FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM
Argumentation in Service of Governance:
Studying Influence of Governance Mode on Pragmatic Argumentation in
European Parliamentary Discussions
Argumentation in Service of Governance
Studying Influence of Governance Mode on Pragmatic Argumentation
in European Parliamentary Discussions
Research Master Thesis - Communication Science: Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy
Author: Zuzana Laslopová Student Number: 10394478 Supervisor: dr. B.J. (Bart) Garssen
Second Reader: dr. A.F. (Francisca) Snoeck Henkemans Date: 2014-6-19
ABSTRACT
The growing number of members of the European Union has posed a great challenge for the policy-making of European Union. A high diversity of member states – cultural, economic and social – has led to a growing uncertainty about the suitable way of making policies happen. This resulted in the introduction of new, unconventional governance mode, departing from hostile conditions of uncertainty about the proper policies to adopt in pursuing common goals.
The participants in European parliamentary discussions propose legislation and provide pragmatic arguments in the framework of conventional or unconventional governance modes. The question we shall raise is whether the uncertainty about, and unknowability of, the outcome of a proposal affect the pragmatic argumentation of European legislators. The aim of this research is to study whether the uncertainty about the outcome of a legislative proposal constraints the argumentation of legislators and, if so, how could such constraints alter the pragmatic argumentation of participants in the European parliamentary discussions. For this aim, this paper will provide an interdisciplinary inquiry of theoretical literature pertaining to both, political science - as the source discipline of the concepts of governance modes – and pragma-dialectical argumentation theory – as the arguably most suitable approach for a study of argumentation in context. The aim of such an inquiry will be to determine the constraints posed by the new governance mode on the European parliamentary argumentation and to raise expectations about the strategic maneuvering of the arguers affected by the former. The study would furthermore provide empirical examples to illustrate the influence of constraints the new governance mode imposes on strategic maneuvering of participants.
Key Words:
Argumentative pattern, governance mode, institutional constraints, pragmatic argumentation, strategic maneuvering, strategic uncertainty
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank the people whose contribution was essential for this paper. Professor Garssen, for his expertise, support, motivation, enthusiasm and patience. Professor Henkemans for her willingness to participate in this project.
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...iii
I. INTRODUCTION...5
II. GOVERNANCE MODES...8
2.1. Governance Modes: Old and New...8
2.2. Scope Conditions of Governance Modes...10
2.3. Role of Parliamentary Discussions in Old and New Governance Modes 11 III. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE ACTIVITY TYPE...13
3.1. Role of Context in Pragma-Dialectical Approach...13
3.2. Institutional Constraints on Argumentation Following the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament...15
3.3. Argumentative Features of European Parliamentary Discussions...16
IV. STRATEGIC USE OF SCOPE CONDITIONS...18
4.1. Scope Conditions in Argumentation...18
4.2. Scope Conditions and Institutional Constraints on Argumentation...19
4.3. Strategic Choices of Topical Potential in the Light of New Institutional Constraints...21
V. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING WITH STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY...27
5.1. Methodology...27
5.2. Case Studies...28
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS...33
I.
INTRODUCTION
The argumentative activity type of European parliamentary discussion has so far been recognized and studied to a large extent, exposing various institutional constraints on strategic maneuvering of arguers (Van Eemeren, Garssen; 2010; Van Eemeren, Garssen; 2012). Empirical studies of primary data sources and studies of guidelines for conduct of participants in these discussions, together with considerations of insights of secondary literature have been useful in studying various constraints to, and opportunities for strategic maneuvering.
The complexity of European legislative context does, nevertheless, provide a new and fruitful source of data when accounting for the argumentative activity type of European parliamentary discussions. A number of different ways in which policies come into being at the European level do, as Smismans (2008) concludes, have a certain effect on deliberations taking part in the legislative process. If a governance mode – which is how Smismans and others (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008; Wallace, Wallace; 2006) call the way of proposing, approving, implementing, enforcing and reviewing a policy – affects discussions that are part of a legislative process, we may consider the governance modes as a point of departure for further characterization of argumentative activity type of European parliamentary discussions. Indeed, there is a good reason to believe that the introduction of new governance mode after the first eastern enlargement1 has posed new
constraints on pragmatic argumentation in European parliamentary discussions over legislative proposals. In order to understand the problematic, we shall look closer to the situation which is brought upon the arguers under the new governance mode.
The growing number of members of European Union has brought new challenges for the legislative process due to a higher degree of diversity of members – social, cultural and economic – which has rendered the conventional governance mode – of proposing a single, specific and directly applicable legislation – problematic (Scharpf, 2003). In
1 Scharpf (2003) considers the enlargements and growing diversity of members of the European Union to
be the main incentive to develop a new way of doing governance. It is, however debatable whether to attribute the introduction of new governance mode to the enlargements themselves, rather, we shall speak about the growing number of members, together with growing number of policy fields being treated in a common, European way, and the subsequent complexity of European legislative system that are responible for the introduction of the new governance mode. However, for the sake of clarity and relevance to this paper, we shall not consider other aspects of situation preceding the introduction of new governance mode in our treatise, simply due to the fact that the growing diversity of members will appear
many policy fields, policy-makers started to face a new situation of strategic uncertainty – a situation where a policy leading to desired aim is a priori unknowable – and it is precisely this situation where the new mode of governance is being adopted (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). Given the novelty of political system such as European Union (Jachtenfuchs, 2006), there is no precedent of a preferred solution to certain problems. Yet, due to a high interdependence of the member states and their policies many problematic issues call for a common solution to problems and legislation is being proposed, passed and implemented. But again, as strategic uncertainty dictates, the results of individual legislations in regards to the goals they pursue are a priori unknowable, which gives rise to a new way of making policies – a new governance mode – that is being used by European legislators along with the old, conventional one (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008).
The fact that legislative procedures of both of these governance modes involve the same basic pragmatic argumentative pattern2 is the reason to ask whether the governance
mode constraints the strategic maneuvering of arguers. Once the arguers are not certain about the outcome of a certain proposed policy, how can they pragmatically argue in terms of its desirable effects?
