A fear of outsiders? : a threat perception of Syrian refugees within minority groups

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Master thesis in

International Relations

A Fear of Outsiders?

A Threat Perception of Syrian Refugees

within Minority Groups

Author: Maarten Holla (10273581) Supervisor: dr. Jeroen Doomernik June 2016 The Politics of International Migration and Asylum

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Abstract

This study examines the threat perception within the Amsterdam LGBT and Jewish community towards Syrian refugees, through the lens of the ‘established and outsiders theory’ as developed by Norbert Elias and John Scotson. It is shown that this perception is relatively small in comparison to the concerns regarding the Dutch Muslim community and the long-term development of Islam in the Netherlands. There are strong differences in this anxiety between the LGBT community and the Jewish community. By applying the established and outsiders theory to this specific case, it becomes clear that the situation is more complex and different factors are in play. Therefore, this sociological theory is not fully satisfying in explaining the relationships between the three groups.

Keywords: threat perception, Jewish community, established, Syrian refugees, outsiders, LGBT community, Muslims

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“The refugee center looks beautiful. But I’m still afraid.”

“How can I take away your anxiety?”

“Actually, you cannot.”

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1_{A conversation between an Amstelveen police officer and an old Jewish man at the opening of the refugee}

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8.3.1. Trustworthiness ... 52 8.3.1.1. Credibility ... 52 8.3.1.2. Transferability ... 52 8.3.1.3. Dependability ... 53 8.3.1.4. Confirmability ... 53 8.3.2. Authenticity ... 54 8.3.2.1. Fairness ... 54 8.3.2.2. Ontological authenticity ... 54 8.3.2.3. Educative authenticity ... 54 8.3.2.4. Catalytic authenticity ... 55 8.3.2.5. Tactical authenticity ... 55

8.4. The Established and Outsiders Theory Revised ... 55

9. References ... 57

9.1. Published sources ... 57

9.1.1 Printed ... 57

9.1.2. Government Publications ... 58

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9.2. Unpublished Sources ... 61

9.2.1. Articles Online ... 61

9.2.2. Online Webpages ... 61

Appendix 1. Interview Transcriptions ... 64

Interview 1. Madelon Bino ... 64

Interview 2. Marc Grünfeld ... 70

Interview 3. Fred Kuiper and Ruud Looman ... 75

Interview 4. Thijs Velthorst ... 84

Interview 5. Esther Voet ... 87

Interview 6. Marcel de Weerd ... 93

Interview 7. Jessica van Zadelhoff ... 99

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1. Introduction

In October 2015, the Amsterdam news institute AT5 published an article that was entitled ‘Syrian refugees are brainwashed to hate Jews’ (website nu.nl, 2016). The article was about the concern of the Jewish community in Amstelveen, a suburban part of the metropolitan area of Amsterdam, towards a refugee center in their neighborhood. The municipality is known for its relatively large Jewish population in comparison to other areas. The Chairman of the Central Jewish Council (Centraal Joods Overleg, CJO), Ron van der Wieken, expressed his fear of incidents:

“In general, the Jewish community supports the admission of refugees. But there are great worries. These people come from countries like Syria and Iraq, who usually adopt a hard tone towards Jews. These people are brainwashed to hate Jews. We cannot underestimate

this threat.” (website AT5, 2015)

In March 2016, the Mayor of Amstelveen, Mirjam van ‘t Veld, received an anonymous letter in which her life was being threatened. According to the Mayor, the letter “had something to do with the refugee center” (Parool, 2016). The Dutch media highlighted the concerns of the Jewish community. However, it turned out that the spokespersons of the community had difficulties to articulate where their fear came from. In an interview with rabbi Yanki Jacobs, anchor man Jeroen Pauw2_{simply asked the question: what are you afraid of?}

According to Jacobs, the security of the Jewish people could no longer be fully protected (Jacobs, 2015). The Central Jewish Council also pointed out that Jewish institutions are kept under close surveillance since the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid), the organization that protects the Netherlands from threats that could disrupt Dutch society, assumed an increased risk of terrorist attacks on Jewish institutions. This threat comes from individuals and organizations from the same countries refugees are fleeing from.

2_{Jeroen Pauw is a Dutch journalist and producer. Since September 2014, he is the anchor man of ‘Pauw’, his}

own talk show. On 15 October 2015, rabbi Jacobs was interviewed about the influx of refugees and the anxiety within the Amsterdam Jewish community.

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During the same period, the media had published several articles about LGBT3_{refugees in}

Dutch refugee centers (website nu.nl, 2015; Volkskrant, 2016). In Amsterdam, these refugees are accommodated in isolated centers since the threat and the number of incidents has increased. This mainly concerns young men from Syria, Iraq and Iran. They are now under the supervision of ‘Safe Haven’ (Veilige Haven), an organization that guides gay people with a multicultural background. The Dutch LGBT interest group COC sent a letter to the Dutch State Secretary for Security and Justice in October to report the abuse and threat of gay refugees within refugee centers. According to the interest group, many LGBT refugees are scared to file a complaint. As the media have focused on the anxiety within refugee centers, not much has been written on the possibility of threat towards the Dutch LGBT community.

These reports raised some questions. If it is the case that the Jewish community and the LGBT community are concerned with the influx of Syrian refugees in Amsterdam, what are the main motives for these concerns? What do they actually fear? How can their fears be explained? Are they scared of people with another religion, ethnicity and background in general? Are they scared of Islam? Do they feel their own position is threatened? These questions led to my first and main research question:

Do the Jewish community and the LGBT community in Amsterdam feel threatened by the admission of Syrian refugees?

As my question shows, I will focus my study on the Amsterdam case. In the methodology part I will explain this decision. I think the question above is a relevant one for several reasons. First of all, my thesis focuses on a very urgent topic. While writing it, the migrant crisis is taking place and shaking transnational, national and local politics. It is important to find out what the effect of this influx is on minority groups that are established in a receiving country. If it turns out that there is a great concern within these minority groups, policy makers might take these anxieties into account when deciding where to host refugees and how to inform established minorities. As I will show in my research, dialogue and taking

3_{The term LGBT is used to refer to Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders. Throughout my thesis I will}

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away preconception is a very important task of national and local politics when it comes to the threat perception.

