Merel Diemont S1617818
mereldiemont@hotmail.com Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RuG)
Master International Relations and International Organization Master Thesis
Number of Words: 56,481 January - June 2012
Prof. dr. R.J. van der Veen
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 1
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 2
Table of Contents
Map 1 - Sudan prior to the Independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011 5 Map 2 - Sudan after the Secession of South Sudan on 9 July 2011 6
Map 3 - South Sudan after Independence 9 July 2011 7
Facts Sudan 2005 - 2011 8
List of Abbreviations 9
Introduction
111.
Orientation 112. Research question and sub questions 13
3. Justification 14
4. Focus 15
5. Thesis outline 16
6. Methodology I – A two-track strategy 18
7. Methodology II – The comprehensive approach model 20
8. Recognizing the limits of the research 20
Chapter 1 Thematic Background: Sudan in Historical Perspective
211.1 A history of conflict 21
1.2 Recent developments 25
Chapter 2 The Comprehensive Approach
272.1. Orientation 27
2.2. Cooperation and coherence in international perspective 30
2.3. Cooperation and coherence in national perspective 31
2.4. Dutch conceptual approaches to the comprehensive approach 38
Chapter 3 The Comprehensive Approach Model
423.1. Different levels of coherence 43
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Chapter 4 Mapping the Dutch Comprehensive Approach for Sudan
494.1. Policy framework for an integrated strategy for Sudan 50 4.2. The Dutch organizational structure for a comprehensive approach 55 4.3. The organizational structure of Dutch civil society in the context of Sudan 60
Chapter 5 Dutch Involvement in Post-conflict Sudan
685.1. Diplomacy - political efforts for lasting peace 69
5.2. Defence – Dutch military in Sudan 71
5.3. Development - Dutch non-governmental organizations involved in Sudan 76
5.4. The role of other ministries 77
5.5. The role of the Dutch private business sector in Sudan 78
5.6. The role of the Sudanese Diaspora 80
Chapter 6 Findings and Dilemmas
83Part I Findings 83
Part II The NGO sector: Differences and Dilemmas 97
Chapter 7 Degree of Coherence
1077. 1. Coherence in the domestic sphere 107
7. 2. Coherence in the local sphere at field level in Sudan 117
Conclusions
129Part I Sub questions 130
Part II Conclusions 137
Literature and Resources
143Annexes
151A. Interviews 151
B. Overview Dutch Governments 2005-2011 152
C. Overviews Results 154
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Overview Figures
1. Structure of the study 17
2. Three foci in a comprehensive approach 39
3. Organizations involved in the comprehensive approach 40 4. Different levels of coherence in a comprehensive approach 46
5. Coherence matrix of De Coning and Friis 47
6. A spectrum of tendencies among structural development and 99 humanitarian assistance
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Map 1 - Sudan prior to the Independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011
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Map 2 – Sudan after the Secession of South Sudan on 9 July 2011
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Map 3 - South Sudan after Independence 9 July 2011
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Facts Sudan 2005-2011
Location: Sudan is located in northeastern Africa. Before the secession of the South on 9 July 2011, Sudan was the largest country in the African continent and the Arab world and tenth largest in the world by area.
Capital: Khartoum
Population: 43,551,941
Ethnic groups: Black 52 %, Arab 39 %, Beja 6 %, foreigners 2 %, other 1 %.
Religion: Sunni Muslim 70 % (in north), Christian 5 % (mostly in south and Khartoum) indigenous beliefs 25 %.
GDP: (purchasing power parity): $ 62,045,783,133 (2010 est.) GDP growth:
2007: 10,2 % 2008: 6,8 % 2009: 4,0 % 2010: 4,5 %
Failed States Index: According to the Failed States Index, Sudan was the world’s third most instable country in 2007 to 2011 and the world’s second most instable country in 2008.
President: (Government of National Unity): Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir (National Congress Party)
First Vice President (and President of autonomous Southern Sudan): Salva Kiir Mayardit (SPLM).
Government type: Following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed, based on a power-sharing arrangement. The National Congress Party (NCP), which came to power by military coup in 1989 was the major majority partner. Following the 2005 Peace Agreement, an autonomous government was formed in the South: the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).
Most important political parties and interest groups 2005-2011
Government of National Unity (GNU): since 2005, consists of NCP and SPLM with the NCP as majority partner.
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS): Seats in both the GOSS and the Southern Sudan Assembly are to be divided in fixed proportion between the SPLM (70%), the NCP (15%) and ‘other Southern political forces’ (15%)
National Congress Party (NCP): formerly the National Islamic Front (NIF).
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List of Abbreviations
3D Diplomacy, Defence and Development AIV Advisory Council on International Affairs
AU African Union
CIMIC Civil-military Cooperation
CDA Christen Democratisch Appel (Christian Democratic political party in the Netherlands) CDS Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CSO Civil Society Organisation
HCSS The Hague Center for Security Studies
D66 Democraten ’66 (Progressive Democratic Party in the Netherlands) DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DGPZ Directorate-General for Political Affairs (MFA) DVB Security Policy Department (MFA)
EFV Fragile States and Peace building Unit (MFA)
EU European Union
GoNU Government of National Unity GOS Government of Sudan
GOSS Government of Southern Sudan (and following independence Government of the Republic
of South Sudan)
HGIS Homogeneous Budget for Development Cooperation ICC International Criminal Court
IDP Internally displaced person
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGADD Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization JAM Joint Assessment Mission
JDT Joint Donor Team
JEM Justice and Equality Movement MDG Millennium Development Goal MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MILAD Military Advisor
MIVD Military Intelligence and Security Service MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCP National Congress Party
NGO Non-governmental Organization NIF National Islamic Front
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan
OSAD Ontwikkelingsadviseur (Development Advisor) PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Party) RNE Royal Netherlands Embassy
SLM Sudan Liberation Movement
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SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SSR Security Sector Reform
SVW Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Reconstruction TFU Uruzgan Task Force
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UP Umma Party
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the
Netherlands)
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Introduction
‘It is not only about a military solution, neither only about a political solution, nor a solution by projects or programs of development cooperation. We have to get used to that mix’.4
Since former UN-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 marked the contours for crisis management in the new era after the Cold War with his Agenda for Peace in 1992, many new concepts were born. What these concepts had in common was that they presented a new approach for crisis management in post-conflict situations, which started from the realization that democratization, peace building and development were strongly interrelated and coherent processes. The various instruments for international cooperation should therefore be much better tuned to each other.5 This lead to the
development of the comprehensive approach to post-conflict situations in fragile states.