The question thus stands: Does the choice of governance mode result into constraints to pragmatic argumentation in European parliamentary discussions over legislative proposals? Given the necessary premise of pragmatic argumentation – the link between the proposed course of action and a desired effect – which is a priori unknowable under the new governance mode, the question of difference of pragmatic argumentation under the new and old governance modes becomes relevant. And then, may we find such constraints, how can the latter be strategically used by the arguers to their advantage? If we wish to answer these questions, we shall conduct an interdisciplinary inquiry of theoretical literature from political science – as the source discipline of theory on governance modes – and from pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation – as a suitable approach for the study of argumentation in (institutional) context. Such an inquiry will result into expectations we shall build up – expectations in terms of institutional constraints and strategic maneuvering of arguers - when understanding
2 The pragmatic argument scheme and the argumentative pattern related to it will be presented in the
following chapters. For now we shall understand pragmatic argumentation to be typical for parliamentary discussions over legislative proposals, and, as such, its presence within both, new and old governance modes will be expected.
argumentation within European parliamentary debates over legislative proposals. Subsequently, different cases of European parliamentary debates within two respective policy-making processes – the 'old‘ and the 'new‘ governance modes – shall be analyzed to illustrate how do the arguers work with the institutional constraints that may follow from respective governance mode in reality.
The paper will proceed by explaining the concept of governance modes in general, and will elaborate on the new governance and conventional (state-like) governance modes in particular in order to clarify those features of governance modes that could possibly affect the argumentation in European parliamentary debates. The following chapter will elaborate on the European parliamentary debates as an argumentative activity type, briefly accounting for the characterization of such debates. The paper will proceed by providing theoretical claims on expectations to be built about the influence of governance modes on the European parliamentary debates. Departing from the particularities of the two governance modes at hand and knowing the characteristics of European parliamentary debates, it will be possible to theorize on the way in which the choice of governance mode will affect these debates. Furthermore, an empirical study will treat real examples of European parliamentary discussions pertaining to each of the governance modes in order to illustrate the expected strategic choices elaborated on in the previous chapter. In a few concluding remarks the thesis will suggest the limitations and possible consequences of the research and possibilities for further studies.
II.
GOVERNANCE MODES
Governance should be understood as a general concept, covering, among others, also the domain of political (Kohler-Koch, Rittberger; 2006). Then a government is only a specific instantiation of governance. However, political scientists are increasingly employing the term of governance to account for the political system of European Union in the past decades (Kohler-Koch, Rittberger, (2006); Wallace, Wallace (2006); Sabel, Zeitlin (2008)). Understanding European Union as a system of governance then allows for a broader, unconventional characterization of policy-making processes3.
Since the concept of governance is too broad to grasp the nature of policy-making within the European Union, and since it covers various patterns of policy-making, several scholars have attempted to go further by analyzing European governance through systematization of policy-making processes into governance modes (Wallace, Wallace (2006); Héritier, Lehmkuhl (2008)). A governance mode is then a way of 'doing governance' and thus enables to analyze policy-making processes and is itself based on empirical observations of actual policy-making.
II.1. Governance Modes: Old and New
As has been mentioned, several scholars attempted to develop a categorization of European policy-making in terms of governance modes, some more successfully than the others. For the purposes of this paper we shall divide existing governance modes into two broad categories that are recognized by scholars (such as Citi, Rhodes (2007), Kohler-Koch, Rittberger; (2006), Sabel, Zeitlin; (2010)). First such group of governance modes we will recognize are the so-called old modes of governance, the second being the new modes of governance. While the terms of ‘new‘ and ‘old‘ modes of governance are being employed by a wide range of scholars, it is necessary to mention that it is by no means the case that some of these modes are obsolete and replaced by the ‘new‘ ones. On the contrary, modes of governance pertaining to both of these groups are being employed alternately, depending on the contextual preconditions preceding the choice of a governance mode (Wallace, Wallace; 2006).
3 Jachtenfuchs (2006) explains the frustration of political scientists to grasp the nature of the European
Union through the lenses of either nation-state model or intergovernmental organization, concluding that the European Union should be categorized as neither, nor can it be analyzed through the lenses of such a polarization. Thus the broad concept of governance is far more suitable for describing the reality of the European Union.
It is, however, true, that the new modes of governance have been introduced within the framework of European Union with a growing diversity of its members, as a reaction to the irresponsiveness of the old governance modes to the new situation – a higher number of member states having very diverse economic, cultural and social conditions – which made the old/conventional policy-making process extremely difficult to be adopted in regards to certain issues and policy fields (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). The set of characteristics of new governance modes have, in its turn, been able to respond to the demands of the newly established situation.
New modes of governance, operating in a polyarchic setting where no single member state, body or institution has the ultimate power over the actors, represent a case of governance by soft power where a more decentralized and less hierarchical approach is being undertaken in policy-making. As opposed to the old modes of governance, new modes of governance aim to produce common results via individual measures of the actors (Sabel, Zeitlin (2008); Kohler-Koch, Rittberger (2006)). This means that the new modes of governance build upon a necessity for common action while recognizing the diversity of the actors as a possible obstacle in common policy-making. As such, new governance modes allow for individual policies to serve a common purpose. This means that no common, directly applicable legislation is being produced, but rather the individual policies, or measures, of the actors are being coordinated in order for them to follow the common goal. In this sense the new modes of governance embrace the diversity of actors and, in some cases, exploit the latter as its asset via mutual learning mechanisms (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). New modes of governance then cannot possibly be hierarchical in a strict sense, since there is no single institution producing legally binding common policies. Rather, multiple individual policies of the actors are being employed to pursue a common goal.
The adoption of the new modes of governance happens in a situation characterized by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for them to be applied – the so-called `scope conditions` (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). These conditions include sufficient diversity of the actors for a single and unified legislation to be extremely difficult to implement, deep interdependence of the actors in terms of the necessity of their common action in resolving a problem, and strategic uncertainty (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). Strategic uncertainty then means that the actors are themselves unable to determine a preferred solution, or preferred means to resolve a problem satisfactorily.
Old modes of European governance include policy-making processes that aim to unify, or harmonize policies of all actors4. As such they resemble nation-state policy-making
in a sense that the legislation is being produced in a more or less centralized fashion, and is being directly applicable to the relevant actors` conduct (Wallace, Wallace; 2006). Furthermore, such legislation is usually common for all the actors and thus disregards possible diversity of the actors and tends to converge or unify the legislation of individual member states. Furthermore, old governance modes build upon a strong notion of hierarchy in terms of policy-making (Héritier, Lehmkuhl; 2008). In this case, one or several institutions are being responsible for legislative procedures that are directly applicable to the actors.
II.2. Scope Conditions of Governance Modes
We shall bring the notion of governance modes closer to the reader by applying it to the context of European Union in order to explain how do the aforementioned scope conditions – diversity, interdependence and strategic uncertainty – come into being and are being worked upon by the actors. Given the fact that both policy-making procedures are being adopted in an environment of high diversity of actors – the group of actors being the same in both policy-making procedures in reality – and given the fact that the interdependence of the actors is presupposed by both procedures – since there would be no motion for legislation at all if the actors would not recognize the need to coordinate their actions – we shall turn to the last scope condition as the one that differentiates between old and new governance modes.
