Post-conflict reconciliation : youth's outgroup attitudes in post-war Bosnia

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POST-CONFLICT RECONCILIATION:

YOUTH’S OUTGROUP ATTITUDES IN POST-WAR BOSNIA

Bachelor Thesis Political Science Willemien Bacic (10837736) Bachelor Thesis Political Science Politics of Identity (73230190LY)

Supervisor: Mike Medeiros

University of Amsterdam Faculty of Social Science June 2018

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Abstract

This study considers the prospects for creating harmonious relations in a multi-ethnic society with a history of intergroup violence. This article seeks to increase our understanding of post-conflict intergroup relations by examining the interethnic relations of young people (born between 1980 and 1990) in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia). I suggest that the youth is more likely to be exhibit negative attitudes towards forgiveness of the outgroups and stronger ethnic identification as opposed to the older age groups. I, further, investigate the impact of intergroup contact outgroup forgiveness and the effect of individual war experience on both forgiveness and ethnic identification. To test the hypotheses, I use data from the South-East Europe Social Survey Project (SEESSP), which contains thousands of observations of survey data from of the ex-Yugoslavian countries. My findings show that reconciliatory attitudes depend little on age and the most on intergroup contact. Contrary to common beliefs, the study shows that exposure to violent does not necessarily increase ingroup identification.

Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, intergroup relations, intergroup forgiveness, ethnic identification, war exposure

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CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION ... 4

2. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA ... 6

3. LITERATURE REVIEW ... 7

4. THEORY ... 9

4.1. Improving Post-Conflict Intergroup Relations: Reconciliation and Forgiveness ... 9

4.2. War Trauma ... 11

4.3. Collective memory... 12

4.4. Intergroup Contact ... 14

4.5. Ingroup Identification ... 14

4.6. Hypotheses ... 16

5. DATA AND METHODS ... 18

5.1. Methodological Considerations ... 19 5.1. Measures ... 19 6. ANALYSIS ... 21 7. DISCUSSION ... 27 7.1. Main Findings ... 27 7.2. Implications... 29 References ... 30 APPENDIX ... 35 I Syntax ... 35

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1. INTRODUCTION

The end of a war does not necessarily mean the beginning of a stable, peaceful society. Especially in post-civil war societies, a permanent solution to conflict also requires the consolidation of positive intergroup relations (Rydgren and Sofi 2011: 26). This article seeks to increase our understanding of post-conflict societies by examining the interethnic relations of the youth (born between 1980 and 1990) in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) - a multi-ethnic country with a history of ethnic violence.

The interethnic relations in Bosnia have been particularly problematic since the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, which was accompanied by the bloody wars of the 1990s (Franovic 2008; Parent 2012). Twenty-three years after the war formally ended, the country is still in peace. However, throughout the entire nation, ethnic division, interethnic tensions and ethnic discrimination are commonplace (Keil and Kudlenko 2015; Đorđević 2015). The situation in post-war Bosnia is further characterized by insecurity and distrust both at the social- and political level, a situation that is aggravated by the dysfunctional political institutions and the deplorable economic situation. As such, the current interethnic relations in Bosnia clearly obstructs the construction of lasting peace as well as political and economic prosperity.

Post-war reconciliation, particularly in Bosnia, has been the focus of numerous efforts by international organizations, national governments and local initiatives (Martinovic, Jetten, Smeekes, Verkuyten 2017: 590). However, these efforts all failed at improving intergroup relations. Moreover, a considerable amount of research exists on this topic, providing useful frameworks for understanding intractable conflicts and reconciliation between intergroups post-civil war. However, both reconciliation efforts and scholarly research, focus predominantly on those who were already adults (“the older generation”) during the conflict.

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Therefore, little is known about the influence of violent intergroup conflict on the attitudes of Bosnian youth towards reconciliation with the outgroup.

During the war, the majority of this group was too young to actively participate in the conflict. Nevertheless, as young children during the war, as adolescents in its aftermath and as adults in the present, they have to cope with the consequences of the war: psychological traumas, heightened salience of ethnic group identity, ethnic discrimination, deplorable economic and political circumstances and so on. To increase our understanding of post-conflict reconciliation, we also need to incorporate the youth and see how they are affected by armed conflict.

The present study aims to contribute to filling this gap by examining war exposure and the post-conflict context the youth were raised into and its influence in shaping their attitudes towards outgroup reconciliation. More specifically, I examine if there is a relationship between age (youth versus adults) and the level of intergroup forgiveness and strength of ethnic identification. I further, investigate the impact of intergroup contact outgroup forgiveness and the effect of individual war experience on both forgiveness and ethnic identification. Foremost, I will discuss to what extent interethnic relation of the youth present a possible path towards intergroup reconciliation in Bosnia. The central question is as follows: “How can positive intergroup relations be stimulated among ethnic groups in post-civil war societies?” To clarify, in the present study, “youth” and “younger generation” refer to all individuals born between 1980 and 1990 who remained in Bosnia after the war ended. Likewise, “adults” or “the older generation” refer to those individuals born before 1980 and who remained in Bosnia after the conflict.

The remainder of this article is organized in six sections. In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of the war and the current situation in Bosnia. Section 3 considers the literature on the impact of armed conflict on children and adolescents. In section 4 the

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broader literature on armed conflict and outgroup attitude will be discussed in order to develop a set of hypotheses of youth’s intergroup relations. The data and method used to test the hypotheses are discussed in section 5. Last section 6 presents the analyses and results, while section 7 offers some concluding remarks.

2. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full account of the civil war in Bosnia, however, a brief historical backdrop and overview of the present-day situation are necessary in order to assess the consequences of the conflict.

