Belarus and Abkhazia
Belarusian Foreign Policy Responding to Abkhazia’s
Self Proclaimed Independence
MA Russian and Eurasian Studies Thesis Leiden University
Dennis Winkel S1393995
Supervisor: Dr M.J. Frear Date: 09-06-2018
I would like to thank Dr M. J. Frear for supervising and advising on this thesis. Furthermore, a special thank-you to my parents Anneke and Eric Winkel, sister, Marloes
Table of Content
Table of Content ...2
Introduction ...4
Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework ...6
1.1 States ...6
1.2 What defines a state? ...8
1.3 De facto states ...9
1.4 State Recognition ... 10
1.5 Conclusion ... 11
Chapter 2: Abkhazia and its quest for recognition ... 13
2.1 History of Abkhazia ... 13
2.2 Montevideo criteria applied on Abkhazia ... 16
2.2.1 Permanent population ... 17
2.2.2 Defined territory ... 18
2.2.3 Government ... 18
2.2.4 Capability to engage in relations with other states ... 19
2.3 Abkhazia as a puppet state ... 21
2.4 Benefits of state recognition for Abkhazia ... 21
2.4.1. Emotional value and passports ... 22
2.4.2. Membership to international organizations ... 23
2.4.3. Bilateral and multilateral benefits... 25
2.4.4. Benefits of partial recognition ... 25
2.4.5. Costs of state recognition ... 26
2.4.6. Benefits for a recognizing state ... 26
2.4.7. Recognition strategies of Abkhazia ... 27
2.5 Conclusion ... 27
Chapter 3: International responses to the self-proclaimed independence of Abkhazia ... 29
3.1 International Recognition of Abkhazia... 29
3.2 Motives of Russia and the EU concerning the recognition of Abkhazia ... 32
3.3 The Shared Neighbourhood ... 34
3.3.1 Armenia ... 34
3.3.2 Azerbaijan ... 35
3.3.3 Republic of Moldova ... 36
3.3.5 Belarus ... 38
3.4 Conclusion ... 40
Chapter 4: Belarus and the independence of Abkhazia ... 42
4.1 Foreign policy of the EU and Russia on the Shared Neighbourhood ... 43
4.1.1 Belarus and the EU ... 45
4.1.2 Belarus and Russia ... 47
4.2 Three time periods in the Belarusian position towards Abkhazia ... 49
4.2.1 1999-2008 ... 49
4.2.2 2008-2010 ... 50
4.2.3 2010 onwards ... 51
4.2.4. Belarusian justification of the decision not to recognize Abkhazia ... 53
4.3 Belarus in between the EU and Russia ... 57
4.4 Importance of Abkhazia’s argument in the decision making by Belarus ... 59
4.5 Conclusion ... 61
Conclusion ... 64
Introduction
‘The Republic of Abkhazia intends to build up its relations with other States on the basis of equality, peace, good-neighbourly relations, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and other universally recognised principles of political, economic and cultural cooperation between States’ (Declaration of Independence, 1999).
These exact words can be found in the Declaration of Independence of Abkhazia as presented by the S. Djindjolia, former speaker of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia. For Abkhazia this marked the beginning of the official independence from Georgia. However, this independence was not recognised by Georgia or any other state at that time. It would take nine more years to get recognised by a total of four states: Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. Up to this day, these are the only states that recognise Abkhazia as independent from Georgia. Ever since the declaration of independence by the people of Abkhazia, it has been reaching out to other states to get recognised as independent. In the (political) conflict that preceded as well as succeeded the declaration of independence there are two major players aside from Georgia. These are the European Union and Russia. Russia should be considered an important actor because of its recognition of Abkhazia in 2008 as well as its (military) interference in the Georgian – Abkhaz conflict. The EU has heavily condemned the actions of Russia and has multiple projects to improve relations with Georgia. The majority of the academic literature and research concerning the foreign relations of Abkhazia and its independence focus mainly on Georgia, the EU, and Russia as important factors and actors.
This thesis will look at the shared neighbourhood of Russia and the EU with the main focus on Belarus and its policy towards the self-proclaimed independence of Abkhazia. Up until now, Belarus has not been a point of focus in the literature when discussing the independence of Abkhazia. As this thesis will show, Belarus is an important point of focus in the foreign policy of Abkhazia and therefore, alongside other reasons, makes it an important case to look
at. The research question of this thesis is: how has Belarusian foreign policy responded to the
case of Abkhazia’s self-proclaimed independence?
To answer this question, the thesis will have the following structure: In chapter 1, I will discuss several concepts related to the topic of statehood, de facto states and how states gain recognition. Chapter 2 will look into reasons why Abkhazia believes it should be seen as independent from Georgia. This will be done by providing a historical background of Abkhazia as well as applying the criteria of the Montevideo Convention to this case. Furthermore, this chapter will explore the benefits of state recognition for Abkhazia. Subsequently, Chapter 3 will explore the international response to the proclamation of independence by Abkhazia. First the motives of Russia and the EU are discussed. This is followed by a focus on the five countries in the shared neighbourhood: Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus and how they relate to Abkhazia. In the final chapter, the main focus will lie with the foreign policy of Belarus towards the self-proclaimed independence of Abkhazia. First an analysis of the foreign policy of the EU and Russia on this region with a special emphasis on the relation between the EU and Belarus, and Russia and Belarus will be provided. By this, the context in which the decision making took place is provided. The decision making by Belarus can be subdivided into three time zones: 1999-2008, 2008-2010 and 2010 onwards. The main sources used for this chapter are official publications from the Presidents, political authorities and Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Belarus and Abkhazia as well as state-owned news agencies from both countries. After this, the justification by Belarus is focused on as well as the place of Belarus between the EU and Russia in relation to this case of self-proclaimed independency. Finally, the thesis will look at the importance of Abkhazia’s argument in the decision-making by Belarus. The main argument of this thesis is that Abkhazia has barely had any influence on the decision making by Belarus, but that the decision made was merely a trade-off between relations with the EU or Russia.
Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework
In the following chapter, several concepts are elaborated upon. These concepts are necessary to engage with recognising states, state independence and how de facto states can be dealt with further on. This chapter is divided into several sections with individual topics. The first section will focus on what states are and how a state emerges. After that, the criteria for defining statehood will be elaborated upon. This will be done based on the criteria of the Montevideo Convention. Thirdly, de facto states are explained and how other states can deal with de facto states. This will be followed by a section on how states gain recognition and how states can recognise other states. After this, a conclusion will be presented.
