MSc Crisis and Security Management - Final Thesis
Climate emergency declarations: a call to arms or mere
greenwashing?
(Source: Kottasovà 2019) Elliot Whiteside S1657410 Dr. Lydie Cabane Word Count: 18,134 12 January 2020 Leiden University1. INTRODUCTION 3
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 8
2.1. Acting in an emergency 8
2.2. Translating the theory into practice 13
3. METHODOLOGY 19
3.1. Case Selection 19
3.2. Data and method 20
4. ANALYSIS 23
4.1. Bristol City Council 23
4.1.1. Institutional context 24
4.1.2. The climate emergency declaration 26
4.1.3. The Full Council’s response 30
4.1.4. Concluding remarks 36
4.2. Trafford Council 36
4.2.1. The climate emergency declaration 38
4.2.2. The Full Council’s response 40
4.2.3. Concluding remarks 44
4.3. Brighton and Hove City Council 44
4.3.1. The climate emergency declaration 45
4.3.2. The Full Council’s response 46
4.3.3. Concluding remarks 51
5. SYNTHESIS 53
5.1. The responsibility to act 53
5.2. An understanding of how to act 55
5.3. Taking action 56
6. CONCLUSION 58
6.1. Research prospects 59
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 61
Appendix I: Climate-linked motions for Bristol City Council 65
Appendix II: Climate-linked motions for Trafford Council 73
1. INTRODUCTION
The declaration of any kind of emergency would suggest that the issue in question is one that poses a significant threat, that in turn requires immediate and substantial attention; the very word itself denotes “a state of things unexpectedly arising, and urgently demanding
immediate action” (Oxford English Dictionary 2019). Hence, one could posit that the ongoing worldwide phenomenon of climate emergency declarations would attest to both a growing recognition of the impact that human-made climate change is having on our planet, along with the urgent need for action to tackle the issue. Indeed, this practice is widespread, with “1,299 jurisdictions in 25 countries” (as of January 11, 2020) having declared a climate emergency, ranging from Parish Councils responsible for a few hundred inhabitants, to the national governments of the UK, Ireland, Canada, France, Portugal and Argentina (Climate Emergency Declaration 2019). Presumably, this would suggest an elevation of the matters of climate change and the environment on the policy agendas of those justristictions who have declared such an emergency. Further still, the general public seem to be increasingly concerned by climate issues with recent polls in the UK placing the environment of around equal import as the economy, crime, and immigration, significantly more salient than education, housing or defence (YouGov 2019, 1). This concern, rather than being simply a passive worry, has manifested itself in numerous political activities, both electorally - such as the so-called ‘Green Wave’ which took place during the 2019 European elections (Mallet et al. 2019) - and in the form of wide-spread direct action (Taylor et al 2019). Additionally, there has been a marked increased media focus on the issue, with the Guardian newspaper making an environmental pledge (The Guardian 2019) and the television broadcasters
Channel 4 hosting a climate debate as part of their general election coverage in order to shine a light on the climate policies available to voters (Guru-Murphy 2019). Indeed, during the
2019 general election, the climate issue has moved into the political mainstream with the Labour Party putting their Green Industrial Revolution plans at the front of their manifesto (The Labour Party 2019a), and launching a stand-alone Environment Manifesto (The Labour Party 2019b). And, with the devastating wildfires raging through Australia in over the 2019-2020 new year, the real dangers of climate change are more prevalent than ever (BBC News 2019).
These developments would appear to mark a decided shift in both the public and political approach to climate change and a desire to take immediate action to make the changes required to halt environmental degradation. Though, that being said, the lack of solutions stipulated - in the form of actionable policy - in a vast number of climate emergency declarations could well bring about a cynical view regarding this political manoeuvre: climate emergency declarations could merely be a face-saving move for governments to appear to be treating climate change as a serious and pressing matter, while in fact taking little action in practice to tackle the problem. The potential for actors to manipulate emergency declarations for political gain is the train of thought that this thesis will bring to the fore with the
following research question: what factors have contributed to action (or inaction) in response
to climate emergency declarations? The essence of this research is to unveil whether or not
such declarations have been followed by serious policy action, as well as to highlight potential obstacles in taking action. Rather than posing as the definitive word on this issue, this paper aims to provide early exploratory evidence into a rapidly developing contemporary issue. It seems to be an essential line of enquiry when one considers that major advocates in favour of climate emergency declarations claim that the purpose of these declarations is to mobilise resources exponentially, or even to war-time levels, in order to counter the threat (The Climate Mobilization 2019).
A fundamental query of this paper lies in questioning whether these declarations do in fact constitute a call-to-arms to combat climate change, or rather, whether they are being exploited as a tool to greenwash reputations in search of short-run political gains. Indeed, Carla Dayner, the instigator of the UK’s seminal declaration in Bristol has stated that action thus far is not living up to words (Green Party Bristol 2019), and Marc Hudson, a researcher at the University of Manchester, stating in no uncertain terms that “[i]n Manchester [...] the City Council is greenwashing” (Hudson 2019). Clearly an evaluation of this matter is essential in order to scrutinise and hold our public institutions to account. Further, from an academic perspective, the novelty of this phenomenon brings with it a hugely limited understanding. While there are swathes of literature on emergency declarations more generally, these often refer to much less abstract instances of emergency. These usually pertain to the responses to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or widespread civil unrest - all such emergencies enacted as either reactionary measures to shock events, or in the days and hours leading to such events where their nature and potency are rather evident. The climate emergency however posits a vastly different threat, whose effects are considerably less localised, much more serious and yet, considerably more ambiguous. Myopia is a common trait in politics; it can be argued that dealing with emergencies whose threat is immediate is equally important for politicians as for those they serve as the fallout from not doing so would have a direct impact on their careers. The same cannot be said for the climate emergency, where the resentment generated by the climate suffering will fall on future generations, not the current electorate whose political sentiment will more likely be governed by other issues that impact them more directly. It is this notion that is the crux of the climate problem. The recent climate emergency declarations, on the face of it, suggest a move away
from political myopia; if such a shift is present then it is indeed important for academia’s understanding of the political process.
With the first declaration in the UK being made by Bristol City Council in November 2018, it is unfortunately far too soon to assess the long-term, or even short-term, policy impact as a consequence of emergency declarations. However, what is possible is to look at the early stage policy actions within the institutions that have declared a climate emergency in order to assess the extent to which they are taking immediate action in terms of policy development. In order to look deeper at the reactions to the climate emergency in practice, this paper shall focus its attention on three early adopters in the UK: Bristol City Council, Trafford Council, and Brighton and Hove City Council. By looking in depth over the policy process of these three local authorities it will be possible to unveil preliminary evidence on the impact that climate emergency declarations have had on positive action to alleviate this global problem.
