How can the perception of threat be juxtaposed to its reality, and how are conflict prevention mechanisms consequently operationalized and perpetuated in the case of the South China Sea?

Yoram Kannangara - 10469370

Master Thesis

International Relations

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Thesis Supervisor – Dr. P.E. Pallister-Wilkins

Second Reader – Dr. D. Bouris

Wordcount: 14,694

How can the perception of threat be juxtaposed to its

reality, and how are conflict prevention mechanisms

consequently operationalized and perpetuated in the

case of the South China Sea?

Source: (Heng, 2012) - http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/the-philippines-and-power-in-the-south-china-sea.html

Table of Contents

The Acronyms ... 3

Introduction - What’s at stake in the South China Sea ... 4

Methodology ... 8

In Theory: Threat, Law, Strategy, Institutions ... 9

i. Threat ... 9

ii. Law ... 13

iii. Strategy ... 15

iv. Institutions ... 16

The Perception of Threat ... 17

International Law as a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention ... 24

Strategic Conflict Prevention Mechanisms ... 27

Institutional Conflict Mitigation ... 34

Conclusion ... 37

Seminal Literature ... 38

The Acronyms

ADIZ – Air Defense Identification Zone AMTI – Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF – Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CIL – customary international law

CINC – Composite Indicator of National Capability/ Composite Index of National Capability CINP – Composite Indicator of National Power

COW – Correlates of War Project CNP – Comprehensive National Power

CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone

EIAS – European Institute for Asian Studies FDI – foreign direct investment

GDP – Gross Domestic Product HT – high threat

ICJ – International Court of Justice

ITLOS – International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea LNG – liquid natural gas

LT – low threat MT – medium threat

NE – negative economic relationship

NILOS – Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea NPI – National Power Index

PCA – Permanent Court of Arbitration PE – positive economic relationship PLA – People’s Liberation Army PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy PPP – purchasing power parity

PRC – People’s Republic of China

RCEP – Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ROC – Republic of China (Taiwan)

SCS – South China Sea

SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute TPP – Trans Pacific Partnership

UN – United Nations

UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea US – United States

Introduction - What’s at stake in the South China Sea

Half a century ago, claimants such as Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines had already started building structures and landing strips on select pieces of land scattered throughout the South China Sea (SCS) amongst the Paracel Islands, the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands, especially the latter. Although this may have preceded the construction of artificial outcroppings at sea, the South China Sea was already on the brink of controversy years before China’s ascension made it so.

The past quarter-century has given rise to China’s sustenance of an indomitable and unparalleled economic growth. As the fourth largest country of the world territorially and the largest of the world in terms of population, comprising approximately a sixth of the global population, such growth cannot occur without notice or compromise. Neither can it act unchecked, for fear of its hegemonic impendence. The supremacy of such a substantial state notwithstanding, territorial disputes are bound to arise as borders are established and

reestablished given their fluidity as it is ever present in the international arena of geopolitics. From Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin bordering on the West Indian Kashmir through to the SCS, a distance of 3000 kilometers, China has laid claim to various territories over which it does not possess direct control. A country laying claim to land in accordance with a rich cultural history dating back 50,000 years, the territory of contemporary China is the legacy of empire building.

In terms of territorial semantics the South China Sea dispute is far more deeply imbedded in current geopolitical discourse because it does not concern a bilateral dispute but exemplifies an issue of multilateral uncertainty. Counting all regional stakeholders besides China: Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Singapore and Cambodia all make territorial claims in, or proximate to, that sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was ratified in 1982 when China was slowly commencing its rise. This regulatory framework was necessary for the international arena yet it has all but alleviated territorial tension in the SCS, as its base principles do not hold for such an area due to an excessive amount of overlap depictable as an abstractly overdrawn Venn diagram with all the important bits in the middle. The SCS is a hub for trade, also known for its maritime silk route, as it is abundant in global shipping lanes. Furthermore it is a relatively untapped resource as of yet, waiting to be further exploited for its rich energy resources, minerals and marine life, not to mention the location of a multitude of islands, atolls and other spatial outthrusts. Although the potential for conflict looms in the humid

nearly three decades. In a day and age, where and when conflict has not always equally been avoided in case of dispute, including war by proxy, the question arises how such static avoidance has remained the prevalent norm for geopolitical relations despite the large number of parties concerned over such an elongated period of time. This begs the question whether the potential for conflict truly has been an imminent phenomenon waiting to occur, or that the perception of threat has manifested itself in a manner disproportionate to its reality.

Whilst struggling to find a singular theme to concentrate on, from a personal standpoint this topic ultimately seemed a fitting choice because of its innate complexity, combined with a regional interest resulting from my focus on China throughout the

specialization part of my IR course. Academically speaking the issue of the SCS has been the center of controversy dating back to its start, the largest source of debate being the underlying motives of the actors involved, particularly China. Furthermore there is much contention as to why and how the political standoff has remained in place for so long.

Politically speaking the scenario has long been perceived as an ‘us versus them’ situation with China on one side and all other actors, mostly supported by the United States (US), on the other. Should China back down it would bode ill for its territorial claims in other areas. Should China advance it would likely be considered a hegemonic power play. Should a neutral solution be found, China might make itself a figurehead for interstate cooperation and compromise. Either way, in spite of its currently fixed state, the SCS dispute may well partially if not fully determine what sort of state China will be and what sort of states its neighbors will become.

The UNCLOS is intended as an internationally binding regulatory framework. Should the dispute be resolved peacefully that will, in part, signal a triumph for the UNCLOS but should the opposite happen it will be greatly undermined and begin to lose value. States like the Philippines have taken the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague as a means for pushing for justice in case of jurisdiction as opposed to merits – not to be confused with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), also situated in The Hague. From the perspective of International Law, the manner in which this point of contention is resolved will likely set a precedent for similar areas of dispute at an international level in the future. More importantly, research questions such as this one help confirm or deny the validity of the UNCLOS as a mechanism preventing conflict.

All the above is intertwined with the formation of strategy and policy, which has been done meticulously by all parties concerned and in anticipation of one another. An issue of such fragility begs the question how justified the perception of threat is and whether individual state or institutional strategies have combined to keep conflict from rising, or

perhaps the dispute itself has served as a stepping-stone towards a platform for regional cooperation. Hence, the following research question:

Research Question

How can the perception of threat be juxtaposed to its reality, and how are conflict prevention mechanisms consequently operationalized and perpetuated in the case of the South China Sea?