Before declaring its independence in 1992, Bosnia was part of the Yugoslav Federation.

The Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks; c. 48%), Serbs (c. 37%) and the Croats (c. 14%) are currently the three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia (Biruski et al. 2014; Dyrstad, Ellingson and Rod 2015). These ethnic proportions are similar to those in prewar Bosnia. The main difference between these ethnic groups is religious, since their language is mutually understandable and used to be commonly categorized under the denominator of “Serbian-Croatian” language (Dyrstad et al.2015: 8). From 1992 to 1995 the country was subject to the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II (Franovic 2008; Cehajic, Brown and Castano 2008; Biruski. Elcheroth and Spini 2014). These years are characterized by genocide, ethnic cleansing, barbaric acts and rapes, particularly aimed at the Bosniaks (Cehajic et al. 2008: 356). The total number of causalities is disputed, but a common estimate is that the overall death toll reached approximately 250,000 (Cehajic et al. 2008; Dyrstad et al. 2015; Dyrstad 2012). Initially, the fighting was between the Serbs and the alliance of Bosniaks and Croats, later also between Bosniaks and Croats (Franovic 2008; Dyrstad 2012). The conflict is defined as an “ethnic civil war”, because the violence took place between ethnic groups

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within the same community (Parent 2012; Bakke, Xun Cao, O’Loughin and Ward 2009). What distinguishes this war from most conflicts, is that the main target were civilians (Franovic 2008; Penic et al. 2017). In Bosnia, approximately 41 percent of the casualties are civilians (Franovic 2008: 9). In 1995, the international community ended the conflict with the Dayton Agreement, which also created a complex group-based power-sharing system (Keil and Kudlenko 2015; Dyrstad et al. 2015; Franovic 2008). The Dayton Agreement formally divided Bosnia in two entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, and the Serb-dominated Republic of Serbia. Decentralization and power sharing allow each entity to have its own government, education standards, police force and so on (Keil and Kudlenko 2015; Dyrstad et al. 2015; Whitt 2010). Within the Federation of Bosnia, power is further decentralized to ensure self-rule for both Bosniaks and Croats (Keil and Kudlenko 2015: 476) This institutional structure was aimed at improving relations across ethnic groups, thus, paving the way for a stable and durable peace in Bosnia (Keil and Kudlenko 2015; Dyrstad et al. 2015). While its success at maintaining peace is an accomplishment hard to deny, the Dayton agreement achieved little in terms of improving interethnic relations (Dyrstad et al. 2015; Parent 2012). As stated in the introduction, the Bosnian society remains divided and, according to many scholars, polarized among ethnic lines (Keil and Kudlenko 2015; Whitt 2010; Leonard, Damjanovic, Simic, and Marshall 2016). The current situation in Bosnia is further characterized by interethnic tensions, ethnic discrimination and stereotyping and deplorable economic and political circumstances. Last, the score of social trust in Bosnia appears to be the lowest of all the European countries, especially in heterogeneous areas (Whitt 2010: 274).

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

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predominantly concerned with the study of youth’s experiences with exposure to violence and its presumed correlation with stress and other forms of psychological impact (Barber 2008; Layne et al. 2010). The majority of these studies provide compelling evidence that youth’s exposure to war causes a broad range of postwar distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and other internalizing disorders (Layne et al. 2010; Parent 2012; Staub 2006; Berman et al. 2001). However, the findings of these studies are often contradictory and inconclusive. For example, several investigators provide evidence for the notion that experiencing traumatic events, such as war, causes lasting harm to children (Layne et al 2010; Fayyad et al. 2004; Berman et al. 2001). One such study on the health of adolescent Cambodian refugees in the United States, demonstrates that many of them continue to meet full PTSD and depression criteria long after their departure from their war-torn homeland (Sack, Clarke and Seeley 1995: 1160). In contrast, Vega and Rumbaut (1991: 362) find little evidence of long-term harm to children and adolescents in post-conflict societies and even observe greater levels of resilience and motivation among this youth. Similarly, Kuterovac, Dyregrov and Stuvland (1994: 363) prove that children from the Gaza Strip who actively participated in the Intifada (uprising) reported greater self-esteem than those who passively stood by.

Research on Bosnian youth is even more sparse. Further, most of these studies were conducted with refugee children and adolescents, who resettled in countries outside of Bosnia. Corresponding with most of the work on youth and armed conflict, these studies are primarily concerned with exposure to violence on youth psychological functioning. In one of the few studies of Bosnian youth living in Bosnia, McCouch (2008:191) find similar effects of exposure to violence on youth well-being as in previous research. More importantly, he further demonstrates how the commonly found negative impact of the Bosnian war, extends to policy-relevant, post- conflict behaviors (idem: 191 – 203). For instance, years after the

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war formally ended, he finds that youth’s prior war experience is associated with lowered political and civic participation and with higher rates of antisocial behavior (vandalism, violence against others, theft). Additionally, McCouch (2008: 196) also shows that the link between exposure to war and antisocial behavior is fully mediated by youth’s negative sense of the future. Taken together, although the findings are inconsistent, previous studies strongly suggest that exposure to war can have profound negative effects on youth’s psychological functioning and on their social behaviors. Therefore, it is feasible to ask and try to examine whether war experience and post-conflict context influence youth’s outgroup attitude.

4. THEORY

Thus far, this article reviewed the impact of exposure to war on youth’s psychological well-being and social behavior. In the section that follows, I will discuss the broader literature on armed conflict and outgroup attitude formation in order to develop a set of hypotheses regarding youth’s intergroup relations. First, the general literature on improving post-conflict intergroup relations will be examined. Based on this literature, I adopt “intergroup forgiveness” as the key predictor of positive reconciliation attitudes. Next, I discuss the central predictors of intergroup forgiveness, followed by five hypotheses regarding youth’s outgroup attitudes.

