Mauer in den Kopfen? : on the role of basic human values in contemporary East German national identification

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“Mauer in den Köpfen?”

On the role of basic human values in contemporary East

German national identification

Bachelor thesis

Crossing Boundaries? Nationalism and national identity

Student: Luuc Brans (10002418)

Supervisor: Dr. T. Reeskens

Word count: 8984 (including abstract)

24th of January 2014

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are quite a few people who have been very helpful in the conduct of this research. I would like to thank Tim Reeskens, my supervisor, for his valuable guidance in the process of writing this thesis. A special thanks goes to Yael Aartsma, who provided me with access to the digital library of the Freie Universität Berlin. Also, I wish to thank Sander Kruse for sparking my interest in German history and discussing the research, and Lucia Geis without whom I wouldn’t have mastered the German language enough to consult German academic literature. Another warm expression of gratitude is extended to Sara Rubingh and Rosa Douw for providing very valuable feedback on the numerous drafts of this thesis and to Ewout Hasken for being critical to my thoughts. In addition, without the great and warm support by Lex Brans and Carry Bomhof, I would not have been able to conduct this research during Christmas time. Finally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation for my dearest American friend Caroline Dittmann, who, although we only speak German to each other, helped me a lot in finding the right words, grammar and expressions in the weird language that is English.

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“Mauer in den Köpfen?”

On the role of basic human values in contemporary East German national

identification

by L.B. Brans

ABSTRACT

Almost 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, German society still seems divided. Many East Germans still identify with an East German national identity and long back to the GDR. This article tries to answer the question as to why East Germans identify with an East German identity. Past research on this topic has focused mainly on socio-economic factors and political attitudes, with mixed findings. This study takes the basic human values approach to national identification as formed by Roccas et al. (2010) to explain national identification in East Germany. Using data from the European Social Survey for regression analysis, the results show that basic human values do not explain East German or all-German identification. Contemporary East all-German identification does not facilitate the pursuit of motivational goals encompassed by basic human values. Socialist attitudes and age are most important in explaining East German identification. These results confirm some past findings on East German identity and support Roccas’ argument that the link between basic human values and national identification varies among different national contexts. However, the operationalisation of East German identity suffers from validity problems due to constraints of the dataset. Therefore, and to bring further clarity to the pressing problems concerning Germany’s inner unity, further research on the topic is needed.

1.Introduction

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt spoke the famous words “Jetzt wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört”. More than 20 years after these famous words, this goal does not seem to have been accomplished. There are still considerable differences in political attitudes, culture and economic welfare between former East Germany (GDR) and West Germany (Davidov & Siegers 2010:44; Blank 2003a,b; Meulemann 2004; Kubicek 2009). Some pundits even speak of a “Mauer in den Köpfen” when talking about the problem of Germany’s inner unity, suggesting the dividing power of the Berlin Wall lives on in people’s heads (Deutsche Welle 2013).

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! In this respect, one particularly interesting phenomenon is contemporary East German national identity and “Ostalgia” – the longing of East Germans for the German Democratic Republic. In the European Social Survey of 2006, 52.2 percent of East German respondents stated they still felt fairly close or very close to the former GDR. Additionally, there are significant mean differences between the amount of East and West Germans feeling attached to new post-1990 Federal Republic (FRG) (Blank 2003a; Neller 2006a; 190). Not only do East Germans and West Germans differ in their national identification, they also differ on some of the basic human values they uphold (Davidov & Siegers 2010). According to some scholars, Germany is a republic of two cultures (Meulemann 2002).

! Although a majority of the East German citizens nevertheless feels attached to the new Federal Republic (FRG), the amount of East Germans feeling attached to East Germany, but not to the Federal Republic, grows (Neller 2006:192). This contemporary East German identification is fascinating and worrisome for a few reasons. According to Neller, East German identification is competing with all-German identification (2006). This might be threatening Germany’s inner unity. Moreover, lack of identification with the dominant national identity also has an impact on the democratic performance of a state. East German identification might therefore lead to less support and legitimacy for the democratic system of the new FRG (Neller 2000:576). Furthermore, it seems odd that a considerable amount of the East Germans still feel attached to the identity that was represented by an oppressive authoritarian state. The East and West Germans also share a common ancestry, language, myth and history. A divide between two people of the same ethnic identity seems odd. Moreover, although there is a considerable body of scholarly literature on the construction of national identity, we still do not know much about the way a national identity lives on after the state it encompassed collapses. Finally, research into this topic might provide policymakers with answers to pressing problems concerning Germany’s inner-unity. This leads me to address the following research question in this article:

Why does a considerable amount of former East Germans feel attached to an East German national identity?

!

There has been research on the topic of East German national identity before (Falter et al., 2000; Neller 2006a,b; Thumfahrt, 2007). Scholars have researched various facets of the East German identity, ranging from popular culture to political attitudes and voting

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behaviour. The obvious sources of national identification such as income, education, and political attitudes have been researched, yielding different findings (Neller 2006a:168). There has, however, not been research on how identification with the East German identity might be formed by individuals’ differences in basic human values, comparable to Roccas et al. study (2010). Using basic human values to explain East German identification not only illuminates the sources of East German identification, but would also give further insight in the way basic human values can serve as a source for national identification. The main question will therefore be researched by exploring the following descriptive questions:

How do basic human values of East Germans relate to identification with an East German national identity?

How do basic human values of East Germans relate to identification with the all-German national identity?

What is the role of basic human values of East Germans as compared to the role of socio-economic factors in relation to identification with the East German and all-German national identities?

As can be derived from these questions, this research looks into the grounds for both East German and all-German identification among East Germans to expose the relations linking all-German and East German identity, thereby bringing more clarity to the dynamics of national identification in Germany. This research does not look into the consequences of national identification in East Germany, nor does it elaborate on all sources of national identification. It merely tries to shed new light on both East German identification and the basic human values approach in explaining national identification.

