Everything Changes but U(K)
An Analysis of the rise of Permanent Campaigning in the United Kingdom between 1978 and 2018
Master’s Thesis by Jack Daniel Cairns Master’s Programme Communication Science
Graduate School of Communication Supervised by Dr. Rachid Azrout
Completed: 28/06/2019 Student ID: 11679077
Abstract
This paper aimed to empirically analyse the suggestion that the United Kingdom was in a phase of permanent campaigning as well as to examine the rise of negative campaigning through the use of a content analysis. This content analysis examined the effect of polling data on the use of threat and opportunity frames in Labour and Conservative Party Conference speeches from 1978 to 2018. No support was found for an increase in permanent or negative campaigning. However, a link was established between incumbency and frame choice as well as between political party and the use of threat framing, with Conservatives using more threat frames and incumbents being
more likely to use opportunity frames. In line with existing theory, those challenging the incumbent were more likely to use threat frames, regardless of party affiliation. The implications
of these results were presented alongside a reflection on this study’s limitations as well as recommendations for future research.
Keywords: Party Conference, Speech, Content Analysis, Threat Framing, Opportunity Framing, Polling Data, Permanent Campaigning
An Analysis of the rise of Permanent Campaigning in the United Kingdom between 1978 and 2018
Political campaign strategies are constantly evolving as politicians attempt to differentiate themselves from their opponents. From William Gladstone’s seminal 1878-80 Midlothian
Campaign, where the Liberal Party leader toured the United Kingdom (hereafter, U.K.) giving a series of speeches (Brooks, 1985), to current Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn’s use of
grassroots campaign groups such as Momentum (Howell, 2018), party leaders have used the time prior to an election to campaign in an attempt to broaden their support. Campaigns have many benefits for the quality of democracy as they drive civic engagement, increase political
knowledge, interest, awareness and likelihood to vote (Hansen & Pedersen, 2014). Nevertheless, they have traditionally remained confined to the time prior to an election. However, evidence from the United States of America (hereafter, U.S.) suggests that campaigning has replaced governing as the principal focus of the government, a process known as permanent campaigning (Blumenthal, 1980).
Permanent campaigning’s origins can be traced back to the 1970s and, specifically, to a memo from one of President Jimmy Carter’s advisors that stated “governing with public approval requires a continuing political campaign” (Beckman, 2010, p.12). However, this was not an isolated perspective and, thirty years later, during George W. Bush’s administration, the White House Press Secretary wrote that the President and his team’s attitude was that governing was a permanent campaign (McClellan, 2008).
While permanent campaigning may have originated in the U.S., it has not been
constrained by geographical or cultural boundaries and is now prevalent in political systems as geographically diverse as Ecuador (Jose & Agreda, 2013) and India (Vij, 2016). In the U.K., it has been suggested that Margaret Thatcher’s decision to hire an advertising agency to work on her 1978 General Election campaign led to the ‘Americanisation’ of British politics (Scammell, 1995) characterised by an increase in professionalisation and a rise in political marketing.
The extent of this rise was chronicled in Lees-Marshment’s 2004 book The Political Marketing Revolution. Lees-Marshment provided anecdotal evidence as to how, in line with the
principles of permanent campaigning, political marketing techniques have become the norm for all layers of U.K. government. Lilleker and Jackson (2010) offer some empirical data for this by analysing polititcian’s use of the internet, finding that U.K. parties used online platforms to build contact with supporters.
The anecdotal case for the rise of permanent campaigning is strong and the increasing reactivity of politicians is observable (Savigny, 2009). In the U.K., this has manifested itself with the governing Conservative party making high-profile changes to flagship policies around
welfare spending in recent years following large scale negative public reactions and instant changes in published polling data (Cowburn, 2017; Mikhailova, 2018). This effect has also been observed among popular policies and individuals, with leading candidates showing a bias toward positive, opportunity-laden messages (Needham, 2005).
In the U.S., politicians increasingly try to set the agenda by employing framing
techniques that are more commonly associated with media organisations. Politicians frame an issue by selecting which parts of a message to focus on (Reese, Gandy & Grant, 2001), in order to generate the maximum possible support for them or their party. Exposure to these frames has a tangible effect on the behaviour and the attitude of the audience: The audience are likely to adopt frames that they themselves are exposed to (Gamson, 1992), which only perpetuates the
existence of a certain frame. Through this method, dominant narratives are often formed (Chong & Druckman, 2007). The combination of instant reactivity to polling data with an increased focus on issue framing is one of the many ways that permanent campaigning can compromise the democratic process (Blumenthal, 1980).
