The construction of EU foreign policy identity : the primacy of internal dynamics : an analysis of discourses of EU Member States and institutions on EU-Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations

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The construction of EU foreign policy

identity: the primacy of internal dynamics

An analysis of discourses of EU Member States and institutions on EU-Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations

24 JUNE 2016

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Author: Diederick van der Wijk (10259457)

Supervisor: Dr. Andrey Demidov

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SUMMARY

This thesis provides a critique of theories on the role of Othering in the construction of EU foreign policy identity. Moreover, it challenges the focus of students of EU foreign policy identity on the conceptualization of the EU as a civilian or normative power. This thesis claims that these theories are too narrowly focused on the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity through an outward-looking perspective. These theories solely try to define EU identity through contrasts with Others or through the conceptualization of the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor.

I find that EU foreign policymaking is constructed through an inward-looking

perspective. My research of the discourses of different Member States and EU institutions on EU-Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations shows that the political debate on the underlying rules and principles of EU foreign policymaking is central to the

construction of EU foreign policymaking identity. The most important discourses primarily relate to the division of responsibilities and competencies in EU foreign policymaking, as well as the guiding principles of the interaction of Member States and EU institutions. This is consistent with Christopher Bickerton’s argument that in EU foreign policy, policymaking and polity-building are inextricably linked.

Thus, the definition of responsibilities, competencies and principles of EU foreign policymaking continues to present challenging and urgent questions to both academics and political actors. This thesis therefore encourages both scholars of EU foreign policy processes and students of EU foreign policy identity to refocus their attention on the internal workings of the EU and the construction of identity through an inward-looking perspective.

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1. Introduction

After the horrors of the two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century, the determination to eliminate the ghosts of warfare from the European continent was institutionalized through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Founding father Robert Schuman’s aim of this cooperation of Western European countries was to ‘make war’

between the two cornerstones of the continental European Community - Germany and France - ‘not only unthinkable, but materially impossible’ (Schuman, 1950, p. 1). Schuman’s ideas have further shaped the integration of the European Community ever since. Ideological

hostilities and territorial disputes have been replaced by deep transnational economic, political and even military links. The instruments of warfare, nationalism and protectionism have lost their role in conflict resolution. There are both strong beliefs and strong European institutions that uphold values of cooperation, democracy, justice and transnational solidarity. These supranational institutions have slowly but surely taken over the role of the nation-state as the sovereign entity in a large variety of policy fields. The European Community could be said to have successfully combatted its ‘temporal Other’ of nationalism and intra-European warfare (Diez, 2004), because of its perseverance to define itself as a peaceful, liberal democratic entity that can thrive through cooperation, consensus-seeking and integration.

The creation of the Single Market, the Treaty on the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European Monetary Union show that the EU continues on the path towards an ‘ever closer union’ (European Council, 1983, p. 25). Nevertheless, one of the areas in which the labour division between EU Member States and EU institutions

remains contested, is foreign policymaking. Foreign policy cooperation and alignment among EU Member States are arranged through European institutions such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the High Representative for the European Union and the External Action Service. However, EU Member States differ in their foreign policy priorities and preferences. The hardship - as well as the necessity - of creating a coherent and strong EU foreign policy is par excellence exemplified by the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the ongoing refugee crisis. These different foreign policy interests and preferences complicate foreign policy coordination and cooperation. Furthermore, they spark the

reluctance of Member States to shift authority over foreign policy to the supranational level. Important common foreign policy decisions therefore remain dependent on intergovernmental bargaining (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Moreover, different from internal

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temporal ‘Other’ to which it can be contrasted, and which can explain the dynamics between Member States and EU institutions in shaping foreign policy and which allows for a clear definition of Self of Member States and EU institutions.

‘Othering’ means that we see the identity of ourselves through Others (Charon, 1992). The contemporary literature on Othering describes two dimensions of Othering: a spatial dimension and a temporal dimension. In spatial or geopolitical Othering, an actor constitutes the identity of Self through spatial delimitations, in which clear borders between the Other and Self are established (Prozorov, 2011, p. 1273). In temporal Othering, an actor constructs the identity of Self through the difference with its own past (Prozorov, 2011, p. 1273).

In scholarly discussions about the construction of EU foreign policy identity, Othering often occupies space. For example, Thomas Diez (2004) claimed that the temporal Other of the EU is becoming less relevant with regard to European identity in general and EU foreign policy identity specifically. Diez (2004) argues that geopolitical Othering has become central to the European identity and therefore to the logic of EU integration. Another important field of scientific debate on EU foreign policy identity is on the conceptualization of the EU as a foreign policy actor, which discusses the actorness of the EU and the image the EU projects on the external environment. For example, conceptualizations of the EU as a normative power (Manners, 2002), normal power (Pacheco Pardo, 2012), civilian power (Duchene, 1972; 1973) or as a global actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999) have sparked the debate on the international identity of the EU and the goals it seeks to achieve outside its borders.

These debates on Othering and the role of the EU as a foreign policy actor share an outward-looking perspective, meaning that the identity of the EU is constructed through how the EU sees a geopolitical ‘Other’, or how the EU takes on - or would like to take on - its external environment. But possibly, an important element of the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity is overlooked here. According to Bickerton (2011, p. 20), EU foreign policymaking processes are about policymaking just as much as they are about polity-building. The complexity of foreign policy cooperation and coordination leads to extensive political debates about the role of the EU institutions in foreign policymaking as such, as well as about the rules and principles which guide the interaction of Member States and EU

institutions in EU foreign policymaking. This political debate is shaped by the articulation of discourses. These discourses construct the identities of actors, which help them to formulate and legitimize their political position in policymaking (Diez, 1999). Understanding of the discourses and identity of actors therefore is of crucial importance in explaining EU foreign policymaking.

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To clearly assess which discourses are central to the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity, this thesis will answer the following research question:

How do Member States and EU institutions together construct the identity of EU foreign policymaking?

The answer to this question can contribute to a more thorough understanding of the discursive drivers of contemporary EU foreign policymaking, as well as of the future opportunities for and restrictions on EU foreign policy. Although unfortunately it is not possible to do this in this research, this thesis also aims to encourage researchers to investigate the similarities and differences in discourses of European political leaders on EU foreign policymaking and EU internal policymaking.