Besides, my research could be important to the academic work on migration. Up until now, most research on migration and the effect on a receiving society, has focused on the tension between minority migrant groups (the refugees) and a homogeneous receiving society (e.g.: “the Dutch”). My thesis, on the other hand, focuses on the tension between two minorities. We see a minority of Syrian refugees on the one hand and the possible threat perception within two established minority groups in a society on the other hand. This adds an interesting aspect to the question of ‘established’ versus ‘outsiders’. I did not invent those two concepts myself. In order to answer my question, I will base my research on a widely supported theory by Norbert Elias and John Scotson. In the conceptual framework chapter I will focus on migrant theories in general and on their ‘established and outsiders theory’ in particular. How does their theory explain the tension between Syrian refugees on the one hand and the Jewish and LGBT community in Amsterdam on the other? This theoretical approach adds a second question to my research:

How does the established and outsiders theory explain the threat perception within the Jewish community and the LGBT community in Amsterdam?

It is interesting to see whether this general theory could be applied to my specific case. To sum up, this study examines the relationship between Jewish and LGBT nationals on the one hand and Syrian refugees on the other, through a case study of Amsterdam. In order to achieve a deeper understanding of this relationship, I will try to understand the tensions between the groups in the perspective of the established and outsiders theory as an analytical framework. My research will, by using interviews and observations, portray the threat as perceived by the two national minority groups. Additionally, I will try to identify potential chances for the improvement of their relationships and local policies.

The next chapter, Conceptual Framework, begins with an overview of literature on migration, which provides a brief review of the existing literature that is related to my topic and outlines some analytical frameworks that have been used. The chapter continues with describing the study of Elias and Scotson and their established and outsiders theory. Their

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concepts have been used as an analytical tool in order to answer my second research question.

In the third chapter I will start by giving an overview of the history of Syrian migration. After an outline of the current migration crisis, I will shed light on the Jewish and LGBT community in the Netherlands as well as in Syria.

In the fourth chapter, Methodology, I will explain the methodology and method I have used in this study. I will also go into more detail on which sources I have used. I will clarify my research design and case selection, as well as explain why my focus on Amsterdam is both practical and well considered.

The Analysis chapter, will be divided into two parts. The first part will describe the threat perception within the Jewish and LGBT community, in order to answer the first research question. In the second part, my findings are analyzed in relation to the established and outsiders theory as an analytical framework, in order to answer the second research question.

In the final part of my thesis, I will provide the reader with some recommendations for local policymaking and suggestions for further research on the topic. In the Conclusion chapter, I will summarize the main results of my work and finally I will reflect on my own work.

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2. Conceptual Framework

In this chapter I will provide an overview of theories on migration, internal and external ethnic identities and established and outsiders. The latter I will elaborate on in particular, since the established and outsiders theory, by Elias and Scotson, will be used as the theoretical basis of my research.

Migration is not a new phenomenon. The Roman Empire faced mass migration from the same countries people are fleeing from today. Juvenalis, a Roman poet and satirist, complained about the fact that Syrian migrants integrated rapidly and became fully assimilated. In the second century, several Syrians became senator and in the century after, the Empire was ruled by three Syrians. According to historian and archaeologist Leonard Rutgers, migration was a fact of life for the Romans. It is also the motor of history (Financieele Dagblad, 2015). Nonetheless, today many people tend to perceive migration as threatening. This is a relatively new tendency. The Roman Empire was a poly ethnic state where various ethnic groups were living together. This lasted until the Middle Ages. The vast plurality in Europe is the direct result of migration. It was only in the nineteenth century, when nation states arose, that people started to fear migration (Financieele Dagblad, 2015).

When people are forced to migrate, they need to establish new relationships with the people who have been living in a certain country before them. The new group has to get used to its new role and is forced to interact with groups that have their established traditions. They need to negotiate their position (Glick Schiller et al., 1995: 48). For a long time, migration has been understood as a one-way process which implies the settlement and integration of “the other” in the society of immigration. The outsider group loses one world and accepts the new one. According to Nina Glick Schiller, several generations of researchers have viewed immigrants as “persons who uproot themselves” (Glick Schiller et al., 1995: 48). They leave behind their home country and face the difficult process of integrating into a new society and culture. Migration has been equated with a loss of country, family and group relations. Migrants belong neither “here”, nor “there”. The Chicago School, and Stonequist in particular, already wrote about “unsuccessful assimilation” and “the marginal man”. In his view, the marginality of the outsider was a result

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of unclear group belonging (Stonequist, 1937). In the next section I will briefly elaborate on the question of group belonging, by discussing internal and external ethnic identities. According to Piore (1979), the maintaining of contacts with the country of origin threatens the integration process into the receiving society. As a result, migration studies are mainly concerned with the problems experienced by the receiving society. Migration has been described as a one-way ticket journey. However, the concept of migration covers various patterns.

Alfred Schütz has influenced much of the sociological work on migration and cultural patterns. Schütz’s migrant is described as someone who stops being the person he used to be before and who adopts the behavior of trying not to be identified as the undesirable other. He tries to fully assimilate into the new society, while still living according to the cultural patterns of the home group. The migrant is in a constant process of adjustment to the cultural pattern of the established group, until he internalizes them as normal. From that point on, he is no longer the outsider (Schütz, 1976).

2.1. Internal and External Ethnic Identities

The members of an ethnic or racial minority group share a social and cultural heritage. This heritage consists, among other things, of family structure, symbols, language and gender roles (Sodowsky and Carey, 1987). This tradition is passed on between different generations and provides individuals within the group with a sense of identification. The members of the group identify themselves as part of the group through a process of interacting with other members and establishing boundaries with outsiders (Smith, 1991: 181). According to Wsevolod Isajiw (1990: 35) ethnic identity is distinguished into internal and external ethnic identity. Someone locates himself in a certain community internally by a state of mind and a specific feeling, and externally by behavior that is appropriate to this state of mind.

The internal ethnic identity is divided into a cognitive, moral and affective dimension. The first dimension refers to someone’s self-image and the image of the group, knowledge of the heritage and knowledge of the group’s values. The moral dimension refers to the feelings of group obligations. Finally, the affective dimension refers to the feeling of attachment to the group (Isajiw, 1990: 36). Simply put, the internal aspect of ethnic identity consists of ethnic

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identification, positive and negative attitudes towards the group and a sense of belonging. The external aspects refer to cultural and social behavior. This is reflected in the areas of friendship, language, activities and traditions. This behavior is interesting when looking at the adaption of immigrants to the receiving society (Isajiw, 1990: 36).

2.2. Migration Theories

Almost twenty years ago, Douglas Massey claimed that there was no single coherent migration theory. He and his colleagues argued that theories of international migration needed to be reassessed, based on new empirical findings. In 1998, they stated that:

“The theoretical concepts now employed by social scientists to analyze and explain international migration were forged primarily in the industrial era and reflect its particular

economic arrangements, social institutions, technology, demography and politics. The classical approach has now entered a state of crisis, challenged by new ideas, concepts, and

hypotheses.” (Massey et al., 1998: 3)

Two decades later, research into global migration continues to increase. However, there is still no general theoretical framework for migration studies, Stephen Castles argues (2010: 1566). Migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained in one single theory (King, 2013: 11). Most migration theories can be classified by looking at the specific level they focus on (micro, meso or macro). The first category of theories focuses on individual migration decisions. Examples of theories on the micro level are neoclassical micro-migration theories and behavioral models. Macro-level theories focus on broader trends and aggregate migration, for example the ‘world systems theory’ and theories on mobility transition. Meso theories are somewhere in between micro and macro theories and focus for example on the community level. Good examples are institutional theories and network theories (Hagen-Zanker, 2008: 5).

