

Dedman and Lin (2001) 1990 - 1995 United Kingdom Significant abnormal return of -3,98 % on announcement day Ferere and Renneboog (2000) 1988 - 1992 France Significant abnormal return of 0,5 % during period [-10,10]

Kang and Shivdasani (1996) 1985 - 1990 Japan Significant abnormal return of 1,02 % during period [-1 to 0]

Denis and Denis (1995) 1985 - 1988 United States Significant abnormal return of 1,50 % during period [-1,0]

Mahajan and Lummer (1993) 1972 - 1983 United States Significant abnormal return of -0,73 % during period [-1,0]

Warner et al. (1988) 1963 - 1978 United States No significant market reaction

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Voluntary resignations

Dedman and Lin (2001) 1990 - 1995 United Kingdom No significant market reaction Ferere and Renneboog (2000) 1988 - 1992 France No significant market reaction

Kang and Shivdasani (1996) 1985 - 1990 Japan Significant abnormal return of 0,40 % during period [-1 to 0]

Mahajan and Lummer (1993) 1972 - 1983 United States No significant market reaction

Age related retirement

Dedman and Lin (2001) 1990 - 1995 United Kingdom No significant market reaction

Ferere and Renneboog (2000) 1988 - 1992 France Significant abnormal return of -0,20 % during period [-5 to 5]

Denis and Denis (1995) 1985 - 1988 United States Significant abnormal return of 0,20 % during period [-1,0]

Mahajan and Lummer (1993) 1972 - 1983 United States No significant market reaction

Internal successor

Ferere and Renneboog (2000) 1988 - 1992 France Significant abnormal return of -1,00 % on announcement day Kang and Shivdasani (1996) 1985 - 1990 Japan Significant abnormal return of 0,38 % during period [-1 to 0]

Furtado and Rozeff (1987) 1975 - 1982 United States Significant abnormal return of 1,05 % during period [-1 to 0]

Reinganum (1985) 1978 - 1979 United States Significant abnormal return of -0,29 % on announcement day

External successor

Ferere and Renneboog (2000) 1988 - 1992 France Significant abnormal return of 2,86 % on announcement day Kang and Shivdasani (1996) 1985 - 1990 Japan Significant abnormal return of 0,95 % during period [-1 to 0]

Furtado and Rozeff (1987) 1975 - 1982 United States Significant abnormal return of 0,72 % during period [-1 to 0]

Reinganum (1985) 1978 - 1979 United States Significant abnormal return of 1,46 % on announcement day

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Appendix B

Appendix B

Companies included in the study

ABN AMRO Holding Getronics Rood Testhouse Accell Group Grontmij Royal Dutch Shell

AEGON Hagemeyer RT Company

Ahold Kon Heijmans Samas

Akzo Nobel Heineken SBM Offshore

Antonov ICT Automatisering Simac Techniek

Arcadis Imtech Smit International

ASM International ING Groep Sopheon ASML Holding InnoConcepts Stork

Ballast Nedam Kas Bank Telegraaf Media Groep BAM Group Kon Kendrion Tie Holding

BE Semiconductor KPN Kon TNT

BinckBank Laurus Tulip Computers

Boskalis Westminster MacIntosh Retail Unilever Brunel International Neways Electronics Unit 4 Agresso

Crucell Numico Univar

CSM Nutreco Holding Moolen Van der

Ctac Oce VastNed OFF/IND

DPA Flex Group OPG Groep Vedior

Draka Holding Ordina Vopak Kon

DSM Kon Pharming Group Wegener Kon

Econosto Kon Philips Kon Wereldhave

Eriks Group Qurius Wessanen Kon

Exact Holding Randstad Wolters Kluwer Fornix BioSciences Reed Elsevier

Fortis Rodamco Europe

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Appendix C

Appendix C

Companies excluded from the study Merger No share data available Air France - KLM SNS Reaal

Arcelor Mittal Tele Atlas

Corio Wavin

LBI International

LogicaCMG Board structure unclear

USG People Buhrmann

Corus

No management changes VastNed Retail Aalberts Industries

Eurocommercial Prop Annual reports not available

Homburg ENDEMOL

Hunter Douglas Eurocastle Investments Nieuwe Steen Inv Kardan

Oranjewoud Beheer Prologis Euro Prop

Ten Cate

TOMTOM

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Appendix D

Appendix D

Descriptive analysis abnormal returns excluding outliners [d = 0]

