Five Nation Branding Nations

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Foreign Cultural Policy as a tool for Nation Branding in five European Countries

Master Thesis European Studies: Identity and Integration Laura Folkers

Scriptiebegeleider: Claske Vos Date: 01-07-2019

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1

– Introduction

1.1 – Introduction and Hypothesis

Four years ago, Victoria L. Rodner and Chloe Preece, published an extensive article about how two countries, China and Venezuela, used culture for their own nation branding efforts and realised “governments are […] cashing in on the status cultural power can provide them”.1_{To come to this}

statement, Rodner and Preece delved in to research about how these two countries brought their foreign cultural policy into practice, and took an international art event, La Biennale di Venezia, as a case study. The Biennale in Venice proved to be a good stage to carry out their research. Because according to them, the event can be described as follows:

“With several levels of participation, including independent curatorship and an awards system within the Palazzo, Venice becomes a platform for selected artists to be cultural ambassadors of their home-grown art scene on the global panorama […]. Art shown on this international scale means that ‘‘politics becomes significant’’[…]. Described by Adam (2009, p. 1) as the ‘‘grand-daddy of art fests,’’ the Venice Biennale confers a seal of approval on the artists who participate, branding them (and their nation) on the international art market.”2

Though the two chosen countries do not seem to have much in common and lie on opposite sides of the world, the study gives interesting insights in the governments cultural policies’ world. The two discussed countries are located quite far away from where the event, the Biennale, takes place – in Europe. This begs the question: what is the status of trends in foreign cultural policies in Europe itself? Do countries in Europe also seek to promote their national image through use of culture?

Not much research has been done up to today when it comes to comparing foreign cultural policies and their objectives of different nations in Europe. Some scholars have done research on specific countries but with slightly different focus, such as research on so-called creative clusters or creative industries. These include focus on cultural clusters by Blanca de-Miguel-Molina, Jose-Luis Hervas-Oliver, Rafael Boix and Maria de-Miguel-Molina and the comparison of creative industries in Europe by

1_{Victoria L Rodner. and Chloe Preece, “Painting the Nation: Examining the Intersection Between Politics and the Visual Arts}

Market in Emerging Economies”, in: Journal of Macromarketing, Vol. 36 (2), (2015) 137.

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Boix, Francesco Capone, Lisa De Propris, Luciana Lazzeretti and Daniel Sanchez.3_{These studies overlap}

somewhat with the themes concerning cultural policy that are discussed in this thesis, but comparative analyses are limited nonetheless. This also applies to related research on big economic players such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain. Occasionally all countries are looked at in a broad sense, but rarely has the comparison of countries been the central subject of studies in the field of foreign cultural policy. Big economic players have on the other hand, been subject to study when it comes to trends in foreign cultural policy. In this study, I will focus on a trend set by the UK, which has similar features like Rodner and Preece found when looking at Venezuela and China (achieving power through the status culture can provide). The UK serves as a good example for drafting foreign cultural policies, and often proves as inspiration on how to brand a nation. This way can be described as a neo-liberal use of culture, to achieve reputation and thus economic benefits: for example, increased tourism towards the country. To enact this use, the UK has discerned certain creative industries to structure and help with this endeavour.

The aim of this research is to establish if smaller European countries follow in the footsteps of the trend set by the UK, a policy towards a more neo-liberal foreign cultural policy, where culture is used for national interests. How is this included in their foreign cultural policy and furthermore how is the policy brought into practice? And how does supporting and acknowledging creative industries help to use culture for nation branding, strengthening – for example – diplomatic ties or the enhancing of a national

economy? By comparing five smaller European countries’ cultural policies (Romania, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland), I will seek to answer the previous questions and the main question at hand:

Have smaller European countries followed the British turn towards the neo-liberal use of cultural diplomacy in their foreign cultural policy for nation branding purposes?

I hypothesize most countries to follow bigger countries like the UK as examples for cultural policy and have therefore already followed – or will soon follow – in their footsteps. However, I presume this takes place subconsciously to a big extent. I will make use of several methods, that incorporate multiple forms of qualitative research, such as national policy documents, interviews, academic literature, and excerpts from online newspapers, which will be more thoroughly described in the methodology.

To test the hypothesis, I have chosen five countries’ cultural policies to compare: Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Ireland. I have come to these five countries because they have in

3_{Blanca de-Miguel-Molina, Jose-Luis Hervas-Oliver, Rafael Boix and Maria de-Miguel-Molina, “The importance of Creative}

Industry Agglomerations in Explaining the Wealth of European Regions” in: European Planning Studies 20:8, 1263 – 1280 (2012) and Rafael Boix, Francesco Capone, Lisa De Propris, Luciana Lazzeretti and Daniel Sanchez, “Comparing creative industries in Europe” in: European Urban and Regional Studies 23:4 (2016) 935 – 940.

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common that they are not counted among the big economic players of Europe such as France, the UK and Germany, and have therefore not been subject of many comparative or, in some cases, even singular academic research activities concerning their foreign cultural policy. They also differ sufficiently amongst each other to give the analyses an edge. They are well spread geographically: three western-European countries and two eastern-European countries. They each have different financial capabilities and are different in size, both in terms of number of citizens and land surface.

Because so little has yet been written about the practice of different foreign cultural policies abroad, I have decided to keep the research limited and specific. This is done by choosing to focus on one creative industry, architecture, and on one event where the policies are brought into practice, the Biennale di Venezia di Architettura. Therefore, this study may add some new comparisons to already existing analyses, such as the comparisons mentioned earlier.4

The research is divided into three levels. The first, presents an overarching view of the status of the five countries foreign cultural policies. The second then concentrates on how these foreign cultural policies are brought into practice in the country where the events takes place: Italy. The last level then focuses on the event itself, to see how much of the influence of the foreign cultural policies is left within the presented national pavilions’ exhibitions of the five discussed countries. The framework of this study can thus be presented as the following funnel:

(Figure 1: Funnel representing the levels of this study)

4_{De-Miguel-Molina, Hervas-Oliver, Boix, “The importance of Creative Industry Agglomerations in Explaining the Wealth of}

European Regions” and Boix, Capone, De Propris, Lazzeretti and Daniel Sanchez, “Comparing creative industries in Europe” 935 – 940.

Five European Foreign Cultural Policies

Brought into

practice in Italy

The

Biennale

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I first create a clear image on the status of current trends in the five compared European countries, in the field of foreign cultural policy. Afterwards I establish if the image correlates to the neo-liberal trend of the UK: if these countries have incorporated this into their foreign cultural policy. And if they have, what remains of the foreign cultural policy when brought into practice during a specific event, such as the Biennale di Venezia. Lastly, if sincere interest in the creative industries is still top of mind, over other drivers for presenting national culture – such as ‘nation-branding’. In the end, the analysis of this study will provide the groundwork for future comparative research in this field.