For the purpose of my thesis, general migration theories are left aside. I will focus on current, new migration theories and the established and outsiders theory. Although, as Rutgers put it, migration is by no means a new phenomenon, this idea is broadly shared

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within certain parts of the scientific world. In the next paragraph I will elaborate on this tendency.

2.2.1 New Migration

In current literature on migration, the concept of ‘new migration’ increasingly appears. This new term suggests that there is something different about the current wave of migration in comparison to former migration. However, the groups that are referred to by using this concept are not homogeneous when it comes to motives of migration, home countries, the situation in these countries and their social, economic and religious background. To name such internally diverse groups ‘new’ without theoretical underpinning, implies oversimplification (Koser and Lutz, 1998).

Olga Petintseva has been studying young new immigrants and youth justice in Belgium. One of her main questions is how and whether or not their position of being so-called ‘new immigrants’ plays a role in the trajectory, in the process of judging and in problem definitions. According to Petintseva (2013), it is not important whether migration is a new phenomenon or not. It is more relevant to focus on changing attention and representations, inequality, the context of receiving countries and the position of migrants in these countries. Therefore, distinctions are necessary to monitor the positions of migrant groups and to foster discussions on discrimination (Petintseva, 2013).

In broader migration literature, you find terms like ‘new migration’ and other terms that refer to novelty or some sort of difference. But new migration is conceptualized in very different ways, so it has ambiguous meanings. Some people speak of new migration as being migration that takes place in the aftermath of a certain époque, for example after the collapse of the communist regimes (Koser and Lutz, 1998). Other people define new immigrants as people who are relatively new in the receiving country. For example, people who have been living in a country for less than ten years (Ryan et al., 2008). Other studies emphasize the role of the legal position of new immigrants (João Guia et al., 2013). And again others speak about different strategies of new migration, referring to groups that are smaller and more diverse, which makes them new or different. Also the importance of social

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networks and the presence of a community is important in migration literature (Petintseva, 2013).

Again other authors incorporate the position, construction and reaction side. So when you read about new migration, you broadly read concepts that refer to the position of new immigrants, for example how their position is constructed. Other authors emphasize the symbolic dimension of new migration by calling them cultural outsiders or social strangers. And a lot has been written on social capital, that emphasizes the role of communities and networks. Some scholars combine these different elements to define new immigration (Petintseva, 2013).

Petintseva criticizes these definitions by arguing that they are all empirical distinctions. They just take one characteristic and define a whole group of people based on this specific characteristic. For example, some studies put emphasis on the position of immigrants in youth justice in particular. Petintseva argues that the definition of ‘position’ is not fulfilling in answering how the position is significant and constructed. Therefore, she focuses on the question how to research ‘position’ without starting to see discrimination everywhere, but still paying attention to the subtle process as it takes place in the context of youth justice. Since decision makers have a lot of influence in this process, subtle changes are possible (Petintseva, 2013).

In order to speak about positions, one needs a theoretical framework that is based on different factors that can serve as a conceptual lens. Petintseva constructed a framework that was based on the same theory I will use in my study, written by Elias and Scotson (1965): ‘The Established and the Outsiders’. This framework enabled her to define the position of new immigrants and it provided a specific focus. Petintseva used the work of Elias and Scotson to formulate a theoretical framework to speak about positions and new migration. She used it as a tool to explain how relations develop over time. Many describe large groups of people as being new. But labeling a whole group of people based on one characteristic is an oversimplification and it does not allow space for dynamics of internal diversity (Petintseva, 2013). Since the second part of my study is based on the established and outsiders theory, I will elaborate on this theory in the next section.

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2.2.2. The Established and the Outsiders

In 'The Established and the Outsiders’ (1965), Elias and Scotson explained the differences in power and rank between two very similar groups, both working class, in a local British community in the early 1960s. They showed how one group monopolized its power sources and used them to exclude and stigmatize members of the other group, by identifying the role of gossip in the process. Elias and Scotson studied the differences in youth crime in the community. The initial intention was to study and explain the differences in misbehavior of groups of people living in three different neighborhoods. They assumed that these differences would be merely determined by their respective economic conditions.

Elias and Scotson studied a suburban area in a wealthy industrial city in central England. They called the city Winston Parva (Elias and Scotson, 1965: 1). The authors categorized the city into three different areas:

Zone 1: A middle class area

Zone 2: A working class area where most of the industries where established Zone 3: A new working class area

The second zone was the first area that was built in Winston Parva. The first zone was built in the 1930’s and 1940’s and host people who were wealthy enough to live there. Zone three was the last area that was built. Elias and Scotson noticed that an “us versus them” relationship was quickly realized between the first two zones and the new people in the third zone. However, they found the largest conflicts between the two groups that were similar in many respects, they were both working class areas (Elias and Scotson, 1965: 69). These conflicts went far beyond crime, security and economic issues. Therefore they decided to look into the broader relationship between the two groups to interpret their findings.

I will use the established and outsiders theory as the foundation of the second part of my study. In general, the theory focuses on community problems that are the result of uneven power distribution between two local groups. The main idea is that the cohesiveness of the established group is what determines their powerful position. The stronger the group

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cohesion, the more powerful it is. As a result, this group is able to gain a superior position within the community. I will use this framework in the second part of my analysis in order to understand the uneven power distribution between the Jewish and LGBT community and Syrian refugees. This might help to improve their relationships and local policies (Tollebrandt and Wrede, 2013: 3).

Demographic factors and cultural, ethnic or religious differences between the groups were insignificant. The one group was excluded from social control by the other group. This concerned material exclusions and exclusion by using gossip and group disgrace. The outsiders were stigmatized by extrapolating the worst characteristics of the minority to the entire group. According to Elias and Scotson, gossiping is one of the measures that is used by the established group to maintain their power. If this group fears its own standing to be endangered, “they immediately notice[d] much in the behavior of the newcomers that offend[ed] their sensibilities and appear[ed] to them as a mark of lower order” (1994: 149). Gossiping is used to confirm the respectability and the higher social status of the established, and to ratify the existing social order. ‘The outsiders are guilty until proved innocent’ (Bauman, 2008).