This article proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical framework with the relevant concepts of national identity and basic human values will be explained. Thereafter, I will expand on the East German case, discussing various explanations and components of East German and all-German identity and the basic human values they represent, after which the hypotheses will be proposed. After the operationalisation section, the results will be discussed and analysed. The article ends with the conclusions, some points for discussion regarding the limitations of this article and recommendations for further research.

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2. Theory

2.1 National identity

National identity is a concept that is widely used in scholarly literature, but at the same time fails to be used with sufficient clarity (Citrin & Sears 2009:146). Since national identity is a social identity, social identity theory (SIT) might be of help. I will briefly discuss SIT before turning to the definition of national identity being used in this article.

Social identity theory posits that the self-concept of an individual involves a personal identity and a social identity, which includes certain group norms, values and classifications (Ashford & Mael, 1989). The social identity is a central part of a person’s self-conception (Hogg 2006:111). According to Ashford & Mael, social identification makes people support institutions, values and activities that embody and support the social identity with which they identify (1989). This also comprises upholding stereotypical perceptions of the self and others. In the same vein, Citrin and Sears argue that a social identity is relational and by identifying one with a human aggregate, one separates an in-group of fellow group members from an out-group of non-group members (Citrin & Sears 2009: 147). The formation of a social identity and identification with this social identity is accompanied by drawing boundaries between an ‘us’ versus a ‘them’.

In social identity theory, social identification with a group is normally defined as “an awareness of one’s objective membership in the group and a psychological sense of group attachment” (Huddy & Khatib 2007:64). Accordingly, we use Huddy and Khatib’s definition of national identity as “a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation” (Huddy & Khatib 2007:65). Barrington provides us with a clear conceptualisation of ‘nation’. He holds that nations are united not only by cultural aspects such as common values, myths and ancestry, but also by the purpose of controlling a claimed territory. Nations can accordingly be defined as “collectives united by shared cultural features (myths, values etc.) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination” (Barrington 1997: 713).

! The usual explanations of national identification focus on certain characteristics of individuals making national identification more salient to them. Socio-economic factors and characteristics like educational level, migration background and income have been found to have an effect on the extent to which an individual identifies itself with the nation (Bollen & Medrano, 1998; Coenders, 2003; Reeskens & Wright 2014:2; Kunovich 2009). People with a higher household income, as well as people with a higher educational level, tend to identify less with the nation (Kunovich 2009:585; Bollen & Medrano 1998:595). The causal

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mechanism behind the latter relationship is that people with higher educational status have greater cognitive skills and have a greater ability to identify with larger communities than the nation (Bollen & Medrano 1998:595). Age also seems to have an effect, with younger people being less likely to identify with a nation because having grown up in a more globalised world, they tend to have a more international outlook (Jones & Smith 2001:110). Roccas et al. recently undertook socio-psychological approach to national identification, linking basic human values of individuals to national identification (2010). This approach sheds light on why individuals identify themselves with the nation instead of who identifies with the nation. There has been little attention around this approach in explaining national identification in general and East German identification in particular. This will thus be the theoretical approach used in this article.

2.2 Basic human values and national identification

Central to Roccas’ explanation for variation of national identification at the individual level are basic human values as proposed by Schwartz. In his value theory of 1992, Schwartz defined values as “concepts or beliefs, pertaining to desirable end states or behaviours, transcending specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance” (1992:4). These values have several functions. One function is that they serve as standards for evaluation of action and events, thereby also underlying political attitudes (Feather 1994:35; Schwartz, 1994). Another closely related function is that they serve as motives for individual action (Davidov & Siegers 2010:45). In this way, they encompass guiding principles for people’s lives and determine which ‘different courses of actions are viewed as attractive’ (Roccas et al. 2010:394-395). Values thus express certain basic motivational goals and influence individual action. Individuals within and across societies show differences in the value priorities they have as a result of generic heritage, personal experiences, social locations and enculturation (Schwartz & Bardi 2001:268).

! Schwartz derives 10 value types from universal requirements for basic human existence; for instance, social interaction, biological needs, and group survival (Schwartz & Bardi 2001:280; Schwartz 1992:4). These 10 types of values are self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence and universalism (Schwartz 1992:6-7; for an elaborate discussion on each of those value types see

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Schwartz, 1992). Often, these value conflict in everyday life. Conformity, for instance, conflicts with self-direction. Therefore, Schwartz distinguishes two higher-order value dimensions underlying the 10 value types; openness to change versus conservation and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence. These structuring dimensions are supported by empirical evidence and are displayed in Figure 1 (Schwartz, 1992). The circular structure shows that some values are opposed to each other, while those conjoining each other share common motivational goals.

Figure 1: Structure and content of higher order human values

Starting with the first dimension, openness to change values consist of value types like self-direction and stimulation. These values make people pursue their “own intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and uncertain directions” (Schwartz 1992:43). Individual independence and creativity are central to these values. Opposed to these values are conservation values. Value types representing this end of the dimension are tradition, conformity and security. Tradition and conformity are very closely related and share the same broader goal of “subordination of self in favor of socially imposed expectations” (Schwartz 1992:40). Uncertainty reduction is central to conservation values; people to whom these goals are paramount try to avoid uncertainty, insecurity and instability and attribute high importance to self-restriction and order (Roccas et al. 2010:396).