The old modes of governance will thus be characterized by strategic certainty of the actors, who are able to recognize the set of possible solutions (possible legislations) to a given problem that is to be treated in a common, European way. Such solutions should allow for a specific legislation applicable to all of the actors. In other words, every actor can be certain of knowability of solution of a problem prior to some, e.g. parliamentary discussion, while others may or may not agree with any particular solution. As such, these policy-making processes are the most suitable for problem-solving in the realm of such issues, where the actors are more or less certain about the measures that might lead to desirable outcome and where the diversity of actors will not pose much obstacles to implementation and effectiveness of the measures (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). The policies
4 In the context of the European Union, the actors are the Member States, European institutions and
regarding monetary affairs or issues regarding the responsibilities of financial institutions are being typically handled via old governance modes after the creation of Eurozone. Single currency has made the diversity of actors irrelevant for monetary policy and thus the decisions over monetary affairs are strongly centralized and precise, thus the member states have no discretion over the implementation.
While the old governance mode is a powerful legislative instrument producing common legislation, in practice it`s employment is often obstructed by the difficulties caused by the diversity of actors (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). Within such a large political body as the European Union – consisting of several nation-states with different economic situations, different cultural backgrounds and such – implementation of common policies is significantly limited. This is the reason why new modes of governance are being increasingly employed as an alternative to the old ones. The new modes of governance, as has been mentioned previously, represent an instrument of soft decentralized power where mutual learning is enhanced, and which provides much space for discretion in implementation of individual policies (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). The actors might, however, within the new governance mode have a preferred solution to a problem – and having a preferred solution is indeed desirable due to the polyarchic distribution of powers. Given the absence of a single hegemon, benchmarking and experimenting requires proposal of certain preferred solutions by the individual actors.
As an instance of new governance mode, we may state the European Social Inclusion policy the aim of which is truly broad – social inclusion – where the nation states are given discretion over their own social inclusion strategies which are being periodically reviewed in processes of benchmarking. Typically, within the framework of new governance mode procedures an institution or an agency is being established that would further enhance, monitor and supervise the policy-making process.
II.3. Role of Parliamentary Discussions in Old and New Governance Modes
The role of the European Parliament became crucial in both governance modes after the introduction of the co-decision procedure. In the case of old governance modes, European Parliament is a part of a conventional legislative procedure where a legislative proposal is being advanced by the Commission, and is discussed and put to vote both in Council and Parliament. The co-decision procedure thus grants legislative powers to the
Parliament who can directly decide upon (regular) legislative proposals being discussed in the Council. Among the legislative procedure itself, various motions for resolutions, debates on various reports or institutional reviews are all part of the parliamentary debates taking place within the old governance framework.
As concerns the new modes of governance, the parliamentary debates may as well be a part of a legislative procedure, albeit an unconventional one. In such a way, the parliamentary debate taking place in the framework of new modes of governance will differ from its conventional counterpart by its results – a non-binding, not so specific legislation leaving room for interpretation and discretion for implementation. A result of such a debate may as well be an establishment of an institution coordinating the actors in their individual ways of achieving a common goal. Finally, the new governance mode accommodates as well the debates over motions for resolution, reports or institutional reviews, all taking part in a large-scale policy-making process.
Now that the governance modes that will be treated have been presented and the role of European Parliament within their scope has been sketched, we shall turn to the European parliamentary debates and the institutional constraints associated with them. In order to do this, we shall first look at the notion of argumentative activity in order to clarify the source of institutional constraints the context poses to the European parliamentary debates.
III. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS
AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE ACTIVITY TYPE
When studying the influence of governance modes on discussion characteristics of European parliamentary debates, it is necessary to provide an insight into what discussion characteristics this paper focuses on. Since this paper embraces pragma-dialectical approach as it`s theoretical background, it will be useful to shed some light into the way in which pragma-dialecticians treat and use the information provided by contextual situation in their studies. In line with such pragma-dialectical treatment, an attempt will be further made to clarify the institutional characteristics of European parliamentary debates, which will enable us to put our studies of influence of governance modes on European parliamentary discussion characteristics into a larger context of current argumentation studies.
III.1. Role of Context in Pragma-Dialectical Approach
The argumentation theory of Pragma-Dialectics, since it has been designed to respond to the need to account for analysis and evaluation of everyday argumentative discussion, emphasizes the context in which argumentation takes place and ascribes it a crucial role in subsequent analysis and evaluation of argumentation in a discussion. If we are about to understand European parliamentary discussions from the perspective of Pragma-Dialectics, we shall see these discussions as occupying a place in the macro-context (Van Eemeren, Garssen; 2010). This setting, the macro-context5, is the argumentative
activity type, which predetermines the possibilities for strategic maneuvering6 of
participants of a discussion.
5 The macro-context comprises four aspects – the domain of communication activity, institutional
conventions, institutional point and communicative genre The domain of communicative activity refers to the field in which the discussion takes place. In the case of a political discussion, as the case of European parliamentary discussions at hand, the domain of communicative activity would be political communication. Institutional conventions represent the conventionalities the discussants have to observe and are intersubjectively recognized, as they are instrumental to achieving the institutional point. These conventions can be explicit, but may be left implicit. The institutional point is then the main institutional aim of the communicative activity. Van Eemeren and Garrssen (2010) use the example of a (national) parliamentary debate as a case of a communicative activity type, the main institutional point of which is the preserverance of democracy. The institutional point is then reached via employment of an appropriate communicative genre. A communicative genre is then a way of achieving the institutional aim within institutional conventions in a certain domain.
6 Strategic maneuvering refers to the concept developed in the extended version of Pragma-Dialectics.
Strategic Maneuvering represents the moves of a speaker within a discussion via which he is able to fulfill the aim of being reasonable and effective in his argumentation at the same time. (Van Eemeren; 2010)
An important instrument for argumentation study that is being enabled for use via such contextual characterization has been revealed in an extended use of Pragma-Dialectics. Strategic maneuvering enables, instead of understanding discussions within a rather idealistic perspective within which the only goal of participants of an argumentative discussion is to resolve a difference of opinion in a reasonable way, incorporates into the theory also the aim of participants to win a discussion (Van Eemeren; 2010). Within this realm, then, the participants of an argumentative discussion have to struggle to pursue two respective goals at the same time. First, to win a discussion and thus to formulate their arguments in the most persuasive way possible and, second, to do so reasonably – to advance reasonable7 arguments and to use only appropriate persuasive
means. It is exactly this dichotomy that forces participants of a discussion to maneuver strategically, which means to balance their two respective goals. Thus no discussion would be completely free of rhetorical choices reflected in the argumentation (Van Eemeren; 2010).