1. Orientation
The comprehensive approach finds its origins in the context of the increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. The scope of the crises faced by the international community is often of such a scale that no single agency, government or international organization can manage them alone. A wide range of agencies, governmental and non-governmental and regional and international organizations have developed specialized capacities to manage various aspects of these complex (post-)conflict situations. However, the lack of coherence among these diverse
international and local actors has resulted often in inter-agency rivalry, agencies working at cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and sub-optimal economies of scale, among other things. This lack of coherence is one of the factors often cited as contributing to the poor success rate and lack of sustainability of international peace and stability operations and reconstruction in fragile states.6 In order to address these shortcomings, and in an attempt to improve the overall success rate of these activities, various agencies, governments and organizations have developed – mostly independent of each other- a range of concepts, models and tools aimed at enhancing the overall coherence. All these initiatives have a similar aim: to achieve greater harmonization and synchronization among the activities of international and local actors, as well as across the analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation phases of the program cycle.7
The Netherlands recognized the need for coherence between the political, security, humanitarian,
4 Minister Koenders for Development Cooperation, 3D-debate, 3 June 2008. 5
Annette Jansen, ‘Beyond integrated foreign policy (3D). context-specific reconstruction’ in Internationale Spectator 62 nr. 4 (April 2008) 191.
6 Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friss, ‘Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach’ in Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2011) 246.
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development and administrative domains in the early 1990s with the 1993 policy paper A World of Dispute.8 This paper noted that in the post-Cold War era crises had become more complex and therefore required a growing involvement of the international community on a continuum stretching from early warning as part of preventive diplomacy, to peacemaking, peacekeeping and rehabilitation and reconstruction as elements of peace-building. It was stated that complex emergencies in particular required an integrated deployment of the instruments of foreign, defence and development policy (including humanitarian assistance), which in turn required the ministries involved to co-operate on these issues.9
One of the countries where the Dutch government aimed to implement an integrated approach to post-conflict management was Sudan.10 In February 2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented an integrated reconstruction strategy for Sudan, focusing on the implementation of Dutch foreign policy to support the reconstruction process in the medium-long term. This internal document stated that the situation in Sudan required an integrated approach, in which political, military, economic and development instruments were tuned to each other.11
The concept of the comprehensive approach, or ‘integrated approach’ as the Dutch government called the concept, has been further developed on the basis of experiences in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the Dutch troops withdrew from Uruzgan in 2010 many studies and reports evaluated this extensive mission. Jair van der Lijn from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations,
‘Clingendael’, published the report: 3D ‘The next Generation’. Lessons learned from Uruzgan for Future Operations.12 Following the line of his report, my research aims to analyze the way the Netherlands implemented a comprehensive approach to Sudan between 2005 and 2011.
Conflict has been part of most of Sudan’s history. Since Sudan’s independence from Great-Britain in 1954, the country has suffered from tribal, religious, ethnic, geographical, regional and socio-economic conflicts. A long civil war between the North and the South ended with a peace agreement in January 2005 known as the ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ (CPA) after a long peace process.13 The international community recognized the need to foster the fragile peace and various initiatives were established, aimed at a sustainable peace. The United Nations (UN) started the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in which the Netherlands participated since 2006 with 15 military monitors, 15 police officials and some staff officials. The period between 2005 and 2011 was therefore a time of post-conflict management and
8
Ministry of Development Cooperation, A World of Dispute (The Hague, September 1993). 9
Mariska van Beijnum and Luc van de Goor (Clingendael Institute) The Netherlands and its Whole of Government
Approach on Fragile States. Case study Sudan (The Hague 2006) 3. 10
The Dutch government uses the term ‘integrated approach’ or ‘3D’ approach. Chapter 2 delves deeper into this definition discussion.
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Integrated Reconstruction Strategy for Sudan (February 2005). 12
Jair van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’. Lessons learned from Uruzgan for Future Operations (The Hague 2011). 13
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reconstruction. In the Netherlands various initiatives emerged from government agencies, as well as from NGOs which contributed to the implementation of the CPA.
2. Research question and sub questions
The main research question of this study is:
To what extent was the Dutch approach to Sudan between 2005 and 2011 a comprehensive approach?
This question is divided into five sub questions:
What is the concept of the comprehensive approach?
In what way did the Dutch government apply a comprehensive (or integrated approach) to Sudan? To what extent was there coherence between the different Dutch ministries involved in Sudan? To what extent was there coherence between the different Dutch ministries on the one hand and
Dutch NGOs involved in Sudan on the other hand?
Which dilemmas played a role in a Dutch comprehensive approach to Sudan?
Sub question 1
In the first part of the research, the concept of the comprehensive approach to international peace and stability missions and to reconstruction in fragile states is discussed. The different names of the concept are mapped out and the concept is scrutinized.
Sub question 2
The second question is focused on the policy documents between 2003 and 2008 in which the Netherlands described their integrated approach to the complex problems in fragile states such as Sudan. An overview of various policy documents, governmental reports and parliamentary papers creates a framework that serves to reflect the policy of the Netherlands towards peace and stability operations, reconstruction and state building in fragile states in general and in Sudan in particular. The governmental and civil society organizational structure the Netherlands used to implement an integrated approach is also explained.
Sub question 3
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Sub question 4
Consequently, coherence between the different ministries and the Dutch NGOs is analyzed. This is an extension of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach because actors other than governmental institutions are included too.
Sub question 5
The last sub question is directed to the difficulties and dilemmas that were encountered and their consequences for the realization of a comprehensive approach to Sudan in practice. With this question it is possible to reveal specific problems. For future policy and activities it is important to avoid these problems and to improve the concept.