1.1 States
When analysing the independence of a state or country, it is important to know what exactly a state is and how a region may or may not become a state. The definition of a state may vary according to the author as well as to what aspects of a state are studied. Since there have been many theories as well as definitions for state, I will focus on the modern state for this thesis. There is not, nor will there be, a consensus on the definition of state. Hence, for this thesis, I use the definition by Max Weber.
‘The modern state possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. … It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is
regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it’
(Weber 1978, 54-56).
Literature often writes about statehood in combination with international law. Reason for this is that most international disputes with a legal background or internal affairs such as human rights violations often reduce to the matter of statehood or the states involved. (Crawford 1977, 94).
Prior to being recognised, a state must be formed. This leads to the two theories of state, namely the constitutive and declaratory theories of state. The foundation of the constitutive theory is that a state is a state and can only be a state if it gets recognised by other states (Talmon 2005, 102). This theory has been contested by a newer, currently more predominant view, which is the declaratory theory of state which states that ‘the international legal personality of a State and its concomitant rights and obligations solely depend on it being able to satisfy the criteria for statehood’ (Talmon 106, 2005). In short, the constitutive theory of state claims a state can only be a state when it gets recognised by other states, whereas the declaratory theory of state claims that recognition is not needed, but that a state can be a state when it exists conform the criteria for statehood. These two theories oppose but also complement each other, leaving room for debate.
Although both theories clearly describe the conditions needed to become a state, neither can explain nor provide a certain outcome for fights for independence. The constitutive theory does not provide an insight in what a state should do to be recognised as a state. On the contrary, the declaratory theory of state claims that a region should adhere to the criteria for statehood.
1.2 What defines a state?
The most important criteria for statehood are defined in the Montevideo Convention which was signed on December 26, 1933 in Montevideo, Uruguay. Although this was an inter-American convention, its criteria shaped the perception of statehood globally (Horbach, Lefeber & Ribbelink 2007, 166). It should be noted, however, that this convention was about the creation of states rather than the continuation of a state, which some might argue is the case in Abkhazia. In article 1 of the convention, it is stated that:
‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.’
(Montevideo Convention 1933)
Although these notions are presented in this convention, it should be mentioned that this was an inter-American convention which was not signed by parties directly involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Aside from that, it is important to realise that this convention was held in 1933, followed by major international events which could have affected the view on these articles. Although these major global events might have changed certain perceptions, the European Union used the same principles from the Montevideo Convention in the Badinter Arbitration Committee to decide whether to or not to recognise Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia in 1991 (Pellet 182, 1992). Furthermore, the Montevideo Convention can provide an insight on the recognition of states since article 1 still provides certain set of characteristics a state requires, in order to be a state according to the declaratory theory of state. These criteria of the Montevideo Convention tie in with the definition of a state by Weber.
1.3 De facto states
When a region declares independence but does not get recognised as independent, it becomes a de facto state. A de facto state is subjected to two main criteria. There must be a political leadership that has been organised and risen to power. Secondly it should have sufficient support and capacity to rule over a population and territory for a durable time span (Pegg 1998, 1). Another important factor is that a de facto state seeks but does not achieve recognition from the international community although partial recognition might be present. This can also be because the de facto governmental control over a defined territory may be considered as illegitimate.
In contrast to de facto states, there are also de jure states. The difference between de facto and de jure states can be narrowed down to two core principles: (1) de facto states have the necessities of being a state (i.e. a structure, political processes and institutions), but (2) it lacks international recognition which would grant it its sovereignty and independence (Steinsdorff and Fruhstorfer 2012, 118). Especially de facto states have an impact on two aspects of international politics which are political economy and conflict. The latter one is of great importance in the case of Abkhazia with its direct conflicts in 1992-1993 and 2008.
De facto states can be effective even though they are illegitimate. For these states, ‘internal sovereignty is … not ruled out by lack of external sovereignty’ (Caspersen 2009, 47). Although this internal sovereignty is of great importance to the de facto state and possibly of greater importance than external sovereignty, both the emergence and continuation of de facto states are near impossible to explain without external factors. These usually appear in the form of a “patron state” which could argue that de facto states are merely subjected to these “patron states”, which makes the de facto state a “puppet state”. This in turn cancels out the sovereignty (Caspersen 2009, 47-49).
There are generally three ways of dealing with de facto states by the international community aside from recognising it. These three ways are opposing the de facto state, ignoring the de facto state and acknowledging the de facto state to a certain amount (Pegg 1998, 4). Although only a few states recognise Abkhazia, it is not completely isolated from the rest of the world. This is possible by engaging with a state, but not recognising it. For Abkhazia as well as other states, this can prove to be useful.
1.4 State Recognition
It is apparent that de facto states, Abkhazia included, strive for independence and international recognition. The recognition of a state comes with two major benefits which are ‘official intercourse … [and] numerous political and commercial treaties’ (Economist 1924, 623). This can be further explained by the limits of not being recognised. When a state does not get recognised by other states in the international community, its major limitation is the international isolation. This results in being unable to manoeuvre within this international community. In other words, de facto states cannot become externally independent without the international recognition and will be dependent on their patron states (Caspersen 2009, 58).
Lacking this recognition might not stop a de facto state from emerging, but it might interfere with the states survival since external independence is vital for a state’s existence in the long run. For some new de facto states such as Abkhazia it can eventually become a choice between ‘embracing dependence or abandoning recognition’ (Caspersen 2009, 56). Although it cannot be considered a vital aspect for the survival of a state, being recognised as a state provides a form of self-worth. When a country is not recognised, often in the media it is portrayed as “self-proclaimed” which can be perceived as belittling when trying to gain recognition.
The main way in which states get recognised is through an official declaration by other states. In 1936, the Institute of International Law passed a resolution in which state recognition as an act was adopted. Article 2 states that ‘recognition emanates from the authority competent, according to the public law of the State, to represent it in foreign relations’ (Institut de Droit International, 1936). De jure recognition, according to article 4, results from either a state declaration (explicit) or from engaging in diplomatic relations of sorts (implicit) (Institut de Droit International, 1936). The implicit recognition of state recognition is a contested and outdated form of recognising states.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the concept of state has been discussed. For this paper, the definition by Weber is used to describe a state. States can exist in accordance with two theories, the constitutive theory of state and declaratory theory of state. The constitutive theory of state argues that a state can only be seen as a state if it gets recognised as such by other states. Alternatively, the declaratory theory of state argues that a state is a state if it adheres to certain criteria. The possible criteria for statehood have been agreed upon in the Montevideo Convention in 1933. These criteria are that a state needs a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Montevideo Convention, 1933). This narrowly ties in with the definition of a state by Weber.