This paper shall begin by establishing a theoretical framework in the next chapter. This will entail a brief look into the nature of emergency declarations by political actors, through which their political nature shall be emphasised. After this, I will introduce the framework of The Unresponsive Bystander by Bibb Latane and John Darley (1970) to provide analytical insight into what stipulates action in response to emergencies. I shall explore how this work, originally from the field of psychology, can provide a useful lens through which to view government action in the context of the climate emergency. Chapter three will explain the methodological aspects of this paper including the case selection, the data which is to be used, as well as any methodological constraints which need to be noted. This section will be concluded with an outline of the structure of the analysis which is to follow in chapter four. The analysis will, on a case by case basis, untangle local government
policy documents in light of the framework, so as to explore potential weaknesses and failings on the route to climate action. The fifth chapter shall synthesise these separate analyses into a discussion in order to present any general traits across the three cases as well as other key issues that arise. This paper shall then present an answer to its research question, and will establish a direction for future research on the climate emergency.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to establish a clear theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of climate
emergency declarations it is necessary to look deeper into the nature of a politically declared emergency, and any relations from this to policy change. This chapter shall begin by looking at what it means to make an emergency declaration. It shall be attested that emergencies are political and that their declaration cannot be considered to be without political motive. From this it shall be clear that declarations per se are not sufficient to demand real action to tackle the problem they outline. Henceforth, I shall turn to Latané and Darley’s psychological model (1970) on what causes action in response to emergencies and extend it to governmental action in order to outline the criteria that must be fulfilled in order for real action to take place. I shall briefly turn to literature on the policy process and policy change as a means to bolster the application of this theory. Subsequently, this entire discussion shall be distilled into one framework inspired by both theoretical perspectives which can be operationalised in order to assess the extent and potential extent of the response take in the climate emergency context.
2.1. Acting in an emergency
Several studies have noted that emergencies have frequently been employed as a political tool instead of a problem-solving policy device as a means of bolstering public opinion (Garrett & Sobel 2003; Sylves & Búzás 2007; Reeves 2011). In fact, this critical take on the enactment of emergency protocol seems to be emblematic of broader shifts within the social sciences where one sees an increased attention given to the breaking down of the discursive frames employed by actors and the discipline is becoming increasingly critical of the motives of actors. Within international relations, constructivism has countered the realist views of a singular rationale among actors; in cultural studies marxist interpretations have long
questioned the formation of culture and identity as predetermined and natural; in security studies, the Copenhagen School have similarly attempted to expose the subjective nature of threats in their discussion of the securitisation process. Traditional understandings of the objective nature of emergencies can be aligned with these critical trends in science, yet this reconceptualisation is by no means complete. There are ongoing attempts to refocus efforts of security and crisis scholars towards a reconceptualisation of crises as constructs and not objective pre-determined entities (Rotiman 2013; Spector 2019). Thus, in order to continue along this line of thought, this paper acknowledges the need for discursive action in order to render something a crisis, and therefore an event or occurrence, such as climate change, is insufficient to demand action.
It is necessary, therefore, to better understand the process of action in emergency situations. For this, existing work within the field of security studies is seemingly insufficient. Indeed, the gradual introduction of climate change into security discussions has exposed a number of shortcomings in our explanatory power through current theoretical
conceptualisations. Maria Julia Trombetta (2008) exposes this by examining how the securitisation theory, while treating threat identification as constructed, still fails to
acknowledge the various “logics of security” that can ensue (599). This stage of the process - moving from a determined threat towards responsive action - remains underexplored amongst scholars of security and thus it is important to look to other disciplines for potential insights.
For this purpose, I shall now turn to the world of psychology. Bibb Latané and John Darley (1970), in their book entitled The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help?, devised a five step path towards action in emergency situations. Based on a number of different controlled experiments, they explored the motivations behind an individual's decision to act when encountered with a range of scenarios, so as to ascertain why some
individuals felt obliged to help while others remained mere bystanders to the event. The resultant five step course to action is as follows: (1) “the bystander has to notice that
something is happening”; (2) “he must interpret it as an emergency”; (3) “he must [...] decide that it is his personal responsibility to act”; (4) “he must [...] consider what form of assistance he can give”; and lastly, (5) “he must decide how to implement his action” (Latané & Darley 1970, 31-32). The latter two of these stages seem to generate a certain amount of overlap. From this point on I shall adapt their phrasing as a means to add clarity, rather than distort their intentions, following from Cynthia Frantz and Stephan Mayer (2009), step four shall be interpreted as the knowledge of how to act, with step five as taking action (207).
Latané and Darley’s work is among the most cited within psychology textbooks (Griggs & Proctor 2002), and indeed, the puzzle of human difference in terms of responding to events is highly important. Despite its salience, this work has propagated its interest largely from within the fields of psychology and sociology; its account is seldom discussed among political scientists and security scholars, yet, ultimately, decision making is essentially a process of humans responding to events. Or to use the words of Hugh Heclo (1974),
governmental activity is merely “a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf” (305); it is the collectivisation of the very same processes undertaken by individuals on a daily basis. Fundamentally, the decision making process remains a human endeavour. Although, in this context, actors do work within organisational structures with differing levels of complexity and diverse endowments of accountability, the human aspect to governance persists; how individuals make sense of issues and act individually directly impacts how organisations do so. Organisational dynamics and cultures may indeed alter behaviour, but indeed, so do other forms of social grouping outside of the institutional arena. Therefore, actions in this regard are still determined by human interaction and hence are subject to basic psychological and
sociological constraints that similarly underpin the individual decision making in daily life. And so, using a psychological framework to support this analysis can help to bring about crucial insights and expand our understanding of the policy process. Government, as a collective of individuals, similar notions of socio-psycho-cultural factors are of great import to patterns of governance and decision making.