Furthermore, strategic maneuvering itself may be understood as being composed of three respective aspects – the choice of topical potential, audience adaptation and stylistics. Under the choice of topical potential is meant the choice of such argument schemes (and structures)8 which may serve the persuasive purpose at a given situation
the most. Also, at every point of a discussion, in order to be effective in terms of persuasion a participant of a discussion should always respond to the audience demand, be it his adversary, or some external audience, and adapt his arguments accordingly. Furthermore, the choice of appropriate stylistics of one`s arguments influences persuasiveness of one`s arguments as well and is thus an internal part of any strategic maneuver9 (Van Eemeren; 2010). Due to the limited scope of this paper, we shall
further concentrate on the choices of topical potential the arguers make within European parliamentary discussions.
7 Pragma-Dialectics is based upon critical notion of reasonableness (Van Eemeren; 2010)
8 Argument scheme refers to the nature of inference in an argument – pragma-dialectics recognizes three
main types of argument schemes – causal, symptomatic and argument by analogy. Argument structure is then connected with the way in which the argument is organized pragma-dialectics recognizes coordinate, subordinate and multiple argumentation (Van Eemeren et al.; 2002)
9 As concerning argument analysis and argument evaluation, the notion of strategic maneuvering has
brought about few novelties. An analyst should be at any times aware of the two respective goals participants of a discussion pursue. This means that every aspect of strategic maneuvering should be accounted for in argument analysis. May, however, a participant pursue his goal of persuasiveness on a detriment of being reasonable, his strategic maneuver is derailed and the argument is thus a bad one (Van Eemeren; 2010).
If we wish to account for the institutional characteristics of European parliamentary debates, we shall go further and derive certain contextual constraints on participants` strategic maneuvering from the Rules of Procedure of European Parliament - a written code of conduct of the members of European Parliament and other participants of such a discussion. Written codes of conduct in certain institutionally embedded contexts, just as the Rules of Procedure, serve as the first point of departure when looking for institutional constraints affecting the strategic maneuvering of arguers.
III.2. Institutional Constraints on Argumentation Following the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament
In general, the Rules of Procedure can provide three sorts of information about the argumentative activity type of the European Parliamentary debates. First kind of information pertains to the participants of discussion, second being indicative of the content of speeches allowed in the discussions and the third one accounting for the allocation of speaking time to the participants.
The Rule 145 – Access to the Chambers - specifies the participants in the difference of opinion and indicates the distribution of roles in the debate at hand. For instance, in a case of a motion for resolution brought to the European Parliament – forwarded from the Commission to the parliament`s vote – this rule clearly states that first (but certainly not the only one) protagonist arguing in favor of the motion will be the rapporteur. Thus, according to the Rules of Procedure several roles, including the role of the moderator of the discussion, are being distributed prior to the discussion – in some cases even the roles of protagonists are being known prior to the individual speeches.
The only constraint on the content of speeches the Rules of Procedure provide is to respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union10.
Turning to the rules constraining the allocation of speaking time, the Rules of Procedure do provide according to the Rule 149 that: allocation of speaking time, list of speakers and the order of speaking time are usually appointed by the President of Parliament and the turns shall be distributed in following way.
Concerning the speaking time participants have to advance their speech, according to the Rule 149 the President allocates ex ante a limited time to the speakers to advance a
speech in the rounds of contributions preceding the “catch-the-eye” procedure. Within the realm of the “catch-the-eye” procedure, the members of Parliament shall not exceed the speaking time of one minute according to the Rule 149. The Rules of Procedure thus clearly specify that speakers have only a very limited time to advance their speeches which then may require rhetorical skills to strengthen the arguer`s case to compensate for the limited time.
III.3. Argumentative Features of European Parliamentary Discussions When it comes to the argumentative features of European parliamentary debates, we shall note that due to the fact that European parliamentary debates consist of several individual contributions, every contribution, in theory, comprises all stages of critical discussion model11. All contributions of a debate shall thus be studied in order to have a
complex overview of all discussion stages of a European parliamentary debate.
The structure of legislative debates over proposals consists of first round of argumentation, presented by the rapporteurs of relevant institutions. These argumentations may be understood as representing an argumentative discussion on their own, consisting of all of the stages of critical discussion where the speakers provide arguments in support of their standpoint and react to anticipated criticism (Garssen; 2013). As we will see, these speeches typically consist of one main argument which might be supported by subargumentation. Multiple argumentations presented by the rapporteur respond to his/her need to advance arguments satisfying as many listeners as possible – providing various arguments in support of the same standpoint. When a speaker deems it necessary, he/she provides subordinate argumentation that transforms an argument into a substandpoint and further supports it (Van Eemeren et al.; 2002). By providing such complex argumentation, speakers will most likely react to either the basic argument, or any of subargumentation.
The introductory speeches of rapporteurs and members of hosting institutions are followed by the reactions of Members of Parliament. As a rule, the reactions of other speakers may react to the argumentation presented in the introductory speeches, be it the main argument itself or any argument of the subargumentative chain (Garssen; 2013).
11 Departing from Pragma-Dialectics, Critical Discussion consists of four separate stages – confrontation
Given that the context this paper is interested in is a legislative one, we shall concentrate on pragmatic argumentation12. We will thus study the influence of governance modes on
strategic maneuvering in the European parliamentary discussions where the main argumentative pattern13 would look as follows:
1. We should do X
1.1. X leads to a desirable Y
1.1. ` (If X leads to a desirable Y, we should do it)14
Within a discussion over legislative proposal, we may expect such a pragmatic argumentative pattern to occur frequently. A statement promoting certain course of action supported by arguments stating its desirable consequences is likely to be the main argument in most rapporteurs’ introductory speeches, given the fact that legislative proposals are required to be functional - i.e. to lead to a certain result – which, in its turn shall be desirable. Treating such discussions will thus enable us to focus on one specific argumentative pattern, while covering a presumably large amount of cases.
These general characteristics of European parliamentary discussions provide a useful framework within which it will be possible to conceptualize the way in which the choice of policy-making method and governance modes affects the behavior of discussants. The following chapter will thus make an attempt to connect institutional characteristics of the European parliamentary debates as described above, with the characteristics of different governance modes in order to describe and understand the differences in contextual situations of European parliamentary discussions the respective governance modes pose.
