Policy Convergence in the
European Union
The role of the Open Method of Coordination
by
Inês Isabel Periquito Antunes da Silva
9
thJune 2020
Student Number: 2391473
MSc Public Administration - International and European Governance
Supervisor: Dr. Brendan Carroll
Second Reader: Dr. Dimiter Toshkov
Glossary 5
Country Abbreviations 7
1. Introduction 8
2. Understanding the OMC 11
2.1. An overview of the Open Method of Coordination 11
2.2. Literature on the OMC 13
Origins and Developments 13
Democracy, Legitimacy and Participation 15
Advancing European Governance 17
Policy Implications 18
Summary Remarks 20
3. Theory 23
3.1. International Regimes & Multi-level Governance 23
3.2. Europeanization 25
3.3. Towards policy convergence: diffusion, learning and transfer 27
Overview of convergence 27
Policy transfer and diffusion 29
Policy learning 31
3.4. Theoretical Framework 33
4. The Education and Training OMC 37
4.1. History of the cooperation 37
4.2. Education and Training 2020 38
4.3. Interaction with Europe 2020 43
5. Methodology 45
5.1. Case Selection 46
5.2. Operationalization & Data collection 47
Dependent Variables 47
Intervening variables 51
Control variables 51
5.3. Data Analysis 53
Convergence of policy content 53
Convergence of policy outcomes 54
OMC activities 54
Evaluating the hypotheses 55
Control variables 56
5.4. Advantages and limitations 57
6. Convergence in the Education OMC 59
6.1. OMC activities 59
6.2. Policy Convergence 60
Policy content 60
Policy outcomes 63
6.3. The impact of the OMC 65
The catching up of low performers 67
The pressure of the European Semester 67
Control Variables 68
6.4. Discussion 69
7. Conclusion 71
References 72
Appendix A: List of sources 83
Appendix B: Control Variables 118
Appendix C: ECEC Policies 120
Appendix D: Structure of the Education System 125
Appendix E: School Organization Policies 131
Appendix F: Policies on Educational Content & Approach 135
Appendix G: Student Evaluation Policies 144
Appendix H: Student Financial Support Policies 147 Appendix I: Policies on School Environment and Pupils’ Guidance 150 Appendix J: Policies on Alternative Educational Paths 155
Appendix K: Quality Control Policies 160
Appendix L: Digital Modernization Policies 163
Appendix M: Policies on the integration of migrants, minority groups and socially
disadvantaged people 166
Appendix N: SEN Policies 175
Appendix O: Policies relating to Careers in Education 178
Appendix P: Miscellaneous Policies 185
Glossary
AVG Average
BYOD Bring Your Own Device
CEDEFOP European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training CPD Continuous Professional Development
CSR Country-Specific Recommendations under Europe 2020 DG EAC Directorate General for Education and Culture
EC European Commission
ECEC Early Childhood Education and Care EE Entrepreneurship Education
EHEA European Higher Education Area ESL Early School Leaving
ET Education and Training EU European Union
Eurostat The Statistical Office of the European Communities
EURYDICE Education Information Network in the European Community GDP Gross Domestic Product
HE Higher Education
ICT Information and Communication Technologies INA Information not Available
ITE Initial Teacher Education
LAMS Low achievement in Mathematic and Science MEV Main Explanatory Variable
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC Open Method of Coordination OER Open End Resources
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD) PLA Peer Learning Activity
PPP Purchasing power parity RV Relative Variation
SD Standard Deviation SEN Special Education Needs
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union VET Vocational Education and Training
WG ET 2020 Working Group ZEP Zones of Educational Priority
Country Abbreviations
AL Albania AT Austria BE Belgium BG Bulgaria CH Switzerland CY Cyprus CZ Czech Republic DE Germany DK Denmark EE Estonia EL Greece ES Spain FI Finland FR France HR Croatia HU Hungary IE Ireland IS Iceland IT Italy LI Liechtenstein LT Lithuania LU Luxembourg LV Latvia ME Montenegro MK North Macedonia MT Malta NL Netherlands NO Norway PL Poland PT Portugal RO Romania RS Serbia SC Scotland SE Sweden SI Slovenia SK Slovakia TR Turkey WL Wales UK United KingdomCountry Abbreviations
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) has, since its inception, been a phenomenon of societal and academic relevance. It impacts both the international landscape and the lives of citizens across Europe at many different levels. The constitutional treaties define its formal competencies in different policy fields (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012). While in aspects of the internal market and foreign policy, the Union enjoys vast capabilities, most social policy areas do not fall under its legislative domain. Nevertheless, the evolution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) exposed a need for deeper collaboration in such fields as the interdependence between member states grew (Tholoniat, 2010). The treaties have come to reflect this aim to cooperate, but without detailing how it should work (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012).
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) came as a tool to address social policy issues, working outside the traditional legislative process, the Community Method. It is a governance framework enabling cooperation without legally imposing on each country’s autonomy. The OMC is grounded on the definition of a shared vision, and the sharing of experiences, translating in a joint way forward (Prpic, 2014). With varying formats, it has been in use for more than two decades.
Much has been written on the OMC in the last fifteen years, from its origins (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; de la Porte, Pochet, & Room, 2001) to its legitimacy (Büchs, 2008a; Hatzopoulos, 2007), going through formulations on its influence on politics and policy (Duina & Raunio, 2007; Lopez-Santana, 2006; Nedergaard, 2006). However, there is no apparent consensus about the OMC's impact, namely in policy developments in the member states as a group. This research aims to address this issue, being driven by one question: To what extent does governance through the Open
Method of Coordination influence policy convergence in the European Union?
1. Introduction
This project studies how the iterative process of collaboration shapes policy in the member states and, more importantly, how similar these might become. It looks at the 28 EU Member States in the period between 2010 and 2017, focusing on the OMC applied to education policy, commonly known as Education and Training 2020 (European Commission, n.d.a). Firstly, it uses content and statistical examination to evaluate policy content and outcomes convergence, respectively. Secondly, documental research is used to uncover the details of the activities performed under the OMC. Finally, the estimation of the impact of the OMC on policy similarity relies on a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis, investigating its relationship to the number, content, and timing of the OMC actions.