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! Regarding the second dimension, self-enhancement values such as power, achievement and hedonism, stress the pursuit of own personal interests, even at the expense of others (Schwartz 1992:43). People emphasising these values tend to pursue social prestige and status (Roccas et al. 2010:396). Oppositely, self-transcendence values, such as universalism and benevolence, put serving the interests of others central. Promoting the welfare of others, close or far, is of high importance for people attached to these values. ! These basic human values can function as motivation for group identification (Feather 1994:36). According to Roccas et al. “the interaction between individuals’ values and the values whose attainment group membership facilitates affects their level of identification with the group” (Roccas et al 2010:412). Individuals are thus more likely to identify with a group if this gives them the opportunity to fulfil the values they associate with. This also applies to the nation as a social group with which an individual can identify (Feather 1994).

! Empirical tests examining this mechanism have yielded different findings concerning the lower order values (Roccas et al. 2010: 395). Values like tradition and conformity were, for example, shown to relate to national identification in Spain, Brazil, America and Israel (Gouveai, De Albuquerque, Clemente & Espinosa, 2002; Roccas et al. 2010:401). In other nations, such as Australia, other values like hedonism also seem to correlate with national identification (Feather 1994). Regarding the higher order values, since one of the main goals stemming from conservation values is uncertainty reduction, people upholding these values are more likely to identify with the nation (Roccas et al. 2010:397). In the same vein, people upholding openness to change values are less likely to identify with the nation since this limits the attainment of openness to change goals (ibid.). Conducting tests with an Israeli, American and Russian sample, Roccas et al. found that the more people endorsed conservation values, the more they identified themselves with the nation (Roccas et al. 2010:412). On the other hand, openness to change values correlated negatively with identification with the nation. Roccas et al. suggest that “a group that provides a sense of safety and stability is not attractive to all to the same degree; it is rejected by people who attribute high importance to values that express motivations for novelty and change” (Roccas et al. 2010:412).

! These relations are not generalisable across countries and merely show that human values explain why individuals attach to their national identity (Roccas et al 2010:413). According to Roccas, “identification is affected by the fit between personal motivations and

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group characteristics” (ibid.). National identification, for instance, does not always facilitate the attainment of conservation goals: when prevailing social expectation is non-identification with the nation, non-identification with the nation may not foster stability, certainty and security, but on the contrary might increase instability and challenge certainty (Roccas et al 2010:413). Thus the content of East German and all-German identity and the basic human values these represent should also be taken into consideration when examining and discussing the relationship between human values and national identification in East Germany. Let us therefore now turn to the case of East Germany.

2.3 The East German Case

2.3.1 Contemporary East German and all-German identity

Scholars disagree on the content, sources and origins of contemporary East German national identity (Neller 2006a:53; Koch 1998:19; Woderich, 1999). We can distinguish two schools of thought on contemporary East German identity and its origins. The first holds that contemporary East German identity is merely a memorial identity (Erinnerungsidentität) with political aspects (Woderich, 1999; Neller 2006b:17). East German identification is then almost interchangeable with GDR nostalgia. This can be both a political longing as a result of GDR socialisation of socialist values as well as a truly nostalgic longing for the ‘good old times’ and certain rituals of everyday life in the GDR (see Ahbe 2004 for an overview of GDR socialisation). Most scholars with this view predict that the East German identity should be slowly dying out as the generation that was subject to socialist socialisation slowly fades away (Neller 2006b:19). The empirical evidence however shows little decline in East German identification since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Neller 2006a:54,170,189). So it seems contemporary East German identification is not only a residual of living in the GDR since East German identification is prevalent among younger East Germans as well (Woderich 1999:51). Other factors besides GDR socialisation must be at play in the formation and content of contemporary East German identity.

Some scholars therefore point to the role of the reunification process (Pollack & Pickel 1998, Neller 2006a:54, Koch 1998:20). The East German identity is mentioned as being a Selbstbehauptung, or self-assertion, of the East Germans following the regime change, societal transformations and the accompanying massive economic and social deprivation after the reunification (Pollack & Pickel 1998:23). Contemporary East German identity is then conceived as being entirely formed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. There is little room for

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GDR nostalgia in this conceptualisation. The main problem with this approach is that it neglects the role GDR socialisation played in forming the identity of East Germans and therefore conceives East Germans as being a sort of tabula rasa after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Neller 2006b:19). It seems rather implausible to fully discard the effects that forty years of GDR socialisation and living in the GDR might have had on an individual’s social identity.

Both schools of thoughts thus obviously have their fallacies and shortcomings. Therefore, I think it would be wise to combine them, by conceptualising an East German national identity as consisting of two main components reflecting these schools of thought (see Figure 2).

Contemporary East

German national

identity

Erinnerungsgemeinschaft: GDR nostalgia Abgrenzungsidentität: Post-reunification deprivation identity,

stereotyping about West Germans

Figure 2: The components of contemporary East German national identity

The first component accordingly emphasises GDR nostalgia. This part of East German identity is the so-called Erinnerungsgemeinschaft or memory collectivity and refers to positive memories in many aspects of life in the old GDR, including the socialist political system but also facets of everyday GDR life (Neller 2006a:55). This component of East German identity idealises the past and ignores the totalitarian aspects of the GDR, such as mass-surveillance, political prisoners and the constraints on political liberty and travel (Neller 2006a:40,44). The second component deals with the problems of the reunification process. This component, called the Abgrenzungsidentität, or demarcation identity, puts the

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blame for the problems of the transformation squarely on the shoulders of the ‘imperialist’ West Germans (Neller 2006a:46). In the eyes of East Germans, West Germans economically, politically and culturally colonised East Germany, with social and economic deprivation of East Germans as a consequence (Neller 2006a:46; Pollack & Pickel 1998). This component of East German identity involves the development stereotypes about West Germans (Pollack & Pickel 1998:14; Neller 2006a:55, 2006b:33). The Abgrenzungsidentität functions as a “Schutzwall against feared social and moral declassification as well as a platform for articulating common East German interests” (Fritze 1995:287 [own translation, LB], Neller 2006a:54, 2006b:19; Pollack & Pickel 1998, Misselwitz 1996). This component finally also involves the denying of the heterogeneity within the East German group and the commonalities being shared with the West Germans (Pollack & Pickel 1998:14).

