The Dutch parliament on migration:
A state of emotion?
“Sometimes, I find it frightening to realize that Mr. Wilders and I have something in common. It seems, namely, that both his and my ancestors came from Indonesia. I find it impressive that someone, being a product of migration himself, can speak against migration like this.”
2
Photo: Jesse Klaver and Geert Wilders Quotation: Jesse Klaver
3
Photo: Jesse Klaver and Geert Wilders Quotation: Jesse Klaver
Source: ANP
The Dutch parliament on migration:
A state of emotion?
Written by Tanja Runhaar Student number: 10657819 Supervisor: Rosa Sanchez Salgado Second reader: Franca van Hooren
Word count: 19.400 July 2017
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of
Master of Science (MSc) in Political Science: Public Policy and Governance
5
PREFACE
“The roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is sweet”, Aristotle said. In front of you lies my master thesis, and I can only hope that you will find it sweet. What I can say for sure, however, is that there would have been no growth without nutrition.
First and foremost, I want to thank Rosa, for giving me the opportunity to graduate on this complex, but highly relevant topic, and supervising me along the way. Furthermore, I want to thank Adger van Helden, Mona Keijzer, Jan-Pieter Dees and all other people at CDA for answering my questions – including the political incorrect ones – with openness and honesty. Of course, my parents and five older brothers cannot be left out. Not only because they are exquisite examples of how to debate passionately, but more importantly, because they taught me the value of integrity, social responsibility, and gratitude. And above all, because they are my indispensable support.
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction………. 9
Part I: Literature overview………10
1.1 Emotions in politics………11
1.2 Emotions in deliberation……….13
1.3 Emotions in parliamentary debates……….16
1.4 Emotions in the Dutch parliament………..18
Part II: Theoretical framework ‘duality of emotion’………..20
2.1 Research questions………..21
2.2 Methodology………...23
Part III: Analysis……….25
3.1 Emotional discourse and emotion markers……….26
3.2 Type of debate and type of speaker………36
3.3 Emotional awareness and emotion management………43
Conclusion………47
Discussion……….49
References………50
Annex I: Debates……….56
9
INTRODUCTION
In the Dutch general elections of March 2017, ‘good’ populism beats ‘bad’ populism. (The Guardian 2017). Months later, however, The Netherlands still does not have a government. A main reason why this is taking so long, is that the largest political parties, who are ought to form a new government, were not able to reach an agreement on migration policies (NRC 2017). This lack of agreement is not surprising, and certainly nothing new. In 2013, an increasing number of migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea towards the European Union. Most of them were refugees coming from war zones in the Middle East and Africa. Especially from April 2015 onwards, the term ‘crisis’ was widely used, as the European Union (EU) struggled to cope with the great amount of asylum applications and illegal border crossings. In the wake of failed referendums, the Brexit and poor crisis management, the European migration crisis is still a great challenge to the legitimacy and credibility of EU institutions. These challenges at the European level reflect the challenges faced at the national and sub-national level – also in The Netherlands. In the years prior to the Dutch general elections in March 2017, the many debates on migration particularly showed division, fuelled by public debate (NOS 2015).
The public debate on migration clearly involves intense emotions. But is the role of emotions in parliamentary debates just as straightforward? The question, however, is not whether emotions play a role in these debates. Research has proven that reason and emotion complement one another (Damasio 1999); that there is always emotion where there is reason. In fact, recent psychiatric and neurological research has refuted the opposition between reason and emotion (Damasio 1999; Solomon 2007). Thus, it seems obvious that emotions play a role in parliamentary debates too. The real question is: are they expressed in that area, and if so, which ones, how, by whom? How are they perceived? What is the emotions’ influence? And how far does that influence reach (Hogget & Thompson 2012; Marcus 2000)? Is the ‘animosity’ between Jesse Klaver and Geert Wilders reflected by emotional dynamics in the debate?
Formal political deliberation is often perceived as a pragmatic and technocratic process in which rational discussion leads to best decision-making, and consequently, the role of emotions is often not empirically analysed (Durnova 2015: 224). And if acknowledged, they are often considered obstacles. “Images and sentiments have become much more important [than they were in the past]”, one of the recent informants of the Dutch cabinet, Tjeenk Willink, stated. “They sometimes threaten to conceal the facts and values we share. In cabinet configurations, facts and values must prevail. Otherwise, there will be no sound policy or homogenous coalition” (De Correspondent 2017). Indeed, “it is usually considered that the
10
power of social actors is derived from their self-control in defining goals, and executing them according to values and against any distracting impulse and emotion” (Barbalet 2002).
In my thesis, I consider emotions, in line with recent literature, an integral part of the process of reasoning. The purpose of my thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the role of emotions in public policy-making, through the analysis of that role in Dutch parliamentary debates – particularly on the topic of migration. This understanding is relevant, not only for scientific ends, but also for societal ends. Migration is arguably the most hotly debated topic of recent years, and research shows that political appeal to emotions influences the public (Brader 2005). Hence, my main research question will be: What is the role of emotions in Dutch parliamentary debates on the topic of migration? This question includes others: which emotions are expressed, how, by whom, how are they perceived, and what is their influence? I endeavour to answer these questions by the analysis of 19 debates, and two in-depth interviews.
This thesis consists, broadly speaking, of three parts. The first part is a literature overview, divided into four sections, moving from generalistic to more specific literature. I will start with the study of emotions in politics and then going into the role of emotions in deliberation. This will be followed by a section in which I discuss parliamentary debates as a form of deliberation. I end the first chapter with an overview of the role emotions have played in the recent history of the Dutch parliament.
The second part is the theoretical framework, in which I will discuss how my analysis is placed within the previously discussed research context, which research questions I aim to answer, and which methodology I will be using to answer them.
The third part is the analysis itself, divided into three sections, or chapters. Here, I will start with a general discussion on which emotions I found in my research, and how they were displayed. After that, in the second chapter, I go into the type of debate and the of speaker as factors of influence on the displayed emotions. The third chapter will be less empirical and more reflective, discussing emotional awareness and emotion management of parliamentarians, largely based on the two in-depth interviews. Finally, I will work towards a conclusion and discussion, placing my research in the wider context of recent literature.
PART I: LITERATURE OVERVIEW
In this literature overview, I will discuss what is already known about the topic of emotions in politics, and with that describe the academic context in which my research can be placed. This part is divided into four sections, moving from generalistic to more specific characteristics of
11
the topic. First, I am going into the study of emotions in politics, mostly within the research field of political psychology, a relatively new field of research. Second, I will discuss the role of emotions in deliberation and how parliamentary debates can be seen as a form of deliberation. Then I continue with the role of emotions in parliamentary debates, to what extent parliamentary discourse reflects emotions and how far-reaching the effects of this reflection can be. Also in this section, I will discuss a very closely related study on the role of emotions in parliamentary debates on a European level of analysis. The fourth section, lastly, aims to provide insight in the history of the Dutch parliament, and the development of how and to which extent emotions play a role in parliamentary debates.