12 Under pragmatic argument we mean a subtype of causal argumentation, where the standpoint
recommends a certain course of action and the argumentation consists of favorable consequences following such a course of action (Van Eemeren et al.; 2002)
13 Under argumentative pattern we understand a connection of argument scheme (causal, symptomatic or
by analogy) and argument structure (multiple, coordinate or subordinate) (Van Eemeren et al.; 2002)
IV. STRATEGIC USE OF SCOPE CONDITIONS
Having explained the broad institutional characteristics of European Parliamentary debates, we may turn to a translation of our theoretical considerations of the governance modes into the language of argumentation theory. In other words, we shall explain in what way we could expect the behavior of participants within European Parliamentary debates to be influenced by the choice of a governance mode. In order to achieve this, we shall make a brief detour and account for the reflection on the scope conditions for new and old governance modes for argumentation in European parliamentary discussions.
IV.1. Scope Conditions in Argumentation
New governance modes are being adopted in a situation where three basic scope conditions are met (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2008). As such, we shall understand these conditions to be specific to, and characteristic of, new modes of governance since these conditions are both sufficient and necessary for new modes of governance to be adopted (Sabel, Zeitlin; 2010). The three scope conditions of new modes of governance are the interdependence of actors, substantial diversity of the actors and strategic uncertainty about the solution to a problem. These conditions then give rise to new modes of governance – the legislative procedure which is based on polyarchic distribution of power which is decentralized to a significant extent and results in legislation which leaves much space for interpretation and discretion in implementation.
When accounted for - in terms of the scope conditions – the procedure of old modes of governance, this mode is similarly characterized by the interdependence and high diversity of the actors, with the strategic certainty of the actors – who are thus certain of knowability of the set of solutions to a problem – as crucial difference between the two governance modes.
These scope conditions are of significant importance for the participants of European parliamentary discussion themselves. Participants of such a discussion are aware of the governance mode they operate in while dealing with certain issue, even though they do not use the language of political scientists – i.e. they are not familiar with terms ‘old’ and ‘new’ modes of governance15. However, since we have established the scope
conditions being characteristic for new and old modes of governance respectively, we may account for the participants` recognition of the governance mode they operate in through their understanding of the situation in which they produce legislation – through their recognition of the legislative procedures they operate with. The recognition of the latter by participants is presupposed in European parliamentary discussion as all of the participants have the obligation to get acquainted with the proposals, reports and other documents summarizing the nature of procedure at hand prior to the discussion.
The scope conditions then descriptive the framework within which a European parliamentary discussion takes place and are recognized by all of its participants. Procedure of the discussion, however, remains the same in both governance modes and is prescribed by the Rules of Procedure. Rather than procedural prescriptions relevant to the discussion, the scope conditions constitute basic knowledge common to all participants which is crucial for meaningfulness of such a discussion. As such, they are part of the material starting points16 of European parliamentary discussions.
IV.2. Scope Conditions and Institutional Constraints on Argumentation Importance of the scope conditions, however, does not end with their recognition as material starting points since they are potentially able to shape the discussion as a whole. This is due to their potential to create institutional – both in the sense of parliamentary discussion and the legislative procedure the discussion takes place in – prerequisites shaping the choices of participants’ argumentation in such a discussion. In order to fully understand how the scope conditions could constrain argumentation, we shall look closer to the main pragmatic argumentative pattern as presented in the previous chapter. Actors’ interdependence condition stands for the necessity to act in a certain matter in common way – i.e. at a European level. Actors’ diversity condition is then its counterpart, rendering the common handling of a certain matter difficult due to
discussion takes place (as stated by the Rules of Procedure). The knowledge of the policy-making procedure then de facto stands for the recognition of governance mode being adopted, even without explicitly stating it. This means that even though the `governance mode` language is not explicitly recognized by the legislators, the procedures themselves are. Given the fact that what we call governance modes is only a set of policy-making procedures, the MEPs and other participants of the European parliamentary discussions have to be familiar with them given the Rules of Procedure, and they are thus aware of the governance mode within which they operate.
16 Starting points (material and procedural) refer to a set of presuppositions, beliefs and a common basis
of knowledge shared by the participants of a critical discussion ensuring a meaningful a reasonable discussion (Van Eemeren et al.; 2002)
the fact that it may hinder a successful implementation of a single common policy. We may now see that these conditions, and the extent to which they enhance or hinder the common resolution of a problem, have a potential influence on all parts of the main pragmatic argumentative pattern.
While the interdependence condition may be strategically used to strengthen all parts of the main argument – stressing that the interdependence of actors calls for common measures, and expresses a direct necessity to act (thus supporting the standpoint) – the diversity condition weakens the argument and expresses potential doubts. In other words, any reference to a high diversity of the actors may come back to doubt the pragmatic argument on the basis of feasibility in terms of implementation of a certain policy, effectiveness of a certain policy in cases of all actors, and even the necessity to act in certain matter with a presumed level of urgency for all actors. However, it does not mean that the diversity condition is the only way of attacking the pragmatic argument presented above. Instead, the diversity condition only leads to one way of doubting and/or attacking such an argument.
As has been formulated previously, we shall understand the condition of strategic uncertainty – or conversely strategic certainty – to be the one that distinguishes old and new governance modes. Thus, it is the strategic (un)certainty which has the potential to shape the argumentative choices of participants. We shall thus continue to account for the ways in which the strategic (un)certainty would shape the actors’ choices in terms of strategic maneuvering of participants in the European parliamentary discussions systematically, considering a specific aspect of such strategic maneuvering – the choice of topical potential.
First, however, we shall provide a theory-driven incorporation of strategic uncertainty into an argumentative discussion of European parliamentary debates. As has been mentioned previously, we will look into parliamentary discussions over proposals, a typical main argumentative scheme of which will be pragmatic, and will take form of an argumentative pattern as follows:
1. We should do X
1.1. X leads to a desirable effect Y
1.1. ` (If X leads to a desirable Y, we should do it)
discussion referring to the scope condition of strategic uncertainty dictates that the outcomes of a certain policy or common action are a priori unknowable17; an effect of
such a starting point on the argument itself shall be deduced. Such a material starting point will not only affect the content of argumentation itself, but will have direct consequence on the argumentative pattern itself. This is due to the fact that the strategic uncertainty ultimately weakens the link between X and Y – thus weakening the whole pragmatic argument as it is. Once it is known and recognized by all participants of a discussion that a mechanism through which X will lead to a desirable outcome Y cannot be a priori known, the act of advancing such a pragmatic argument would fall short in terms of reasonableness.