Three prime ambitions drive this work: (1) understand how this form of governance has impacted social cohesion in the EU; (2) identify who are the leading actors; and (3) discern what are the essential dynamics at play in such processes of coordination. The results can improve the theoretical understanding of policy collaboration in multi-level governance structures, especially in the process of Europeanization and how it impacts policy convergence. More importantly, the insights devised can serve as a basis for further planning the methodologies used in the European functioning of different policy areas. The noted effects of the OMC can enlighten which aspects from the framework are worth pursuing or might be superfluous and resource-draining.
The next chapter provides background on OMC's evolution and reviews the academic literature on the topic. It is followed by the core theoretical underpinnings, with a chapter exploring contributions on the issues of international regimes, multi-level governance, Europeanization, policy transfer, diffusion, and learning. The last section presents the theoretical framework, anchored primarily in constructivist and normative approaches, detailing expectations on the relationship between convergence and the OMC.
Chapter 4 takes a more detailed look at the Open Method of Coordination within the education field, particularly providing context to ET 2020, the focus of this
study. The following chapter describes the methodology used in the study, detailing the key variables, and how the data is collected and analyzed. At the same time, there is a discussion of some of the limitations of the chosen design.
Subsequently, chapter 6 presents the findings, namely whether or not convergence is observed and under what circumstances. Finally, the conclusion draws key lessons from the research and offers suggestions for future research on the Open Method of Coordination and policy convergence.
2. Understanding the OMC
Addressing the goals of this research project starts with understanding what the OMC is and learning from previous academic contributions. The first section of this chapter examines the Open Method of Coordination in detail, including a brief overview of the history of its application. It provides background information to some of the assumptions in the theory and methodology chapters. At the same time, it gives context to ET2020, examined in more detail in chapter 4.
The second part dives into the body of scholarly work developed in the last twenty years. There has been a significant number of publications looking at the Open Method of Coordination from different perspectives. It is structured around four core aspects of inquiry relating to the OMC: its conception and evolution, its democratic character, how it has shaped European governance, and its impact on policy development. This literature review aims to examine the rich theoretical with a critical outlook. By fleshing out gaps and unanswered questions, it helps bring focus to pertinent paths of research. More importantly, it emphasizes the fundamental contributions that substantiate the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3.
2.1. An overview of the Open Method of Coordination
The Open Method of Coordination is a governance tool that allows EU member states to work together in policy areas deemed relevant, but not formally within the Union's competencies (Eurlex, n.d.). Its conception had social policies in mind, namely the fields of education, social inclusion, employment, and the information society (The Council of the European Union, 2000).
It relies on four primary mechanisms: the agreement on common goals, the development of policy guidelines, the definition of indicators and benchmarks, and continuous evaluation, peer feedback, and best practice sharing (Eurlex, n.d.; Prpic,
2014). The integration of social and corporate partners, additional to national governments, is highly emphasized (European Parliament, 2000). Different European institutions also take part in the process. The Commission can propose guidelines and should facilitate the benchmarking and monitoring processes. The European Council provides supervision and orientation on the main direction the OMC should take in each policy area (The Council of the European Union, 2000).
The OMC's origins can be traced to the European Employment Strategy implemented in the mid-1990s (Eurlex, n.d.). Nevertheless, one of the first official mentions of the term "OMC" is in the outputs of the Lisbon European Council in March of 2000, as the primary tool to deliver the Lisbon Strategy. This formalization came at a time of increasing public disappointment with the EU institutions (Commission of The European Communities, 2001). The OMC posed a more inclusive and adaptable way forward while supporting the long-term development of an economically competitive, more cohesive European society (The Council of the European Union, 2000). The expectation was it would contribute to better governance and satisfaction of the EU citizenry, aiming at "(…) spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals." (European Parliament, 2000, paragraph 37).
The Presidency of the Council further commented on the essence of the OMC in respecting national diversity when addressing societal challenges. It highlighted the method's role as a learning platform (The Council of the European Union, 2000). Simultaneously, the 2001 White Paper on European Governance reinforces the idea that it should not replace the Community method. Traditional EU policy-making is a threefold process: the European Commission advances policy proposals, the Council and the European Parliament (EP) have the power of approval, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is responsible for ensuring legal compliance. The OMC should not be used in instances where the Community method can be applied (Commission of The European Communities, 2001).
Over the last two decades, the usage of the OMC has become normalized in the governance structure of the EU, as part of both the Lisbon Strategy and its successor, Europe 2020. While the name "Open Method of Coordination" appears less frequently nowadays, the format continues to be applied in the initially intended policy areas, albeit evolving differently in each of them (Prpic, 2014). It was also employed for other issues, such as Aquaculture policy (European Commission, n.d.b). Some of the most prominent examples currently at work are in Social Protection, sometimes referred to as the Social OMC(s) (European Commission, n.d.c), Education (European Commission, n.d.a), and Culture (European Commission, n.d.d).
2.2. Literature on the OMC
Origins and Developments
Much of the early literature on the OMC focuses on characterizing and placing it in a theoretical backdrop. General descriptions are common, such as “policy instrument” (Tholoniat, 2010) or “multilevel governance” tool (Hatzopoulos, 2007). Several authors consider it as a form of policy coordination, as well as providing the opportunity for organizational learning and policy transfer (de la Porte et al., 2001; Nedergaard, 2006). Borrás and Jacobsson (2004) put in the more comprehensive context of ‘soft-law’, an approach followed by many (Bruno, Jacquot, & Mandin, 2006; Duina & Raunio, 2007; Lopez-Santana, 2006), and recently refined in the concept of “indirect legislation” by Brunon-Ernst and Van Waeyenberge (2015).
There was also debate around the novelty of the method. While some find innovative features (Bruno et al., 2006), many recognize parallels with the models used by International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the Nordic coCo-operation (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; Nedergaard, 2006; Schafer, 2006).
The origin of the Open Method of Coordination was likewise subject to consideration. The European Monetary Union (EMU) appears to have given way to the proliferation of this governance structure. Recognizing the impact of national social policies on the overall macro-economic stability of the Union sparked the need to address these challenges collectively (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; de la Porte et al., 2001; Tholoniat, 2010). Still, in such domains, states feel very strongly about their national sovereignty, and it is difficult to find substantive agreement. The OMC appeared as the answer to this puzzle (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; de Ruiter, 2007; Schafer, 2006).