Sample Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera Probability

Whole sample (ols) 124 -0,19% -0,06% 9,06% -7,57% 0,00 3,81 3,36 0,1861

Whole sample (market) 124 -0,20% -0,03% 9,70% -8,79% -0,05 4,16 7,03 0,0298

Forced resignations (ols) 60 0,59% 0,53% 9,06% -6,83% -0,17 4,17 3,72 0,1558

Forced resignations (market) 60 0,53% 0,37% 8,70% -8,79% -0,15 4,57 6,35 0,0419

Voluntary resignations (ols) 34 -1,40% -0,85% 3,37% -7,57% -0,51 2,67 1,66 0,4367

Voluntary resignations (market) 34 -1,20% -0,37% 3,21% -7,38% -0,67 2,53 2,86 0,2388

Age related retirements (ols) 14 -0,08% -0,42% 4,55% -3,92% 0,60 3,17 0,86 0,6508

Age related retirements (market) 14 -0,39% -0,74% 3,42% -3,95% 0,36 3,92 0,81 0,6682

Internal successor (ols) 29 -0,28% -0,08% 9,06% -7,57% 0,26 3,62 0,80 0,6703

Internal successor (market) 29 -0,40% -0,38% 8,70% -7,38% 0,17 3,62 0,60 0,7414

External successor (ols) 17 0,02% -0,37% 5,34% -6,70% -0,40 3,34 0,54 0,7628

External successor (market) 17 -0,37% -0,59% 4,27% -8,79% -1,08 4,77 5,53 0,0629

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Appendix E

Appendix E

Results including the outliners Whole sample ( n = 130)

OLS model Market model CAAR (%) t-value CAAR (%) t-value [ d = 0] 0,96%*** 3,07 0,95%*** 3,01

[d = 0, d = 1] 0,41% 0,65 0,29% 0,46

[ d = -1, d = 0] 0,97% 1,54 0,97% 1,54

[d = -1, d = 1] 0,41% 0,44 0,31% 0,33

Forced resignations ( n = 66)

OLS model Market model CAAR (%) t-value CAAR (%) t-value [ d = 0] 2,8%*** 5,78 2,72%*** 5,63 [d = 0, d = 1] 2,51%*** 2,59 2,28%** 2,36 [ d = -1, d = 0] 2,91%*** 3,01 2,8%*** 2,89 [d = -1, d = 1] 2,62%** 1,81 2,36%* 1,63

Voluntary resignations (n = 34)

OLS model Market model CAAR (%) t-value CAAR (%) t-value [ d = 0] -1,40%*** -2,77 -1,20%** -2,37 [d = 0, d = 1] -2,22%** -2,19 -2,07%** -2,04 [ d = -1, d = 0] -1,52%* -1,50 -1,20% -1,19 [d = -1, d = 1] -2,34%* -1,54 -2,07%* -1,36

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Age related retirements ( n = 14)

OLS model Market model CAAR (%) t-value CAAR (%) t-value

[ d = 0] -0,08% -0,13 -0,39% -0,67

[d = 0, d = 1] -0,52% -0,44 -1,19% -1,02 [ d = -1, d = 0] 0,07% 0,06 -0,01% -0,01 [d = -1, d = 1] -0,37% -0,21 -0,81% -0,47

Internal successor ( n = 32)

OLS model Market model CAAR (%) t-value CAAR (%) t-value [ d = 0] 2,41%*** 4,85 2,30%*** 4,62 [d = 0, d = 1] 1,39% 1,40 1,08% 1,08 [ d = -1, d = 0] 2,53%** 2,55 2,37%** 2,38 [d = -1, d = 1] 1,51% 1,01 1,14% 0,77

External successor ( n = 20)

OLS model Market model CAAR (%) t-value CAAR (%) t-value [ d = 0] 3,22%*** 3,47 2,82%*** 3,03 [d = 0, d = 1] 2,01% 1,08 1,42% 0,76 [ d = -1, d = 0] 3,98%** 2,14 3,12% 1,68 [d = -1, d = 1] 2,77% 0,99 1,71% 0,62

*** Significant at 1 % level, ** 5 % level, * 10 % level

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