3. Justification
The literature about the comprehensive approach has expanded rapidly in recent years. The use of the 3D-approach in Afghanistan in particular is a much described and analyzed theme. However, the
comprehensive approach is also a disputed approach and the ideas about the content, goals and results are not yet clear. Ideas about it diverge. With this research I would like to make a small contribution to the development of the comprehensive approach.
- Mariska van Beijnum and Luc van de Goor from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in 2006 wrote a report on the ‘Whole of Government’ approach of the Netherlands to Sudan.14 My research aims to extend this study in two ways. The research of Van Beijnum and Van
de Goor was mainly focused on the years 2005 and 2006. I would like to make an extension in time and focus in this study on the years from 2005 to 2011. This period is of special importance due to the crucial phase in which Sudan found itself after the signing of the CPA. The second extension to the report of Van Beijnum and Van de Goor is the scope of the approach. The report of Van Beijnum and Van de Goor is focused on the ‘whole-of-government’ approach. It analyses the degree of coherence between the different Dutch ministries. My research takes a broader view and is focused on a comprehensive approach which also incorporates the activities of Dutch non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs) and Dutch private business companies.
- Most reports and articles about a comprehensive approach are based upon the situations and experiences in Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree in Iraq. However, in my opinion it is also necessary to discover more about the strengths, weaknesses and dilemmas of a comprehensive approach in other conflict situations. After all, every conflict situation is characterized by its specific
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problems, local culture and own circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to shift the focus from Afghanistan and Iraq to fragile states in other parts of the world.
- The above mentioned motives for this study are grounded in theoretical considerations, but the study is also of importance for practical reasons. With the forming of the new state of South Sudan in July 2011, the United Nations decided to set up a new mission: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The Netherlands also participated in this mission. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the results and dilemmas of the former Dutch contribution to a UN-mission in Sudan. - UNMIS ended on 9 July 2011 with the independence of South Sudan. As a consequence this is the
right moment to look back and evaluate the approaches used and the way these functioned in practice. Lastly, the results of the research could be of importance for the Dutch government and the Dutch ministries as a form of policy evaluation in order to improve future policy.
The research is directed to the period between 2005 and 2011 because in those years the process of peace making in Sudan entered a new phase. The parties of the North and the South of Sudan signed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA) after a period of almost half a century of civil war. The
international community recognized the importance of the peace agreements and employed various efforts to prevent war breaking out again. The United Nations set up the UN-Mission UNMIS (United Nations Mission In Sudan), in which the Netherlands participated. The period of 2005-2011 was therefore a post-conflict period where reconstruction, peacekeeping operations and state building came together and overlapped. Theories and literature of a comprehensive approaches to reconstruction, to international peace and stability operations and to state building are therefore all applicable to this period. The Dutch government was right in its response to the report of the AIV in its observation: ‘The principles of a comprehensive approach are applicable to every involvement in a foreign conflict or process in fragile states’.15
4. Focus
The study focuses on coherence between the different Dutch actors in Sudan. However, in order to avoid a too extensive research, it is necessary to define the limits of the research question.
Period – The study focuses on the period between 2005 and 2011 because that period formed the first post-conflict phase of the conflict between the South and the North of Sudan, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreements. These Peace Accords were agreed on 9 January 2005 and included, among other things, a six-and-a-half-year interim period in which elections were to be held for a new Sudanese President and a referendum which would decide on the fate of South Sudan. The six-and-a half-year interim period ended on 9 July 2011 with the seceding of South
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Sudan (the result of the referendum) after which Sudan and South Sudan entered a new phase. The study is therefore directed at this interim-period in order to analyze the degree and role of
Netherlands coherence for maintaining the fragile peace.
Funding - In addition this study will not elaborate on the financing mechanisms behind the activities regarding the comprehensive approach. This is a pity because these mechanisms indeed give a good impression of the degree of integration between the different ministries and non-state actors. For example the establishment of the Stability Fund in 2004 formed an important initial step on the path towards a flexible and effective funding instrument at the intersection of security and
development. Since the comprehensive approach is increasingly seen as a way to reach more effective and durable results in fragile states, the attention for the funding of activities at the intersection of security and development equally increased. However, due to the necessity of limiting this study, this will not be elaborated further. For a clear and actual overview of the different ways of funding these activities I would like to refer to the report of the Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States. The need for a Coherent Approach.16
Conflict - The last limitation of the research is the focus of conflict. As Chapter 1 describes, the conflict in Sudan consisted in fact of three different conflicts, each with their ‘own’ peace
agreement(s). The period of research, between 2005 and 2011, was in most parts of Sudan a post-conflict phase after the signing of the CPA. Because of this, I will focus only on the North-South conflict in Sudan. The problems in Sudan are very complex with an important role for religion, ethnicity, history and economic interests, and the conflict in Darfur is even more complex. Despite the involvement of the Netherlands in Darfur and the serious characteristics of the Darfur conflict, I will only focus on a Dutch comprehensive approach to the North-South conflict of Sudan with the eye on the practical feasibility of the research.
5. Thesis outline
The research consists of five different components which are interrelated according to the following logic. These components, which on the whole correspond with the five sub questions, together contribute to an extended answer on the central research question.
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Figure 1. Structure of the study.
Chapter 1 – Thematic Background gives an overview of the context of the research. The causes of conflict in Sudan are explained and the recent developments are mapped out because they form the context in which the Dutch comprehensive approach was implemented.
Chapter 2 –The Comprehensive Approach forms the first part of the theoretical framework of the study. This chapter consists of an elaboration of the discussions of the comprehensive approach. The Dutch conceptual positions to an integrated approach are unfolded and the different components of the comprehensive approach are explained.
Chapter 3 – The Comprehensive Approach Model is the next step in this theoretical framework: a deepening towards the central theme in a comprehensive approach, namely coherence. The coherence matrix of De Coning and Friis is presented and described in detail.
Chapter 4 – The Dutch comprehensive approach to Sudan aims to create a framework based on different policy documents, debates and parliamentary papers, which provide an overview of the way the
Netherlands aimed to implement a comprehensive approach to Sudan. In the second part of this chapter the inter-ministerial organizational structure, as well as the Dutch organizational structure for civil society organizations, used for a comprehensive approach are mapped out.