Even without this logic, the elements of this framework bear many similarities with other more commonly used theories within political science. For example, the multiple streams framework, as presented by John Kingdon (1984) in Agendas, Alternatives, and
Public Policies, notes a necessity of the convergence of an identified problem - step one -, a
solution - step four -, and the political will. Only upon the coalescence of these factors can action - step five - then ensue. The link between the five steps and political will is perhaps less evident, however political will is subject to the notion of the responsibility to act, the third step Responsibility in politics is often derived from democratic accountability and legitimacy, and driven by the media, and thus bears a number of similarities to Kingdon’s related concept. Similarly the previously critiqued securitisation theory presents an account of steps one and two whereby for an issue to become a security concern an issue must be
discursively framed, and subsequently perceived as a threat (Buzan et al. 1998). What I am saying here is that the framework of The Unresponsive Bystander is a perfectly valid tool beyond the level of the individual, and the concepts within it are by no means beyond the realms of previous thought. However, it renders itself highly useful as it provides for a more comprehensive account of what is required to move from an issue to action that the other theories mentioned. It fills the holes left by previous theoretical shortcomings and provides an operationisationable chronology of criteria to exploit. Its explicit focus on emergencies also fills a demand in academia to begin to view crises as subjective, constructed and
discretionary. What this theory adds, most importantly, is its predictive value. While
Kingdon’s multiple streams framework (1984) views the problem, the solution and political will as independent entities, Latané and Darley (1970) see each of their five steps of
constituent of a progressive process: one cannot act without knowing how to; one does not formulate such knowledge without realising a responsibility to act; one will not take the responsibility to act for a problem which they do not see as urgent; and one cannot define something as an emergency without first recognising its existence. This chronology is useful in its ability to highlight what has already been achieved, and what is yet to be achieved on the path to action. In the context of the climate emergency this can offer clear insight into how a government is progressing to tackle the issue, and where the shortcomings of their endeavors lie.
If we consider this framework in the context of the climate emergency, a declaration of this emergency, by nature, is the fulfilment of steps one and two, formally noting the existence of the threat of climate change, as well as the issue’s emergency status. The fulfilment of the other steps is, however, not necessarily guaranteed by such a declaration. Regarding step three, governments at any level have a responsibility to those within their jurisdiction, particularly within democracies. However, multi-level governance blurs this responsibility: a community may be covered by local, national and international polities, as well as a number of other actors, so who is responsible? This ties in with the notion of the diffusion of responsibility. Frantz and Mayer (2009) suggested that “when the magnitude of the emergency is greater than the personal resources available to an individual, the potential helper is likely to engage in defensive attribution and not accept responsibility for the
emergency” (214). Responsibility may be rejected by smaller-scale entities who feel that they lack the capacity to address a global problem of such a scale. Further, a declaration of an
emergency does not, in itself, provide any knowledge of how to act to help alleviate the problem. This is further complicated within systems of government where it is often demanded that rigorous informative documents are produced and analyses before a final understanding of how to act can be determined. Further to this, the knowledge of how to act does not necessarily mean that such an action has to take place and the scale of action can differ greatly. This brief discussion emphasises the notion that the presence of an emergency and the recognition of its threat is not sufficient to demand action, either from an individual or a government. Thus, it is essential for this study to go deeper into how those declaring climate emergencies fare in relation to the notion of responsibility to solve the issue, their knowledge of how to do so, and their active participation. Now, it is necessary to begin to explain how each step can be noticed in reality.
2.2. Translating the theory into practice
Now I must begin to collate what has been discussed thus far in order to present a clear and workable theoretical framework upon which the analysis of the climate emergency
declarations and environmental policies can be undertaken. Noting that the acknowledgement of an emergency through a formal declaration does not ascertain political action, I elaborated upon Latané and Darley’s (1970) five-step theory explaining the criteria required for such action to occur. In the context of this paper, we can assume that steps one and two have already been met through the climate emergency declaration itself as in all cases the motions both acknowledge the occurrence of climate change, recognise that a threat exists and deem it to be an emergency. Thus, the focus of this paper shall be on the latter three steps: the
In their discussion, Frantz and Mayer (2009) give an ample description of all the steps from an individual perspective; it is important to note how this would be considered
differently when looking at a government. If we take step three, the responsibility to act, Frantz and Mayer note that feelings of community and “we-ness” are important factors (2009, 207). For members of government, this would be viewed as a responsibility to the citizens of one’s jurisdiction, to one’s constituents. Responsibility to act will only be present if members of a government demonstrate an acceptance of their membership to a community. Further, it will require a recognition that their government is the one responsible to act to protect or preserve their community. Frantz and Mayer make reference to the potential of a diffusion of responsibility whereby actors claim that it is the job of someone else to solve the problem (214). Thus, when looking at local governments, it is particularly important to assess whether the solution of the problem at hand not only is within their powers, but that it is perceived by them to be within their powers and not subject to the higher powers of national government or international institutions, or the lower powers of individuals. Considering step four, knowledge of how to act can be interpreted similarly to on the individual level, only that for policy-making would require a much greater level of expertise than individual decisions. For this it would be important to consider the breadth of reporting on the climate issue, as well as the presence of any clear protocols for dealing with climate issues. For example, a deeply integrated climate risk assessment protocol would suggest that knowledge and expertise exists within the government to highlight problems and solutions. Admissions of not knowing or requests for further information and reporting would demonstrate the inverse.
The fifth step, of taking action itself, is perhaps the most tricky to put into practice. The majority of what we would consider as action by a government would be in policy change and policy implementation. While both are key factors, for the purposes of this thesis
I shall centre my interpretation of action on policy change. Implementation is the step which follows changes in policy and discusses how such policy is translated into reality. However, with only just over a year having elapsed since the first declaration in the UK, it is too soon to assess this part of the process. Policy change can be considered however, as it is largely codified into agreed upon documents which are available in the public domain, which are available as soon as new policy comes into being. Hence, I shall turn to examine the conceptualisation of policy change which is to be used.
Early thinkers tended to see policy-making as a rather top down process whereby the government select policy as they desire which in turn is put into place by an abiding and unthinking bureaucracy. Yet over time the process has been reconceptualised as much more dynamic, featuring a number of different actors and often rejecting a top-down view in favour of more pluralistic models. A number of different conceptualisations of this process exist, one of the most prominent being Paul Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (1988; 1993; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994). The ACF outlines the presence of advocacy coalitions - groups formed of “people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system—i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions—and who show a non-trivial degree of
coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier 1988, 139). Within each advocacy coalition, and for each actor (member) within the group, there are three types of beliefs. First are the deep core beliefs referring to one’s “underlying personal philosophy”; second, the policy core beliefs, which refer to one’s “fundamental policy positions”; and third, secondary aspects, meaning one’s ideas about the funding, delivery and implementation of policy goals (Sabatier 1993, 30-1). Based on their beliefs, a number advocacy coalitions then compete against one another for dominance within a policy subsystem - the “set of actors who are involved in dealing with
a policy problem” - in order to exert influence on the ‘governmental authority’, the decision maker and policy overseer (Sabatier 1988, 138). Based on this, policy decisions are then enacted. Changes to this set up are often minimal due to the relatively fixed nature of core beliefs, thus policy change often relates to changes in secondary aspects (Sabatier 1993, 31).
