Ideal or non-ideal reasoning in matters of justice?
Vicente Juarez van Leeuwen, 10092277
University of Amsterdam, bachelor Political science
Specialisation: political theory and behavior
Global Justice, Luara Ferracioli
Word total: 8999 24 June 2014
E-mail:
Vicente_jvl@hotmail.com
[Introduction]
“The one thing we can be sure of is the reality of the sacrifice, the dying and the dead. But the ideal for which they die remains unrealized. The eggs are broken, and the habit of breaking them grows, but the omelette remains invisible.”
Isaiah Berlin – The crooked timber of humanity: Chapters in the history of ideas (2013) p. 6
People tend to follow and base policy on a certain ideal, but reality seems to be too messy, too complex, to ensure the full accomplishment of a given ideal. The above standing quote from Isaiah Berlin gives us a great deal of insight into our political, economic and social reality. The world in which we live is a diverse one. One only has to look around him to see all kinds of differences. Be it religion, ideologies, ways of living. There seems to be a broad spectrum of values through which we give meaning to our life and through which we tend to live our lives. There’s also a wide variety of living conditions in which we try to accomplish the above standing. We can think of climatic conditions, political realities such as a liberal democracy or a vicious dictator, economic deprivation, or a combination of the three. Of course there are much more empirical factors that influence the accomplishment of our values. But the main thing here is that there is an inescapable friction between our ideals and reality. Conflict of values is therefore inescapable in a world as diverse and complex as our own. Conflict of values or conflict of empirical reality, as such, doesn’t necessarily lead to injustice, but an injustice always involves a conflict. The question then becomes: when does conflict give rise to an injustice?
Behind the quote from Isaiah Berlin stands his ethical pluralism. In which he denounces the idea of a harmony of values, or as Condorcet ones said: “Nature binds truth, happiness and virtue together by an indissoluble chain,” (Berlin, 2012: 212). According to Berlin a harmony of values, or telos, is a “metaphysical chimera” (Ibid: 213). There are situations in which we need to choose between values we consider having equal weight and that choice inherently involves sacrifice of this or that value. Ideal formulations of justice (or other values) shouldn’t be primary in our moral thinking and shouldn’t be the foundation of our politics. For how do we know when we defined justice in its ultimate fashion? And
what’s the worth of a perfect definition when we can’t implement justice accordingly in reality?
Where Berlin looks to the conceptual impossibility of harmony of values, Amartya Sen looks at the consequences of what he calls plural grounding and what that exactly means for the concept justice. Sen sees like Berlin, a world in which people value certain concepts or aspects differently and asks the question of whether it is necessary, for justice, that “we have to agree on one specific line of censure for a reasoned consensus on the diagnosis of an injustice that calls for urgent rectification?” (Sen, 2009: 2). Sen broadens Berlin’s discussion by also asking whether it is necessary for curing injustices to have an ideal definition of justice. On the one hand, Sen argues, a perfect definition of justice is irrelevant for making a normative judgment about a situation; the other is that the quest for a perfect definition doesn’t help people living in acute deprivation, whatever the cause, at this very moment. So not only does he look at the ideal & non-ideal distinction but he deems it necessary for a theory of justice to have an action-guiding aspect. In The idea of justice (2009), Sen makes a distinction between Transcendental Institutionalism (TI) and Realization Comparisons (RC) approaches to theories of justice (Ibid.: 5-7)1. The TI approach to justice primarily concerns itself with defining an ultimate principle, in this case justice, and creating institutions through which the perfectly defined value comes about. The RC approach focuses primarily on comparing the actual situation with a feasible, but, non-existing situation, which should lead to social realization.
This being said, in this thesis I will focus on the TI & RC distinction made by Sen. I will argue that TI theories of justice are secondary, and not per se necessary to matters of justice. TI theories of justice do not capture what is, in an ordinary sense, meant by justice or injustice and that TI theories of justice are too static for giving at least a minimal account guidance. What I precisely mean by ‘a minimal account’ of guidance will be explained in section three.
I start with an account of our social reality in which different values are in conflict with one another. This conflicting nature of reality will serve as a departure point for the rest of the thesis. The ideal & non-ideal distinction will draw heavily from this discussion of the social reality. In the next part TI theories of justice will be discussed. I will discuss the role of plural grounding, as defined by Sen, for the plausibility of TI theories of justice. This has
consequences for whether or not a theory of justice needs to be action-guiding. In the third part I will mainly discuss the RC approach to justice and try to demonstrate that the problems raised by TI theories of justice can, for the most part, be absolved through emphasizing realization and a comparison of reality with a feasible potential. I will end this thesis with a conclusion.
[I]
Isaiah Berlin, Lithuanian by birth, emigrated in 1921 to England too become one of the most influential social and political philosophers of the twentieth century. During his lifetime he stressed the importance of liberty, argued against political extremism and intellectual fanaticism and was a true defender of liberalism (Stanford, 2013). He came to hold these strong believes through his experience of the Bolshevik’s revolution of 1917 in the former USSR and the international tensions springing from the cold war. He rejected “the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution.” (Berlin, 2012: 212). He even went so far as saying that this belief in a final solution came from a psychological necessity we humans create when dealing with the complexity of our social reality (Stanford, 2013). Although Berlin fiercely states his point, his account of the conflicting nature of our reality is highly relevant for the way we deal with justice and the way in which we theorize on the subject matter. So, let us take a closer look on how Berlin came to have the ideas he has.