4.1. Improving Post-Conflict Intergroup Relations: Reconciliation and Forgiveness Much of the literature on improving intergroup relations in post-conflict societies is concerned with intergroup reconciliation (Parent 2012; Bar Tal 2008; Staub 2006; Leonard et al. 2016). A generally accepted definition of intergroup reconciliation is lacking; however, most definitions refer to a process that requires a profound psychological change towards the other, during which previous enemies “come to see the humanity of one another, accept each other and see the possibility of a constructive relationship” (Staub 2006: 868). Intergroup

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(Parent 2012; Cehaic et al. 2008). However, the expectation that reconciliation will naturally occur when conflict ends, has been proven to be incorrect (Rydgren and Sofi 2011; Parent 2012; Myers, Hewstone and Cairns 2009). For instance, a study on intergroup relations in post-conflict Northern Ireland, reported that the singing of the peace agreement (Belfast Agreement) itself, was insufficient in realizing reconciliation (Meyers et al. 2007: 277). Instead, Myers and colleagues (idem: 278) identified intergroup forgiveness as an essential condition for successful reconciliation and the improvement of intergroup relations. They, therefore, recommend that reconciliation initiatives should be aimed at promoting intergroup forgiveness, rather than other forms of reconciliation efforts such as truth commissions and war tribunals, which often fail to stimulate positive intergroup relations. This also appears to be the case in Bosnia: the Dayton Agreement, prosecution of war criminals and numerous other reconciliation efforts, all failed at improving intergroup relations (Parent 2012; Bakke et al. 2012; Whitt 2010).

Numerous other scholars agree with the notion that intergroup forgiveness is the key precursor for reconciliation (Cehajic et al. 2008; Leonard et al. 2016; Penic et al. 2012; Staub 2006). Intergroup forgiveness- as defined by Cehajic, Brown and Castano (2008: 352), is “a prosocial orientation that involves a reduction of feelings of revenge, anger and mistrust towards the perpetrator group and intentions to understand, approach and engage with its members”. Forgiveness implies that people who have been affected, personally or as members of a group, by collective violence are willing to put the past behind them and work towards the restoration of relationships (Penic et al. 2012; Cehajic et al. 2008). In other words, intergroup forgiveness stimulates prosocial behavior among individuals, which is considered a critical element in reconciliation processes (Penic et al. 2012; Cehajic et al. 2008; Karremans and Van Lange 2004; Noor, Brown and Prentice 2008a). The positive effects of intergroup forgiveness on prosocial behavior is well-documented. For example, Karremans

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and Van Lange (2004: 207), show that forgiveness is positively associated with both the motivation to pursue relationship-constructive actions and the level of intended intergroup cooperation. Other studies find that forgiveness is correlated with higher levels of empathy towards members of the outgroup and with the release of feelings of anger and revenge towards the offender (Noor et al. 2008a; Cehajic et al. 2008). Last, Đorđević (2015: 415) demonstrates that positive attitudes towards forgiveness are related to reduced social distance and increased social trust. In conclusion, previous studies demonstrate the importance of intergroup forgiveness on improving post-conflict intergroup relations, as it stimulates prosocial behavior and, as thus, positive reconciliation attitudes. Following this logic, this study adopts intergroup forgiveness as the key predictor of intergroup relations in post-conflict societies.

4.2. War Trauma

As noted before, a considerable amount of research captures the impact of experiencing war on youth’s psychological well-being. Previous studies find the same psychological consequences of war exposure for other age groups (Rydgren and Sofi 2011; Myers et al. 2009). Thus, in general, individuals’ exposure to violent conflict is highly associated with a broad range of post-war distress, such as PTSD and depression (Parent 2012; Meernik and Guerrero 2014; Franovic 2008). General literature on post-conflict societies suggest that trauma also generates a breakdown of social trust, leads to a collective erosion of social ties and social polarization between individuals, communities and groups (Staub 2006; Parent 2012; Rydgren and Sofi 2011). This view is sustained by a growing number of studies, which indeed find a negative impact of individual war experience on outgroup attitudes (Penic et al. 2016; Bakke et al. 2009; Hewstone et al. 2004; Meernik and Guerrero 2014). An important finding of these studies, is that the degree to which individuals are affected by exposure to violence strongly affects their forgiveness attitudes. For instance,

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several scholars demonstrate that individuals directly affected by conflict, are less willing to forgive members of the outgroup (Penic et al. 2016; Bakke et al. 2009; Hewstone et al. 2004). Similar, Meernik and Guerrero (2014: 400) find a negative correlation between the number of traumatic events individuals experience and his or her attitude towards reconciliation and forgiveness. In sum, previous studies strongly suggest that individual exposure to war is negatively associated with one’s readiness to forgive members of the outgroup.

4.3. Collective memory

The way we remember the past of our group plays an important role in shaping present-day intergroup relations (Bar-Tal 2007; Staub 2006; Shnabel, Halabi and Noor 2013. In this regard, many scholars use the terms “collective memory” to describe the phenomenon and related consequences. To start, groups involved in prolonged, violent conflicts develop a certain narrative of the conflict that reflects the beliefs, attitudes and emotions experienced by members of a certain group (Bar-Tal 2007: 1436-1440). In line with the theoretical reasoning of the social identity theory, this collective memory of the conflict usually presents a positive image of the ingroup and a negative one of the outgroup(s). Moreover, the collective memory portrays one’s ingroup as the victim of the opponent, thereby denying outgroup suffering and one’s own involvement (Bar-Tal 2007; Shnabel, et al. 2013). There is much evidence that the way history is told and taught can significantly affect the intergroup attitudes and behavior, even for those who did not experience the event(s) themselves (Martinovic 2017; Bar-Tal 2007; Parent 2012).