It has become undeniably lucid from both the literature and general discourse on the subject matter of the SCS, that there is a clear-cut chasm of viewpoints from which to approach the initial research question, also pertinent to the employable tools with which to address said question. This division can be attributed to the significance of judicial and strategic discourse in exacerbating and alleviating regional tensions. The conception of threat is also a notion relative to its purveyor, and framing it from legal and strategic angles should illuminate its existence, or a lack thereof, from those angles and clarify its relevance in this case study. Keeping this in mind, and not forgetting the role of influential institutions such as the UN and ASEAN whose purpose in the greater scheme of things is to promote

collaborative relations amongst nations and prevent conflict, the following sub-research questions should suffice in complementing the issues raised in the root question.

Sub-research Questions

1. What is the perception of threat in the South China Sea, and which variables factor into that perception?

2. How are conflict prevention mechanisms operationalized and perpetuated within the framework of International Law?

3. How are conflict prevention mechanisms operationalized and perpetuated strategically?

4. What role do institutions such as the ASEAN play in mitigating conflict?

The first sub-research question addresses the first half of the overall research question:

lay the groundwork for determining how threat can be interpreted and perceived. The following chapter should provide an adequate continuation of the factors determining threat perception but elaborate on how state actors are justified in perceiving threat, contrasting their own reality with the reality of others. It is by understanding the respective realities of states that one may come to comprehend their modus operandi for the prevention of conflict.

From a legal perspective, threat is based on the level of ability to comply with

International Law, creating a relatively black-and-white discussion, but a similar approach cannot be taken for issues of strategy. From a strategic point of view in the international political arena, the moment a threat is perceived it becomes a reality. The perception and reality of threat are essentially unanimous with one another; of strategic importance is how one consequently responds. Institutions play another role altogether; they perceive threat and act in response to prevent it from becoming a reality through the normalization of regulatory frameworks. These varying manners of dealing with threat are addressed in the latter three sub-research questions, respectively providing insight into the mechanical workings of three varying modes of conflict prevention. Following the methodology and theoretical framework, each consecutive chapter will be focused on one of the sub-questions in the order listed above.

The first chapter will recap issues of threat perception in the South China Sea by listing the primary and secondary actors involved. The causes and consequences of a regional conflict will be labeled, culminating in an assessment of current threat from both legal and strategic points of view as well as from a global standpoint. This will obviously also attempt to account for the differentiation of perception and reality of threat.

The following chapter will explore the relevance of international law and subsequently explain what the importance is of maritime law, UNCLOS in particular. Next, its regulatory standards and goals will be run through, as well as to whom it is applicable and the likeliness of state actors to abide by its standards. Rounding off, a look will be taken at the effectiveness of UNCLOS, the possibility of regulatory alternatives, and ultimately how everything comes together befitting its purpose and viability as a mechanism for conflict prevention.

The third chapter will be directed at state strategy and its fluidity within the SCSs incessantly dynamic environment. A look will be taken at the general motives of relevant actors, as well as their strategic methodology and the use of its employment as a deterrent to conflict.

The penultimate chapter of this paper will place its focus on the role of certain

interests. The appositeness of said institutions will be examined with regard to their role as international peace-builders and their ability to establish a comity of relations in the region.

Finally, some concluding remarks will be made in the last chapter as to where one might go from here in terms of approaching the entire issue at the local, regional and international levels, and furthermore what truly seems to be at stake in the SCS.

Methodology

This paper, comprised primarily of literature research, will combine historical and discourse analysis, briefly incorporating descriptive statistics to yield qualitative results with light quantitative support. A diverse number of sources and their accompanying data will have to be consulted; this will be accomplished through consultation of the abundant

literature and research institutes available and by interviewing various specialists in the field to help contextualize the issues at hand, for which I’ve contacted recommended experts from various institutions. First, Dr. Frans-Paul van der Putten is a Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), and a specialist on China’s rise as a global power and regional security in the case area concerned. He will be able to discern and identify the strategies employed by respective stakeholders as mechanisms for conflict prevention in addition to the assessment of threat. David Fouquet is a Senior Associate at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), a former journalist whose academic work is focused on issues of security and economic relations pertaining to South-East Asia, the South China Sea in particular. Known for his neutrality and unwillingness to take sides in assessing the causality of South-East Asian regional tensions, he should be able to offer a wholesome birds-eye perspective on the issue. Finally, Prof. Dr. Alex Oude Elferink is a university professor of international sea law, and the chairman to the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (NILOS). His specialism will provide a gateway to understanding the innate complexity of public international law with regard to the construction and portrayal of territorial claims in the case of the South China Sea.

My background in anthropology should serve me well in planning and

contextualizing my interviews. These will be conducted in an open as opposed to a structured or semi-structured fashion because of the digressing specialties of each person, allowing for more detailed answers individually as well as disclosing their approach to the subject and frame of reference. Unfortunately further fieldwork is not really an option in this case given the limitations of this research project, so I have opted mainly for a continued thorough search through the literature and make use of said interviews to help frame the information

In order to assess the overlap of the territorial claims and the mechanisms in place for the prevention of conflict, my starting point was be to assess where the UN, the ASEAN states, China, and other states or institutions overlap in their data and public records. In that way the basis for threat perception could be observed respectively and joint conflict

prevention mechanisms could be identified as well. Although intent as a variable remains difficult to measure, the aforesaid data could help generate an indication; a hidden agenda can always play a role nonetheless. Capability as a variable for threat-perception should have been easily traceable on the other hand, although even there one encountered resistance; manipulation of data, discrepancy in sources, or over the top muscle-flexing. As previously mentioned, the crux of information was ultimately procured from the abundant literature.