1.1 Emotions in politics
In the history of political science, relatively little research has been done on the role of emotions in politics. Instead, political science was dominated by rational, structural and organizational models (Calhoun 2001; Goodwin et al. 2001). The biggest of them may be Rational Choice Theory (often abbreviated as RCT), rather a paradigm or ‘family of theories’ (Green & Shapiro 1994: 28), in which is stated that individuals always make prudent and logical decisions, serving their highest self-interest. When we apply this originally economic principle to public policy, it holds that rational individuals choose the policy option that is most likely to maximize their own utility (Griggs 2007: 174). Important assumptions in RCT are the consistency and transitivity of preferences, which means that preferences can be rank-ordered. Due to these consistencies, deductive reasoning can be applied and predictions of future behaviour can be made. Such predictions are, however, extensively undermined by phenomena like terrorist attacks, the economic crisis and the migration crisis.
Since the 2000s, consequently, the study of emotions gained renewed interest in many disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, neurobiology and psychiatry (Barbalet 2002; Damasio 1999; Elster 1999; Solomon 2007; Turner and Stets 2006). Also in political science, there have been a few studies on the role of emotions. In the field of international relations, for example, research has been done on the role of emotions in foreign policy-making and on interstate conflict (Ross 2006; Redlawsk 2006). Another prolific field has been social movements and collective action (Goodwin et al. 2001; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Jasper 2011). In the most prolific field, political psychology, theories such as the Affect Control Theory or the Affective Intelligence Theory have shown that emotions considerably impact political behaviour (Marcus 2000; Redlawsk 2006). But although emotions and the study of emotions are considered relevant for political science, they are mostly perceived as an external
12
factor of influence on mainstream political theories, rather than being a well-integrated part of these theories. The latter generally promote dispassionate decision-making (Koziak 1999; Maiz 2010), while emotions are still related to old prejudices like partiality, dependency, sectarianism and subjectivity. It is usually considered that the power of social actors derives from their self-control in defining goals and executing them according to values and against any distracting impulse and emotion (Barbalet 2002). These prejudices prevail while the opposition between reason and emotions has been refuted by recent psychiatric and neurological research (Damasio 1999; Solomon 2007).
As already widely acknowledged in other disciplines, I expect that emotions do also serve a function in politics. Therefore, we should neither avoid nor discard them; on the contrary, we should expand our knowledge of their functionality to better understand and perhaps even improve the public policy-making process.
In order to be able to incorporate the role of emotions into political science, specifically public policy-making, it is essential to understand what emotions are. In psychology, emotions are commonly defined as an aroused state of the organism, which includes consciousness, visceral and behavioural changes (Parrott 2001). However, the existing literature on emotions lacks solid consensus on how they are best understood. Perhaps the oldest perspectives on emotions are the cognitive view and physiological view.
The cognitive view, posed by Jon Elster, states that beliefs precede emotion. “Emotions depend on beliefs because of the need for cognitive appraisal of the eliciting situation before any emotional reactions can be triggered” (Elster 1994: 34). One of the most important theories flowing from the cognitive view is appraisal theory, in which it is stated that that emotions are extracted from and triggered by our evaluations, appraisals or estimates of different events and situations (Brader and Marcus 2015: 168).
The physiological view, on the contrary, states that physiological changes precede emotions. This view is based on the so-called James-Lange theory, in which emotional experience follows emotional behaviour or reactions to certain events. “We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike and afraid because we tremble” (James in Laird and Bresler 1990: 636-637). Although in reverse order, both perspectives treat reason and emotion as independent from each other. As a result, emotions are often perceived as opposing rationality (Solomon 1999). But while sometimes emotions are ‘countering and opposing’ reason, at other times emotions seem to ‘share in’ reason and thus, emotions and reason are not inevitably antagonistic (Bickford 2015). In this line of thought, I will continue with the role of emotions in deliberation.
13
1.2 Emotions in deliberation
Although political scientists increasingly acknowledge the relevance of emotions in political science, this acknowledgement has not led to sociological or political theory’s full inclusion of emotions (Calhoun 2001). When emotions are investigated in political science, most attention goes to emotions experienced by citizens. Public institutions and policy-makers, on the contrary, are often pictured as rational and technocratic actors, trying to argue for collective solutions (Bickford 2011; Hogget & Thompson 2012). Emotions, then, are usually seen as things to be avoided, as obstacles for proper deliberation, decision-making and policy-making (Chong 2015: 98). In other words, according to the dominant reasoning in sociological and political theory, especially democratic theory, emotions seem to be, or some would say ought to be, absent from the formal political sphere. “One could even argue that evacuating emotions was the initial purpose of deliberation, especially when we bear in mind that deliberation was too often seen as a rationalizing instrument to achieve mutual understanding, to calm down controversies and conflicts – in fact to calm down emotions” (Durnova 2015: 222). This traditional view descends from the normative ideas concerning the rules for ‘good’ deliberation, theorized by Jürgen Habermas (Mansbridge et al. 2006). According to Jane Mansbridge et al., Habermas stressed rationality, consensus formation, and the search for common good as the most important facets for ideal deliberation.
It is now commonplace to talk about the deliberative turn in democratic theory (Dryzek 2000). More recently, however, deliberative democratic theory had moved beyond the ‘theoretical statement’ stage and into the ‘working theory’ stage (Chambers 2003). Instead of focussing on the central theoretical principles underlying deliberative democratic theory, the attention has shifted towards empirical examples of public deliberation. In line with recent literature and its focus on deliberation in practice, “we can say that deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation” (Mansbridge 2006: 7).
While joining this definition of deliberation, which rightfully underlines the openness of the debate and the accessible exchange of arguments of equal participants, I would like to add another, more goal-oriented perspective as well: its role in solving policy problems.
14
According to Barnes, “deliberation aims to bring decision-making out of the hidden back rooms in which bargaining takes place between interest groups, and enable ‘ordinary citizens’ to engage in dialogue with both the issues and the decision makers” (2008: 468). Being theorized in the context of the ‘participatory turn’ in governance (e.g. Dryzek 2000; Fishkin 1991), deliberation has had a considerable impact in shaping a new imaginary of what participative policy-making might look like. The underlying belief of participative policy-making is that technical or expert knowledge alone is inadequate to the resolution of policy problems, since the issues such problems raise are also political and ethical. Deliberation is believed to generate better decisions that hold greater legitimacy because they are more open and informed in order to achieve the greatest public good (Bobbio 2003). While deliberation is not necessarily participatory, it does reflect the various representations of different interests, including feelings and emotions, that are not merely those of the participants in the debate. Most importantly, as Young (2000) suggests, assuming that deliberation has to be based solely in reason, which is usually defined as neutral and dispassionate, and conducted solely through rational argument, will exclude many people. She argues instead for the importance of valuing other styles of speech that represent the expression of emotional meaning. Without this specific representation, policy issues are hard to be adequately dealt with.
