The Bologna Process: An Open Method of
Coordination?
Author Hieke van der Voort
Student number 10366814
Main Supervisor Jamal Shahin
Second Supervisor Menno Spiering
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Contents
The Bologna Process: An Open Method of Coordination?
1
Contents
2
Introduction
4
Chapter 1
6
The Open Method of Coordination: New Mode of Governance?
6
1.1. Introduction
6
1.2. Hard law versus soft law in the EU
6
1.3. The history of the OMC
9
1.4. Critical review
12
1.5. Conclusion
14
Chapter 2
16
The Origins and Structure of the Bologna Process
16
2.0 Introduction
16
2.1. History of the Bologna Process
16
2.2. The organisation of the Bologna Process
18
2.3. Measuring Progress and the Stock-Taking Procedure
20
2.4. The Ministerial Conference and the Communiqué
22
2.5. Conclusion
24
Chapter 3
26
The Bologna Process in the Netherlands
26
3.0 Introduction
26
3.1 Network of actors in the Netherlands
27
3.2 Netherlands in the international context
29
3.3. Bologna coordination in the Netherlands
30
3.3. International Cooperation in the Bologna Context
32
3.4 Conclusion
34
Chapter 4 - The European Commission and the Bologna Process
36
4.0. Introduction
36
4.1 The role of the European Commission in the Bologna Process
36
4.2. Internal Dimension
38
4.3. The External Dimension
39
4.4. Conclusion
41
Conclusion
43
Literature and references
48
Policy Documents
50
Interviews
52
Abbreviations
53
Introduction
Since its official introduction in 2001 the Open Method of Coordination has been used by the European Union as a method of soft law policy making. The Open Method can be used in areas of policy that are not suited to hard law policy making in the European context, because the national laws cannot be harmonised easily, or because the subject of policy making is politically sensitive and there is much resistance against European laws. A quintessential example of such a policy area is higher education. Each European member state has its own historical context and academic tradition. There is a great diversity in academic systems in Europe and the way higher education is organised is often subject of public
discussion. With all these national differences it is difficult to establish general laws or policy. This is one of the reasons the European Union does not have legal competency in this area: the member states were never willing to give up national autonomy to create European harmonisation.
In the last 25 years, however, there have been radical changes within national higher education systems, due to European harmonisation. 47 European countries, both EU and non-EU countries, have cooperated intensively to establish an European Higher Education Area. After the Bologna Declaration in 1999, members of the Bologna Process have worked together to harmonise their national education systems. The Bologna Process is intergovernmental and based on voluntary cooperation. It is based on declarations and communiqués, and not on treaties or laws. In the public discussion the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy are often confused. They are both European projects, with a great overlap in members and a similar goal: creating one competitive European area for higher education. The difference is that the Lisbon Strategy is an official EU strategy, while the Bologna Process was an initiative of
European Ministers of Education.
In this thesis I will look closely at the organisation of the Bologna Process, both in an European and a national context. The goal of this is to find out to what extent the Bologna Process fits the characteristics of the Open Method of Coordination. The set-up of my research questions is relatively straight forward. I will first discuss the Open Method of Coordination. Then I will discuss the origins and structure of the Bologna Process, to see how its characteristics fit into the Open Method. The second half of my chapter will be dedicated to the Bologna Process itself. How has it developed over time, and what do those developments mean for the countries that are involved? I narrow this research down to one case study: the Netherlands. This country makes an interesting case study, because it was involved in the Bologna Process as early as the Bologna Declaration. From the beginning the Netherlands has had a reputation as a forerunner in the process. I will look at developments in the Dutch approach towards the Bologna Process. In order to give full disclosure on the relationship between the Bologna Process and the Open
Method of Coordination, I will dedicate my final chapter towards the role of the European Commission. How has the European Commission been involved, and how did this role change over time? What threats does this influence pose to the member countries, and what opportunities does it offer?
Methodology
Some words on my methodology. Most of my research relies on analysis of communications and policy documents. There is an abundance of documents, reports and archival resources concerning the Bologna Process, available in the archive of the EHEA and in the database of the European Commission. I have used the Communications of the EHEA, and reports written by the working groups of the BFUG, as well as the stock-taking reports published by both the European Commission and the EHEA. I was trained as a historian, and thus my natural inclination is to be descriptive in my research, and to rely on qualitative analysis of texts. I do not aim to theorise the developments in abstract models, but I try to give more insight into the actors within the Bologna Process and their motives and interests. In those areas where fewer written sources were available, I have used interviews as a source. This is mainly in chapter three, the Dutch case study. I have interviewed current and past Bologna Coordinators at the Ministry of Education, and I have interviewed a number of Bologna Experts in the Netherlands on their experiences with the Bologna Process in the Netherlands. A full list of interviewees can be found in my literature list. In my thesis I use both the terms ‘Bologna Process’ and ‘EHEA’ to describe the group of members who have signed the Bologna Declaration and actively work on implementing the Bologna goals. Formally the European Higher Education Area was completed in 2010. With the term I refer to all members countries of the EHEA. The term ‘Bologna Process’ is used to describe the process in itself: it refers to the procedures, structures and other practical issues within the Bologna Process. With the term ‘(Bologna) Experts’ I refer to the group of Bologna National Experts who have been appointed by the European Commission as promotors of the Bologna Process. This is a specified group, which is why I capitalise the word Experts when referring to those individuals. If I used the term ‘experts’ without a capital, I mean general experts: policy experts on internationalisation, for example, or academics who have expertise in European Policy Studies. With the term ‘Bologna Coordinator’ I refer to the official BFUG representative of the Ministry of Education: the civil servant who coordinates the Bologna Process at the Dutch Ministry of Education, and who advices the Ministry on Bologna matters. Throughout my thesis I use a set of abbreviations. I always write out the term in full the first time, and then use abbreviations. In the annexes I have included a list of abbreviations.
Chapter 1
The Open Method of Coordination: New Mode of Governance?
1.1. Introduction
In 2000 the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was officially endorsed as a method of policy-making, at the Lisbon Council. The Open Method of Coordination is a method that is used in the European Union to create harmonisation in policy areas that are not defined in EU treaties. As the name suggests, the OMC is used in the EU to coordinate processes of policy-making. When a EU body wants to harmonise several national policies in areas where it has no competency, the OMC can ensure harmonisation without compromising the sovereignty of Member States. The EU sets a general goal and creates a set of guidelines and a time path. The Member States then proceed to reach the goal through policy that is suited to the national law, traditions and social system. This national approach to reach the European goal is described in a National Action Plan (NAP). In this way, each Member State can work towards reaching the common goal, without a complete europeanisation of the national culture. The method is called ‘Open’, because public consultation is an essential part of the process. Each Member State should consult both public and private organisations, experts and citizens. The EU body that set out the policy process also coordinates. Each year the Member States hand in an Annual Report, and the coordinating party evaluates the progress of the Member States by benchmarking the results.