Berlin develops his pluralism account in contrast to what he calls the Ionian fallacy, or more simply monism. Bluntly stated it goes as follows (Stanford, 2013):
1. All genuine questions must have a true answer, and one only; all other responses are errors.
2. There must be a dependable path to discovering the true answers, which is in principle knowable, even if currently unknown.
3. The true answers, when found, will be compatible with one another, forming a single whole; for one truth cannot be incompatible with another. This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the universe is harmonious and coherent.
Berlin rejects all three assumptions. Like Immanuel Kant, Berlin believed there’s a distinction between factual matters and the way we perceive and the interpret these facts. The way we interpret facts and then structure or categorize our reality accordingly is the way we give meaning to this reality (Stanford, 2013). Berlin, in contrast to Kant, saw these categories as fluid. These categories vary over time and are in this sense historical, and are not, like Kant said, a priori to experience as such being transcendental of character (Berlin, 2012: 144). Although Berlin never gave a full account on this epistemological matter it is assumed that he meant by this that a good portion of these categories, or values, are formed through “culture, education, ordinary experience and common social practices, as well as philosophical theories.” (Stanford, 2013). So the way we structure our reality and interpret facts is fluid. But not all of these categories are fluid to this extent. Berlin considered the act of choosing, freely, between conflicting ultimate values and the need to analyze our experiences as aspects of the human condition which do not vary (Berlin, 2012: 214). So how does this relate to the Ionian fallacy?
According to Berlin people have the urge to merge all propositions to a single category2 (Stanford, 2013). He speaks of the deflationary approach and the inflationary approach. The deflationary approach entails the breaking-down of all propositions to one single category. This meant going from the general to the particular. The inflationary approach was the opposite and tried to force single categories under one category scheme. This was the other way around forcing the particular under a general category. According to Berlin the underlying assumption for both approaches was the thought that everything “is made out of, or can be reduced to or understood in terms of, one and the same substance or type.” (Stanford, 2013). If we look at the first assumption of the Ionian fallacy, as above stated, we can discern the assumption of both deflationary and inflationary approaches that there is a true answer, a true category general or particular, which are linked with one another. The second assumption, as above stated, concerns the mechanism, “the dependable path” implied by both approaches. Berlin considered these assumptions as being falsely founded on a wrong perception of reality. This perception he said comes from a
2
The thesis conditionals don’t allow an elaborate description of this tendency. The important assumption here, I will take this too be true for the thesis, that people have the tendency to categorize. For more information on Berlin’s theory see Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays (1978).
psychological need for certainty. The mechanisms thus are ways for us to deal with a reality which we cannot comprehend.
The third and last assumption of the Ionian fallacy is rejected on the basis of the objectivity of values. According to Berlin values are created through human beings and derive their authority from this fact (Berlin, 1999:15). Because values are human creations, and we hold these creations, i.e. values, with strong conviction, human beings therefore are the most morally precious things (Stanford, 2013). These values are only meaningful in relation to human beings. So the meaning of the concept of justice can only be judged if we look closely at the impact it has, in real life, on actual persons. The impact can come from many different sources, say an actual economic institution, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or simply social norms. Berlin liked to quote Alexander Herzen to make his point, namely “a new form of human sacrifice had arisen *…+ of living human beings on the altars of abstractions” and whether it’s through “nation, church, party, class, progress, the forces of history” (Berlin, 2013: 16) justice is only relevant, only has meaning because we created the concept, because we are the ones suffering (or not) from actual theories, structures or institutions.
The, objective, values we create do not form a harmonious whole. People don’t live their lives on the basis of one value. We all value different values and these are sometimes incompatible in certain situations. We think off children as not being autonomous enough to make their own decisions, people with a mental disorder are sometimes deprived of their right to lead and choose their own lives. Absolute liberty is impossible in a world where people don’t want gross inequalities. The saying ignorance is bliss gives us a good depiction of the contrast between knowledge and knowing nothing at all. So too think that all of our values, and according to Berlin there are many, form one whole, or to think that this is possible, is too deny the fact that our reality and the values we hold are “too many, too minute, too fleeting, too blurred at the edges. They criss-cross and penetrate each other at many levels simultaneously, and the attempt to prise them apart *…+ and pin them down, and classify them, and fit them into their specific compartments turns out to be impossible.” (Berlin, 1999: 119). A conflict free world, even a hypothetical one, “is not the world we know or understand.” (Berlin, 2002: 213).