While campaigns are constantly changing and adapting, there are certain aspects that remain constant: notably, the political speech and the party conference. Political speeches have been a part of politics since its very beginnings in Ancient Greece (Schiappa, 1992) and while the party conference is a newer tradition, it is also firmly established as a mainstay of politics. Annual party conferences can take place in a variety of settings: in advance of an election, in the aftermath of a victory, during a global crisis or during times of relative calm. Historically, these external factors have a large influence on speech content and, for example, during the Labour
Party’s, 1975 conference the only issue considered was U.K. membership of the European Economic Community (now the European Union). Both conferences and speeches allow
politicians a regular platform from which they can attempt to generate support while also setting the narrative about themselves and their party, often through the conscious use of certain frames.
Given the challenges that permanent campaigning presents the democratic process and the scarce empirical support for Scammell’s assertion that U.K. politics now mirrors those from across the Atlantic, this paper will endeavour to fill this gap. Doing so will allow for a greater understanding of the underlying principles that inform the actions of politicians in the U.K. as the country heads through the most disruptive phase of its politics in the post-war era (Powell, 2017). Considering this, this paper proposes the following research question:
What is the effect of polling data on the frames used during conference speeches by the Labour and Conservative Party leaders and how has this changed since 1978?
Theoretical Framework
Permanent Campaigning
Permanent campaigning exists when “political marketing techniques become intertwined with and essential to the act of governing” (Conaghan & de la Torre, 2008, p.268). This process results in a loss of the distinction between campaigning and governing (Ornstein & Mann, 2000) of which, the use of public opinion data is “one of the hallmarks” (Van Onselen and Errington, 2007, p.81). Political parties increasingly use polling data to devise strategies that will increase the popularity of a chosen politician or policy (Blumenthal, 1980; Needham, 2005). These strategies can range from the subtle changes to the presentation of a message as well as more tangible changes such as a politician’s travel destinations (Doherty, 2007).
While the emergence of permanent campaigning has altered politics, it is not clear whether, normatively, these consequences are positive or negative for the politics process.
Those who view permanent campaigning as a positive development highlight the accountability benefits of politicians being reactive to the demands of the public and interest groups (van Onselen & Errington, 2007). Although this perspective is not a new one—former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln said in 1858, “whoever can change public opinion can change the government” (cited in Guelzo, 2014, p. 171)—it has been increasingly embraced by modern leaders such as Barack Obama (Doucet, 2018) as well as U.K. Chancellors of the Exchequer, including Gordon Brown and George Osborne (Warwick, 2015).
In the U.S., the dominant media narrative focuses on the negative aspects of permanent campaigning (Ehrlich, 2019; Galston, 2014). Adherents to this focus on its ability to be used as a manipulative device (Heclo, 2000) as well as the tendency for politicians to avoid tackling controversial issues due to fear of being damaged in the polls. Ornstein and Mann (2000) highlight this by using game theory: They note that while political campaigning is a “zero-sum game with a winner and a loser,” governing should be about negotiation as “today’s adversaries may be tomorrow’s allies” (p.225). According to Ornstein and Mann (2000), the larger the role of campaigning in governing, the less likely it is that political parties can build coalitions and reach cross-party consensus.
This has been borne out in the current British political logjam surrounding Brexit, with numerous commentators and parliamentarians describing British politics as “broken” (Shrimsley, 2019; West, 2019) and 82% of the British public saying they agree on their assessment of British politics (YouGov, 2019). In the U.S., this difficulty has manifested itself in multiple ‘government shutdowns’, a phenomenon that, while once rare, has become a common occurrence (Sakuma, 2019).
Furthermore, Burstein (2003) notes that the increased data available on public opinion “leads elected officials to be particularly responsive on highly salient issues,” (p. 30) and, consequently, less responsive on low salience issues. In the U.S., public opinion affects public policy down to the state level (Caughey and Warshaw, 2018) and this has consequences for the entire democratic process, in whichever country permanent campaigning has established itself.
Framing
By embracing permanent campaigning, politicians set the agenda outside of election campaigns (Blumenthal, 1980). As permanent campaigning grows in prominence, this
agenda-setting influence increases. Agenda-setting is traditionally accompanied by the concepts of priming and framing (Scheufele, 2000). While priming theory is concerned with the ability of media and politicians to increase the salience of certain issues (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), framing theory focuses on which aspects of a message are selected for inclusion (McCombs, 1997). Given that political campaigns are typically contested over a few, highly salient issues (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008), the selection process that informs the use of framing is of more relevance than priming which is typically linked with longer term shifts in memory and recall (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Framing theory was seminally defined by Entman (1993) in the following way:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (p.52)
Entman’s (1993) definition outlines that framing requires the selection of certain pieces of information, resulting in “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals” (p.53).
Much of framing theory focuses on the media and their ability to frame a topic, however, politicians are increasingly using framing as a way of persuading their audience either by
adopting existing frames or creating their own (Druckman, Jacobs & Ostermeier, 2004). Therefore, in a political context, frames become “selective views” that “construct reality in a certain way leading to different evaluations and recommendations” (Matthes, 2012, p.249).