According to Elias and Scotson, the higher the threat perception within the established group, the more likely it is that their beliefs are driven towards the extremes of rigidity and illusion (Elias and Scotson, 1965: 95). The influx of refugees that the established are facing is a good case for feeling threatened. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it:

“The refugees bring home distant noises of war and the stench of gutted homes and scorched villages that cannot but remind the established how easily the cocoon of their safe

and familiar […] routine may be pierced or crushed.” (Bauman, 2008)

The outsiders, on the other hand, do not use gossip as much as the established. They rather use labels of “lower human value” and describe the established group as “envious”, “cold” and “jealous” (1994: xxi). In this way, they express disappointment with the manner in which the established group has received them in their country. The authors claimed that the only observable difference between the two groups was the duration of their stay in the community. The duration was significant in this particular context. The established group

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was characterized by strong internal cohesion, social networks and a shared background. The outsiders group was relatively new without significant social networks and powerful positions (1994: xxi). In answering my second research question, I will look into four central elements of the established and outsiders theory:

1. Internal cohesion; 2. Social networks;

3. Shared background and position; 4. Gossiping.

Elias and Scotson’s work is actually about how power is exercised in everyday interactions and group relations. This stress on power relations is a very interesting approach. The authors criticized the fact that characteristics as race and ethnicity are taken for granted as the outcome of power relations and not what determines peoples positions (Petintseva, 2013). This work has provided a focus on how important certain characteristics are in a certain context.

The case of the British community shows how power is reproduced and exercised in daily interactions between different groups and how the established group uses stigmatization to reassure their superiority and group charisma, in reacting to the threats to their monopoly by the outsider group (Loyal, 2011: 188). The essential differences between groups are the result of the imbalance in power and status relations, rather than a feature that is assigned a specific meaning, for example the duration of the stay in a community. Although material and economic inequalities are an important factor of these relations, they are not limited to these features. Power is relational and dynamic and is not reduced to material elements (Loyal, 2011: 188). Elias and Scotson already argued that macro-economic factors are not the single forces that shape social figurations, interdependence and group cohesion (Elias and Scotson, 1965: xxxii). With figurations they refers to so-called ‘figurational sociology’ that studies the position of one group in relation to other groups. These positions are not entirely determined by objective motives like economic positions (Coakley and Dunning, 2000: 92).

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Symbolic factors and status also play an important role, especially when power balances are more even. Positioning and discriminatory practices do not only occur in particular societal contexts. Elias and Scotson strongly criticized the objectivation of some aspects of relations that are characterized by inequalities (Loyal, 2011). For example arbitrarily referring to characteristics as race, religion and origin. According to the authors, these are the outcome of an unequal power balance instead of what determines peoples relations and positions. Therefore, it is important to research why and how certain characteristics become weighty throughout social dynamics. The nature and distribution of power resources vary in different settings. Nonetheless, the mechanisms of figurations that are characterized by unequal power distribution are comparable overall and determined by the way societies and the people who live in these societies are cohesively developed and organized (Loyal, 2011: 198).

The outsider group does not have the essential social networks and therefore the members of this group cannot count on tolerance and informal social control. As a result, this group is often perceived as threatening by the established group. The latter has access to power resources from which the former group is excluded. The established can mobilize these resources to keep the outsiders in place in order to reassure their own position (Petintseva, 2013).

More traditional approaches that rely on an abstract notion of “othering” are, according to Steven Loyal (2011: 186), ‘limited in their scope for explaining the diverse and differentiated causes underpinning the concrete social contexts within which ethno racial forms of discrimination are expressed’. Othering describes the process of ‘denying equal legitimacy to individuals and cultures that do not conform to one’s own arbitrary, ever shifting criteria of normality – it is a two-sided coin. On the one hand it creates a clearly defined undifferentiated “them”. On the other, it forges a bond of solidarity’ (Ní Shuinear, 2002: 177).

Elias and Scotson provided a more useful sociological framework. Although the established and outsiders theory is a very broad one to the extent that it explains how the outsider group is constructed in terms of gender, ethnic and racial differences, there are important differences with more traditional approached to othering. The approach of Elias and Scotson

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departs from the idea that people are motivated by social and economic forces (Loyal, 2011: 135).

According to Elias and Scotson, a certain shift in power ratios could result in a loss of dominance by a particular group. The long term conflict of struggles between different levels of power results in material and socio psychological dynamics. Over the last decades, this idea has proven to be very relevant when it is applied to the effects of mass migration. The configuration of social relationships explains the relationship of domination of one group over the other (Loyal, 2011: 139). To simply put emphasis on characteristics like religion, race or ethnicity would draw the attention away from deeper causal factors that explain the process of domination and discrimination: the difference in power between groups.

2.3. Summary

The power balance is one of the central concept in established-outsider theory. Conflict is more likely when both the established and the outsiders are striving for control of the same power sources. The two central power sources in the established and outsiders figurations are group cohesion and key positions in institutions (Hogenstijn et al., 2008: 145). Besides I will look at the internal cohesion, social networks, shared background and gossiping when applying the theory to my case.

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3. Background

3.1. Syria: A History of Movement

Before the current violence in the Middle East and North Africa, Syria was already facing serious problems concerning income inequality, unemployment and the suppression of minorities and opposition groups. The average GDP per capita has been about a tenth of the average GDP in most the European Union countries (Yazgan et al., 2015: 183). Even without the violent upheavals today, there were adequate reasons for many Syrian people to flee their home country. The violence is possibly providing a window of opportunity to facilitate the migration process, but it is not the single motive (Yazgan et al., 2015: 183).

Syrian migration is by no means a new phenomenon. However, there is a difference with the past. The volume of the current migration is much larger and the transnational effect of Syrian refugees today is particularly high. The number of people who left Syria before 1922 was around 500.000, while this number increased up to more than four million by 2007. The number of refugees today already reached half of these numbers combined (Yazgan et al., 2015: 185).

The political environment of Syria has long motivated Syrians to move to other countries as they felt political oppression and insecurity. Syria has been an unstable country. It has experienced various military coups since its foundation in 1946. The country has experienced more than twenty military interventions following the first coup in 1949. Economic motivations were also a strong motivation for people to leave the country (Yazgan et al., 2015: 185). Until the 1960s and 1970s, migration from countries in North Africa and the Middle East was mainly towards the United States and Europe. Also, Lebanon was a popular destination country because of the visa convenience and physical closeness of the country. In the second half of the 1970s, job opportunities in oil producing countries increased. The Gulf countries were perceived as attractive destinations for Syrian economic migrants. As a result, remittance became an important part of the Syrian economy. The country received approximately two billion dollars remittance from Syrians living abroad in 2007. At the same time, Lebanon still received large numbers of Syrian workers as the

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country was facing labor shortage as a result of the civil war from 1975 to 1990 (Yazgan et al., 2015: 185).