Previous work identified ingroups collective memory as a possible obstacle for forgiveness (Penic et al. 2012; Parent 2012; Martinovic et al. 2017). This is especially true when collective memories glorify the ingroup (i.e. sacralization of the ingroup, in a way that precludes criticism) or transform ingroup suffering into being “exclusive”. The latter refers to

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groups competing over their victim status (i.e. each group involved in the conflict claims to have suffered more). As such, the groups perceive only their own suffering and shift blame towards the outgroup(s). Studies find that the refusal to acknowledge one’s own wrongdoings and the inability to emphasize with outgroup suffering strongly interferes with reconciliation and forgiveness attitudes reconciliation (Shabel et al. 2013; Staub 2006). Strikingly, previous research suggest that the negative effects of shared narratives may be even greater for those who are, in whatever way, less involved in conflict (Bilali 2013; Martinovic et al. 2017). To adequately interpret this finding, one must consider to role of different sources of collective knowledge. In this regard, it is assumed that people’s conflict-based beliefs depend on their knowledge about the war event. For individuals not exposed or less involved in the conflict, the primary sources of information about the conflict are mass-mediatized narratives and political speeches (Bar-Tal 2007; Penic et al. 2016; Martinovic et al. 2017). Research long established that these narratives expressed to major societal channels tend to bias the ingroup (Berman et al 2001; Bar-Tal 2007). Consequently, those for whom the media are the main source of knowledge about the war, are more likely to endorse such beliefs (Bilali 2013; Martinovic et al. 2017).

Last, if not adequately dealt with, these collective memories can manifest itself in various ways in new generations. As Bar-Tal (2007: 1436-1440) explains, the collective memory of the ingroup is expressed is major societal channels of communications and translated into cultural products such as books, films, music etc. Through family, educational institutions, politics and the media, the younger generation is exposed and socialized to follow this narrative of the conflict (ibid). Without any information or experiences proving the contrary, by adulthood, many of them will endorse similar beliefs, attitudes, values and emotions as the older generation (Bar-Tal 2007; Penic et al 2016). In this regard, various scholars highlight the importance of intergroup contact (Parent 2012; Bakke et al. 2009;

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Dyrstad 2012). Through contact with outgroup members, knowledge about collective war experiences can circulate across group, which is likely to contradict to simplified us against them narrative. Several studies show that contact enhances perspective taking, which reduces intergroup prejudice and increases intergroup trust and, as such, improve attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation (Bar-Tal 2007; Staub 2006).

4.4. Intergroup Contact

Positive intergroup contact is widely recognized as one of the most important facilitators of improving intergroup relations. Positive contact is associated with a decrease in ethnic prejudice, increase in intergroup trust and empathy and is, thus, found to be linked to positive attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation attitudes. However, for contact to result in better relationships between groups, it is important that contact is frequent, and the quality of the contact is high. According to Pettigrew, contact with outgroup members should have a “friendship potential” in order to improve relations.

4.5. Ingroup Identification

Previous studies of intergroup relations in post-conflict societies, suggest that group identity is one of the central predictors of forgiveness because of its vital role in shaping intergroup relations (Penic et al. 2012; Bakke et al. 2009). As is well known, according to the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and the Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell 1987), people tend to favor their ingroup in order to maintain a positive self-esteem (ingroup bias), which can result in negative attitudes, judgements or treatment of the outgroup (Verkuyten 2005; Transue 2007; Bakke et al. 2009). Although, ingroup favoritism does not necessarily translate into negative responses towards outgroups, they are likely among those who identify more strongly with their ingroup (Meyers

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et al. 2009; Bakke et al. 2009; Parent 2012). In other words, increased salience of a certain group identity enhances negative outgroup responses (Bakke et al. 2005; Dyrstad 2012). Studies typically suggest that collective exposure to war increases ingroup identification, which reduces pro-social orientation towards outgroups and, hence, reduces intergroup forgiveness. This theorizing is in accordance with the central premises of the Realistic Conflict Theory. According to this theory, threat and fear (perceived or real) to the ingroup are likely to increase ingroup identification and, as such, lead to negative evaluations towards the outgroup (Dyrstad 2012: 819). A factor obviously related to threat and fear is exposure to conflict. The few studies that empirically examine these links, indeed find a positive relation between exposure to war and ingroup identification on the one hand, and a negative correlation between ingroup identification and intergroup forgiveness on the other hand (Hewstone et al. 2004; Noor et al. 2008b).

In contrast, identification with a superordinate identity is found to enhance intergroup forgiveness because it is inclusive towards outgroups, which reduces prejudice and increases intergroup trust (Transue 2007; Bakke et al. 2009). The literature th And, as such, it reduces prejudice and increases trust between different groups, which both are necessary elements for intergroup forgiveness. Various studies provide evidence for the positive effects of superordinate identification on intergroup relations. These positive effects can also be found in pre-war Bosnia. Before the war broke out, the majority of the population identified themselves with the superordinate Yugoslavian identity and thus not, or to lesser extent, with their narrower ethnic groups. In addition, for over 46 years the different ethnic groups in former-Yugoslavia peacefully co-existed and the interethnic relations were generally described as peaceful and friendly, with Kosovo being the exception to this. Many scholars therefore rejected the general perception that ethnic diversity caused the war in Bosnia (Muro 2015; Whitt 2010). Later, numerous studies indeed prove that strong ethnic identification was

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not the cause of the conflict (Whitt 2010; Dyrstad et al. 2012). Taken together, it can be stated that in pre-war Bosnia heightened salience of ethnic group identification was absent. And, therefore, not an important determinant of intergroup relations.