In Theory: Threat, Law, Strategy, Institutions

i. Threat

Booth and Wheeler (2013, p.145) define Security Dilemma Sensibility as “an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behavior, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.” It would be interesting to apply that notion of the security dilemma sensibility in assessing the motives of the various actors involved in the SCS. If parties such as China adhere to said sensibility, this would reinforce the idea that the perception of threat far outweighs the reality. The fear of action can serve compellingly to influence states in their threat perception and consequent action. The conjecture of enmity is inherent to state behavior, and is elaborated upon further by Farnham (2003) by relating it to the perception of threat. She also writes that “states assess threat at least as much on the basis of intentions as capabilities” (Farnham, 2003, p.396). If a similar neorealist conceptualization of threat can be relayed to the case of the SCS, then one must take capabilities and intentions as contingent variables for threat perception. Walt (1987) lists these same variables when assessing what conceptualizes threat, but it is Chen & Yang (2013) who take that conceptualization a step further.

Chen & Yang (2013) assume that states’ behavior is governed by the anticipation of a high level of threat (HT) or low level of threat (LT) combined with an expected positive economic relationship (PE) or expected negative economic relationship (NE), illustratable though various combinations: HT-PE; LT-PE; HT-NE. Their notion of threat is based on Walt’s (1987) Balance of threat theory, which lists four major threat inducing elements, namely geospatial proximity, hostile intent, as well as aggregate and offensive power. Should states perceive the sum total of these factors to be great then they are likely to perceive threat

and act to counter it accordingly from a lack of security. However, Walt’s (1987) conception of threat is based on military and geopolitical concerns, whereas it does not account for economic relations at all.

The expectation of an economic relationship is denoted separately by Chen & Yang (2013), and is influenced by Copeland’s (1996) Theory of trade expectation, which fuses liberal and realist discourse to predict state behavior. He “introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war. This supplements the static consideration in liberalism and realism of the levels of interdependence at any point in time, with the

importance of leaders dynamic expectations into the future… In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade” (Copeland, 1996, p. 6-7). Taking this into account, Chen & Yang (2013) suggest a NE, in this particular case, to be derived from the direct competition of regional actors with China on export markets and foreign direct investment (FDI) movements, seeing as such competition will likely lead to higher unemployment rates and hence negative interdependent relations for the regional actors. Taking this into consideration, they suggest “as a consequence, we expect Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore to have positive economic relations while Indonesia, Laos, Philippines Thailand and Vietnam will have negative ones” (Chen, 2013, p. 274).

Chen & Yang (2013), on describing state relations in South East Asia, use hedging to illustrate the general behavior of certain ASEANstates, which diverges according to the

threat perception of each member state with a stake in the SCS, describing it as “a policy that

seeks positive relations with all great powers in a region” (Chen & Yang, 2013, p. 270).

hedging is the product of HT-PE. It is an accommodative middle ground for states to establish

peaceful ties with respective powers whilst retaining a fallback procedure should relations with one of the powers deteriorate. In this particular case they are not only referring to China as a great power, but the US as well. The latter may well play a prominent role in influencing regional threat-perception but one has yet to figure out how to incorporate it sufficiently into the mix. Other parties that may have to be accounted for as well could be Australia, India, and perhaps even New Zealand and Russia as well as other extra-regional actors. Furthermore, on opposite ends of the spectrum, with hedging centered in the middle, Chen & Yang (2013) explore soft-balancing and bandwagoning as responsive forms of state behavior respectively in the face of presumed threat or in its absence. Soft-balancing, the strategic product of HT-NE, is the policy of pursuing informal military relations and establishing economic ties with other powerful states – than the ones perceived as threatening – in order to counterbalance the current power structure. Bandwagoning, the strategic product of LT-PE, is the policy of

accommodating powerful states in order to profit from prolonged cooperation and increased economic and trade benefits. Taking the aforesaid examples of responsive state behavior, it becomes clearly visible how closely threat and strategy are intertwined in the overall theoretical discussion and how this may well continue into the analysis. However, the typologies of state behavior, are exemplary of responsive and strategic policy and will therefore play a more prominent role in the chapter assessing strategy as a conflict prevention mechanism.

Commendable for their theoretical groundwork, Chen & Yang’s (2013) strategic typologies can nonetheless be simplified for application to this research by fusing their conception of military and geopolitical threat with expected economic relationship. They do not clearly account for a difference between HT-PE and LT-NE, most likely because both lie at the theoretical middle of the threat spectrum and therefore indicate a medium threat, the consequent product of which may still be hedging. HT-NE is doubly negative and should therefore simply be referred to as high threat, the strategic reaction to which remains

Soft-balancing. LT-PE is doubly positive, which is why low threat will suffice in its case, having bandwagoning as a consequent state strategy. Hence, the variable possibilities for assessment

of the level of threat have been simplified slightly for this case study.

Drawing upon the general tendency in the literature to incorporate capability and intent as recurrent themes for the perception of threat, I intend to do so as well while denoting my own interpretation of threat so far. Threat-perception is the anticipation of potential danger and conflict from another state actor, individually or collectively, based upon capabilities and intent threatening the balance of power within an economic and military context. This can exist in three levels: low, medium and high threat. Most definitions of threat-perception seem to take only the latter, military context, into account while taking the economic aspect for granted. I feel, similarly to Chen and Yang (2013), both are absolutely necessary. Moreover, the perception of threat should be equal to a perceived lack of security, or a perceived necessity for securitization. Furthermore, this concept of threat-perception will consciously refrain from using geospatial proximity as a factor. The current technological developments of respective actors have served to transcend traditional border conceptions by states, also with regard to the maritime-continental divide, an example of which is visible in present-day military excursions in the region. The current nature of undefined and disputed territories in the SCS makes it too difficult, unfortunately, to analyze threat based on geographic

difference.

Keeping the qualitative take on threat-perception as the main argument, a quantitative measure displaying comparative descriptive statistics for each state could serve to clarify their relative positions. Singer (1958, p.94), on defining the Armament-Tension Dilemma

formulates that “𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡.” This formula corroborates Farnham’s (2003) concept of threat perception using capability and intent as essential variables. Singer goes on to highlight the diminishment of threat perception, as either variable approaches the zero mark. “Any attempt to break out of the arms-tension circle must successfully reduce threat-perception by addressing itself to the reduction of both military capability and estimated military intent” (Singer, 1958, p.94-95). Singer (1958) suggests that the perception of threat lies with actors themselves as they begin to form a threat themselves. Should they refrain from exaggerating hostilities, hostilities are less likely to surface.