Yet, the pragmatic argumentative pattern presented above is typical for the discussions over legislative proposals and is being used within the framework of both old and new governance modes, given the necessity to justify certain course of action by certain desirable outcome. It would be ultimately pointless and thus unnecessary to advance a legislative proposal without a pragmatic incentive (without pointing out its function). It is thus up to the arguers to be persuasive in terms of convincing their partners of necessity and usefulness of a certain course of action – i.e. X – while remaining reasonable and avoiding denial of unknowability of the results of X in terms of desired result – i.e. Y. In order to achieve this, the participants have to maneuver strategically and respond to the constraints posed by strategic uncertainty reasonably and effectively at the same time. This would mean that the starting point of strategic uncertainty would ultimately alter the argumentative pattern of arguers when discussing under the new governance mode, who will be thus constrained in terms of the exploitation of topical potential.
IV.3. Strategic Choices of Topical Potential in the Light of New Institutional Constraints
As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, the basic argumentative pattern of European parliamentary debates consists of a basic argument presented at the beginning of discussion by the rapporteurs, often supported by subargumentation. Reaction of the following speakers is then typically linked to certain part of the rapporteur`s argumentation. Pragmatic argumentation, being central to this paper, is then a common
17 Unknowability and, conversely knowability will further refer to strategic uncertainty – which dictates
that the actors are not only not sure about the results of a certain policy, but the possible policies resolving a certain issue could not be known
argument scheme used in political legislative discussions (Garssen; 2013) and is thus treated in order to account for the influence of old and new governance modes on European parliamentary discussions.
In the light of the scope condition that is to be treated – strategic (un)certainty – as the motivation behind differences in choices of topical potential made by the participants of European parliamentary discussions in old and new governance modes respectively, we shall understand that the strategic uncertainty dictates that the link between legislative proposal and the desirable outcome is unknowable.
Nevertheless, the main pragmatic argument of the rapporteurs is:
1. We should do X
1.1. X will lead to a desirable Y
1.1.` (If X will lead to a desirable, we should to it)
As has been argued previously, the starting points following the contextual setting – the new governance mode – will have direct effect on the acceptability of 1.1. statement, since it renders the link between X and Y unknowable and unpredictable. The arguer, being aware of such a constraint on his/her argumentation, has to make proper choices of topical potential in his/her argumentation in order to be able to reasonably support the standpoint 1.
Given that the aim of participants when maneuvering strategically is twofold – i.e. the aim of being reasonable while effective in persuasion – the mitigation of the claim 1.1. would not seem to be an effective choice. Given that the core of pragmatic argument is a suggestion that a certain (proposed) course of action would bring about certain desirable effect, a mitigated claim X might lead to Y will directly expose the uncertainty of the arguer about the usefulness of X. In other words, the mitigation of claim 1.1. would bear a twofold message – that X might lead to Y and that X might not as well lead to Y. The uncertainty of the link between X and Y thus presents a challenge for strategic maneuvering where a simple mitigation, while reasonable, is not necessarily effective. Furthermore, such mitigated claim will directly expose the unknowability of the X’s outcome in terms of Y, therefore rendering the arguer’s situation more difficult under the new governance mode – as opposed to the situation under old governance mode where the outcome of a certain X might (and in most cases is) known. Working with a proposal X under such a complex setting of diverse actors as in European Union,
it is a priori impossible to know any set of Xs that could be presumed to have the potential to lead to Y. While under the old governance mode mitigating the X leads to Y claim may thus still be an option – since X would be an element of the known set of possible solutions leading to Y and thus the X-Y link has stronger grounds – the new governance mode renders any such mitigation to be a dangerous jeopardy of the arguer`s case – after all, X might not have anything to do with Y.
Especially within legislative context, it is highly desirable to present certain expected outcome of a proposed course of action – X. Without any clear expectation about what would a certain X lead towards, no course of action would be justified. It is thus required by the context that an effect of X would be presented. Moreover, the polyarchic distribution of power under the new governance mode makes it desirable for the actors to come up with, even unknowable, solutions (Xs) to a certain problem. This is due to the fact that polyarchic distribution of power, given that there is no single hegemon, encourages the environment of experimentation and benchmarking. This then means that the pragmatic argumentative pattern under the new governance mode is useful and strategic to use under the new modes of governance as well. This also means that even though the outcomes of a certain X in terms of Y are unknown, it is still worth justifying the functionality of a given X and the pragmatic reasons for its adoption. Given, however, the fact that the strategic uncertainty renders the justification of the 1. statement through a desirable Y as its effect, the arguer shall justify the necessity of X through its outcome, different from Y in order to argue for the usefulness of X. At the same time, the link between the X and Y is central to the argumentative pattern of legislative proposals as presented above, and should thus be comprised within the argumentation. While it is not possible to remain reasonable without mitigating the link between a certain course of action and a desired effect, another outcome - Z - would provide the arguers with an opportunity to both, mitigate the link between the X and Y and to justify the usefulness of X.
Such a division of the link between X and Y through a knowable outcome of X – Z – will provide the arguer with the opportunity to show that his proposal would bring about a certain result with a relative certainty, which would then satisfy the expectation of his audience to provide the grounds for the functionality of, and the pragmatic reasons to adopt, his proposal. At the same time, the arguer can in this way remain reasonable by virtue of not denying the unknowability of the effect Y following the X. This is the core
of the strategic nature of the division of X-Y link by a Z element – while still showing a knowable function of the legislation (which is the X resulting in Z), the arguer is able to remain reasonable and not to claim that X will indeed lead to Y. When compared to the aforementioned simple mitigation of the ‘X leads to Y’ statement, such a resort to the Z element would expose the functionality of the legislative proposal X, and will thus be persuasively more effective.
The strategic choice would then be to provide subargumentation to the basic pattern, which would include a division of the link between the X and Y – a choice where the effective usefulness of X and the reasonable mitigation of X leading to Y could be accommodated:
1. We should do X
1.1. X leads to a desirable Y 1.1.1a Because X leads to Z 1.1.1b And Z might lead to Y 1.1.` (If X leads to Y we should do it)
Employing this argumentative pattern in legislative European parliamentary discussions in the cases of new governance modes then not only enables the arguer to justify the usefulness of legislation but also to strategically accommodate a reasonable mitigation of the `X leads to Y` statement. Such a subargumentation also distracts the listeners from the weak X-Y link, which then stands for another rhetorical asset of such subargumentation.