4.6. Hypotheses Intergroup Forgiveness

The literature suggests that collective memory of one’s ethnic group can significantly negatively impact individuals’ outgroup attitudes, especially for those who were not or less involved in the conflict. During the time of the war, the majority of the youth was too young to actively participate in the fighting. In addition, parents generally prevent their children from witnessing traumatic events. Hence, it is likely that societal channels are their primary source of information about the conflict, which means they were socialized to follow a certain negative of the conflict which present a positive image of the ingroup and a negative one of the outgroups. Moreover, they grew up and are maturing in deplorable economic and political circumstances, creating significant insecurity. All of which are negatively associated with intergroup forgiveness. Also, contrary to the older generation, they grew up in an ethnically divided country, went the ethnically segregated schools and go the ethnically segregated cafes in the present. Thus, they have little prior and present positive interethnic relationship. Consequently, the possibility to learn the collective memory of the other, is little. In conclusion, the circumstances in which this generation grew up and is maturing in, is distinctly different from those of the older age groups. Therefore, it is expected that the youth will exhibit lower levels of intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 1). Based on the literature we also expect individual exposure to violence to decrease one’s readiness to forgive (hypothesis

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2) and interethnic contact to increase levels of intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 3). This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: The youth will exhibit lower levels of intergroup forgiveness than the older generation

H2: Individuals who have experienced greater levels of wartime suffering will exhibit lower levels of forgiveness towards individuals from other ethnic groups

H3: Individuals with more interethnic friends will exhibit higher levels of intergroup forgiveness towards members of the outgroup

Ethnic Identification

As discussed above, interethnic conflict did not cause the war in Bosnia. However, it is plausible to assume that strong ethnic identification is both present and of importance to present-day social relations in Bosnia, especially for the younger generation.

In his study, Barber (2008: 306) finds that prior to the war, Bosnian children were generally unaware of their ethnic and religious differences among their and in their direct environment. During the war, however, victims were targeted not because of their involvement in the fighting but because of their membership in a broader ethnic group (Penic et al. 2016; Barber 2008). From one day to next – quite literally – the youth saw their friends, classmates, neighbors and even family members turn into enemies. And, as such, they learned that the purpose of the aggression was to assault who they are: a member of an ethnic group (Fisher and Simic 2016; Barber 2008). As discussed above, previous research suggests that exposure to war enhances the salience of group identities. However, the youth these effects may have been greater. First, at a young age, they learned that their ethnicity mattered. After all, they got attacked based on their ethnic belonging. In addition, contrary to the older aged group, they did not grow up nor mature under the subordinate Yugoslavian identity, which is

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associated with more positive outgroup attitudes. Instead, they developed their primary view about the self and others during a time marked by the traumas of war and during a time in which, due to the Dayton Agreement, ethnicity got institutionalized (Leonard et al.2016; Parent 2012). By decentralization and power sharing, the international community divided Bosnia along ethnic lines. Both on the social and on the political level. The result is an ethnically divided government which made one’s ethnic belonging politically relevant. Instead of promoting multiculturalism, which is associated with greater tolerance towards outgroups (Verkuyten 2005: 121), politicians encourage citizens to maintain their group identity. Taken together, it is it is expected that ethnic identification is stronger among the youth. Also, based on the literature, we expect individual exposure to war increases the level of ethnic identification. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H4: Ethnic identification is stronger among the youth as opposed to the older generation

H5: Exposure to warfare increases individual ethnonationalism

5. DATA AND METHODS

To analyze youth’s attitudes towards outgroup members, I use a multilevel regression analysis in SPSS (version 24). The data used in the analysis consist of a representative survey conducted late 2003 to early 2004 by the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP, Simkus 2007). The sample size includes six former Yugoslav countries, which are: Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. The full sample includes 18 351 respondents. However, the analysis is limited to Bosnia (N = 6453), which was exposed to the most violent and widespread conflict in the 1990s. The Bosnian subsample is representative of the general adult population aged eighteen or higher. The SEESSP dataset is particularly useful because it includes standard-based quantitative information regarding

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respondents’ ethnic relations and war-related attitudes, which makes it possible to test the theories on youth’s levels of intergroup forgiveness and ethnonationalism.

5.1. Methodological Considerations

The purpose of article is to examine war exposure and the post-conflict context the youth was raised into and its influence in shaping their attitudes towards outgroup reconciliation. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, obtaining this type of information has proven to be a real challenge. Fortunately, the SEESSP dataset does include the necessary variables to test the theories. However, the fact that the survey was conducted between 2003 and 2004 has some implications for the analysis. First, this limits the analysis of the “youth” to those born between 1980 and 1986, instead of those born between 1980 and 1990 as conceptualized in the introduction. Thus, at the time that the survey was conducted, the respondents were between 18 and 24 years old. A total of 1025 respondents meet this criterion. Therefore, the limitation does not affect the internal- nor the external validity of this research. Second, the Dayton Agreements ended the war in 1995, which means that there is a time lag of about eight years from the end of the conflict to the measurements of its possible effects. The main advantage of such a time lag, is that the data captures long-term effects, instead of immediate and possibly short-lived ones. According to various social scientist, the values, beliefs and attitudes individuals develop during their adolescence years, generally remain the same the same during the course of their lives (Becker and Van Praag 2006: 71). Therefore, it is feasible to assume that the SEESSP survey reflects present-day ingroup and outgroup attitudes and behaviors in post-war Bosnia.