As emotions are increasingly recognized as relevant in deliberation processes, they gained scholarly attention. However, studies on the role of emotions in parliamentary deliberation are limited. Most studies on parliamentary deliberation are focused on argumentative justification leading to certain outcomes, like voting and preferences (Bächtiger et al. 2005; Lord 2013). The emphasis is placed on the content rather than the emotional dynamics that are part of the deliberative process. My analysis concerns the process rather than the outcome and emotional dynamics rather than argumentative justification.
While it is widely known that emotions belong to political rhetoric and that emotional displays can be interpreted as a discursive practice (Fischer 2009; Bickford 2011), they are often perceived as particularly subjective. Rhetoric, a committed and passionate attempt to persuade others, is usually regarded as aiming to manipulate rather than to reflect a genuine expression of emotional meaning and content of the position being represented. In this line of thought, effective deliberation and collaboration need to overcome emotional barriers, using political-psychological assistance (Fischer 2009).
Only a few scholars consider that emotions can enhance deliberation. Barnes (2008) argues that public officials find emotions difficult to handle in the context of deliberation directed to at issues of policy or service delivery, but that the emotional morality is necessary
15
to deliberation in the context of public policy-making – particularly with respect to deliberation that is capable of delivering welfare, well-being and justice. Such a morality, she argues, addresses the likelihood that participants will have an emotional investment in the issues being debated. Also, it understands that emotional expression will often be necessary to communicate the substance of the issues to be addressed. Doing so, the morality enlarges the way in which both officials and citizens think about policy issues.
Having stated that emotions play an important role in, and might even enhance deliberation, it is relevant to discuss its very conceptualization within the context of deliberation. Usually, emotions are seen as the object of appeals which function as adjuvants to argumentation. Speakers appeal to emotions like shame or fear in order to enhance the cogency of an argument, which bears on something else. The underlying assumption of using emotions to achieve maximal persuasion is that emotions shape cognition.
Micheli (2010), however, proposes to consider emotions themselves as the very objects of argumentation. He is drawing on the Aristotelian concept of pathos, in which Aristotle consistently analyses emotions in terms of their cognitive antecedents rather than in terms of their consequences for cognition (Elster 1999). Simply put, rhetoric not only teaches us that emotions have cognitive effects, but also, and crucially, that they have cognitive origins. Following this line of thought, Micheli argues that emotions may become disputable matters during interaction: their adequacy may be challenged and, consequently, speakers may put forward claims which either seek to justify or to undermine them. This is important, because it suggests that emotions are not only complementary to the content of an argument by enhancing its cogency, but rather co-establish the content itself.
Central to Micheli’s proposition is his going beyond viewing emotions as either misleading rational perception or as a privileged mode of perception. Endorsing Micheli’s proposition, Bickford (2011) argues that dissatisfaction with these opposing alternatives has led many thinkers to turn to Aristotle’s account (e.g. Allen 2004; Nussbaum 1994; Sherman 1997). For Aristotle, emotions are indeed central to the kinds of creatures humans are, but what is crucial to moral and political perception, is the interaction of emotion and reason. Bickford applies this insight to public policymaking. The Aristotle-inspired account she offers stresses the potential perceptiveness of emotion, but also the multiplicity of social beliefs about emotion – which can be found in all forms of political communication. “We should neither exclude emotion from legitimate political communication, nor simply privilege more affective modes”, she says. “Rather, we should recognize that emotion talk is both a constituent of our judgments
16
and also gives us the materials to remake those judgments, and thus ourselves, and thus the world” (Bickford 2011: 1036). I wholeheartedly adopt this view.
1.3 Emotions in parliamentary debates
Before taking a closer look at the role of emotions in parliamentary debates, it is useful to make clearer what is meant by ‘deliberation’ and ‘debate’, and how they cohere. The parliamentary debate can be considered a form of deliberation. According to Rasch (2011: 5), however, there is a difference between deliberation and debate that has to be taken into account when analysing the parliamentary debate as a form of deliberation. While deliberation is characterized by process and dynamics, parliamentary debates are more or less restricted by rules (Rasch 2011: 8). Also, parliamentary debates seem to be an arena for the explanation of party standpoints and solid positions. Rasch appoints, however, that the amount of deliberation in political debate is rather a continuum than a strict dichotomy between debate and deliberation (Rasch 2011: 7).
While parliamentary debates indeed follow a preconceived structure, there is room for interruption, discussion and improvisation. “Parliamentary debates presuppose, on the one hand, a spirit of adversariality, which is manifested in position-claiming and opponent-challenging acts, and, on the other hand, a spirit of cooperativeness, which is manifest in joint decision-making and cross-party problem-solving processes in order to reach commonly acceptable goals regarding future policies and suitable lines of action at a national level” (Ilie 2010: 879). According to Ilie, examining the parliamentary discourse has become increasingly important because of the shifting social paradigms and political polarisations (2010: 879). The author argues that political speech and action are tightly intertwined through the purposeful use of language, which, on the one hand, provides language users with frames for the expression of ideas and emotions, and, on the other hand, gets in its turn (re) shaped by these very ideas and emotions. And thus, the use of language in institutions such as the parliament is used for political purposes and the struggle over language by parliamentarians is always a direct manifestation of the struggle over political power.
An exquisite example of how far-reaching the political power of parliamentary discourse can be, is reflected by Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino. In their study, they analysed how the British political elite has securitised migration and asylum since 9/11 by looking at when and how parliamentary debates linked counter-terrorism to immigration and/or asylum. They argue that there are at least two formats, or ways of framing, through which migration and asylum, as well as other policy issues, are politically embedded within security debates (Huysmans & Buonfino 2008: 767). The first is referred to as ‘the politics of exception’,
17
which focuses on the state of threat to the life of the nation, the legitimacy of exceptional policies justified by this threat and the ensuing trade-off between security and liberty that it produces. The second is labelled ‘the politics of unease’, which addresses insecurities in a less pronounced way. It does not focus on existential threats to the territorial and functional integrity of the state, but connects a variety of different policy areas such as welfare provisions, counter-terrorism and illegal immigration through the discussion of policing technologies. Judith Shklar has called the latter ‘a liberalism of fear’ – security measures encroaching on civil liberties out of fear, contributing to institutionalising ‘arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary and unlicensed acts of force’ by public institutions (Shklar 1989: 29).