In order to answer the research question, I will first outline the theoretical discussion of the three categories of discourses relevant for the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity: discourses on Othering (1), discourses on the EU as a foreign policy actor (2), and discourses on the rules and principles guiding the interaction of Member States and EU institutions in EU foreign policymaking (3). This theoretical discussion serves to build an analytical framework in which the guidelines for the identification of discourses are presented. I will research the discourses of political leaders of EU institutions and Member States through the analysis of policy documents, speeches, interviews and press statements. These discourses exclusively relate to the cases of EU-Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations. The cases of European energy policy vis-à-vis Russia and European migration policy vis-à-vis Turkey have been selected based on the following criteria: (I) the third country being a geopolitical Other for the EU, (II) leverage over the EU in the policy area that is researched (III), a similar timeframe shaping the context of discourses and (IV) a high politicization of the issue, implying the availability of sufficient data. I will analyse the statements, texts and speeches of Austrian, Czech, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian and Slovakian government leaders, as well as officials of the European Commission, the president of the European Council and the Chief of the energy Committee of the European Parliament. As for EU-Russia relations, the content of their speeches and remarks focuses on the possible establishment of an EU Energy Union and the expansion of the Nord Stream Pipeline Project, whereas for EU-Turkey relations the political debate on the migration crisis is central. I find that for both cases the discourses on the underlying rules and principles of EU foreign policymaking are most important to the construction of EU foreign policy identity. Furthermore, discourses on Othering and on the EU as a foreign policy actor appear less

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important to the construction of EU foreign policy identity. This points to the construction of EU foreign policy identity through an inward-looking perspective. These findings thus challenge the theories on the role of Othering in the construction of EU foreign policy identity, as well as the focus of students of EU foreign policy identity on the

conceptualization of the EU as a civilian or normative power. Moreover, these findings support Bickerton’s thesis that EU foreign policymaking and polity-building are inextricably linked. Scholars of the EU and its identity should therefore refocus their attention on the internal workings of EU foreign policymaking and the role of foreign policymaking in the integration process.

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2. Theoretical framework - the construction of

EU foreign policymaking identity

The purpose of this theoretical framework is to outline the three main pillars of EU foreign policymaking identity construction and to show the political nature of the discourses within these pillars. In order to understand why the debates on EU foreign policy identity are actually relevant, I will first discuss how discourses shape identities and influence political thoughts and actions. Next, I turn to Othering as the first pillar of EU foreign policymaking identity construction. I discuss the scholarly debate on the relevance of temporal and geopolitical Othering for the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity. Afterwards, I turn to the debate on the EU as a foreign policy actor as the second pillar of EU foreign policymaking identity construction. I discuss the actorness of the EU in foreign policy, the

conceptualizations of the EU as a normative, civilian or military power and the security, economic or normative goals of EU foreign policy. The final pillar is about the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity through an inward-looking perspective. I discuss the underlying rules and principles of EU foreign policymaking, such as the labour division in foreign policymaking between the supranational, regional and national level, the centrality of actors in policymaking processes and principles such as equality, solidarity and unity.

2.1 Politics as a theatre for discursive struggle

This thesis commences with the assumption that discourses and identities matter in

policymaking behaviour. There is no such thing as independent interests realization (Lukes, 2004). The discursive context powerfully shapes an actor’s definition of its interests (Diez, 1999; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991, p. 58). In other words, interest definition is the outcome of a political struggle and the power relations that provide the context of this struggle (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006, p. 350). This assumption is in contrast with rational choice theories emphasizing the cold strategic calculation with which actors process their information about policy options (Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005), and builds on the works of Foucault (1984; 1991) and Diez (1999). Foucault argues that actors do not ‘act as

autonomous subjects but from a ‘subject position’ made available by the discursive context in which we are situated’ (1991, p. 58). Discourses thus construct the identities of actors which allow them to coherently formulate their interests and positions (Diez, 1999). Moreover, discourses are not merely used to legitimize the policy choices certain actors make, but they

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are an essential element in the political struggle. Political actors aim to establish dominance of their interpretation of a concept (Waever, 1990, p. 340). The conceptualization of a

phenomenon such as Europe as a normative power (Manners, 2002), market power (Damro, 2012) or a normal power (Pacheco Pardo, 2012) therefore is not only a theoretical, but also a very political endeavour (Diez, 1999).

It is important to show that because of their political nature, discourses can challenge the status quo and change the political landscape. Diez (1999) clearly points out that

discourses enable the behaviour of actors, rather than being in a direct causal relationship with behaviour. Discourses provide the boundaries for the possibilities of what is to be articulated and how actors can position themselves. Moreover, they allow for a constant change in these boundaries of positions because discourses are fluid, though they can be very persistent (Diez, 1999). Diez further substantiates this notion of change in discourse dominance through the concept of ‘discursive nodal points’ (Diez, 2001, p. 15). According to Diez (2001), discursive nodal points are in the category of ‘essentially contested concepts’. Central to the thesis of essentially contested concepts is that there is no neutrality in political discourse (Connolly, 1983). ‘Discourses shape the institutional ‘structure of meanings that channels political

thought and action in certain directions’ (Connolly, 1983, p. 1). Therefore there is a direct link between interpretations of contested concepts, interests and power relations (Gallie, 1955)1_.

Discursive nodal points refer to the interlinkages between discourses. ‘Essentially contested’ concepts are filled with meaning by the interconnection of discourses and therefore the primacy of a certain discourse can diminish if the lines of connection to other discourses change. The dominance of a discourse can thus be replaced by the centrality of another discourse if it is contested. Consequently, the meaning of a certain concept transforms (Diez, 2001), which on its turn shapes political thoughts and actions.

2.2 The role of Othering in the construction of EU identity

After the discussion on the relevance of discourses in the political debate, I turn to the role of Othering discourses in the construction of EU identity. Firstly, I explain the mechanism through which Othering constructs the identity of Self, after which I turn to the literature on

1_{Gallie (1955) outlines a framework with which we can assess the ‘contestedness’ of a certain concept. He}

identifies the following criteria that constitute contestedness: ‘(I) their appraisive character, (II) internal complexity, (III) diverse describability, (IV) openness, (V) reciprocal recognition of their contested character among contending parties, (VI) an original exemplar that anchors conceptual meaning, and (VII) progressive competition, through which greater coherence of conceptual usage can be achieved’ (Collier et al. 2006, p. 212). Collier et al. (2006) extensively discuss the application of this framework to the concepts of democracy and rule of law and provide a deeper understanding of the use of Gallie’s essentially contested concepts.