Alongside their persuasive nature, politicians also utilise framing in order to categorise themselves as well as their political agenda (Boeynaems, Burgers, Konijn & Steen, 2017). In a two-party system (or a de-facto two-party system such as the U.K.), this can create a clear narrative that presents a dichotomous choice of ‘us’ vs ‘them’. In doing so, politicians can create an environment where an opponent is seen as opposing all of their proposals, even if this is not the case and, thus, polarisation increases (Calvert & Warren, 2014).
However, there are numerous moderating and mediating factors that must be accounted for in order to understand the effects of framing. In this regard, the credibility of the source is paramount with multiple studies finding that frames are not influential when the source is not credible (Druckman, 2001; Hartman & Weber, 2009). While the national credibility of party leaders can change overtime, when they are among their own party members they are often viewed as credible (Caldwell & Dixon, 2009; Wickham-Jones, 2005) and this grants them a large amount of power during the party conference.
In the context of the party conference, the influence of credibility could be strengthened further due to the partisan information environment. Druckman and Nelson (2003) find that while framing effects can be negated by conflicting views, when views are concurrent with the frame that is being applied, then the frame is more prone to being adopted. This suggests that frames presented to members of a political party are more likely to be accepted and alter the future behaviour. Furthermore, credibility is strengthened if the frame itself is consistent (Benford & Snow, 2000). Thus, frames are then repeated by the leader in a bid to maintain credibility and the cycle is repeated. This cycle is then amplified to the public beyond the conference through the partisan media environment in the U.K, as newspapers who agree with Conservative Party policy are likely to be more positive than those who do not, and vice versa (Brandenburg, 2006). The increased professionalisation of politics indicates that these scientific findings are likely to have implemented in democracies where permanent campaigning is a key part of governing (Tenpas & McCann, 2007).
The Role of Framing in Permanent Campaigning
Permanent campaigning and political framing can also be viewed together: As a political party increases the length and scope of its campaigning output, an increase in targeted framing can also be expected. Framing in politics is used to influence and set the agenda (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003) in order to persuade new supporters as well as maintaining existing support (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010), both of which are distinctive aspects of the permanent campaign.
companies by focusing on themes rather than specific policies (Sparrow & Turner, 2001). The adoption of framing in political discourse allows for a greater focus on themes as topics are adapted to fit a dominant narrative.
Moreover, an increase in mediatisation across society has led to the need for all industries to react by providing greater quantities of content (Hjarvard, 2008). In this context, politicians are compelled to use targeted campaign frames more frequently. Thus, when framing exists outside of the traditional election period, usually defined as around two months prior to an election in the U.K. (MacQueen, 2015), permanent campaigning can be observed.
In order to understand the content of the permanent campaign, it is necessary to draw from negative campaigning theory. Skeperdas and Grofman (1995) concluded that when political campaigns are conducted between two candidates, the front-runner in these campaigns will “engage in more positive and less negative campaigning than the opponent” (p.49). The finding that a candidate's position in the ‘race’ can influence their campaign style is supported by Needham (2005) who noted that front-runners are more likely to use simple messages which appeal to voter aspirations by presenting them with opportunities. The opposite is true for trialing candidates, who often turn to threatening and negative tactics in a bid to mobilise (Sigelman & Buell Jr., 2003; Miller & Krosnick, 2004). The rise of polarisation (Fraune & Knodt, 2018) and of the ‘race’ in the modern, two-party, political campaign means that threat and opportunity frames have grown in prominence in democracies where permanent campaigning has taken hold. Furthermore, the aspect of fear, via the medium of threats from politicians, is also becoming a larger part of the UK election environment (Dean, 2005). Combining these theories with the role of polling data in permanent campaigning, brings this paper to the following set of hypotheses:
H1: There will be an increase in the prevalence of threat and opportunity frames between 1978 and 2018.
H2a: When behind in opinion polls, both political parties are more likely to use threat frames. H2b: The larger the trailing margin, the greater the use of threat frames.
H3a: When leading in opinion polls, both political parties are more likely to use opportunity frames.
H3b: The larger the leading margin, the greater the use of opportunity frames.
Negative Campaigning
The increasing permanence of the political campaign is, however, not the only shift in how campaigns are conducted. Alongside this, it has become, in the media, commonly accepted that political campaigns have also increased in their negativity. Publications from across the world have chastised politicians for ‘going negative’ (Goichman & Ashkenazi, 2019; Rosario, 2019). Research also supports this anecdotal shift in reporting: Lau and Rovner (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of literature around the concept of negative campaigning and found a substantial increase newspaper and scientific articles between 1980 and 2000.
Negative campaigning exists when a candidate uses negative statements in an attempt to gain an advantage over their opponent (Lau & Rovner, 2009). These statements are often accompanied by attacks, usually but not always, toward the opposition party and those who represent the party. For example, the Conservative Party’s 1997 ‘New Labour, New Danger’ poster depicting Labour Party leader Tony Blair with ‘demon eyes’ (Culf, 1997). Alongside this style of political attack, negative campaigning can also manifest itself in more subtle forms, often through negatively valenced messages (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009) such as threat or risk frames that are attributed to the opposition party.