The OMC is seen as a new form of policy-making, because of these two aspects: public
consultation as an inherent part of the policy process, and the fact that the EU sets goals and guidelines, but leaves the formulation of a National Action Plan with the Member States, Since its endorsement in 2000, the OMC has been the subject of both praise and criticism. It has been praised as a ‘laboratory’ for experiments in democratic policy-making, and criticised because there are wide differences between its objectives and implementation. In this chapter I will first look at the origins of the OMC, and then analyse the critical reviews of the OMC, in order to get a broad view of the benefits and drawbacks of the method.
1.2. Hard law versus soft law in the EU
In order to fully understand the novelty of the Open Method of Coordination, it is important to fully understand how it works and what makes it different from the Community Method. First of all, it is important to note that several, among whom Radaelli, point out that there is no such thing as ‘the’ Open Method of Coordination. The OMC is an umbrella term for methods of policy that use characteristics of the OMC as it is described in the Conclusions of the Lisbon Council. The method varies in different policy areas, and as such the OMC should be seen as a genre, more than a strict and singular method of policy-making. In the Conclusions of the Lisbon Council, the OMC is explained as a means of ‘spreading best 1
practices and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals’, which is used in areas where it
Radaelli, Claudio. ‘The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance architecture for the European 1
can be effective and useful. This also means that the OMC is used in different fields than the Community 2
Method. They are not interchangeable, as they have a different nature and character. The Community Method is representative for hard law, while the Open Method of Coordination is seen as an example of soft law. They have different directives. In cases where the Community Method is used, the goals is to create uniform EU rules that Member States of the EU must adopt. These rules replace national law. They are binding, and the law provides sanctions enforced by the European Court of Justice if the rules are not followed. The law also has a procedure for non-compliance and Member States can be challenged in court. This makes the Community Method an effective method to achieve goals in the EU: the rules are clear and uniform and they can be enforced if necessary. The diversity and effectiveness of the 3
Community Method are guaranteed by its three levels of operation. Laws are proposed by the European Commission, they are adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, and they are enforced by the European Court of Justice. The Community Method has been criticised for being complex and undemocratic, because it is so far away from national citizens. 4
Therefore the European Commission published the White Paper on Governance in 2001, where it explains how, among others, soft law mechanisms can help solve this problem. The Open Method of Coordination is one of the methods that can be used for this. The effectiveness and results of the OMC are dependent on an entirely different way of working than the Community Method. As with the Community Method, the European Commission creates directives, general goals of policy. Unlike with the Community Method, however, the Commission does not propose a method or solution, but invites Member States to find a suitable answer to the problem. Whether or not the Member States reach the goal within the set time and framework, is entirely up to the Member States. The OMC knows no sanctions and has no procedures of enforcing the cooperation of Member States. This potentially makes OMC only ‘paper tiger’. However, the OMC depends on other mechanisms of pressure, with competition among Member 5
States as its main driving force. While the European Commission frames the OMC as a ‘community of learning’, the OMC mostly depends on a culture of competition, where the best-achieving Member States will praised, and the worst-achieving Member States will feel pressured to perform better. Although ‘naming and shaming’ is officially no longer allowed in the EU, the mechanism of social pressure remains important. Trubek and Trubek distinguish at least six other ways the OMC could be effective. Naming and shaming is one way, learning from each other’s example by mimicking or by creating a discourse, another. Then there is deliberation: national or international discussions on the EU directives, which leads to more attention towards the policy subject. Learning from each other is one way of achieving goals that Trubek and Trubek agree with. And then there is the last possible effective measure of the OMC, the creation of networks. Creating European and national networks brings together relevant actors, which will lead to more effective policy. Again, however, competition is a necessary premise for this: without social 6
Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, §37. 2
David Trubek and Louise Trubek. ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open 3
Method of Co-ordination’. European Law Journal (2005) 11:3, 343-364
European Commission. ‘ European Governance - A White Paper’ (2001), COM(2001) 428 final/2001/C 287/01 4
Trubek and Trubek, ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe’, p. 356 and 357. 5
Trubek and Trubek, ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe’, p. 356 and 357. 6
pressure, these ways will not be effective. Another important condition is that the practical execution of the method is important for its effectiveness. Taking into consideration these two conditions, the OMC is essentially different from the Community Method, because it is based on the intrinsic motivation of Member States, rather than the pressure of formal sanctions.
Because the OMC does not provide sanctions and procedures for enforcement, it is more of a mode of governance, than it is a method of policy making. The Community Method, on the other hand, is a method of making political decisions through supranational bodies of the EU: the European
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is a method of indirect democracy: representatives of the Member States are closely involved through the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, but the law itself is designed by officials of the European Commission and there is no direct involvement of citizens. And, importantly, the law is uniform and applicable to all Member States, regardless of the different national systems and culture. Therefore the Community Method only works in terrains where the European Union has jurisdiction, that is to say, in those areas and subjects that are defined in EU Treaties. These areas are restricted by the two principles of EU law: those of subsidiarity and proportionality. The EU needs to respect the sovereignty of the Member States by limiting itself to laws that are necessary to achieve the goals of EU Treaties, and therefore all law needs to be proportional to these goals, as is set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. At the same time, all EU law is subject to the principle of subsidiarity. The EU only has competence to create laws in areas national legislature does not cover. This principle is written down in Article 5 of the Treaty of the EU. Then, lastly, the EU has the principle of conferral. This principle establishes that the EU only has
competence in those areas that are conferred upon the EU through EU Treaties. These three exclude many policy areas from the reach of the EU: especially areas less relevant to the creation of a single market, such as health, culture, education, youth and sport.