Case study line: theories applied to the Dutch involvement in Sudan Theoretical line
Case study line: theories applied to the Dutch involvement in Sudan
History conflict Sudan and Dutch involvement
Dutch comprehensive approach to Sudan
2005 - 2011 05 - 2011
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Chapter 5 - Dutch Involvement in Post-conflict Sudan - analyses the different policy fields used in the context of a comprehensive approach for Sudan and the various Dutch actors involved between 2005 and 2011. These actors make up the different components of the intended comprehensive approach towards Sudan. The Dutch contribution to the United Nations Mission UNMIS is discussed, as well as the different Dutch ministries involved in Sudan, of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence are the most important. Last but not least, the role of Dutch NGOs and of the Dutch private business sector are investigated.
Chapter 6 – Findings and Dilemmas – delves deeper into the results of the literature study and the interviews in order to reveal the findings, observations, critical factors and dilemmas regarding the comprehensive approach to Sudan and a comprehensive approach in general.
Chapter 7 – Degree of Coherence – delves deeper into the findings of the literature study and the
interviews in order to analyze the degree of coherence between Dutch actors in the domestic sphere in the Netherlands and at field level in Sudan. In this chapter all the elements, as presented in figure 1, come together and allow for a detailed, structured and objective analysis concerning the degree of coherence between the different Dutch actors in Sudan.
Finally, in the Conclusion the five sub questions are answered, and following from this an extended answer on the research question is given. The last step is to come to some (policy) recommendations for a more effective implementation of a comprehensive approach to post-conflict situations in fragile states.
6. Methodology I - A two-track strategy
In order to answer the research question, the study is based on a two-track strategy. First, the study looks at coherence in a comprehensive approach in general. The development of the concept, the different names and the different components of the approach are analyzed. This first track forms the theoretical framework in which the comprehensive approach is explained. This track aims to answer the first sub question: What are comprehensive approaches?
The literature study is based on reports, policy documents, parliamentary papers, articles and books, of which the most important are:
- The report of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States. The Need for a Coherent Approach (December 2008);
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- The article from Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, ‘Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of a Comprehensive Approach’ (March 2011);
- The Study of Mariska van Beijnum and Luc van de Goor from the Clingendael Institute The Netherlands and its Whole of Government Approach on Fragile States (August 2006);
- Different policy documents of which the Horn of Africa Policy Memorandum (February 2004), the Reconstruction after Violent Conflict memorandum (March 2005) and the Integrated Reconstruction Strategy for Sudan (February 2005) are most useful;
- To support these reports and documents I made use of various articles, reports, documents and books.
The first track serves as background for the second track, which specifically deals with the comprehensive approach of the Netherlands towards Sudan. This second track aims to address the other sub questions. This track consists of a combination of literature study and interviews with representatives of the main Dutch actors in Sudan: diplomats involved in Sudan, Dutch military involved in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),representatives from Dutch NGOs as well as from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and private investors.17 The interviews were held to generate further information on the activities of the different Dutch actors in Sudan.
With regard to both tracks I would like to add some observations. The literature of the first track consists for the large part of policy memoranda and political reports and articles. These policy memoranda and Parliamentary letters especially were the result of the vision and ideas of the Government in those years. This time factor implies that change is possible and that the basis – the ideas on the Dutch
comprehensive approach and its implementation- might be subject to change. This is the consequence of examining a political theme such as the comprehensive approach. The ideas as expressed in this context are thus not my own views, but the Governments’.18 Where it concerns my own opinion this will be explicitly mentioned.
In relation to the second track, which is formed by interviews held with Dutch actors on the comprehensive approach, care is taken to protect the interviewees’ professional identity as much as possible, although in the same time I have tried to mention the background of the person concerned because this could be important for the context of a particular vision. I have tried to find a balance on this point. However the privacy of the persons interviewed is my highest priority, because without them this study would be impossible. It is my highest concern to guarantee their privacy and at the same time place their visions in the right perspective.
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Annex A provides a list of the people interviewed. 18
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7. Methodology II – The Comprehensive approach model
There are different ideas about what the comprehensive approach entails, but basically it strives for greater coherence in the different approaches of different organizations. The level of coherence differs for the organizations involved. In order to be able to analyze coherence in a comprehensive approach, this study uses a framework developed by De Coning and Friis, within which they distinguish six degrees of coherence and four types of organizational interaction. In this framework the levels of coherence are a continuum of integration ranging from 1) unity; 2) integration; 3) cooperation; 4) coordination and 5) coexistence to 6) competition. The four different types of organizational interaction are 1) intra-agency; 2) whole of
government; 3) inter-agency and 4) internal-external. This framework is useful because it allows for a more precise description and mapping of the different forms of coherence within missions and of other activities in fragile states, making them more comparable. Furthermore, the framework embraces the fact that today’s comprehensive (peace) operations have a multilevel and multi-actor character of interaction. lastly it is important to note that the framework is purely an instrument to structure the analysis and that it has no normative intentions. For example, it does not argue that more or less coherence would be better. As such, it allows for an objective analysis.
8. Recognizing the limits of the research
Prior to the study it is important to recognize some limitations of the research:
- Due to the fact that it was impossible to interview all the persons involved in Sudan, the study is a qualitative research study instead of a quantitative one. However I spoke with at least two different representatives from every group of actors, and in most cases with five or six, to realize a certain degree of objectivity. Where this objectivity is not granted I will make a remark on this.
- I am aware that the interviewed people probably did not tell everything and sometimes maybe told a ‘politically correct story’ to avoid eventual problems.
- I am also aware of the high ‘feel good’ value of terms as a comprehensive approach. It is a catchy term that sounds attractive for many people. However, some people argue that its impact in practice is limited. This will become visible in the study.
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Chapter 1 Thematic Background: Sudan in Historical Perspective
‘Sudan, Land of Blacks’.