Three other contextual factors might have played a role in its inception. The predominance of center-left parties in the national executives created a push for bringing social issues to the EU arena. Seemingly, some saw the need to counterbalance the persuasive power of economically minded agents leading EU politics. Finally, the enlargement to post-Communist states, with inferior standards in the social domains, created a fear of descending quality of welfare systems at the European level. The OMC would allow some EU involvement in critical social areas, as well as expanding the type of participants (de la Porte et al., 2001; Bruno et al., 2006; Tholoniat, 2010).
The life of this policy instrument has been tempestuous. The beginning was experimental, with organic initiations where different actors saw it fit. It served, to some extent, to create new epistemic communities, as well as clarify the practicalities behind the idea of the OMC. Questions on its efficiency and effectiveness followed. Many processes were terminated or streamlined. From 2006 onwards, there was an apparent stabilization of the surviving OMCs (Tholoniat, 2010).
While cooperation in new issues might come from the need for mutual support, the demand for coordination is more salient when there is high interdependence, especially if more robust governance tools have failed before. The characteristics of the issue can partially explain why different OMCs have developed distinguishably (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004). In his thesis, de Ruiter (2007) reasons
that salient issues, both in the eyes of the public and political elite, are prone to develop the OMC infrastructures quicker. Tholoniat (2010) adds that the greater the consensus, the bolder the policy's changes might be.
Recently, a move from multilateral coordination to a more bilateral approach between the Commission and each nation individually is observable. It started with the revision of the Lisbon strategy, becoming more pronounced with the introduction of Europe 2020 (Dawson, 2018; Tholoniat, 2010). Moreover, some remark that European governance has become increasingly fiscally and economically minded (Hermann, 2017). The Euro crisis strengthened the tools of the EMU, which has not spilled over to social policy (de la Porte & Heins, 2015). Dawson (2018) sees the European Semester subsuming autonomous pursuits in the social field, effectively neutralizing some of the previous OMCs.
Democracy, Legitimacy and Participation
Reflections on the democratic nature of the OMC and its legitimacy are abundant. The political accountability of the method is questioned, notably because it excludes representative bodies like the European and National Parliaments (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004). Büchs (2008a) is even more severe, highlighting a deficit in both input and output legitimacy. There is a lack of clarity and rules in the involvement of different stakeholders and a perceived ineffectiveness in achieving broader social goals. Additionally, the method’s flexible characteristics make it unclear where accountability lies. For example, the European Court of Justice has no manifest jurisdiction over the OMC (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; Hatzopoulos, 2007).
On the other hand, initial expectations were also of advancement in transparency and engagement of the broader public with European policy-making (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; de la Porte et al., 2001). The OMC was a bastion of hope for accommodating diversity while promoting the European integration project (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; Schafer, 2006; Tholoniat, 2010).
Including a vast number of participants and enjoying public attention was seen as key to success. Defining appropriate benchmarks would need a “bottom-up” approach, including non-government organizations, and civil society. Otherwise, hegemonic powers might take the steering wheel, leading to a clash between the institutionally embedded vision of each member state. This was the method in the EMU, with the following of the German model, but with social policy, it might not be adequate (de la Porte et al., 2001).
Nonetheless, the participation of relevant groups in each policy field is diverse (Büchs, 2008a; 2008b). Some consider it to be instrumental and politicized (Hatzopoulos, 2007), but Harcourt (2013) maintains that the OMC has contributed positively to the involvement of professional networks in policy-making, while more limited to the overall civil society. Dawson (2018), reflecting on the European Semester, also mentions an increasing engagement of social actors in the last few years, countering the trend of the beginning of the decade.
Peer and public pressure were also supposed to encourage compliance in the absence of coercive mechanisms (de la Porte et al., 2001; Schafer, 2006). The “Shadow of Europe” and the fear of falling behind complement this view (Ertl, 2006; Lopez-Santana, 2006). At first, the Commission appears to have downplayed this aspect but has since shifted approaches and created country-rankings (Tholoniat, 2010). Observations show that media attention to OMC outputs is quite low, mostly only known to experts (Büchs, 2008a).
More recently, though, Brunon-Ernst and Van Waeyenberge (2015) reported that national administrations aim to look good in the OMC reports. Outputs receive political attention, albeit sometimes the data is too poorly presented to be useful. Dawson (2018) also notes that the European Semester has possibly put to practice the “shadow of hierarchy” by forging a connection between the reporting on social goals and fiscal aspects that are subject to sanctioning mechanisms.
Advancing European Governance
How has the OMC shaped rules and norms of EU governance? This is another question attracting academics’ attention. Starting with the Lisbon Strategy, a new policy cycle at the European level appears to have emerged. It brings actors with different ideologies to the table, in a structured format and with technical support (Brunon-Ernst & Van Waeyenberge, 2015; Tholoniat, 2010). Furthermore, some recognize a more profound shift to evidence-based policymaking (Tholoniat, 2010).
At first glance, the OMC seems to embody the principle of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, it supports a multi-level approach to particular policy issues, possibly becoming a promoter of further interdependence. By informally upgrading goal definition to the EU-level, it creates a way of bypassing the functional restrictions to the integration process (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; Ertl, 2006). On the other hand, there is no real upload of competencies to a higher level. The pervasion of the method might make it the go-to choice for shared challenges, hindering future formal integration (Hatzopoulos, 2007).
Differences are also evident in the parts played by distinct actors. Most obviously, the European Council takes the lead in this process (Brunon-Ernst & Van Waeyenberge, 2015). The OMC seems to have strengthened the European Commission’s power as well (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004). As agenda-setter, it enjoys more control than anticipated (Mattocks, 2018).
Büchs (2008a) discards any significant contribution of the OMC in shifting interpretations on the competency sharing between EU and national levels. She sees it in similarity to a two-level game between the national and European levels (Büchs, 2008b). Quoting the EU as vouching for a particular policy option increases bargaining power in specific constituencies (Lopez-Santana, 2006). It also presents the opportunity for governments to advance unpopular policies, while blaming it on the Union (de la Porte et al., 2001; Schafer, 2006). Duina and Raunio (2007) also believe it can give national legislators tools and insights for lawmaking and critically analyzing governments’ work.
Policy Implications
More significant to this research project is the work discussing the impacts of the OMC in the substantive development of the different policy fields. There are three core topics the literature explores: policy change, policy convergence, and procedural aspects. The first two are connected since formulations about change set out the possibility of policy convergence between the member states. There are also concerns about the practical aspects of the OMC influence overall outcomes.