In the light of what we know today, this liberalism of fear becomes even more relevant. Years later, an unexpected referendum with an unexpected outcome has led to what is now widely known as Brexit. Although illustrated with policing technologies in the example above, the politics of unease could indeed have played an important role in the run-up to, and eventually the actual happening of Brexit. The article discusses how the political elite renders insecurities in relation to migration and asylum (Huysmans & Buonfino 2008: 766). Through explicitly playing on the fear of citizens, parliamentarians seek support and legitimacy for certain policies (Huysmans & Buonfino 2008: 780; Oates 2005). It is not discussed, however, if and how parliamentarians bring emotions to the debate, and therewith reflect their own emotions or represent the emotions of their constituents. “Instead of dramatic speech acts articulating existential threats and thereby legitimating calls for exceptional politics, security practice consists of knitting various discourses of unease and danger into a patchwork of insecurities, that facilitate the political exchange of fears and beliefs and the transfer of security practice from one policy area to another” (Bigo 1996; 2002; Bigo and Guild 2005; Huysmans 2006). This points out how powerful parliamentary discourse can be, and that emotions can play a pivotal role in public policy-making.
As already mentioned, however, most studies do not address emotions, and when they do, it involves the emotions experienced by citizens. To my knowledge, the only study that considers the emotions experienced by the parliamentarians themselves during parliamentary debates, is one done by Rosa Sanchez Salgado. Considering emotions as an integral part of the process of reasoning and decision-making, she analyses the emotions in debates of the European Parliament on the topic of migration. She found that fear and shame were the most frequently expressed emotions, and that the frequency depended on the type of key-player: fear was expressed more often by extreme right-wing political parties, while shame was more present in
18
the expressions of left-wing parliamentarians (Sanchez Salgado 2017: 15). I will take these findings into account in the analysis of the Dutch parliament.
1.4 Emotions in the Dutch parliament
When and how emotions are expressed, and how emotions are perceived, is dependent on different factors, such as the institution where the debate takes place. EU institutions, for example, are usually depicted as very technocratic and consensus-seeking. Members of the European Parliament are considered rational and respectful, and personal attacks are exceptional at the European level (Lord 2013). It is interesting to investigate how the expression of emotions by parliamentarians differs across various levels of governance.
At the same time, it is important to be aware of other factors of influence, like the topic of the debate, the timing of the debate, contextual factors and specific characteristics of the institute that is analysed. History, culture and language, for example, are important factors that should be taken into consideration. For this reason, I will discuss some characteristics of the Dutch parliament.
“Emotions are in fashion”; this is how Remieg Aerts (2003: 12) starts his article about political styles in The Netherlands since 1848. Every year, the centre for parliamentary history (Centrum voor Parlementaire Geschiedenis) publishes a book in which scientists, journalists and (ex-)politicians write about the most important parliamentary events of the year; Aerts’ article was published in the 2003 edition. The topic of that particular edition was ‘emotions in politics’. The book’s publication was shortly after the rise and assassination of Pim Fortuyn, a far-right politician who is seen as the predecessor of Geert Wilders1, and the resurrection of the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid; PvdA) under the ‘telegenic’ Wouter Bos. “Has Dutch politics been hit by emotions more than ever? A confirmatory answer is obvious: after all, the events of recent years are unusual, a deviation from the normal pattern of Dutch politics” (Aerts 2003: 12). Especially in contemporary media and populistic culture, Aerts argues, politics are perceived as being boring and dry. “It says less about politics than it says about the needs of the press and the public, who want to see sensation, action and emotion. From the point of view of representation, perhaps, politics falls short” (Aerts 2003: 22).
According to Andeweg and Thomassen (2003: 33), this falling short in representation has everything to do with the extent to which the competition between political parties ‘fits’ with the degree of division in society (see table 1). Given this relationship between political
1 Geert Wilders is a far-right Dutch politician, founder and leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) since 2004,
19
competition and social division in The Netherlands, Andeweg predicted what is happening today: “Without the function of bridging social divisions through compromise, consensus government may run the risk of degenerating into a political cartel. Without true opposition within the system, the only opposition possible will be against the system. The recent rise of the populist Right in consensus democracies such as Austria, Belgium and Switzerland is fuelled at least in part by such resentment against a closed political cartel. So far, Dutch consensus government has escaped this fate (…) But for how long?” (2000: 709). Nowadays, it seems like the expression of emotions by politicians is indispensable for the people to feel represented, and that facts and values are no longer sufficient (Beunders 2002).
Table 1: The degree of division in society and the level of competition between parties (Lijphart 2001)
Society
Homogenous Deeply divided
Parties
Cooperation Cartel democracy Consensus
democracy
Competition Majority democracy Centrifugal
democracy
But how are emotional politicians perceived and judged? And are men and women judged in the same way, when getting publicly emotional? Carla van Baalen investigated the responses to crying politicians over the Dutch parliamentary history, and distinguished six types of responses. The most common responses are the negative ones: ‘This should not have happened’, ‘Those tears are not sincere’, ‘This is a weak person who is unable to control his/her emotions’ and ‘This is a weak politician because decisions that are made are based on emotions’ (Van Baalen 2003: 40, 41). The fact that these are the most common responses, has to do with the norm, Van Baalen argues. “Adults are not supposed to cry in public, especially not at work, and certainly not in politics; crying is a sign of weakness, belonging to the private atmosphere” (Van Baalen 2003: 36).
Positive responses include appreciation for the fact that a politician expresses his or her feelings, thereby showing that he or she is a human being too, and a response of relief regarding the violation of the norm: ‘Hopefully, this is a step in the right direction’ (Van Baalen 2003: 41). But while the norm is shifting towards what some even call an emotion culture, it is striking that men and women do not seem to be weighted equally: when a male politician is crying, it
20
makes him more human – when it is a female politician, however, the question is asked whether her crying has to do with the fact that she is a woman (Van Baalen 2003: 42). Although this study concerns the act of crying specifically, it raises the question to what extent gender plays a role in how emotions are expressed and perceived.
Another study focuses on passion and excitement during debates in the Tweede Kamer on human rights in the colonies around 1850. Ulla Jansz deliberately sheds light on the beginning of a liberal political culture, characterized as legal, sober and rational. She points out that ‘even’ in this period of time, “emotions were no taboo and were not seen as weak, irrational or unmanly” (Jansz 2003: 55). Emotions were placed opposite to calmness and impartial factuality, but were not presented as contrasting rationality. With this alternative view, she makes clear that emotions cannot be ‘turned off’ – they are always intertwined with the process of public policy-making and political decision-making.
PART II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ‘DUALITY OF EMOTION’
In this theoretical framework, I will discuss how I place my analysis within the previously discussed research context, which research questions I aim to answer in my analysis, and which methodology I will be using to answer them.
Since research on the role of emotions in parliamentary debates is limited, my analysis will mainly be explorative and descriptive, aiming to expand the knowledge of the role of emotions in public policy-making (Swanborn 1991: 12). By providing a better understanding of that role, I hope to contribute to better policy-making and better policy-outcomes.