19Ismael al-Azhari, the founder of current Sudan
Modern Sudanese history owes much to Napoleon. It was his victory of 1797, in the Battle of the Pyramids, which shook the power of the Mamelukes, the Caucasian ruling class of Egypt, and paved the way for the rise of power of the Albanian soldier of fortune Muhammed Ali. He sent his third son, Ismael, across the desert at the head of 10,000 men and by 1821 all of north and central Sudan was his. For the first time in history, the Sudan –the name means ‘land of Blacks’ began to take shape as a political entity. 20
1.1. A history of conflict
Africa’s former largest country, Sudan, is divided along lines of religion (70 percent Muslim, 25 percent animist, 5 percent Christian), ethnicity (African, Arab origin), tribe, and economic activity (nomadic and sedentary).21 Since its independence in 1956, the country has been characterized by ongoing centre - periphery tensions. As a result, Sudan has been in a state of near constant war, the deadliest conflicts being those between North and South from 1956 to 1972 and between 1983 and 2005, and, more recently from 2003, the conflict in Darfur.22
Historical overview
Having successfully resisted Egyptian domination since pre-modern times, Sudan was finally conquered by Ottoman-Egyptian forces in 1820. But unable to defeat a Sudanese rebellion in 1885, the loose Egyptian administration that ruled the country collapsed. Four years later Egyptian forces, now reinforced by the British, recaptured Khartoum and established an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Under the British ‘divide and rule’ strategy, the country was separated into North and South. In 1947 political power was granted to the northern elite, which retained it following independence in 1955. Anticipating marginalization by the North, Southern army officers rose in mutiny in 1955 and formed the Anya-Nya (‘Snake Venom’) guerilla movement which began launching attacks on government troops. In the North, in 1958 General Abboud seized power in a coup d’état and began instituting a policy of Islamisation. With Abboud himself forced out of office by a 1964 popular uprising, several Arab-dominated governments followed, until in 1969 General Nimieri gained power through a coup d’état.23 A failed 1971 Communist coup left Nimieri politically isolated, pushing him to seek peace with Ethiopia, Uganda and southern rebels. The Addis Ababa peace
19
United Information Centre Khartoum, www.unic.un.org, ‘Where we work’, ‘Khartoum’, Last visited 27-05-2012. 20
Douglas Johnson, H., The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Bloomington 2003). 21 Sudan was Africa’s largest country until the secession of the South on 9 July 2011. 22
M.W. Daly, Sudan (Oxford 1993). 23
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agreement with the Anya-Nya in March 1972 granted autonomy to the South and integrated the guerillas into the national army. This was the beginning of eleven relatively quiet years.24
However, systematic violations of the agreement by the government, combined with an increasing Islamic shift in late 1970s and discovery of oil in the South eventually led to a resumption of hostilities and the deployment of northern troops in southern oil-rich areas. Following a mutiny by southern troops against the government in early 1983, President Nimieri abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement in June, dissolving the South’s constitutional guarantees and declaring Arabic the official language. Islamic Sharia law replaced traditional Sudanese law three months later. Southern grievances crystallized around the Sudan People’s Liberation Army /Movement led by John Garang.25 A popular uprising overthrew Nimieri in 1985 and Sadiq al-Mahdi’s democratic government (Umma Party) was elected the following year.26
Moves towards reaching peace between the SPLA/M and the government stopped when the National Islamic Front (NIF) led a bloodless coup in June 1989, a day before a bill suspending Sharia law was to be passed. Led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the NIF (later renamed National Congress Party – NCP) revoked the constitution, banned opposition parties, moved to Islamise the judicial system and stepped up the North-South war, proclaiming jihad against the non-Muslim (Christian/animist) South. With the SPLA/M weakened by the 1991 fall of the Mengitsu-regime in Ethiopia and internal disputes, inter-ethnic fighting broke out in the South. Khartoum’s harboring of Osama Bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalist groups in the early 1990s led to international isolation.27
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Between 1994 and 2001 on-off negotiations between the government and the SPLM/A under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took place, but made little progress. However, peace talks gained momentum in 2002-2004 with the signing of several agreements. Under the mediation of the IGAD, the Sudanese Government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A signed a series of six agreements between 2002 and 2005:
(1) The protocol of Machakos: Signed in Machakos, Kenya on 20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan with regards to state and religion after a six-year period, while maintaining Sharia Law in North Sudan.
(2) The protocol on security arrangements: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003.
24 M.W. Daly Sudan (Oxford 1993). 25
The southern rebels were the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and their the political party was called the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
26 Jos van Beurden, Sudan. People, Politics, Economics and Culture (Den Haag 1998). 27
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 23
(3) The protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004. (4) The protocol on power-sharing: Signed in Naivasha on 26 May 2004.
(5) The protocol on the resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan / Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States: Signed in Naivasha on 26 May 2004.28
(6) The protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei: Signed in Naivasha on 26 May 2004.
These agreements needed to be finalized in order to achieve a comprehensive peace treaty: one on permanent cease-fire arrangements, one on the implementation of all protocols signed and one on the international/regional guarantees. The negotiations between the parties on the Permanent Cease-Fire Protocol were interrupted during the round of talks, held in Naivasha in July 2004. The parties could not reach agreement on a number of issues: mainly the redeployment of forces in eastern Sudan and the financing of the SPLM/A. Under sustained pressure from the international community, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative for the Sudan, the African Union and the IGAD, the parties agreed to resume the peace talks in Nairobi, on 7 October, 2004. The talks resumed with high level discussions between the First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and the Chairman of the SPLM/A, John Garang. On 16 October 2004, the two leaders issued a joint press statement in which they declared that issues discussed and resolved during the negotiations on a permanent cease-fire arrangement during the pre-interim and interim period included the following:
1. The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) in Eastern Sudan; 2. Establishment of JIUs Service Arms;
3. Collaborative approach of handling other armed groups;
4. Other aspects of permanent cease-fire including the role of United Nations Peace Support Mission. The parties also agreed that:
The ‘Technical Committee on Implementation Modalities and International and Regional Guarantees’ would immediately commence its work;
The First Vice-President and the Chairman of the SPLM/A would return after the month of Ramadan to finalize the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on a date to be communicated by the parties by the IGAD Secretariat.
The Technical Committee on the Ceasefire Negotiations would continue to discuss any remaining issues including the funding of the armed forces and the timing of incorporating and integrating other armed groups into respective structures of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLM/A.29
28
UNMIS, www.unmis.unmissions.org, ‘Background to Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Last visited: 27-05-2012.