It is in this area, where there is no competence for hard law that the Open Method of
Coordination is an alternative. The OMC, as the name suggests, is more about governance than it is about actual policy-making, and can well be used in areas in which the EU wishes to exert some influence without trespassing the limits of its competence. In the Conclusions of the Lisbon Summit of 2010 the official guidelines for the OMC are presented. The OMC must contribute to the common objectives in the Treaty, and should not be used in areas where the Community Method is possible. Furthermore, the OMC should only be used when there are clearly defined goals and objectives. It should have built-in regular mechanisms for reporting to the European Parliament. The European Commission should be closely involved and play a coordinating role in the process. And, finally, the data and information generated throughout the process should be widely available. The data must be collected in such a way that they can help determine whether legislative or programme-based action is needed to overcome the problems highlighted in the objectives. I will use these characteristics later on in my research to see how they 7
apply to the Bologna Process.
Communication from the Commission of 25 July 2001 "European governance - A white paper" [COM(2001) 428 7
The main advantage of the Open Method of Coordination is that it leaves autonomy with the Member States. In the complex areas of policy where the OMC operates, there are great differences between the national systems of the Member States. Each state has it own model of healthcare, education and welfare and therefore it is difficult to establish one single policy for these countries. The OMC allows Member States to look for solutions that fit the national system and culture. To find these solutions, the OMC also provides another major advantage. The OMC is an open system, in the sense that it does not limit policy-making to Member States and national governments. The OMC specifically invites Member States to include national (and international) stakeholders in the process. This is why it has been praised as a laboratory for democratic policy-making. Depending on the execution of the process, the OMC leaves room for a wide field of players and actors. It involves stakeholders in the creation of new policy, which ideally leads to policies which are suited to their interests and wishes.
1.3. The history of the OMC
As noted in the introduction, the OMC was embedded as a method of policy-making in 2000. There are many theories and visions on the emergence and necessity of the OMC. These visions can be summarised into four main approaches, which each illuminate one aspect of the process: historical contingency, political realism, legal principles, and finally, the necessity for a new mode of governance in the EU. In the first approach, the emergence of the OMC had a very pragmatic rationale. At the Lisbon Summit, the Member States pledged that Europe would become the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, ‘while at the same time maintaining a commitment to solidarity and equality.’ Trubek 8
and Trubek argue that these two aims were impossible to reach in the early 2000s, because a competitive European knowledge-based economy would require a greater harmonisation of the European social policy. There was, however no legal basis for this, because the EU did not have any competency in the social areas of policy. The lack of Treaty-based competence required a new solution to create policy in these areas. One solution would be to create new EU Treaties which would expand the EU’s legal competency. However, this solution was not viable, because the EU had reached already a ‘deadlock in decision-making’, even without an expansion of EU Treaties. Because the competition between Member States and the multi-level decision making policy made the EU a very bureaucratic system increasingly less capable of making policy decisions. With the OMC the EU moved away from hierarchical decision-making, as the actual decision-making lies with the Member States. Thus, using the OMC was preferred over an expansion of EU Treaties, as it provided a way out of the deadlock. 9
Increasing bureaucracy in Brussels and Strasbourg was not the only reason why no new Treaties were created. In his article on the origination of the EU, Armin Schäfer argues that there was very limited support for an expansion of EU Treaties in the area of social policy, mainly because of historical
institutional reasons. According to Schäfer, decision-making in the EU should be explained from the
Trubek, David and Trubek, Louise. ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open 8
Method of Co-ordination’. European Law Journal (2005) 11:3, 343-364
Erika Szysczak, ‘Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination’. European Law Journal (2006) 12:4, 9
perspective of historical institutionalism. The traditional Community Method is based in supranational institutions. Via European Treaties, the Member States authorise European institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, to create laws and policy. Although this
authorisation is limited by the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and conferral - which I will further discuss later in this chapter - these supranational bodies are authorised to act for the Member States. This means a loss of sovereignty for the Member States, in trade for a coherent European law. As the European Union has gradually moved towards areas of policy which were traditionally exclusively national,
especially in the area of social policy, this has become more problematic in national politics. Each Member State has its own traditions and history in its social welfare system, and Schäfer argues that the Open Method of Coordination benefited from historical contingent events that led to a climate suitable to the OMC. In the mid-1990s, there was a European political tendency towards left-wing national governments, who traditionally supported European influence less than the center right-wing Christian Democrat governments that had been in power until that time. The governments, thus, started to call 10
for ‘neo-voluntarist, soft mode of governance’, which involved more autonomy for the Member States and less supranational governance, especially in social policy. The OMC brought a solution to these 11
problems, and is attractive for governments because of several reasons. It is a flexible system that can be adapted to ‘diverse institutional arrangements, legal regimes and national circumstances in the member states’ . An important benefit of the OMC is, furthermore, that it is voluntary: it gives the impression that 12
Member States are free to create their own policy, even if they are guided to the goals through the coordination process. As it can be flexibly interpreted, it helps ‘superseding political resistance’.
Furthermore, it permits shifting blame, which helps national governments to enforce policy that they can blame the EU for. And, lastly, it offers symbolic politics, because a joint action of European governments against social issues ‘fosters the impression of determination’. 13
The third approach is less focused on the Member States’ national politics, but embeds the emergence of the OMC ‘in the master discourse of competitiveness’. Radaelli sees the ‘lack of shared beliefs on what the European model of capitalism should be’ as the main obstacle towards the formation of a EU social strategy. The EU is comprised of many different social models, which are ‘based on different norms, work through different institutions, and produce different responses to the challenges of
increased competition in an integrated world economy. These differences made especially areas of 14
social policy politically sensitive. The OMC was presented as a solution to this problem. As the system allows Member States to pursue the general aims on their own terms, ‘OMC can be described as a ‘political space’ wherein sensitive policies can be made without clashing over the norms and values of
Schäfer, Armin. ‘Beyond the Community Method: Why the Open Method of Coordination was Introduced to 10
European Policy-making’. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) (2004) 8:13, online <http://eiop.or. at/eiop/ texte/2004-013a.htm>
Schäfer, ‘Beyond the Community Method’, p. 11. 11
Ibidem 12
Idem, p. 12. 13
Radaelli, Claudio. ‘The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance architecture for the European 14
different models of capitalism’. This was especially relevant because of the earlier described Lisbon aim 15
of becoming the world’s most competitive knowledge based economy.