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the temporal and geopolitical Others of the EU. Before moving on to the relevance of the temporal and the geopolitical Other of the EU, first it is important to discuss the interpretation of Othering as a theoretical concept.

Weis defines Othering as ‘that process which serves to mark and name those thought to be different from oneself’ (1995, p. 18). The way in which Weis phrases the notion of difference points to her interpretation of Othering as negating or exclusionary2. By defining what the Other is, one defines what the identity of Self is not. Othering eventually serves to – consciously or unconsciously -distinct the identity of Self from the identity of another entity (Neumann, 1999). Discourses are vital in the construction of these identities (Chilton, 2005). As Diez (2004) describes, the European discourse on the Middle East and Turkey in particular has served to define the European identity along geopolitical lines. The characterization of the Islamic world as non-democratic, authoritarian, non-liberal and perhaps even backward also functions to construct the European Self as liberal, democratic and modern.

The construction of the identity of Self through Others can greatly affect

policymaking. The relevance of Othering for EU policymaking is illustrated by the explicit and implicit reference to the EU’s temporal Other3 as the main impetus for European

integration in the post-World War II discourses of leaders of European Community Member States (Diez, 2004, p. 326). Basically, scholars distinct two types of Othering: in geopolitical Othering the contrast with another geographic entity is central, whereas in temporal Othering the present is compared to another moment in time (Diez, 2004). Dalby defines geopolitical Othering as ‘that ideological process of constructing spatial, political and cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space as separate from the threatening other’ (1990, p. 173). According to Diez, ‘the most common processes of othering in international society are geographic in nature’ (2004, p. 325). The clear borders of territorial entities allow for the construction of the external in terms of danger, threats and different values. In absence of a clear territory, geopolitical Othering did not play a major role in European identity

construction (Diez, 2004).

Scholars should be aware that although the both can be identified separately, the spatial dimension and the temporal dimension of Othering are inextricably linked (Prozorov, 2011). The temporal Other of the European Community entails a spatial dimension, since it relates to Europe as a geographic entity. Therefore, rather than speaking about temporal and

2_{Canales (2000) uses the term exclusionary instead of negating.}

3_{In the introduction I have defined temporal Othering as the construction of the identity of Self through the}

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geopolitical Othering in binary terms, it is more appropriate to discuss the balance between or the hierarchy of the temporal and the geopolitical dimension. Such a shifting balance in the prominence of temporal or geopolitical Othering is particularly relevant, because there is a qualitative difference between temporal Othering and geopolitical Othering. Temporal Othering has been extremely important for the construction of the identity of Self of the European Community. It has created a European Community that is self-reflexive and that wants to exterminate the demons from the past. Diez argues that this self-reflexivity ‘makes the temporal Other more open than geopolitical Othering’4 (2004, p. 321). Different from geopolitical Othering, the openness residing in temporal Othering and the absence of negating reference to a geopolitical Other are expressed through a more friendly attitude towards individuals, organizations and institutions outside the borders of the EU (Elbe, 2003, p. 121).

Considering this difference in self-reflexivity between temporal and geopolitical Othering, it is interesting to analyse how the balance has shifted away from temporal Othering towards geopolitical Othering in the construction of EU identity (Diez, 2004) in general and the identity of EU foreign policymaking in particular. The supposed changes in the roles of the temporal Other and the geopolitical Other can basically be attributed to two factors: the fading of the collective European memory of the horrors of the two World Wars and the Eastern Enlargement.

Firstly, I argue that time is seriously challenging the idea of identity construction through the Othering of the collective European memory of the horrors of the two World Wars. Although historical memory is one of the dimensions of national identity (Smith, 1992), the changing demographic composition of EU Member States and EU institutions has shifted the balance towards those who merely possess indirect historical memories of the two World Wars. This marks the difference between ‘lived experience’ and the preservation of lived experience (Crane, 1997, p. 1373). To say the least, although the collective memory of the atrocities of the two World Wars remains, younger generations have become increasingly distant from this lived experience (Crane, 1997, p. 1378). This increasing distance thus is one of the explanations for the decline of the temporal Other in EU identity construction as described by Diez.

Secondly, according to Diez (2004) the role of the temporal Other as a driver of

4_{The use of the term ‘geopolitical’ is related to the constructivist understanding of geopolitics emphasizing the}

role of identity, strategic culture and the politics of community and territoriality, rather than the realist understanding of geopolitics as an approach stressing the interests and capabilities of geographic entities (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006).

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European integration changed with the Eastern Enlargement. The backwardness of Central and Eastern Europe that was reflected in nationalism, war and illiberal societies added a geographical dimension to the EU’s Othering56_{. The European Community could now see the}

image of the temporal Other not only in its own history, but in other geographical areas as well (Diez, 2004). Moreover, Diez (2004) argues that the EU started to define itself more and more through the geopolitical Othering of actors outside the EU such as the Islamic world, the United States and Russia (Neumann, 1999). The geographic antagonisms central to European geopolitical Othering are in sharp contrast with the self-reflexivity of temporal Othering of the European post-World Wars community.

However, Prozorov (2011) provides a third explanation for the shift from temporal Othering to geopolitical Othering: the success of the European project of self-transcendence. Prozorov phrases this as follows:

‘The very success of this project of self-transcendence, that is, the relegation of sovereignty and

geopolitics into the past, entails the emergence of a more consolidated and substantial self-perception of Europe, which paradoxically leads to the need for its delimitation from Others and the resurgence of the ontopological rationality that it has successfully abandoned’ (2011, p. 1278).

This ‘consolidated and substantial self-perception of Europe’ (Prozorov, 2011, p. 1278) means that the EU cannot construct its identity through temporal Othering any longer and therefore it needs to seek geopolitical Others to construct the identity of Self.

2.3 The role of the conceptualization of the EU as a foreign policy actor in EU

foreign policymaking identity construction

In the previous section, I have discussed how the identity of EU foreign policymaking is constructed through Othering, but it is also important to analyse how the EU sees itself as a foreign policy actor and its goals in the external environment. Traditionally, students of EU foreign policy identity have focused on EU actorness in foreign policy and the image with

5_{Prozorov (2011) refutes Diez’s (2004) conceptual separation of geopolitical Othering and temporal Othering,}

arguing that there always is a spatial dimension to temporal Othering, since the temporal Other of Europe refers to Westphalian Europe in which spatial or territorial Othering was the norm. I underline Prozorov’s (2011) critique on this separation, but I do not see the inevitability of the spatial dimension in temporal Othering as problematic in theorizing European and EU identity. It only damages Diez’s argument about openness to the foreign, to which Diez (2004) refers as a central element of the European self-reflexivity. However, the co-existence of a spatial and temporal dimension in the EU’s Othering that Prozorov sees, does not contest the centrality of the temporal dimension and the lesser importance of the spatial dimension in what Diez calls Europe’s temporal Other.