In 1963, Singer went on to found the Correlates of War Project (COW), a tangible attempt to quantify and accumulate conflict-related data for the years to come. The most remarkable element of this project is a unique method to quantify military capability, known as the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC), which measures hard power. The results of this indicator have been mapped in the Composite Index of National Capability (idem) up until 2007. It converts six elements into an overall estimate of military capability: military personnel, total population, urban population, military expenditure, energy

consumption, and iron and steel production. Each value is converted to a percentage of the world total, after which they are added up and divided (by the number of factors) to ascertain the CINC (Singer, 1988):

(!"#"$%&' !"#!$%&'()! ! !"!#$ !"!#$%&'"( ! !"#$% !"!#$%&'"! ! !!"!#$%& !"#$%&&"' ! !"!#$% !"#$%&'()"# ! !"#$ !"# !"##$ !"#$%&'(#))

! = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶.

In order to apply this formula to a contemporary setting, a new calculation of CINC will have to be made to ascertain more recent figures. To maintain some level of consistency, all data for said calculation will be taken from the World Bank as it is a relatively reliable source of statistical information. The World Bank no longer measures iron and steel production in its database. Research & Development as percentage of GDP would have been a welcome modern alternative, however that dataset is partially incomplete as well. Instead, iron and steel production will be removed from the formula altogether. Also, to maintain comparative accuracy the pre-2007 values incorporated into this analysis will have to be recalculated as well. Based on data availability this paper’s CINC value will comprise the following five elements: total population, urban population, total armed forces personnel, military

expenditure as percentage of GDP, and energy consumption per capita. To avoid confusion, this will be referred to as the Composite Indicator of National Power (CINP).

(!"#"$%&' !"#!$%&'()! ! !"!#$ !"!#$%&'"( ! !"#$% !"!#$%&'"( ! !!"!#$%& !"#$%&&"' ! !"!#$% !"#$%&'()"#)

! = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑃.

This will always provide a value between 0 and 1, to be rounded off to three decimal places in this instance for the sake of conciseness. This paper will calculate the CINP values for 2005

and 2012 for a comparative illustration of respective changes, as the World Bank database has complete datasets of the countries concerned for those years.

Applying Singer’s (1958) logic could indicate the variability of threat quantitatively, as it is present in the SCS. The problem with his threat-perception formula is that intent is almost impossible to quantify as the true intentions of state actors can never truly be known, let alone proven. Therefore this essay will attempt to take his calculation of threat-perception as a basis but will always assume estimated intent to be a constant variable, in this case 1, and estimated military capability a derivative of CINP, meaning that: 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑃 𝑥 1. Now, economic capability has to be factored into the equation as well, so as to arrive at a quantitative result that may be related to the qualitative findings of threat, which are also based on both military and economic capability. The most proportionate

representation of economic might is gross domestic product (GDP). This computation will account for purchasing power parity (PPP) as that provides better measurement from a domestic perspective. This is because it gauges, on an annual basis, standard of living and economic power based on the total population whilst accounting for a variation of elements in different countries, allowing for a more wholesome value from an international perspective. In order to fit a value of PPP GDP into the formula of threat perception it must be converted according to the same ratio used for the military statistics, which is by converting each state’s GDP to a percentage of the world total. To achieve this one must divide PPP GDP by the PPP gross world product (GWP). As is the case with the CINP values, this will always provide a number between 0 and 1, to be rounded off to three decimal places. That said, adding to the aforesaid formula based on the qualitative assumption that threat is derived from military and economic capability, this essay will quantify threat perception as follows:

𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑷 𝒙 _{𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑮𝑾𝑷 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂}𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂 𝒙 𝟏.

It is important to take note of the existence of alternative measures to CINC. China itself measures Comprehensive National Power (CNP), through a multitude of variables indicative of both hard and soft power. This goes for the National Power Index (NPI) as well. This essay has expressly ignored soft power indicators because of their more abstract nature and

potentially positive effects, which makes them somewhat redundant for the measurement of threat as opposed to power/ The same applies to the World Power Index (WPI), which

measures material, immaterial, and semi-material capacities to give a cumulative indication of hard and soft power.

ii. Law

Viewing this case study from the perspective of International Law, a theory of

compliance is necessary to analyze the functionality of International Law and UNCLOS in the South China Sea. Guzman employs such a compliance-based theory, stating that “at a

minimum, a sound theory of compliance must explain both (1) instances of compliance with international law and (2) instances of violation” (Guzman, 2002, p.1840). He is essentially critical of other theories on compliance for their inability to deliver useful explanations for the violation of international law, only accounting for the observance thereof. Guzman himself best sums up the extent of his article’s argument: “it lays out a theory of international law and compliance that explains how national behavior is influenced by international law. It does so within the framework of a rational actor model in which states value a reputation for

compliance with international obligations. Along with the possibility of direct sanctions, reputation provides an incentive for states to comply with their obligations. By developing and preserving a good reputation, states are able to extract greater concessions for future promises. Because the magnitude of reputational sanctions is limited, the Article points out that they will not always provide sufficient incentive for nations to comply with the law. This explains why one sees violations of international law in some instances. It also suggests that scholars of international law should keep the limits of that law in mind. In particular, it is unlikely that international law can influence decisions of fundamental importance to the state with any frequency” (Guzman, 2002, p. 1886-1887). Hence, a compliance-based theory suggests that states are thus obliged to follow international law for the sake of preserving the legitimacy of the international legal system and for the sake of preserving their own

legitimacy. Also, a decision is governed by fear for resulting sanctions. If they refrain from abiding by custom, then this must be a meticulous decision incentivized by a calculated ratio of loss versus gains. For the legal system to effectively work in this case, states must always naturally and independently arrive at the decision to comply despite such calculations. Koh (1997, p. 2645) reinforces this, highlighting that for rules to maintain validity and remain effective “voluntary obedience, not coerced compliance, must be the preferred enforcement mechanism.”