In the fourth and last theory, the OMC is not so much a historical or political necessary step, as it is an experiment in democratic governance. This is a theory that Radaelli explains, stating that the OMC offers new insights in policy-making and soft law governance. ‘Better governance’ is here understood as ‘“Better” in the sense that soft law is no longer seen as a second-best option in cases where legislation cannot be produced’ Instead, the new method of the OMC is viewed as ‘superior to traditional approaches because it fosters learning and provides flexibility to the policy process.’ In many texts the OMC is 16
spoken of as a form of experimentalist governance, which provides a new mode of governance, because of its new way of decision-making: by engaging civil groups such as civil servants, scientific experts and representatives of interest groups in the process of deliberation, the Open Method ensures to close the democratic gap not only by engaging and stimulating Member States to formulate a policy suited to national conditions, but also by engaging these non-political groups, so that all policy is fitted to the needs of those who will be subjected to it. This has the further advantage of creating new and 17
unexpected solutions to complex problems. By interacting with ‘dense multi-level networks’, several perspectives can be compared and this can lead to creative solutions. 18
Each of the approaches I have described point out a different element of the conditions under which the Open Method of Coordination was initiated. The Open Method of Coordination is not the first in its kind. There have been several procedures for soft-law policy making, and the OMC itself is similar to the European Employment Strategy, which has been called the OMC’s predecessor. The EES began in 1994 when the European Council asked the Member States to draw up programmes to fight
unemployment in their countries, and to report the results via annual reports on the implementation of these Multiannual Programmes (MAPs). In this case the Council provided the framework for these plans by stating the priority themes and setting four areas which the MAPs should address. The annual reports that followed the implementation of the programs were assessed by the European Commission,
European Council or Council of Ministers. After five years of implementing and assessing, the EES itself was reviewed. The results of these were in turn used to make recommendations for further EU policy on the subject.
In theory, the Open Method of Coordination was thus a new method of governance, that would help close the gap between the EU level of policy making and national governments. It would help to harmonise EU law, while preserving national sovereignty. Perhaps the most important and innovative aspect of the OMC was the built-in public consultation, which would bring the EU closer to citizens and consequently help to decrease the democratic deficit of the EU.
Radaelli, ‘The Open Method of Coordination’, p. 21. 15
Radaelli, ‘The Open Method of Coordination, p. 22. 16
Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin. ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist 17
Governance in the EU.’ European Law Journal (2008) 14:3, 271-327.
Susana Borrás and Claudio Radaelli. ‘Recalibrating the Open Method of Coordination: Towards Diverse and More 18
1.4. Critical review
However, not all political theorists agree on the benefits and working of the OMC. From the start of the OMC, the OMC has been criticised by academics. These critiques can be divided into three categories: fundamental criticism on the concept of the OMC, critique on the execution of the OMC, and critique on the effects of the OMC. Often these critiques are inherent to the OMC: they are the flip side of the coin. Many of the benefits of the OMC are also its possible downfalls.
Critique on the fundament of the OMC
In the first category, that of fundamental critique, the advantages of the OMC are also seen as essential weaknesses. Szyzczak, for example, points out that the foundation of the OMC is not in compliance with the principles of the European Union. The EU, as I have explained, is founded on the principles of rule of law, and the principle of good governance. A governmental body should create policy that are based on transparency, accountability, and a democratic process. In the process of policy-making in the Open Method, however, there is ‘no clear demarcation between rule-making and rule-implementation.’ The 19
European Commission establishes a procedure and a general goal, while the national governments both create and implement their solution. The Commission then reviews these rules and can then decide to make additional rules or to set additional standards. This is contrary to the idea of separation of powers, because there is no party that legitimises this process.
The effectiveness of the OMC is entirely dependent on its practical execution, as with all forms of soft law. The OMC will only work if the theory of competition among Member States holds true. If there is no competition among Member States, there will be no peer pressure to keep up with the leading Member States. And if there is no competition, the Member States will not be impressed by naming and shaming. The accession of new Member States to the EU poses a problem to these premises, because 20
they shift the balance in the European equilibrium. As the EU admits new Member States, the differences between the Member States become greater. There are more different national social systems, but the economical differences also become greater. The mechanism of the OMC assumes that all Member States are equal. Competitiveness can only be successful when the Member States have similar starting points. If one of the participants has significantly fewer resources, and is behind in terms of political efficiency, there is no equal competition. As the EU expands, this raises problems for the OMC, for which there are no easy solutions, as De la Rosa shows. 21
Critique on the execution of the OMC
These fundamental critiques are closely related to the critiques on the practical execution of the OMC. The proposed benefits of the OMC are only beneficial if they are effectively executed. The growing
Szyszczak, Erika. ‘Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination’ European Law Journal (2006) 12:4, 19
486-502, p. 495
Szyszczak, ‘Experimental Governance’, p. 500. 20
De la Rosa, Stéphane. ‘The Open Method of Coordination in the New Member States - the Perspective for its Use 21
inequality between the Member States is one example of a situation in which the fundament and execution of the OMC are closely related. Another area where the execution of the OMC is related to the assumed benefits, is the area of public participation. One of the intended by effects of the OMC was a heightened involvement of non-governmental actors in policy-making. The OMC is called a ‘new mode of governance’ because it experiments with new forms of public consultation. The OMC depends on a multi-level network of stakeholders, who all give input to the national government. When all parties cooperate to create national policy, the OMC is more democratic than other methods of policy-making, because it involves stakeholders in the policy before it is legitimised. This multi-level network should consist of diverse groups of stakeholders, all of whom have an equal influence. These groups can be NGOs, civil initiatives, but also individual citizens. In reality, however, not all groups are equally represented, if they are represented at all. Empirical research in policy areas in which the OMC is used, shows that
participation and engagement of civil actors is not always used in a satisfactory way. As civil 22
participation is one of the main benefits of the OMC, this is quite serious critique of the OMC. However, as Borrás and Radaelli point out, there is room for improvement in this aspect of the OMC, and there are more dangerous effects, not all of which were intended, of the OMC. 23
Critique on the effects of the OMC
These unintended by effects of the OMC are the flip side of the coin. As described in the previous, the OMC was originally designed because the Community Method could not be used in areas where the EU has no legitimacy. With the OMC, policy can be harmonised while the national sovereignty of member states is not undermined. The obvious downside of this theory is that the EU does get involved in this process, as it creates guidelines and sets benchmarks against which the process of member states is measured. As Szyzsczak argues, this results in a ‘subtle penetration into areas of competence outside of Community competence. The framing of a Community policy through guidelines, indicators, and benchmarking is not a soft, or neutral process, but shapes the framework within which national policies, and actors must work.’ The EU is increasingly leading in policy areas in which it has no legitimacy. The 24
standards and guidelines that the EU provides, form a normative frame in which the progress of member states is measured. This is emphasised by the fact that the OMC is a process which, by nature, requires that member states rethink their national policy and possibly prompts national debate on the subject. 25
Furthermore, although the OMC is supposed to be a solution to national differences on politically sensitive subjects, the OMC ultimately does not respect these national difference. The OMC is based on a system of competition and learning from each other. These two are at odds with each other, because the
See, for example, Smismans, Stijn. ‘New Modes of Governance and the Participatory Myth’. Western European 22
Politics (2008) 31:5, 874-895, and De la Porte, Caroline and Nanz, Patrizia. ‘The OMC - a deliberative-democratic mode
of governance? The cases of employment and pensions’. Journal of European Public Policy (2004), 11:2, 267-288. Borrás, Susana and Radaelli, Caludio. ‘Recalibrating the Open Method of Coordination: Towards Diverse and More 23
Effective Usages’. Sieps (2010) 7, 1-100
Szyzsczak, ‘Experimental Governance, p. 500’. 24
Kröger, S. (2007) ‘The End of Democracy as We Know It? The Legitimacy Deficits 25
of Bureaucratic Social Policy Governance’. Journal of European Integration , Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 565–82, p. 568.