1.2 – Theoretical framework and Definitions

Culture and cultural policy

Culture is a difficult term to define. It can refer to the social behaviour of a certain group or even entire populations but can also relate to the production or the expression of artistic activities or artefacts. The first definition is based on an anthropological approach, whereas the second focuses on aesthetic values. When considering cultural policy, the latter interpretation has become more frequently used to define culture than the more traditional anthropological approach to cultural policy. In this vein, Dave O’ Brien stated:

“The German Romantics introduced a distinction between Zivilisation and Kultur […] This distinction contributes to the modern view of ‘culture’ as creative achievement and production of artistic work, in contrast to aristocratic notions of social position expressed in good manners. This gave rise to a number of persistent but problematic themes in the valuation of culture, including the notion of culture as an expression of national achievement […].”5

The end of O’Briens citation, the problematic consequence he names, (the notion of culture as an expression of national achievement) brings us closer to understanding the term national cultural policy today and any academic debate concerning it. Not only do we understand that culture is a difficult term, for the definition of cultural policy and cultural diplomacy (which are different but not mutually

exclusive), additional explanation is required.

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As for the definition of cultural policy, Toby Miller and George Yúdice argue:

“Culture is connected to policy in two registers: the aesthetic and the anthropological. In the aesthetic register, artistic output emerges from creative people and is judged by aesthetic criteria, as framed by the interests and practices of cultural criticism and history. […] The anthropological, on the other hand, takes culture as a marker of how we live our lives, the senses of place and person that make us human – neither individual nor entirely universal, but grounded by language, religion, custom, time and space.”6

This statement by Yúdice and Miller substantiates O’Brien’s: the first part of their definition deals with aesthetic differences within certain groups or populations, whereas the second deals with anthropological differences between certain groups or populations. As for the policy part of the term, this addition is to clarify that an institution supports and channels both registers (aesthetic creativity and the anthropology of a population or group). To conclude, Miller and Yúdice state that policy “is bureaucratic rather than creative or organic: organizations solicit, train, distribute, finance, describe and reject actors or activities that go under the signs of artists or artwork, through the implementation of policy.” Ergo, the policy supports creatives and the creative, but does not itself deal with creating any creative product.

Cultural diplomacy and nation branding

According to Patricia M. Goff, who wrote about cultural diplomacy for the Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, “cultural diplomacy rests on the assumption that art, language and education are among the most significant entry points into a culture.”7_{Furthermore, she states that good relations can be sustained}

by implementing cultural diplomacy into cultural policy: often countries use the term within their foreign cultural policies as a means to build trust between nations and to strengthen political relations. Goff also mentions a few other terms that stand alongside it when stating that “Cultural diplomacy sits on a

spectrum of ideational approaches to diplomacy. Alongside it on this spectrum one can locate soft power, branding, propaganda, and public diplomacy.”8

In line with these other terms related to cultural diplomacy, as mentioned in the quote above, other scholars have argued that many countries indeed try to use culture to strengthen their national image (of their national identity) abroad. This, in turn, can solidify economic ties to countries of interest. For example, Samogy Varga argues that since the 1990’s there has been a “transformation to the radically

6_{Toby Miller and George Yúdice, “Cultural Policy”, (SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 2002), 1.}

7_{Patricia M Goff “Cultural Diplomacy” The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013) 1.}

8_{Ibidem, and Diane Dodd, Melle Lyklema and Kathinka Dittrich – Van Weringh “a Cultural Component as an integral part of}

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new and ‘economized’ concept of foreign cultural policy”.9_{David Clarke elaborates on the role of the}

importance of economic benefit in cultural diplomacy, when stating and quoting the following:

“[The i]mplicit (and often explicit) assumption among policy-makers who back investment either directly in […] projects or indirectly via intermediary organisations such as cultural institutes, is that, as Maack states, the transmission of their national cultural will ‘brin[g] about an understanding for national ideals and institutions as part of a larger attempt to build support for political and economic goals’ (Maack 2001, p. 59). This places cultural diplomacy within the scope of what Joseph Nye has famously described as ‘soft power’, in other words the power to ‘set the agenda and attract others’, closely allied with ‘the ability to shape the preferences of others’”10_.

Furthermore, one must not confuse cultural diplomacy with public diplomacy. Maurits Berger argues that there is a distinct difference between cultural and public diplomacy:

“while public diplomacy is unilateral with an emphasis on explaining one's policies to the others, cultural diplomacy takes a bi- or multilateral approach with an emphasis on mutual recognition. Cultural diplomacy is therefore explicitly not meant to be the promotion of a national culture.”11

As such, cultural diplomacy should not be seen as a form or as an instrument of soft power or branding tool, according to Berger. Yet, even though Berger suggests cultural diplomacy should not be used as a tool for soft power, this does not mean it does not happen. Further on in the study we will be able to see how – in contrast to what Berger believes, cultural diplomacy is or can be used as a tool, in the form of either nation branding or soft power. The latter two terms overlap, so for the clarity of this study I will limit my definition to the use of ‘nation branding’ instead of ‘soft power’ (or both).

If, according to Berger, cultural diplomacy should not be used as an instrument of soft power, cultural diplomacy stands on the opposite side of nation branding. Nation branding is an important and topical term in relation to cultural policy. If the term ‘nation branding’ can be defined as ‘the construction

9

Somogy Varga, “The Marketization of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State”, Constellations Volume 20, No 3, 2013, 455.

10

David Clarke, “Theorising the role of cultural products in cultural diplomacy from a Cultural Studies perspective”, International Journal of Cultural Policy (2016), 22:2, 149.

11_{Maurits Berger, ‘Introduction’, Bridge the Gap, or Mind the Gap? Culture in Western-Arab Relations (January 2008),}

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and promotion of a national identity’ such as stated by Per Ståhlberg and Göran Bolin, how does it correlate to cultural policy, and where do these terms overlap? 12_{Nation branding can be defined as a tool}

to improve the country’s image abroad (and at home), thus becoming a marketing role within cultural policy. According to Michael J. Ahn and Hsin-Ching Wu, the arts and culture sector has an effective role when it comes to improving a country’s image.13_{Just as cultural diplomacy can be one of the goals or}

means within a country’s cultural policy, so can nation branding be a means or goal of cultural policy. They could both exist alongside each other in one cultural policy.

Nation branding, as we shall see, also often has a role within foreign cultural policy, though most policies do not adopt the term literally. What we understand after reading this, is that finding one, clear definition of any of the theoretical terms used, is not possible. All scholars have different approaches and different stances when it comes to defining terms in the policy field, of which most overlap. In this study, I will use nation branding as a term that is defined as either a tool that, just like the neo-liberal approach, that can be used to accomplish goals of foreign cultural policies, or as a potential goal or result of the foreign cultural policies.