5.1. Measures

Intergroup forgiveness. The dependent variable intergroup forgiveness is previously conceptualized as a “reduction of feelings of revenge, anger, and mistrust towards the

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(Cehajic et al. 2008: 352). This is measured using the item, “I can never forgive the members of other nationalities in this country for wat they have done during the war, and I want nothing to do with them”. The variable is scored on a rating scale from 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree, in which a higher score indicates more intergroup forgiveness. This variable has been used in similar studies to measure intergroup forgiveness.

Ethnic identification. As described before, the dependent variable ethnic identification refers to the strength of individuals’ ethnic attachment. Previous studies suggest that a strong ethnic identity in post-conflict societies, is associated with lower intergroup forgiveness-, trust- and reconciliation and with higher levels of ethnic prejudice-, intolerance- and exclusionism (Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn 2003; Dyrstad 2012; Simkus 2007). Unfortunately, the SEEESSP dataset does not include information on strength of individuals’ ethnic attachment. However, what I label “strong ethnic identity” has previously been labelled ethnonationalism (Dyrstad 2012; Penic et al. 2016), ethnic intolerance (Hodson 1999; Massey, Hodson and Sekulic 2006), ethnic exclusionism (Simkus 2007) and prejudice (Strabac and Ringdal 2008). In all these studies, the same variables are used to measure the variables above. Therefore, the present study adopts the same variable to measure the strength of ethnic identification, which are: (1) “Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others”, (2) “Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation(ality)”, (3) “Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust”. Response categories are ranged from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.

Age. In the previous section, I theorized how, through mechanisms of socialization, ethnic identity and war exposure, armed conflict affects youth’s intergroup relations. To analyze this, I need to compare two groups: the youth (aged 18 to 24) and the older generation (aged 25 or higher). To do this, I recoded the variable “respondent age in years” to a dichotomic variable, in which 1 = respondents aged 18 to 24 (“the youth”) and 0 =

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respondents aged 25 or higher (“older generation”). In the analysis, the 25 or higher category serves as the reference category.

Individual exposure to warfare. To test the effects of individuals exposure to war on intergroup relations, I use a dichotomous variable that captures whether the respondent has had a close friend or family member killed or disappeared during the war.

Intergroup contact. As discussed earlier, previous studies strongly suggest that contact with outgroup members is one of the central predictors of intergroup forgiveness. According to the previous research, contact between outgroup members should have a friendship potential. Therefore, to measure this, I use the item “thinking about ten of your closets, are any of these friends belong to a different ethnic group than you?”. I recoded the variable in 1 = yes and 0 = no, in which a higher score indicates that a respondent has a more heterogenous network of friends.

Control variables are included in the analysis to control for other major predictors of intergroup relations. The literature on outgroup evaluations identifies sex and education as relevant socio-demographic variables. I recoded the variable sex to 1 = male and 0 = female. Education is measured by the item “respondent’s highest educational degree completed”, which is defined as respondents’ education in years of completed education. The variable is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 = none and 14 = master’s or doctoral degree, in which a higher score indicates that the respondent is higher educated. Last, I control for respondents’ self-declared religious identity, in order to avoid possible spurious effects, in which a higher score indicates more religiosity.

6. ANALYSIS

To purpose of the present analysis is to test two main propositions; first, that the younger generation will exhibit lower levels of forgiveness towards individuals from other

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group. Further, I am interested in the impact of individual war experiences on both intergroup forgiveness and ethnic identification and of intergroup contact on intergroup forgiveness. To estimate these relationships, I use basic multiple regression analysis. In all models, I controlled for a series of individual level predictors.

Table 1: Effects of age, exposure to war and intergroup contact on attitudes towards forgiveness of the outgroup(s)

Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Age (youth) 0.081* (0.049) 0.070(ns) (0.049) 0.960** (0.048) Gender (male) -0.032(ns) (0.038) -0. 069(ns) (0.025) -0.250(ns) (0.038) Education (years) 0.033*** (0.008) 0.034*** (0.008) 0.031*** (0.008) Religiosity (standardized) - 0.058*** (0.019) -0.060*** (0.019) -0.021(ns) (0.019)

Individual war experience -0.136***

(0.039) Intergroup contact 0.344*** (0.038) Constant 2.935*** (0.049) 3.016*** (0.054) 2.759*** (0.052) N 3059 3059 3059 R2 _0.03 _0.03 _0.04

Note * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

In model 1 (table 1) I examined the impact of age on one’s attitude towards forgiveness of the outgroups. Model 1 reports that one unit increase in age is associated with a 0.08 unit increase towards intergroup forgiveness. A higher score on the forgiveness scale

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indicates more willingness to forgive the outgroup. Thus, contrary to what I expected, Bosnian youth is more likely to exhibit positive attitudes towards intergroup forgiveness. These results are statistically significant (p < .10), but less than the other variables. Further, I find that respondents who are more educated demonstrate stronger levels of forgiveness and those who are more religious report lower levels of forgiveness. Both results are statistically significant (<.001).

I was also interested in the degree to which individuals’ wartime experiences continue to influence their present-day attitudes regarding forgiveness of the outgroup (table 1, model 2). As expected, individual wartime experiences are negatively and statistically significant (p<.001) associated with intergroup forgiveness. On average, the impact of one unit increase in wartime experience is to typically decrease Bosnians’ forgiveness attitudes towards the outgroup by 0.14 unit. The findings also suggest that war experience leads to a decrease of 0.01 unit on youth’s score. However, in this case, the effect between age and intergroup forgiveness is insignificant. A possible explanation for this is that adults are generally more actively involved in conflict (both mentally and physically) compared to children and adolescents. It is therefore plausible to assume that they experienced a greater number of traumatic wartime events as opposed to children and adolescents. Perhaps, having experienced less traumatic events during the conflict, the youth is more able to forgive members of the outgroup. However, this is merely an educated guess, more in-depth research can provide a more conclusive answer.