benchmarks influence the outcome of the national policy process. As Tsoukalis argues, the framework of benchmarks and results creates patterns of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and this means that sember states will feel pressured to conform to the outcomes of the ‘winners’. Therefore the member states who are in the 26
lower regions of the benchmarks will look up to the member states who have made progress in the area, and they will feel inclined to conform to the policy of the successful member states. Although this learning effect is part of the OMC, this is an effect that is paradoxical.
1.5. Conclusion
The number of publications on the nature and effects of the OMC is almost countless, and this chapter is too short to even give a concise overview of the results of all this research. Broadly speaking, the OMC is praised because it provides a new mode of governance, which helps to navigate away from the
increasingly complex bureaucracy of the Community Method. It is important to note that the OMC relies on two premises: the first is competition between the Member States, and the second is an effective and well-functioning execution of the method itself. These conditions also mean that the OMC supposes equality between all Member States: they can only be in fair competition when the starting position is equal and more or less similar.
In the critical reviews of the OMC these premises are mostly the source of criticism. Not all Member States are equal, and the accession of new Member States poses problems as there is an increasing economic diversity in the European Union. Is it really fair to compare the achievements of a new Member State with that of an established and economically well-faring Member State such as Germany? The OMC also supposes that all networks are effective: that civil actors are closely involved in the creation of new policy, and that the National Action Plans are actually bringing in the expected results. One problem in assessing the OMC is that relatively little empirical research has been done to see if the OMC works in practice. Other criticisms focus not so much on the execution of the OMC, but on its effects. They claim that the European Union is slowly increasing its influence on areas that belong to the competency of the Member States. In this way the European Union is becoming more influential in the nation states, where it was actually supposed to stimulate the growth of national sovereignty.
To review a specific case of the Open Method of Coordination, it is therefore important to note that the OMC is a complex method. The effectiveness of the OMC entirely depends on the way the OMC is executed, and to what extent the rules of the principles of the OMC are brought in practice. In order to review the OMC in a specific policy area, one should not look only at the results, but also critically review the set-up and execution of the process in that area. Therefore I will closely look at the history and theoretical principles of the Bologna process. First to see to what extent the Bologna process fits into the Open Method of Coordination, and then to see how exactly the principles of the Bologna process are used in practice.
Tsakatika, Myrto. ‘A Parliamentary Dimension for EU Soft Governance.’ Journal of European Integration (2007) 29:5, 26
Chapter 2
The Origins and Structure of the Bologna Process
2.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed the Open Method of Coordination. In this chapter I will introduce the Bologna Process, and discuss its history, structure and objectives. The Bologna Process is a process resulting from the Bologna Declaration, which was signed in 1999. It is a process that grew organically, both in size and in set-up. It was originally strictly intergovernmental, and signed by 29 European countries. It is often described as an open process, characterised by pragmatism and idealism. Others, however, have been more critical about the process, and especially the role of the European Union. Especially in academic literature it has been claimed that the Bologna Process is used by the European Union to extend its mandate, and to become more involved in areas that do not belong to the European (…), because they are not described in Treaties. In this respect the Lisbon Strategy is an interesting counter-process. The 2009 Lisbon Strategy has more or less the same goals in the field of higher
education as the Bologna Process, and all Member States involved in the Lisbon Strategy, are also part of the Bologna Process. I will not go into the Lisbon Strategy too much in this chapter, because the
relationship between the two processes has been widely discussed. However, it is important to note the importance of the Bologna Process as a sort of ‘grassroots’ process, created and executed almost entirely by national Ministries of Higher Education, and within those Ministries mostly by policy officials.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The history of the Bologna Process, to understand the political and historical context. The organisation of the Bologna Process: who is involved, how is progress measured, which arrangements are made. The last two sections give further details on the meetings, and describe the goals and tasks of the Bologna Follow-Up Group and the Ministerial Conferences.
2.1. History of the Bologna Process
The Bologna Process started in 1999, ten years after the end of the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall. The Central and Eastern European countries had not yet joined the European Union, but the bonds between Western and Central Europe were slowly growing. It was also the period of rapid economic growth, and in many countries the higher education system had grown to its limits, because higher education had become much easier accessible for students from all kinds of backgrounds. And, finally, it is important to note that this was a period of rapid growth of digital infrastructure. The world wide web and e-mail became more readily available, and were also introduced in office settings. This made communication on an international level much more attractive.
It is within this context that the Bologna declaration was issued in 1999, by 29 European Ministers of higher education. The declaration was meant as a mission statement, to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010. The EHEA was supposed to make European higher education attractive and competitive, especially compared to American higher education. By cooperating the European
Ministers of Higher Education hoped to make the European higher education system the most attractive
system to study world wide. Already at the beginning the Declaration was signed by countries well beyond the European Union, including the countries formerly behind the iron country.
The Bologna Declaration set the following objectives to create the European Higher Education Area:
- A system of ‘easily readable and comparable degrees’;
- A system of two cycles: undergraduate and graduate, with the undergraduate degree as ‘an appropriate level of qualification’ for the European labour market;
- A system of transferrable credits, such as the ECTS system to promote mobility;
- Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles, for both students and teachers, researchers and administrative staff;
- Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance
- ‘Promotion of the necessary European dimension in higher education on the level of curricular development, inter-institutional cooperation, mobility schemes and integrated programmes of study, training and research’. 27
The Bologna Process was initially explicitly organised as an independent, intergovernmental process, where the European Union was not involved. Although the European Commission had expressed interest to join the process, the members initially did not want the European Commission involved. However, as 28
Bologna Declaration (1999), p. 3-4. 27
Interview C, 28 April 2015 28
Source: Global Higher Ed, created by University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab. Online,
the administrative burden grew along with the process, the EU was asked to provide financial support and so became involved in the Bologna Process. I will go into further detail about this in the third chapter of this thesis.