As outlined earlier, threat frames themselves are often varied and are constantly under construction, as the identity and nature of the political debate develops (Risse-Kappen, 1996). They can take the form of direct tangible threats coming from terrorism or environmental issues or from existential threats that highlight relationships between the perceived ingroup and the perceived outgroup (Noreen & Sjöstedt, 2004). Moreover, threat framing has the ability to create and strengthen these divisions, with the goal of increasing public awareness and concern (Thrall, 2007), leading to polarisation.
There is considerable debate about whether the implications of negative campaigning, are on a normative level, positive or negative. Firstly, there is evidence that the rise in negative campaigning has a negative effect on the political debate, as it demobilises the electorate and lowers political efficacy (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon & Valentino, 1994) while, as with the use of threat framing, also increasing attitude polarisation (Garramore, Atkin, Pinkleton & Cole, 1990). However, there are defenders of negative campaigning who argue that negative
campaigning draws the voter’s attention to issues that they would have otherwise remained unaware of (Mayer, 1996).
With regards to the effect for those who turn to negative campaign strategies, numerous studies have indicated that ‘going negative’ can be beneficial for a political party (Damore, 2002; Mark, 2006), although these effects are greater for those who are challenging the incumbent (Lau & Pomper, 2002). Indeed, prospect theory suggests that frames that highlight risks or negative consequences are more likely to be successful as individuals are inclined to act to prevent losses, rather than acting to achieve gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Alongside the incumbency factor, there are also systemic moderating factors to the success of negative campaigning. Hansen and Pedersen (2008) found absence of negative campaign tactics in multi-party systems, concluding that the use of negative campaign tactics is curtailed by the system as “the benefits can go to many parties, while the risk of backfire is limited to the sponsoring party” (p.423). Although the U.K. has a multi-party system, political races are almost exclusively carried out on partisan lines dividing the Labour Party and the Conservative Party (Drucker, 1979; Lipson, 1953; Vandenabeele, Scheeper & Hondeghem, 2006), nullifying much of the risk outlined by Hansen and Pedersen (2008).
Regardless of its effect, negative campaigning is often viewed as the dichotomous partner to positive campaigning but Jamieson, Waldman and Sherr (2000) caution against this
perspective, noting that some attacks are legitimate, while also warning against using such a dichotomy as doing so excludes content that includes a comparative element. With this in mind, this paper will view negative campaigning through the prism of threat frames attributed to the opposition party, such as the aforementioned ‘New Labour, New Danger’ campaign. Given the
theoretical and anecdotal evidence supporting the rise of negative campaigning, and the U.K.’s relative political duopoly, this paper proposes the following hypothesis:
H4: There will be an increase in the use of threat frames, attributed to the opposition party, between 1978 and 2018.
Methodology
Sampling & Procedure
A content analysis was conducted in order to analyse the use of threat and opportunity framing during party conference speeches. This content analysis utilised a corpus of texts from each of the two largest U.K. political parties, Labour and the Conservatives, annual conference speeches. As outlined in the introduction, party conference speeches were chosen as the unit of analysis due to their consistent nature, being conducted in the same weeks annually as well as being of similar length. Furthermore, the studying of party conference speeches allows for observations to be made outwith of the election cycle and, thus, allows for the investigation of the theoretical increase in permanent campaigning.
To investigate the possibility of a longitudinal change, speeches were analysed from 1978 to 2018. This starting point was chosen as it corresponds with Margaret Thatcher’s,
aforementioned, decision to hire the first external company to work on a political company which marks the theoretical starting point of permanent campaigning in the U.K.. Speeches were gathered from an online database of British political speeches (Britishpoliticalspeech.org) and cross-referenced against political party databases, newspaper archives and personal websites of the speakers to ensure veracity, resulting in a census sample of 82 speeches (for examples see Appendix A).
Coding was conducted in random order (detailed coding scheme in Appendix B) by two researchers, both Master’s students in Communication Science at the University of Amsterdam.
While the unit of analysis was the speeches themselves (N = 82), individual sentences were taken as the coding unit (NSentences= 29828). The average speech length was 364 sentences (MSpeechLength = 363.73, SDSpeechLength = 99.81) and the total number of sentences was evenly distributed across the sample (for a histogram, see Appendix C). An inter-coder reliability test was conducted based on a randomly selected 10% of the total sample (Nspeeches = 8), the results of which will be discussed in the following section.