6_{Rumelili (2004) has extensively discussed the liberal constructivist assumption that the constitution of identity}

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which the EU enters the outside world, being it a military power, civilian power, normative power or as a leader in global politics. Moreover, EU foreign policy priorities also have a role in the debate on the EU as a foreign policy actor. I want to find out up to what extent the debate on EU actorness, the different conceptualizations of the identity of the EU as a foreign policy actor and the formulation of foreign policy goals is actually central to the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity.

Actorness of the EU in foreign policy

According to Hill (1993), actorness has two main constituents: the degree of decision- and law-making autonomy and ‘the structural prerequisites for action at the international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties’ (Hill, 1993, p. 309). Bretherton and Vogler (1999) show that there is both an external and internal dimension to actorness. The external dimension is constructed through the way third parties perceive (Kaunert, 2010) and recognize an actor, as well as through how they evaluate the actions of an actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, pp. 28 – 33). The internal dimension of actorness is constructed through four criteria: ‘(1) a shared

commitment to a set of overarching values and principles; (2) domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy; (3) the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; and (4) the availability of, and the capacity to utilise, policy instruments’(Kaunert, 2010, p. 658).

With regard to the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity, it is most

interesting to see how the EU evaluates itself across these criteria of the internal dimension of actorness. Scholars such as Hill (1993) and Toje (2008) have discussed the views of EU Member States and EU institutions on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Hill (1993) described the difference in the EU’s foreign policy and its achievements as the ‘capability-expectations gap’. According to Toje, the three components of Hill’s capability-expectations gap were ‘the ability to agree, resource availability and the instruments at the EC’s disposal’ (2008, p. 121). Failure to live up to the expectations with regard to one or more of these components leads to the judgement of EU foreign policy as ineffective by actors involved in EU foreign policymaking. These perceptions of EU foreign policy as ineffective or effective influence the confidence and the political legitimacy of the EU institutions in foreign policymaking.

The confidence and legitimacy of the EU as a foreign policy actor plays an important role in the construction of EU foreign policy identity (Bickerton, 2011). Bickerton (2011)

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therefore discusses how to judge the success of EU foreign policy. Bickerton (2011) criticizes the narrow definition of EU foreign policy effectiveness as the achievement of certain goals in the relations with third countries, such as security and stability, economic benefits or

democracy promotion. He rejects the discussion of Grant (2009), Archer and Behr (2010) and Krastev (2010) of the EU as a failing or ineffective foreign policy actor. Instead, scholars should welcome the view of EU foreign policy cooperation as an end in itself. Moreover, according to Bickerton (2011, p. 15) scholars should not overlook that inaction, rather than purposive action, might be a better account of success. We could view the success of EU foreign policy cooperation as the prevention of unilateral foreign policy actions that have not been thought through. Another function of EU foreign policy could be the ‘collective shelter against the call for more active foreign policy’ (Weiler and Wessels, 1999, p. 251). Given this variety of functions EU foreign policy can possibly have, it is interesting to research the discourse on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of EU Member States and institutions and its relation to the perception of the role of the EU as a foreign policy actor.

Another cleararticulation of a discourse on EU actorness is the conceptualization of the EU as a global leader.Bretherton and Vogler (1999) see that the cumulative impact of the external activities of the EU suggests that it is one of the central actors in the global political system. The EU’s role in environmental politics is often labelled as the clearest example of a characterization of the EU’s leading position in the global system (Groen, Niemann and Oberthur, 2012; Zito, 2005).Groen et al. (2012) see direction and goal-attainment as the two key constituents of leadership. They also refer to the focus of leaders to achieve progress and to work towards a shared purpose (Groen et al., 2012, p. 175). As far as climate policy is concerned, Groen et al. (2012) show that the EU failed to attain the goals outlined for the 2009 Copenhagen conference, because the EU lacked internal coherence as an actor. Furthermore, the high level of politicisation of the issue in other countries created a very narrow window of opportunity to agree on a common programme. However, according to Groen et al. (2012) the EU has succeeded in assuming a leading role at the 2010 Cancun climate conference. Nevertheless, Groen et al. (2012) contradict themselves by stating that the EU adopted a leading role, regardless of its downsized policy ambitions at the Cancun

conference. It is therefore important to keep in mind that ambition and progressive direction remain conditions for global leadership qualifications.

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The EU as a military, civilian or normative power

Scholarly efforts to characterize the scope and domain of power in international relations have commenced with Edward Carr’s (1939) Twenty Years’ Crisis. His categorization of military power, economic power and power over opinion have paved the way for the different conceptualizations of the EU as a military, civilian or normative power.

Manners (2002) discusses these different powers all together. In his analysis of the different conceptualizations of the EU, he points out that Carr and others follow the

assumption that the most important power is the ‘political power over opinion’ (Kubalkova, 1998, p. 33). This assumption is derived from the idea that there is no objective reality out there (Manners, 2002). They underline that states and international society are fictive. The status of states solely rests on ‘the strength and breadth of people’s willingness to believe in, or merely accept, their reality’ (Manners, 2002, p. 12). Manners (2002) stresses that part of the construction of the ‘international identity’ of an entity such as the EU, is its internal dialogue about its interaction with the outside world. This obviously refers to how the beliefs, ideas and discourses present within the EU can construct the EU as a civilian, military or normative power.

I first turn to the conceptualization of the EU as a civilian power. Twitchett (1976) defines civilian power as ‘the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems; the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress’ (Manners, 2002, p. 26). Central to the conceptualization of the EU as a civilian power is the supposed remunerative character of the EU and the EU’s ability to use economic instruments (Manners, 2002).

However, this definition of civilian power founded in economic instruments and diplomacy has been challenged by other scholars (Bull, 1982) because it does not account for military effectiveness and self-sufficiency. After the agreement on the Treaty on the European Union, the calls for increased military power within the EU institutions in order to add a defence dimension to the EU’s civilian power grew louder. Increasingly, the political debate concerned Bull’s (1982) assumptions that the military capacity of an institution was essential to become a powerful international actor and that supranational integration was required to really act as a unitary actor. The conceptualization of the EU as a military power is thus solely related to the EU’s ability to use military instruments. Therefore it naturally has a much more punitive character than the conceptualization as a civilian power (Manners, 2002, p. 29).