3.2. The Current Migration Crisis

The conflict in Syria has resulted in the world's largest humanitarian crisis since the Second World War. Internal and external displacements are increasing and humanitarian needs rise. More than a million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe in 2015, which has sparked a crisis in countries that struggle to cope with this influx. Since the beginning of 2016, more than 130.000 people have reached Europe by boats. The European Union has mobilized more than five billion euros for relief and recovery assistance to people in Syria and its neighboring countries (European Commission, 2016: 3).

Although not all Syrians apply for asylum in Europe, many of them do. With more than 470.000 asylum applications in 2015 Germany received the highest number of Syrian refugees, followed by Hungary. According to the International Organization of Migration more than one million people reached the continent by sea and more than 30.000 by land (website BBC, 2016). Over 3000 people have died in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean last year. In September 2015, the ministers of the European Union decided to relocate 160.000 refugees over the member states. Although many Syrians have applied for asylum, the amount of people being given asylum is much lower. In 2015, this number was 292.540 (website BBC, 2016). More than one million people actually applied for asylum. The refugee crisis shakes European migration and asylum policies. It seems that more people will continue to flee their insecure environments. The European Union will therefore face more influx of migrants from neighboring countries (website BBC, 2016).

According to Sirkeci and Cohen (2009, 2011) we live in a conflict driven culture where most human mobility is down to some kind of conflict. This includes disagreements and latent tensions, but also armed and violent clashes. Migration is initiated by difficulties, discomforts, clashes, restrictions and violence at the country of origin. People decide to migrate when they perceive a certain conflict as a threat or when they live in an environment of insecurity. In response to the challenges migrant face on their journey and in their new countries,

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migration changes. The nature of human mobility is dynamic, which helps to understand why so many Syrians are suddenly leaving Turkey (Sirkeci and Cohen: 2009, 2011).

A question that is asked by many is whether these migrants are “refugees” or “economic migrants”. According to Pinar Yazgan et al. (2015: 182), the difference between a refugee and an economic migrant is “imagined”. They argue that most economic migrants have some story of difficulty driving them to other countries, while at the same time refugees have an obvious economic cause along with the immediate threat they are facing. Countries or political parties that try to address the current crisis by categorizing people as refugees and non-refugees are ineffective (Yazgan et al., 2015: 182). There are several studies that show that there are almost always multiple motivations for why people flee their home country.

The root causes of Syrian migrants are unlikely to disappear in the near future (Yazgan et al., 2015: 183). Syrian migration will continue for the foreseeable future just like it is the case with Iraq and Afghanistan. The current migration is not a Syrian problem, but an international issue and the responses to this must be transnational. European countries must accept to live with Syrian immigrant communities. Since 2011, large numbers of Syrian refugees have been coming to Europe and to Turkey in particular. Today, there are estimated to be more than six million displaced people, about two thirds of whom are international migrants. In order to understand the broader picture, we also need to consider Syrian refugees who are not able to register (Yazgan et al., 2015: 184).

Since September 2015, the Amsterdam government accommodates Syrian asylum seekers. The city has set up four locations in order to receive a maximum of 1500 asylum seekers. These locations are spread throughout the city: one in the West, one in the center, one in the South East and one in the Southern area. Since April 2016 those locations are under the surveillance of the Central Organ for Asylum Seekers (Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, COA). In the same month, the refugee center located in the Jewish area of Amstelveen stared to host 80 refugees.

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3.3. The Jewish Community in The Netherlands

In recent history, Jewish people have arrived in the Netherlands in two different periods. The first group consisted of Sephardi Jews who fled the inquisition in Portugal and Spain. Later, the Ashkenazi Jews, who were prosecuted in Germany, Poland and Russia, migrated to the Netherlands. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, a large amount of Jewish refugees arrived from Germany and the areas that were occupied by the Nazis. A part of these people succeeded in migrating to the United States and Latin America before the occupation of the Netherlands. During the Second World War, more than 100.000 Dutch Jews were killed in the Holocaust (Salomon, 1996: 329).

According to a Dutch report by the ‘Jewish Social Services’ (Joods Maatschappelijk Werk), there were more than 50.000 Jews living in the Netherlands in 2010. Previous research demonstrated that a decade before 1999 the amount was estimated to be only 40.000, but the number of Jews was still increasing as the number of Jews in the years after the Second World War was miscalculated (Stichting Joods Welzijn, 2009).

Between 2011 and 2013, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in the Netherlands increased by 30% (Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn, 2014). Jewish institutions in several European countries have been the target of jihadi terrorist attacks. Israel and the Jewish people are perceived as the enemy of Islam and are an important part of jihadi propaganda. European secret services have concluded before that jihadi organizations recruit, train and task western jihadists in Syria (Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014: 4). These jihadists could be send (back) to Europe to commit a terrorist attack. This was the case with the terrorist attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014 (Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014: 4). Since these attacks, the central governments and local city governments in the Netherlands have taken further measures, including an increased protection of Jewish organizations.

It must be noted that the Jewish community in the Netherlands is by no means a homogeneous one. There are large differences between liberal Jews and orthodox Jews. According to Marcel de Weerd, police officer at the Jewish Network of the Amsterdam Police Department, the liberal Jewish community is very progressive (2016). They are willing to start dialogue with Syrian refugees. Parts of the orthodox community have biased

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opinions, while there is no evidence for these prejudices. However, the resistance towards the Muslim community is not solely articulated by the orthodox community. Misconception is a problem within the liberal community as well. I will expand on this notion in discussing my own experiences from a lecture I attended on May 26th_{, organized by the Liberal Jewish}

Community.

3.4. The Jewish Community in Syria

At the beginning of the 21st_{century, a small Jewish community was left in Syria. The country}

had officially banned Jews from government employment and politics and they did not have military service obligations. The Jewish religion was mentioned on their passports and identification cards – with no other minority this was the case. The community kept decreasing in the following years. Between 2001 and 2003 the community shrank from 200 to less than 100. As a result of violence and war, less than fifty Jewish people were left by October 2015. With the threat of Islamic State, less than twenty Jews were left in the country one month later (website CNN, 2015).

3.5. The LGBT Community in The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, an estimated six per cent of the people are gay, lesbian or bisexual. Five per cent has an ‘ambivalent gender identity’ and 0,4 per cent has an actual desire to sex change. According to a 2015 report from Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de

Statistiek), gay men feel less secure than bisexual and straight men (Dutch Ministry of

Security and Justice, 2015: 48). Gays and lesbians suffer more from disrespectful behavior by strangers in public and in public transport. Gay men have to deal with disrespectful behavior by the staff in shops, companies and government organizations. Lesbians and bisexual women face a disrespectful treatment by people they know more often than straight women. Lesbians are more often victims of violent crimes and gay men are more often confronted with crimes against property and vandalism than straight men. They are also more often the victim of cybercrime than straight men (Statistics Netherlands, 2015).