Measures of Frames
In order to measure the use of frames, this study draws upon pre-existing frames utilised in the study of news framing. In particular, the work of Schuck and De Vreese (2006) in the operationalisation of the dichotomous frames of ‘risk’ and ‘opportunity’. As noted, in the aforementioned paper, using a pair of valence frames, such as ‘risk/threat’ and ‘opportunity’, prevents the gathering of insufficient data offered by a simple positive/negative dichotomy. However, as this study is not concerned with newspaper coverage but rather with direct political communication, it was necessary to adapt these frames. This adaptation took place following a period of exploratitative test coding using a random sample of the corpus and resulted in a dichotomy based on ‘threat’ and ‘opportunity’ (see codebook in Appendix D).
These threats and opportunities were both divided into six indicator frames (detailed in Table 1), before each sentence was assigned a binary code (1= ‘frame present’, 0 = ‘no frame present’), as per the predefined codebook. This division created topics that served as
measurement objects for the overarching concepts of threat and opportunity. Indicator frames were employed as measurement objects in order to strengthen reliability (Matthes & Kohring, 2008) and make coding more efficient. In order to test H4, both coders also coded which actor was deemed to be the source of the frame, selecting from a list of eight predefined categories, (for a full list of actors, see Appendix D) this aspect of data gathering was also sufficiently reliable (see Table 1).
Table 1
Indicator Frame
MFrame SDFrame Krippendorff’s Alpha
(Frame Presence) Krippendorff’s Alpha (Frame Source) Economic Threat 0.05 0.03 .89 .88 Societal Threat 0.04 0.03 .85 .84 Security Threat 0.02 0.02 .81 .79 National Political Threat** 0.0003 0.001 -* -* Party Threat** 0.001 0.003 -* -* Personal Threat** 0 0 -* -* Economic Opportunity 0.06 0.03 .86 .86 Societal Opportunity 0.06 0.06 .86 .85 Security Opportunity 0.02 0.02 .84 .84 National Political Opportunity** 0.001 0.002 -* -* Party Opportunity 0.01 0.01 .79 .79 Personal Opportunity** 0 0 -* -*
* Insufficient data to test reliability
** Variable omitted from grouping variables.
Following this coding, the binary sentence codes for each speech were combined before being divided by the number of sentences in the speech resulting in a score between 0 (= ‘no frame present’) to 1 (= ‘frame always present’) for each sub-frame (also detailed in Table 1). However, the infrequency, and the inability to ensure reliability, of certain indicator frames meant that they were subsequently omitted from the analysis. The remaining variables were then grouped together to create the variables: Threat (M = 0.10, SD = 0.05), consisting of Economic Threat, Societal Threat and Security Threat, and Opportunity (M = 0.15, SD = 0.08), consisting of Economic Opportunity, Societal Opportunity, Security Opportunity and Party Opportunity. Given the infrequency of the indicator frames that were removed, the means of the final variables were unaltered (see Table 2).
Table 2
Descriptives of final frame variables before and after variable removal
Before After
M SD M SD
Threat 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05
Opportunity 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05
Polling Position
In order to assess the effect of polling position on the use of frames, it was necessary to obtain historical polling data. This data was gathered from the online archive, UK Polling Report and checked against the archives of individual polling companies in order to ensure reliability (for complete data, see Appendix F). In order to best understand the effect of polling position on speech content, the average polling position, relative to the opposition party across the month prior to the party conferences was calculated from all available sources, with the largest lead, 34 points, coming for the Labour Party in 1997 and the smallest lead of 1.01 points being the
Conservative Party’s in 1991 (see Figure 1). Across the sample, the Conservative Party (MConPol = -5.23,SDConPol= 12.02) trailed the Labour Party (MLabPol = 5.23,SDLabPol= 12.02) more often than
they led, which was considered in the interpretation of the upcoming analyses. Furthermore, the large polling gap created by Tony Blair’s period as Labour leader, from 1994 to 2007, will be factored into this paper’s conclusions and, thus, all relevant hypothesis will be tested with and without this period.
Finally, for hypothesis testing, a grouping variable was created with two groups consisting of one group containing all speeches that were delivered by leading politicians and another containing the speeches made by trailing politicians. Alongside these grouping variables, three control variables (Political Party, Election Year and Incumbency) were added to isolate any effects that were linked to political ideology (Schoonvelde, Brosius, Schumacher & Bakker, 2019), an on-going election campaign (Rhee, 1997) or the role of Prime Minister (Anderson & Glomm, 1992).