Koh (1997) feels that the continuous construction and dissemination of state identity weigh in on state compliance with international legal procedure as well. “Such a process can be viewed as having three phases. One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party’s internal normative system. The aim is to ‘bind’ that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set. Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The transaction generates a legal rule which will guide future transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the

interests and even the identities of participants in the process” (Koh, 1997, p. 2646). The internalization of customary international law as a legal norm is part of that process of identity construction. It serves to create an implicit fluidity for state actors and their counterparts as norm-internalization becomes dynamic and susceptible to change, both influenceable and influential. In that sense state inclination to compliance is guided from a constructivist perspective, by the aforementioned means of constructing identity and internalizing norms.

iii. Strategy

Strategy encompasses all operational plans of action employed by states to manufacture a desired outcome or deter an undesired outcome. It is with regard to security issues in the face of perceived threat that the nature of such strategy increases in importance within the international arena. In their article Uncertainty, Booth and Wheeler (2013) also explore the notion of Three Logics used by state leaders on an a priori basis to fill in the blanks and guide the decision making process with regard to security dilemmas. “Fatalist Logic is the idea that security competition can never be escaped in international politics. Human nature and the condition of international anarchy determine that humans will live in an essentially conflictual world. Mitigator Logic holds that security competition can be ameliorated or dampened down for a time, but never eliminated. Here, notions of regimes and societies are key, blunting the worst feature of anarchy. Transcender logic is the idea that human society is self-constitutive, not determined. Humans have agency, as individuals and groups, and so human society can seek to become what it chooses to be, though inherited structural constraints will always be powerful. A global community of peace and trust is in principle possible if in practice it currently looks improbable” (Booth & Wheeler, 2013, p.143-144). Applying these logics to the respective stakeholders can help establish the motives behind their decision-making process in assessing how conflict avoidance strategy has been employed thus far. The respective logics will serve to label the type of state behavior apparent from that strategy. This will be done in correspondence with Chen & Yang’s (2013) strategic typologies of hedging, bandwagoning, and soft-balancing, which can be linked to the Three Logics respectively.

There is an inherent relationship between threat and strategy in state behavior. States maintaining a currently irreversible skepticism of other state behavior and agendas, perceptive of high threat and weary of their power, are likely to uphold a fatalist logic when strategizing, which will lead them to engage in soft-balancing practices to counter-adjust the imbalance. States that view threat as little or non-existent (low threat) will operate according to

transcender logic. This is because they feel more confident about their position and their

states that can help them develop further. Hedging will result from states that adhere to

mitigator logic because they experience medium threat by their position of uncertainty within

the complex web of interstate relations and wish to solidify their security infrastructure from all angles so they may take sides if threat were to increase.

iv. Institutions

Institutions such as ASEAN have the potential to be powerful tools for implementing and maintaining high standards for cooperation on a regional and multilateral scale. Keohane (1995) guardedly expresses the importance of Institutionalist theory in rationalizing state behavior of interstate cooperation to achieve shared goals. Institutionalist theory expresses institutions as a utilitarian means incentivizing cooperation for greater gains. “When state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur, nor the institutions that facilitate cooperation to develop. When states can jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions. Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane, 1995, p. 41-42). Institutions have the power to expedite objectives that cannot be singularly achieved or without collaboration. That power, transcendent of lone state action and agenda, elevates their utility to the status of mechanisms potentially capable of preventing conflict. This is equally applicable to the case of the SCS, where the institutions concerned cannot take full credit for their role in alleviating regional tensions but they have certainly played a significant part. Keohane (1995, p. 50) allows for the possible impact institutions are capable of, stressing their fundamentality, but warns they are not singularly the answer: “This necessity for institutions does not mean that they are always valuable, much less that they operate without respect to power and interests, constitute a panacea for conflict, or always reduce the likelihood of war. Claiming too much for

international institutions would indeed be a ‘false promise.’ But in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace.”

In light of Keohane’s (1995) view on the relevance of institutions, the chapter on institutions will illustrate how these organizations active in the SCS factor into the current equation of temporal regional stability based on their existence for the purpose of cooperation and the service they offer. Their role in the international arena surpasses singular and bilateral state behavior and their value can be traced to their multilateral nature. Operating under the assumption that institutions, just as international law and state strategy, serve as a component

mechanism, this essay will go on to approach the three component mechanisms for conflict prevention as a reactionary means to the underlying perception of threat.

The Perception of Threat

This chapter will address the following sub-research question: What is the perception

of threat in the South China Sea, and which variables factor into that perception? The

potential for conflict in the South China Sea, and therefore the presence of threat, is traceable to a multitude of disputes as opposed to a singular contested topic. The various disputes in the South China Sea have their roots in a dichotomy of claims with regard to either territorial sovereignty or maritime territory. In no single case can the issue be simplified to a bilateral debate after which one party may sail away appeased and the other aggrieved. It retains an inherent multilateral complexity at all times. However, regarding the bigger picture of the current situation in the SCS it may well be possible to split the parties into two camps and thus revoke the age-old theme of ‘us versus them,’ but more on this later on. The state of external or international relations is not exclusively accountable in this situation either. “State actors are also dealing with rising nationalism. This creates internal problems as well, leading governments to artificially label external problems so as to deal with internal affairs by externalizing them. Additionally, these issues are fueled by the various economic interests at stake, which can be compartmentalized into trade, mineral resources and the fishing industry” (van der Putten, 2016). One thing is certain, state behavior suggests the materialization of multiple incentives influential to motive and conduct.

(Amti, 2014, Natural Resources in the South China Sea)

The depth of mineral resource and trade inherency in the South China Sea is also a contested subject, of which time and exploration will be the judge. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), an initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), maps out a general depiction of proven and probable oil and gas reserves in the region (see the image above), where one can also see that the center of the SCS is still blank due to an utter lack of certainty concerning its mineral resources. Odeyemi highlights its role of importance nonetheless in determining economic and consequent political decision-making as part of processes of securitization. “Associated security dilemmas clearly merge within the SCS maritime context. The essence of this argument is that the SCS region accounts for over 30% of global shipping, particularly crude oil, and contains one of the world’s most important sea lanes. Aside from being central to global oil transit, the SCS itself has an estimated 7.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Therein lies both its political and strategic importance. Subject to the accuracy of

Chinese estimates, the SCS will eventually yield 130 billion barrels of oil meaning that its crude reserves places it second only to the Persian Gulf – home to the highest reserves globally” (Odeyemi, 2015, p. 295). The purported extent of mineral resources in the region serves to politicize the claims thereto and exploitation thereof in the international arena,

especially at a time when the world is still largely struggling to cope with energy scarcity and gradual energy resource policy reforms, the culmination of which is still decades away. Energy resources have been subject to severe securitization in the past decades. The

acquiescence of energy resources is equal to the establishment of security, meaning the lack of said resources is indicative of threat. The SCS is hence a golden nugget on the world map and although claimed ownership may well be the ticket to economic success, if those claims are refuted states may soon find themselves in the perilous downward spiral at the bottom end of international political economy. This is why mineral resources and subsequent trade are such important elements for the regional actors in the SCS and understandably displays why threat may be perceived in the area.