! Thus, as shown in Figure 2, the contemporary East German identity has two components, one that mainly has to do with the GDR past, and a second component that emphasises the post-reunification socio-economic deprivation of East Germany. These two components both reflect elements of a national identity, since they emphasise myths, values, and stereotyping. The GDR nostalgia component also refers to a form of territorial self-determination. Therefore, contemporary East German identity is in fact a national identity. ! Being a national identity, contemporary East German identity is theoretically seen competing with the all-German national identity. Although some East Germans are able to combine both identities, the amount of East Germans feeling attached to East Germany, but not to the Federal Republic has been growing in the post-reunification decade (Neller 2006a: 192). This indicates that there is a competing dynamic between the two national identities. Since the reunification was in fact merely an incorporation of East Germany into the Federal Republic, the post-reunifcation Federal Republic bears the same national symbols, political, juridical and economic system as West Germany did (Neller 2006a:57; Zawilska-Florczuk & Chiechanowicz 2010:22,35). No alterations of the core components of West German identity have taken place since 1990. The post-reunification all-German identity is thus the same as the old West German identity. Accordingly the all-German identification can be defined as a feeling of attachment to the Federal Republic.

2.3.2 Past research on contemporary East German identification

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East German identification have looked into both socialisation and situational factors to explain contemporary East German identification (Neller 2006a:64).

! According to the socialisation hypothesis, most East Germans evaluate the current political regime with the socialist values and attitudes they have internalised as a result of GDR socialisation (Neller 2006b:27). Therefore, they reject this political system and associate with an East German identity. Explanatory factors for East German identification according to this hypothesis are thus socialist attitudes and values (Neller 2006a:212-213). Moreover, this hypothesis attributes explanatory power to the age of individuals in relation to East German identification, expecting that the East German identification and thus GDR socialisation will slowly fade due to generational effects (Neller 2006b:19). The situational hypothesis on the other hand, holds that the economic and social deprivation of East Germany after reunification leads to East German identification. ‘Losers’ of the reunification, in particular the unemployed, should be more likely to identify with East Germany (Neller 2006a:215). This reflects the origins the second component of East German national identity, the Abgrenzungsmentalität, which puts emphasis on the post-reunification socio-economic deprivation of East Germans. Explanatory factors according to this hypothesis are household income, social class and employment status (Nelller 2006a:215). Gender is also mentioned as an explanatory factor in this hypothesis, since especially women were struck by unemployment after reunification (Neller 2006a:156).

! The empirical studies of these hypotheses by different scholars have yielded inconsistent findings (for an overview, see Neller 2006a). The strongest evidence points towards gender and socialist attitudes, but other factors must also be involved since these factors seem to tell only a part of the story (Neller 2006a:170). Both deprivation factors, such as unemployment, household income and gender, and socialisation factors, such as socialist values and positive attitudes toward the GDR welfare state, have been found to determine East German identification (Neller 2006a:163). But some relations were not exactly clear, and findings by other scholars claim the contrary (Neller 2006a:154). Neller also found, after an extensive study, that both hypotheses seem to have explanatory power. In respect to East German identification she found the strongest support for the socialisation hypothesis (Neller 2006a:237), although she does not rule out socio-economic factors as proposed by the socialisation thesis.

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2.3.3 Basic human values represented by East German and all-German identity

In the scholarly literature, there has thus been no room for more abstract values such as basic human values, although these might be able to explain national identification in East Germany. To explore how basic human values are linked to East German national identity and an all-German national identity, we should look at the basic human values these two identities represent. This can partially be derived from the way East and West Germans still differ on the basic human values they uphold, as researched by Davidov and Siegers (2008), and partly be deducted from the societal constitution of former East and West Germany.

! Davidov and Siegers expected differences in human values because the social and political constitution of the two Germanys provided different opportunity structures to individual behaviour and set the framework for socialisation of basic human values (Meulemann 2002:14; Davidov & Siegers 2008:50). The two authors found, 18 years after German reunification, significant differences between East and West Germans on some higher order values. East Germans attach more to conservation values such as tradition, conformity and security (Davidov & Siegers 2008:58,59). This highlights that the GDR provided and thus represented overwhelming security against both economic problems and criminality (Kubicek 2009). The GDR embodied security values at its very core and socialised its citizens accordingly (Meulemann 2002; Hanhardt 1975). The post-reunification economic insecurity might have strengthened these values among East Germans. Furthermore, as Davidov & Siegers point out, social change was “regarded with suspicion” and acting opposed to the regime was not permitted and not tolerated. Thus the GDR represented tradition and conformity (Davidov & Siegers 2008:52). The fact that these values are still different between East and West Germans 18 years after reunification, suggest that these values are still disseminated widely in East German society, possibly also among young people who have not been actively socialised by the GDR.

! The national identities also represent other differences in values. West German society was highly pluralistic, individualistic and encouraged direction and self-actualisation (Meulemann 2002:14, Davidov & Siegers 2008:49). Therefore the all-German national identity, being the direct successor of West German identity, represents openness to change values, in which these pluralistic and individualistic characteristics are central. Moreover, the pursuit of individual success and prestige was also encouraged in West German society (Meulemann 2002). The all-German identity accordingly represents

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self-enhancement values. Furthermore, the East German society was highly collectivist, expecting individuals to conform to (socialist) norms and standards and constraining individual freedom to pursue happiness and individual values. The GDR thus represented transcendence values such as universalism and benevolence, while also defying self-enhancement values as these emphasise the individualistic pursuit of self-interest, power and dominance over others, directly opposed to the central GDR goal of the egalitarian classless society.