Early on, theories anticipated policy change at the national level anchored in two main aspects. The idea of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) was a base for hypothesizing policy convergence. Similarly, the cognitive and normative dimensions of networking substantiate the possibilities for the multilateral learning provided by the OMC (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004).
Bruno et al. (2006) emphasize the prescriptive character of the OMC by labeling policies as “good” or “bad”, at the same time providing a forum for the collective conception of problems and solutions. Consequently, influences in the agenda-setting and policy formulation phases are discernible in the member states (Lopez-Santana, 2006). Discussing certain aspects at the EU level makes them rise to the top of the domestic agenda (Larocque and Noël, 2014; Lopez-Santana, 2006). The iterative character of the OMC, with constant reinforcement of defined goals and strategies, helps move subjects forward in the policy process (de la Porte et al., 2001; Lopez-Santana, 2006).
The learning process within the OMC can encompass three different but interconnected purposes. Exploration and instrumental learning seek greater understanding and new answers. Convergence assumes an orientation to a desired state, influenced by the reputation and authority of other countries (Borrás & Radaelli, 2015). Nedergaard (2006) observes this in practice. Nations failing or lacking in certain areas look for countries with best case practices from whom to learn. Albeit less pronounced, Nedergaard's (2006) study also notes that learning is
These contributions do not look at policy implementation, but their comments on whether the learning process prompts actual policy reform are not very encouraging. Lopez-Santana (2006), mostly optimistic about the impact of the OMC, still recognized that the institutional legacy and constraints hinder policy convergence between countries. Nedergaard notes that “(…) horizontal processes of Europeanization may be expected to lead to already similar countries becoming even more alike, whereas differences between very different countries remain. However, this tendency should not be overstated.” (Nedergaard, 2006, p. 438). The OMC might lead to convergence of overall standards, but differentiated policy goals and content (de la Porte et al., 2001).
Still, some have tried to investigate how these expectations fair out in reality. Most consider the Social OMCs, as they are the most commonly mentioned and more extensively developed. Statistical evidence midway through the Lisbon Strategy was disheartening, with results far from the set goals (Büchs, 2008a; Daly, 2008). Larocque and Noël (2014) noticed learning in innovative policy issues but also pointed out that consensus was not achieved, not even at the policy goals level. They infer that national institutions and party politics continue to be the most considerable influences in shaping social policy at the national level.
In the education field, the observations are comparable. Ertl (2006), revising education and training policy evolution, identifies equivalent policies across member states, bridging some of the gaps in qualification systems. Still, he is skeptical of convergence on the overall “educational dimension”, as reports indicate very disparate performance between member countries. In 2018, Gornitzka continued the reflective exercise and arrived at a similar conclusion. In the most pragmatic sense, it seems the OMC has not delivered as a catalyst to achieve goals under the 2010 and 2020 strategies (Gornitzka, 2018).
A recent study on policy outputs in the youth employment field seems to show a brighter picture (Tosun, Treib, & De Francesco, 2019). Despite only top-performing countries improving in specific metrics, there is some catch-up
convergence in some of the policies implemented. They also note that financial incentives associated with this more recent OMC seem to have limited effects on national policies, contrary to the advanced by other authors (Dawson, 2018; Hatzopoulos, 2007).
Finally, there are more practical observations about the OMC. Its propagation and of related practices at the international level leads to excessive reporting and duplicate work (Brunon-Ernst & Van Waeyenberge, 2015; Hatzopoulos, 2007; Schafer, 2006). Domestic civil servants also feel that the EU does not take their feedback on the procedures forward (Brunon-Ernst & Van Waeyenberge, 2015). In the end, this governance system might be disconnected from actual policymaking (Schafer, 2006).
Summary Remarks
As seen in this review, the Open Method of Coordination has attracted considerable attention during the last two decades. Scholars have looked at it as a dependent variable, trying to explain its origins and development. The method has also been studied as an independent variable. Academics tried to estimate its impact on the governance dynamics of the EU and in national policy-making.
How to interpret the OMC represents the most significant area of agreement. Despite using different denominations, the overall understanding is of the OMC has a governance tool focused on learning. Similarly, the literature on its origins is quite consensual. Moreover, the majority of empirical investigations point to shortcomings in the method’s potential to attract widespread public attention.
Most scholars also acknowledge it is a politically charged device. Nevertheless, there seems to be no agreement on how. While some see it as hindering integration, others posit it promotes it. Several also conceive it as an opportunity for domestic actors to advance their political goals. Still, there is little empirical investigation to substantiate these views.
Theoretical expectations about its potential as an agent of policy change are the most common. Looking at the empirical research discussed, impacts in agenda-setting and policy formulation are promising. However, the few studies that look at policy outputs cannot find evidence of either relevant policy change or convergence between the member states.
From a methodological point a view, one can observe that much of the work consists of theoretical analyses (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; Borrás & Radaelli, 2015; Büchs, 2008a; 2008b; de la Porte et al., 2001; Duina & Raunio, 2007; Hatzopoulos, 2007). Observational findings focus on the social welfare field, with much of the literature examining the European Employment Strategy and the Social OMCs within the Lisbon Strategy (Bruno et al., 2006; Daly, 2008; Larocque & Noël, 2014; Tholoniat, 2010). Furthermore, most of the studies analyze only a small number of states (Brunon-Ernst & Van Waeyenberge, 2015; Lopez-Santana, 2006), relying heavily on interviews (Brunon-Ernst & Van Waeyenberge, 2015; Harcourt, 2013; Lopez-Santana, 2006; Mattocks, 2018; Nedergaard, 2006). The temporal dimension of many cases might also be too short to produce relevant results (Daly, 2008).
Several questions remain largely unanswered. Have any of the hypothesized consequences of policy learning effectively happened? If not, why is the OMC still in use? Moreover, why has it continued evolving? What can these new features tell us? What kind of impact has it had in European integration, if any? These interrogations shed light on several aspects that might be worth exploring further.
First, more comprehensive studies of the impacts in national policy-making are necessary, including the totality of EU member states involved in the OMC processes and looking beyond the Social OMC as a primary case. More extensive periods should also be considered, especially for observing the policy process's entirety, from agenda-setting to policy evaluation. Moreover, the analysis of convergence could happen at several levels. It can go beyond the traditional national observations, considering supranational or subnational regions across the EU.