This incompatibility of values is not the only thing that is wrong with the third assumption. Even if we could comprehend this utopia in which no value is trumped, how
would we judge or weigh one value against another? This is his incommensurability critique. Berlin believed that there is no tool through which we can say that this value is more important than the other, regardless of the situation (Stanford, 2013). There are two problems with this ideal situation. The first is stated above and is empirical, we do not and cannot comprehend a world in which we don’t have to choose between “equally ultimate ends” (Berlin, 2002: 213-214), as stated above. The second is that if we were to create such a world, the consequence would be that the values in question would be transformed or even abandoned altogether (Stanford, 2013). Justice, liberty, or equality would lose their meaning, in the ordinary sense of the word, to us. And it is precisely in this sense that these concepts derive their meaning, through the impact they have on actual persons. Let me clarify on this matter. The incommensurability of values as Berlin meant it does not mean that we cannot “make judgements between values on a case-by-case basis,” (Stanford, 2013). It means that we cannot make a grand universal rule which we can apply in all instances in this way. Berlin tells us: “Forms of life differ. Ends, moral principles, are many. But not infinitely many: they must be within the human horizon.” (Berlin, 2013: 11). It is this human horizon through which we can understand and evaluate principles or concepts amongst each other. For a value to be objective, it has to be within the human horizon. This means that we can imagine and ‘grasp’ those values to be ours. Although we do not hold these values, we can still see them lurking on the horizon. A world in which all these values would be harmonized, meaning we could rank them in a relative manner to each other, would force these very values outside our human horizon (Ibid.: 11). Reconcilement of freedom and equality or spontaneity and planning means nothing for individuals in everyday life. Berlin (Ibid. 13) says: “that principles which are harmonized in this other world are not the principles with which, in our daily lives, we are acquainted.”. Freedom and equality, for instance, if harmonized transcends the world of ordinary human beings. So he says: “it is on earth that we live, and it is here that we must believe and act.” (Ibid: 13). Incommensurability of values is something that takes place in our reality, in our world. Suggesting that there is a universal value or guiding normative principle is to deny the daily routine of choosing between ultimate ends, ultimate values. And choosing between ultimate values is inherently human. To say that there is a harmonized whole is to deny this inherently human trait (Ibid: 14).
[II]
Amartya Sen is a social and political philosopher who concerns himself with the concept of justice. In his book The idea of justice (2009), Sen argues, that there are many grounds for grounding an injustice, he calls this plural grounding. This plural grounding is an important aspect for the distinction he makes between TI and RC approaches to justice. In this second section I will shed light on the TI approach and explain why this account is problematic. I will also discuss some important critiques of Sen’s work. But let us first look at this important distinction he makes.
Like Berlin, Sen is convinced of the plurality of society and the values its individuals hold. In The idea of justice he looks at the idea of plural grounding. According to Sen (2009: 2) we “can have a strong sense of injustice on many different grounds, and yet not agree on one particular ground as being the dominant reason for the diagnosis of injustice.”. He gives us an example of three children who all want to have a flute, but their reasons are different. One argues one the basis of utilitarian principles, the second on egalitarian grounds and the third on a libertarian ground (Brown, 2010: 3). Although all of these theories vary enormously, one cannot say that, if we were to take them at face value, the particular concerns of any of these theories is irrelevant or not important (Sen, 2009: 3). They all reach different conclusions on the matter, but they all try to give us an impartial perspective. The distinction between TI and RC approaches to justice stems from his account of plural grounding. Therefore it is necessary to shed light upon this distinction.
Sen traces the distinction of TI and RC approaches back to the enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Ibid: 5). The TI approach to justice has two particular features. The first is that it searches for a perfect definition of justice, or looks for “identifying the nature of the just,” which cannot be “transcended” (Ibid: 5-6). The second one is its concern with institutions rather than actual people living in a world which is shaped by these very institutions (Ibid.: 6). An important aspect of the second feature is that, generally speaking, these kind of theories have to resort to making idealized assumptions on the way people should act in the particular ‘perfect’ institutions. An example of this is John Rawls who says in A theory of justice (1999: 7-8) “*…+ I examine the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”. Rawls applies his theory of justice to an imagined community and for the sake of theorizing assumes full compliance of its members.
The RC approach stands in opposition to full compliance and idealized assumptions. It focuses on the actual behavior of individuals under certain institutions. By addressing actual behavior and actual institutions, it tries to incorporate social realization in the theory itself (Sen, 2009: 7). One overlapping characteristic of these kinds of theories is that they compare reality with a possible reality. The way they conceive of reality and what is feasible varies, off course, much, due to theoretical differences between all these theories. For the moment this is enough on the RC approach. In the following chapter I will explain in greater detail what the RC approach according to Sen entails.
The transcendental and institutional aspect of TI theories both have their particular problems according to Sen. Transcendentalism has two main problems. Transcendental theories just assume that under ideal circumstance a reasoned consensus between individuals is possible (Sen, 2009: 9). The flute example given above makes clear that in reality this often not possible, at least not without conflict. But TI assumes that if we idealize away the conflicts of real life, there’s a possibility for reasoned consensus. In reality there are many different principles which can be seen as plausible, but what is unknown is “whether the plurality of reasons for justice would allow one unique set of principles of justice to emerge *…+” (Ibid: 11). Sen speaks of different dimensions and departure points and that “There are many different ways of assessing the extent of each such discrepancy and of appraising the comparative remoteness of actual distributions from what the principles of full justice would demand.” (Ibid: 99). So the feasibility of a transcendental conception of justice would mean that all these discrepancies between dimension and departure points would have to be overcome3. So one way of getting rid of the discrepancies would be through a common standard or in Berlin’s terms a ‘common currency’. This would give us a tool to approach questions of justice, or injustice, in a quantitative manner. Value X has in this situation weight X and value Y has less weight, so X trumps Y. But this standard is absent in real life, and according to Sen’s account of plural grounding it is arbitrary, at best, to guillotine one set of ‘objective’ evaluative criteria of justice to another (Ibid.: 4). To restate Berlin’s position on the matter, a standard through which we would assess values, would consequently involve the abandonment of these very same values, because they
3
By dimensions I mean the different situations in which one needs to compare certain values. Departure points are walks of life, or guiding principles individuals use to lead once own life. One can think of certain ideologies or religion et cetera.
would not be in our human horizon (Stanford, 2013). So a general consensus is implausible because of the multi-dimensionality of human life and the only way through which we could absolve the conflict involves the abandonment of the very values we would try to harmonize.