! In short, the GDR represented self-transcendence and conservation values, whereas former West Germany represented self-enhancement and openness to change values. We have seen that these two former national identities form fundamental parts of their successor national identity. Thus the all-German national identity represents self-enhancement and openness to change values. Contemporary East German identity represents self-transcendence and conservation values and rejects self-enhancement and openness to change values. The self-transcendence values are inherited from the GDR identity and the conservation values stem from the GDR but have been strengthened by the social deprivation in the post-reunification era and are thus probably a strong component of contemporary East German identity.

2.4 Hypotheses

Based on these findings, I have four expectations regarding the link of basic human values and national identification in East Germany.

! First, I expect that East Germans with conservation and self-transcendence values are more likely to attach to the contemporary East German national identity. Identification with East Germany can fulfil the uncertainty reduction function of national identification as theorised by Roccas et al. Furthermore, the East German identity also represents nostalgia to a long and secure past and traditions. Therefore, people upholding conservation values should be more likely to identify with East Germany. Self-transcendence values are also a central part of contemporary East German national identity. Moreover, past research showed a strong link between socialist attitudes, which are concrete political outings of transcendence values, and East German identification. This leads me to expect that the self-transcendence values will also drive East German identification.

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! Second, on the other hand, East Germans upholding openness to change and self-enhancement values are less likely to attach to East Germany, since these are defied by contemporary East German national identity.

! Third, I expect that East Germans upholding openness to change and self-enhancement values are more likely to identify with the all-German national identity, since these values are embodied by the all-German national identity. The new FRG also represents change for East Germans, furthermore enhancing its attractiveness to people upholding openness to change values. Moreover, the new FRG regime also offers more opportunities for pursuing personal interests than the old East German regime did, making it more likely that East Germans pursuing self-enhancement values attach to the all-German identity.

Fourth, I don’t expect a relationship between conservation values, self-transcendence and the all-German identity. Although the all-German identity makes the attainment of goals of the opposing values possible, it doesn’t make the attainment of self-transcendence and conservation goals impossible. The all-German identity does not represent nor defy the core goals encompassed in these values. Identification with Germany is therefore expected to have no significant relation on these values.

! Since these have been found to have an influence on East German identification in previous research, I will control for age, educational status, attitudes towards socialism, income, gender and subjective post-reunification change in personal situation. I expect these to have some influence on the dependent variables, but no spurious relationship.

! These hypotheses theoretically seem interesting. If they are confirmed, it will mean that national identification shows different patterns in East Germany than the patterns found by Roccas et al. in Israel, Russia and the US. Furthermore, we will discover which human values the national identities represent among East Germans.

3. Data and methods

3.1 Data

In order to answer the research questions, the hypotheses will be tested using the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 3, collected in 2006. This is the most recent survey that collected data on both national identity and Schwartz value variables in East Germany. To reduce statistical noise, the West German respondents and West German respondents that migrated to East Germany were filtered out.

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3.2 Dependent variables

Unfortunately, the survey only provides questions to measure one side of our conceptualisation of East German identity: the question regarding East German identification asks about closeness to the GDR. To measure East German national identification, I will use a recoded version of the ordinal variable “clesbefde”. This variable measures the closeness of the respondent to the former GDR by asking “Do you feel strongly, pretty much, a little or not at all emotionally attached to the former GDR?” with four answer options ranging from “strongly attached” (1) to “not at all” (4) (European Social Survey 2006:92, own translation, LB). I recoded this variable so that the answer options are more intuitive; higher values now mean higher attachment to the former GDR. The ordinal variable “clesgerde” measures the attachment to the whole of Germany by asking the follow-up question “And how is this with Germany as a whole?” again with the answers ranging from “strongly attached” (1) to “not at all” (4) (ibid.). This variable has been recoded for easier intuitive use as well. Both variables are measured on an ordinal level. I will return to the limitations of this operationalisation in the discussion section of this paper

3.3 Independent variables

The ESS includes 21 variables measuring the Schwartz Value inventory. According to Davidov et al, the ESS human values scale “captures the motivational circle on which it is based” (Davidov et al. 2008:440). However, not all 10 values were measured correctly in the ESS, as they found only 7 distinguishable values. These were: security, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and combined tradition/conformity, universalism/benevolence, and power/achievement values. I combined these values into four higher order value scales as displayed in Table 1 (see Appendix). Before constructing these scales, I reversed the variables so that they are more intuitive and I centred them to correct for differences in individual scale use, as recommended by Schwartz (ESS website). The reliability tests when constructing the higher-order value scales showed rather low alphas, as can be seen in Table 1 in the appendix, but according to Schwartz this is reasonable: “Considering the small number of items used to measure each of the ten values and their necessary heterogeneity, even reliabilities of 0.4 are reasonable.” (ESS EduNet).

3.4 Control variables: socio-economic variables

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variables to make sure there is no spurious relationship at play. These socio-economic variables are education, employment status, family income, age, attitudes towards socialism and perceived post-reunification change in personal situation. Education is being measured by the ordinal variable “edlvade” asking the respondents their highest completed level of education, with 7 answer values, ranging from “no school” to “PhD”. Employment status is measured by the dichotomous variable “pdwrkcr” that measures if the respondent is currently in paid work of any kind. I reversed that variable to provide clarity. Net household income is measured with variable “hincntn”. This ordinal variable uses a scale to determine the net income of the household (ESS 2006:65). Age is being measured with the variable “age” which computes the age of the respondent by looking at birth year and subtracting that from the date the respondent was interviewed. Attitudes towards socialism are being measured by asking respondents “Socialism was a good idea, it was only badly realized” with answer options ranging from (1) fully agree to (5) fully disagree. I recoded the answer scale so that 5 means ‘fully agree’ and 1 means ‘fully disagree’. Finally, the perceived post-reunification change in personal situation is measured by asking “When you, all in all, would compare your current personal situation with your personal situation before the reunification of 1990, would you say that you are currently better off, that there is no difference, or that your situation has gotten worse?” with 3 answer options, recoded so that 1 indicates that the person is worse off, 3 that the person is better off and 2 indicates that the respondent perceived no difference. This variable will be called “better off after reunification” in the results.