De facto states are states that are not recognised as states by other states. In these de facto states, a political leadership needs to be organised and gained power. Furthermore, it needs to be able to durably rule over a territory and population. There are three ways to deal with de facto states aside from recognising it. States can ignore the existence, partially recognise it or oppose its existence. For a de facto state, international recognition mainly provides opportunities to manoeuvre within the international community. In the following chapters, the
Montevideo Convention as well as the concept of de facto states and how states can deal with de facto states will be used to answer the research question.
Chapter 2: Abkhazia and its quest for recognition
In this chapter, the main focus will lie with Abkhazia and its self-declared independence. First, a brief history of Abkhazia will be provided in order to familiarise with the conflict that preceded the declaration of independence by Abkhazia. This is followed by the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention and how these relate to the independence and (argued) statehood of Abkhazia. The third section will look into with Abkhazia as seen as a puppet state. After this, the benefits of recognition will be discussed. This includes citizenship, membership to international organizations but also the costs of being recognised as an independent state. Finally, a conclusion will be presented. This chapter will provide an understanding to why Abkhazia has claimed independence from Georgia and whether the existence of Abkhazia as a state can be justified using the Montevideo criteria.
2.1 History of Abkhazia
Prior to understanding Abkhazia’s claim on independence, it is important to familiarise with the history of the breakaway region in Georgia. The following section will provide an overview of the history of Abkhazia since the invasion of Georgia by the Red Army in 1921. The full history of Abkhazia goes back much further than this, some argue even 500 thousand years when a settlement near modern Sukhumi was built. With the introduction of Christianity in the first century CE, a new era started. Between 786 and the end of the 10th century, the first
Abkhaz Kingdom existed, which was succeeded by the Kingdom of Abkhaz and Kartvels till the end of the 13th century. After this kingdom ceased to exist, both Russia and the Ottoman
Empire have ruled over this area which was most often described as the Abkhaz princedom (President of the Republic of Abkhazia, 2018).
After the invasion in 1921, the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia (SSR Abkhazia) was formed. This officially lasted till December 16, 1921 when SSR Abkhazia engaged in a
treaty with the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (Georgian SSR). This treaty implied a de-facto independence from the Georgian SSR and therefore Abkhazia held a special status within the USSR.
Since it was not fully incorporated within the Georgian SSR, it was free to join the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1922. In 1931, the Georgian authorities further incorporated Abkhazia in the Georgian SSR, resulting in the end of the SSR Abkhazia which would become the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhaz ASSR) (Shenfield, 2010). This republic was an official region within the Georgian SSR. The incorporation was arguably a first step towards undermining Abkhaz authority.
During the Great Purge between 1936 and 1938 the majority of Abkhaz political actors were removed from power within Abkhazia as well as the Georgian governmental structure, of which a great number was arrested on political grounds. This meant that in 1952, out of the 228 top party officials as well as governmental actors and business managers in Abkhazia, 80% were ethnic Georgian, leaving only 34 Abkhaz and 10 other nationalities in power (Shenfield, 2010). During this period, the Abkhaz language became severely repressed as well by the closing of Abkhaz schools and media control.
After Stalin’s death, the repression was slightly lifted, and Abkhazia’s cultural development was stimulated. The repression by Georgians during the Stalin era of the Soviet Union would prove to be an important factor in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict that (re-)emerged during the 1980’s and 1990’s (Shenfield, 2010).
Moving towards the end of the Soviet Union, Georgia regained its independence from the Soviet Union on May 26, 1991 after a referendum held on March 31, 1991. During the short reign of elected president Gamsakhurdia he promised to re-establish full control over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was shortly followed by a coup d’etat as well as a rise of conflict in these breakaway regions.
Numerous causes can be named for the conflict that would reach a new high between 1992 and 1993. Georgia claims authority over Abkhazia, using the decree by Stalin from 1931 as legitimacy, and Abkhazia argues to have ethnical and historical differences from Georgia, hence its claim on independence (Kvarchelia 1996, 18).
On 14 August 1992, a war between the Georgian forces and the Abkhaz separatists started, following the proclamation of independence by the Abkhaz government on July 23rd. The Abkhaz separatists were backed by Russian minorities in the Caucasus such as Chechens and Cossacks after the Georgian troops entered Abkhazia. Within this conflict, numerous war crimes were committed by both sides. The CSCE even ‘expressed their deep concern over “ethnic cleansing”, the massive expulsion of people, predominantly Georgian, from their living areas and the deaths of large numbers of innocent civilians’ (CSCE 1994, 7).
There are no exact numbers available, but the Committee on Human Rights and Interethnic Relations of the Georgian government and the Committee for Human Rights of Abkhazia argue there were 4000 Georgians killed, 10,000 wounded and a 1000 missing as well as 4040 Abkhazians killed (of which 1820 civilians), 8000 wounded and 122 missing (Human Rights Watch, 1995).
According to the Abkhazian authorities, the sovereign Republic of Abkhazia was formed after this war in 1993. This was followed by the adoption of the new constitution as well as the appointment of the first president, Vladislav Ardzynba, on November 26, 1994. After a referendum in 1999, the Act on State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia was finally adopted on October 12 of that same year (President of the Republic of Abkhazia, 2015). This referendum had 87,6% of its eligible population vote, which had 97,7% vote in favour of this new constitution which would adopt the Act on State Independence.
The Abkhazians claim that Georgia violated the agreed cease-fire on multiple occasions after the war in 92/93. In 2008, the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia came to a new high
with a second war. In this war, the Abkhazians got full support from the Russian government and with combined forces, the Georgian troops were removed from Abkhazia. On August 15-16, a cease fire was signed between Russia and Georgia, formally ending the war (President of Abkhazia, 2015).
In 2008, Abkhazia got officially recognised as a sovereign country by the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev. Currently, the Georgian government refers to Abkhazia as the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, although it still claims it is ‘the legitimate integral part of Georgia’ (Government of Georgia, 2014). Abkhazia itself uses the same terminology to describe its statehood. However, it does also claim to be independent from Georgia (Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, 2017a). It is an interesting observation that both parties call Abkhazia an autonomous region. Although this has no direct implications, it can make one wonder how the independence of Abkhazia would add to its existence.
2.2 Montevideo criteria applied on Abkhazia
Although Georgia officially considers Abkhazia as a territory occupied by Russian military since the passing of a resolution on August 28, 2008, Abkhazia claims to be independent and wishes to be recognised as such (Civil Georgia, 2008). To be recognized, a new state needs to provide proof to other states that they are dealing with a factual state, rather than a theoretical one. This can be done by looking at the four criteria of statehood as stated in the Montevideo convention. Looking further into these criteria, it shows that these are not as defined as it appears. Firstly, a permanent population implies that a state is more than a government or a territory, but also a collective group of individuals (Zadeh 2012, 22). This permanent population does not specify an amount, but only states that there should be a population at any given moment.