The goal of the Bologna Process was to create a European Higher Education Area by 2010. At every Ministerial Conference a new communiqué was adopted, where the plans for the following years were laid out. In the Leuven Communiqué adopted in 2009, it was stated that the European Higher Education Area has been developed, characterised by ‘permanent cooperation between governments, higher education institutions, students, staff, employers and other stakeholders’. However, as the
objectives set out by the Bologna Declaration and the policies developed in the subsequent years are still valid’, the Ministers committed to implement the Bologna objectives beyond 2010. After 2010, the 29
Bologna countries were often referred to as European Higher Education Area, emphasising that the Bologna Process is formally created. At the Budapest-Vienna meeting, where the EHEA was celebrated in 2010, a new Declaration was issued along the lines of the Leuven Communiqué. In this Declaration, no specific time path was mentioned, implying that the Bologna Process is now a network of cooperating countries, rather than a specific policy process. After 2010, the pre-2010 structure was maintained,
despite the fact that there was no clear goal. In 2015 the first meeting in a non-EU country is organised, in Yerevan, Armenia.
2.2. The organisation of the Bologna Process
The Bologna Declaration is an intergovernmental, non-binding manifest exclusively signed by ministers responsible for higher education. It is important to notice this: it is in no way like a treaty that can be ratified and later enforced legally. The driving force of the Bologna process is the commitment of each individual member. In order to motivate the members to stay committed, a Ministerial Conference is organised every two years to speak about the progress and future of the Bologna goals. The Bologna Process can be joined by all countries that are part of the European Cultural Convention, and as such it is not limited to member states of the European Union. The only exception to this is the European 30
Commission, which joined as a full member of the process in 2001. Apart from the full membership of the European Commission, some other non-state parties have been added to the process as consultative members. This means that these groups can give advice to the Bologna members, and that they can attend and organise seminars and meetings. These official partners are the European University
Association (EUA), the European Students Union (ESU) [formerly called ESIB], the European Association of Institutions in Higher Education (EURASHE), European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), Education International, BUSINESSEUROPE, and lastly the Council of Europe and UNESCO.
The structure of the Bologna process on the European level is divided in two levels: the ministerial and the official level. The ministerial meetings take place bi-annually in the shape of the ministerial
Leuven Communiqué 2009, p. 2. 29
Council of Europe, CET 18, signed on 19 December 1954 in Paris. 30
meetings. At these meetings the new goals and the communiqué are discussed, and the contours of the future process are drawn. The second level is the official level, and this level consists of the policy officials who work at their national Ministries on the Bologna Process. This is the level that ensures the continuity of the Bologna Process. The policy officials meet at least every six months in the Bologna Follow-Up Group, the BFUG. The BFUG is at the heart of the Bologna Process, because it organises seminars,
discusses policy development and takes care of implementation and review of the policy in each member country. The BFUG is also responsible for writing the working plans, coordinating working groups and the stock-taking process.
The BFUG and the Ministerial Conference are coordinated by the BFUG board. The board consists of the so-called ‘troika’: the current EU president, the last EU president and the next EU president.
Furthermore, the Vice-Chair of the Bologna board is the country that hosts the next ministerial meeting. 31
Furthermore, the board consists of the European Commission, and four consultative members (Council of Europe, EUA, ESU, EURASHE). This system of rotating chairs which follows the EU presidency, was 32
originally invented because it ensured that all countries would be president at some point, and also because linking the Bologna Process to the EU presidency would help to give attention to the Bologna Process constantly. After some years, the original system did not work any more, because more and 33
more non-EU countries joined the process. At this point the ‘double troika’ was introduced: each Conference would be co-hosted by a non-EU country. As the board changes every six months, the Bologna secretariat was introduced around the preparations for the Bergen Conference in 2005. The secretariat functions for two years, and is hosted by the country that organises the next Ministerial Conference.
Financially, the Bologna Process is mostly self-sufficient. All costs involving policy implementation are carried by the members themselves. Each member also pays its own fees and travel costs for visiting Ministerial Conferences, BFUG Meetings and seminars. Initially, the Bologna secretariat was also financed by the host country itself. However, since the beginning of the Bologna Process the European
Commission has become more involved, providing financial support for some aspects of the process. A substantial part of the Bologna secretariat, for example, is financed by the European Commission. In the next chapter more attention will be paid to the role of the European Commission.
The Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG) is at the heart of the Bologna Process, as it is where the working plan is made, discussed and implemented. The BFUG takes place at least every six months, and is attended by Ministry officials and representatives of the consultative partners. The agenda for the BFUG is set by the Bologna board, and the administrative preparation is done by the Bologna secretariat. The BFUG also allows for continuity within the Bologna Process. As the Ministerial Conference takes place only once every three years, most Ministers only go through one Bologna cycle in their term. The BFUG is carried by Ministry officials, who can be involved for an indefinite period. The Ministry representatives
This was decided in the Leuven Communiqué in 2009, and further outlined in the BFUG meeting in Stockholm in 31
2009. The non-EU countries are picked based on alphabetical order. Tasks are divided by the chairing team themselves.
Official information on the Bologna structure, see: http://www.ehea.info/article-details.aspx?ArticleId=5 32
Interview C, 28 April 2015 33
meet at least every six months in the BFUG. This usually becomes more frequent as the next Ministerial Conference draws nearer. Attendance of the BFUG meetings is voluntary, as is participation in one of the working groups of the BFUG. At the BFUG meetings the progress of the Bologna Process is discussed, and best practices are exchanged.
Besides these central BFUG meetings, every four years a new work plan is announced. The BFUG can set up working groups on specific subjects, such as quality assurance, mobility and
internationalisation and life long learning. If necessary, ad hoc working groups can also be set up. The working groups work out policy recommendations and do this by organising seminars on the policy subjects, and by research possibilities for future action. The working groups are open to EHEA members, the European Commission and Consultative members. Additionally, experts and expertise organisations can be ask to participate in the working groups. These working groups report the BFUG, and its 34
recommendations are used in programming the Ministerial Conference. In practice the organisation of seminars and events is not only done by working groups, but also by individual countries and the Consultative members. All events are listed on the website of the EHEA. 35
Apart from reports from working groups, exchange of best practices and preparation of the Ministerial Conference, the BFUG also takes care of the stock-taking procedure, which takes place every three years.