The impossibility charge of a reasoned consensus, Gilabert (2012) says, is overstated by Sen. He says that a theory of justice “should not claim to demonstrate what it cannot demonstrate.” (Gilabert, 2012: 43). He means by this that it is obvious that a theory of whatever kind, due to epistemic limitations, can never claim to have reached the level of transcendence. So therefore Gilabert (Ibid.: 43) concludes that “Sen seems to fault proponents of TA for failing to see the conflict between (a) claiming that a set of political demands is superior to others and (b) claiming that it has been shown that there are, or could be, no conceivable alternatives that are superior to the ones proposed.”. Gilabert says that what underlies the TA approaches is through revealing, or at least attempting to reveal, the nature of the just one can form guiding principles which are superior to any alternatives (Ibid.: 43). The advantage of this kind of approach is that it would give more “breadth” and “depth” to our evaluations of potentials.
So Gilabert weakens the goal for TI to the search for a concept that can prove that it is superior to any of the alternatives. But this answers nothing. Sen’s entire point with the flute example is that at face value one cannot deny the force of all three children’s arguments. For even if we leave the transcendental heights of Sen’s TI conception, to show that your conception of justice is superior to all other alternatives needs thorough clarification. This clarification task which Gilabert bestows upon TI is not likely to differ substantially from the clarification of a transcendental conception of justice. Because it would still have to be done by a common standard and it is this common standard that is troublesome, even if we would devaluate the goal for TI conception of justice from transcendence to superiority.
This closely relates to the second critique Sen offers of transcendental theories, namely that a theory of justice “demands a framework for comparison of justice for choosing among the feasible alternatives and not an identification of a possible unavailable perfect situation that could not be transcended.” (Ibid: 9). Determining whether a situation is just or unjust, necessarily involves a choice. Transcendental theory, according to Sen, is therefore a redundant exercise and he makes this clear through an example. Sen (Ibid: 16)
states that “if we are trying to choose between a Picasso and a Dali, it is of no help to invoke a diagnosis *…+ that the ideal picture in the world is the Mona Lisa.”. His point here is that the choice of determining whether a situation is just or unjust, the use of a transcendental justice concept in making the actual choice is of no practical use. This argument is also founded upon the multi-dimensionality of the realm of principles. A ranking of values involves overcoming “*the+ problems to arrive at a relational ranking of departures from transcendence.” (Ibid: 99; italics added). But this lies as Sen (ibid: 99) says “beyond the specific exercise of the identification of transcendence”.
This is not an uncontested claim. John Simmons responds by saying that an ideal is necessary for making normative statements about certain situations. Simmons (as in Schmidtz, 2011: 2) says that it matters “which of the two peaks of justice is the higher (or more just) is a judgment that matters conclusively only if they are both on equally feasible paths to the highest peak of perfect justice.”, because “Blindly groping for local high ground is as likely to lead away from Everest as toward it.”. Simmons responds to the mount Everest metaphor used by Sen and, as Schmidtz rightly points out, is right if we just look at the metaphor itself. But his critique is based on the wrong assumption that justice, as a concept, is something that has a telos, an end goal. Or to stick with the metaphor, that justice is ultimately reached “for so long as we climb, we reach the highest peak sooner or later.” (Ibid: 2). Schmidtz, and here is a similarity with Berlin (2013: 13), argues that justice has no end goal. He uses another metaphor to state his point: “the terrain’s outstanding landmarks are injustices: pits in an otherwise featureless plane.” (Schmidtz, 2011: 2). Being in one of those pits is the only relevant criteria for calling something an injustice. So to undo an injustice, one has to make it possible for a victim of injustice to climb out of one of these pits. Schmidtz (Ibid: 2) says that: “Justice is less a property than an absence of properties that make for injustice.”. Thereby dodging the end-goal problem.
Pablo Gilabert also has a somewhat critical reading of Sen’s redundancy charge. Gilabert (2012: 44) says that the demand, which Sen bestows upon TI, of giving definitive guidance in matters of justice and thereby giving us a tool to rank certain values to each other is an unrealistic demand. I agree with Gilabert on this point. It seems that the delineation Sen creates between TI and RC is based upon to strong conditionals of the two positions. Gilabert says that the RC approach cannot give us “definitive guidance” and no
“ranking of values” either (Ibid: 44). Although Sen doesn’t say that it does, his claim that TI is redundant cannot hold. Gilabert gives us five reasons.