As we have read, there is a difference between cultural diplomacy and cultural policy. Both terms can stand alone: cultural policy being a document or guide for an institution or, in this case, country, to support creatives or the creative. And cultural diplomacy is one of the ways of communication between countries or states, trying to understand each other with mutual respect, for example as a means to build trust between nations and to strengthen political ties. In this way, cultural diplomacy can be a strategy or methodology within a certain cultural policy. Many countries involve the aim to share knowledge, build trust or to strengthen (political) ties, in their cultural policy. For example, one of the goals within the cultural policy of the Danish Ministry of Culture is “to promote intercultural dialogue”14_{, and within the}

cultural policy of the Netherlands as devised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Educations, Culture Science there is – amongst other things – “a focus on the arc around Europe; support for cultural diplomacy worldwide”15_{. Additionally, it would make sense for cultural diplomacy to assume}

a distinct role in foreign cultural policy. As a foreign cultural policy is focused on the international, it makes sense to include the diplomatic spectrum, as carrying out the foreign cultural policy would mostly take place outside the country of origin.

12_{Per Ståhlberg and Göran Bolin, “Having a soul or choosing a face? Nation branding, identity and cosmopolitan imagination”}

in: Social Identities, 22 (2016) 274.

13_{Michael J. Ahn and Hsin-Ching Wu “The Art of Nation Branding. National Branding Value and the Role of Government and}

the Arts amd Culture Sector” in Public Organization Revue 15 (Springer Science+Business Media New York, New York 2013) 157 – 173.

14_{The Danish Ministry for Culture, ‘FEJL! INGEN TEKST MED DEN ANFØRTE TYPOGRAFI I DOKUMENTET. STRATEGY}

2017–2020’ (2017) 5.

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Creative industries and neoliberalism

As mentioned earlier, foreign cultural policy can also be used for economic benefits, whilst incorporating nation branding within the policy as a tool. Sometimes, creating and designing serves a more commercial goal than just the intrinsic or aesthetic value of art and culture. Richard E. Caves uses the term ‘creative industries’ for these working fields and explains that creative industries can be described as a “product or service contain[ing] a substantial element of artistic or creative endeavour”.16_{Examples can be found in the}

fields of architecture, design, fashion, gaming, and graphic design – to name a few. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) of the government of the UK, has, being one of the trendsetters when it comes to cultural policy, starting in 2015, when 9 cultural fields were identified as creative industries: ‘Advertising and marketing’, ‘Architecture’, ‘Crafts’, ‘Design: product, graphic and fashion design’, ‘Film, TV, radio and photography’, IT, software and computer services’, ‘Publishing’, ‘Museums, galleries and libraries’ and ‘Music, performing and visual arts’.17_{I will apply this definition of the DCMS throughout}

my research.

By focusing on creative industries within cultural policies, it seems as if these policies serve a goal towards more economic benefits rather than focus on the intrinsic value of art. This shift in the purpose of art, is described by Juhana Venäläinen as having been a part of a longstanding academic discussion:

“[t]the uncertain destiny of arts and culture in the face of pressures from contemporary capitalism has been a repeated concern in academic and popular discussions. […] [T]he neoliberal reorganisation of the nation-states, having roots in the late 1970s and yet intensifying in the “post-crash” austerity of the early 2010s, has questioned the legitimacy of art as a public good that should be supported by state funding.”18

This is for example felt in other sectors such as education, as Chris Peers states:

“[w]here art once occupied a place alongside mathematics, owing to the pluralist belief that children’s diverse talents and gifts could best be cultivated within a general

16_{Richard E. Caves, Creative industries: contracts between art and commerce (Harvard University Press, 2000) vii.}

17_Ibidem.

18_{Juhana Venäläinen, “Culturalization of the Economy and the Artistic Qualities in Contemporary Capitalism” in: Art and the}

Challende of Markets Volume 2: From Commodification of Art to Artistic Critique of Capitalism, ed. Victioria D. Alexander, et al., (Cham, Zwitserland: Palgrave Macmillian, 2018) 37.

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education, now neo-liberalism focuses much more concertedly on schooling for economic productivity and employment.”19

Many countries follow this surge towards the use of culture in a neo-liberal way, instead of looking at art for its intrinsic value. Again, the trendsetting country in adopting the neo-liberal use of culture in cultural policy, is the UK. For example, O’Brien states that “British cultural policy emerged from three central government ‘uses’ of culture: excellence, inclusion and economy.”20_{The creative}

industries, as named and defined by the DCMS mentioned above played a role in the success of the neo-liberal cultural policy of the UK, which is shortly explained by O’Brien:

“DCMS's act of constructing creative industries, by defining them in terms of exploitation of intellectual property on the basis of individual creativity that has the potential for job and wealth creation, shifted the focus away from the identity and communality of culture understood by both the new urban left and in the narrative of consumption”.21

As such, O’Brien continues to argue the following:

“the British model of cultural policy, using an arm's length Arts Council to deal with the problem of overt political influence in cultural life, has been very influential throughout the world, particularly in Commonwealth nations. […] [T]he model of creative industries, the ‘DCMS 13’, has been similarly influential as part of a global network of academics, think tanks, policymakers and nation states.”22

More than a decade ago, before the financial crisis of 2008, European member states seem to have worked together often and openly concerning foreign cultural policy in the EU. In a study from 2006, Diane Dodd, Melle Lyklema and Kathinka Dittrich even argued that the EU corresponds and facilitates cultural relations quite intensively:

“The review of hundreds of policy documents, reports, statements on official websites, and other studies has indicated that there is an openness expressed by EU Member States

19_{Chris Peers, “Making art invisible: visual education and the cultural stagnation of neo-liberal rationality”,}_{Discourse: Studies in}

the Cultural Politics of Education, 32:3, (Routledge, 2011) 418.

20_{O’Brien, “Cultural policy. Management, Value and Modernity in the Creative Industries”, 32.}

21_{Ibidem, 58.}

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to cooperate in external cultural policy, especially where the EU might support and complement initiatives of the Member States.”23

Examples can be found in some organisations that have convened under a united EU flag, such as the European Cultural Diplomacy Platform, which represents a collaboration between the Goethe-Institut, the British Council and the Institute Français, amongst others.24

However, other scholars such as Richard Higgott, Virginia Proud, Clarke, Somogy Varga argue in more recent studies that this situation has undergone substantial change.25_{Even though the EU claims}

there is such a thing as a European culture which can be communicated internationally, most European countries first and foremost try to promote their own national cultures at home and abroad. This can also be called ‘cultural nation branding’, which can be viewed as a more specific field within the nation branding spectrum. In 2013, Varga already addressed the issue when he mentions that “foreign cultural policy has become economized, de-politicized, and transformed to assist ‘nation branding’ efforts”26_,

which can be read as another way of describing the neo-liberal turn. And even though this does not necessarily mean that cooperation between countries concerning cultural policy has become uncommon, it does reflect on the priorities countries might set for the goals of their foreign cultural policy.