The perception of threat, and by whom, also warrants a line-up of the respective actors involved. On the one hand there are the regional actors at the center of the dispute, all the so-called claimant states in the SCS: China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Cambodia. On the other hand there are the extra-regional actors harboring an immediate interest and alliances set with local partners in the region: the US, Australia, India, New Zealand, and Russia to name a few. Upon looking at statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which has consolidated a database on the military expenditure of over 170 states since the late 1980s, it becomes evident that as a region South-East Asia has made a significant budgetary increase in that field. The region has upped its military expenditure from a total ‘$25,8 billion’ in 2005 to ‘$42,2 billion’ in 2015, not including China. In that same period, the Philippines and Vietnam have both acted to more than double their military expenditure, respectively increasing by approximately ‘$2,5 billion’ and ‘$3,5 billion’. Of the regional actors however, China has seen the largest, most exponential military budgetary expansion in the past decade with a raise of ‘$169,1 billion’. In relative terms, said expenditure currently amounts to ‘1,9%’ of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), whilst it is ‘2,3%’ for Vietnam and ‘1,3%’ for the Philippines (SIPRI, 2015). Nevertheless, it seems clear that a greater emphasis has been placed on regional military budgets in recent years. One would deem the logical conclusion to such an observation to be that the players concerned must perceive some sort of threat for them to engage in such drastic forms of militarization. Conversely, the US as an extra-regional actor upped its budget in the same period by approximately “$92,6 billion” to a total of “$596 billion” in 2015, currently accounting for “3,3%” of its GDP (SIPRI, 2015).

(AMTI, 2014, Asian Military Personnel)

The above map, courtesy of AMTI (2014) to help visualize an indication of military capability, gives a brief overview of current overall military capability by the regional and surrounding actors, displaying the number of military personnel. The below map, idem, provides a slight indication of the intensity and proximity of US military troop presence despite being an extra-regional actor.

The dispute in its current manifestation has come to be known as a case of China versus its counter claimants, the other regional actors in the SCS. As one can see in the first of the two above maps, the Chinese giant overwhelms its regional counterparts individually as far as military capability is concerned in every respect. Even if all the counterclaimants, including Taiwan, were to combine forces then they would still only amass 1.257.600 army troops versus China’s 1.600.000. Furthermore their navy would come up short by 34.200 military personnel, and their air force by 246.800 (AMTI, 2014). Although power projection may not be a policy ambition of the Chinese government, the apparently sheer difference in numbers makes the projection of power a fundamental given. Of course military capability is not exclusively a numbers game but also quality, training, intellectual capacity, discipline, dedication and originality factor into the equation as well. Yet the odds would seem stupendously in favor of China and even if the Chinese were to lack offensive intent, these remarkable differences seem justifiably enough to create a sense of dread and consequently a feeling of threat on the part of the regional actors. It is here that the extra-regional actors come into the picture to level the balance of power.

To the east, the US is the most prominent outside player involved in the SCS dispute. As the global hegemon in military and economic terms, it stands to lose the most with China close behind in second place. China has harnessed an unprecedented extremity of economic upsurge, making it the world’s second largest economy, predicted to pass the US as the dominant economic power within the coming decades. Its fourth place deficit militarily is likely to be cut short sooner than later as the economic growth machine sustains military growth as well. The potential this has to delegitimize the US, which still sees itself as the hegemon, is fuel for the perception of threat as well and has served as a stimulus to increased cooperation between the US and its South East Asian neighbors, China not included. As US allies, Australia and New Zealand’s proximity to the south of the area as well as ties with claimant states raise their stakes in the issue, their own political incentives notwithstanding. Both of the latter parties remain adamant to preserve a sense of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific as the consequences of conflict would be very much likely to spill over onto their turf even if they were to refrain from interference. For India the interests are slightly different however because their largest concern seems to retain freedom of navigation so they may reap the benefits of trade adjacent to the maritime silk route with regional partners. China’s territorial assertions would serve to limit such freedoms and stint India’s comparable levels of economic growth, thus generating threat and producing incentive to interfere with regional politics in the SCS.

Economic threat stems from observed economic growth and capability, or the hazard to such growth and capability. China’s booming industrial proliferation has automatically placed it in a position of contrast vis-à-vis its regional and extra-regional contemporaries. It posits sovereignty over most of the South China Sea through its so-called nine-dash line. Leaving aside issues of territoriality and legality, such ownership, if attained, would have immense ramifications in terms of its detrimental effects for other states in trade, fishing and general resource exploitation. Moreover, a cut-off of trade in the area would limit liquid natural gas (LNG) flows through the region, of which a third of the world’s share flows through the Malacca Straits, much of which is bound for US allies Japan and South Korea as well both of who have external competing claims with China (AMTI, 2014). It is in such situations that the control of the South China Sea becomes part of a bigger policy picture, at least for the Chinese. An indication of LNG movement can be seen in the image below from AMTI (2014).

(AMTI, 2014, South China Sea LNG Flows)

David Fouquet (2016) feels that in the global arena, the perception of threat in the SCS plays a prominent role but has been sustained by outer circles. “It’s connected to so many other things. Maybe it is connected to a wider context, which is the changing balance of power between the big players in the world. Also, it can be attributed to everyone’s search for

a new identity and relationships. That includes Europe, and naturally the US and China. They are the driver on this. The perception of threat has been formed largely by the influence of the elites, the scholars and the politicians across the Atlantic. They’ve dominated” (Fouquet, 2016). This statement is suggestive of threat to be an international or even western conception with regard to this particular case, less of an issue for the local players perhaps whom have taken various steps to counterbalance the precarious state of relations in the region. The respective actors are fully aware that mutually excessive military activity will only serve to exacerbate tensions and instead opt to rationally deal with threat as it comes.