From the literature overview above, no straight-forward theoretical framework follows. For example, there is no clear conceptualization of emotions anywhere – and it is exactly this conceptualization that I need for my analysis. Existing literature on emotions lacks solid consensus on how emotions are best understood (Scherer 2005). The common psychological definition of emotions, ‘an aroused state of the organism, which includes consciousness, visceral and behavioural changes’ (Parrott 2001), is too broad and therefore not sufficient for examination of the role of emotions, let alone in the context of parliamentary debates. I will therefore need to develop a conceptualization myself.
Based on recent literature, I see emotions as inseparable from reasoning and decision-making, and thus from public policy-making. Although there is a lot of discussion on the normative question whether emotions belong in the public domain, this is an irrelevant question from an empirical point of view: even if they should not be in the public domain, they are still there (Hogget & Thompson 2012; Marcus 2000). Since my analysis will be mainly empirical,
21
I will regard emotions as an obvious part of political rhetoric, in which emotional displays can be interpreted as a discursive practice (Fischer 2009; Bickford 2011).
With regard to the discursive practice, my analysis focuses on the process rather than on the outcome of the debate, and within the framework of that process, my analysis focuses on the emotional dynamics, rather than on the argumentative justification of the different standpoints. Based on an Aristotelian understanding of the interaction between reason and emotion, Susan Bickford claims that “emotional expressions are interpreted, reacted to, given meaning by ourselves and others in a context of difference, conflict, and inequality” (Bickford 2011: 1032). Within this context, political discourse is led by power games, and the struggle over language by parliamentarians is a direct manifestation of the struggle over political power (Ilie 2010). Hence, I conceptualize emotions in accordance with the theory of Susan Bickford, who states that “the ways people think and talk about emotion are part of the communicative struggle over meaning and political conflict over public decisions” (2011: 1029).
2.1 Research questions
In line with Aristotle’s ancient thought and its resonance in modern science, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be focussed on the duality of emotion: the interdependence of the innate physiological processes and the psychological assessments of these processes. In other words, the interaction between emotion and reason. Hence, my research does not only include an empirical analysis of displayed emotions in parliamentary debates, but also a reflective part, exploring the psychological assessments of parliamentarians. I endeavour to capture the duality of emotion by asking the following sub-questions:
1) Which emotions are displayed by the members of the Dutch parliament on the topic of migration?
2) How are these emotions displayed by the members of the Dutch parliament on the topic of migration?
3) To what extent do the displayed emotions depend on the type of debate and the type of speaker?
4) To what extent are parliamentarians aware of the role emotions in Dutch parliamentary debates on the topic of migration?
To answer the first sub-question, I will analyse Dutch parliamentary debates on the topic of migration. My focus will be on the emotional discourse in these debates, that is to say, the verbal expression of emotion. Non-verbal expressions of emotion, like the tone of voice, facial
22
expressions and body language will not be analysed in this study. While the analysis of non-verbal expressions would certainly contribute to the understanding of the role of emotions, I expect, following the theory of Bickford, that the emotional dynamics specifically are caught the best through the analysis of emotional discourse. This qualitative content analysis, defined as “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases and meanings” (Berg 2006: 303), will be done by using Atlas.ti. I will use the automatic and manual coding options in Atlas.ti, based on so-called ‘emotion markers’. Emotion markers are words that indicate emotional discourse, displaying certain emotions. This first analysis is aimed at showing which emotions were displayed in the debates, and how often.
To answer the second sub-question, I carefully read the quotations that were coded in the first analysis, and the context in which the emotions were expressed. Doing so, I am analysing a few specific characteristics of the displayed emotions, namely their directness and direction. Do parliamentarians, for example, use the word ‘angry’ to express their anger, or does their anger appear more indirectly? And do the displayed emotions concern personally felt emotions, or the emotions of another parliamentarian, or the emotions of other people outside the debate? The analysis in this part is more interpretative than in the previous one, and aims to create a deeper understanding of the first part by providing further insight and theory building. To answer the third sub-question, I will analyse the co-occurrence of expressed emotions, type of debate and type of speaker. Regarding the type of debate, I will look at how the displayed emotions are distributed over the debates, which debates are more or less emotional than others, and why this could be the case. Regarding the type of speaker, I will look at the distribution of displayed emotions amongst the political parties that participated in the debates, and at specific parliamentarians who stood out in their use of emotional discourse. Furthermore, the quotations were coded ‘male’ or ‘female’, to analyse the influence of gender on displayed emotions. The aim of this analysis is to see whether the national level resonates a similar pattern regarding the type of debate and the political spectrum of the speaker as the European level (Sanchez Salgado 2017: 15), and whether male and female parliamentarians differ in the expression of emotions (Van Baalen 2003: 42).
To answer the fourth sub-question, finally, I will use the plenary debates to a much lesser extent, and primarily focus on the qualitative content analysis of the interviews with Mona Keijzer and Jan-Pieter Dees. Mona Keijzer is one of the parliamentarians that participated in the debates that were analysed, and Jan-Pieter Dees was the policy officer that helped her prepare for these debates, specifically on the topic of migration (and related topics like refugees
23
and asylum). More information on the political background of Mona Keijzer and Jan-Pieter Dees will be discussed in the methodology section. In the debates, emotional awareness will be measured too, as “talk about emotion that is itself emotional expressive” (Bickford 2011: 1029). Furthermore, the interviews with Mona Keijzer and Jan-Pieter Dees will be used to investigate to what extent politicians are aware of the role of emotions in parliamentary debates, and how they subsequently deal with these emotions – so-called ‘emotion management’.
Based on recent literature, I expect that emotions play an important role in parliamentary debates on the topic of migration. Regarding the first sub-question, I expect that the emotions fear, anger, shame, sympathy and compassion in particular will be present in the debates on migration (Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009; Cheng 2015; Hall 2010; Hartley and Pedersen 2015; Huysmans 2006; Kronick and Rousseau 2015; Murray and Marx 2013; Leenders 2003; Rowe and O’Brien 2014; Rosenberger and Winkler 2014; Sanchez Salgado 2017). Regarding the second sub-question, I expect that emotions are expressed in different ways and different directions, as “emotional expressions are interpreted, reacted to, given meaning by ourselves and others in a context of difference, conflict, and inequality” (Bickford 2011: 1032). Regarding the third sub-question, I expect that extreme right populist parties will express more politics of fear, while left-wing populist parties will express more politics of shame (Sanchez Salgado 2017). Regarding the fourth sub-question, I expect that parliamentarians have a certain amount of emotional awareness, and that they regulate their own emotions, understood as ‘emotion management’. Finally, I expect that parliamentarians try to influence emotional dynamics, since “political discourse is led by power games, and the struggle over language by parliamentarians is always a direct manifestation of the struggle over political power” (Ilie 2010).