3.5 Methods of analysis

Two statistical methods will be used in the analysis. First, linear multiple regression will be used. This method of analysis makes it possible to test our hypotheses by establishing whether there are correlations between our dependent and independent variables. Moreover, it gives us the opportunity to compare the strengths of various correlations with each other and gives us an insight in the explained variation. Second, I will be testing the hypotheses with logistic regression. Our dependent variables only have four answer values. This is somewhat lower than usually permitted for linear regression. Using linear regression for these kind of variables is not uncommon, but to obtain higher validity and reliability, I will nevertheless triangulate the findings of the linear regression with

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logistic regression. For this purpose, the dependent variables have been recoded into dichotomous variables.

The hypotheses will be tested using four models per hypothesis. In the first model, the respective two human values under scrutiny will be the only independent variable. Thereafter, every model will contain another battery of control variables that have been shown to have an effect on East German identification (see section on past explanations of East German identification). This way, we can detect spurious or mediating relations and see more easily the variance that every control variable has to contribute. In Table 2, a schematic overview of the models is displayed.

For each hypothesis, the results of the linear regression will be presented. The results of the logistic regression are displayed in the appendix. They will only be shortly discussed in the text.

4. Results and analysis

4.1 Contemporary East German identification

Tables 3 and 4 show some surprising results. We expected conservation and self-transcendence values to have a significant positive relation with East German identification, and openness to change and self-enhancement values to have a significant negative relation. The results provide no evidence for these expectations. A few things stand out from the regression results.

First, as we can see in the first model of table 3, conservation values had a significant effect on attachment to the GDR as we expected. Contrary to my expectation, the other basic human values showed no correlation whatsoever. When controlling for age and gender, it

Table 2: Set-up of the models to be tested: Dependent variable: either All-German attachment or GDR attachment

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

A: Human values under scrutiny (conservation values + self-transcendence values or openness to change + self-enhancement values)

X X X X

B: Control variables 1: Age + Gender

B: Control variables 1: Age + Gender X X X

C: Control variables 2: Attitudes towards socialism

X X

D: Control variables 3: Socio-economic variables (household income, employment status, post-reunification change of personal situation, level of education)

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becomes clear that a spurious relationship is at play. Gender has, contrary to previous research findings (Neller 2006a:155), no influence, but age seems to minimise the effect of conservation values on East German identification. This is interesting, since Davidov and Siegers findings suggested that young East Germans attribute importance to conservation values as well. Our findings nevertheless suggest that younger and older people differ markedly on conservation values. This is probably due to the fact that young people have not been the subject of GDR socialisation. As we see, however, the explained variability, as indicated by R-squared, increased only slightly when adding age in both the second model in table 3 and 4 by a mere 0.04.

A second, more important effect that stands out is the role of attitudes towards socialism. When adding this variable the explained variability of the models increased; in both model 3 of table 3 and 4 with approximately 0.16 points, or 16.7 percent variability. Attitudes towards socialism are thus an important explanation of East German

Table 3: The effect of conservation and self-transcendence values on closeness to the former GDR

Conservation values 0.110** (0,049) 0.032(0.054) 0.034(0.064) 0.032(0.048) Self-transcendence values -0.016 (0.064) -0.037(0.064) -0.021(0.058) -0.020(0.056) Age - 0.173*** (0.002) 0.081*(0.002) 0.133*(0.002) Gender - 0.075 (0,066) 0.046(0.060) 0.058(0.058)

Socialism good idea, badly realized - - 0.419***

(0.031) 0.339***(0.032)

Level of education - - - 0.088*

(0.018)

Better off after reunification - - - -0.284***

(0.039) Household income - - - 0.044 (0.018) Employment status - - - 0.087* (0.069) Constant 2.670*** (0.057) 2.028***(0.154) 0.925***(0.168) 1.086***(0.249) N 680 680 680 680 R-square 0.012 0.042 0.209 0.267

Remarks: Displayed are standardised coefficients. Standard error displayed between the brackets *Significant for p<0.05. ** significant for p<0.01 en *** significant for p<0.001.

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identification. Moreover, these have a far greater influence than age on the identification with East Germany; the standardised beta is four to five times higher in both models and the age variable loses some significance. Theoretically seen, it is surprising that political attitudes have an effect when human values do not. Human values shape political attitudes and not the other way around. The relationship therefore should have been the other way around; human values influencing both identification and political attitudes. On the other hand, this finding confirms previous research that showed that socialist attitudes do play an important role in explaining East German national identification.

Finally interesting is the fact that not income, but the subjective feeling of being better off after reunification has a significant negative effect on East German national identification. This shows that it is not real objective circumstances that matter most, but nostalgic feelings that ‘in the past everything was better’. This even has a bigger effect than age. The other significant effects, level of education and employment status, confirm previous findings and our expectations. In both table 3 and 4, not much explained variability was added when we controlled for the socio-economic variables. This shows that the most

Table 4: The effect of openness to change and self-enhancement values on closeness to the former GDR

Openness to Change -0.051 (0,055) 0.007(0.057) -0.039(0.052) -0.033(0.050) Self-enhancement -0.060 (0.046) -0.007(0.047) 0.036(0.043) 0.030(0.042) Age - 0.184*** (0.002) 0.091*(0.002) 0.140**(0.002) Gender - 0.070 (0,066) 0.044(0.060) 0.055(0.058)

Socialism good idea, badly realized - - 0.427***

(0.032) 0.345***(0.032)

Level of education - - - 0.085*

(0.018)

Better off after reunification - - - -0.284***

(0.039) Household income - - - 0.039 (0.018) Employment status - - - 0.084* (0.069) Constant 2.595*** (0.047) 1.961***(0.147) 0.874***(0.161) 1.073***(0.248) N 680 680 680 680 R-square 0.007 0.04 0.210 0.277

Remarks: Displayed are standardized coefficients. Standard error displayed between the brackets *Significant for p<0.05. ** significant for p<0.01 en *** significant for p<0.001.