Peter Hall (1993) presents a similar approach to the notion of policy change by also denoting the importance of underlying cultural factors in the policy-making process. For Hall, policy-making exists within a framework of discourse within which actors share a mutual understanding of the plausible outcomes to policy formulation and change, which he terms a “policy paradigm” (279). His approach goes substantially further into identifying differing extents of policy change through an identification of three different degrees, or to use his terminology, orders of policy change. First order policy change involves the alteration of the settings of a certain policy instrument (278). By this he is referring not to a change in the means of policy delivery but rather the quantity delivered. For example, a first order change in income taxation would be to change the tax rate, while the nature of the tax remains constant along with the underlying goals upon which the tax is based. A second order change would represent a marginally more substantial alteration to both the “instruments of policy as well as their settings” (278-9). Continuing from the previous example, this could be seen through the introduction of a new kind of income taxation, for example on income from stocks and shares as opposed to wages. However, as with first order policy change, second order changes are still subject to an unchanging policy paradigm or worldview. Both of these types of changes are brought about by experience-based learning, being the idea that
“[policy] responds less directly to social and economic conditions than it does to the consequences of past policy” (277). In essence, these types of change are representative of trial and error - relatively minor adjustments based on existing approaches to problem
solving. Fundamental policy change comes in the form of third order changes, which are seismic shifts in policy goals and objectives, where the dominant worldview of a polity breaks down to be replaced by a new one (279). Hall cites the example of the shift of
Keynesianism to Monetarism in the UK during the 1970s whereby the underpinning logic of macroeconomic management was overhauled, giving rise to a completely different set of possible solutions to the puzzles of policy-makers (ibid).
These three orders of change add useful analytical insight by which we are able to grade the extent of policy change, and thus go some way to determining success in regards to action. Afterall, this thesis does not wish to make a subjective judgement on policy success in terms of its results, but rather focus on the level of response that there has been to the climate emergency. Despite the multi-actor ideas that underpin Hall’s conceptualisation, this paper shall take policy change as a symptom of the interaction of these actors. Thus, while this thesis is focused on looking at local councils as an entity, it concedes that beneath the
resulting policy is a more complex picture that is less easily defined. Notions of responsibility and knowledge shall, to a certain extent, shine a light on some of these interactions. However, since this papers central focus is in exploring the response of a given council in terms of its own action, I shall not engage in discussions on the formation of a policy paradigm or the details of various competing coalitions - this lies beyond the scope of this thesis.
Considering the climate emergency in light of this, one could assume that the
declaration of an emergency would constitute a higher order change or a paradigmatic shift in a given policy domain. An emergency declaration is, on paper, a formal acceptance of current policy practices being insufficient to address a problem; it is an acknowledgement that
profound change is required and will ensue. This is not to say that the frame of emergency politics does not represent a paradigm in itself, rather that a certain issue can no longer be
solved within its original domain to a new emergency-orientated one. However, in political practice there are a number of issues that question this logic, as politicians may exploit the politics of emergency in the pursuit of power or political interests. Indeed, such interests may mire notions of responsibility. It is for this reason that this exercise is of great import, to shed light on the nature of political responses to emergencies in an empirical fashion, highlighting that an active response is by no means a requisite.
In summary of this discussion, a cheat sheet has been created so as to clearly outline the key aspects of the final three steps to action and how to spot them:
Category Definition Indicators
Step three: Responsibility to act
Recognition that the responsibility to deal with the issue lies with oneself
Positive indicators
● References to “we-ness” or community (Frantz & Mayer 2009, 207).
Negative indicators
● References to a subordination to other institutions - “diffusion of responsibility” (Frantz & Mayer 2009, 214). Step four: Knowledge of how to act Demonstration of sufficient knowledge of how to solve the problem
Positive indicators
● References to prior reports, studies or other kinds of information related to the climate issue ● Evidence of established protocol for assessing
climate issues Negative indicators
● Requests for new knowledge (reports, surveys etc.) Step five:
Taking action
Governmental action is equated to policy change, the extent of which can be measured via Hall’s three orders of policy change
First order change indicators
● Language of economy, public health, or other non-climate-as-emergency frames.
● Adjustments to the settings of existing policy instruments (Hall 1993).
● Favourable references to prior policy and/or actions (Hall 1993).
Second order change indicators
● Language of economy, public health, or other non-climate-as-emergency frames.
● Introduction of new policy instruments and/or removal of existing policy instruments (Hall 1993) Third order change indicators
● Language of climate-as-emergency
● References to the inability of the present mindset to sufficiently address the problem (Hall 1993) ● Introduction of new policy ambitions/goals (Hall
3. METHODOLOGY
The ambition of this chapter is to highlight the choices made towards the method of analysis as a route to answer the research question. Since this thesis is exploratory in nature, the underlying theme of this is an open one which can provide space to discover and uncover potential new lines of thinking. This chapter shall begin with outlining the reason for which certain cases were selected and then outlining and justifying the data selection, ending with a brief overview of how the analysis shall proceed.
3.1. Case Selection
This thesis has, due to its exploratory nature, opted to employ case studies. Indeed, as posited by Yin (2009), the case study method is of particular use when the researcher has no control over behaviour, but the events subjected to analysis are contemporary (18). This is certainly the case for the phenomenon of climate emergency declarations. I have chosen to use Bristol City Council, Trafford Council and Brighton and Hove City Council as the main subjects of this investigation, predominantly due to the fact that they were among the first to declare a climate emergency. This therefore will offer a greater post-declaration timeframe to be subjected to analysis than other examples which are much more recent. While other declarations were made around a similar time, these represent some of the largest urban early adopters. This thesis has opted to focus on urban communities firstly due to the larger populations that are represented, and secondly due to the impact that urban areas have on climate change due to the large levels of economic activity. Additionally, these councils possess similar scopes of policy action with both Bristol and Brighton and Hove classified as Unitary Authorities, and Trafford as a Metropolitan Borough, meaning they all possess the full scope of policy action available to a local authority in the UK. These three cases were
also chosen due to the availability of data which, as relatively large, urban, local authorities, is relatively extensive and uniform and the frequency at which meetings occur is broadly similar. It is acknowledged that the political leanings of these cases are not purely representative of the UK at large, and further still, as the front-runners in the declaration of a climate emergency, it is evident that these councils are more inclined to address the issue of climate change than many other local governments. However, I intend to measure the extent of the response to the climate emergency, thus alluding to the increased or decreased importance of climate change within the council following the declaration.