Secondly, the OMC can be studied within the broader context. Authors like de la Porte and Pochet (2012) suggest contemplating the pressures from different EU and non-EU actors on the social agenda. For example, the political inclinations both at member state and European level might affect the policy-making stemming from the OMCs. It might also be crucial to consider the more recent developments in European governance. Changes from multilateral to bilateral coordination, the European Semester, and new financing initiatives might have altered the effectiveness of the method.
Finally, taking a management approach might be fruitful. There is a variety of OMCs in diverse policy areas and using different implementation components. It could be relevant to understand what features have enhanced or hinder success.
3. Theory
Several gaps in the broader understanding of the OMC have been fleshed out, but addressing all in a single research project would be quite challenging. The focus of this work is in examining the OMC’s consequences in policy change. As discussed in the prior section, there is substantial literature that posits the OMC as having the potential to influence it, especially drawing on cognitive and normative theories.
This chapter draws further on several areas of academic inquiry to advance tentative answers to the relationship between the OMC and policy convergence. Firstly, we examine developments in international regimes and governance, which provides context for the OMC, a multilevel governance tool. We proceed to the literature on Europeanization and the processes of policy learning, diffusion, and transfer that might impact policy change, possibly leading to convergence. The final section brings together relevant aspects from the previous discussions, presenting the core hypotheses and the dynamics that substantiate such predictions.
3.1. International Regimes & Multi-level Governance
Stephen Krasner devised the most widely used definition of international regimes, characterizing them as “(…) principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” (Krasner, 1982a, p. 185). They are social institutions bringing order to the interaction of actors working together to achieve goals in specific areas (Bradford, 2007; Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Young, 1980). Still, it is essential not to confuse them with supranational governments or large international organizations (IOs). They are comparable to more abstract concepts, such as the one of policy regime defined by Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009).
A regime addresses a particular policy issue and can take on different organizational formats, whether formal or informal (Young, 1980). While many
conceptions are state-centric, they can include relevant non-governmental actors, such as non-profits, civil society movements, and even private companies (Bradford, 2007). Recognizable international regimes deal, for example, with policies of trade or climate change.
How do such regimes come about? From a functionalist perspective, regimes arise out of the demand for them (Haggard & Simmons, 1987) or out of usage. If a method is employed ad hoc several times, and it works, it can end ingrain itself in the operating of a particular area (Krasner, 1982a). Additionally, spillover effects can explain why regimes emerge in some policy domains (Haggard & Simmons, 1987).
Realists view self-interest and pursuit of power as the main drivers. Coordinating states’ behavior is relevant only when individual action is suboptimal (Keohane & Martin, 1995; Krasner, 1982a). Discordantly, from a normative perspective, Ernst Haas (1980) reflects on the role of consensual knowledge as a catalyst for the construction of regimes, made stronger by the existence of agreed social goals. He calls this a “substantive linkage”, where knowledge sheds light on joint gains. Still, he recognizes they can exist with less consensus, albeit less stable.
Levy, Young, and Zürn (1995) summarize a process of regime formation in three stages: (1) agenda formation, where a particular issue rises as an international priority; (2) institutional choice, when the way to address the problem is devised; and (3) operationalization, when it turns into practice. From there, they seem to endure shifts in power and short-term interest. Even when there are changes in the international landscape, uncertainty about the future, as well as failure to conceive newer and better options, contributes to the resistance of established regimes (Krasner, 1982b).
Levy et al. (1995) also reflect on the workings of international regimes. From a policy perspective, they should respond to the challenges that originated them. Politically, one might consider how they affect the behavior of different actors. Overall, regimes work by socializing to improve cooperation and authority recognition, facilitating learning, and creating identities.
International regimes might influence critical aspects such as the distribution of power and interests of the actors involved too (Krasner, 1982b; Levy et al., 1995). New Institutionalism recognizes the fundamental role of institutions, not only constraining preferences but shaping them. They also mediate power dynamics. Influence over resources impacts power, which in turn, ends up shaping institutions again (March & Olsen, 1983).
The most recent contributions on the topic of international regimes, namely by Alter and Munier (2009) and Drezner (2009), address “complexes” that reflect the current overlapping and conflicting nature of international agreements. It connects to the concept of multi-level governance devised by Hooghe and Marks (2003). Primarily in the European Union context, it reflects a layered governance system, choosing how and where they include themselves. Piattoni (2015) discusses its implications and points out how it provides learning processes between participants and a way of bypassing ingrained institutional traditions.
Multi-governance systems can be of Type I, with demarcated hierarchies and responsibilities, or Type II, task-specific, flexible, and with variable membership and structure. Many times Type IIs evolve to Type I (Hooghe & Marks, 2003), similar to how international regimes develop. It is plausible to consider that such governance systems can be an integral part of more extensive international regimes.
3.2. Europeanization
Nested in the ideas of international regimes and governance development, Europeanization provides exciting insights. However, the concept is quite contentious in the literature. Early on, Olsen portrays it as “(...) the emergence, development, and impacts of a European, institutionally-ordered system of governance.” (Olsen, 2002, p. 922). During this reflection, he systematizes it from five different perspectives. Firstly, the phenomena of reach development, such as the EU enlargement to new member-states. Secondly, in the development of institutions at
the supranational level, both formal and informal. Thirdly, the adaption of the national and sub-national dynamics to the multi-level governance system with a nucleus in the EU. Fourthly, there is the notion of the exportation of the European order beyond the continents’ borders. Finally, there is the broader idea of a continuous unification process (Olsen, 2002). This last relates to the idea of Europeanization at the polity level explained by Sedelmeier (2012). In such instances, there are effects in national identity, in aspects of democracy and human rights, as well as in politics, in the sense of government structures, parties, and political contestation.
Most research pursuits in Europeanization look into the EU's impact on change at the national level, especially in terms of policy (Sedelmeier, 2012). However, the authors diverge on whether it is a research agenda, an explanatory variable, or a theoretical mechanism (Bandov & Kolman, 2018; Sedelmeier, 2012). In this line of reasoning, Radaelli (2002) provides a persuasive definition:
Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (p. 108).