2.2 Methodology
As briefly introduced in the previous section, the role of emotions in Dutch parliamentary debates will be explored through a qualitative analysis of two case studies. A case study can be defined as a “detailed examination of a single example” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 220).
The first case study consists of 19 plenary debates of the Dutch parliament on the topic of migration. These debates took place between March 2015 and March 2016, covering the peak of the crisis. They are written in Dutch and available online, on the website of the Dutch parliament2. They can be found by using the search engine with key-words like ‘migratie’, ‘asiel’, and ‘vluchtelingen’ (see Annex 2 for the list of debates, including titles and dates). The selection of the debates is based upon reference to migration, asylum and refugees. Therefore,
24
not only debates concerning migration policy at the national and the European level are included, but also debates on returning ISIS-warrios, and the attacks in Paris in November 2015.
Background information for the first case can be found below; the situation of the European migration crisis is sketched in Box 1, the characteristics of the Dutch parliamentary system are described in Box 2. This first case study is a so-called ‘likely’ case: it is most-likely to find emotional expression in parliamentary debates on the topic of migration (Bryman 2012: 70; Flyvbjerg 2006: 226). If emotional expression turns out to be an exception in these debates, then there is little chance to find emotional expressions in other cases. Such a generalisation, however, can only be made to a certain extent when doing a case study (Bryman 2012: 71). After all, my findings cover the exact circumstances of this particular case and are thus very specific. Yet, it is possible that my case findings are relevant for, for example, other Western parliaments, or other levels of governance with comparable circumstances.
The second case study can be seen as a deepening of the first case study. This second case study consists of interviews with two members of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)3, which is one of the political parties that participated in all 19 debates that were analysed. The people interviewed are Mona Keijzer, a CDA-parliamentarian who participated in many of the debates, and Jan-Pieter Dees, the policy officer that helped Mona Keijzer to prepare for the debates. Of course, one should be very careful with making generalisations based upon these interviews, since they are very specific. They are first and foremost aimed to provide a better understanding of the emotional awareness of parliamentarians.
3 Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) is a Christian-democratic political party in The Netherlands. CDA is one of
the bigger parties that is often in the coalition, holding a centrist (to centrist-right) political position. Box 1. Facts European migration crisis
This graph shows how the number of asylum applicants peaked in 2015. During the Convention of Refugees in 1951, refugees were defined as ‘people that have founded fear for persecution’. Most of these people came from the conflict and war areas Syria, Eritrea, Irak, Iran and Afganistan (Vluchtelingenwerk 2017). According to the principle of non-refoulement, people with a refugee status may not be send back to the countries where they are in danger (Amnesty
25
PART III: ANALYSIS
In the analysis, I will discuss the results of my own research on the role of emotions in Dutch parliamentary debates on migration, following the theoretical framework above. I will start with a general discussion on which emotions were displayed in the debates under analysis. Following from recent literature, I will look at the emotions fear, anger, shame, sympathy and compassion. Furthermore, the emotions pride, surprise and hope will be included as well. Also in the first chapter, I will discuss when and how emotion markers relate to emotional discourse, and how emotions are displayed in terms of directness and direction of emotional discourse. In the second chapter, I am going into the type of debate and the type of speaker as mediating factors on the displayed emotions. More specifically, I will take into account the topics of the debates and the political spectrum and gender of the speaker, to see if and to what extent the expression of emotions is influenced by these factors. The third chapter will be less empirical and more reflective, not leaning primarily on the debates, but on the interviews, that have been done with CDA-parliamentarian Mona Keijzer, and her policy officer Jan-Pieter Dees. Here I investigate emotional awareness and emotion management, to gain better insight in the cognitive process of emotions. This analysis aims to provide better understanding on the role of emotions in parliamentary debates, the duality of emotion, the inevitability of emotion in public policy-making and the subsequent importance of emotional awareness in the public domain.
Box 2. Facts Dutch parliament
The democratic system of The Netherlands, the so-called ‘Staten Generaal’, consists of an ‘Eerste Kamer’ (75 members) and a ‘Tweede Kamer’ (150 members; 93 men, 57 women). The representatives are chosen at least every four years during the general elections. In 2015, the following parties formed the parliament (in order of chairs): VVD (40), PvdA (36), SP (15), CDA (13), D66 (12), PVV (12), ChristenUnie (5), GroenLinks (4), SGP (3), PvdD (2), Groep Kuzu/Ozturk (2), 50Plus (1), Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren (2), Houwers (1), Klein (1), Van Vliet (1). The course of a plenary debate consists of two phases. Firstly, the spokespersons of the political parties pose pleas and the (prime-)minister or secretary of state responds. Secondly, questions left can be asked by members of the parliament to the governing parties (VVD and PvdA). Plenary debates are led by the chairman or chairwoman of the parliament, which means that the parliamentarians must deliberate via the chairman/woman. That is not to say, however, that interruptions cannot be made.
26
3.1 Emotional discourse and emotion markers
In this chapter, I will discuss my analysis on emotional discourse – the verbal expression of emotions – in Dutch parliamentary debates on the topic of migration. Given the complex nature and subjectivity of emotions, I make use of emotion markers, which are words that indicate emotional discourse, displaying certain emotions. This is considered a pragmatic approach in which a systematic starting point of the analysis is expected to result in greater reliability. Table 2 on the next page gives an overview of the emotions under analysis, their corresponding emotion markers, and their meaning. In this chapter I endeavour to answer the sub-questions which emotions are displayed, and how they are displayed.
Before going into the findings, I will give some more explanation on the specific applications of the methodology, that is to say, how I coded emotional discourse, and how these codes were linked to the emotions under analysis. The two most basic ‘rules’ I followed were that I did not code the same emotion twice in one speech, or one turn to speak, but that I did code more than one emotion in one speech, sometimes even in the same sentence. I will illustrate these two rules with the following quotation:
“Ook als de heer Wilders mijn baan zou hebben – ik hoop dat dat nooit gebeurt en daar zal ik hard voor blijven werken – zou hij te maken hebben met dit complexe vraagstuk. Dan zou hij snel merken dat er geen simpele oplossingen zijn. Daar komt bij dat zijn bijdrage mij verbaast als ik even naar de inhoud kijk. Elementen van dit voorstel die wat meer gericht zijn op de middellange termijn, werden eerder door de heer Wilders omarmd. Ik herinner mij debatten daarover. Het verbaast mij dat hij daar nu zo sterk afstand van neemt. Ook enige consequentheid in de opstelling van de PVV helpt ons allemaal om dat debat met hem goed te kunnen voeren” (Mark Rutte, VVD).
Here, I underlined the emotion marker ‘verbaast’ twice, but I coded this quotation as just one display of the emotion surprise. In the same quotation, the emotion hope is displayed, which I subsequently coded as a display of the emotion hope. The result, consequently, is one coding of surprise and one coding of hope. Furthermore, I did not code every quotation containing an emotion marker appearing in Table 2. The word ‘hope’, for example, is in Dutch not only used to express hope, but also as the opposite of ‘a little’4. When the latter was the case, obviously, I did not code the quotation as politics of hope. Thus, in order to be coded as emotional discourse, a quotation must both contain an emotion marker and carry its intended meaning.