According to Higgot and Proud this phenomenon of ‘cultural nation branding’ has intensified over the last decade – in line with what Varga already predicted in his research. Additionally, Higgot and Proud’s research states that:

“[R]esilience strategies as a response to nationalists as actors of foreign cultural policy. It focuses on the last several years, especially that period since the global financial crisis of 2008 that has seen a rise of nationalist populism as a political phenomenon”27_.

This correlates to a preceding study by Clarke, who the following when it comes to foreign cultural policy in the EU:

23_{Dodd, Lyklema and Dittrich – Van Weringh, “a Cultural Component as an integral part of the EU's Foreign Policy?”, 10.}

24_{Launch of a new European Cultural Diplomacy Platform,}

https://www.bozar.be/en/news/114939-launch-of-a-new-european-cultural-diplomacy-platform, accessed on 30-01-2019, 20:46.

25_{Varga, “The Marketization of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State”, 442 – 458, Richard}

Higgot and Virginia Proud, Populist-Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Cultural Diplomacy, International Interaction and Resilience. (Stuttgart, 2017), 8 and Clarke, “Theorising the role of cultural products in cultural diplomacy from a Cultural Studies perspective”, 147.

26_{Varga, “The Marketization of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State”, 442 – 458.}

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“The concept of cultural diplomacy continues to receive significant attention as a potential means by which nations may maximize their soft power, that is to say their power to persuade and influence either other states or the citizens of those states in order to achieve their foreign policy goals.”28

According to these scholars, it seems that European countries have become increasingly nationally oriented when it comes to the cultural branding of their national culture and thus their cultural diplomacy, and policy. The neo-liberal use of culture, by the incorporation in cultural policy of nation branding, cultural diplomacy and supporting creative industries as a means to generate increased tourism influx, and diplomatic or economic benefits, seems to have taken root in the EU.

1.3 – Methodology

The neo-liberal turn of the UK towards an approach of the incorporation of supporting creative industries within their cultural policies, has led to the question whether other, smaller European countries have followed this trend. If the UK can be seen as a trendsetter towards neo-liberal cultural policies, have other countries induced similar developments in their cultural policies? And what is the role of the creative industries in this presumed shift towards neo-liberal cultural policy?

This study focuses on five smaller players within the European Union, and compares Romania, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland, to respond to the central question of this study: Have smaller European countries followed the British turn towards the neo-liberal use of cultural diplomacy in their foreign cultural policy for nation branding purposes?

To answer the central question, I have chosen to look at three different levels, briefly explained earlier: (1) mapping the foreign cultural policies, (2) applying focus by analysing how these policies are brought into practice in Italy, and lastly (3) applying a focal lens on one specific creative industry, being architecture, as promoted and supported during one specific event: the Architecture Biennale di Venezia 2018. (See figure 2 for a theoretical overview.)

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(Figure 2: Theoretical overview of method used for this study)

The research is split into four chapters. This chapter deals with definitions, the theoretical framework and the methodology of this study. The remaining three chapters can be described as three levels. By dividing into levels, every chapter will gain increased depth and focus. (See figure 2 for a theoretical overview.) On the first level, I will start with comparing the foreign cultural policies of the five countries. I will use a broad selection of national cultural policy documents available, and the online database of the ‘Compendium, of the Council of Europe’.29_{I have held interviews with some individuals}

who are responsible for the execution of foreign cultural policies of the countries. These interviews will return and be thoroughly reviewed in the third chapter. With this information I will be able to make several comparisons between the countries’ policies involving the history of their cultural policy (both national and international), the geographical focus, the way the policy is organized (under what authority: who is the commissioner and who are the actors), what goal or mission it has formulated, and if there is a special attention for creative industries (architecture in particular). The outcome will shed light on if the cultural policies incorporate a neo-liberal approach to culture, and therefore, if these are supporting my hypothesis.

On the second level, to take an even closer look, I have chosen to look at the case of foreign cultural policies brought into practice in Italy for two reasons. On the one hand, Italy is the country where the event takes place, thus making it easier to apply focus throughout the study. Second, because I worked six months at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Italy, in Rome. Through contacts at the

29_{Compendium Database,}_{http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/countries-profiles-download.php,}_{accessed November 18}th_{, 2018.}

Five European Foreign Cultural Policies

Brought into practice in Italy Biennale di Archittetura 2018 Cultural Policy

Nation branding, cultural diplomacy, neo-liberal use of

culture through supporting the creative industries

Architecture

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Embassy, I was able to interview the different actors, and as we shall see, in some cases also authors of foreign cultural policies of the five compared countries as applied in Italy.

Another issue that can be compared in this chapter, is how the actors of the policies seek to promote certain cultural sectors. How do they plan events, and with whom do they collaborate to make the events happen? Most of the interviewees have disclosed their yearly budget for cultural projects to me, which in comparison will give some insight as to what is thought to be most important channel for promoting cultural policy, in the manner of a more or less ‘follow-the-money’ principle.

Next, I have asked the representatives of the five countries about their opinion on what their country is known for when it comes to the creative sector. And, if there is a distinct sector, they deem their country’s creatives excel at, is this the sector they promote most? How important is the architecture sector to them, and what role (supporting or other) do they play at the Biennale? This will also show how much these actors, and thus the ministries of culture through them, are supporting architecture and architects abroad. Comparing these interviews with the second chapter’s conclusions, will show much of the theory of the foreign cultural policies is in fact carried out. This will also show how much these actors, and thus the Ministries of Culture through them, are supporting architecture and architects abroad. In concluding this chapter an analysis can be made to determine if neo-liberal use of culture, and mostly architecture, are on the agenda in practice.

Finally, on the third and last level, I will compare the actual outcome and what influence the foreign cultural policies had during the Biennale di Archittetura di Venezia in 2018. I will interview curators, review the opening speeches of the different national pavilions, compare the content shown during the Biennale at their specific pavilions, and analyse what well-known architectural media publishes concerning the national participation and national exhibitions at the Biennale, and see how many events are organized with or without the help of the government in relation to the Biennale. This will show how and if, and with what effect, the foreign cultural policy is carried out.

Architecture is one of the main creative industries as defined by the DCMS, and one which, poses and interesting stance, in straddling the creative and the industrial components of the creative industries as well as being a pure expression of art and an industrial produce at the same time. I think most people will not directly view architecture as a pure form of art such as painting or sculpting, but do associate it with culture: when visiting other cities as tourist, many marvel at buildings which have become recognizable cornerstones for big European capitals: the Colosseum for Rome, the Eiffel Tower for Paris, the skewed tall houses of Amsterdam – to name a few. I seek to compare how European countries try to brand their nation through their expertise in architecture during and before the Biennale.