2.3. Measuring Progress and the Stock-Taking Procedure
In 2005 the stock-taking procedure was introduced. The procedure was thought of and create by a working group on stock-taking. This group consisted of seven people, from the European Commission, Ireland, Norway, Croatia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Russia. The group was charged with 36
carrying out a stocktaking exercise by the Ministers in the Berlin Communiqué, to see how the process was advancing. For the stock-taking procedure, the European Commission provided financial support through the Socrates Program. Apart from financial support, the EC facilitated the procedure by letting EURYDICE, the research network of the EU, provide data on the progress of countries. The Bologna
members each filled in a questionnaire set up by EURYDICE, after which EURYDICE prepared a report. This questionnaire contained questions on the way the Bologna Process was set up nationally, but also
contained question about specific topics, such as the bachelor master structure, the introduction of a quality system and the introduction of the ECTS system.
In the academic literature on this subject, the stock-taking procedure is often seen as a sign of an increased influence of the European Commission. Barbara Haskell, for example, claims the EC uses the
Bologna Process. ‘Work plan 2012-2015’ (15-03-2013), p. 4. 34
This website includes the event calendar, but also an archive, reports and many documents concerning the 35
Bologna Process. http://www.ehea.info.
Bologna Process. ‘Bologna Process Stocktaking. Report from a working group appointed by the Bologna Follow-36
Up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Bergen 19-20 May 2005 (2005), p. 10
Bologna Process to reach the Lisbon Agenda, Bologna ‘being seen as a useful set of instruments in the development of the knowledge economy’. Ruth Keeling agrees with this standpoint on the European 37
Commission, saying that the EC pushes ‘the idea that educational activities and ‘outputs’ are measurable. In its assessments of the Bologna Process and European research, the Commission measures educational achievements both at the level of the individual (in terms of ECTS credits and research output), and also in its comprehensive ‘stocktaking’ procedures which analyse the ‘performance’ of participating
countries.’ Both authors suggest that due to the meddling of the EC in the Bologna Process, the process 38
itself has become increasingly focused on output and measurability.
Something is to be said for this idea, as the results of the first few years were compared through a ‘traffic light’ or colour coding system, where bright green signified great progress and bright red meant that results were lacking. In between those categories were three other categories. However, according to one of the creators of the system, the colour coding was not designed to create competition. The reasons for using the system of colour coding were rather more pragmatic: ‘We thought, Ministers don’t read big reports, and they certainly do not read between the lines. So if you want to show the state of affairs at one glance, you’d best use a colour system.’ Although the stock-taking procedure was not per se meant 39
to compare the countries, the creators were aware of the fact that it might create a sense of competition between the members. ‘We had quite a bit of yellow, some green, and some red. If you really did not anything, it should be clear. Then it would be red. We just thought we would do it, and we could always change the system later. 40
Nowadays, the process still functions the same way. The countries fill in a report with a template provided by EURYDICE, and EURYDICE creates the report. The review of the report is written by a working group. All countries receive a draft, and can make amendments to the text if they feel their results have not been reviewed properly. If the country can provide enough material to argue their case, the text is edited. The report is discussed and adapted at the Ministerial Conference. Again, here the focus was on 41
the topics and ambitions, and not on the process itself. Again, one of the creators of the stocktaking procedure remembers: ’We were all driven by the substance and an urge to improve the process. There was no one playing any power games.’ 42
This observation that substance was more important than power play is confirmed by the discussion on the accession of new members to the Process. In principle, all countries who signed the European Cultural Convention were welcome to join the Bologna Process. However, to ensure ‘the realisation of the European Higher Education Area’, each candidate country must present a national
Haskell, Barbara. ‘When Can A Weak Process Generate Strong Results? The Bologna Process to Create a European 37
Higher Education Area’ in: Toemmel, I. Verdun, A. (ed.) Governance and Policy Making in the EU (2009), p. 274
Keeling, Ruth. ‘The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda: the European Commission’s Expanding Role 38
in Higher Education Discourse’. European Journal of Education (2006) 41:2, pp 204-223, p. 209. Interview C, 28 April 2015
39
Interview C, 28 April 2015 40
Interview C, 28 April 2015. Also: Bologna Process. ‘Bologna Process Stocktaking. Report from a working group 41
appointed by the Bologna Follow-Up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Bergen 19-20 May 2005 (2005), p. 14.
Interview C, 28 April 2015 42
report before the Ministerial Conference as a stocktaking. The Ministerial Conference decides upon the accession of new members, based on a recommendation by the BFUG. When Kazakhstan, a country that 43
does not belong to the Cultural Convention asked to join in 2004, the BFUG advised that ‘inviting representatives from Kazakhstan authorities and institutions to Bologna Seminars should not constitute any problem’. Eventually, the Bologna Process facilitated the non-European applicants by hosting a 44
separate and parallel conference, something which I will elaborate on in the next section. Eligible applicants were solely judged on five principles, as ‘the Establishment of the European Higher Education Area can only be achieved by incorporating these principles in the higher education system of each country:
• International mobility of students and staff; • Autonomous universities;
• Student participation in the governance of higher education; • Public responsibility for higher education;
• The social dimension of the Bologna Process’ 45
For this reason, not all applicants were actually accepted. Belarus, for example, was rejected initially because the country could not prove sufficiently that universities were autonomous. At the 2015 46
Conference, Belarus will be accepted after a second application.
2.4. The Ministerial Conference and the Communiqué
The Ministerial Meeting takes place every two years. It is a two day conference organised by the EU Chair of that moment, together with a non-EU member of the Bologna Process. All members of the Bologna Process are invited to the Conference. They can each bring a delegation of five people, consisting of the Minister and at least two Bologna experts, of whom one student. The main goal of the Ministerial Conference is to discuss and create a new Communiqué to outline the future of the process. To discuss the progress a stocktaking procedure is organised, and each country fills out a national report. Although the Communiqué is at the centre of the Conference, the programme is mainly filled with seminars and working groups on best practices and training in Bologna issues. In this section I will go further into the different elements of the programme, and the goals and set up of the Conference.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the external dimension of the Bologna Process has become increasingly important in the last few years. In 2009 the first Bologna Policy Forum was organised. The
From Berlin to Bergen, General Report from the Bologna Follow-Up Group to the Ministerial Conference in Bergen 43
19-2 May 2005. Preliminary and incomplete draft 01.02.05 awaiting results from ongoing projects and other contributions.