Results
Firstly, to test whether the use of threat and opportunity frames have increased over time, a regression analysis was conducted, using the speech year as the independent variable and the total percentage of frames per year as the dependent variable. All necessary assumptions for regression analysis were met (see Appendix G) and the model itself was significant, F(1, 81) = 30.39, p < .001. The regression model, and thus ‘speech year’, as the only dependent variable
can be used to predict the quantity of threat and opportunity frames. The strength of the prediction is relatively large and 28% (R2 = .28) of the variation in total annual frames can be
predicted by the speech year, b = 0.003, t = 5.51, p < .001, 95% CI [0.002, 0.004], b* = 0.53. This indicates that for every year closer to 2018, the number of frames increased by 0.3% and, thus, increased by 12% across the entire sample. However, given the visualisation of the relationship in Figure 2, and the varying levels of threat and opportunity framing outlined (see
Appendix H for distribution of the frames by party), it is pertinent view each type of threat individually
This was done by using two further regression analyses, the first with threat variable as the dependent variable and the second using the opportunity variable. As with the earlier regression, all assumptions were met (see Appendix G). Only the result of the regression model using opportunity framing was significant, F(1, 81) = 55.93, p <.001, with these results
indicating that 41% (R2= .41) of the variance in quantity of opportunity frames were a result of
the speech year, b = 0.003, t = 7.49, p < .001, 95% CI [0.002, 0.004], b* = 0.64. In context, this means that the number of opportunity frames has increased by 0.3% each year and by 12% across the time frame.
However, given the insignificant regression model (F (1,81) = 0.34, p = .563, b = 0.00), using the threat frame variable, H1 is only partially supported as the increase in opportunity framing between 1978 and 2018 has not been accompanied by an increase in threat framing.
To test the effect of polling position, and more precisely the effect of trailing and leading on the use of threat opportunity frames, two independent samples t-tests were carried out. Given the large disparity generated in polling position generated by Tony Blair’s Labour Party
leadership, the tests were subsequently re-run in order to ensure the results were not biased by a single politician. The complete results of all four t-tests are detailed in Table 3.
Table 3
T-tests: The effects of polling position on the use of threat and opportunity framing
Trailing Leading 95% CI M diff. N M SD N M SD t-test df Threat 41 0.098 0.047 41 0.100 0.050 -0.024, 0.019 ns 80 Opportunity 41 0.137 0.067 41 0.161 0.091 -0.059, 0.011 ns 80 Threat^ 28 0.100 0.041 28 0.099 0.047 -0.022, 0.025 ns 54
Opportunity^ 28 0.150 0.069 28 0.136 0.091 -0.029, 0.057
ns 54
*p < .050
^ Test run after the removal of Tony Blair
Across the numerous statistical tests, no t-test returned a statistically significant result. Nevertheless, the first t-test run using the opportunity variable did indicate a mean direction in the hypothesised direction, with speeches from trailing candidates containing 13.7% opportunity frames, and speeches from leading candidates featuring 16.1% opportunity frames. Furthermore, it appears possible that Tony Blair’s leadership has an influence. While the mean difference in the use of opportunity frames (Mdiff = .024) is initially in the hypothesised direction, suggesting that those who are leading are more likely to use opportunity frames, after the removal of Tony Blair and the various Conservative leaders he faced, this mean difference is reversed (Mdiff = -0.014). Across both tests regarding threat framing, this same mean reversal is also found (Mdiff = -0.002 to Mdiff = 0.001), suggesting that the role of the individual leader has more influence than polling position. This, combined with the statistically insignificant results, means that both H2a and H3a can be rejected and it should be stated that the role of polling position has no effect on the use of threat and opportunity frames.
Although no effect of polling position was identified, two regressions were still run in order to test H2b and H3b and to understand the role of polling data and possible control factors on the use of threat and opportunity frames. While also testing once again if Tony Blair had a statistically significant impact on the results. As illustrated in Table 4, when all assumptions were met (see Appendix G), all models produced statistically significant results. Although with 1
the exception of the first opportunity framing model and the second threat framing model, these results were caused by the significant role of incumbency.
1 However, during both residual plots involving the models without Tony Blair, the linearity of the relationship was
Table 4
Regressions: The effects of polling position, and control variables, on the use of threat and opportunity framing
Threat Opportunity
Model 1 b* Model 1^ b** Model 2 b*** Model 2^ b*
Constant 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 Polling Position 0.001 (0.16) 0.00 (0.002) 0.001(0.20)* 0.00 (0.04) Election Year 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.14) 0.03 (0.14) 0.03 (0.14) Incumbency -0.04 (-0.37)** -0.06 (-0.72)*** 0.07 (0.46)*** 0.09 (0.54)** Political Party 0.003 (0.03) 0.03 (0.32)* -0.01 (-0.07) -0.02 (-0.10) Adjusted R2 0.11 0.26 0.24 0.18 F 3.59 5.80 7.34 4.07 N 82 56 82 56 Note: b* in brackets. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p <. 001
^ Test run after the removal of Tony Blair
In the first opportunity model, the effect of polling position was marginally significant, b* = 0.20, t = 1.88, p = .06, 95% CI [0.00, 0.03]. This indicates that, in regards to opportunity framing, for every one point a politician leads in the polls, the number of opportunity frames will increase by 0.01%. Meaning that during Tony Blair’s 34 point lead in 1997, he uses 0.34% more opportunity frames than if he were tied in the polls. This model also shows significant results for the factor of incumbency, b* = 0.46, t = 4.41, p = < .001, 95% CI [0.04, 0.11]. Thus, incumbent politicians use 7% more opportunity frames than their challengers. When Tony Blair’s long period of leading in the polls is excluded from the analysis, incumbent politicians are 9% more likely to utilise opportunity frames (b* = 0.54, t = 3.09, p = .03, 95% CI [0.03, 0.14]).