27
3.1.1 Which emotions are displayed?
In general, the expectation that emotions play an important role in the parliamentary debates on migration, can be confirmed. All emotions that are shown in Table 2 were present in the debates, and they are presumably neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. On the one hand, there are more emotions to be found in the debates, and on the other hand, there will be a certain degree of overlap between the present emotions. Although not too many ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions are being distinguished, they have many different nuances and mixtures (Parrott 2001; Plutchik 2001), resulting in a great variety of emotions. The purpose of my thesis is not to cover as many emotions as possible, but rather, to analyse the most relevant emotions in a systematic manner.
Table 2: Emotions, emotion markers and meaning
5 Following the categorization of Parrott (2001), fear, anger and surprise are considered primary emotions, shame,
compassion, sympathy and pride are considered secondary emotions, and hope a tertiary emotion.
6 Translated, the emotion markers are afraid, fear, terror (fear), shame, disgrace (shame), angry, furious,
scandalous (anger), sympathize, terrible, indescribable (compassion), understand, support, agree (with)
(sympathy), pride (pride), surprise, amaze (surprise), hope (hope).
7 Definitions are based on the Online Oxford Dictionary https://en.oxforddictionaries.com
Emotion5 Emotion markers6 Meaning7
Fear Angst, bang, terreur An unpleasant feeling caused by threat of danger,
pain or harm.
Shame Schamen, schande A painful feeling of humiliation or distress caused by
the consciousness of wrong or foolish behaviour.
Anger Boos, kwaad A strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or
hostility.
Compassion Meeleven, verschrikkelijk, onbeschrijfelijk
A feeling of sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others.
Sympathy Begrijpen, steunen, eens (zijn) A positive feeling of understanding between people, or support in the form of shared feelings or opinions.
Pride Trots A feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived
from one's own achievements.
Surprise Verrassen, verbazen A feeling of mild astonishment or shock caused by something unexpected.
Hope Hoop A feeling of expectation and desire for a particular
28
Box 3. Emotions and corresponding emotional discourse Fear
“Opvang in de regio is niets waard met open grenzen. Om die reden kunnen wij de brief van het kabinet in de prullenbak gooien. Wat ook opvalt, is dat het woord ‘terreur’ niet één keer in de brief voorkomt. Ik heb geen collega erover horen praten. Islamitische Staat heeft al aangegeven dat men duizenden terroristen meestuurt. Jihadisten en terroristen lopen nu al rond in Europa, klaar om een aanslag te plegen. Ik vraag het kabinet om daar een antwoord op te geven. Zwijg er niet over. Wacht niet op de volgende aanslag” (Geert Wilders, PVV).
Shame
“Voorzitter. Vorige week stond ik hier met een hartenkreet: het moest afgelopen zijn. In ons Europa sterven geen kinderen tijdens een wanhopige overtocht. In ons Europa verkommeren geen gezinnen op Hongaarse stations. In ons Europa van rechtvaardigheid, solidariteit en barmhartigheid ontfermen we ons over hen die bescherming nodig hebben en geven we een gezamenlijk antwoord op de oorzaken van de vluchtelingenstroom. Dat Europa is ver weg, beschamend ver weg” (Diederik Samsom, PvdA).
Anger
“Dit is ook weer een verandering van ongekende omvang. Het woord ‘draai’ zit in mijn achterhoofd. Het was namelijk de VVD zelf die overal rondbazuinde: nu gaan eindelijk de grenzen dicht. Mijn grote boosheid zit in het feit dat dit echt een leugen is; ze gaan namelijk niet dicht. (…) Zeg dat nou eens een keer!” (Sybrand Buma, CDA).
Compassion
“De Partij voor de Dieren leeft intens mee met de slachtoffers en de nabestaanden van de aanslagen in Parijs. Tien maanden na de laffe aanslag op Charlie Hebdo is Parijs opnieuw getroffen door een aanslag. Het is een aanslag die verwoestend is in zijn uitwerking” (Frank Wassenberg, PvdD).
Sympathy
“We snappen elkaar niet alleen, we zijn het voor een groot deel met elkaar eens. Ik denk dat dat belangrijk is. (…) Ik ben heel erg blij met de inzet van de heer Van der Staaij. We komen elkaar een eind tegemoet” (Alexander Pechtold, D66).
29
Pride
“Nee, dat is niet waar. Ik heb bijvoorbeeld al ongeveer zolang ik in deze kamer zit een lans gebroken tegen vrouwenbesnijdenis, eerst toen ik nog bij mijn vorige partij zat samen met Ayaan Hirsi Ali, en daarna met mijn eigen partij, de Partij voor de Vrijheid, die ik heb opgericht. Dat zullen we ook altijd doen. Misschien stemmen we niet voor alle moties die door iedereen worden ingediend, maar als één partij het opneemt voor de mensen die het slachtoffer zijn van de islamisering, dan is het wel mijn partij. Ik ben daar trots op, en dat kunt u niet wegpoetsen” (Geert Wilders, PVV).
Surprise
“Ook als de heer Wilders mijn baan zou hebben (…), zou hij te maken hebben met dit complexe vraagstuk. Dan zou hij snel merken dat er geen simpele oplossingen zijn. Daar komt bij dat zijn bijdrage mij verbaast als ik even naar de inhoud kijk. Elementen van dit voorstel die wat meer gericht zijn op de middellange termijn, werden eerder door de heer Wilders omarmd. Ik herinner mij debatten daarover. Het verbaast mij dat hij daar nu zo sterk afstand van neemt. Ook enige consequentheid in de opstelling van de PVV helpt ons allemaal om dat debat met hem goed te kunnen voeren” (Mark Rutte, VVD).
Hope
“Ik snap de bevlogenheid van de heer Samsom als hij spreekt over wat wij allemaal zien. Die heb ik ook, die heeft iedereen hier, mag ik hopen. Niemand zit op beelden te wachten van nog meer slippertjes die aanspoelen. Wij staan hier echter voor de vraag met welke boodschap wij het kabinet naar Brussel willen sturen. Ja, ik hoop dat het met iets terugkomt waarmee al die mensen worden geholpen” (Emile Roemer, SP).
30
Box 3 illustrates how emotional discourse corresponds to the emotions under analysis, and how emotion markers work as a catalyst for connecting emotional discourse to a specific emotion.8 Following from recent literature, the emotions fear, shame, anger, compassion and sympathy were analysed initially. Figure 1 shows that anger was displayed most often in the debates, followed by fear and sympathy. The emotions shame and compassion were displayed to a lesser extent. When all emotions were included, pride and surprise were both displayed less, but hope more than doubled the display of anger (see Figure 2), which is remarkable.