Last, interestingly, education and religiosity appear to be unaffected by individual war experience.

Model 3 (table 1) displays the results of intergroup contact on forgiveness. According to the results, contact is likely to inflict a positive significant effect on forgiveness (p<0.01). More specifically, respondents with an ethnically heterogenous network of friends, report

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stronger forgiveness (increase of 0.34 by unit) than those with an ethnically homogenous network of friends. This is in accordance with hypothesis 3. Furthermore, the youth appears to be 0.96 more forgiving towards the outgroup than the older generation. These results are statistically significant (p<0.05). Strikingly, however, the average level of forgiveness in model 3 is the lowest of all the models. Last, among the demographic variables, the “education” variable is statistically significant across all the models in table 1. Moreover, neither individual war experience or interethnic contact strongly affects the score of education. I return to these findings in the discussion. The effect of “gender” is insignificant across the models and religiosity is negatively significant associated with forgiveness in model 1 and model 2 and appears to be almost unaffected by individual war experience. However, the effect of religiosity on forgiveness is insignificant in model 3, in which the impact of intergroup contact on forgiveness is examined.

In sum, hypothesis 1 – Youth will exhibit lower levels of forgiveness towards members of the outgroups – finds no support. Across all models the youth reports more positive attitudes towards intergroup forgiveness. But, the difference is small (0.08, 0.07, 0.10) and statistically insignificant in model 2. However, the results consistently indicate a positive relation between youth and levels of forgiveness. Therefore, hypothesis 1 can be rejected. Further, in accordance with findings of similar research, I find that individual war experience decreases outgroup forgiveness, while intergroup contact increases outgroup forgiveness. Taken as a whole, the entire model accounted for 10% of variability in intergroup forgiveness.

Table 2: Effects of age on strength ethnic identification Determinants

Indicators of ethnic identification Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

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(0.053) (0.048) (0.047) Gender (male) -0.279*** (0.042) -0.130*** (0.038) -0.114*** (0.036) Education (years) 0.030*** (0.009) -0.024*** (0.008) -0.005(ns) (0.008) Religiosity (standardized) - 0.255*** (0.021) -0.236** (0.019) -0.174*** (0.018) Individual war experience

Constant 2.842*** (0.054) 2.769*** (0.054) 2.670 *** (0.11) N 3059 3059 3059 R2 _0.06 _0.05 _0.03

Table 3: Effect of individual war experience on ethnic identification Determinants

Indicators of ethnic identification Model 7 Model 8 Model 9

Age (youth) 0.081(ns) (0.053) 0.057(ns) (0.048) 0.031(ns) (0.046) Gender (male) -0.284*** (0.042) -0.133*** (0.038) -0.117*** (0.036) Education (years) 0.029*** (0.029) -0.024*** (0.019) -0.005(ns) (0.008) Religiosity (standardized) - 0.253*** (0.021) -0.234*** (0.019) -0.173*** (0.018)

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Individual war experience 0.178*** (0.043) 0.126*** (0.039) 0.101*** (0.037) Constant 2.738*** (0.054) 2.694*** (0.056) 2.610 *** (0.51) N 3059 3059 3059 R2 _0.06 _0.05 _0.03

Table 2 present the results of hypothesis 3. If the hypothesis is correct, we expect the youth to exhibit stronger ethnic identification. The latter is measured using three indicators (ranged 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree), in which a lower score indicates a stronger ethnic identification. According to the results, the variable “age” is positively insignificant associated with ethnic identification. In other words, the youth appears to identify less strongly with their ethnic group compared to the older generation, but this result is insignificant. The findings also show that the models explain little of the variance in ethnic identification. Taken together, this suggest that there is no relationship between “age” and ethnic identification. Therefore, hypothesis 3 can be rejected. Further, ethnic identification is statistically significantly associated with lower education, but the effect is weak. The findings also suggest that ethnic identification is significantly stronger among men (p<.001). Last, strong religious identity is negatively significantly associated with ethnic identification. The results indicate that people who report being more religious also identify more strongly with their ethnic group. However, as noted before, the most distinctive feature of ethnic groups in Bosnia, is their religion. Which means that religiosity is also related to ethnic identification and, therefore, could be mutually reinforcing.

Last, table 3 displays the results of hypothesis 4. Based on the literature, we expect experiencing war trauma to increase individual ethnic identification. Again, ethnic

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identification is measured using three indicators, in which a lower score indicates stronger ethnic identification. Contrary to what I expected, individual war experiences have a significant, positive effect on all three indicators of ethnic identity (p<.001). In other words, it appears that exposure to war does not increase ethnic identification. Hence, hypothesis 4 can be rejected. Overall, individual war experience has surprisingly little effect on the socio-demographic variables. Again, gender and religiosity are negatively significant associated with ethnic identification across all three models. The lack of effect of war experience on individual ethnic identification is surprising, giving the recent history of a violent ethnic conflict in Bosnia. This raises the question of how these seemingly contradictory findings can be explained. As discussed earlier, previous research strongly suggests that fear, perceived or real, towards the ingroup increases negative outgroup attitudes. In the case of Bosnia, violence was spread throughout the entire nation and civilians were target indiscriminately, meaning that almost no one was spared from threat and insecurity. Thus, perceived threat of exposure to war and actual threat of exposure to war, could work in the same direction. This could be a possible explanation as to why there is almost no marked difference in the attitudes of those who were and those who were not exposed to war. But, again, this is only an educated guess