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3.6. Positions against LGBTs in Syria

In Syria, LGBT persons face several legal challenges that non-LGBT residents do not face. Same sex activity between men is considered as illegal. The legal status of same sex activity between women is unclear. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, there have been reports of LGBT Syrians being killed, blackmailed and tortured in areas that are controlled by Islamist rebels (Smith, 2013).

The Syrian constitution instructs that Islam is the official religion, and the source of national law. The legal code prohibits having same sex relations, referring to them as ‘carnal relations against the order of nature’. Same sex relationships provide imprisonment. In a report by Amnesty International, a gay man said: “We get threats in the street every day. Sometimes we wait until it gets dark. We are addicted to rain because the streets are empty” (2015: 4).

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4. Methodology

In this chapter I will describe the methods applied in researching my thesis. My research has been conducted in the form of a case study of Amsterdam with a qualitative approach. The main methods I have chosen to carry out my study were semi-structured interviews, in combination with the literature review as presented in my conceptual framework and participant observation in the refugee center and a lecture. This qualitative research enables me to simplify and manage data, while keeping in mind complexity and context (Atieno, 2009: 16). The theory written by Elias and Scotson is used as a framework in order to interpret my findings in relationship to the second research question.

4.1. Justification of Research Methodology

The method of interviewing is an important tool in order to depict the story behind people’s experiences (McNamara, 2016). The interviews I have conducted enabled me to collect in-depth information. Besides a standardized open-ended question in order to introduce the established and outsider theory, I choose for semi-structured interviews. This means that a short list of topics was used as a guide throughout the interviews, leaving room for the respondent’s own experience. It is already very interesting what direction the respondent takes and which topics he or she emphasizes. In this way I was able to understand the social reality and the personal perception of my respondents (Bryman, 2016: 469). In practice, this means that I barely asked any questions, apart from one that introduced Elias and Scotson’s theory. This open-ended question was asked to all interviewees. This allowed participants to give as much detailed information as they desire and it allowed me to ask questions as a means of follow-up. “Standardized open-ended interviews are likely the most popular form of interviewing utilized in research studies because of the nature of the open-ended questions, allowing the participants to fully express their views and experiences” (Turner, 2010: 754). This approach enabled me to easily compare and analyze the interviews.

Although I tried to primarily conduct face-to-face interview, one of my interviews was a telephone interview. There are certain disadvantages to telephone interviews. For example, telephone interviews need to be relatively short to not let people feel imposed upon and

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social cues like body language cannot be used as a source of extra information (Bryman, 2016: 485). Nonetheless, my telephone interview was one of the longest interviews. The interviewee had a lot of interesting information to share and kept elaborating on the topic. Also, social cues as intonation were still available. In my reflection I will elaborate more on the advantages and disadvantages of my research methodology.

Interviewing disrupts people in their normal flow of events (Bryman, 2016: 496). Participant observation allowed me to come closer to a “naturalistic emphasis”, because it enabled me to confront people in their natural environments (Bryman, 2016: 496). Certain social dynamics and behavior in social settings become apparent when it is not clear to people that you are trying to collect data (Watts, 2010: 2). As Bryman puts it, “participant observation entails the relatively prolonged immersion of the observer in a social setting in which he or she seeks to observe the behavior of members of that setting and to elicit the meanings they attribute to their environment and their behavior” (2016: 270).

4.2. Data and Case Selection

The key stakeholders in my study were the Jewish and LGBT community. My primary sources were interviews with experts from different organizations that have a focus on the position of these minorities in either the Netherlands as a whole or Amsterdam in particular. I have collected my data through seven interviews with eight respondents, participant observation in the refugee center in Amstelveen and a lecture organized by the Liberal Jewish Community (Liberaal Joodse Gemeente) on the future of Islam in the Netherlands and the effect on the Jewish community.

The reason why I choose Amsterdam as a case for my study is a practical one for different reasons. Amsterdam hosts the largest Jewish community and LGBT community of the Netherlands. Besides, since I live in Amsterdam and time was short, it was easiest for me to interview people and organizations that are located in Amsterdam. Also, most Jewish and LGBT organizations are situated in the capital. In the reflection part I will come back to the question of case selection.

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4.3. Selection of Respondents

Since my research focuses on the perception of threat, I first contacted the Amsterdam Police Department. The first interview I conducted was with the head of the Jewish Network. He referred me to the director of the Liberal Jewish Community. The head of the LGBT Network of the Amsterdam police referred me to COC, the LGBT interest group. In this respect, snowballing was one of my unintentional techniques to approach respondents. My other respondents I contacted myself. This selection was based on information about the largest and most influential organizations and people within both communities. My respondents were:

Madelon Bino (Director of the Liberal Jewish Community), Marc Grünfeld (Jewish Social Services), Fred Kuiper (police officer, location Uilenstede/Kronenburg), Ruud Looman (police officer, location

Kostverloren), Thijs Velthorst (LGBT Network Amsterdam Police Department), Esther Voet

(editor in chief Dutch Jewish Weekly and columnist), Marcel de Weerd (Jewish Network

Amsterdam Police Department) and Jessica van Zadelhoff (project officer asylum, LGBT interest group COC)

4.4. Method of Interviewing

As I mentioned before, I have used semi-structured interviews in order to answer my research question. I tried to create an informal sphere by referring to my interview as a “conversation”. I told my respondent to tell me as much as they thought would be interesting and relevant. Since my interviews were semi-structured I did not have a rigorous set of questions. However, to test the established and outsiders theory I needed to ask all my respondents the same question. That is where the ‘standardized open-ended part’ comes into play. I introduced Elias and Scotson’s theory by simply explaining the core basics of their ideas, e.g. a strong economic, social and cultural position, internal cohesion and gossiping. If I had the feeling my respondent understood the basic principles of the theory, I asked them if they thought the ideas were applicable to the current situation.

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4.5. Ethical Considerations

The purpose of my study is to portray a general picture of the situation in Amsterdam, through the eyes of minority groups. This purpose is explained to my respondents before the interview, in order to make them feel comfortable with the topic. I have been honest about my research question and the objective of my study. I think openness is very important because in this way I showed my respondents my concerns about their anxieties. Since this topic and the nature of some of the questions are in some way politically sensitive, I carefully explained to my interviewees that they could read my final study before I would hand it in. I am very well aware of the fact that I am here to learn from their experiences and knowledge and not the other way around.