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As Manner’s (2002) describes, the conceptualization of the EU as a normative power is in its essence really different from the conceptualization as either a civilian power or a military power. The definitions of the EU as a military or civilian power are more empirically focused, since they contain more measurable or definable components. Normative power is defined as the power to ‘change others through the spread of particular norms’ (Manners and Diez, 2007, p. 174). The concept of normative power thus also includes a more intangible dimension of so-called norms. The intangible discourses in the political debate on the EU shape the norms the EU is able or willing to spread and therefore shape the international identity of the EU (Manners, 2002, p. 29).

According to Manners (2002), the EU’s normative core consists of the principles of peace, democracy, liberty, rule of law and human rights. Along with these founding

principles, the EU’s norms are also reflected in its institutions and in the fundamental rights it aims to fulfil for its citizens, being dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizenship and justice. Normative power is the spreading of these norms to third countries through contagion, information, institutional relationships or physical presence (Manners, 2002).

Security, economic and normative goals of EU foreign policy

After the discussion of the possible conceptualizations of the international identity of the EU, I now turn to the goals of EU foreign policy. The aim of this section is to clarify that actors can have different foreign policy goals based on their understanding of foreign policy. The clear formulation of policy priorities is an element of the actorness of EU foreign policy (Kaunert, 2010, p. 658). Therefore the discourses on foreign policy goals are important in the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity.

Basically, scholars distinct security goals, economic goals and normative goals. Brandtner and Rosas (1998) state that the role of human rights in EU external policies has grown since the early 1990s, both in legal and institutional terms as well as regarding activities in third countries. For example, the human rights clause has been introduced in many bilateral trade and cooperation agreements. Moreover, the EU increasingly facilitates institution-building in third countries in order to promote civil rights and democracy both through financial assistance as well as the transfer of best practices (Brandtner and Rosas, 1998).

The traditional international relations theories of realism and liberalism also give way to discuss security and economic interests as the main foreign policy goals. Realist

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nature and that military power eventually provides the ultimate solution to conflicts.

Therefore the initial aim of states is to achieve security and stability in order to guarantee the survival of the state (Jackson and Sorensen, 2013, p. 66).

Whereas realism is preoccupied with military power necessary in a world of anarchy, liberalism shows a more rosy picture. States can achieve progress for individual citizens in the international arena through cooperation. To foster this cooperation, states require a more complex set of economic and institutional instruments than just military power. Moreover, the liberalist and realist perspective on the goals of international cooperation are inherently different. The accumulation of power is secondary in liberalism, whereas the welfare of the state and its citizens is the primary task of government (Jackson and Sorensen, 2013, p. 109).

2.4 Identity construction through an inward-looking perspective: the role of

EU foreign policymaking rules and principles in the construction of EU

foreign policy identity

Now I have discussed the role of Othering discourses and discourses on the EU as a foreign policy actor, I turn to the role of policymaking rules and principles in the construction of EU foreign policy identity. Othering discourses and the discourses on the EU as a foreign policy actor share the preoccupation with the external environment in the construction of EU foreign policy identity, whereas the political debate on the rules and principles of EU foreign

policymaking is illustrative for an inward-looking construction of EU foreign policy identity. It is clear that the functions of EU foreign policymaking do not only come about in the external environment, but that there is also an internal dimension to these functions. Bickerton (2011) points out that the continuous political struggle in EU foreign policymaking because of ill-defined competencies, responsibilities, procedures and principles leads to the inextricable linkage between policymaking and polity-building. This thought is further substantiated in the following argument:

‘Politics undeniably exist within the EU, but it is a politics without sovereignty. One of the results is that, as we see in the foreign policy field, each policymaking moment is about much more than just policy: it is also a struggle for power between different actors, a search for meaning, an attempt at identity building. There is no doubt that within nation-states

policymaking is also burdened by various internal functions. However, in the case of the EU, the struggles and rivalries are of a higher order: they are about shaping the most basic

elements of the EU, such as the role of the legislature, the constitutional balance between the bureaucratic and the executive arm and so on. It is for this reason that policymaking and polity-building within the EU are so difficult to separate’ (Bickerton, 2011, p. 20).

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Following from this argument, Bickerton (2011) concludes that policymaking and policy outputs remain a secondary phenomenon of polity-building, as long as the questions of power and authority and of the principles to guide foreign policy dynamics in the EU remain

unsettled. It is to these questions that I now turn.

EU foreign policymaking labour division: national sovereignty, supranationality and regionalism

As Bickerton notes (2011), labour division between the Member States and EU institutions is not set in stone for EU foreign policymaking. Therefore the political debate on the national sovereignty of Member States and the sovereign competencies of supranational European institutions has ever remained. Moreover, the increased cooperation within EU regions such as in the Visegrad Group7 has also introduced the role of the regional level to EU foreign policymaking.

Krasner (1999) defines sovereignty as encompassing elements of legal authority and legitimacy in whatever policy field, as well as control over the domestic environment without the influence of external actors8. National sovereignty over foreign policy therefore is in constant conflict with supranational foreign policymaking, since the balance between the both defines where legal authorities rest and the extent of control of Member States over national policy configurations. As Dinan (1999) discusses, EU Member States formally share sovereignty through the European institutions. The European Commission functions as a supranational body, while nations have sought to maintain sovereign competency over certain affairs such as foreign policy through the Council of Ministers.

Besides the supranational and national level of foreign policy decision-making, the activities of regional actors within the EU with an ambition to play a role in foreign

policymaking such as the Visegrad Group have also influenced the political landscape of EU policymaking. Member States within a region or group can derive their delineation from material factors such as geographic or intense economic ties, but also from the construction of regional norms and identities (Vayrynen, 2003). The reference to regional interests,

cooperation or identity can thus point to a regionalist discourse present in Member States or

7_{The Visegrad Group consists of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.}

8_{Krasner (1999, p. 9) distinguishes domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, national legal}

sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the organization of public authority within a state. Interdependence sovereignty is the ability to control transborder movements. National legal sovereignty refers to the recognition by third actors. Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion of external actors from domestic policy configurations, which is central to the interpretation of sovereignty used in this thesis.

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EU institutions. The role of regions in EU foreign policymaking is particularly interesting, because regional definition of foreign policy interests and negotiation strategies greatly influences the dynamics of foreign policymaking on the EU level (Vayrynen, 2003).