The main reason for this ‘overrepresentation’ of the emotion hope is, presumably, that the word ‘hoop’ is used to express many different variations of the emotion hope, namely, hope as expection (‘Ik hoop dat als de brief af is, het sneller zal gaan dan in de brief staat’), hope as
desire (‘Ik hoop dat de heer Pechtold het met mij eens is’), hope as despair (‘Ik hoop dat de
VVD dan eindelijk een keer bij zinnen komt’), hope as fear (‘Ik hoop niet dat we dat echt gaan doen’) and false hope (‘Ik hoop dat er wordt afgesproken dat de capaciteit voor de Search and Rescue echt omhoog gaat. Ik zie in dat dit geen structurele oplossing biedt, maar…’). In my analysis, the emotion hope was most often expressed as a desire, particularly in the emotional dynamics between coalition and opposition parties. In chapter 2, this will be further explored.
Figure 2 shows that the emotion compassion was least often displayed. The main reason for this ‘underrepresentation’ seems to be that compassion is usually displayed in a less direct way. That is to say, that compassion is often expressed without the use of an emotion marker. The following example illustrates such an indirect display of the emotion compassion:
“Die afspraken zijn broodnodig, omdat mensen nog steeds de levensgevaarlijke tocht over de Egeïsche Zee wagen. Omdat mensen hun laatste spaargeld gebruiken om tegen woekerprijzen door mensensmokkelaars naar de EU gebracht te worden. Omdat mensen door rivieren op de Balkan waden. Omdat mensen op de vlucht voor geweld in Syrië geen perspectief meer hebben in hun thuisland, maar dat perspectief en de bescherming ook ontberen in de buurlanden van Syrië waar zij hun toevlucht hebben gezocht” (Marit Maij, PvdA).
While Marit Maij clearly displays compassion in this example, the quotation does not contain an emotion marker, and is therefore not included in the analysis. This can be regarded a limitation of the analysis, and a downside of the use of emotion markers. In the second part of this chapter, where I will discuss how the emotions in the analysis were displayed, I will further go into the directness of emotional displays.
31 27% 11% 23% 22% 17%
Anger Compassion Fear Sympathy Shame
13% 5% 11% 11% 8% 38% 7% 7%
Anger Compassion Fear Sympathy Shame Hope Surprise Pride
Figure 2: All analysed emotions
32
The emotion shame was displayed less often than expected based on comparable research at the European Parliament (Sanchez Salgado 2017). Sanchez Salgado argues that “the politics of blaming and shaming is often based in human dignity and human rights”, and that the groups who adopt this strategy are mainly left-wing political parties, who also have “specific policy proposals, such as the creation of safe and legal pathways to migration, humanitarian visas and more funds for development policy”. While both the specific policy proposals and the so-called politics of blaming and shaming seem to resonate in the Dutch parliament, this seems to happen in a less direct manner than at the European level:
“Ik vind dat je legale vormen van migratie mogelijk moet maken. Ik vind dat je met humanitaire visa zou moeten werken. (…) Wat ik onbegrijpelijk vind, is dat wij tegen de mensen zeggen dat zij eerst een soort zeskamp moeten overleven, dat zij een levensgevaarlijke zee moeten oversteken, dat zij €1.000 per persoon moeten betalen voor een bootje, terwijl wij ook zouden kunnen zeggen: pakt u het vliegtuig, dat is een stuk goedkoper en een heel stuk veiliger. Dat is inderdaad waar ik voor ben. Iedereen die zegt dat dat een aanzuigende werking heeft, moet niet huilen bij foto's van dode kinderen” (Jesse Klaver, GroenLinks).
Especially the last sentence carries the message: ‘we have a choice, we can save more lives. And if we choose not to do it, we are to blame for that, and we should be ashamed for it.’ Thus, although the emotion markers of shame are not displayed very often, that is not to say that no ‘blame game’ is played. In chapter 2, this will be further discussed and interpreted in the context of the emotional dynamics between left-wing and right-wing political parties. In the same context, I will go into the emotions fear and anger, as these emotions are displayed in particular debates and by particular speakers. It is therefore more useful to discuss them taking into account the type of debate and the type of speaker as factors of influence.
Last but not least, in my analysis, the emotion sympathy is conceptualized as ‘a positive feeling of understanding between people, or support in the form of shared feelings or opinions’ (see Table 2). However, sympathy can also be conceptualized as ‘feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else's misfortune’. As the latter comes close to the conceptualization of the emotion compassion, which is also included in my analysis, I decided to use the first conceptualization. In my analysis, consequently, the displays of the emotion sympathy might refer to another kind of emotional expression than it might do in other research. In other words, while I coded an expression like ‘I wholeheartedly support Minister Rutte on this plan’ as a display of sympathy, another researcher might code an expression like ‘I feel pity for the people who are forced to flee’ as such. This can be regarded a limitation, as it complicates future comparative research.
33
3.1.2 How are emotions displayed?
To better understand how the emotions are displayed through emotional discourse, I made two categorizations based on the directness with which emotions are displayed, and on the
directions in which emotions are displayed. These categorizations are not exhaustive: emotions
are expressed and displayed through emotional discourse in many more ways than I could possibly capture in my analysis, let alone in this chapter. Hence, my aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which emotions are expressed.
Table 3 provides an overview of different ‘degrees of directness’. Within this overview, a primary display of emotions refers to the most direct display of emotions through discourse. That is to say, that a primary display of an emotion contains an emotion marker which directly relates to the expressed emotion. In Table 3, the example of a primary display contains the emotion marker ‘bang’, which directly relates to the expressed emotion fear.
Table 3: The directness with which emotions are displayed through discourse
Directness of emotional discourse Example
Primary display of emotion
“Ondanks de lichtpuntjes die in de overeenkomst te vinden zijn, ben ik toch bang dat Turkije niet zozeer onderdeel vormt van de oplossing van het vluchtelingendrama, maar soms in een bepaald opzicht ook zeker onderdeel vormt van het probleem” (Emile Roemer, SP).
Secondary display of emotion
“Dat is een beetje de angst in dit hele debat. Even los van de Kopenhagencriteria, de angst zit hem erin dat de toetredingsmogelijkheden tot de Europese Unie versneld kunnen worden door de samenwerking met Turkije op het vlak van de vluchtelingenproblematiek” (Voordewind, ChristenUnie).
Tertiary display of emotion
“Ons land gaat in de uitverkoop. Dankzij onze premier, die zich heeft laten piepelen en chanteren door de Turken. Nog nooit is een Nederlandse minister-president zo vernederd, zo door de knieën gegaan. (…) Wat is dit voor ultieme zwakheid? Wat is dit voor een domheid?” (Geert Wilders, PVV).