29
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 24
The final North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 9 January 2005, which granted South Sudan autonomy for six years. A Government of National Unity was formed between the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was set up in the south. National elections were scheduled for 2009, later pushed back to 2010 and a referendum for southern independence was scheduled to be held in 2011. While implementation of the CPA delayed – largely due to the absence of political will within the ruling National Congress Party –a new constitution was ratified and a new government installed in October 2006. Tensions between Khartoum and Sudan’s peripheral areas persisted however, and in some parts fuelled a new cycle of violence.30
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement also called for the creation of two Multi-Donor Trust Funds, one for the Government of National Unity and one for South Sudan, as part of the wealth-sharing protocol. The Sudan National Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-N) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) were officially established, following the Oslo donor conference in April 2005. At this pledging conference donors pledged over $500 million for the two MDTFs. Donors included the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, European Commission, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Iceland, Greece, Canada, Spain, and Egypt. The World Bank made a historic contribution of $10 million from its net income. The trust funds were administered by the World Bank, working together with UN partners, donors, civil society, and the respective governments. The funds are means for donors to coordinate the reconstruction and development needs of both Northern and Southern Sudan. The MDTFs were funded by donor countries and managed by two technical secretariats, one for the MDTF-National, which focuses on war-affected areas of Northern states (based in Khartoum), and a second for the MDTF-Southern Sudan (based in Juba). Both trust funds provide funding for priority projects and programs that are both pro-peace and pro-poor.31
In the South, the July 2007 deadline for the withdrawal of government troops the border regions passed without any national or international response. The face-off between Arab militia and the SPLA/M continued in the oil-rich Abyei region on the North-South border, which had been granted special
administrative status by the CPA. In March 2008, renewed fighting broke out between the army and the SPLA/M, displacing some 100,000 people from the region. Amid fears of a return to full-scale civil war, in June 2008 both parties signed the Abyei Roadmap, which called for the deployment of a joint military force and the submission of the Abyei border dispute to the The Hague-based Permanent Court for Arbitration (PCA). In 2009, the CPA ruling called for a redrawing of the region’s borders ahead of the 2011
referendum.32
30
UNMIS, www.unmis.unmissions.org, ‘Background to Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Last visited 27-05-2012.
31
Worldbank, www.web.worldbank.org, ‘Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds’, Last visited 27-05-2012. 32
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 25
The Comprehensive Peace Agreements failed to address many demands of the eastern groups that fought in the North-South conflict from A separate agreement (Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement) regulating power and wealth sharing at the regional level was signed between the government and Eastern Front rebel groups (a coalition of different Eastern rebel movements) in October 2006. Confidence in the government’s commitment nevertheless remained low. Progress was finally made in May 2007 when al-Bashir appointed three Eastern Front officials to government positions. 33
1.2 Recent developments
The implementation of all three major mechanisms to end conflict, the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement, has been partly unsatisfactory, largely due to the resistance of al-Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party. Of these three peace agreements, the CPA was relatively the most successful. As agreed in the CPA, multiparty elections were held in Sudan in April 2010 and al-Bashir was elected for President for another period. On 9 January 2011, the South voted in a referendum to secede from Sudan. Ninety-eight percent of voters cast ballots for secession in mostly orderly and peaceful balloting. International and national observers hailed the referendum process as being consistent with international standards and representing the free expression of voters. On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan officially declared independence, seceding from Sudan. 34 On 14 July, 2011, the country became a United Nations member state.35
However, less than six months after South Sudan broke away from Sudan, tensions between the neighbors crystallized again into fears for direct confrontation. Now since early 2012, South Sudan is facing a major food crisis and violence from heavily-armed ethnically-based militias that have been sweeping parts of the countryside, killing hundreds and making a mockery of the South Sudanese security forces. Stoking the tensions, Sudan and South Sudan are covertly backing rebels in each other’s backyards, leading to border clashes and relentless aerial bombings. The more than 1,000 mile border between the countries is now effectively closed, with millions of pounds of emergency food and just about all trade held up in a two-way stranglehold. Both sides desperately need the oil to run their governments, feed their people and stamp out insurrections. And theoretically, both sides need each other. One of the problems of the two Sudans is that 75 percent of the oil lies in the South, but the pipeline to export it runs through the North. Because of this, oil was once thought to be the glue that would hold the two nations together and prevent conflict. Now, it seems, oil is becoming the fuse.36
It was indeed South Sudanese oil that drove Sudan’s economic boom of the past decade and made the repression by the Sudan’s Islamist Government tolerable to many Sudanese. So when the South
33
Crisis Group www.crisisgroup.org ‘Conflict Histories Sudan’, Last visited 27-05-2012.
34 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Sudans’ Oil Feud Risks Shattering a Fragile Peace’ in New York Times (10 February 2012). 35
United Nations, www.un.org, ‘UN welcomes South Sudan as 193rd Member State’, Last visited 27-05-2012. 36
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 26
declared independence, it took oil worth of billions of dollars with it, gutting Sudan’s economy and creating the deepest crisis that President al-Bashir has faced in his more than 20 years in power. In the current fight over oil, the South has refused to turn over royalties for using Sudan’s pipelines. Sudan reacted in late December 2011 by seizing oil tankers filled with South Sudanese crude. South Sudanese officials have admitted they are using their oil to squeeze Khartoum to make concessions on all sorts of issues, including the disputed area of Abyei, insisting that oil production, about 350,000 barrels a day, will resume only after ‘all the deals are signed’. In short, the problems between North and South Sudan are far from solved and the future will show if the period 2005-2011 was the beginning of the long awaited peace or only an interruption of conflicts.37
37
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 27
Chapter 2 The Comprehensive Approach
‘Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peace building into a coherent support strategy’. 38
Kofi Annan in his former capacity as UN Secretary-General
2.1 Orientation
The changed nature of crisis management
As early as the 1990s, when the age of ‘modern’ crisis management operations began, it was clear that peace building entered a new phase wherein actors had to adapt their involvement to the new
characteristics of crisis management. The need arose for greater cooperation and coherence. In 1992, for example, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali published a report entitled An Agenda for Peace, which stated: ‘Peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include
comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people’.39 Since then, the need for greater cooperation and a more coherent approach had been highlighted in countless meetings and policy documents.