Secondly, the defined territory implies that a state needs a defined territory to be a state. Border disputes do not interfere with the existence of a state. Although it means that the territory of a state is not defined, it should be interpreted that a territory does not need precise borders but needs general borders which may vary (Zadeh 2012, 19-20).
Thirdly, there must be a government. This government should be ‘capable of exercising independent and effective authority over the population and the territory’ (Zadeh 2012, 23). In some cases, it can be hard to define whether a government is capable of exercising this authority or whether it fails to do so.
Finally, a state needs the capacity to enter relations with the other states. This can be interpreted in many ways which can include foreign investment, trade, aid and dialogue. Some scholars might argue this is not a requirement to gain statehood, but rather the result of gaining statehood (Zadeh 2012, 32).
If Abkhazia would inherently adhere to these criteria of statehood, one could argue that in accordance with the declaratory theory of state as presented in chapter 1, Abkhazia can be seen as a legit state.
2.2.1 Permanent population
Looking at the first one, a permanent population, Abkhazia does have a clear demographic structure and a permanent population. During a 2011 census held by the Office of Government Statistics, the total population of Abkhazia is 240,705 (AbkhazWorld, 2011), these data are also presented by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The demographic breakdown of nationalities shows that out of the 240,705 inhabitants, 122,069 are Abkhazians, 22,077 Russians, 41,864 Armenians, 43,166 Georgians, 3201 Megrelians/Mingrelians and 1380 Greeks. All nationalities combined add up to 91 different nationalities (Civil Georgia, 2008b).
Neither the United Nations (UN) nor the World Factbook by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report on the population of Abkhazia since neither recognise it as an independent country. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that Abkhazia does indeed have a permanent population, and thus fulfils the first criterion of statehood according to the Montevideo convention.
2.2.2 Defined territory
Secondly, the Montevideo convention states that a state should have a defined territory. As previously stated, due to border conflicts, a defined territory does not need to have defined borders to be recognised as such. However, on the territory of Abkhazia, all parties can agree. The Abkhazian governmental website as well as the UNPO and the Georgian governmental website state that the territory of Abkhazia is roughly 8700km2 which would make up a total of
12,5% of the entire Georgian territory with Abkhazia included (Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, 2017b), (UNPO, 2015), (Government of Georgia, 2014).
The reason that all parties can agree on the territory is that although Georgia does not recognise Abkhazia as independent, it still recognises Abkhazia as a region within Georgia which has a Georgian defined territory. This territory corresponds to the territory as defined by the Abkhaz government.
2.2.3 Government
Thirdly, a government is needed as stated by the criteria listed in the Montevideo convention. When looking at this criterion, the government should be functional in all forms, being able to rule over the territory and population. The government of Abkhazia currently consists of the President (Raul Khajimba), Vice President (Vitali Gabnia), Prime Minister (Artur Mikvabia), First Vice Premier (Shamil Adzynba), Vice Premier (Dmitri Serikov), Chief
of Cabinet Staff (Diana Pilia): a total of 14 ministers and 7 chairmen of state committees (Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, 2017b).
This shows quite an extensive government, theoretically capable of ruling all aspects of governance in Abkhazia. There have currently been several elections of which the previous presidential elections took place in 2009, 2011 and 2014. The election in 2014 was observed by the UNPO during an Election Observation Mission (EOM) of which the results were presented to the European Parliament.
Mainly, the UNPO reported that the elections were ‘largely conducted in an organised, peaceful and transparent manner and conformed the international democratic standards’ (UNPO, 2014). This shows that the government of Abkhazia is arguably democratically elected and controls its population and territory in a democratic way. The effectiveness of this government, however, is up for debate.
Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that Abkhazia does have a governmental structure similar to other, recognised, states. Its president is elected for a five-year term and the power is divided among a legislative power (People’s Assembly), executive power (president) and the judicial power (supreme court and lesser courts). This is all written down in the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia on November 26, 1994.
2.2.4 Capability to engage in relations with other states
The final criterion of statehood according to the Montevideo convention is that a state should be capable to enter in relations with other states. In theory, the Abkhazian constitution enables Abkhazia to engage in international relations with other states. This is set in articles 47 (8) and 53 (4) of the Abkhazian constitution. Article 47 (8) states that the Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia will ‘ratify and denounce the interstate treaties and agreements of the
Republic of Abkhazia’ (Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, 2008). Article 53 (4) enables the President of Abkhazia to ‘sign international instruments and interstate treaties’ (Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, 2008).
Furthermore, Abkhazia engages in international relations on a practical level as well. First of all, the foreign ministry of Abkhazia has two embassies, several consulates, plenipotentiary representatives and representatives of the ministry around the world. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, 2017).
This shows that, although only recognised by three states, Abkhazia has a more extensive network of its foreign ministry in other states which do not recognise Abkhazia as an independent, sovereign country. It should be noted, however, that although these consulates and plenipotentiary representatives are present in other states, this does not necessarily imply these states view these institutions as a part of a state, nor that they treat them as such.
Secondly, an important pillar of foreign relations is trade. An article by ApsnyPress (Abkhazia’s state press agency) has stated that in 2012, 82% of Abkhazia’s trade balance was with Russia (64%) and Turkey (18%). The remaining 18% can be subdivided in Baltic Countries (5%), Moldova (2%), Germany (2%), Ukraine (1%), China (1%) and Other (7%). Exports from Abkhazia only go to Russia (64%) and Turkey (36%) (ApsnyPress, 2012). There are no exact figures available for the import.
These four criteria show that Abkhazia can be argued to be a state, according to the declaratory theory of state when accepting the Montevideo criteria as the basis for statehood. Furthermore, by adhering to these criteria of the Montevideo Convention, it similarly adheres to the concept of state as defined by Max Weber.
Nonetheless, Abkhazia does not get widely recognised as a state. Thus far, Abkhazia gets recognised by four countries: Russia (Solovyev, 2008), Nicaragua (President of Nicaragua, 2008), Venezuela (BBC, 2009) and Nauru (Reuters, 2009) as well as four other non-recognised
countries: South Ossetia, Transnistria, Republic of Artsakh and Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
2.3 Abkhazia as a puppet state
If one would accept that Abkhazia is, or can be, a state that is independent from Georgia, it can still be seen as highly dependent on Russia. Therefore, Abkhazia can be seen as a puppet state. In the case of viewing Abkhazia as a puppet state, Russia fulfils the role as “patron state” by fully supporting as well as recognising the independence of the breakaway region. There are multiple ways a “patron state” can support a de facto state. This can be done by providing currency, passports or more specifically for Abkhazia, security and state budget (Caspersen 2009, 50). A “patron state” does not make up for international recognition.