The centrality of actors in EU foreign policymaking processes: intergovernmentalism and the Community Method

It is important to see whether this tension between the primacy of Member States’ sovereign competencies and supranationality (Dinan, 1999, p. 2; Zurn, 2000) as described in the

previous section, is also experienced by Member States with regard to EU foreign

policymaking processes. Foreign policymaking processes can roughly go two ways: along the

intergovernmentalist route and along the Community Method. The Community Method refers

to the centrality of European institutions in finding European solutions in foreign policymaking. It is therefore strongly advocated by an institution like the European

Commission (Majone, 2009). Intergovernmentalism on the other hand refers to the bargaining between Member States or individual bargaining of Member States with third countries (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter, 2015). Moravcsik (1993) outlines the three main elements of liberal intergovernmentalism: ‘the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation’ (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 480). According to Moravcsik (1993), in EU foreign policymaking Member States define their interests and bargaining strategy based on domestic constraints and opportunities for cooperation at the EU level. The core of this theory is thus inherently different from the Community Method, since it perceives Member States as central to EU foreign policymaking rather than EU institutions.

Equality of treatment and double standards

The previous section discussed the undeniable political nature of the labour division among actors within EU foreign policymaking and the process of cooperation in EU foreign policymaking. However, principles such as equality and solidarity underlying EU foreign policymaking also have a political meaning.

Somek (2001) describes the protection of the individuals in a supranational system from systematic discrimination within the co-existence of nation-states as one of the main functions of supranational institutions. His conceptualization is predominantly focused on the protection of the basic rights of citizens, and the extension of liberties such as the free

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argument to the non-discrimination of the actors in the supranational system. The equality between Member States and the neutrality of EU institutions in foreign policymaking processes are crucial for the legitimacy of these institutions. For example, Hadjimichalis (1994) discussed the influence of liberalization and the creation of the Single Market on regional inequalities within the EU. Member States obviously move at different speeds in political and economic development and therefore neutrality of EU institutions in weighing the concerns of Member States is vital. An EU with double standards in its approach of

Member States cannot be recognized by each Member State individually as a legitimate actor.

Principles of solidarity and unity

Being one of the core norms of the EU (Manners, 2002, p. 33), the solidarity among Member States is one of the keys to foster a spirit of unity and mutual understanding within the EU. Cohen and Sabel (2003) discuss whether there is space for popular sovereignty and

redistributive solidarity given the extension of the political community beyond the nation-state in the EU. The technocratic view of the EU assumes that EU institutions cannot obtain democratic legitimacy, because there is no European demos. European citizens cannot

identify with an overarching legislative body as long as they are not united through a common identity and history. The same reasoning applies to the possibility of solidarity. According to the technocratic view of EU democracy, the principle of solidarity is too founded on a particular sentiment which allows for the definition of a community identity and therefore paves the way for burden- and responsibility-sharing (Cohen and Sabel, 2003). The identification of a strong solidarity discourse in the political debate on EU foreign policymaking could challenge the technocratic view that redistribution in the EU can be neither an aim of individual policies nor anchored within EU policymaking. It could for example give space to the view of the EU as a deliberative polyarchy, in which solidarity is rooted in moral and practical grounds. The sheer recognition of equality as an important value within the interaction of agents, as well as the anticipation of positive consequences for further collaboration, could trigger transnational solidarity in the EU (Cohen and Sabel, 2003, p. 721).

As much as solidarity is at the core of the interaction of Member States in EU foreign policymaking, the unity of EU Member States and institutions retains primacy in every aspect of European collective decision-making. As Bickerton (2011) discussed, cooperation or unity in EU foreign policymaking should be less regarded as a means, but rather as an end in itself. Moreover, the coherence or unity of the EU affects the internal dimension of the actorness of

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the EU (Kaunert, 2010). The internal unity or division of the EU in foreign policymaking thus affects the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity.

2.5 Concluding remarks

This theoretical framework aimed to outline the three pillars of EU foreign policymaking identity construction, being discourses on Othering (1), on the EU as a foreign policy actor (2) and on the underlying rules and principles of EU foreign policymaking. Moreover, it served to understand how discourses construct identities and political thoughts and actions. However, these theoretical discussions of the three pillars of identity construction also show how important insights in the prevalence of certain discourses in the political debate are. For example, there is a qualitative difference between temporal Othering and geopolitical Othering. Furthermore, it is clear that discourses on the EU as an effective or ineffective foreign policy actor influence the confidence and the political legitimacy of EU institutions in foreign policymaking. Moreover, the conceptualization of the EU as a military, economic or normative power can affect the advocacy of the use of certain foreign policy instruments by Member States and EU institutions.

This theoretical framework also shows the difference between the construction of EU foreign policymaking identity through an outward-looking perspective and an inward-looking perspective. Rather than defining the identity of Self through the contrast with geopolitical Others or through the conceptualization of the EU’s approach of its external environment, the inward-looking perspective is preoccupied with the underlying rules and principles of EU foreign policymaking. The political debates on the rules and principles of EU foreign policymaking represent fundamental choices between supranationality and national sovereignty or between the Community Method and intergovernmentalism. These debates therefore can affect the nature of the EU as a polity. Moreover, they give insight into the core principles such as equality, solidarity and unity that guide the interaction of Member States and EU institutions in foreign policymaking processes.

In conclusion, the three pillars of EU foreign policymaking identity construction are highly political. In order to understand EU foreign policy and its identity, it is therefore crucial to research the importance of these pillars for the construction of identity, as well as the relevance of the different discourses within these pillars.

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3 .

Methodology - migration policy regarding Turkey

and energy policy vis-à-vis Russia as cases that put

the outward- and inward-looking construction of EU

foreign policymaking identity to the test

In this chapter I will outline the criteria with which the cases of EU-Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations have been chosen in order to research the construction of EU foreign policymaking. Following, I will discuss the selection of the Member States and EU institutions which are particularly relevant for these cases. Finally, I provide an overview of the documents, speeches and statements used in the discourse analysis. The next chapter will go more in depth about the analytical framework with which the documents, speeches and statements of political leaders will be analysed. This analytical framework describes how discourses are identified in the analysis.