BFUG, ‘ Applications for participation in the Bologna Process’. BFUG4 9 (15 February 2005) 44
From Berlin to Bergen, General Report from the Bologna Follow-Up Group to the Ministerial Conference in Bergen 45
19-2 May 2005.’ Version 3 May 2005’ p. 40. Interview C, 28 April 2015
Bologna Policy Forum is a conference parallel to the Ministerial Conference, where countries who are not part of the European Higher Education Area (non-Bologna countries) are invited to discuss issues of higher education. In itself this cooperation is interesting, because the entire idea of the Bologna Process is to create a higher education area that is competitive with other parts of the world. Despite this fact, the strategy document ‘for the European Higher Education Area in a Global Setting’, distinguishes five goals for the external dimension of the process:
1. Improving information on the EHEA;
2. Promoting European higher Education to enhance its world-wide attractiveness and competitiveness; 3. Strengthening Cooperation based on partnership;
4. Intensifying policy dialogue;
5. Furthering recognition of qualifications. 47
It is in this context that the Bologna Policy Forum is organised. The Bologna Policy Forum (BPF) takes place as a parallel session of the Ministerial Meeting, and is visited by both EHEA and non-EHEA members. At the Forum, issues on cooperation in higher education are discussed, such as cooperation in quality assurance, the recognition of foreign grades and international mobility of students. This event is attended by all sorts of countries, ranging from Australia and New Zealand to Israel, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, the US and China. It is chaired by representatives and Ministers from the Bologna countries. Although the 48
Bologna Process remains open only to European countries, there has been a development of similar initiatives in other parts of the world. For example New Zealand and the United States of America have each set up similar initiatives related to the Bologna framework. For the EHEA countries, the Bologna 49
Policy Forum is mostly used as place to brand European higher education. The main action lines
concerning the external action of the Bologna Process are providing information on the European Higher Education Area, through leaflets, a website, Bologna information Points, education fairs and media campaigns. The Bologna Policy Forum fits into the third, fourth and fifth action lines: strengthening cooperation based on partnership, intensifying policy dialogue, and furthering recognition of qualifications. 50
This is why non-EHEA countries are also welcome at regular Bologna seminars: the Bologna group has specifically declared that it wants to ‘ensure that the European Higher Education Area does not develop into a “fortress Europe”, but rather remains relevant to the world: open, flexible, and ready to learn from international experiences, and to anticipate the need for further reform and adjustment in
EHEA. ‘European Higher Education in a Global Setting: A Strategy for the External Dimension of the Bologna 47
Process.’ (Leuven 2009), p. 3.
EHEA. ’Statement by the Bologna Policy Forum 2009’ (Leuven 2009). 48
New Zealand Government. ‘New Zealand and the Bologna Process’ (Wellington 2008) and Clifford Adelman, 49
Institute for Higher Education Policy. ‘Learning Accountability from Bologna: A Higher Education Policy Primer’ (Washington 2008)
EHEA ‘Elements for possible future actions’ in the Higher Education Area in a Global Setting (London 2007) 50
good time.’ The programme of the main Conference consists of many meetings and group discussions. 51
All meetings can be attended by all delegates, with the exception of the special meeting for the Heads of Delegates. Depending on the actual delegations, this meeting can be considered a ‘Ministers only’ meeting. At this meeting the future of the Bologna Process is discussed. Then there are several meetings organised by partners and members, such as the European Student’s Union, the ENQA, Business Europe and the EURASHE. These meetings can be attended by all delegates. The core meetings, however, are 52
based around discussing, finalising, and finally presenting the Communiqué. This is done in several meetings. The meetings themselves are all chaired by Ministers of Education. While the draft Communiqué and the draft Stocktaking report have already been prepared in the BFUG, this all happened on an official level. The Ministerial Conference is the first time the Ministers of Higher
Education discuss it. At the same time, this means that much of the input of the individual countries has already been discussed prior to the Ministerial Meetings. One of the main benefits of the Ministerial Meetings is not so much the official meetings, but rather the informal circuit. 53
2.5. Conclusion
The structure of the Bologna Process is open in many respects. The Process is open to new members, even to members outside of the European Union. Countries have to meet the requirements, which are based on the academic climate and the national ambitions for higher education. The procedure is open, and the application is judged on potential for meeting the Bologna goals, and basic compatibility of the higher education system to the European systems. Non-EU countries can apply, as long as they have signed the European Cultural Convention. Although membership is limited to these countries, the meetings can be attended by countries from over the world. For the Ministerial Conference, a parallel structure was set-up to accommodate non-Bologna members. The Bologna Policy Forum is intended to create a global network of cooperation, and to promote the European Higher Education Area world wide. In this external dimension of the Bologna Process, one main goal is to promote the EHEA, but another part is reserved for discussion on cooperation, making it essentially open again.
This open character is also shown in the openness to invite and include non-members to the seminars and conferences. At the Ministerial Conference, for example, each delegation should consist of five delegates, of whom one student and one other non-Ministerial delegate: a university representative or other Bologna expert. The delegates are welcome at all meetings at the Ministerial Conference, except for the Heads of Delegation meeting. The same goes for the policy seminars that are organised
throughout the year. These meetings can be attended by anyone who is interested. As the atmosphere is open and the meetings (especially the BFUG) have a relatively open character, there is little political pressure on the process. Countries who want to make progress can be involved and active, while other countries can choose to have a less visible role. As each country is responsible for its own progress and
EHEA. ‘The EHEA in a global context: Report on overall developments at the European, national and institutional 51
levels. Final version’. (Leuven 2009), p. 12.
See for example the Yerevan Ministerial Conference 2015 schedule on url (‘http://bologna-yerevan2015.ehea.info/ 52
pages/view/programme') Interview C, 28 April 2015 53
finances, there are no real consequences if a country chooses to be less involved. The biggest benefit of attending meetings is that there is an open exchange of knowledge and best practices, which can be profitable to all members. This also makes cultural and political differences less important. Because the countries carry their own costs, it is easier for countries with a healthy financial and democratic system to make progress than it is for countries that lack a well-balanced higher education structure.
The openness of the structure of the EHEA makes up for this, as it is based on peer learning, but richer and more developed countries arguably still profit much more from the Bologna structure. For these countries it is much easier to score well in the stock-taking procedure. In the next chapter I will look at the role of the European Commission, and I will also pay attention to the way the European