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Yet, before conclusions from the comparison of the national exhibitions can be made, it is necessary to understand what the Biennale is about, and to reflect on how other scholars have sought to compare exhibitions in general. Though the Art Biennale of Venice has already been held since 1895, the Architecture Biennale is held every other year when the Art Biennale is not happening, commencing in 198030_{As such, the Biennale has existed for almost 40 years today. Since all compared nations in this}

study already had a national pavilion before 1980, we can presume that they have participated during the Architecture Biennale since its initiation. Monica Sassatelli claims that, in correlation to the hypothesis of this study, “historically, tourism and prestige have played a key role since the start of the Biennale, as much reasons for its creation as ‘fraternal association of all peoples’”. 31_{Sassatelli’s argument is mostly}

grounded in her statement that claims that “[g]lobalization has problematized the use of culture as national expedient, promoting this new emphasis on legitimation via economic utility”.32_{Sassatelli draws}

on Yúdice to the extent that she claims Yúdice argues the following:

“if the review and classificatory function is lost, what is left is seen as a mere culture of consumption that instrumentalizes art, and whole cities, for tourism and prestige. Or, to say it differently, that sacrifices the specificity of the cultural field to heterogeneous rationales, to national or regional promotion and, ultimately, to a new economic ‘expediency of culture’ paradigm where nothing escapes instrumental economic rationality.”33

Sassatelli explains that the Biennale was very much focused on nations even before the architecture biennale started in 1980:

“Initially confined within a central exhibition space at the Giardini del Castello site, the Biennale started to overflow into dedicated national pavilions within the gated park as early as 1907: seven were ready before the First World War (Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Hungary, France, Sweden, Russia). Until the Second World War, and perhaps until the 1960s, it was still possible to discern an order and intent, only partially realized, to recreate a miniaturized world. This was one where key players sat next to each other: Great Britain next to France, next to Germany. […] Even today, the Giardini maintains a

30_{Monica Sassatelli, “Symbolic Production in the Art Biennial: Making Worlds”, Theory, Culture & Society 34:4 (2017) 98 and}

109.

31_{Ibidem, 98.}

32_{Sassatelli, “Symbolic Production in the Art Biennial: Making Worlds”, 99.}

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special fascination, so much so that ‘the way we come to Venice to play the game of seeing the show . . . remains largely determined by the quaint attraction of seeking out the national pavilions while promenading through the park grounds and palaces with the air of the global traveller and conqueror of the colonial age’.”34

Of the countries mentioned having a pavilion from a very early stage, the UK, France and Germany are named first. After 1980, Sassatelli continues to explain that other elements supporting or extending the exhibitions outside of the Giardini, gave the entire Venice Biennale a more ‘festival’ kind of feeling.

Since the Biennale kept on growing, and not all nationalities were able to maintain a national pavilion within the Giardini, the official site of the Biennale was expanded to the Arsenale since 1980, a short walk from the Giardini. (See figure 3 for an overview of which countries have a national pavilion at the Giardini:)

(Figure 3: Overview of the 30 national pavilions at the Giardini)

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At the Arsenale, nations could also procure a space for their national pavilion.35_{Of the five compared}

countries, Ireland is the only country that has a national pavilion within the Arsenale instead of at the Giardini (See figure 4 for an overview of which countries have a national pavilion at the Giardini:)

(Figure 4: Overview of the 23 national pavilions at the Arsenale)

Next to official national participations in the national pavilions located at the Giardini and the Arsenale, there is also space (mostly in the Arsenale, and for a smaller part in the Central Pavilion at the Giardini) for other exhibitions not necessarily related to nations. However, in relation to these other exhibitions, Sassatelli argues the following:

“Subtle distinctions emerge: some countries are merely national participations’ temporarily hosted in different spaces every year and assimilated to the growing array of free ‘collateral events’; others have the more prestigious national pavilions, housed within the permanent, paying sections of the exhibition at the Giardini and Arsenale. This creates

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an interesting tension with an increasing number of collateral events that are not officially national participations, but clearly imagine themselves as such.”36

To map these other exhibitions and relate them to countries, I have made a chart (see Figure 5) that shows all the exhibitions and the nationality of the curators of these exhibition (either the location where a firm or organization is based when the curators were a group, or the nationality of the curator if the curator was not in a team) in the Central Pavilion and at the Arsenale.

(Figure 5: Additional participating exhibitions at the Central Pavilion and the Arsenale, based on nationality of exhibitor or location were exhibiting firm/organisation is based, at the Architecture Biennale di Venezia 2018)

What stands out, is that the Irish were very present during the 2018 Biennale. Though this is linked to the fact that the head curators were Irish, as we shall read more on in the final chapter, other countries are

36_{Sassatelli, “Symbolic Production in the Art Biennial: Making Worlds”, 104.}

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 R o man ia De n mark Ire lan d Th e N eth erl an d s Po la n d Fr an ce A u str al ia Un ite d S tate s In d ia Braz il Sw ed en Un ite d Kin gd o m Italy Sw itz er lan d Bel gi u m Ch in a Po rt u gal In d o n es ia Sl o ve n ia Ch ile Sp ain N o rwa y Jap an Bur ki n a F as o Ba n gl ad es h So u th -A fri ca Fi n lan d Me xi co G e rman y V ie tn am

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also noteworthy: Switzerland and the UK are the other countries most present during the 2018 Biennale. The Swiss pavilion received the Golden Lion, the highest award or prize affiliated with the Venice Biennale. And even though the UK did not win anything, they apparently made sure they were visibly present. Of the other compared countries, two countries were not present at all outside their own national pavilion: Romania and Poland. The Dutch and Danish were, but only marginally when compared to bigger countries such as the USA, France and Spain. Another country that could be perceived as smaller, but which was very present, was Portugal.

What relation does this presence have with the foreign cultural policy of the five compared countries? To answer this question, I will compare several aspects of the national exhibitions, such as for example aspects related to content, curators and exhibitors, opening speeches and reception of

architecture focused media. The sources used consist of interviews with curators, analysis of articles in ArchDaily (a well-known architectural website that reviews architecture worldwide), and content presented at the official website of the Biennale, as well as overall presence. (Figure 5)

To understand what role artists and curators play in the overall phenomenon of bringing the foreign cultural policies of their nations into practice, I have chosen to look at the way Rodner and Preece have approached this in their study. A part of their study focuses on the complicated position of artists within the phenomenon of nation branding efforts by nations’ governments through the reinforcement of foreign cultural policies. Rodner and Preece discern three interconnected levels in which artists must manoeuvre, to keep some success for themselves: “their individual practice (artist branding) in terms of the work they want to produce; the art world (cultural branding) which operates based on the

legitimization structures of the international art market; and government policy (nation branding).”37_This

begs the following questions, do curators and artists know about the goals of the nation they represent in the pavilion and its foreign cultural policies? What decisions do they make? Are they promoting

themselves, or promoting the nation, or both?