The first is that TI is a relevant exercise because it can help us in determining relevant descriptive features (Ibid: 45). Gilabert (Ibid: 45) says that “The principles underlying the perfect society should be relevant to comparing imperfect ones.”. I think Gilabert has a valid point here. Although ‘the perfect society’ is something that doesn’t exist, for the reasons Berlin gave us, TI as a method can support the choice we have to make in the RC approach by making clear the relevant criteria in that choice. By saying relevant, Gilabert doesn’t mean that we have an explicit valuational ranking of certain values. But TI can make it clearer to us which features should count in our assessment of a situation. A second reason against the redundancy charge is that through shedding light upon the relevant criteria for the assessment, the TI approach thereby strengthens our comparative assessment (Ibid.: 46). I agree with Gilabert, for the first reason, that it indeed does strengthen our comparative assessment, but Gilabert (Ibid.: 47) concludes that “in the absence of total comparisons partial comparisons yield only prima facie reasons.”. He seems to think that the RC approach would entail only partial comparisons. But Sen’s point is that there are many criteria on which we can make a normative judgment, thereby concluding that something is an injustice (Sen, 2009: 106). But we don’t need all of them spelt out in a perfect way to make that judgment. That something is a partial solution doesn’t make it a prima facie reason, or superficial if you will (Ibid.: 107). The third reason Gilabert gives us is that TI makes it possible for us to look at the short term and long term goals (Gilabert, 2012: 47). Gilabert sees the RC approach as being too much focused on short term goals and because of that, the RC approach is to static and supportive of the status quo. This is something I do not agree with. The comparative assessment, again, is strengthened by the search for extra criteria, but the RC approach is dynamic in the sense that each time the assessment of situations, of policies, is different. The social and political reality keeps changing, therefore what is feasible (or not) keeps changing as well. Every time an assessment has to be made, we can look at a situation in a new way, and try to adjust the unjust situation to make it a litter bit better. We can never achieve full justice, but it is the RC approach that by leaving out a substantive view on justice and instead putting emphasis on choosing, that is inherently dynamic and critical of the status quo. The fourth reason for Gilabert why TI isn’t redundant is that an ideal conception has heuristic significance (Ibid.: 46). Although this is
pretty obvious, this strikes me as truly redundant. For if we are confronted with a choice, between reality and a feasible potential, there are many realities that are unfeasible at the moment but also have this heuristic significance. We can, for example, think of a tribal society in which we try to install democratic institutions. The leap from a tribal society to a perfect democracy would, of course, not be feasible. An ideal conception of the perfect democratic, or just, society would indeed have heuristic significance. But the heuristic significance would also follow from, say, the United States or Holland. Although these nations have a long democratic tradition, there are many reasons on which we can say that they are not a perfect democratic society. An ideal conception of justice is in this respect indeed a redundant exercise. The last reason Gilabert (Ibid.: 48) gives us is that an ideal conception of justice could have “inspiration and motivational significance”. I agree with Gilabert here, but this function seems to me to at best a secondary function of TI. Gilabert says that (Ibid. 48): “We should not let the “best” be an enemy of the “good,”, but also “let the good be an enemy of the “better,”, or even the “best.””. This is true, TI for the above standing reasons is not a redundant exercise, and Gilabert (Ibid.: 48) is right in saying that “Ambitious political pictures can inspire political action”. But these ambitious political pictures also have a downside. Perfect just worlds, world peace, perfect democracy, are all so far from our political reality that they seem impossible to reach. These observations are likely to produce inaction, cynicism and apathy. Reality, for the most of us, is too complex and a perfect conception of whatever concept is probably going to make us aware of the enormous gap between reality and perfection. The RC approach in this respect gives us a way to tackle the complexity of reality and to break it down into smaller pieces thereby giving us a way through which we are able to escape the deadlock and actually achieve something. So it seems that although both TI and RC have a common goal, getting rid of injustice, the emphasis of the RC approach on social realization makes it easier for us to guide action and cure injustice. But Gilabert is right in saying that the TI approach is not redundant, but in view it has a supportive role rather than a leading one.
Let us now focus on what Sen considers to be the problem with the institutional aspect. Sen argues that the strong focus TI theories of justice have on ideal institutions and likewise social arrangements are the wrong way to proceed (Sen, 2009: 18). For Sen the institutions and the actual behavior that follows from them are inseparable. Because the actual behavior that stems from the institutions is greatly determined by what choices
individuals have within a certain institutional scheme. He draws upon a Sanskrit distinction, namely that of niti and nyaya to explain. Niti is in short “organizational propriety and behavioural correctness.” (Ibid.: 20) and nyaya focuses on “the necessity of examining what social realizations are actually generated through that institutional base.” (Ibid.: 82). He equates niti with the TI focus on ideal institutions and social arrangements and nyaya with the RC focus on social realizations. The niti and nyaya distinction, and from that the necessity of including actual human behavior in determining whether a situation is just or not, is made clear through an (extreme) example of niti, namely that of the Holy Roman emperor Ferdinand I. He said: “Let justice be done, though the world perish” (Ibid.: 21). This is, of course, niti taken to the extreme. No matter the consequence, justice (read: perfect justice) needs to prevail. From a niti perspective nothing seems wrong here, but if we look at the example from a nyaya perspective, we reach a different conclusion. Justice is dear to probably all individuals alike, whatever your vision of justice may be. But we tend to have a maximum to what consequences we could and would bear (Ibid.: 21). Another question arises with the strong focus on institutions. Institutions in and of themselves are not considered good (or just) in themselves. It is through the outcomes they produce we use the predicate ‘just’ or ‘good’ to these institutions. Berlin would agree here. For it is us humans who create values and concepts, like justice, and through us they derive their authority. Without the act of making moral categories, we do this through experiencing the institutional scheme in real life, an institutional scheme is nothing other than an arrangement which is morally blank. Therefore a theory of justice cannot be primarily focused on institutions, the main focus should lie with actual behavior. That being said, Sen (Ibid.: 112) nor I deny the importance of institutions in bringing about a more just world. But the consequence of the niti approach by TI theories makes for a theoretical blindfold.