Furthermore, it seems to be strategic and rhetorically effective to resort to the interdependence condition when dividing the X-Y link. Such a resort appears to even be a typical one18, and consists of appealing to the sense of interdependence in the content
of the Z element of the subargumentation. In other words, the Z would typically refer to a (close) cooperation among the actors, coordination of policies, mutual learning or other assets of common action. This follows the nature of the new modes of governance, where interdependence has to be highly relevant and the advantages of common actions have to be often stressed, which is due to the fact that in many cases the issues treated by the procedures of new governance modes are subject to problematic diversity of the actors.
18 Based on a research conducted on 10 randomly chosen cases of legislative European parliamentary
debates pertaining to the new governance mode. even though the population of the research is very limited in both, scope and representativeness, a reliable generalizable research has not been the ambition of this paper. Rather, it provides a useful lead to the typical ways of arguing.
The pragmatic argumentative pattern constructed as it has been presented will then, remains to say, be particularly vulnerable to an attack appealing to the diversity condition. If the arguer choses to present the Z element referring to the condition of interdependence, the Z standing for close cooperation for instance, attacking any other part of the pragmatic argument on the basis of diversity would ultimately weaken the 1.1.1.a and subsequently the 1.1. statement as well. This is because once an antagonist will appeal to high diversity in his argumentation against the basic pragmatic argument, all parts of the pragmatic argument that are supported by an appeal to interdependence condition would be weakened as well. May, for instance, an antagonist chose to doubt the 1.1.` statement in the pragmatic argument on the basis of diversity, then, depending on the content of both the argument and the attack, either whole argument 1.1. with its subargumentation could be attacked at the same time, or only its part. In such a way, even if the antagonist could use a single doubt, which explicitly attacks only one part of the basic pragmatic argument, to doubt or attack several statements of the argument at the same time.
Thus the arguers in the legislative European parliamentary discussions pertaining to the new governance mode, and the protagonists of a legislative proposal in particular, seem to be constrained by the condition of strategic uncertainty, which, in its turn, may create certain conventions in argumentative patterns in such discussions. It is not the ambition of this paper to prove that such conventions exist empirically, nor that the argumentative pattern presented above exists only in the discussions pertaining to the new governance mode.
We shall say that the introduction of the new governance mode brought about a constraint to argumentation which will necessarily exist in the discussions pertaining to the new governance mode. This does not mean that we would not find this pattern in the cases of old governance modes. However if the arguers would use this pattern in such a case, its choice would not follow from a constraint posed by the governance mode. Given the condition of strategic certainty that characterizes the old modes of governance, there is no longer need to divide the X-Y link, since the mechanism through which the X would eventually lead to Y is, in principle, knowable. This would mean that X belongs to a knowable set of Xs with a potential to lead to Y. We can now understand that while this is the case, the division of the X-Y link can, and often is, employed in argumentation under the old governance mode as well. If, for instance, the
arguer choses to support the `X leads to Y` standpoint with an insight into the mechanism which would make X lead to Y, then there may as well exist certain steps in between the X and Y that could play the role of Z element in the aforementioned pattern. The potential division of the X-Y link under the old governance will however not result from the institutional constraint posed by the governance mode, but will rather be incidental and will be subject to choices of the arguer following the particular proposal or argument.
The argument presented in this chapter then is that the conditions characteristic for the new modes of governance pose a necessary constraint on argumentation, which would then be reflected in the argumentative pattern used by the arguers. While this pattern is not exclusively used in the legislative European parliamentary discussions pertaining to the issues handled through the new governance mode, what distinguishes the discussions pertaining to the old and new governance modes is the strategic nature of such argumentative pattern due to the institutional constraint on argumentation posed by the new governance mode.
Now that we have explained how the constraint posed by strategic uncertainty came to be, and how exactly it is reflected in argumentation, we shall illustrate our findings on real European parliamentary discussions. Such a study will serve several purposes. First, we will shed more light on the way the actual arguers deal with the constraint posed by strategic uncertainty in real life discussions. Secondly, we will illustrate the findings presented in this chapter by the way of examples – for this an explanation of the level of directness of the X-Y link under both governance modes will be provided. Lastly, we will enable the reader to fully understand the way in which the constraint posed by strategic uncertainty is being reflected in a discussion, and how do the arguers use such a constraint as their strategic advantage in real situation.
V.
STRATEGIC MANEUVERING WITH STRATEGIC
UNCERTAINTY
V.1. Methodology
In order to study the influence of old and new governance modes on particular European parliamentary discussions empirically we will use two different cases of such debates, each pertaining to a different mode of governance. Both discussions have been chosen from the archive of sittings of European Parliament in the course of the past year, and each of these discussions contains one main pragmatic argument in the speech of rapporteur. The classification of the debates at hand into governance modes has been done by a predetermined set of criteria. First round of classification has been done through a study of policy fields to which given debates pertain to, the history of the fields in terms of governance modes and policy-making procedures, current developments and scientific literature on the field.
In case of doubt over the assignment of governance mode to a debate, a second round of classification took place, where not only the field, but also the issue at hand has been studied. More specifically the particular legislative procedure at hand, its degree of centralization discussed and/or decided, level of precision and possible direct applicability of resulting legislation – either following the discussion or prior to the discussion – have been considered, as secondary features of old and new governance modes19. The level of centralization has been considered either by means of the proposal
at hand, or the amount and the roles of different actors participating in the policy-making process (the role of agencies, lower-level units = member states), the precision has been relatively assessed by estimate of the level of discretion left to implementation. Having the cases selected and sorted by governance mode adherence, an analytical overview (using pragma-dialectical reconstruction and analytical tools) of all debates have been done, enabling for a clear, systematic overview of argumentation and strategic maneuvering. After the pragmatic argumentative patterns have been reconstructed, an explanation of the choices from topical potential the arguers have made was provided.