3.2. Data and method
This thesis will centre its analysis on the information presented in motions - the legislative acts of local authorities. Included in the motions assessed are, of course, the respective climate emergency declarations of each case. These are to be analysed so as to present an initial understanding of the nature of the move towards action. Indeed, the declarations set the groundwork for the possibilities of the resulting action they induce and thus are pivotal. After analysing the declarations themselves, I shall turn my focus to the motions presented to the Full Council over the period of a calendar year since the initial declaration. The reason why motions are given priority in this thesis is due to the fact that they are one of the major representations of policy change as they themselves constitute the policy of the local authority. Motions are indicative of the decision making of the council as a whole and therefore are of vital importance. Also, the typical format of the motions of local authorities is rather uniform and presents not only the resolutions - what action is to be taken - but also the information and beliefs that underpin each decision. They therefore present a concise but significant indication of the general ideas of each council in regards to each issue. New
reporting or strategic plans require motions to instigate, and due to the short time that has elapsed since the declaration, other documents that have been instigated following the declaration are scarce or incomplete. Other live reporting of council decisions, such as minutes, significantly lack uniformity between councils. For example, Brighton and Hove’s minutes present almost a word for word account of any Full Council meeting, whereas Bristol’s are merely a chronology of decisions taken. Thus, restricting the data to motions alone provides a level of comparability between cases. Within cases using motions avoids the incorporation of political noise which may distort evidence as potential outlying voices may are at risk of being extrapolated as representative of the council at large.
These motions will be limited in number by compiling only the ones which are climate-linked. By this I mean any motion which presents support for an intentional alleviation of the pressures on climate change. This includes not only motions which explicitly aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also those that prevent dwindling biodiversity, encourage recycling or limit plastic use; motions which refer to the climate emergency and raise the risks of environmental deregulation are also included. All motions 1
selected through this definition are presented in the appendix in order to demonstrate the implementation of this selection. The contents of these motions shall then be analysed through the lens of the previously established framework, using the noted indicators to guide the discussion.
For the purposes of clarification I would like to iterate that the ambition of this thesis is not to make an unequivocal judgement on whether or not the declarations have succeeded or failed; rather, I aim to highlight certain behaviours within the decision-making process which are either helping or hindering action. Through the perspective of The Unresponsive
Bystander (Latané & Darley 1970) it will become possible to unveil certain underlying
perceptions held by local government actors about their role and understanding of the climate issue and it will be possible to shed light on the cultural underpinnings which may be stifling real action. It must, too, be made clear that this study by no means will claim to have the final say on the issue; indeed, after little more than a year since the first declaration in the UK, it remains too early for a definitive assessment. However, this thesis wishes to discover early signs, positive or negative, of action to redress the issue. This is, I believe, an essential endeavour given the pressing nature of climate change and the necessity of quick and extensive action.
4. ANALYSIS
This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the key implications that arise from the policy actions of Bristol City Council, Trafford City Council, and Brighton and Hove City Council. The focus of these discussions shall be centred on the climate-linked motions which have been brought before the Full Council of these three authorities; this shall be performed on a case by case basis arranged chronologically according to the date of the emergency
declaration. The selected climate-linked declarations are laid out in the appendix. Within the analysis, specific quotes shall be drawn upon in order to highlight relevant themes which have implications on the response from each case in relation to the framework of The
Unresponsive Bystander. Each case shall begin with a brief introduction of the respective
area and local authority; Bristol City Council’s introduction shall include a separate
discussion on its constitutional framework due to its unique arrangement. Then the analysis shall begin in earnest, first with a more focused look at the declaration, then expanding the discussion to the motions that have followed over the course of a year. The fifth chapter will later collate the key points from across the cases with the aim of establishing a more general understanding of the factors at play in moving from emergency recognition towards action.
4.1. Bristol City Council
Bristol, in England’s southwest, is one of Britain’s larger cities with almost half a million inhabitants residing within the jurisdiction of its City Council (Bristol.gov.uk n.d. c). Before becoming the first UK local authority to declare a climate emergency it has long-been considered as a pioneer in its response to climate change and sustainability. In 2008, Bristol was deemed to be Britain’s most sustainable city rising from third place the year before (The Telegraph 2008) and became the country’s first European Green Capital in 2015. At the same
time, Bristol has a strong economy in comparison with other UK cities, with the 8th highest employment rate, 8th highest level of innovation and the 10th highest productivity rate as of 2017 (Centre for Cities 2018). All this would place the city in good stead for tackling the issue of climate change as there is seemingly an impetus to redress the problem, as well as suitable economic foundations to support solutions. It is important, therefore, to look deeper into the local system of governance in Bristol - which holds a unique position among the three cases having a directly elected mayor heading the executive - and its recent political tendencies in order to provide a contextual basis for the expectations for the success of any potential surge in action to tackle climate change. From this point the analysis shall follow along the lines of the structure outlined at the start of this chapter, first looking at the nature of the declaration itself and then at the development of the Council’s behaviour in light of the declaration, from which a preliminary conclusion shall be drawn.
4.1.1. Institutional context
Bristol City Council was first established through the Local Government Act of 1972, where it was given the status of a non-metropolitan district within the county of Avon, headed by the Avon County Council. In this arrangement, decision-making constituted a two-tier system with the County Council and the City Council sharing the power of local governance. In 1996, following the recommendations of a commission established by a further Local Government Act of 1994, Bristol City Council was elevated to the status of a unitary authority, meaning that all local decision-making powers were vested solely within it.