Although this does provide security for Abkhazia, it limits its potential in the international community and its potential to develop in a fully independent state. For other states this can be considered beneficial to reduce the influence of Russia in the Caucasus. Recognizing Abkhazia as an independent state may be complicated due to the non-recognition policy of Georgia towards the breakaway region but engaging politically and economically with the region might prove to be possible. If this engagement will stay behind, it will put Abkhazia in a position where it must choose between Moscow and Tbilisi. Given past events, it will be unlikely that Abkhazia will turn back to Tbilisi, resulting in a more thorough relationship with Moscow (Cooley & Mitchell 2010, 66).
2.4 Benefits of state recognition for Abkhazia
After the second World War, the number of states increased rapidly, from 64 states in 1945 to almost 200 in 2014 (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 79). The majority of this increase can be attributed to decolonisation. When looking at this decolonisation, it became apparent that it was
a rarity that a colony would be let go without there being a secessionist movement in the colony. This implies that there was a longing for independence. Since a lot has changed since the mass-decolonisation and Abkhazia is not a colony, not all motives are similar, but some remain the same. As shown, Abkhazia is aiming towards full independence. The constitutive theory of state claims that a state can only be a state if it is recognised by other states. Therefore, being recognised would imply being a state in accordance with this theory. In 2009, Putin stated that although only a few countries recognise Abkhazia, it was only needed that Russia would recognise it in order to continue the peacekeeping efforts in the region (Putin, 2009). This section will look at the benefits for Abkhazia of being recognised as a state.
2.4.1. Emotional value and passports
The feeling of being recognised can be perceived as a valid reason to strife for state recognition, albeit not very academic nor measurable. This feeling of being recognised can however be linked to nationalism. In the case of nationalism, an important factor of being recognised is having the nationality being recognized. This, in turn, can be linked to de jure citizenship. When someone is considered a citizen of a country, one can obtain a passport for this specific nationality. Since 2006, it is possible for Abkhazians to obtain an Abkhazian passport. This passport, however, does not get recognised by the majority of countries, similar to the Abkhazian nationality. Because of this, Abkhazians cannot travel abroad on an Abkhazian passport, aside from traveling to the four states that do recognise Abkhazia. A solution for this would be to obtain either a Georgian or Russian passport.
In the 1990s, it was not allowed to distribute Georgian passports in Abkhazia, nor was it possible to gain an Abkhazian passport. Since this resulted in the disability to travel, Russia stepped in and provided Russian passports to citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Mühlfried 2010, 9). This has proven to be an argument for Russia to aid its citizens in Abkhazia in the
fight to gain independence from Georgia in 2008. In 2002, 150.000 Abkhazians obtained a Russian passport (Mackinnon, 2002). By awarding Russian passports to 150.000 Abkhazians, these people became more dependent on Russia. In case Abkhazia would decide to move away from Russia, these passports could be revoked, removing the ability to travel abroad and gain certain benefits related to e.g. pension in Russia.
2.4.2. Membership to international organizations
A more practical motive for wanting state recognition is the possibility to gain membership to certain organisations. The most important organisation that would, at least, require statehood as a condition for membership is the United Nations. Being a membership of the United Nations can be helpful to a state in multiple ways. These benefits can be attributed to the major objectives or purposes of the UN as cited in Article 1 of the UN-Charter. The purposes of the UN are ‘to maintain international peace and security … to develop friendly relations among nations … to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character … [and] to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends’ (UN-Charter, 1945).
When individually looking at these purposes, Abkhazia would benefit a lot from UN membership, based on these objectives alone. Currently, the conflict in Abkhazia has cooled down, but chances are a new conflict could arise. Being a UN member would greatly improve the security of the state. Although Abkhazia does attempt to improve relations with other states, these efforts have not been very fruitful. Being recognised as a state, and even further, gaining, UN membership could positively influence the relations between Abkhazia and other states. However, it should be noted that being a state or being recognised as one, does not automatically result in admission to the UN.
Aside from the main objectives of the UN, the UN has multiple organs that could benefit Abkhazia or any member state as such. Several UN programmes have been and are present and active in Abkhazia. Most of these are active in the economy, healthcare and education of Abkhazia. During a meeting in February 2017, the start of UN Women in Abkhazia was discussed and should start in the near future (Apsnypress, 2017).
Although these UN programmes are active in Abkhazia, some specific specialised agencies have statehood as a requirement for a state to be eligible for aid. The most important ones are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to gain loans. These forms of aid could provide a new state, such as Abkhazia in case of recognition, to further develop its economy and create financial independence (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 80).
Another international organisation that could provide significant help to Abkhazia is the European Union. No member state of the EU recognises Abkhazia as an independent state. But, in the (theoretical) case of Abkhazia being recognised by the entire European Union, this could prove to be very beneficial for Abkhazia. The ultimate goal could be EU membership. Nonetheless, this is not required for benefiting from being recognised as a state by the EU.
One of the benefits of being recognised by the EU would be eligibility to join the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which is in turn part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). As the European External Action Service (EEAS) explains, the EaP ‘aims at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation’ (EEAS, April 2016). This would have multiple effects on Abkhazia.
Firstly, this would greatly improve relations with the other EU members as well as the EU in general as an institution, providing a big market and possibilities for trade and other interaction. Secondly, Abkhazia could specifically improve relations with the EU through an Association Agreement and joining Deep and Comprehensive Trade Areas. This could be seen as a first step towards economic and political integration. Not only does this imply better
chances for Abkhazia on a global or regional scale, but it also reduces the dependence on Russia.
2.4.3. Bilateral and multilateral benefits
Up until now, the importance of international organisations has been stressed. Aside from international organisations, being recognised as a state also provides opportunities for multilateral or bilateral financial aid (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 94). In the case of Abkhazia, the event of recognising Abkhazia would already be a signal towards Georgia. Nonetheless, in theory, it is easier for a state to engage in bilateral aid when the other party is being recognised as a state as well. This can in turn be related to the concept of free markets. For Abkhazia, it would be less difficult to join the market when it is recognised (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 94-95). As an example of a bilateral benefit of state recognition is that recognition has postal value as well. When a state gets recognised, the postal value enables states to mail goods or correspondence directly to this specific state, hence creating possibilities for bilateral interaction and trade (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 94). Obtaining this postal benefit, positively affects the possibility of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and increases the economic chances for a non-recognised state.