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5. Analysis

In this chapter the findings from my interviews and observations will be analyzed and elaborated on. In the first part I will answer the question of threat perception within the LGBT and Jewish community in Amsterdam. In the second part I will analyze my data in relation to the analytical framework formed by Elias and Scotson in order to portray relationship between both minorities and Syrian refugees.

5.1. Threat Perception

Although the media have been speaking of a threat perception within the LGBT and Jewish community in Amsterdam, in particular from within refugee centers, this has not been scientifically proven. In this section I will elaborate on my findings from the expert interviews I have conducted. Herein, I will distinguish between the two minority groups.

5.1.1. The LGBT Community

One of the first interviews I conducted was with Thijs Velthorst from the LGBT Network of the Amsterdam Police Department ‘Pink in Blue’ (Roze in Blauw), who has been in close contact with Syrian refugees in Amsterdam. Informed by a range of media reports on the abuse of LGBT refugees, I was very interested in Velthorst’s experiences concerning threat reports and police records around this potential problem.

According to Velthorst, Syrians have a level of civilization that emulates the European level and even transcends it in certain domains. Aleppo, Homs and Damascus are metropoles. Of course, he admits, these cities have been weakened since the outbreak of the war, but before that these areas paralleled Amsterdam (Velthorst, 2016). The Syrian refugees he has been talking to, are fluent in English and have a cosmopolitan worldview. The LGBT community in Syria’s main cities is quite well represented and people are liberal minded. In the rural areas, people of course have a different view on certain aspects. But the same goes for the Netherlands, Velthorst adds.

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The Amsterdam society, Velthorst argues, is known for its open, liberal and willing approach towards the shelter of Syrians. In this respect, Amsterdam stands out in comparison to areas outside the city borders. In other parts of the country, the road ahead for Syrians is a rocky one. In Amsterdam, the police had to stop people who wanted to donate money, food and clothing. “Syrian families were receiving new Nikes and video game consoles” (Velthorst, 2016). Since the LGBT interest group COC started to report the abuse of LGBT refugees within refugee centers in November 2015, the organization has received emails from over 350 people, gay and straight, who wanted to become a volunteer. In this sense, it is hard to tell whether this abuse is solely of concern within the LGBT community itself. According to Jessica van Zadelhoff, who works at the national office of the LGBT interest group, the number of complaints and questions is much lower than the number of people who are simply willing to help. In this way, it seems like people have a positive view on the situation (Van Zadelhoff, 2016). Although this beautifully shows the inexhaustible readiness to help, Velthorst also notes that this might give the wrong message to those people. “We are not looking for the image that the Netherlands is the promised land” (Velthorst, 2016)

When talking about the LGBT community in Amsterdam, Velthorst notes that there is no such thing as an LGBT community. This acronym is invented in order to understand deviant behavior, he says. Although I refer to the group by using the acronym for practical reasons, no other community is as diverse as the LGBT community according to Velthorst: “from lipstick lesbians to leather men.”

According to Velthorst, the threat that other minorities in Amsterdam perceive and the fear that their way of living is threatened by Syrian refugees, makes no impression upon the LGBT community in Amsterdam. The LGBT community does not regard Syrian refugees with suspicion, like other minority groups do. The difference in threat perception between other minority groups (e.g. Jews) and LGBTs could be easily explained, according to Velthorst. The history of the Jews is very different from the history of the LGBTs and what they have achieved. Also, as I said before, Amsterdam is an exception compared to other parts of the Netherlands. Amsterdam hosts people with 186 different nationalities. “I don’t see the difference if 1500 Syrian refugees are added to this population” (Velthorst, 2016).

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5.1.2. Observation From the Refugee Center and a Jewish Lecture

In the next section I will analyze my first research question concerning the Jewish community. But first, I will briefly go into my observations from a visit to the refugee center and a lecture on the Islam and the future of Jews in the Netherlands.

On May 12th I payed a visit to the refugee center in Amstelveen, accompanied by police officers Fred Kuiper and Ruud Looman. The center is located in a former business office, and still looks like one. At the entrance children were playing soccer next to a young woman who carried a baby in her arms. Another man was smoking a cigarette. He and Looman, who obviously knew the man, had a little conversation. When we decided to go inside he offered the man a cigarette.

“It is our duty to show them that the police is here to help. We are friends. We will not beat them up.” (Looman, 2016)

On the ground floor there was a check-in counter where everyone who enters and leaves the building has to register. After introducing myself to the man behind the counter, who seemed to be very proud of the “hotel-refugee-center”, I joined the officers on their daily round through the center. I was very surprised by the positive atmosphere. People were laughing, facetiming, drinking tea, children were playing and running and the “local” hairdresser was giving a young boy a haircut. In the meantime, Kuiper and Looman were making sure that emergency exits were closed.

A concern articulated by Fred Kuiper is the lack of surveillance by the police. The Central Organ for Asylum Seekers is responsible for the surveillance of the refugee center. Kuiper and his colleague Ruud Looman try to limit potential incidents by staying in close contact with the security guards. The police is responsible for the public sphere and not with the surveillance within the center. However, there is some mistrust towards the surveillance organized by the central organ. Since this influx of refugees is a sudden and new phenomenon, there is no “default template” for refugee centers, Kuiper argues. Since the local government and the police make every effort to control the process properly, it is sometimes difficult to see that the surveillance within the center is not regulated well

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(Kuiper, 2016). The police tries to do everything it can to reassure the Jewish community is safe. As a result, the community feels that the surveillance is well-organized. However, if the overall organization has certain deficiencies, this trust might disappear. Then, the police will again have to deal with unrest within the public sphere. Although the Amstelveen center is one of the more “luxury” ones, in some cases families are staying here for over a year. According to Kuiper, agitation is inevitable (Kuiper, 2016).

When we arrived at the first floor they wanted to introduce me to their friend. A young Syrian girl who arrived in the Netherlands only six months ago. Together with her parents and two younger sisters she stayed in one of the rooms that was situated around an empty space. When she asked who I was, Looman said I was a researcher from the police department. “I am a good person, don’t get your handcuffs”, she said. I laughed at Looman referring to his duty and said I would never do that. The entire conversation we had was in Dutch. The girl had started to take Dutch lessons a few months earlier and her language skills were impressive. The fear articulated by Jewish people in the area crossed my mind.

A few weeks later I attended a meeting organized by the Liberal Jewish Community on the Dutch Islam and the future for Jews in the Netherlands. When locking my bike in front of the institute, the Jewish vigilance became clear to me. A young man, who had been standing at the gate, came up to me and asked me what I came for. When I said that I was attending the lecture, he wanted to know my name and how I knew there was a meeting that night. I kindly told the guy my name and said the director invited me after the interview we had the week before. After he had asked me some questions on my thesis, he let me through.