From its creation, Bristol City Council was the sole authority for both the legislative and executive functions of government at the local level. In 2012 this constitutional
mayoral role to head the executive branch instead of a cabinet formed by members of the governing party (or parties) in the Council. The mayoral election in Bristol uses the preferential voting system of Supplementary Vote, whereby the winning candidate must achieve a vote share of larger than 50 percent (Bristol.gov.uk n.d. b). If this does not occur after all the first preference votes are counted, then all but the leading two candidates are eliminated and the second preference votes of those who voted for an eliminated candidate are then added to the votes of the remaining candidates (ibid). For the first mayoral election, which took place in 2012, turnout was a mere 27.92 percent (Bristol.gov.uk n.d. a); this rose significantly for the 2016 mayoral race to 44.87 percent suggesting increasing levels of legitimacy for the new role (Bristol.gov.uk n.d. d).
It is of great import to discuss the nature of this new division of powers within Bristol as it presents unique challenges to councillors in terms of the scope of their influence. The Mayor’s role is as the leader of the Council and thus does not form an entirely separate institution, though his appointment is independent from that of the Council as a whole (Bristol City Council 2019a, 2). The mayor forms executive through the appointment of a “Deputy Mayor and between one and eight Executive Members from the 70 Councillors” (ibid). The 70 councillors are elected as representatives for their local ward (district), where each ward elects between one and three councillors according to its population size.
Councillors do continue to form part of the executive if selected to become an Executive Member despite the newly increased separation of powers. This could bring about certain conflicting interests among those in this role who work both as councillors, responsible to the constituents of their wards, and at the same time as part of the Mayor’s administration which has been installed on a separate mandate. Together, the Mayor and the 70 councillors form
the Full Council, which “sets the broad Policy and Budget Framework within which the Council including the Mayor and their Executive operates” (ibid).
Substantial decision-making powers reside with the executive and the Mayor, who reserves the right to decide on so-called ‘key decisions’, those “where the Council will incur significant expenditure/savings or which have a significant impact on communities in two or more wards in the City” (3). This may seem rather extensive, though the Full Council
remains responsible for scrutinising the Mayor, as well as maintaining full control over the budget, planning laws, constitution, and the plans and strategies which form the Council’s policy framework; thus, the Mayor remains considerably beholden to the of the Full Council. The focus of this research shall remain on the motions presented by the Full Council in order for a greater consistency across cases, but the specific limitation to this approach must be noted. Indeed, it was the Council, not the Mayor who initiated the emergency declaration.
4.1.2. The climate emergency declaration
Beyond the mere fact that Bristol did indeed declare a climate emergency, it is important to delve a bit deeper into the particular motion which outlined this declaration. In terms of the word count, Bristol Council’s climate emergency is significantly the most expansive of this thesis’ three cases, totalling 601 words, almost double that of Trafford, and more than three times the length of Brighton’s motion. However, thanks to this Council’s particular
constitutional arrangement among the cases, the declaration can only go as far as requesting the Mayor to declare an emergency and to implement policy accordingly. Indeed, he did confirm his support for this orally during the Full Council meeting. One could argue that the emergency declaration by the Council forced a level of responsibility onto the mayor; following the motion it could have been politically detrimental to not respond in a manner
considered to be sufficient. This could go some way to suggest how the declaration of a climate emergency can inherently instill a sense of responsibility to act. Further, due to the nature of the mayoral office and its associated level of public and institutional scrutiny, this enforced accountability to an issue could be seen to speed up the process of action and could contribute towards an explanation of Bristol’s relatively extensive planning for the climate emergency. That being said, however, with the declaration taking place on the 13th
November 2018, it was not until the 16th July 2019 that the Mayor made a formal reiteration of this and formalised the 2030 target for carbon-neutrality and the other requirements of the original motion.
That being said, there are a number of points of interest that must be noted from the motion. The first of these is that a severe threat is explicitly stated by claims that present atmospheric carbon dioxide “far exceeds” that which is “deemed to be a safe level for humanity” (Bristol City Council 2018a, 13). Not only does this language expose a clear threat, it reinforces the notion that the threat posed is currently present, rather than a future expectation. This clearly underlines the declaration’s achievement of both steps 1 and 2 of action in an emergency scenario with the climate issue’s recognition and the clear exposition of the threat it poses and its demarcation as an emergency. However, with the threat being framed as one against humanity, rather than noting specificities of the threat to the residents within the Council’s jurisdiction, it could be interpreted as a problem beyond the scope of the Council, which acts to relieve a certain level of direct responsibility.
Despite this, it is paramount to note that the declaration asserts the Council’s role in addressing the issue as “local authorities [...] should not wait for their national governments to change their policies” before making changes themselves (14). Further, with the stipulated 2030 carbon-neutrality target covering not only Council activity but emissions of the whole
city, it is clear that the Council indeed sees itself responsible for climate action on a city-wide basis, rather than just for its own operations. This is emphasised by the assertion that
“individuals cannot be expected to make this reduction on their own. Society needs to change its laws, taxation, infrastructure, etc., to make low carbon living easier and the new norm” (14). This statement suggests serious intent particularly when considering the ideas discussed earlier about the importance of a self-acknowledged responsibility to help in order to bring about action in emergency situations; as a key institution within society, the Council clearly accepts a certain level of responsibility. Yet it is evident from the declaration that the council does perceive itself to be subordinate to the national government in its ability to address the issue by requiring the Mayor to “call on Westminster to provide the powers and resources to make the 2030 target possible” (15). Though, irrespective of this admission, responsibility is still demanded on behalf of the council in this declaration by emphasising Bristol’s position as a former European Green Capital granting a “duty to be a leader on environmental issues in the UK”, further stating the city’s responsibility to be able to “work with partners across the city and region” as well as “other governments” to tackle the issue (15). In essence, any potential inferiority in means compared to national governments does not absolve the Council of its responsibility to help in the climate emergency. Rather, the Council frames the issue as something for which actors of all levels of power are responsible, insisting on its role as one of many actors who need to take action.
To this end, it is stressed that carbon emissions must be cut by 75% “as soon as possible” (14). In acknowledging the pressing nature of climate change, Bristol’s motion continues by calling for the most ambitious carbon neutrality target of the three cases, “pledg[ing] to make the city of Bristol carbon neutral by 2030, taking into account both production and consumption emissions” (15). By accounting for both sides of economic
activity, this declaration sets lofty ambitions and noting that a lot needs to be done in order to reach this goal as “current plans and actions are not enough” (14). However, despite claims that the issue “must be humanity’s number one priority,” the declaration insists on inserting an economic frame by stressing the “economic benefits in terms of new jobs, economic savings and market opportunities” that can be delivered as a result of climate action (14). This could be viewed as a limit to the intent presented by the declaration as it restrains the climate issue to an economic frame rather than one purely of urgency or existential threats. This could suggest that the declaration is rendered important only insofar as it helps pursue pre-existing economic ambitions, and limits the potential for a wholesale shift towards third order changes. Hence, the extent of action which could be expected to ensue from this should not be overstated.
