Jorn Severijn
University of Leiden
Number of words: 14966
Ukraine and inter-institutional conflict:
Neorealism as explanatory framework for the improved relation
between the European External Action Service and European
Commission.
S1504363
Grijpensteinstraat 61, 2405GM
Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands
Phone number: 06-11509039
jorn.severijn@hotmail.com
Table of contents
Introduction 2.
Chapter 1:
Identifying the conflict areas 5.
Chapter 2: Literature review 9. Chapter 3: Methodology 16. Chapter 4: Analysis 20. Chapter 5:
Why Ukraine matters most 26.
Conclusion 30.
Introduction
‘It [European Political Cooperation] is essentially suited to reacting to events: anything more would require a much closer harmonization of EPC and EEC activities. In the long run this would presumably require a much larger secretariat […]; it would, in fact, require the establishment of both a common foreign policy and a common European diplomatic service.’1 Almost thirty years
later, through decision by the Council of the European Union, an institution was brought into existence that would serve to create common foreign policy for all European Union member states. Receiving its mandate by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service (EEAS) is, in theory, celebrating its first decade of existence. In practice it took until 2010 before the institution was up and running in order to perform its duties. Catherine Ashton, High
Representative (HR) at the time and responsible for the EEAS, officially proclaimed the institution ready for action at a low-key event in December 2010.2
The establishment of a diplomatic service came before an increase in foreign policy
harmonization which was what Allen expected. The start of the EEAS was characterized by inter-institutional struggles with the European Commission (EC), the Council Secretariat, the
President of the European Council and the member states. Main debated issues were the responsibilities, influences and shifting competences regarding these institutions. Nonetheless, through skillful negotiation and a strong determination Ashton eventually succeeded in creating capacities for the EEAS.3 Under Ashton’s guidance there was more time for self-reflection and
assessing internal affairs. Behavior to do so was amplified, because the EEAS was still in its infancy and had to establish its role through negotiation with the EC and member states. There was no need for shared stances, strong leadership and effective policy yet, since no external pressures to do so existed.
The annexation of Crimea in 2014 changed the aforementioned situation. Crisis in Ukraine has been described by some as a wakeup call for European Union (EU) officials.4 Russian aggression
forced these officials into quicker compromises regarding foreign policy and institutional responsibilities (e.g. the near instant creation of Taskforce Ukraine). The different external
1 D. Allen, ‘Postscript 1982’, in: D. Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels (eds.), European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe (London 1982) 170-176, 175.
2 A. Rettman, ‘Ashton names EU foreign-service priorities at low-key launch event’, 2010, 2 December. Retrieved
from https://euobserver.com/institutional/31413 (11-3-2019).
3 J. Howorth, ‘The ‘New Faces’ of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy
on the Global Stage’, European Foreign Affairs Review 16:3 (2011) 303-323, 317.
4 J.J. Mearsheimer, ‘Getting Ukraine Wrong’, 2014, 13 March. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/opinion/getting-ukraine-wrong.html (19-3-2019); W. Wohlforth, ‘The Return of Realpolitik’, 2015, 19 June. Retrieved from https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Return-of-Realpolitik-17536 (19-3-2019); D. Averre, ‘The Ukraine Conflict: Russia’s Challenge to European Security Governance’, Europe-Asia Studies 68:4 (2016) 699-725, 718.
conditions had changed the opinion of other EU organizations and made them more receptive towards the EEAS and the HR. Therefore, the mistrust and disapproval other EU institutions had for Ashton and the EEAS is not apparent for current HR Federica Mogherini.
The purpose of this thesis is twofold: to show that the 2014 crisis in Ukraine brought about change into EU inter-institutional relations and highlight neorealism as an excellent frame of understanding on how this could happen. Thus, the question is; what root cause explains the decrease in conflict between the Commission and the EEAS? It is hypothesized that the external shock of the Ukrainian crisis played a key role in changing relations between the HR and the Commission. Therefore, looking at the effects of the Ukrainian crisis on the EEAS’ position within the EU is core of what this thesis does. European security was after all at stake, which brought back realpolitik into the fore. This justifies advocating, within this thesis, that neorealism is capable of clarifying the actions of the EU. Examining motives regarding the discrepancy between both HR periods provides scholars understanding of EU bureaucracy behavior. Furthermore, results could advocate how future relations can streamline more and increase cooperation between the EU institutions.