3.1 The relevance of migration policy regarding Turkey and energy policy

vis-à-vis Russia for EU foreign policymaking

The speeches and texts of government leaders of EU Member States and EU institutions officials that reflect the discourses that construct the identity of EU foreign policymaking relate to two cases:

1. European migration policy in relation to Turkey in light of the refugee crisis 2. European energy policy in relation to Russia

Although at first sight the similarities between both cases might not seem evident, I will explain why these cases are representative and offer the opportunity to assess how EU foreign policymaking identity is constructed.

The cases of European energy policy vis-à-vis Russia and European migration policy vis-à-vis Turkey have been selected based on the following criteria: (I) being a geopolitical Other for the EU, (II) leverage over the EU in the policy area that is researched (III) a similar timeframe shaping the context of discourses, which allows for a sound comparison between the both and (IV) a high politicization of the issue, implying the availability of sufficient data.

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(I) A geopolitical Other: controlling for temporal and geopolitical Othering

Three entities are generally referred to as the most exemplary geopolitical Others of the European Union, being the United States (Diez, 2004), Turkey (Diez, 2004; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Nabers, 2014) and Russia (Neumann, 1999; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012). The United States as the geopolitical Other is constructed through differences regarding attitudes towards laissez-faire capitalism, culture, environment and interventionism (Diez, 2004). This Othering of the United States is reflected in Manners’s (2002) conceptualization of the EU as a normative power, which is largely based on the contrast with the United States. However, the temporal dimension of Europe’s Othering of the United States is very hard to identify (Diez, 2004). Therefore the case of the United States does not allow us to properly control for the factors of temporal Othering and geopolitical Othering.

The Othering of Russia and Turkey does possess clear elements of both temporal Othering and geopolitical Othering. Diez (2004) argues that for European identity Turkey is the geopolitical Other that is representative of the Islamic world. He argues that in the 90s and early 2000s the depiction of Islam as the Other of a Christian European Self is ‘back in the headlines, ironically at a time when a substantial number of EU citizens are Muslims’ (Diez, 2004, p. 32). Turkish EU candidacy has increased pressure on the spatial dimension of EU Othering, because Turkey’s eligibility challenges the borders of the EU that are currently drawn. Furthermore, the Turkish road to official, but even more so officious recognition of membership of the European Community also points to the temporal dimension of European Othering of Turkey, being a country that still cannot live up to the standards of the European Union and the contemporary acquis communautaire. Neumann (1999) sees this temporal Othering as similar to the Othering of Russia, which according to Neumann is seen as ‘the country that is perpetually seen as being in some stage of transition to Europeanization’ (1999, p. 111). Obviously, the temporal Othering of a different geographic entity is by definition an instance of geopolitical Othering.

(II) The dependent position of the EU in Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations

Interestingly, besides the similarities between Turkey and Russia in their roles as the EU’s Other, they both have significant leverage over the EU in the foreign policy areas that are central to this research. These high-pressure political environments require the EU to show the true nature of its foreign policymaking identity.

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EU’s dependence on Russian energy resources

As Boussena and Locatelli (2013) show, the European Union imports a lot of its gas from Russia. In a lot of countries of the former Soviet Union, such as the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria, the market share of the Russian firm Gazprom is 100% (Boussena and Locatelli, 2013). However, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom remain the largest consumers of Gazprom gas (Boussena and Locatelli, 2013). The relative market share of Gazprom in these countries varies from 25% in Italy to 85% in Poland.

In the conceptualization of the energy relationship between Russia and the EU two narratives are dominant: the relation is either characterized as a strategic partnership of interdependent actors, or as a relation of dependence or asymmetric interdependence in which Russia has a dominant position. Scholars such as Baldwin (1980), Caporaso (1978) and Keohane and Nye (1972; 1977) have extensively debated the conceptualization of these concepts and their implications for power relations. According to Baldwin (1980, p. 500), ‘power resources are usually defined as the means by which one actor can influence the behaviour of other actors’. In this conceptualization, dependence is definitely a major resource of power. In a dependence relationship or in a relationship of asymmetrical

interdependence, dominant actors have the largest ability to influence the behaviour of other actors (Baldwin, 1980). This is to say, not only in the domain in which the dependence arises. Possibly, the Russian ability to limit gas exports to the EU can change the behaviour of the EU in foreign policy domains, or its attitudes towards human rights issues within Russia. Similarly, the EU’s ability to inflict damage on the Russian economy by decreasing its investment in the Russian energy sector (Umbach, 2010) is also a source of power. However, both powers are also constrained by the large costs they have to bear in order to exercise their power. Therefore the question of symmetry and asymmetry Caporaso poses in his framework (1978) to analyse dependence and interdependence relations is of incredible importance in order to assess which actor has a more powerful, and which actor has a more problematic position.

The other question Caporaso (1978) discusses in his framework is related to the scope and domains of the power of both actors over each other. The axis in his framework ranges from dependency – in which the actor is completely controlled by external influence and therefore has no actorness – to full autonomy or autarky. This axis allows us to think about the extent of the power in asymmetrical interdependence relations. According to Keohane and Nye, we should consider the ‘intensity of relations and relative power of resources of actors’

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(1977, p. 122) in order to measure structural sources of power. In the energy relation between Russia and the EU, we should therefore aim to establish a hierarchy of values in the

exchanges made (Caporaso, 1978). My suggestion is that the role of EU money, infrastructure and market regulations is essentially secondary to the resources and energy capabilities of the Russian Federation and therefore the opportunity costs to opt out of the relation with Russia would be much larger for the European Union than for Russia.

EU’s dependence on Turkey in the refugee crisis

In light of the current refugee and migrant crisis and the failure of the EU’s border management organizations such as FRONTEX9 and EUROSUR, Turkey has become an increasingly important actor in the EU’s attempts to properly manage migrant and refugee flows (Baird, 2015). The pressure that refugee flows exercise on leaders of governments of EU Member States has continued to increase along with the growing role of Turkey as a transit country for refugees from war-torn countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey provides accommodation to over 2 million refugees, of which the lion’s share is from Syria (Volkskrant, 2015). Of the 8000 refugees that are said to reach EU territory every day, over 85% has travelled via Turkey (Volkskrant, 2015). To date, the EU and its Member States have not succeeded in the creation of a system to proportionally ‘redistribute’ refugees

(Guardian, 2015). This has led the EU and its Member State leaders – with Angela Merkel in a very prominent role – to negotiate with Turkey in order to regain control over migratory flows and the sentiments within their nations.