Indeed, the action made explicit by this particular motion is almost non-existent. Beyond the calls to declare an emergency, impose a 2030 target date for carbon-neutrality, and request assistance from the national government, the other actions only go so far as to ask the Council to: “[w]ork with other governments [...] to determine and implement best
practice”; work with other local actors through pre-existing “relevant strategies and plans”; and “[r]eport to Full Council within six months with the actions the Mayor/Council will take to address this emergency” (15). The absence of actionable policy here hints at a lack of present knowledge about how to tackle the issue, thus limiting the achievement of the fourth step of responding to an emergency. Despite certain proclamations of prior successes made earlier in the motion, the Council admits that their “current plans and actions are not enough” (14). Without any indicator as to what future plans and actions could be implemented, it cannot be ascertained that the Council had, at the time of the declaration, sufficient
mark the beginning of a learning process to acquire this; any developments regarding this shall be exposed later by analysing actions since the declaration.
Overall, the declaration itself alludes to some potential shortcomings of Bristol City Council’s impetus for action in response to the climate emergency. One the one hand there is a clear recognition of the issue and of it being an emergency; there is also a recognition of responsibility despite potential concerns regarding a lack of power vested in the Council, and a subordination to higher levels of government. However, there is little evidence that the Council have the required knowledge to tackle the issue and thus this must be a consideration of the next stage of the analysis. It was acknowledged that the changes that need to take place are substantial, though evidence of this at this stage is absent. The focus of this declaration is on reduction of emissions first and foremost; other related and interconnected issues, such as that of biodiversity, will be considered but only to the extent to which these are connected to greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed the only danger made explicit by the declaration is that which arises from such emissions, with little stated to pinpoint local sources.
4.1.3. The Full Council’s response
Throughout the meetings that have taken place since the emergency declaration was enacted on the 13th November 2018, a total of ten motions have been brought before the Full
Council. Of these motions, six contained explicit mentions of issues related to climate change and of which five passed, with the sixth failing to be voted upon due to time restrictions and therefore shall not be analysed further as it is yet to be debated. This presents a stark contrast 2
Council were explicitly tackled climate issues. These numbers refer only to those motions 3
which contain references to climate change as elaborated upon in the third chapter. By looking solely at this limited insight it could be posited that climate issues are increasingly under consideration by the Council. Such superficial figures alone give little indication of the nature of such considerations and thus a deeper look into the contents of them is necessary.
One of the motions brought to the Full Council with explicit reference to the climate emergency occurred on the 9th September 2019, calling for the Council to support the policy measures contained within a Green New Deal as proposed by the national Labour Party - a motion which was subsequently passed. The nature of this policy acts to reinforce previous concerns about a potential diffusion of responsibility. It stipulates three actions for the Council to take. The first is to merely “restate the urgency of the Climate Emergency” and praise other institutions that have made similar declarations (Bristol City Council 2019c, 13). The second is to reassert support for the One City Plan - which was established in January 2019 and shall be reviewed in more detail later - “and to work towards delivering the Green New Deal locally where possible” (ibid). Such non-committal language here could bring into question the resolve of the Council to take action and indeed it presents no binding
requirement to act. The third resolution simply requests “that the Party Group Leaders write to their respective national party leaders for their support with national legislation, regulation, and investment,” subsequently outlining a number of policy ambitions to be recommended (ibid). This acts to demonstrate once again the Council’s perception of itself as an inferior actor in tackling climate change and thus seeking action from the national government rather than assuring changes in its own behaviour. An amendment to this motion was tabled so as to stipulate local government action, to “call on the Council administration to begin a Green
3A further climate-linked motion was brought to the Full Council at the 13th November 2018 meeting, the same
New Deal for Bristol by committing to actions [...] that are currently within its powers” (10). Indeed, proposing such an amendment does demonstrate the acceptance of a greater
responsibility among some members of the Council, particularly among the Green Party councillors who moved the amendment. However, the amendment’s rejection and the original motion’s subsequent success clearly underlines a reluctance of the Council to accept a
responsibility to act in its capacity as a local authority, thus implying that the third step towards action is not fulfilled in this instance. Indeed, since the nature of this motion was simply to enforce support for a proposed plan brought forward by the national Labour Party, one may suggest that this was simply a political act to legitimise the party as opposed to forcing meaningful action. Indeed, the rejected amendment contained a list of seven actions that the Council has the ability to take unilaterally (10-11). By rejecting these without presenting policy alternatives, the Council both dismisses the offered knowledge and demonstrates none of their own. Thus not only is the accepted responsibility to act in question; so too is a common understanding of how to act.
In the cases of the other four passed climate-linked motions, no similar requests to national powers were put forward (Bristol City Council 2018b; 2019a; 2019b). That being said, each motion did stipulate the need to engage in various ways with other stakeholders, insinuating that responsibility is shared; this could become a route towards inaction if the Council considers unilateral action unviable. Yet, three of the four do call for such unilateral Council resolutions in addition to collaboration which indicates that, although diluted, the responsibility to act is present. What is important to note however, is that in two of these cases the nature of this responsibility is significantly different. While being deemed relevant motions due to their mention of greenhouse gas emissions, both the motion on Anti-Vehicle Idling Zones and the motion on the phasing out of pesticides are approached much more from
a public health perspective. The former emphasises strongly that air pollution “has a massive impact on the health of our [Bristol’s] citizens,” at the same time opting to reference the World Health Organization, The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, and Public Health England, focusing on the health risks to certain demographics (Bristol City Council 2018b, 11-12). The reference to “our citizens” was earlier denoted a positive
indicator for the responsibility to act, however, the issue’s framing turning towards the issue of public health could act to alter this onus of responsibility. Instead of being responsible to act on climate change, the Council only explicitly notes a responsibility to protect the health of its citizenry. This motion does applaud plans for a “new greener fleet” of waste disposal vehicles as well as a shift to less polluting busses and support for electric cars which could be interpreted as a positive sign (11). Yet, if the purpose of this is limited to preventing health issues as opposed to tackling the climate emergency then it cannot be considered to be an acknowledgement of responsibility for this issue as such.