Taking the elaboration of the formula for threat perception, based on the Armament-tension dilemma as discussed in the theoretical chapter, the following chart illustrates threat perception as it can be measured for the US and China, having first calculated CINP. Hence, the following chart illustrates threat perception of China, and the US in 2004 and 2014 as the dominant players at opposite ends of the political power spectrum of relations in the SCS dispute. Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei have been purposely omitted due to partially incomplete data, which would not have given a clear indication of each actor’s perceived threat and their smaller roles in the region as secondary powers, despite being claimant states in the SCS.

China

US

[2005]

_{Population, total}

_1,303,720,00

_295,516,599

Urban Population

554,367,818

236,200,507

Military Expenditure (% of GDP)

2.0

3.8

Armed Forces Personnel, total

3,755,000

1,546,000

Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per

capita)

1,361.7

7,846.5

CINP 2005

0.421

1.235

GDP 2005

7,399,199,501,842.0 14,705,567,303,239.4

GWP 2005

75,363,103,663,418

75,363,103,663,418

Threat Perception 2005

0.041

0.241

[2012]

Population, total

1,350,695,000

314,112,078

Urban Population

700,862,129

254,770,024

Military Expenditure (% of GDP)

1.9

4.2

Armed Forces Personnel, total

2,993,000

1,492,200

Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per

capita)

2,079.1

6,812.3

CINP 2012

0.478

1.112

GDP 2012

14,880,592,037,847.1 15,878,110,168,865.5

GWP 2012

97,175,435,611,213

97,175,435,611,213

Threat Perception 2012

0.073

0.182

Interestingly enough, one can see that the United States is perceived to be far more threatening than its Chinese counterpart, with a far higher level of threat perception in both 2005 and 2012. However, it has also seen a significant decrease in its threat level whereas China has nearly doubled its perceived threat in seven years. If these numbers indicate anything, it is the clear fluidity of power relations and perceived threat in the region, the two powers moving closer to one another. Unfortunately more recent statistics could not be used but presumably China and the US would then have been even closer to one another in terms of threat perception. Furthermore, this formula would have served a better purpose if all others actors’ threat perception could have been calculated as well. It would have been interesting to see if the level of threat perception for China and the US would have been drastically higher than the other regional claimant states.

International Law as a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention

This chapter will examine the following sub-research question: How are conflict

prevention mechanisms operationalized and perpetuated within the framework of

International Law? The sixth chapter of the UN Charter outlines in Article 33(1) that “the

parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or

arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (UN Charter; Chapter VI; Article 33(1)). In line with this ideology, ASEAN and China agreed to sign a Code of Conduct in November of 2002, of which Article 1 reads, “The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations” (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; Article 1). It is in the spirit of this article and a general code of conduct that states are required to pursue peaceful solutions to any dispute, abstaining from such conduct would signal instability and serve to delegitimize states in the face of the world.

“Legitimacy, not justice, he [Franck] reasoned, should be the prime goal of an international rule system” (Koh, 1997, p. 2643). The fear for loss of face surely benefits adherence to law and may well be one of the most important factors for conflict prevention. The question remains to what extent this is the case however, the answer to which can only be attained by dissecting the efficaciousness of UNCLOS.

The Law of the Sea Treaty, better known as UNCLOS, a maritime pillar of public international law, was brought to fruition in the mid ‘50s and had reached its third and current phase by 1982. It established the following: a 12 nautical miles territorial zone, 12 nautical miles contiguous zone, and a 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for all sea areas aligned adjacent to the coast of a state. Over 150 UN member states are now party to this agreement, including the various regional states of the South China Sea, all of whom have taken steps to ratify it. UNCLOS has laid the legal groundwork to determine the oceans’ use in every respect. Given their ratification of the convention, this also applies to the states bordering on the SCS, which have made disputed claims to various parts of the SCS, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. The exception here is the Republic of China (ROC): a non-member state of the UN, better known as Taiwan, whose overall status of sovereignty is under discussion to begin with but has attempted legislative measures to direct its policy into acquiescence of UNCLOS nevertheless as part of continued processes of developing a normative regulatory framework.

As important as UNCLOS is, it may only be applied to one half of the claimancy dilemma. “UNCLOS does not address questions of sovereignty over land territory. Its provisions on coastal state jurisdiction assume such sovereignty” (Beckman, 2013, p.142). It is important to take note of this because essentially the dispute concerned revolves around questionable sovereignty, more specifically sovereignty over the pieces of land scattered throughout the SCS. The states that are ultimately granted sovereignty over certain regional islands and the like, will be able to assert said sovereignty to claim maritime zones. In that sense, the landmasses concerned harbor the potential for greater claims in the SCS. That is where the arbitrary limitations of UNCLOS lie (Oude Elferink, 2016). This in turn raises the question how effective the Law of the Sea can be in this case as a mechanism for dispute resolution, or the prevention of a consequent conflict for that matter? Although it may be limited in some respects, its strength lies in the potential to assert delimitations in relation to territorial waters.

“UNCLOS makes important distinctions between offshore geographic features such as (1) islands, (2) rocks, (3) low-tide elevations, (4) artificial islands, installations and structures, and (5) submerged features. The distinctions are significant because different maritime zones can be claimed from different features. Maritime zones can be generated only from land territory over which a state has sovereignty – which is often described as the principle that ‘the land dominates the sea’. The maxim is long-standing and has often been cited with approval by international courts and tribunals” (Beckman, 2013, p.149-150). According to UNCLOS, within the differentiation of geospatial features, one might denote islands as having maritime zones equal to land territory, which includes the respective

contours of territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZ, and continental shelves. Not only are they enclosed by water and of a natural genesis, but also they are never submerged by high tides. Their ability to suffer economic life or human habitation distinguishes them from rocks, which is why the latter are only awarded the rights to territorial seas and contiguous zones. Low-tide elevations, not granted their own maritime zones, merely have the advantage of serving as baseline point from which to measure the breadth of a territorial sea and only if they lie inside a 12nm distance from a land feature. Artificial outcroppings have no maritime zone entitlements whatsoever and are subject to coastal state jurisdiction, to which exclusive construction rights are bestowed so long as this takes place within the EEZ and continental shelf. One might consider these terms to be fairly clear in their definition, but they seem to be expressly neglected by claimant states in order to provide a continued state of ambiguity concerning the exact breadth of their claims. “None of the claimants in the South China Sea have clarified which features they consider to be islands, rocks, low-tide elevations, artificial islands, and so on. The resulting uncertainty is noteworthy since the majority of features are not above water at high tide. Furthermore, there appear to be cases in which a claimant state has built installations and structures on low-tide elevations or submerged features within 200 nm of another claimant. The claimant states have also not clarified which features they believe are islands. Nor have they clarified what maritime zones they are entitled to claim from such islands” (Beckman, 2013, p. 151). The SCS dispute claims are expressly enveloped in continuous ambiguity by their perpetrators. This makes one wonder how the PCA can possibly manage to arbitrate their cases if the complainants cannot provide any information as to what it exactly is that they have a problem with. It proves that the claimants all have weak arguments for their case and hope to win on the basis of uncertainties over the dispute.