2.4.4. Benefits of partial recognition
Partial recognition also has certain benefits. For example, it would allow Abkhazians to travel with Abkhaz documents. Although accepting an official symbol of a country can be very sensitive, especially for Georgia, it is not a new phenomenon. Both the United States as well as the United Kingdom allow visa and travel applications from the Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus, even though this Republic only gets recognised by Turkey (Cooley & Mitchell 2010,
67). Furthermore, although Georgian embargo’s might encumber possible trade with Abkhazia, it could be worth trying to engage in trade with Abkhazia as a third party.
Currently, as argued, Abkhazia can be seen as a puppet state from Russia. A possible reason why this would not be sufficient and full independence is desired, can be found in the limitations that puppet states have. Since Abkhazia has lost its (economic) dependency on Georgia, it has gained dependency on Russia. This stands in the way of developing fully as an independent country. Although having Russia as a patron state or being recognised as a de facto state does have its benefits, it cannot account for the benefits an independent state would have such as membership of the UN or receiving aid from several international organisations.
2.4.5. Costs of state recognition
Aside from benefits, three costs of statehood can be identified as well. These costs can be identified as such that a new state needs a viable judicial and financial system, will lose all benefits of being included in the current state, and any humanitarian aid could possibly leave the area (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 96). In the case of Abkhazia, it has been shown that these financial and judicial systems are already in place and that Abkhazia currently possesses semi-autonomy in Georgia. This implies that it does not benefit from the Georgian state. This would only leave a third of the “cost” for Abkhazia to bear, but this might be insignificant compared to the possible gains of statehood.
2.4.6. Benefits for a recognizing state
As shown, there are many benefits to being recognised. However, the act of recognising a state needs to be beneficial to the recognising state as well. Without an incentive, recognition is unlikely. Furthermore, these benefits would need to outweigh the possible losses of
recognising a new state, i.e. trading with the origin state. Several reasons to recognise a state can be identified, of which some can be related to the benefits for the recognised state.
First of all, the recognised state could more easily trade with the recognising state. This could also result in trade benefits or contracts to benefit both parties. Secondly, agreements can be made on e.g. mining resources in the recognised country. In general, preferential treatment can be agreed upon in return for recognition. This could be economical as well as political. If the recognised state has a lot of resources available, this could be an incentive to recognise it and gain beneficial trade or mining agreements on these resources.
2.4.7. Recognition strategies of Abkhazia
Abkhazia has engaged in multiple strategies in order to gain recognition. The most visible strategy is appealing to the shared history and culture with other states. In 2014, the speaker of the Abkhaz government, Valeri Bganbga, wrote a letter to the presidents of Belarus and Kazakhstan to gain recognition. He stressed that during Soviet times, the contact was present in multiple forms. Furthermore, the shared historical relations would provide a good foundation for recognising Abkhazia as independent (GHN, 2014). Although neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan recognise the independence of Abkhazia, its citizens have a special opportunity to enter Abkhazia. These visitors do not need a visa if they enter Abkhazia for ‘tourist or business purposes for a period not exceeding two weeks’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, 2018a).
2.5 Conclusion
When looking at the Montevideo criteria, Abkhazia has a permanent population which has been certified in a census in 2011. Its territory can be agreed upon by both Abkhazia and Georgia, although the parties do not agree on its independence. The government of Abkhazia
is extensive and set in the Abkhazian constitution. Although perceived to be democratic, its functionality can be questioned. In the constitution, the possibility to engage with other states is established. Furthermore, with the consulates and embassies of Abkhazia abroad and the trade with other states, it can be argued that Abkhazia is capable of engaging in relations with other states. It should be noted, however, that this can be a one-way relation. Taking these four criteria into account, one could argue that Abkhazia has the necessities for statehood.
There are multiple benefits to being recognised. First of all, aside from the feeling of being recognised, being recognised as a state would also result in the recognition of the Abkhazian nationality. That would provide the possibility to travel abroad, using an Abkhazian passport. Furthermore, this would reduce the dependence on Russia and Russian passports. Secondly, being recognised as a state could open doors to certain international organisations. The most important would be the United Nations, the possibility for loans from the IMF and World Bank and the possibility to improve the relation with the European Union. Thirdly, bilateral and multilateral relationships could greatly improve by being recognised as a state since this would facilitate access to the global market. There are costs to statehood such as losing benefits from being a part of a state, however, these can be neglected due to the current independence of Abkhazia from Georgia.
Finally, the strategies of Abkhazia to appeal for recognition are often related to the cultural and historical similarities with other states. The main focus of Abkhazian foreign policy lies with Kazakhstan and Belarus whereas they perceive these countries to be the most likely to recognise the Abkhazian independence. Kazakhstan and Belarus therefore receive special visa treatments.
Chapter 3: International responses to the self-proclaimed independence of
Abkhazia
As stressed in the introduction, the majority of the debate around Abkhazia and its (potential) independence focusses on the main players. These players besides Georgia and Abkhazia are the European Union and Russia. Whereas these two major powers can certainly be perceived as the most influential powers in this debate, there are more states to take into consideration. This chapter will focus on the international response concerning the self-proclaimed independence of Abkhazia. First, the current international recognition of
Abkhazia will be discussed, followed by the motives of Russia to recognise Abkhazia and the motives of the EU not to recognise it. Furthermore, the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia will be discussed as well as their position towards Abkhazia and its self-proclaimed independence.
3.1 International Recognition of Abkhazia
The recognition of Abkhazia was first blocked by Resolution 1808 by the United Nations Security Council in 2008. This resolution extended the observation mission in Georgia and reaffirmed ‘the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders’ (United Nations, 2008). Later, Abkhazia got recognised by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru nonetheless. The latter three states recognized Abkhazia for a variety of reasons. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia will be elaborated upon in the next section.
As previously stated, Abkhazia does arguably adhere to the four criteria of statehood according to the Montevideo Convention which would argue it to be a state following the declaratory theory of state. The constitutive theory of state, on the other hand, could argue against Abkhazia being a state because it lacks general recognition. Opinions may vary, since
four UN-member states do recognise the independence of Abkhazia which can be argued to be enough to be seen as a state in accordance with the declaratory theory of state. The UN does not hold criteria for how many states need to recognize a state for it to be fully accepted to be a state. For state recognition however, in its core principle, the UN adheres to the Montevideo criteria.
The decision of Russia to recognise Abkhazia as an independent state was met with general disapproval. The main argument provided against the recognition of Abkhazia is that ‘such recognition presents a breach of international law, namely, the violation of the territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised border’ (Chirikba 2009, 1).