Similarly the latter motion on pesticides gives greater focus to health risks than to climate issues. It does note the potential “deleterious effects on fauna as well as flora” from pesticide use as well as a need to better understand the impacts of glyphosate on biodiversity (Bristol City Council 2019a, 13-14). Still, there is no link made here between biodiversity and climate change, and while the two are most certainly linked, without explicit connections being made it remains unclear as to whether the Council includes biodiversity in its climate change assessments or rather, views it from an alternative standpoint (such animal welfare concerns or an aesthetical judgement of the city landscape). The absence of biodiversity as an issue in the emergency declaration itself could tentatively imply the latter. Further still, the predominant focus of this motion, once again, is public health, with a mention of the “carcinogenic risks,” which, along with other health risks, should be considered “[i]n the
same way that this council is looking to address the risks from air pollution” (14). Once again, with references made to the World Health Organisation and the European Food Safety Agency, it seems that human health is at the centre of this motion, not the environment. The biodiversity connections could act to show a level of responsibility for the climate issue at large, though this cannot be certain. Indeed, what is demonstrated here is that the
multifaceted nature of climate change in terms of its wide-ranging interconnections with a number of different policy domains can act to obscure notions of responsibility. While it is clear from these two motions that the health of Bristolians is an issue for which the Council determines a “duty of care,” a similar account is not overt on the climate issue.
It is important, however, to further contextualise this assessment: these two motions - where the focus on the climate is overshadowed by other considerations - were the first to be brought forward since the declaration itself, the first in December 2018 and the second in January 2019. The three that followed are significantly more climate orientated and explicit and, hence, one must consider the implication of time lags in policy making. Indeed, the declaration cannot be expected to produce instantaneous results, particularly considering that policy takes time to draft and introduce into the legislative arena. The fact that recent motions are more explicitly focused on the climate issue suggests that there is an ongoing movement towards a greater acceptance of responsibility to directly address the issue.
Now turning the attention towards the knowledge of how to act, there are both positive and negative indicators of success at this stage of the path to action. One motion, pertaining to the introduction of Anti-Vehicle Idling Zones, focuses its resolutions on ensuring investigations are taken into the feasibility of an anti-vehicle idling policy (Bristol City Council 2018b, 12-13). Included in this is an assessment into whether existing
request for such information would suggest rather substantial insufficiencies in knowledge at least regarding this one policy. Similar moves are made in the motion seeking the phasing out of pesticides whereby the action demanded comes in the form of producing a report into the risks of a particular pesticide how best to phase it out (Bristol City Council 2019a, 14-15). Both motions do contain references to various external information sources in outlining the need for action, though the information available to date is seemingly insufficient for
successful policy formation. The willingness to use external information in problem framing could suggest positive steps; on the other hand, reluctance to use external information in drawing up policy is concerning.
Yet, on the contrary, the Green New Deal motion, in putting forward the Council’s demands to national government, does emphasise a desire to “enable the accelerated delivery of the Friends of the Earth asks and projects” (Bristol City Council 2019c, 13). This example shows a willingness to utilise the proposed actions of external actors in creating new policy frameworks. However, as with the earlier discussion on this motion, there is a notable reluctance to follow suit in local policy formation. In the rejected amendment, Friends of the Earth was cited as the proposer of the local actions laid out. Hence, there is an apparent discord between how the Council uses information to inform recommendations to the national government on the one hand, and how the very same information is used to form local policy on the other. This could suggest that it is not the knowledge of how to act that is lacking, but rather the willingness to use it. Such unwillingness could be subject to failings in previous steps towards action - a failure of recognised responsibility - or other organisational factors which give priority to actions based on in-house reporting. Indeed, it could be the case that local actions, for which the Council are democratically accountable, necessitate deeper, locally-based evidence to ensure that decisions in this arena are made effectively. Policy
which stipulates national lobby efforts on the Council’s behalf lack the potential for serious political ramifications, as ultimately it is not the Council who is held accountable for such decisions. This could explain why the council more freely accepts external assessments in such cases.
4.1.4. Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that Bristol’s seminal climate emergency declaration constituted a unique approach to tackling the issue of climate change, however, while a clear threat was attested to, a number of concerns have since arisen. The declaration itself verbally defended a responsibility to act while at the same time diverting policy responsibility to the national government. Similar moves to shrug off responsibility were also seen in the motion on the Green New Deal. Indeed the response seems to have been stronger in cases where health frames are used, which suggests that the climate itself is insufficient to trigger Bristol's duty of care. The demand of new reports indeed suggests a willingness to learn but implies a current lack of sufficient understanding to act.
4.2. Trafford Council
The area of Trafford, situated within the Greater Manchester region in the North of England, has a population of approximately 240,000, roughly half that of Bristol (Office for National Statistics 2019). The local authority of Trafford Council represents a number of different towns including Sale, which accounts for more than half of the area’s population, Altrincham and Stretford, as well as the Old Trafford area which lies on the border with the City of Manchester area, and is home to Manchester United Football Club. Being situated on the periphery of Manchester the area includes both urban sections as well as more rural spaces,
though there are still many ties to the urban hub of the UK’s third city. That being said, the authority’s boundaries not being representative of a single city but rather a collection of towns and villages within a larger urban area does create distinctive forms of identity and association among its inhabitants which is likely to be different to the cases of both Bristol and Brighton. This rural and urban mix could provide for contrasting understandings regarding the importance of our natural environment which could impact upon climate policy. Similarly to Bristol, Trafford’s economy is rather successful, generating more jobs than working age citizens, at a ratio of 1.13:1, significantly above the regional and
nationwide averages (Nomis n. d. a). Once this has been laid out, along with, once again, a brief outline of the area’s political context, the analysis shall be carried out in a similar manner to the previous case, followed with a preliminary assessment of Trafford’s climate action.
Trafford’s constitutional set-up, which shall be the next topic of discussion, is much more in line with the majority of local authorities in the UK, without a separately elected executive. According to the constitution, the Full Council is responsible for “making, amending, revoking, re-enacting or adopting bylaws and promoting or opposing the making of local legislation or personal Bills” (Trafford Council 2019d, 8). In this regard the
Council’s local decision making arsenal seems to be comprehensive, or at least more so than Bristol where bigger decisions are vested within the Mayor. In Trafford, the executive branch, as is the case in parliamentary systems, is fused within the legislative branch and is made up of members of the governing party or parties. While a Mayor exists in name, it is in name only as this function is solely ceremonial - the Mayor chairs council meetings but has no decision making power. One important thing to note is that Trafford Council is a constituent member of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, an institution which