Reviewing all these elements in the fourth chapter will offer the possibility to analyse how the foreign cultural policies are included in the organization and all other elements of the 2018 Biennale. Finally, this case study makes it possible to identify the presence of neo-liberal use of culture, and architecture in this case, thus stating whether this policy was the agenda during this specific event.

37_{Rodner and Preece, “Painting the Nation: Examining the Intersection Between Politics and the Visual Arts Market in Emerging}

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2

– Five European foreign cultural policies 2.1 - Introduction

Before providing an answer to the question on how European countries seek to brand their culture in other European countries, it is needed to map the positioning of the foreign cultural policies of these five countries . Some countries have national and foreign cultural policy documents accessible online in English. For the ones that do not, the Compendium Database, accessible online on the website of ‘Compendium: Cultural policies and Trends in Europe’38_{gives the opportunity to download profiles on}

cultural policies per European country. The database is mostly based on official documents and provides only a narrow window on how accurate the countries publicize and update their strategies, as explained per country profile by certified authors.39

To map these foreign cultural policies, I will look closely at documents that I was able to obtain and are otherwise accessible online. Documentation can consist of official statements, strategies and policies of governmental bodies such as Ministries of Culture, academic articles, country profiles (within the Compendium database) and personal interviews held with the actors on cultural diplomacy in Italy. Unfortunately, not all countries offer clear documentation concerning their foreign cultural policy. Though the absence of public documentation can be perceived as a lack of relevant information, a lack of information can also be noteworthy as a signal. For example, it can show that a country does not have a special focus on foreign cultural policy.

There are a few subjects that I will compare. In some cases, (Poland, Romania and Ireland) additional historical context is needed to understand why little documentation exists. In cases where countries already have dealt with cultural policy for a longer time, I will analyse the debate concerning their policies. The next subject is the organisational structure behind the policy, ie who are the

commissioners and who bring the policy into practice. Another subject is the geographical focus of the country’s policies. Last but not least, I will compare what attention is given (or not given) to creative industries, with architecture in particular as a final focus point before drawing conclusions to test the hypothesis concerning the neo-liberal use of culture in the foreign cultural policies.

38_{http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/countries-profiles-download.php,}_{accessed on the 8}th_{of November 2018, 15:53.} 39_Ibidem_.

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2.2 – Romania

When it comes to Romania, information on the current foreign cultural policy is hard to come by. As mentioned, the cultural policy profile available in the Compendium database has not been updated since July 2012 (date of consultation: 19-04-2018).40_{To understand why the formulation and execution of a}

(foreign) cultural policy is not as clear as the other countries’ policies, some historical perspective on Romania’s cultural policy is required. According to the country profile of Romania in the Compendium database uploaded in July 2012, the cultural policy of Romania has passed some turbulent times last century. For the purpose of this research I will not describe the entire century but focus attention on the time since Romania’s revolution that ended the communist rule in 1989. During its revolution, one symbolic change is often described: the centre of the Romanian flag which held a communist symbol was torn off. This liberating act was the start of something new for Romania. Being cut off from Western Europe for a prolonged period and abrupt fashion resulted in the desire to be recognized by Western Europe – the geographical focus of the cultural policy of Romania is Western Europe.

Eight years ago, Nadia Kaneva and Delia Popescu wrote a paper about the way the Romanian government has used nation branding in relation to cultural policy in the past. Kaneva and Popescu claim that most of the governments’ nation branding efforts are directed towards promoting tourism influx into Romania. They base their research on several campaigns initiated between 2001 and 2004. These campaigns resulted in several commercials and were targeted at a European audience. The funding came for the largest part from European funds.41_{After analysing the content of the commercials, Popescu and}

Kaneva argued that Romania wants to be identified as a meeting place between the future and the past, modernity and tradition, West and East. They claim that “[t]he juxtaposition of these [traditional and modern] elements, captures the tensions between a national identity narrative rooted in a pre-communist historical heritage and a new one expressed through the tropes of Western, capitalist modernity.”42_The

tone seems critical – but it does confirm that due to the communist past and being cut off from the West, Romania’s cultural policy seeks to close the gap and become integrated into the European family in their own way, that certainly makes use of culture in a neo-liberal way.

Is Romania merely ‘using’ culture, in the case of Kaneva and Popescy for tourism, or are there also other goals? According to the official governmental website of Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government is seeking (and implementing actions) to promote Romanian culture abroad using several ways:

1. “Promoting several possibilities at Romanian universities”,

40_{http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/countries-profiles-download.php}_{, accessed on the 19}th_{of April, 2018, 13:52.}

41_{Nadia Kaneva and Delia Popescu, “National Identity Lite, Nation branding in post-Communist Romania and Bulgaria” in:}

International Journal of Cultural Studies 14 (2) (2011) 197.

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2. “Increasing lectures of the Romanian language abroad,”

3. “Assisting 30 executive programs and various cultural events organized by the diplomatic missions of Romania abroad.”43

These promotions are supported by Romanian Cultural Institutes in the following cities: Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, Istanbul, Lisbon, London, Madrid, New York, Paris, Prague, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Warsaw, Venice, Vienna and Rome. The institutions in turn are administrated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coordinated by the Romanian Cultural Institute in Bucharest (RCI), which institute manages all institutions abroad. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government implements their cultural diplomacy through their diplomatic missions and their culture sections and are supported by the Romanian Cultural Institute.44

Even though the article of Kaneva and Popescu dates back 8 years, it seems that not that much has changed. The claims made by Kaneva and Popescu correlate well with another part of their argumentation in relation to claims made by Rudolf Dinu, head of the RCI in Rome, who claims that internally the Romanian government has some organizational struggles when it comes to forming a cultural policy. Dinu claims the following:

“[E]ssentially[,] you may discover some fluctuation in the strategy of the Romanian Cultural Institute starting with 2003 – 2005, until the end of the first mandate of the Institute’s first president, Horia-Roman Patapievici, who was the president of the institute until 2012. 2012 is a benchmark because it’s not only the year of changes in the management of the institute, but also the year when the supervisory role was moved from the Romanian presidency to the Romanian Senate. The Institute must now present an annual report to the Senate Committee for cultural activities. And it has the budget approved by the parliament.”45

This statement could also explain why the country profile has not been updated since 2012, since the cultural policy became the responsibility of the Senate rather than the president.

In the Romanian Embassy in Italy, there is not an existing cultural section to be found, and the implementation of the foreign cultural policy is handled by the head of the RCI in Rome. (The case of Italy will be elaborated on in the third chapter.) In an interview, Dinu mentions that the Institutes are in fact diplomatic missions, and that “the Romanian Cultural Institute [is] in theory the only one with the

43_{https://www.mae.ro/en/print/2939,}_{accessed on 28-03-2018, 15:50.}

44_Ibidem.