[III]
It seems to be that the TI approach to justice is not the way through which we enhance or cure injustices. Although the TI and RC distinction by Sen is put forth quite bluntly. We can still clearly see a difference between the two approaches. TI asks what the very nature of justice is. And the RC approach asks what is necessary for an enhancement of an unjust situation? Two different questions, and they obviously bring forth different answers. Despite this difference I think that what drives them both is the improvement of an unjust situation.
In the case of the RC approach this is quite clear. But the TI approach has, I argue, the same goal. For what is the purpose in defining justice, in a perfect manner, and not using it to bring forth enhancement of justice? The second question, that of enhancement, then becomes the most prominent one in answering. Therefore we now turn our attention to the RC approach as defined by Sen.
The question what is needed for an enhancement of justice, inherently involves making choices. Brown (2010: 3), in discussing Sen’s theory, says “we ask ourselves whether this policy will make the world a somewhat better place as opposed to that policy *…+”. A perfect conception of justice isn’t a prerequisite for making a normative judgment. Because, I would argue, it lacks the capacity to guide action4. By this I mean that a theory of justice needs to have dynamic structure, through which people can cope with complex problems of injustice and break the problem down into, and here I use a simplistic metaphor, bite-size pieces. The choice between alternatives is. According to Sen we need a structure which can give us an open-ended comparison of choices (Sen, 2009: 89). This open-endedness, which is embedded in the structure, is important because trying to search for a “once-and-for-all finality.” will make for an a priori demarcation of possibilities in alternatives(Ibid.: 89). Open-endedness pays tribute to our everyday life in which principles compete, collide and change over time. This open-endedness also prevents a grid-lock. Namely, “*The RC approach+ has persistently made room for reassessment and further scrutiny.” (Ibid.: 107). This is important because of Berlin’s incompatibility of values and the often limited reach of the human mind. Like Berlin, Sen argues that while one general principle, in social questions, can look plausible, it may still collide with other generally formulated principles (Ibid.: 107). The limited capacity of the human mind charge is important because the general principles are formed with respect to a certain concept and/or situation, although TI theorist try to be maximally inclusive, and when we apply this general principle to another concept or situation, we will run into problems. The practical argument here is that it is very hard to oversee and include all variables that matter in matters of justice. Berlin (213: 14) also gives us a “practical socio-psychological” argument, namely “some problems can be solved, some
4
The action guidance aspect, according to Valentini (2009: 340-342), of normative principles entails that these same principles should guide action in real life. Usually this can mean three things. The first, action guidance means motivating people in taking action. The second one is that principles should be “immediately applicable” to real life and the last one is that principles constructed under idealized conditions should be applicable to the real world.
ills cured, in both the individual and social life.” but “every solution *to matters of justice+ creates a new situation which breeds its own new needs and problems, new demands.”. A TI theory of justice is formed in a particular situation, which has its specific problems and demands, but the limited foresight of individuals makes it at best “metaphysical optimism” to think that the TI theory can account for the new situation, with accordingly new problems and demands (Ibid.: 15). We people can’t transcend the situation in such a way to account for consequences of our actions. A general principle or rule that applies to matters of justice, which has an eternal air or that transcends situation or historical period, is pretty naïve. In the new situation, which was not foreseen in the formation of the theory, new problems arise and when this happens, what we end up with is again a choice between two alternatives of how to apply the general principle. It thus lacks the capacity to guide action in the sense stated above.
Another feature of the RC approach is the permissibility of partial solutions. The idea here is that a theory of justice acknowledges the difficulty of ranking concepts and thereby accomplishing justice (Sen, 2009: 107). Sen distinguishes between assertive and tentative forms of incompleteness. Assertive incompleteness is to rigid because it can lead to evaluations that certain concepts fall out of the scope of justice, and this is precisely what Sen tries to avoid. TI seems to have assertive tendencies through its transcendental aspect. The normative principles derived from a TI theory of justice are valid regardless of the situation or historical period. Something is either good or bad, just or unjust, very static and assertive indeed. The emphasis Sen puts on social realization is because he thinks that a theory of justice actually needs to have an action-guiding aspect (Brown, 2010: 4). So the action-guidance aspect that Sen wishes to achieve is not that a theory of justice needs to say do this or act so, in such and such a situation. No, he seeks to avoid assertive incompleteness. Because it’s very static and clinging on to a perfect definition of justice is likely to demoralize people, for the gap between reality and the ideal is too big. So his answer to this problem is to incorporate tentative incompleteness in the structure of a theory of justice (Ibid.: 108). Incompleteness may still, and most certainly will, occur, but now it’s not un unsolvable transcendental truth which needs to be overcome, but “operational difficulties *coming from+ limitations of knowledge, or complexity of calculation, or some other practical barriers in application.” (Ibid.: 108). Tentative incompleteness thus downplays the consequence of looking through the TI lens and seeing a
huge gap between the injustice at hand and a possible solution. The RC approach does not ask of us that we could and should solve the injustice at once, or even in a short manner. And by allowing us to solve only bits of the big and complex problems that accompany injustices, it breaks down a certain mental barrier for people. Who would be in a deadlock if they only saw the great gap between the just and the reality, the unjust. In that sense is Sen’s theory helpful in applying it to real life.