One of the main arguments by Russia that followed was that such violation of the territorial integrity did not withheld states from recognising Kosovo earlier that year and thereby violating the territorial integrity of Serbia. As a defence against this accusation, these states replied that the case of Kosovo is unique and cannot, nor should, be seen as a precedent of Abkhazia (Chirikba 2009, 1).
When taking this argument of the territorial integrity of a state into account, it could be noted that therefore the emergence of a new state is impossible in the modern world since it would always violate existing borders. In order to check the legality of the independence of Abkhazia, Chirikba used six questions to put Abkhazia’s independence in a legal perspective. These questions include ‘(1) Did Abkhazia have a history of statehood before it became a part of the Georgian SSR? … (2) Was Abkhazia a state during the Soviet period? … (3) Did the Abkhazian ASSR have the right of secession from the Georgian SSR? … (4) Did Abkhazia have any legal inter-relations with Georgia in the post-Soviet period prior to its recognition? … (5) Did Abkhazia manage to establish itself as an independent polity before its recognition? … [and] (6) Does Abkhazia meet internationally accepted criteria for qualification as a State?’ (Chirikba 2009, 1-3). Some of these questions such as ‘Did the Abkhazian ASSR have the right
of secession from the Georgian SSR?’ will receive a different answer, depending on which side of the conflict in Georgia will provide the answer.
The conclusion is that Abkhazia has an extensive history of being a state although this was not always an independent state, prior to its incorporation in the Georgian SSR. When looking at international law, it can be argued that between its independence from the Georgia in 1993 and its recognition by Russia in 2008, Abkhazia was self-governed and met the criteria for statehood as mentioned in the Montevideo convention (Chirikba 2009, 11-12). When relating back to the argument of the violation of the territorial integrity of Georgia, two arguments are provided to support the claim that this was in fact not a breach of international law. These arguments are that both wars in 1992-1993 and 2008 were the results of the Georgian oppressive policy towards Abkhazia and that Georgia held no control over the region any longer (Chirikba 2009, 11-12). By disproving the argument of international law, some scholars believe that it is not international law, but rather (geo)political arguments that withhold states from recognising Abkhazia.
This raises the question what could happen if other states decided to recognise Abkhazia as an independent state. The most important actor in this case would be the European Union. In 2008, the European Union deployed a Monitoring Mission in Georgia to aid in resolving the conflict. In the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015, the EU reconfirmed its dedication to the relationship with Georgia. This relationship resulted in the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in July 2016 (European External Action Service, 2017). The relationship between the European states and Georgia can be an important incentive not to recognise Abkhazia.
The fear of losing the support of Georgia in the Southern Caucasus can be a reason why the EU Member States do not recognise Abkhazia (Clamadieu, 2017). Although not recognising Abkhazia could be more beneficial towards the EU-Georgia relation, it could also mean that
the only viable partner for Abkhazia would be Russia. This could result in a stronger position of Russia within the Southern Caucasus. Nonetheless, the European Union could not decide to recognise Abkhazia as long as Georgia holds its non-recognition stance towards Abkhazia since its relationship with Georgia is perceived to be more valuable. Furthermore, recognising Abkhazia could be used as a precedent for other de-facto states within the region as well as outside the region to claim independence and use Abkhazia as an example to justify their independence.
Lastly, although it is argued that there is no legal ground for not recognising Abkhazia, it can also be argued that there is no legal ground for recognising Abkhazia either, giving it an exceptional status in international law. The “rights of peoples to self-determination” is applicable on cases with a colonial history and there is no right of secession in international law, making it hard to find legal ground to recognise Abkhazia as an independent state (Clamadieu, 2017).
3.2 Motives of Russia and the EU concerning the recognition of Abkhazia
As previously stated, the two major players within this situation are the Russian Federation and the EU. This section will elaborate on the reasons provided by Russia to recognise Abkhazia, and the reasons provided by the EU not to recognise it.
Since the Russian decision to – suddenly – recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, former president Medvedev gave a statement on August 26, 2008 on this exact question. The main reason for Russia to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia was the attack by the Georgian government on Tskhinvali. During this attack, many people perished. This included several Russian peacekeepers. The attack on Tskhinvali was perceived by Russia as an attempted Genocide. As a result, Russia believed that a peaceful solution would no longer be possible and decided to interfere (Medvedev, 2008).
It is argued that Medvedev did not provide a solid argument on why to recognise (especially) Abkhazia, since there was no attack on Abkhazia. Furthermore, it was striking that after so many years of conflict, Russia decided only now to interfere. This implies that purely being attacked might harm the right of self-determination but that does not mean that it should lead to secession (Samkharadze 163, 2016).
Another argument given by the Russian officials is related to the recognition of the independence of Kosovo. Kosovo is often mentioned when discussing Abkhazia since some people argue it is a rather similar case, yet others argue the complete opposite. Whether the cases of Abkhazia and Kosovo are similar is not relevant for this thesis.
In a statement by Putin on January 2006, prior to the recognition of Abkhazia, he said that if Kosovo would be granted independence, he would not see a valid reason not to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Samkharadze 163, 2016). Several statements followed in the years prior to the recognition of both Kosovo and later Abkhazia and these statements would often refer to the same idea of precedence in case Kosovo would be recognised as independent.
The possible recognition of Abkhazia by the European Union was discussed on September 1, 2008 by the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels. In the second point from the conclusion that was sent to the delegations, it is stressed that the European Council ‘strongly condemns Russia’s unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ (European Council, 2008). Furthermore, it called upon the Member States of the EU not to recognise this independence.
The decision by the European Council is based upon several principles in international law. As quoted ‘It [the European Council] recalls that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions’ (European Council, 2008).
3.3 The Shared Neighbourhood
As previously mentioned, the majority of the literature about the Georgian Abkhazian conflict as well as the fight for independence of Abkhazia focuses on the two bigger players in this game, which are the European Union and Russia. Russia being the actor that actively supports the independence of Abkhazia on the one side and the European Union that actively supports the Georgian territorial integrity on the other side. Aside from these two big players, there are multiple smaller players which are important as well. These smaller players in the case of this thesis are both geographically as well as politically in between the two big players. To narrow it down, I have chosen to look at the former Soviet states in the shared neighbourhood of the European Union and Russia. These states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Naturally, Georgia will be omitted for obvious reasons. This leaves five countries with an approach towards Georgia, Abkhazia and the conflict in general. None of these countries officially recognise Abkhazia. In this following section, the position of these states will be elaborated upon.