The role of incumbency is also prevalent across both models concerning threat framing, although the direction is reversed. In the first model, the incumbency factor, b* = -0.37, t = -3.31, p = .001, 95% CI [-0.06, -0.01], indicates that those in power are 4% less likely to use threat frames. In the second model, without Tony Blair, this effect is larger, with a 6% reduction in threat frames for the incumbent politician, b* = -0.72, t = -4.34, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.03]. Furthermore, in this model the effect of the political party is also marginally significant, b* = 0.32, t = 1.91, p = .061, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.56] indicating that Conservative Party leaders are 3% more likely to use threat frames than those in the Labour Party.
Nevertheless, these regression models were run in order to test the relationship between polling position and, both, threat and opportunity framing. As no significant results were found both H2b and H3b must be rejected.
Finally, a regression analysis was used to test, H4, in order to measure the effect of the speech year on the quantity of threat frames attributed to the opposition party (see Figure 3). Although all necessary regression assumptions were met (see Appendix G), the model was not significant, F(1, 81) = 0.27, p = .602, b = 0.00. This, combined with the visualisation in Figure 3 means that it is appropriate to reject H4 and state that there has been no significant increase in the use of opposition-attributed threat frames across the time period.
Discussion & Conclusion
This paper aimed to empirically analyse the theoretical rise of permanent campaigning in the U.K., by measuring the effect of public opinion polls on two dominant campaign frames: threat and opportunity. Generally speaking, no such link was found. However, this study did gather some interesting findings that offer empirical evidence about the state of campaigning in the U.K. with implications both for the democratic process and for future research.
Most notably, while not hypothesised, this paper establishes a robust relationship between incumbency and framing decisions. Across the sample, those who were in power were more likely to use opportunity framing, while those who were challenging the incumbents
favoured threat framing. This is in line with the findings of Miller and Krosnick (2004) who, in the U.S., found that trailing candidates were likely to use these framing tactics in an effort to mobilise support. These findings also echo those of Boin and McConnell (2009) who note that incumbents are unlikely to be deterred from framing opportunities, even if they wish to maintain the ‘status-quo’. This finding also supports arguments surrounding the increasing
professionalism of political communication (Lees-Marshment, 2004) as they echo the
well-respected findings of Lau and Pomper (2002), who note that threatening, negative messages work best for challenging politicians.
Furthermore, this paper establishes that the use of opportunity framing has substantially increased over the previous 40 years, while the use of threat framing has remained stable. These findings have implications for the understanding of political campaigns in the U.K., as political parties and journalists must act as a counterbalance to their opponents or, in the case of the journalists, the political system, offering potentially endless opportunities to the electorate. This could result in more attention being paid to the costs behind a political manifesto, something the Labour Party emphasised before the last General Election (Labour Party, 2017). Moreover, given that Entman notes that framing involves the conscious selection of aspects of information any increase in framing also presents challenges for the democratic process as politicians stray further from the essence of the information available to them.
In regards to a stable level of threat frames, this finding is contrary to a breadth of research (e.g., Gross & Johnson, 2016; Lau & Rovner, 2009; Mark, 2007) which suggests that political campaigning has increased in negativity. Yet, it is in line with Walter (2014) who found no evidence of an increase in negative campaigning in U.K. General Elections between 1980 and 2006. Combined with Walter (2014), this finding offers an interesting perspective on the debate around voter mobilisation. If the U.K. electorate are mobilised by positivity rather than
negativity then political parties have the opportunity to present the positive case for policies that they often avoid, for example the Labour Party could launch a campaign about the positive effects of immigration or the Conservatives may be able to demonstrate the positive case for lowered public spending.
This paper also found, in regards to threat framing, that Conservative Party leaders were more likely to use threat frames. This is in line with theory surrounding the different attitudes of political liberals and conservatives. For example, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanksi and Sulloway (2003) find that Conservatives are more susceptible to threat stimuli while also being more likely to use threat stimuli in order to mobilise voters (McVeigh, 1999). Moreover, as this finding was only significant following the removal of Tony Blair’s period as Labour Party leader, and thus the longest period of Conservative opposition, it can be concluded that this is not influenced by the earlier finding that those in opposition use threat frames more than incumbents.