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ability to operate abroad. The whole mission of the institution is to promote the Romanian culture in Europe and in the whole world.” Dinu also states that there are three bodies that collaborate on promoting Romanian culture abroad, namely the Ministry for Culture and National Heritage (MoCNH), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Romanian Cultural Institutes.46

It is evident that Romania still mainly focuses on Europe, and the West of it in particular. Dinu explains that the Romanian Institutes are next to being a diplomatic mission, also a cultural centre, institute and school. As mentioned earlier, most of the cultural institutes are based in the main cities in Western Europe. And because the foreign cultural policy is carried out by the cultural institutes, the actors of the policy seem to be located in the West of Europe. Geographically, this means the policy is focused on Western Europe. However, it is too easy to jump to the conclusion that the West of Europe is a strategical choice. It must be taken into account that a lot of these institutions have existed for a long time and it is therefore easy to focus on those countries because the institutes have had time to build a network. Setting up new institutions will need time to create such intricate networks and might cost a lot of money. The only institutions outside Europe are located in Turkey, the United Stated and Israel.

Architecture, or creative industries in general, are not mentioned by the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about promotion of Romania abroad.47_{However, in the country profile on the}

Compendium database a broader light is shed on architecture and the creative industries (even though it is dubbed culture industries, I believe there is a big overlap with the definition of the DCMS). According to Livin Chelcea, Anda Becut and Bianca Balsan, the authors of the country profile, the included cultural industries are divided into three categories: “new” industries that consist of design, multimedia,

architecture and gaming, “traditional” industries consisting of visual arts, handicraft, shows and written culture, and lastly “classical” industries which are audio video production, radio, film and editing. The goal of the incorporation of these industries is mainly for “the development of the economic dimension of culture”.48

Architecture is not broadly discussed, however at some point Chelcea, Becut and Balsan mention the following:

“Law no. 35/1994 creates a cultural added tax, also known as the cultural stamp. The law stipulates the conditions under which the funds are collected and used from the eight domains in which cultural stamps are applied (literature, cinema, theatre, music, folklore,

46_{Dinu, Interview.}

47_{https://www.mae.ro/en/print/2939,}_{accessed on 28-03-2018, 15:50.}

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visual arts and architecture). In 2011 architecture was added through a modification in the abovementioned law.”49

Though this reflects on the national cultural policy rather than the international policy, it does seem that architecture was valued of higher potential than before 2011. Any other indication of the valuation of architecture in the cultural policy of Romania is not mentioned by Chelcea, Becut and Balsan.

As we have seen, when it comes to the actual cultural policy of Romania, academics have published some rather critical articles on the manner of how the Romanian government seeks to promote culture abroad. Kaneva, Popescu and also Anca-Georgiana Andrei discuss nation branding by the government and the relation of the Romanian national image abroad with its connection to national and international perceptions of the results of nation branding.50_{Andrei argues that the government has}

actively sought to improve the national image abroad by using nation branding since the 1990’s, and that after having analysed five case studies, these nation-branding actions have either gotten a neutral or negative response nationally as well as internationally. Reasons for the negative reactions stem from corruption in the government and the lack of positive results.51

Based on the findings of the abovementioned scholars, the information in the country profile of the Compendium database and the information on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it does seem like the Romanian foreign cultural policy focuses on the use of culture rather than the intrinsic value of culture. By trying to brand their national image and focusing on the increase of tourism, as well as enlarging the economic spectrum of cultural industries, they seem to have followed the neo-liberal turn of the big economical players of the EU. Another conclusion is that cultural diplomacy also plays a large role in Romania’s foreign cultural policy. Following M. Goff’s definition of cultural diplomacy, that it “rests on the assumption that art, language and education are among the most significant entry points into a culture”52_{, the second point stated by the government, increasing lectures of the Romanian language}

abroad, could mean this point is more related to cultural diplomacy than a neo-liberal use of culture. Finally, we see that in the end, the foreign cultural policy of Romania is geared towards different goals, both related to enhancing economic benefits and tourism through neo-liberal use of culture, and on the spectrum of cultural diplomacy as well.

49_{Livin Chelcea, Anda Becut and Bianca Balsan, Country Profile: Romania, (Compendium, 2012), 39.}

50_{Kaneva and Popescu, “National Identity Lite, Nation branding in post-Communist Romania and Bulgaria” 191 - 207,}

Anca-Georgiana Andrei, “ The impact of nation branding campaigns on country image. Case study: Romania” in: Management & Marketing. Challenges for the Knowledge Society 12 (2) (2017) 222 – 236 and Nadia Kaneva and Delia Popescu, “’We are Romanian, not Roma’: Nation Branding and Postsocialist Discourses of Alterity” in: Communication, Culture & Critique 7 (2014) 506 – 523.

51_{Andrei, “ The impact of nation branding campaigns on country image. Case study: Romania”, 222 – 236.}

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2.3 – Denmark

The Danish foreign cultural policy is accessible online in English. The current strategy is devised for the period 2017-2020. The policy was created by the International Cultural Panel (ICP) which consists of a myriad of representatives of the following bodies: the Ministry of Culture, the Agency for Culture and Palaces, the Danish Architecture Centre, the Ministry of Business and Growth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Danish Design Centre, the Danish Film Institute, the Danish Cultural Institute, the Danish Arts Foundation and VisitDenmark.53_{Most of these bodies have a cultural focus, but two of them do not:}

VisitDenmark and the Ministry of Business and Growth. These institutions are not focused on the cultural sector but rather on tourism and economy respectively.

As mentioned in the introduction, several scholars believe cultural policy to be gradually more interwoven with economic benefits by a neo-liberal use of culture, when the national image is concerned. In this light, it is not surprising that VisitDenmark and the Ministry of Business and Growth are involved. Viewed from the Danish perspective, cultural policy is a means that could be ‘used’ to improve the economy and increase tourism to Denmark – which is again, also good for the economy. One of the actors of the Danish foreign cultural policy, Karen Öbling, cultural attaché of the Embassy of Denmark to Italy, even confirms this when asked about the importance of nation branding: “yes, I do think it is important because of course behind all the nation branding we want to show that Denmark is a nice country and we would like people to travel there and spend a lot of money, and sort of contribute to our economy and all these things. I think we’re pretty good at it.”54

When looking closer at the goals of the policy, we can see that this is indeed a big part of the strategy. The four objectives in the foreign cultural policy for the strategy of the period 2017-2010 are:

1. “to develop and renew Danish art and culture” 2. “to market Denmark as a nation”

3. “to promote cultural exports” 4. “to promote intercultural dialogue”55

Two of these objectives, that of marketing the Danish national and that of promoting cultural export, are not solely focused on culture. Marketing Danish culture abroad can be viewed as a form of nation branding. Promoting cultural export is creating economic benefits for the nation and the Danish cultural fields. On these economical and nation branding ways, the strategy states that

53_{The Danish Ministry for Culture, ‘FEJL! INGEN TEKST MED DEN ANFØRTE TYPOGRAFI I DOKUMENTET.}

STRATEGY 2017–2020’ (2017).