3.3.1 Armenia
According to the 2011 census, the third largest ethnicity in Abkhazia is Armenian with 17,39%, right after Georgian and, of course, Abkhaz. This implies that in 2011, around 42.000 Armenians were living in Abkhazia (AbkhazWorld, 2011). The president of Armenia, Serzj Sarkisian, has made a statement in 2008 that Armenia will not recognise Abkhazia. He does state that he supports the right of self-determination of Abkhazians. The main reason provided for this decision is that Armenia cannot recognise Abkhazia for the same reason it cannot
recognise Nagorno-Karabakh nor Kosovo (UNPO, 2008). Furthermore, it is a political game for Armenia to play.
Recognising Abkhazia would worsen the relationship with Georgia. This could prove to be disastrous for the economy of Armenia since its trade is already blocked by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Georgia’s importance to Armenia can be found in the accessibility of Armenia. The Russian gas reaches Armenia via a pipeline that runs through Georgia. Furthermore, as a landlocked country, Armenia is reliant on the ports in both Poti and Batumi in Georgia which process roughly 90% of the import and export of Armenia by sea (Armenia Liberty, 2008). By taking these facts into consideration, Armenian recognition of Abkhazia does not seem likely to happen.
3.3.2 Azerbaijan
In 2008, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Khazar Ibrahim, stated in a speech that ‘Azerbaijan’s position remains unchanged. We recognise Georgia’s territorial integrity’ (Today.az, 2008). Azerbaijan has a similar de facto region, Nagorno-Karabakh, which is de facto ruled by the Republic of Artsakh which proclaimed independence in 1991. Although Azerbaijan does not exercise any power over this region, they refuse to acknowledge it. This results in a strong opposition against the possible independence of Abkhazia. In 2007, prior to the recognition of Abkhazia by Russia, Venezuela and Nicaragua, the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, held a speech at the opening of the GUAM Baku Summit. This speech also focused on breakaway regions. Aliyev mentioned Abkhazia and stated that the world community ‘will never recognise criminal regimes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Dnestr region and Daghlig Garabagh’ (Aliyev, 2007).
Aside from respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan claims that the independence of Abkhazia is against the international law. During a joint meeting of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in 2016, it was stressed that a peaceful solution should be sought for the conflicts with the de facto states due to their illegitimate existence in accordance with international law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, 2016). Furthermore, the relation between Azerbaijan and Georgia has been improving in the past few years with an important similarity between the countries which are the breakaway regions.
In March 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, and Georgia, Mikheil Janelidze, gave a joint press conference in which both parties stressed the importance of supporting and recognising each other’s territorial integrity. Mammadyarov once more stressed that ‘this conflict must be settled based on the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of internationally recognised borders’ (Mammadyarov, 2016). Naturally, following the 2017 parliamentary elections in Abkhazia, an official statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan stated that Azerbaijan does not recognise the elections nor its results (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, 2017).
3.3.3 Republic of Moldova
Similar to Azerbaijan, Moldova faces its own breakaway region, Transnistria. In an official statement from the Moldovan government, it expressed its opinion on the breakaway regions of Georgia; ‘The government of Moldova does not think at this moment that international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will become a factor stabilising the situation’ (Reuters, 2008). Here, Moldova uses the argument that recognition will not stabilise the region nor will result in peace. This was further elaborated upon during the 63rd general
assembly of the United Nations in 2008. In the speech, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova, Andrei Stratan, stated that settling a dispute with force is not beneficial and that recognising Abkhazia would not benefit the situation in the region.
During this speech he also mentioned the argument of international law for not recognising Abkhazia. Only the ‘Helsinki Final Act, the United Nations Charter and all current principles of international law’ would guide the Moldovan Governments decision on such cases (Stratan, 2008). Aside from the arguments of international law and stabilising the region, the region of Transnistria provides an important reason not to recognise Abkhazia. By recognizing Abkhazia, it would be tough for Moldova to hold on to its position towards Transnistria as a non-recognised region in Moldova.
3.3.4 Ukraine
Ukraine does not recognise Abkhazia, which can be attributed to several causes. Currently, Ukraine faces breakaway regions in the east and it has supposedly lost Crimea after the 2014 annexation by Russia. Denying the recognition of Abkhazia has been mentioned often in Ukraine. In 2008, former president Yushchenko stressed the importance of the territorial integrity of Georgia and that acknowledging Abkhazia would be a violation of the Georgian territory as well as international law (Yushchenko, 2008). In 2010, the former president of Ukraine Yanukovych stated that Ukraine would still not acknowledge the independence of Abkhazia. This time, a slightly softer approach was taken, stressing the importance of international law and the fact that it would not solve a (frozen) conflict. With this move, Yanukovych, whom is often perceived to be pro-Russian, was believed to let down Russia (Yanukovych, 2010).
The latest comments about Abkhazia from Ukraine are made by Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Pavlo Klimkin who has repeatedly spoken about not letting the Donbass conflict escalate and follow the Abkhazia scenario (Klimkin, 2017). Again, international law and the territorial integrity of Georgia appear to be the main causes for not recognising Abkhazia. Currently, another argument might be more pressing. Since Russia supports the independence
of Abkhazia, this could be seen as a reason for Ukraine to decide against it. This can be traced back to the Russian interference in the Donbass region as well as Crimea which resulted in significantly damaged relations between Ukraine and Russia.
Another reason is more historic. During the 1992 war in Abkhazia, Ukrainian volunteers gathered and fought on the Georgian side of the conflict which shows strong ties between the two countries. This could result in the consideration of losing Georgia in the process of recognising Abkhazia, which would not be beneficial for either party.
3.3.5 Belarus
Of all countries mentioned, Belarus is the odd one out. First of all, Belarus is not as dependent on Georgia as Armenia, nor does it have a breakaway region like Azerbaijan, Ukraine or Moldova. Secondly, of these countries, Belarus has the closest ties with Russia. Thirdly, the stance towards Abkhazian independence has changed over the years.
Belarus and Abkhazia do not have an important shared history that goes back a long way. With the emergence of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia and Belarus became part of a single Union. It was not until 1996 that Belarus and Abkhazia really engaged in bilateral relations. In 1996, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) imposed economic sanctions against Abkhazia. This was signed by ten states, including the Russian Federation, but excluding Belarus (Civil Georgia, 2008a). Up until this day, this holds a lot of meaning to the Abkhaz population and government.
Proceeding to the recognition of Abkhazia by Russia, in September 2008, president Alexander Lukashenko has given an interview in which he addresses Abkhazia. The question from Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung aims at why Belarus had not immediately recognised Abkhazia’s independence in spite of their close ally, Russia, doing so. When answering the question, Lukashenko said that Belarus has close ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on a