Another reason why RC matters is that Sen widens the voices which are thought to have a say in matters of justice. He distinguishes between the usual membership entitlement and enlightenment relevance. Who has a saying in a certain matter is normally decided upon being a member of a certain group or society. People whose interests are involved but are not part of that group or society are excluded. Enlightenment relevance, as a basis for having a say, is valuable because “the person’s perspective and the reasons behind it bring important insights and discernment into an evaluation” (Ibid.: 108). The above made distinction is based upon what Sen calls closed-impartiality and open-impartiality. This is an important distinction because a biased, or parochial, choice of potentials is something he wants to avoid in matters of (global) justice. Closed-impartiality, he says, can lead to parochialism. This means that by only letting people from a certain group or society have a say in their matters is bound to restrict the perspectives given on the matter (Ibid: 122). Open-impartiality is supposed to prevent this by allowing outsiders to make judgments on a certain matter. These outside perspectives can shed new light upon cultural practices, policies or institutional arrangements which, according to our parochial values, are judged to be just or unjust. But how does Sen create an open-impartial view of potential choices, while at the same time giving a practical tool for application?
He uses Adam Smith’s impartial spectator (Ibid: 124). A thorough and impartial examination of our own conduct, policies or institutional arrangements, requires the perspective from someone outside this community. The reason is that by “The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, *…+” and “by the presence of the real spectator *…+ we are likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-command.” (Ibid.: 125). Due to cultural traditions, or parochial values, our “man within the breast” can be deceived in thinking that a given tradition or normative judgment is just or unjust. An individual who is born and raised in a particular society is likely to adopt the norms and values of its society.
These norms and values greatly influence how an individual perceives the world around him. So if we want “to broaden our understanding and to widen the reach of our ethical inquiry.” It is necessary to include an impartial outsider(Ibid.: 125). A second reason for imposing this device is that “the actions of one country can seriously influence lives elsewhere.” (Ibid.: 129). In our globalizing world a decision in for instance emission restrictions on cars can have profound consequences for people on the other side of the globe.
Jonathan Quong challenges Smith’s impartial spectator. First off, he thinks that the impartial perspective from the impartial outsider isn’t as impartial as Sen proposes (website Public Reason). According to Sen, Quong says, we should think about the particular consequence of our own policies, because they can and often will have consequence for people somewhere else. We are all connected in some way or another. Therefore “no one is a disinterested observer when it comes to global justice since there are no disinterested parties” (Ibid.). I think Quong is right in stating that everybody is connected in some way to people from across the globe. But, he takes this claim of interconnectedness too far. Yes we are probably all connected with one another, but due to a lack of information, it is in many cases very hard to untangle reality’s web and expose the causal chain. For to be a biased observer would imply that the observer is aware of his causal link to a certain injustice. Quong takes this empirical argument to far, sometimes it is possible that due to the interconnectedness of our world, giving an impartial observation is difficult. But the strength of the impartial observer device is not swept aside by a possible empirical fact. For it is very possible due to our complex reality that the observer in question is connected in some way to the injustice, but is simply not aware of this. Thereby the impartiality in question still upholds.
Secondly, Quong thinks that Sen “*conflates+ two different questions here” (Ibid.). Namely, whose view could be of use in judging social justice questions and who should have a say in these matters. The difference is that the first question is about giving impartial advice or opinion on a certain matter. The second one is about whose “view should be counted” (Ibid.). But this charge of conflating the two questions is something Sen is pretty clear about. Sen’s use of the impartial spectator is not about giving the impartial spectator some “final arbitration” power” (Sen, 2009: 131). But it’s useful for us because we can hear “the point of view of others, which may help us to achieve a fuller – and fairer – understanding” (Ibid.: 131).
The third charge Quong notes is that of how the impartial spectator would escape the parochialism charge. Beside Quong’s interconnectedness charge he says that “because you are disinterested doesn’t mean you lack your own cultural or other prejudices, beliefs etc… and so why isn’t this observer equally likely to be guilty of parochialism?”(website Public Reason). He goes on to state “a disinterested observer from another society might be less likely to understand the culturally specific impact that a proposed rule might have for a population of people with very different cultural or religious beliefs.” (Ibid.). Let me start with the first charge. Parochialism is indeed something you want to avoid as much as possible. The impartial spectator, which is disinterested and being an outsider, necessarily has his own views and values, he holds dearly. They off course influence the way he looks upon a given situation of injustice. But the difference between parochialism in a TI constructed device and with the impartial spectator is that parochialism in the impartial spectator is a posteriori instead of a priori. If we, as a given group of people, would try to construct a transcendental device of impartiality it is likely that, a priori, we would incorporate our own normative beliefs. Thereby somewhat closing off the possibility for fresh perspectives on a matter of justice. This would follow because if we have decided through a transcendental route upon how to judge normative matters, the transcendental element wouldn’t allow other criteria to be added to the definition of justice. For what is a transcendental definition worth if it appears to be incomplete? So the point which Sen tries to make is that the impartial spectator gives a fresh perspective on the matter, and maybe this is parochial due to his valuation framework, but it is a new perspective. This new a posteriori perspective will probably challenge our own view, and can make us think in a completely new way about our own parochial values.