7. DISCUSSION 7.1. Main Findings

In the present study, I sought to examine Bosnian youth attitudes regarding outgroup reconciliation. Both scholarly research and reconciliation efforts do not consider possible unique effects of one’s age on post-conflict outgroup attitudes. The present study aims to contribute to filling this gap by examining war exposure and the post-conflict context the youth were raised into and its influence in shaping their attitudes towards outgroup

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First, building on previous findings and theoretical models, I expected the youth to exhibit more negative attitudes towards forgiveness (model 1, table 1). Contrary to what I expected, in all three model’s youth exhibited higher levels of intergroup towards the outgroup as opposed to the older aged groups. Therefore hypothesis 1 can be rejected. In model 2, I examined the impact of war exposure on intergroup forgiveness. As expected, experiencing war is negatively associated with intergroup forgiveness. Strikingly, in model 2 (table 1) the effect between age and forgiveness becomes insignificant when analyzing the effect of war exposure on intergroup forgiveness. A possible explanation for this is that adults are generally more actively involved in conflict (both mentally and physically) compared to children and adolescents. It is therefore plausible assume that, having experienced less traumatic events during the conflict, the youth is more able to forgive members of the outgroup to assume that they experienced a greater number of traumatic. Last, according to the results contact is likely to inflict a positive significant effect on forgiveness. This implies that respondents with an ethnically heterogenous network of friends, report stronger forgiveness (increase of 0.34 by unit) than those with an ethnically homogenous network of friends. Therefore hypothesis 2 and 3 can be confirmed.

Table 2 and reports the results regarding the effects of age on ethnic identification. Overall, I find no support for the second central hypothesis that – the ethnic identification is stronger among the youth. According to the results, the variable “age” is positively insignificant associated with ethnic identification. Therefore hypothesis 4 can be rejected. Further, ethnic identification is statistically significantly associated with lower education and higher religiosity, but the effect is weak. The findings also suggest that ethnic identification is significantly stronger among men (p<.001).

Finally, table 3 reports the result regarding the effects of war exposure on individual ethnic identification. Contrary to what I expected, individual war experiences have a

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significant, positive effect on all three indicators of ethnic identity (p<.001). In other words, it appears that exposure to war does not increase ethnic identification. Hence, hypothesis 4 can be rejected.

To conclude, I would like to point out that, across all models, education has a significant but small positive effect on intergroup forgiveness and leads to a small decrease in ethnic identity. In general, you would expect that with higher education comes more tolerant attitudes. This appears to be the case in Bosnia. Which is not surprising due to their ethnically segregated towns, villages and even schools. However, it does show the negative impact on segregation and tolerant attitudes.

7.2. Implications

While not generalizable to the entire population, the results do provide a starting point for discussing current psychosocial elements of reconciliation efforts. First, the average score on intergroup forgiveness remains low if you consider that the war ended over twenty years ago. The same goes for scores on ethnic identification. Additionally, the youth does exhibit more tolerant attitudes, however, these differences are small. If you consider the deplorable economic and political situation in Bosnia, ethnic division, along with the, previously discussed, low levels of social trust, these findings are troubling. Economic dissatisfaction and heightened ethnic identification make people, and especially the youth, receptive towards radical ideas of religious leader or politicians. It is already known, that radical Islam is spreading throughout Bosnia. All taken together, the current situation Bosnia is not much different than 25 years ago. My study suggests, although lacking high explanatory power, that the youth is important to consider in both reconciliation efforts and scholarly research. Especially, considering the small role education plays in stimulating more tolerant behavior. More research is needed in order to gain insight in a path towards stable intergroup relations.

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APPENDIX

I Syntax

* Encoding: ISO-8859-1.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. USE ALL.

COMPUTE filter_$=(v003=2).

VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'v003=2 (FILTER)'. VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0).

FILTER BY filter_$. EXECUTE.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. REGRESSION

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N /MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA CHANGE /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215.

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/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male v215 v207 Bw22_Yes.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male v215 Bw22_Yes Zv207.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male v215 Bw22_Yes Zv207.

REGRESSION

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/MISSING LISTWISE

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male v215 v207.

RECODE v011 (18 thru 25=1) (ELSE=0) INTO Youth. EXECUTE.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER Youth Male v215 Zv207.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

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REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v031

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 Bw22_Yes /METHOD=ENTER Male Zv207 v215 v011_Youth.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v031

REGRESSION

/STATISTICS CI(90) BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v033

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REGRESSION

/STATISTICS R ANOVA CHANGE /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v033

REGRESSION

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v033

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v033

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/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v792

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Bw22_Yes Zv207 v215.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v033

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v031

REGRESSION

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/MISSING LISTWISE

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v032

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v032

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215 Bw22_Yes.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v031

REGRESSION

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/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v033

REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215 v678_warexperienceyes Bw22_Yes v663_thoughtstrauma

v664_dreamstrauma v665_relievewartraum.

REGRESSION

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/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v031

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215 v209.

REGRESSION

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/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215 Bw22_Yes v277_friendsyes.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215 Bw22_Yes v678_warexperienceyes v663_thoughtstrauma

v664_dreamstrauma v665_relievewartraum.

REGRESSION

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/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male Zv207 v215 Bw22_Yes v277_friendsyes v209 v138.

RECODE v277 (2=1) (SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO v277_friendno. VARIABLE LABELS v277_friendno 'v277_friendno'.

EXECUTE.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=STEPWISE v011_Youth Male v678_warexperienceyes Zv207 v215 v277_friendno.

REGRESSION

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040

/METHOD=ENTER v011_Youth Male v678_warexperienceyes Zv207 v215 v277_friendno.

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/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT v040