Several mechanisms can play a role in this, from integration, either positive or negative, to tools to facilitating coordination (Bandov & Kolman, 2018). Europeanization can be studied from a compliance perspective, taking a rationalist viewpoint, analyzing the cost-benefit of participation or defection (Sedelmeier, 2012). However, many of the mechanisms are not binding, nor a rational perspective tells the whole story. A constructivist outlook considers the role norms and social learning. There is a reliance on lesson-drawing, emulation, and the role of experts and epistemic communities, aspects discussed further in the next section (Bandov &
Kolman, 2018; Radaelli, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2012). It also means that Europeanization should not be viewed in absolutes. There can be different degrees, starting from absorption, going through adaptation, to more profound transformations (Radaelli, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2012).
Radaelli posits that Europeanization might precipitate convergence (Radaelli, 2002). There are noticeable similarities in policy instruments. Still, the outcomes are not equal, with different clusters being quite distinguishable (Sedelmeier, 2012).
Börzel (2002) looks at how member states might react to Europeanization, characterizing three distinct groups. The pace-setters upload their policies to the European level. These are usually the countries with economic power, able to command expertise, as well as ensure their presence in all the relevant settings. The foot-draggers are on the opposite extreme. With policies and institutions that are the furthest away for the European model, they stand to bear extreme costs in conforming. They react by trying to stop or contain the Europeanization process, but frequently lack the means to impose their ideas. Lastly, there are the fence-sitters, somewhere in between. Customarily they take advantage of a two-level game, making partnerships at the EU-level that will be most beneficial for the political dynamics at home.
A complete view of Europeanization might be circular. It starts by looking at the domestic level, studies the influence of the EU, and zooms in again to identify the consequences in the member-states (Bandov & Kolman, 2018).
3.3. Towards policy convergence: diffusion, learning and
transfer
Overview of convergence
The idea of convergence is not new. For decades now, scholars have observed societies seemingly evolving more and more alike. This tendency is frequently associated with industrialization, causing countries all over the world to face similar
challenges. The ideas of globalization, technological advances, and economic development feed into the bridging of cultural and political divides (Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Howlett et al., 2009; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006). On this basis, academics came to recognize that domestic factors alone might not explain policy change in an ever interconnected world (Towns, 2012).
Focusing more narrowly on policy convergence, Bennett (1991) portrays it as a conscious process, moving towards a common point. The temporal aspect is essential in conceptualizing convergence. Building on this, Seeliger (1996) proposes a relative analysis by looking at “change in difference over time” (Seeliger, 1996, p. 289). This clarifies convergence, opposite to divergence. It also denotes a difference from synchronous or indeterminate developments, when countries move in the same direction and at the same pace, in the first case showing identical results.
Many have written about the object of policy convergence. Bennet (1991) presents one of the more consensual lists, naming five key aspects: policy goals, content, instruments, outcomes, and style. Noteworthy on this classification is that some academics recognize the diminished relevance of looking only at policy outcomes. A multitude of aspects that go beyond the perspective of convergence can influence them. Hence many consider a more comprehensive analysis more meaningful (Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Strunz, Gawel, Lehmann & Soderholm, 2018).
Strunz et al. (2018) reflect on the degree of convergence. In absolute terms, we might expect harmonization. However, the notion of conditional convergence acknowledges that other aspects mediate such developments. Holzinger and Knill (2005) also comment on the direction. In some instances, how the meeting point moves might be relevant. For example, in the case of regulation, convergence can be at the bottom, with relaxed standards, or at the top, with stricter policies.
Convergence viewed as a process encompassing policy change is extremely complex, with multiple causal variables interacting (Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Holzinger & Knill, 2005). Theories in policy convergence recognize the
idea of independent problem-solving when countries respond to challenges in similar ways, but mostly devoid of any external pursuit (Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Strunz et al., 2018). Not all transnational similarities have a supranational explanation (Bennett, 1991).
Nevertheless, there are many mechanisms, operating in the international context, that might contribute to policy convergence. They borrow from endeavors in policy diffusion, learning, and transfer, many describing similar modes of explaining policy change. The next section looks at policy transfer and diffusion, followed by comments on how learning feeds into it.
Policy transfer and diffusion
Policy transfer can be defined as the use of knowledge from a particular political endeavor in developing policy in a different time or place (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). They conceptualize a continuum that addresses the motivations behind the transfer, from the voluntary and rational choice to learn to external commands (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). The simpler the context, problem, and solution, the easier the transfer. Costs of implementation might be a constraint, while cultural and political similarities between the countries, many times heightened by joint membership in IOs, improve chances (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013). Moreover, not all transfers lead to success, as they can be uninformed, incomplete, or even inappropriate (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Additionally, one can transfer negative lessons, in essence, learning what not to do (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Stone, 2004).
Coercive transfer describes the clearest case when talking about convergence: imposition by a third party, which can be another state, a multinational company, or an international organization (Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Simmons et al., 2006). Many of these notions stem from DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) work on coercive isomorphism: external pressures to conform based on strong dependence and societal expectations. These actors can sanction or reward the nation into policy
change by economic and political means, or legal competence (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). Holzinger and Knill (2005) separate these two in imposition and international harmonization, respectively. The latter connects to the framework of international or supranational legislation, while the first relies on power asymmetries (Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Simmons et al., 2006). Overall, such situations represent robust transfers of policy, namely instruments, contents, and even the total transposition of legislation (Graham et al., 2013; Stone, 2004).
Competition can also be a driver. It connects to the notions of organizational survival and market pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Most countries want to be attractive, both economically and socially and will shy away from policies that put them at a disadvantage (Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Graham et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2006). Holzinger and Knill (2005) look at this expressly from the lenses of regulation, where countries are encouraged to adjust policy options to avoid losses from organizations looking to the most financially beneficial frameworks around the globe.
Another powerful mover is reputation. Countries do not wish to be seen as laggers (Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Holzinger & Knill, 2005). The normative character of politics pushes a desire to belong, conform to the standard practices (Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Holzinger & Knill, 2005). Nations will copy policies to legitimize themselves, especially if they consider the reference nation as innovative or a leader (Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Simmons et al., 2006; Graham et al., 2013; Towns, 2012). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) put it as a way to deal with uncertainty by mimicking perceived successful models. It might lead to emulation, a somewhat indiscriminate replication of a program from another nation (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Holzinger & Knill, 2005). Financial and time restrictions might also trigger emulation, as it might be faster and easier to replicate policies than to invest in more in-depth learning (Holzinger & Knill, 2005). The information more readily available will have the most significant impact (Elkins & Simmons, 2005).