Three Jewish experts were presenting figures about the position of Muslims in Europe on a scale of topics, compared to other religious groups. One of the guest speakers was Mostafa Hilali, a Dutch Muslim and Lieutenant Colonel in the army of the Netherlands. He was the only Muslim at the lecture. He mentioned that the tensions between Muslims and Jews and the Netherlands will not be solved when sixty Jews gather and talk about Islam. Jews and Muslims should come together and talk about the future (Hilali, 2016). When he started talking, the audience got slightly noisy. Hilali was clearly surprised by this fanatic response and reacted by saying “I don’t want to be here anyway. I might just leave right now” (Hilali, 2016). This triggered the audience to shout phrases like “just leave” and “you do not know

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what you are talking about”. Unfortunately, a fruitful discussion did not take place. In some way, Hilali was right by arguing for bridging between the two religious, rather than staying separated. A feature the Liberal Jewish Community advocates for. In ‘The Dutch Muslim Community-section’ and in my policy recommendations I will elaborate on the relationships between Dutch Jews and Muslims. In the next section I will look at the threat perception from Syrian refugees within the Jewish community.

5.1.3. The Jewish Community

Before going into the question of threat perception, I will provide some more background on the refugee center in Amstelveen. In September 2015, the Amstelveen government announced the plans of hosting refugees. The location of the refugee center would be the former office at Laan van Kronenburg. This street is situated between Uilenstede4_and

Kostverloren and Buitenveldert, areas with a large Jewish population. This location is surrounded by Jewish institutions that are under severe surveillance. Simply put, the refugee center would be located at the heart of the Jewish area of Amsterdam (see appendix 2). Fred Kuiper, police officer at Uilenstede and Kronenburg5_{, received several phone calls from}

people within the Jewish community. They asked them what they could do to discourage the government.

The Amstelveen government organized a meeting for locals. 90% of the people who attended the meeting were Jewish. Also, they set up internet communication where people can discuss their worries. Many people reported their concerns. However, the general trend was very positive, police officer Kuiper says (2016). In comparison to other municipalities in the Netherlands, the Amstelveen community was very willing to help and came up with solutions. Several negative reactions and the Mayor’s death threat, on the other hand, fostered some turmoil. The Amstelveen police department has been very alert concerning potentially disruptive people or suspicious behavior. As a result, the government decided to set up a consultative group, in which local people are represented. These people meet every three weeks and Kuiper attends these meetings as well. Although certain concerns towards the refugee center are often expressed, people are generally very positive

4_{Uilenstede is the student area in Amstelveen, nearby the refugee center.} 5_{Kronenburg is the area in which the refugee center is located.}

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(Kuiper, 2016). Based on the biggest concerns, the police department and the government have developed different scenarios. These scenarios focus on disturbances within the refugee center and in the neighborhood.

In contrast to the experience expressed by Velthorst, the Jewish community in Amsterdam perceives a more serious threat from Syrian refugees. This threat perception varies from a direct fear for the current refugees in Amstelveen, to a more long-term anxiety concerning a permanent demographic change. Others argue that not the refugees are a threat, but established Muslim communities in Amsterdam cause a lot of anxiety.

A part of the Jewish community expresses the fear that anti-Semitism in Syria is kindled at an early age. According to Marcel de Weerd (2016), this had not been proven. These Syrian refugees flee their country to survive and protect their family. They differ from the average Syrian. Madelon Bino, director of the Liberal Jewish Community, agrees with De Weerd on this point. She and her colleagues have visited the refugee center several times. Syrian refugees stood in positive contrast with refugees from different nationalities. Of course, there is a possibility that there is a black sheep among these Syrians. But, as Bino (2016) puts it in perspective:

“That potential danger could also come from someone in our own society. I don’t think this threat comes from people within refugee centers.”

When the Amstelveen government announced its plans to establish a refugee center at the heart of the Jewish community, a lot of commotion arose. Immediately the community faced a dilemma: on the one hand there is fear and concern, on the other hand a part of the Jewish community itself arrived in the Netherlands as refugees after the Second World War. The main concern was the fact that the center was located on people’s daily routes to Jewish schools, the synagogue and other organizations. A continuous source of concern was the fact that young children would be unsafe on their way to school. According to De Weerd (2016), the Jewish community is afraid of an ISIS fighter who infiltrates in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, this has not yet been proven to be the case. Marc Grünfeld, who works at the organization for Jewish Social Services in Amsterdam, finds these sentiments understandable. Without the prove that these Syrian refugees have bad intentions, people

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feel threatened. “This is simply the result of their presence. Besides, they speak a language we cannot understand. In combination with a consistent trauma and permanent security, people feel threatened” (Grünfeld, 2016). The terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Copenhagen have heightened the tensions within the community. It is true that some refugees are averse to Jews, just like they are averse to LGBTs. However, as Bino puts it, in general there has been engagement between both groups.

As a result of a one-sided impression within the Muslim community, Jews are perceived as evil. Especially young children tend to be fanatic in this believe. The problem is simply the result of a false image. The fact that there is anti-Semitism in Syria is clear. But that does not mean that every single Syrian is anti-Semite (Bino, 2016). De Weerd finds it very difficult that some people think that actually is the case. Those people had to leave everything behind to save their lives. On the other hand, in October there was a performance by the Israeli army band, organized by the Liberal Jewish Community. A group of Muslims protested against the army. Amongst them were a couple of refugees who had arrived in the Netherlands a few days before (De Weerd, 2016).

Within the Jewish community, religion is definitely not the only reason why people feel threatened. According to De Weerd, the fear is the direct result of one-sided (false) impressions of what happens within the Muslim community. Over the past years, anti-Semitic messages from Muslims have increased. A rise of anti-Semitism is a general trend in the Netherlands and in other European countries. Besides, as Velthorst (2016) mentioned, there is a discrepancy between crimes that are reported and what actually takes place. De Weerd thinks that Jews are less willing to report certain activities. For this reason, the Jewish Police Network cooperates with the Centre Information and documentation Israel (Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël, CIDI). Another problem is that many crimes are committed in secrecy; gravestones are smeared and Jewish objects are wrecked. In this context, many Jews perceive the influx of Muslim refugees with a strong anti-Semitic background as threatening.6

6_{Since the terrorist attacks during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, at which eleven Israeli Olympic}

team members were taken hostage and eventually killed, Jewish organizations in Amsterdam are kept under surveillance. All Jewish schools are permanently guarded.

A fear of outsiders? : a threat perception of Syrian refugees within minority groups

Master thesis in

International Relations