The outcomes of the EU-Turkey negotiations reflect the nature of the relation of asymmetric interdependence with regard to migration, in which Turkey has the dominant position. The EU has confirmed its ‘commitment to re-energise the accession process’ (European Council, 2016a) of Turkey into the EU, as well as the acceleration of the

‘fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap, with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016’ (European Council, 2016a). Moreover, the EU has committed to speeding up the disbursement of the 3 billion euros assistance to fund projects for refugees (European Council, 2016a). However, it is yet unclear whether the obligations of Turkey with regard to readmission of irregular migrants will achieve the stated goals of ‘ending the human suffering and restoring public order’ (European Council, 2016a).

9_{European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member}

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(III) The politicization of the issue

Both the issues of EU energy policy vis-à-vis Russia - with its discussions about the possible creation of an Energy Union and the disputed expansion of the Nord Stream project – and EU migration policy with regard to Turkey are highly politicized. Therefore the availability of data in the form of speeches of government leaders and EU institutions and policy documents of EU institutions and Member States is large, which allows for a good comparison of the different Member States researched and a comprehensive picture of the discourses that together construct EU foreign policymaking identity.

(IV) Timeframe correspondence

In this thesis, only those texts and speeches of government leaders and EU institutions

officials from 2014 onwards are researched. This allows for a proper comparison between the discourses on energy policymaking regarding Russia and migration policymaking with regard to Turkey. Moreover, the intensification of the politicization of both issues has commenced in 2014, with a renewed peak in the amount of refugees and the Ukraine Crisis.

3.2 Actor selection

The main criterion for the selection of the Member States of which the discourses of

government leaders are researched, is the political involvement in both issues. With regard to energy policy, involvement can manifest itself through the association with the Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2 or South Stream Pipeline, as well as strong advocacy of the Energy Union or strong opposition or support of one of the gas pipeline projects. With regard to the Nord Stream project, Germany is the most relevant stakeholder in the operation of Nord Stream (Nord Stream AG, 2016) on which I will focus. With regard to the South Stream Project, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria10, Hungary and Greece were to be connected by the project (Gazprom, 2016). The current postponement of the construction of South Stream has shaped their

attitudes with regard to EU energy policy and the Nord Stream project. Other countries involved are Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which currently function as transit countries for the supply of Russian gas (Politico, 2015) and which can possibly lose their function as a gas transit country as a result of the completion of new pipeline projects (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). Le Coq and Paltseva (2012) have also assessed the increase of gas

10_{Bulgaria will not be included in the analysis because of the lack of available data and my personal constraint}

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dependence risk for Lithuania and Latvia11_{, which exacerbates an already strong dependence}

on Russia.

With regard to the migration crisis and the EU’s relations with Turkey similar actors are involved. There has been a strong opposition of Central Eastern European countries against the negotiating terms of the EU’s agreement with Turkey and the plans to redistribute refugees among the Member States, for example by the Visegrad Four Group consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland (The Atlantic, 2015). Germany and Austria initially pursued policies welcoming refugees, but the Austrian government has recently increased border control measures (Reuters, 2016a). The importance of Greece and Italy as possible transit countries and as a destination for refugees also points to their involvement in EU policy with regard to migration vis-à-vis Turkey.

This selection of Member States includes a large proportion of Central and Eastern European Member States. However, the methodological complications related to this disproportionality are limited. CEECs are perhaps the states in which the geopolitical

Othering of Russia is the strongest, because of the fairly recent Soviet involvement in most of these countries. Moreover, the geopolitical Othering of the Islamic world also appears

strongest in Eastern European rhetoric. This is for example shown by the reluctance of the Slovakian prime minister Fico and the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, to invite Muslim refugees into their countries (The Washington Post, 2016). Energy policy vis-à-vis Russia and migration policy vis-à-vis Turkey therefore arguably represent extreme cases. These cases therefore perfectly suit the purpose of testing the assumption of scholars such as Diez that Othering is an important mechanism in EU foreign policymaking identity

construction.

With regard to the selection of EU institutions and its representatives, the aim is to provide a broad view of the discourses of the different institutions with regard to Othering, the EU as a foreign policy actor and the rules and principles underlying EU foreign policymaking. Therefore the discourses of representatives of the European Commission, the president of the European Council and a prominent member of European Parliament will be discussed. With regard to EU-Russia energy relations, the discourses articulated by Jerzy Buzek – the

president of the energy committee of the European Parliament – , European Council president Donald Tusk and EU Commissioners president Jean-Claude Juncker and vice-president for

11_{Lithuania and Latvia will not be included in the analysis because of the lack of available data and my personal}

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Energy Union Maros Sefcovic will be researched, along with policy documents of the

different institutions. With regard to EU-Turkey migration relations, the discourses articulated by first vice-president Frans Timmermans will also play a role.

3.3 Sampling

As discussed in section 3.1, the timeframe of the cases with regard to EU energy policy vis-à-vis Russia and EU migration policy vis-à-vis-à-vis-à-vis Turkey coincides. The documents subject to analysis consist of interviews, press conferences, policy documents and briefings by

government leaders or EU officials. Obviously, there is no clear correspondence between the amount of policy documents, press conference statements and interviews per Member State or EU institution, which is a clear limitation of the research. The following table illustrates the number of sources used per actor for each case:

Policy documents Speeches and statements Interviews, press articles and publications Total number of sources Commission energy 6 11 0 17 Commission migration 10 13 2 25 Council energy 0 4 2 6 Council migration 0 3 0 3 Parliament energy 0 2 1 3 Austria energy 2 2 Austria migration 0 3 2 5

Czech Republic energy 0 1 1 2

Czech Republic migration 0 2 0 2

Germany energy 0 2 0 2 Germany migration 0 6 0 6 Greece energy 0 3 0 3 Greece migration 1 4 1 6 Hungary energy 0 1 1 2 Hungary migration 0 3 0 3 Italy energy 1 2 2 5 Italy migration 0 2 5 7 Slovakia migration 0 1 1 2 Visegrad 4 energy 3 0 1 4 Visegrad 4 migration 7 0 1 8

Table 1: number of sources per actor per case

However, the institutional or discursive context in which interviews are conducted affects the eventual discourses identified. For example, a large part of the press conferences by leaders of Member States and by the president of the European Council Donald Tusk were at European Council meetings. Because of the intergovernmentalist nature of the European Council as an institution, the comments of government leaders possibly tend to refer more often to elements

The construction of EU foreign policy identity : the primacy of internal dynamics : an analysis of discourses of EU Member States and institutions on EU-Russia energy relations and EU-Turkey migration relations