[Conclusion]
So, do we need to theorize in an ideal or non-ideal fashion in matters of justice? Let us start with our departure point, Berlin’s rejection of monism. Berlin saw values as dynamic things. They vary in substance over time. Because values are created by human beings, he concludes, those values themselves are only relevant if we consider them in relation to human beings themselves. Values derive their authority from this relationship with us, their creators.
According to Berlin there are two arguments against the monistic belief. The first is the incompatibility of values. This is the more or less empirical argument that the freedom of the wolf is death for the lamb. Total freedom means, in reality, greater inequality. The second counter argument is the incommensurability of values. These values which derive their objectiveness and authority from their relation they have to individuals themselves need to be within the human horizon. The harmonized world where values coexist, where no value trumps another, is a world we do not know or understand. These values are forced outside our horizon and the consequence is transformation or abandonment of these very values. This strong rejection of the ideal is something Sen agrees with for his own reasons.
Theories of justice need to take account this plural aspect of reality. Sen does this and sees that there is a plurality of reasons on which to accord the predicate just or unjust to a certain situation. He argues that to make a normative judgment it is not necessary to all agree on one specific principle or normative argument. In short, we do not need to have a perfect definition of justice for saying that something is an injustice or not. The distinction of TI and RC is based upon his plural grounding view of reality. TI tries to identify the nature of the just and the RC approach tries, through a comparison of reality with a feasible potential, to achieve a more just social reality.
According to Sen TI theorizing is not feasible and it’s redundant exercise for achieving a more just situation. The feasibility charge, I agree, is not possible. This isn’t possible because it would imply that justice has a transcendental definition. But besides the fact that there are epistemic limitations, i.e. we can never know if we have defined justice in this manner, the perfect definition of justice would entail that this perfect definition could be harmonized with other values. It would mean that justice could perfectly coexist with say equality or freedom. For reasons given by Berlin on this matter I think this argument of Sen is valid. The redundancy charge given by Sen is not entirely true. Sen says that the search for a perfect definition is not of immediate help in the goal of achieving a better social reality. Although I think TI isn’t primarily necessary for bettering a certain situation, it does have a supportive role in achieving a more complete assessment of a situation. According to Gilabert the TI approach can help in determining the relevant criteria for the assessment of a situation or choice. Thereby strengthening the assessment and ideals can give inspiration and motivate people to take political action.
The institutional aspect of TI is problematic as well, says Sen. The strong focus on institutions through which justice needs to be achieved is misguided. Sen sees the institutions and the behavior that stems from them as inseparable. Institutions greatly determine what behavior is possible, they provide room or they don’t provide room for action. So he says that is actual behavior that should be leading the discussions of justice. Another argument against the strong focus on institutions is that institutions are in and of themselves morally blank. A just institution is only a just institution when it produces just behavior.
If the TI approach is not the way forward, what is? Sen argues that to enhance an unjust situation, the act of choosing is necessarily is involved. A perfect definition doesn’t pay tribute to this empirical reality. A theory of justice needs to be action-guiding in this respect. It needs to help us choose between alternatives. I mean this in a procedural manner. The RC approach of Sen does this. It allows the possibility of partial solutions through tentative incompleteness. This tentative incompleteness makes it dynamic. Times change and values tend to change as well. A theory of justice needs to be able to change accordingly. By allowing partial solutions it makes it easier for individuals to break down the complex structure of unjust situations. Thereby making the situation more manageable. The third reason why RC should be preferred over TI theories of justice is that it widens the scope of voices in matters of justice. Sen is keen on avoiding what he calls closed-impartiality, or parochialism. To avoid parochialism Sen uses the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator is supposed to be an outsider which can shed new light on matters of justice. Through giving a new perspective, this doesn’t mean a real vote in actual matters; the impartial spectator is able to broaden the discussion. There’s a possibility that our own parochial values will be challenged. Thereby challenging the status-quo. It is also very relevant in matters of global justice, because it gives outsiders a voice. This is important because a policy choice on one side of the globe is able to have profound effects on people on the other side.
In the end I think the more relevant question is the one which RC revolves around. Namely, how can we enhance an unjust situation? How do we achieve positive social realization? A transcendental conception of justice is due to epistemic and empirical limitations not feasible. But beside the fact that we can never know if have the perfect
definition of justice. The approach itself is not a redundant one. We should always on the lookout for new criteria, thereby strengthening our assessments. But on the other hand we should not be primarily focused on this task. It has a supportive role to play. For it is the victims of today that need help. The choices of today make for a more just or unjust world and it is precisely these choices which deserve our attention. Choice should be our primary concern. I agree with Berlin that “Ends are not discovered at all, but made, not found but created.” (Berlin, 2013: 227). The same goes for justice.
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Berlin. I. (2013) The crooked timber of humanity: Chapters in the history of ideas, Henry Hardy (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press
Brown. C. (2010) On Amartya Sen and “The idea of justice”. Ethics & International Affairs. 24:3
Gilabert. P. (2012) Comparative assessments of justice, political feasibility, and ideal theory. Ethic theory Moral Prac. 15:39-56
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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/
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