19 Under the primary features we understand the scope conditions of the policy field being characteristic
for the governance modes, the secondary features are then the procedures for which the old and new governance modes stand respectively
V.2. Case Studies
In order to account empirically for the strategic choices of participants of legislative European parliamentary discussions pertaining to the new governance modes, we have chosen a case of a discussion on Public Employment Services policy, taking place on April 15th 201420. After a reconstruction using pragma-dialectical tools, we have arrived
at the following overview of the main pragmatic argument presented by Frédéric Daerden, the rapporteur:
1. We should vote for the legislation on Public Employment Services
1.1. The legislation on Public Employment Services will lead to desirable unemployment rate decrease, reduction of the duration of unemployment and progress in fight against structural unemployment and social exclusion
1.1. ` (If the legislation on Public Employment Services leads to unemployment rate decrease, reduction of the duration of unemployment and progress in fight against structural unemployment and social exclusion, we should vote for it)
In order to be able to comprehensively account for the strategic choices Daerden has made, we shall identify the variables X and Y as introduced in the argumentative pattern presented in the previous chapters. We can see that voting for the legislation on Public Employment Services stands for the X in our pattern, while the unemployment rate decrease, reduction of the duration of unemployment and progress in fight against structural unemployment and social exclusion stands for the Y in the original pattern. We thus arrive at a simple:
1. We should do X
1.1. X will lead to desirable Y
1.1. ` (and if X will lead to desirable Y then we should do it)
Now, in order to support the claim 1.1.A, the arguer opts for following subargumentation:
1.1.1.a Legislation on Public Employment Services leads to good cooperation of all relevant actors
1.1.1.b Good cooperation might lead to unemployment rate decrease, reduction of the duration of unemployment and progress in fight against structural unemployment and social exclusion
We can see that the arguer opts for choosing a subordinate argumentation stating that
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the legislation on Public Employment Services would lead to a certain Z – good cooperation of all relevant actors. In this way, Daerden has chosen to divide the link between the legislation on Public Employment Services, and to state that this legislation will lead to good cooperation, which then, in its turn, might lead to a desirable Y. It is noticeable that the Z the arguer has chosen – good cooperation – makes an appeal to the interdependence condition, to a common procedure that should be adopted in order to make a progress in the issue of employment policy.
In this case, the X-Y link presented in the main pragmatic argument – the link between the legislation on Public Employment Services and unemployment rate decrease, reduction of duration of unemployment, and progress in fight against structural unemployment and social exclusion is blurry and unclear. The proposed legislation includes an establishment of a Public Employment Services network that should carry initiatives such as a common evidence-based reference system. There is no direct visible link between the creation of a network of public employment services and the achievement of the desirable Y Daerden proposed. A concrete impact of creation of such a network on real issues of unemployment and social exclusion is ex ante unknowable – there is no tangible mechanism through which a creation of a network with an evidence-based reference system would lead towards improvement of unemployment rate, for instance. This is why the arguer has chosen to provide the listeners with a tangible result of the proposed legislation – good cooperation – that would follow with a relative certainty.
This allows the arguer not to put that much of emphasis on his following claim, stating that good cooperation might lead to Y. At this point the arguer has been able to mitigate the claim Z leads to Y by employing the term “might”, and he has been able to do this without exposing his proposal to criticism regarding its uselessness by providing a tangible, probable result. In addition, even the support of the `X might lead to Y` statement does not appear to be a strong one:
1.1.1.b.1.a Missions and objectives of this cooperative network are ambitious
1.1.1.b.1.a.1.a Missions of this cooperative network are initiatives based on comparative learning, benchmarking of implementations of employment policies
1.1.1.b.1.a.1.b The objectives of this cooperative network in-clude unemployment rate decrease, reduction the duration of
unemployment and progress in fight against structural unem-ployment and social exclusion
1.1.1.b.1.a.1.c` (This is ambitious)
1.1.1.b.1.b To make these missions and objectives feasible and achievable, compulsory cooperation must be adopted
Stating that in order to make the ambitious aims of the proposed legislation feasible a good cooperation is needed is not a strong support for 1.1.1.b. Daerden only stated that good cooperation is a necessary condition for achieving Y, which does not mean that a good cooperation is a sufficient condition and thus, if achieved, would indeed lead to Y. As, however, follows from the strategic uncertainty, the results of X are a priori unknowable. A mitigation of the X leads to Z claim is thus reasonable, and the support of this claim, even a weak one, responds to anticipated criticism.
Daerden has nevertheless provided the listeners a tangible result of his proposal through the division of the X-Y link, the result being the good cooperation, while remaining reasonable. In such a way he has strategically used the institutional constraint posed by strategic uncertainty.
Within the same discussion, Sari Essayah, a member of European Parliament speaking for the group PPE, has attacked Daerden`s on the basis of diversity of the actors. Claiming that while the unemployment situation is of utmost importance, the employment policies have been, and should remain, national issues, since the unemployment rates differ significantly among the member states, she has attacked the 1.1.` statement of Daerden. Saying this, Essayah has presented an argument that even if the legislation on Public Employment Services would lead to unemployment rate decrease and other aims presented under Y, the legislation should not be adopted, since the employment policy should not be handled in a common European way.
What shall be noticed is that through this attack Essayah was able not only to attack the 1.1. ` statement, but has also managed to doubt the 1.1. statement as well. This is due to the fact that once the antagonist refers in his/her attack the diversity condition, he/she refuses any action based on the interdependence - which the protagonist has embodied in Z. In other words, Even though the attack of Essayah has been directed towards the 1.1.` statement, it has as well implicitly doubted not only the desirability of Z as a step between the X and Y, but also the link between Z and Y – recognizing that the issue of employment policy is important and urgent while refusing good cooperation implicitly states that good cooperation would not lead to unemployment rate decrease, reduction
of duration of unemployment and progress in fight against structural unemployment and social exclusion. In such a way the antagonist is able to attack and/or doubt several parts of the protagonist`s argument by advancing one single argument.
As a point of reference we have chosen a legislative European parliamentary discussion pertaining to the old governance mode in order to demonstrate the lack of the institutional constraint on argumentation posed by strategic uncertainty. For this purpose a discussion over the powers of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority taking place on the 11th of
March 201421 will be treated.
The rapporteur, Burkhard Balz, has presented in this discussion a pragmatic argument falling under the basic argumentative pattern of the legislative European parliamentary discussions:
1. We should vote for the Omnibus II directive
1.1. Omnibus II directive will lead to desirable better European stakeholder protection and financial stability
1.1. ` (If the Omnibus II directive will lead to desirable better European stakeholder protection and financial stability we should vote for it)
Again, in order to better understand the argumentative choices the arguer has made, we shall understand that the vote for the Omnibus II directive stands for the X in our basic pattern, and a better European stakeholder protection and financial stability stands for the Y.
We may see now that the Omnibus II directive, which prescribes clear regulations for the conduct of insurance companies – such as requirements for risk management and business organization – does lead to financial stability much more directly than did the network of Public Employment Services in the previous case. The measures included in the proposed legislation lead towards the Y with a relative certainty, since the procedures the legislation prescribes are directly linked with the desired results.
From this follows that the arguer is no longer constrained by the condition of strategic uncertainty and is thus not forced to come up with a division of the X-Y link. Instead, a symptomatic argumentation scheme has been employed, by the arguer explicitly stating
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