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important explaining variable of East German identification is attitude towards socialism, both in strength and added explained variability.

! The logistic regressions show almost the same pattern and results as the linear regressions. The goodness-of-fit jumped in comparable ways when adding socialism as in the linear models, increasing the pseudo-R measure of Nagelkerke’s R-squared with approximately 0.16 in both models. The effects of socialism are also the strongest in the logistic model (odds-ratio in the fourth model is as high as 2.08 and 2.14). There are however two important differences between the logistic and the linear models. First, employment status didn’t show significance in any logistic model. Therefore, we should be cautious when interpreting the exact influence of this variable on East German national identification. Moreover, when testing for the effect of openness to change and self-enhancement models, the openness to change values showed a significant effect in model 1, with p<0.05, then turning insignificant in the second model, before dipping into significance again in model 3 and 4. This might point to a suppression effect. The p-value however was rather high (0.044 and 0.048 respectively). Triangulated with the linear regression, we should therefore not attach to high of an importance to these findings. All other variables reflected the patterns found in the linear regression.

In conclusion, my first two hypotheses have been rejected by the data. Basic human values showed to have no effect on the feeling of closeness with the GDR and thus with East German identification. Moreover, explanations that have been found in previous research, such as socialist attitudes, age and socio-economic variables, have been confirmed. There are several possible speculations as to why we found these results. First, perhaps the East German identity does not make the attainment of the motivational goals these values encompass possible, when speaking of conservation and self-transcendence values, or impossible, when speaking of openness to change and self-enhancement values. In other words, the East German identity cannot facilitate the pursuit of these values. Second, East German identity might emphasise concrete socialist attitudes more than the abstract basic human values that underlie these attitudes. Therefore, no correlation has been found. Third, the rejection of our hypotheses might have to do with shortcomings in the operationalisation of the dependent variable. I will return to this in the discussion section of this article. Fourth, the findings regarding the control variables confirm past research on this topic and serve therefore as an extra support for previous research. Finally, it is possible that human values do not drive group identification in East Germany, contrary to the theoretical expectations

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and findings of previous research in other countries. To uncover if basic human values do relate at all to national identification in East Germany, let me now turn to testing the expectations regarding identification with Germany as a whole as formulated in my third and fourth hypothesis

4.2 All-German identification

Regarding the identification of East Germans with Germany as a whole, we expected that openness to change and self-enhancement values would lead to higher all-German identification, while self-transcendence and conservation values would show no relation with all-German identification. When looking at the results presented in table 5 and 6, quite a few interesting things stand out.

First, contrary to our expectations, openness to change showed no relation with all-German identification. On the other hand, self-enhancement values did show to influence all-German identification, although in the non-expected, negative direction. This suggests

Table 5: The effect of openness to change and self-enhancement values on closeness to the FRG

Openness to Change -0.013 (0.046) -0.028(0.048) -0.07(0.047) -0.012(0.045) Self-enhancement -0.099* (0.038) -0.112**(0.040) -0.132**(0.040) -0.145***(0.038) Age - 0.040 (0.002) 0.001(0.002) 0.022(0.002) Gender - -0.036 (0,055) -0.022(0.055) 0.017(0.052)

Socialism good idea, badly realized - - -0.195***

(0.029) -0.095***(0.029)

Level of education - - - 0.019

(0.016)

Better off after reunification - - - 0.288***

(0.036) Household income - - - 0.058 (0.016) Employment status - - - 0.018 (0.062) Constant 2.590*** (0.039) 2.748***(0.124) 3.162***(0.147) 2.079***(0.224) N 680 680 680 680 R-square 0.010 0.013 0.048 0.141

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that the identification with the all-German identity does not provide the opportunity to achieve self-enhancement goals such as the pursuit of personal success, power and status among East Germans. On the contrary, identification with the all-German identity might make the achievements of these goals harder to such an extent, that East Germans pursuing these goals are less likely to identify with the all-German identity.

! Secondly, the other values don’t have any significant relation with the dependent variable. Self-transcendence shows a significant relation in model 2. The explanation for this is possible suppressor effects from adding gender and age. This has not been confirmed by the logistic regression and theoretically does not make any sense. Therefore, we can safely assume that our fourth and final hypothesis, stating that conservation and self-transcendence values show no significant relation with all-German identification has been confirmed.

Finally, the control variables show some interesting differences and similarities with the grounds for identification for East Germany. Contrary to identification with East

Table 6: The effect of conservation and self-transcendence values on closeness to the FRG Table 6: The effect of conservation and self-transcendence values on closeness to the FRG Table 6: The effect of conservation and self-transcendence values on closeness to the FRG Table 6: The effect of conservation and self-transcendence values on closeness to the FRG Table 6: The effect of conservation and self-transcendence values on closeness to the FRG

Conservation values 0.036 (0.041) 0.050(0.046) 0.049(0.045) 0.078(0.044) Self-transcendence values 0.075 (0.053) 0.082*(0.054) 0.075(0.053) 0.061(0.051) Age - -0.027 (0.002) 0.011(0.002) 0.019(0.002) Gender - -0.038 (0,055) -0.025(0.055) -0.018(0.053) Socialism good idea, badly realized - - -0.180***