Empirical evidence of a Conservative Party bias toward the use of threat framing has implications for the understanding of future political campaigns in the U.K. Adding empirical evidence to infamous anecdotal evidence such as the aforementioned ‘New Labour, New Danger’ campaign or David Cameron’s ill-fated ‘Chaos under Ed Miliband’ tweet (Dallison, 2018) allows for both political journalists and political parties to contextualise Conservative Party campaigns and, thus, moderate their reporting or reaction to these frames. This
understanding could lead to an altering of the dominant narratives around U.K. political campaigns as well as the possible reduction in tension in what is an increasingly combative political debate (Beckett, 2018).
Finally, an effort to establish empirical support, through the measurement of the effect of polling position on speech content, for the anecdotal rise of permanent campaigning in the U.K.was almost entirely unsuccessful. While there was a relationship between polling position and the use of opportunity frames, this relationship was only marginally significant and
non-existent after controlling for the influence of Tony Blair. While this relationship should not be downplayed, it does suggest that permanent campaigning in the U.K. is still in its infancy, if it even exists at all.
Limitations & Future Research
In order to understand the implications of this research paper, it is necessary to
is a limitation of this research. While the UK is a two party system in the sense that only two parties have won elections since 1916, there have been notable periods of multiple party politics (Quinn, 2013; Raymond, 2016). Specifically, the period surrounding the Social Democratic Party’s breakaway from the Labour Party (1988-90) and the U.K.’s only period of a coalition government, between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats (2010-15).
It is also worth noting the rise of numerous national parties in the U.K. such as the Welsh nationalist Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party. Although not possible due to the
resources and time required to chart each party’s success, future research into the U.K. political system should consider this.
With regards to methodology, the most prominent limitation comes from the
measurement of negative campaigning. While attributing threats to an opponent is an indicator of negative campaigning, it is not the only one and this paper lacked the scope to measure other indicators of negative campaigning such as campaign content and speeches given outside of party conferences. However, given that negative campaigning offers the potential for backlash (Hansen & Pedersen, 2008), it is also understandable that it remains confined to short political campaigns. Thus, the findings of this research should not be discounted, but rather treated with caution.
Furthermore, due to the scope of this research, it was impossible to test for all frames used between 1978 and 2018. Thus, while the findings around threat and opportunity framing are robust, conclusions about the entire state of campaigning the U.K. would require future research around other common campaign devices such loss/gain frames or competency frames. A further limitation relating to the scope of this research was the sample’s timeframe: 1978 was chosen as the start date as it marks the first campaign in which Margaret Thatcher, employed an advertising agency, however a larger study could also include conference speeches prior to this point to discover if an instant shift was made in how campaigns were conducted in the U.K.
Finally, in regards to this paper’s limitations, the use of average polling data as a measure of the polling environment must be considered. Notably, the use of this data only allows for a binary categorisation between leading and trailing and does not permit an understanding of
trends. For example, a party could be trailing by three points but the party may have been trailing by seven points or leading by four in the weeks previous. Future research around the effect of polling position on speech content should aim to include variables that allow for an
understanding of the polling environment as well as the polling position, although this would require a longer study with more focus on the collection of polling data.
Future research on this topic should also endeavour to utilise issue-specific public opinion data that is now commonly available and look at the effect of polling data on individual issues, both in regards to speeches but also policy decisions. Moreover, research that combines these empirical findings with a series of interviews with speech writers would result in a mixed methods approach that would allow for a greater understanding of what influences the content of party conference speeches. This understanding could also be broadened with the inclusion of other dependent variables alongside polling position such as annual immigration figures, GDP growth or unemployment figures or, in line with Tenpas and McCann (2007) data on political party polling expenditure. Drawing from this paper’s theoretical framework, further research could seek empirical evidence for the theoretical framing credibility cycle in party conferences. This research would require a combination of speech content analysis combined with a survey distributed among conference participants.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the lack of measurable influence of polling position has positive
implications for the state of representative democracy in the U.K. As observed throughout the Brexit negotiation process, politicians have remained immune from immense public pressure, and the effect this has had on the polls, including large scale protests surrounding the delay in leaving the European Union (BBC, 2019) and a public petition with over six million signatures demanding the revocation of Article 50 (Petition Parliament, 2019). This is contrary to previous governments who, as mentioned earlier, made very public reversals on policy announcements.
A normative discussion about the positives and negatives of representative democracy is not within the scope of this thesis but the empirical evidence it offers, when combined with
current events, does suggest that the concept of permanent campaigning has not yet been
established in the U.K. Collectively, these findings present mixed support for Scammell’s (1995) assertion that U.K. politics has become Americanised and that political marketing techniques have entered common usage. On one hand, an increase in opportunity framing indicates that political messages have become more sophisticated over the time period. However, the lack of an effect of polling position on speech content combined with no measurable rise in negativity suggests that the Americanisation of U.K. politics is not yet fully completed and, indeed, may never be. This suggests that contrary to the breadth of research bemoaning the state of the democratic process (e.g., Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1975) there is little scientific reason to be concerned about the state of politics in the U.K.
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