54_{Karen Öbling, Interview with Laura Folkers, Personal Interview, Rome, May 22, 2018.}

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“[c]ultural exchanges with other countries play a major role in promoting the export of cultural products and narratives about Denmark, both as a nation and as a tourist destination, in marketing cultural tourism and in facilitating cultural dialogue with other countries.”

Obviously, increasing tourism to Denmark by marketing the nation abroad through means of culture, is one of the goals.

Another interesting feature of the strategy is the geographical focus of Danish foreign cultural policies. The policies focuses on the USA, Asia (Japan, South-Korea and China) and the European neighbours of Denmark (The Baltic and Nordic region, and the UK, France and Germany).56_{The Baltic}

region consists of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The Nordic region consist of Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, and the autonomous territories of Greenland and the Faroe-Islands. Those last two belong to the Kingdom of Denmark and it therefore makes sense that they are included. This does not completely correlate to the locations where Danish Cultural Institutes can be found: St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Beijing, Brussels, Riga and Paris. The institution in Paris, Riga and Beijing operate in three of the priority

countries, namely France, Latvia and China. The others do not. However, there are different definitions of the ‘Baltic region’, and the strategy includes Warsaw and St. Petersburg, representing Poland Russia as included in the region. That leaves us with Brussels, which could still hold an important position European Union-wise. Consequently, just as with the case of Romania, the geographic focus goes out to where the cultural institutes already exist. The policy even dedicates it as such: “The Danish Cultural Institute already serves as a good platform for cultural exchanges, and there are advantages to be gained from incorporating it into the activities of the ICP (International Cultural Panel).”57

When it comes to the Nordic countries mentioned in the policy, Öbling confirms that these are geographically prioritized. She explains the importance of the collaboration with the Nordic countries, when she claims that “the Nordic collaboration has been increasingly reinforced over the last five years. This year there was […] a platform launched that is called the Nordics, which is basically a toolbox for how to brand the Nordic countries.”58_{This Nordic collaboration has existed for a long time according to}

Peter Duelund, who has studied the collaboration since 1960. Duelund is a name that pops up often when it comes to the Nordic Culture subject. He is (amongst other positions) Director of research of the Nordic Cultural Institute. In his paper on Nordic cultural policies of 2008, he claims that several initiatives led to,

STRATEGY 2017–2020’, 5.

57_{Ibidem, 13-14.}

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the following Nordic cultural model, based on the ideas and attitudes of the new welfare state of the 1960s:

“This model was put into practice in the post-war period, especially from the 1960s onwards, and it came to include all the Nordic countries. This also explains the basic similarities in the cultural policy of the Nordic nations [today], even if there are a number of minor differences, of course”.59

The Danish foreign cultural policy does not discuss creative industries. It briefly mentions architecture: the aim is to work together with the Danish Architecture Centre, and there is considerable interest in architecture relevant for Denmark, in particular in the USA.60_{This does not mean that within}

the policy no value is given to architecture, also other creative industries are not mentioned specifically. As we shall learn in the next chapter on the case of the application of Danish foreign cultural policy in Italy, Öbling explains that she has no clear focus on certain creative fields, but rather reacts to what demand and opportunities are presented to her.61_{Additionally, the third priority that is directed towards}

the increase of cultural export, shows the value culture can have: in this case culture is ‘used’ to promote and export cultural products abroad, which confirms that the Danish policy also includes a neo-liberal use of culture to some extent in their foreign cultural policy.

Lastly, same as for the Romanian case, the fourth point stated in the foreign cultural policy is directed towards increasing international dialogue, which correlates more with cultural diplomacy than nation branding, on which the earlier points seem to be directed to. Instead, the Danish aim to increase European dialogue, correlates to the argument of Dodd, Lyklema and Dittrich, who claim that “there is an openness expressed by EU Member States to cooperate in external cultural policy, especially where the EU might support and complement initiatives of the Member States” 62_{. However, this argument occupies}

the last place amongst the focus points in the foreign cultural policy, and we may suspect that the relevance of this point is regarded as of less priority. than the first three points, who seem to be focused more on promotion of Denmark’s identity through culture.

59_{Peter Duelund, “Nordic cultural policies: A critical view”, International}

Journal of Cultural Policy, 14:1, (2008) 7-24. (14.)

STRATEGY 2017–2020’ 4 and 14 respectively.

61_{Öbling, Interview.}

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2.4 – Ireland

In comparison to Romania, which has been independent for not even half a century, Ireland was relatively late with forming a cultural policy, even though they composed one around the same time (in the 90’s). Though this can be attributed to the fact that Romania already had cultural institutes and thus a network in place, this is a noteworthy remark. Obviously, Romania being a sovereign state before the Cold War, it had time to establish a network long before Ireland could. In comparison to the other countries, Ireland does not have a widespread, long existing network of cultural institutes. This is not strange considering most of the first cultural institutes of the other countries have existed relatively long, and Ireland has only been independent for almost a century.

Being part of the United Kingdom, which historically does have cultural institutions since a long time, it is explicable that Ireland did not develop a cultural policy until relatively recent days, compared to other European countries. After becoming independent in 1921, cultural policy was not a subject that received prioritized attention. Having faced a lot of economic difficulties in those first decades of independence, this gap in policy was thought to be a secondary issue. Only in 1951 a first attempt was made to address the subject in the form of an Arts Act, led by the Arts Council, which was an autonomous party on arms-length of the department of the Prime Minister. It was 1993 when the Department of Arts, Culture, and Gaeltacht (DACG) was created, and the first real cultural policy was brought to life.63

Ireland does not have a specific foreign cultural policy, but there is a clear and short general cultural policy, which is updated every two to four years. Ireland does not have ministries but instead has departments. In the most recent cultural policy, for the period 2018 – 2020 as devised by the Minister of the Department for Culture, Heritage and Gaeltacht, Josepha Madigan, the international approach is discussed briefly:

“We will also continue to work to develop Ireland's international reputation as a hub of cultural and artistic excellence and, together with the bodies under our aegis (Appendix 1), will work across the heritage, arts, culture and creative sectors, to ensure that they continue to make a significant contribution to Irish life, contributing to tourism and supporting job retention and growth.” 64

When we split up the priorities, they can be summed up as the following 4 points of focus: 1. International cultural reputation of cultural and artistic excellence

2. Significant contribution to Irish life

63_{Marian Fitzgibbon, “Country Profile Ireland”, Compendium: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, (2015) 2 and 3.}

Five Nation Branding Nations - Foreign Cultural Policy as a tool for Nation Branding in five European Countries