As the Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) stated in its report Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States: the Need for a Coherent Approach (2009) that the basic premise of the comprehensive approach is that all activities aimed at promoting security and development should be harmonized with one another, even if they are implemented in different phases. Reconstruction and sustainable development activities could only be successful if the society that they are targeting has achieved a guaranteed minimum level of security and is also making efforts to strengthen the law.
Establishing a secure environment is primarily the responsibility of the military. However, a military ‘victory’ does not constitute a political solution. From the beginning of an intervention in a fragile state
opportunities for political, social and economic development should therefore be explored and exploited. The aim should be to establish a civil society, characterized by good governance and a level of law and order that facilitates further social and economic development, while respecting local practices and customs regarding decision-making and legitimacy. Every intervention that does not meet these conditions
38
A note of Guidance by Kofi Annan on integrated missions, in Annan’s former capacity as UN Secretary-General, establishes the integrated missions concept as the guiding principle for future post-conflict complex operations. United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005, paragraph 4.
39
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 28
would be doomed to fail.40
As Luc van de Goor and Claudia Major described in their Policy Brief How to make the
comprehensive approach work (2012), international crisis management has changed in three dimensions over the past decades.41 First, the spectrum of tasks has expanded. If traditional peacekeeping focused on containing military escalation, contemporary crisis management aims to deal with security, political and economic dimensions of a crisis to reach a comprehensive and sustainable conflict transformation.
Consequently, there is a wide range of tasks that comprises humanitarian aid as well as security or ensuring the rule of law. Second, the timelines of crisis management have expanded. Activities span today from hot stabilization to conflict prevention; the actual crisis management; up to post-conflict prevention; peace building, and can take several years, up to decades. Third, the number of actors involved has increased. This is partly due to the broadened spectrum of tasks, which require specific instruments and expertise that no single actor can supply. Moreover, actors from the crisis region, such as governments or relevant forces from neighboring regions, become increasingly involved. Their ownership in conflict resolution is central to ensuring its sustainability.42
Due to this expansion of tasks, timelines and actors, and the enhanced interaction and tasks, the complexity of crisis management has increased tremendously. As the AIV and the Policy Brief of Luc van de Goor and Claudia Major both underlined, crisis management has become foremost complexity
management. The internal and external coordination of all available instruments and actors, their timely and appropriate deployment in the various conflict phases, and the definition of common mission objectives have become important for reaching a sustainable crisis response. That is what the
‘Comprehensive Approach’ is about. It reinvigorates the way crisis responses should be planned and carried out in view of enhancing both its efficiency and interdependency of tasks involved.43
Definitional issues
In recent years, various terms have been used at international and national level to describe the need for ‘greater cooperation and coherence’ in crisis management, including the ‘whole-of-Government’ approach, the ‘whole of actors’ approach, the ‘whole of nation’ approach, the ‘3D approach’ (which stands for
diplomacy, defence and development) and the comprehensive, integrated, coordinated, coherent or consistent approach. However, the actors concerned (International organizations, individual states,
ministries and non-governmental organizations) often ascribe a range of different meanings to these terms. As Annette Jansen, author of the article ‘Beyond integrated foreign policy (3D): context-specific
40
Advisory Council on International Affairs, Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States. The Need for a Coherent
Approach (The Hague 2006) 13-14.
41 Luc van de Goor and Claudia Major, How to make the comprehensive approach work (21 March 2012). 42
Van de Goor and Major, How to make the comprehensive approach work. 43
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 29
reconstruction’ suggests, it is doubtful whether the constant invention of new terms contributes to policy in this area, as it creates confusion and may even lead to irritation between the various actors.44
The Dutch Government asked the AIV on 13 June 2008 for advice on the ‘compatibility of political, military and development objectives in crisis management operations’.45 Even this request for advice failed to distinguish between three concepts, being: (1) the coherent approach; (2) the integrated approach; (3) the 3D approach. The AIV gave in its report an example of the conceptual confusion: the term ‘integrated approach’, which the Government used in its request for advice – and in many policy documents – literally means ‘to combine various instruments into a whole’. The AIV asked the rhetoric question if the
Government’s pursuit of an integrated approach meant that the relevant ministries and other organizations should be merged? The AIV stated that this was probably not what the Government had in mind.46
To achieve mutual understanding and effective cooperation among the various actors, it is therefore important to ensure that these concepts are used with care, that there is consensus about their meaning and that the subsequent actions are in accordance with its meaning.47 In order to avoid
misunderstanding, the AIV used the more neutral terms ‘greater cooperation and coherence’ and ‘coherent approach’ in her report. I will choose the definition ‘comprehensive approach’, because this definition is used in most literature and articles. Jair Van der Lijn from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael also replaced the term ‘3D approach’ sometimes for the ’Dutch Comprehensive approach’ in his report ‘3D The Next Generation’. Lessons learned from Uruzgan for future operations (2011).48 The 3D approach takes the policy instruments Diplomacy, Development and Defence as a starting point for a more integrated foreign policy. Because I use a broader view than just the three D’s, this study takes the comprehensive approach as a starting point.
The Government uses in her policy documents the term ‘integrated approach’, despite the fact it probably means something different, as the AIV pointed out in its report.49 However, in the context of the policy of the Dutch Government I will follow its terminology and use the definition ‘integrated approach’. In the rest of this thesis I will use the term comprehensive approach.
44
Annette Jansen, ‘Beyond integrated foreign policy (3D): context-specific reconstruction’ in Internationale Spectator 62 nr. 4 (April 2008) 191-196.
45 Advisory Council on International Affairs, Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States. 46
Ibidem 14-15. 47
Ibidem.
48 Jair Van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’. Lessons learned from Uruzgan for Future Operations (The Hague 2011) 10.