Policy diffusion is defined, usually, similar to policy transfer: it happens when one country’s policy decisions are influenced by previous choices of another (Graham et al., 2013). Stone (2004) adds how it intrinsically connects to the idea of dispersion, a patterned succession of adoption. Elkins and Simmons (2005) differentiate it more significantly by considering it an uncoordinated process, not led by hegemonic powers or international organizations. The result of diffusion can also be divergence when countries reject another’s solution (Graham et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2006). The point of agreement lies in the interdependence.
Policy learning
Beyond the discussed above, many transfer or diffusion mechanisms rely strongly on learning (Simmons et al., 2006). Defining policy learning is itself a challenge, as contributions over the years present various interpretations, from instrumentality to the social dimensions of politics (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Zito & Schout, 2009). The object of learning also varies. Considerations go from specificities to broad goals and beliefs, including institutional dimensions that can lead to organizational change (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Zito & Schout, 2009).
Learning can happen at different levels, from the individual to the overall political system, passing by the meso-level of organizations. What happens at the lowest level does not necessarily translate to the broader spectrums (Moyson, Scholten, & Weible, 2017). Learning is not a purely rational pursuit for the optimal solution, as informed by the idea of bounded rationality. Actors are bounded by their context and capabilities in terms of resources, time, and cognition (Graham et al., 2013; Moyson et al., 2017).
Beyond the nation-states, there are also important mediating actors. Somewhat of “Go-betweens” (Graham et al., 2013), that many times act as entrepreneurs, championing a particular policy (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), or brokers, by helping build consensus and compromises (Sabatier, 1988). These can be
professional experts, academics, the media, as well as elected officials and international organizations (Graham et al., 2013).
Elkins and Simmons (2005) believe learning processes, as opposed to coercive or mimetic transfers, produce better policy because they are motivated by a desire to improve and require a more significant commitment from those involved. Processes can be more or less organized. Some focus on researching evidence and information available elsewhere (Holzinger & Knill, 2005), which implies a conscious lesson-drawing for experiences (Bennett, 1991). Others mention Bayesian learning, where beliefs are updated based on past and external experiences (Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Simmons et al., 2006). However, as noted by Graham et al. (2013), learning in politics is considerably subjective. It is not only about whether a policy is adequate, but if it obtains public appraisal and is politically desirable.
Normative isomorphism establishes a moderately informal learning path, where professionals of similar backgrounds interact and share common ground (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Based on this, Haas (1992) refined the concept of epistemic communities, playing a crucial role in bringing expertise to the policy process and providing ways of tackling common difficulties that do not rely on conflict. The continuous synergy creates shared beliefs and constructions (Bennett, 1991), with learning sometimes happening at the deepest level of norms and ideas (Simmons et al., 2006; Stone, 2004). At the same time, they can be used politically to legitimize previously developed policies. Dunlop (2009), trying to identify when the role of epistemic communities is most salient, notes that political leaders' motivations and control influence how the knowledge of experts permeates the process.
Learning also happens more formally, in instances of transnationalization of problems, pushing countries to establish more permanent cooperative processes (Bennett, 1991). They enhance socialization (Graham et al., 2013), with the regularity of interactions opening space for the sharing of experiences and facilitate the creation of joint programs (Holzinger and Knill, 2005). Usually, the learning effects will reflect
in the policy contents, but also at the ideational level (Stone, 2004). Nevertheless, such international frameworks also create the opportunity for what Holzinger and Knill (2005) call "international policy promotion", a top-down approach where benchmarks and goals drive a particular path.
In brief, learning can happen either individually, when considering purely research, or in group interactions, through structured and unstructured activities. Moreover, it carries layers beyond facts and figures, being subjective to the actors involved and their context.
Finally, it should be noted that this review tries to organize the concepts of policy transfer, diffusion, convergence, learning, and change in a way that allows presenting the main ideas and contributions. It does not aim to be, in any way, a definitive taxonomy or account of the work done on the subjects. In the literature, many of the considerations discussed here are under several of these headings, whose definitions themselves vary from author to author. From the many publications available, the effort by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) in creating a policy transfer framework appears to be one of the most comprehensive in terms of considering different actors, degrees, and mechanisms, as well as national and international dynamics.
3.4. Theoretical Framework
To what extent does governance through the Open Method of Coordination influence policy convergence in the European Union?
First, it is imperative to clarify what is meant by policy convergence. In the context of this, convergence is the increase in similarity across a defined period. It means that the focus is not on how alike policies are at a precise moment, but on how they have evolved through time. It is not the policy topic with more significant similarities at the final moment that might display convergence, but the ones that have grown closer during the time-span.
Secondly, some assumptions about the OMC need clarification. The policy areas where the OMC is applied can be considered as international regimes. The fields of education or social inclusion, for example, possess specific rules, norms, and procedures within the EU. These are expected to promote cooperation, which intrinsically connects with the decision to use the Open Method of Coordination.
These EU policy regimes appear to be the result of poor outcomes of unilateral actions, as the case of the Social OMC (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; de la Porte et al., 2001). Spillover effects from one policy area to another area might also be present, observing the proliferation of OMC across domains (Tholoniat, 2010). Moreover, the resistance of the OMC processes, as observed by Tholoniat (2010) and Gornitzka (2018), connect with the notion that when a regime is established, it is not easily dismantled.
At the same time, the OMC plays a role in the construction of the regime, itself enabling the space for building common practices. Relying Radaelli’s (2002) notion, the OMC can be seen as a driver of Europeanization.
These regimes seem to be somewhere between the ideal types I and II of multi-level governance, with the OMC being an important tool in its functioning. While there are some formalized structures, overlapping of actions and competencies due to the non-binding nature of these policies at the European level is frequent, as well as interactions with other international regimes. For example, the European Higher Education Area (European Higher Education Area, n.d.) is both a parallel and intervening regime with the EU's efforts on education policy.
The assumptions above realize the complexity of the international backdrop where the OMC operates, while recognizing its potential as a facilitator and creator of further cooperation and dialogue. It enables the formulation of a set of tentative answers to the research question.