(0.029) -0.079*(0.029)

Level of education - - - 0.019

(0.016)

Better off after reunification - - - 0.292***

(0.036) Household income - - - 0.047 (0.016) Employment status - - - 0.008 (0.062) Constant 2.585*** (0.048) 2.722***(0.130) 3.118***(0.154) 2.107***(0.227) N 680 680 680 680 R-square 0.007 0.009 0.040 0.131

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Germany, age and level of education do not seem to have any relation with identification with Germany as a whole. Socialist attitudes does seem to have a negative effect on German identification, suggesting that for people upholding socialist attitudes there is a trade-off between East German and all-German identification. In other words, socialist East Germans feel more attached to East Germany, and less to Germany as a whole. The effect of being better off after reunification however is greater, as we see indicated by the increased R-square and the standardised coefficient being almost five times bigger than the socialist attitude coefficient. East Germans thinking they are better off after reunification feel closer to Germany as a whole. These East Germans feel that they benefited from the regime change and attach positive feelings to the new regime of the Federal Republic, and thus feel attached to the all-German identity.

! The logistic regressions shows that self-enhancement is not significant in the first two models, mirroring the increase of significance of this variable through the four models in the linear regression. This suggests that there is some correlation between self-enhancement and the control variables in model 3 and 4, although this does not seem to be likely from a theoretical perspective. This points to a rather complex relation that needs to be clarified by further research. By and large however, the logistic regressions show the same patterns of relations among the independent and dependent variables. The goodness-of-fit-indicators of the logistic regression reflect the goodness-of-fit indicators as expressed by the R-squared in table 5 and 6.

In short, only one of my final two hypotheses has been confirmed: there was indeed no relation found between self-transcendence, conservation values and all-German identification. The relation between self-enhancement and all-German identification was the only significant relation between human values and all-German identification. However, the relation was not in the expected direction: people pursuing self-enhancement goals like social prestige and power are less likely to identify with Germany as whole, suggesting that identifying with Germany as a whole makes the attainment of these goals harder. This effect is nevertheless rather small when compared to the effect that the perceived improvement of post-reunification personal situation had on the attachment to Germany. Moreover, socialist East Germans are less likely to identify with Germany as a whole and for them identification with Germany as a whole appears to be opposed to identification with East Germany.

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4.3 Concluding remarks after analysing all four hypotheses

To summarise the results, three out of for hypotheses were rejected. Self-enhancement is the only basic human value to have any effect on national identification, whether East German or all-German, among East Germans. The effect of self-enhancement was however in the non-expected direction as it had a negative influence on all-German identification. Socialist attitudes and the feeling of being better off after reunification played the most important role in explaining both German and East German identification. Moreover, age has proven to be a very important explanation of East German identification. Finally, the results provide evidence for both the situational hypothesis stressing socio-economic explanations and the socialisation hypothesis emphasising the role of GDR socialised values on East German identification. Of course, these results might have been influenced by limitations in the operationalisation. I will return to that in the discussion section, but first I will make some final conclusions.

5. Conclusion & Discussion

In this article, I have tried to answer the question “Why does a considerable amount of former East Germans feel attached to an East German identity?”. Since basic human values had not been examined as an explanatory factor for national identification in East Germany before and they shed light on why individuals identify with the nation instead of who identifies with the nation, they provided for a possible explanation. The underlying descriptive questions were how these basic human values relate to East German and all-German identification, both independently and in relation to past explanations of East German identification.

To answer these questions, I used the basic human values approach in explaining national identification, studied by Roccas’ who emphasised that the link between national identification and human values is context dependent. I used a conceptualisation of East German identity consisting of two components, one emphasising GDR nostalgia, while the other stresses East German Abgrenzungsidentität formed by the post-reunification social and economic deprivation of East Germany. It was expected that East Germans attributing high importance to self-transcendence and conservation values were likely to identify with East Germany, while those pursuing self-enhancement and openness to change goals were expected to identify less with East Germany. On the other hand, East Germans upholding self-enhancement and openness to change values were expected to identify with the

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all-German identity, while self-transcendence and conservation values were expected not to influence all-German identification. These hypotheses were tested with various regression models, both linear and logistic, using data from the ESS Round 3 and controlling for variables proven to have an effect on national identification in East Germany in previous research. The fourth hypothesis was the only hypothesis to be confirmed, all other hypotheses were rejected by both the logistic and the linear regression analyses.

Answering the descriptive questions, I can say that the basic human values East Germans uphold have almost no effect on the way they identify themselves with either the East German identity or the all-German identity. Only people upholding self-enhancement values tend to identify less with the all-German identity. No other links were found. The East German identity and the all-German identity thus do not facilitate the pursuit of any motivational goals encompassed by basic human values. Socialist attitudes, age and the extent to which an East German is now better off after reunification are the most important determinants of both all-German and East German identification. Old socialist East Germans, who feel deprived by the reunification, tend to identify him or herself with East Germany. East Germans who feel that their personal situation became better after reunification feel more attached to Germany as a whole, while socialist East Germans tend to identify less with the all-German identity. These findings support some previous research on the topic of East German identification (Neller 2006a).

To answer the main question, there are several reasons why East Germans attach to the East German identity. This research shows that age, education, change in personal situation since the reunification and socialist attitudes are the most important factors explaining contemporary East German identification. Basic human values are not able to explain why East Germans identify themselves with East Germany.

These findings both contradict and support earlier arguments in the theoretical literature linking basic human values with national identification. They are in line with Roccas’ argument that basic human values do not have the same relationship with national identification across different contexts (Roccas et al. 2010:413). Contradicting arguments in the literature, national identification in East Germany is not able to provide certainty and stability. Finally, the relations between basic human values and national identification in Germany show different patterns compared to relations found in Israel, Russia, Australia and the US.