49
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 30
2.2 Cooperation and coherence in international perspective
Historically, the UN, regional security coalitions and national armies have been the main actors involved in peace and crisis management and reconstruction operations, each with different agenda’s, aims and approaches. However, in today’s operations, more than ever direct relationships are important between the military, local population and humanitarian agencies. Governments and organizations such as the UN, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) realized that a one-dimensional military approach does not suffice. Challenges and threats cannot be addressed by the military or civilians
exclusively and each crisis situation requires an individual, tailored and comprehensive response. Research also found that peace building operations are more likely to be successful if they address the causes of the conflict and if the (military) mission is embedded in the approaches of, and cooperates with, other actors such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. Moreover, Governments and missions have increasingly come to rely on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the delivery of services. As a result, the number of actors increased, as have the different forms of interactions between them.50
The UN was one of the first organizations to realize the importance of coherence when, at the beginning of the 1990’s, it became involved in large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Such operations not only dealt with the military aspects of a conflict, but also organized elections, repatriated refugees and provided humanitarian assistance. This culminated in the concept of integrated missions as set out in the Brahimi report in which other parts of the UN system were integrated in peace keeping operations to guarantee better coherence.51 Such an approach in which different types of actors strive for different levels of coherence has subsequently been applied by other organizations as well. NATO and the EU generally label it as the ‘comprehensive approach’.52
At the national level, many Governments, predominantly in the West, also started exploring ways in which to improve coherence across Government departments to their international engagements. These national-level initiatives have become known as the ‘whole-of-Government’ approach. This typically entails some form of systematic process aimed at ensuring that the different ministries or departments engaged in its international peace and stability operations do so in a coherent manner. The original Canadian 3D concept –referring to the relation between defence, development and diplomacy- is the signature example of the whole-of-Government approach. However, today most proponents of the whole-of-Government approach, including Canada, engage not only the three ministries mentioned, but also typically the office of the Prime Minister or President, as well as the ministries responsible for justice, police, correctional
50 Van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’, 24. 51
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (21 August 2000). 52
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 31
services, interior affairs and finance.53 But the whole-of-Government approach still takes the interaction between different departments as a starting point, where this study states that also non-governmental agencies as NGOs and the private sector should and could play an important role in the context of crisis management and reconstruction.
Most Western countries that adopted the whole-of-Government approach have done so over the past decades, and in most cases this development has been largely shaped by their engagement in Iraq and especially in Afghanistan. Many of them were responsible for, or participated in, a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan PRT model was an attempt to apply the whole-of-Government model to a nationally deployed entity, consisting of a military component, responsible for security-related tasks, development advisors responsible for development projects, political advisors responsible for engagement with local authorities and political analysis, and police and/or judicial advisors. There is no commonly agreed PRT model or structure. Each lead nation has developed its own model, and the degree of whole-of Government integration differed significantly.54
2.3 Cooperation and coherence in national perspective
In the beginning of the 1990s, politicians and policy makers in the Netherlands also realized that peace building in fragile states was easier said than done. The need arose for greater cooperation and coherence, on a national level. The AIV mentioned the example in 1992 when Minister of Defence Relus ter Beek noted during a joint visit with at that time Minister for Development Cooperation Jan Pronk to Dutch armed forces in Cambodia that development cooperation and defence would henceforth become increasingly intertwined in such operations. The principle that various ministries need to cooperate in crisis
management and operations and reconstruction interventions is thus far from new.55
The essence of the Dutch comprehensive approach is that it basically strives for greater coherence in the different approaches of different policy instruments, organizations or actors involved.56 These policy instruments, organizations or actors, together form the different components of which a comprehensive approach consists. Although this study takes the comprehensive approach as a starting point, it focuses mainly on the elements of the 3D-approach: diplomacy, defence and development. However, in contrast to a 3D approach, this study also indirect discusses the contribution of other ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Moreover the study also includes the role of Dutch NGOs and Dutch private companies in the context of the Dutch comprehensive approach for Sudan.
53
Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, ‘Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach’ in
Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2011) 250.
54 De Coning and Friis, ‘Coherence and Coordination’, 250-251. 55
Advisory Council on International Affairs, Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States, 13. 56
Merel Diemont, January – June 2012 32
Diplomacy
In the context of foreign relations, diplomacy is seen as the act or practice of conducting international relations. Traditionally diplomacy means the conduct of relations of one state with another by peaceful means. As the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Uri Rosenthal stated in his Parliamentary Letter on 8 April 2011, the role of diplomacy is changing as a consequence of the changing world since the end of the Cold War: new players arise on the world stage and the increasing importance of growing economies have a strong influence on the relations between participants of the international order.57
The act of diplomacy is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ideas about the role and functioning of diplomacy in a comprehensive approach are well explained by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen, during the ‘3D debate’ in the Upper House on 3 June 2008. Verhagen stated that of the three D’s, diplomacy is the component which is least visible and as a consequence most difficult to understand. In his opinion diplomacy is not only the contact between diplomats, but also everything that can be attained with the application of diplomatic means and the use of diplomatic pressure, such as good governance and the improvement of human rights and rule of law. Before as well as during and after a violent conflict, political dialogue is very important in order to find political answers for the conflicts concerned. Diplomacy is striving and working for political solutions and political reconciliation. In reaction to questions from Members of Parliament Minister Verhagen posed the question what modern diplomacy entails.58 Since the end of the Cold War this is an often discussed question. In the context of the
comprehensive approach, modern diplomacy focuses on conflict prevention and the ending of conflicts. Instruments to attain these goals are dialogue, pressure, power of persuasion and cooperation. Of crucial importance to prevent or end conflicts in or between states is the building of consensus and the promotion of political stability, balance and reconciliation. Good governance and widespread local involvement are crucial elements in this context. Diplomacy takes place on different levels: direct contact between
ministers, contact between officials from capitals, contact between embassies and authorities where these are established and contact between NGOs and local structures. The involvement of diplomacy in a
comprehensive approach fits in the new form of diplomacy to work more integrated and in a coherent way.59
Defence
In the policy memorandum Reconstruction after Violent Conflict (2005), the Dutch Government set out their ideas about the role of the military in an integrated approach: The primary role for military in a post-conflict phase would be to create security and stability as basic conditions for sustainable reconstruction.60
57
Parliamentary document 32 734 nr. 1 (8 April 2011).
58 See remarks of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Report of the 3D debate, 3 June 2008. 59
Parliamentary document 32 734 nr. 1 (8 April 2011). 60