In 2013, the Philippines filed the first, and only, case against China now being handled by the PCA; the filing was supported by Vietnam. The Philippines made 15 claims, of which only 7 are being taken into account. Given UNCLOS’s lack of jurisdiction over issues of sovereignty, the Philippines has attempted to make a case requiring maximum elucidation on the issues pertaining to the law of the sea. Let us contemplate that if the PCA ends up ruling in favor of the Philippines this would essentially mean that all of the crucial issues relevant to other claimants would have been addressed as well. This would mean that the pieces of land in question, including much of the Spratlys are legally speaking rocks and not entitled to a continental shelf. In such an outcome China’s claim of the nine-dash line based entirely on supposed historical entitlements would become redundant because these claims are opposed to UNCLOS. Even if China would be awarded sovereignty rights to some of those rocks, the maximum maritime benefits this would bring with it is territorial and contiguous zones, considerably less than what they are aiming for (Oude Elferink, 2016).

China has however, rejected participation in the PCA’s arbitration so if, and when, a declaration is made the question remains what their reaction will be.

Seeing as the PCA has not yet ruled on the case of the South China Sea, it seems only natural that states have not undertaken radical actions yet as this would undermine the value of the international judicial system and its ability to rectify international disputes. Once a judgment has been made, its not necessarily binding in the sense that states can always opt for non-compliance. However, it is unlikely they will do so because of the detrimental impact this will have on their sense of legitimacy as actors in the international arena. Also, given the excessive number of separate minor disputed cases, it is unlikely that every ruling will bear the same winner and loser. Gains and grievances are likely to occur for both sides and it is in the spirit of mutual acceptance and recognition that states will establish themselves as strong states with character, legitimizing their image in the political arena for future disputes. It is doubtful that any of the state actors concerned will behave otherwise because they have too much to lose by policies of non-compliance. Such a feared loss of gains and legitimacy is what acts to prevent conflict in the SCS.

Strategic Conflict Prevention Mechanisms

This chapter will be guided by the following research question: How are conflict

prevention mechanisms operationalized and perpetuated strategically? Chen & Yang (2013)

pinpoint the factors of most concern when analyzing states’ strategic options in the SCS within a political, military and economic dimension. Based on this, areas of concern are the regional hegemony of China, including the economic costs versus benefits of its continued rise, as well as the overall territorial disputes and the potential for a Sino-US conflict. Keeping these interests in mind, priorities change over time, as do the costs and benefits of various state policies, the subjects of a constant fluidity of relations in the international arena. Briefly touching upon the strategy of each claimant state, this chapter will assess the logic behind their respective decision-making process and how consequent strategic typologies are utilized to optimize the balance of power as conflict prevention mechanisms.

The Philippines as a case example of a state experiencing high threat, have employed a fatalist logic to govern their decision to side with the US in order to soft-balance against China. Primarily a military strategic choice, the Philippines’ contested claim against China over the Spratly Islands as well as China and Taiwan over the Scarborough Shoal have fueled maritime tensions. These have escalated to a developed asymmetry of naval capability in and around the area. With China dominantly responsible for that asymmetric growth, the

their case is being addressed, the Philippines have been weary of Chinese action should they lose and equally weary should they win. The need for a rebalance in the region was the product of both domestic and foreign policy pursuits by the Philippine government but with Rodrigo Duterte as the President-elect of the Philippines, their entire former state logic and consequent strategies may well be altered slightly. Although the Philippines cannot afford to lose the US as a powerful ally, Duterte’s politics may be less reliant on US military and economic support than his predecessors.

Vietnam, a direct neighbor of the Chinese, may well be one of the claimant states most threatened by assertive Chinese maritime policy and economic growth. Although shared borders play into its perceived high threat level, their ongoing dispute over the Paracel Islands as well as the Spratly Islands and the waters to its west remain central. Vietnam’s inherent skepticism towards Chinese intentions and their continued threat to security becomes apparent from a multitude of examples. An illustrative case concerns the Vietnamese choice of investor for a local infrastructure investment project to construct high-speed railway systems. One of several enthusiastic potential investors, China offered a low-cost novel building scheme for an interstate railway line from Ho Chi Minh City to Cambodia’s Phnom Penh. Japan’s proposal, on the other hand, was far more expensive but also promised greater technological innovation, ultimately becoming the first choice for the Vietnamese. Many argue that from a critical perspective, the Vietnamese were so skeptical of the Chinese offer because of the purpose such a transportation infrastructure might serve for China, fearing it would be used to their advantage in case of war (Chen & Yang, 2013). Such a level of mistrust in spite of seemingly good intentions not only stems from high threat perception; it embodies the fatalist logic that appears inherent to Vietnam’s making of state decisions, allowing threat perception to govern economic and infrastructure related cost-benefit

decisions. This aside, an increase in bilateral trade has not overcome the competition for FDI and the export market, or Vietnam’s trade deficit to China. Such issues have led Vietnam to adopt a policy of soft-balancing towards China (Chen & Yang, 2013). It has led them to engage in various joint military exercises regionally with the US, culminating in recent adjustments to both US And Vietnamese policy for further collaboration and Obama’s visit in May, 2016. The pursuance of a strategic soft-balancing policy as a result expresses the potential hard power that bilateral or multilateral alliances are capable of vis-à-vis the Chinese.

One may conversely argue that the potential high-speed rail line to Phnom Penh was also disproved by Vietnam because of Cambodia’s strong ties with China. Cambodia’s low threat perception of China derives from its use of transcender logic, which has led to a committed pro China stance. Its subsequent bandwagoning policy has made it a recipient of