H1: The continuous usage of the OMC increases convergence in member states’
H2: The continuous usage of the OMC increases convergence in member states’
policy outcomes;
The expectation is that the usage of the OMC will increase convergence, predicated on the idea that it provides the space for social learning. The core mechanisms at work here, discussed in section 3.3, relate to the networks of experts and politicians. The OMC provides structured and continuous interactions, devises specific mechanisms for the sharing of best practices, and encourages the common definition of approaches. The anticipation is that this learning process will have serious effects on beliefs, policy goals, and contents. At the same time, it should provide a solid basis for proper implementation, leading to convergence also in outcomes. Furthermore, both hypotheses encompass the notion that learning happens not only at the individual level, but escalates at least to the extent of national organizations.
Two additional mechanisms are hypothesized to be at work, considering the complexity of policy-making within a multi-level governance system. First, countries starting with low performance will be motivated to catch-up, anchored on the normative side of politics and reputational pursuits. The external pressure, the “naming and shaming” from publicly displaying each nations’ performance is a driver. The top performers can be perceived as pace-setters, as described by Börzel (2002). However, disagreeing with what she suggests, laggers will not be foot-draggers. Contrarily, they will search to conform, most probably driven to emulate the reference nations, as suggested by Nedergaard (2006). This suggest convergence will be at top, i.e., towards high performance in benchmarks.
H1.1: Lagging countries will converge towards policies defined by top-performing
countries;
H2.1: Low-performing countries will show a more accentuated evolution than
Second, the introduction of the European Semester has brought a more grave tone to some goals in social policy. They are reported together with fiscal and economic progress that can be sanctioned in various forms. Additionally, social policies are now subject to Country-Specific Recommendations. It creates an apparent “shadow of hierarchy” (Dawson, 2018). Countries will be more compelled to act on the specific topics in line with the Semester, reflecting the mechanism of a coercive transfer. The top-down pressure will drive states to conform faster in such topics, by comparison with other policies in the same field.
H1.2: Convergence will be more accentuated in policies included in Country-Specific
Recommendations;
H2.2: Convergence will be more accentuated in goals under-reporting in the
European Semester;
The choice to concentrate both on policy content and outcomes relates to the complexity of the relationship in analysis. Focusing only on one aspect would probably obscure parts of the mechanism at play, as convergence in one is not indicative of the other. It is essential to clarify that policy content is used broadly, different from Bennett’s (1991) typology, encompassing all different types of actions the governments enact in dealing with a specific issue. Moreover, it does not focus on a specific phase of the policy process, ranging from ideas at the agenda-setting or formulation stage to fully-fledged programs.
In summary, this framework considers that three core mechanisms might be at play: a cognitive one, characterized by the collective learning in networks; a normative one, where countries will replicate the practices the view as enhancing their reputation; and a coercive one, where international pressures dictate member states' behavior. It is crucial to recognize its complexity, but also its independence. It can be the case that all are present, that only one occurs, but the others not, or even that none of them reveal themselves.
4. The Education and Training OMC
Before detailing the methodology used in this research, it is vital to understand our object of study more profoundly. This chapter presents key facts and characteristics of the OMC in the education field, particularly ET2020 and its relationship with the European Semester. These inform some of the subsequent choices on data collection and analysis.
4.1. History of the cooperation
Cooperation in Education and Training can be traced back to 1957. The Treaty of Rome set forth the collaboration, specifically in vocational training and retraining of workers (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957). More recently, the Treaties of Maastricht in 1992 and Lisbon in 2007 have continuously emphasized the importance of this policy area, extending the ideas of cooperation and sharing of information to the entire field of education (Ecorys UK Ltd., 2014). Article 165 of the TFEU sets out this ambition, as well as the reach and limitations of the Union’s competences. It shall act as a promoter and enabler, but respect each member state’s autonomy (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012).
In the context of the Lisbon Strategy, a broad and encompassing cooperation developed: Education and Training 2010, the first OMC application in the policy field. After several reworks, a final plan was approved in 2002, setting goals and actions until the end of the decade (Council of the European Union, 2002). Table 1 below details the building blocks of this framework.
Table 1: Overview of ET2010. Source: copied from Council of the European Union (2002).
4.2. Education and Training 2020
Education and Training 2020, the current strategy for ET, became official in mid-2009 in a communication by the Council. It fully embraces the concept of lifelong learning, with policies from early childhood to adult education (Council of the European Union, 2009). It sets out four overarching goals to guide the process of collaboration during the 10-year period and seven benchmarks (European Commission, n.d.a). Initially, a benchmark for language learning was planned, but never materialized. Table 2 summarizes these details.
Strategic Objectives Benchmarks
1. Improving the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the EU;
2. Facilitating the access of all to education and training systems; 3. Opening-up education and
training systems to the wider world
✦ an EU average rate of no more than 10 % early school leavers should be achieved. ✦ t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f g r a d u a t e s i n
mathematics, science and technology in the European Union should increase by at least 15 % by 2010 while at the same time the level of gender imbalance should decrease. ✦at least 85 % of 22 year olds in the European
Union should have completed upper secondary education.
✦the percentage of low-achieving 15 years old in reading literacy in the European Union should have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000.
✦ the European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning, should be at least 12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group).
Table 2: Overview of ET2020. Source: copied from European Commission (n.d.a).
These goals serve both guiding and monitoring purposes, being broad enough to accommodate diversity and shifting priorities (Ecorys UK Ltd., 2014; ICF & Technopolis, 2019). The majority of countries defined national targets, reflecting what they believe can be their contribution to the overall European goals (Ecorys UK Ltd., 2014).
ET2020 was designed to operate with three-year working cycles, each with specific priorities. The first set, defined in 2009, included 15 priority areas (Council of the European Union, 2009). New priorities were presented in 2012 and 2015, in Joint Reports of the Council and the Commission analyzing the progress of the previous
Strategic Objectives Benchmarks
1. Making lifelong learning and mobility a reality;
2. Improving the quality and efficiency of education and training;
3. Promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship;
4 . E n h a n c i n g c re a t i v i t y a n d i n n o v a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training.
✦ At least 95% of children should participate in early childhood education;
✦ fewer than 15% of 15-year-olds should be under-skilled in reading, mathematics and science;
✦ the rate of early leavers from education and training aged 18-24 should be below 10%; ✦ at least 40% of people aged 30-34 should have
completed some form of higher education; ✦ at least 15% of adults should participate in
learning;
✦ at least 20% of higher education graduates and 6% of 18-34 year-olds with an initial vocational qualification should have spent some time studying or training abroad; ✦ the share of employed graduates (aged 20-34
with at least upper secondary education attainment and having left education 1-3 years ago) should be at least 82%;