I have said a few times that it [working in the EEAS] is like flying a plane while you are still building the wings and somebody might be trying to take the tail off at the same time. You are always in low turbulence but none the less the plane has left the runway.5
(C. Ashton, Evidence session with Baroness Ashton)
By recognizing the existence of internal struggles, this quote from Ashton introduces the first area this thesis will be about. Knowing what type of conflicts were present, how these evolved and how the institutions of the EU were involved helps to better understand how much
progress has been made after the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. This is what makes up the initial chapter of this thesis, because it establishes a baseline for future comparison.
The second chapter explains the existence of three theoretical frameworks (i.e. neorealism, institutionalism, social-constructivism) within international relations studies. The strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks are discussed along with several works that adhere to them. Furthermore, information is given which explains why this thesis believes that neorealism is the right framework in regards to the change of relationship between the EEAS and the
Commission. Lastly, the chapter explicitly states the connection between this thesis and other existing literature. In that sense it highlights the theoretical progress within international relations as a study and the contribution that this thesis can make. Ultimately, displaying why neorealism is important and that this thesis has added value to the existing literature are the main goals of chapter two.
The third chapter explains the methodology which is used to construct this thesis’ argument. Three things will be clarified within this chapter. First, the technique of content analysis will be introduced as primary method for supporting the argument. Secondly, the role of interviews as a supplementary method is discussed. This includes showing what advantages and
disadvantages arise during interviews. Lastly, it is shown that the argument within this thesis is based on displaying causality whereby a specific event has changed the original situation into a different one.
The fourth chapter provides the actual analysis which has been done. It shows how multiple documents were investigated through their content and what kind of message these documents advocate. Besides individually analyzing these documents, a comparison between them is made as well. This is done to highlight the contrast between the older documents and the more recent ones.
Chapter five is part of the analysis process as well. This is where the role of the Ukrainian crisis in changing the relation between EEAS and Commission is cemented. There are certain
documents which reference the importance of Ukraine in this matter and those are supported by interviews, including personal ones, with officials from the EU. The ending of this work is a conclusion that ties together the results of the content analysis and the interviews.
Furthermore, the main argument is reaffirmed to be the sole conclusion taken from the
evidence provided. The conclusion provides a summary and some points of self-critique as well, because that assists future research into the topic.
Chapter 1:
Identifying the conflict areas.
Ashton has been in the position of HR for five years (2009-2014) and has made a lot of effort to get the institution up and running. Mogherini took over in 2014 and has, at the time of writing, almost successfully completed her five year term as well. Therefore, a scholarly opportunity for research has presented itself. Ashton and Mogherini have had different experiences regarding their relation to the other EU institutions.6 This chapter investigates the issues which occurred
during Ashton’s tenure. It will be shown that it is characterized by struggles over capacity
building with three EU institutional actors. These are the Commission, European Parliament (EP) and the European Council (which was supported and/or represented by the Council Secretariat or member states). All came into negotiation conflicts with the EEAS, because of their interest in having some form of influence over the EEAS. Three major themes which heavily influenced how Ashton could form the EEAS as an organization will be discussed.
Firstly, administrative procedures were one area which the Commission and the European Council wanted to have some say over. Tough challenges quickly arose, because the EEAS, as a foreign policy instrument, does not adhere to administrative procedure standards which other EU institutions do have to follow. For example, there is no regulatory or redistributive decision-making within the EEAS.7 Tasks which the EEAS does consists of obtaining information, develop
foreign policy strategies and prepare documents for the Commission decision-making
procedure. Despite these different procedural manners, the Commission threw its institutional weight at the EEAS in order to obtain institutional supremacy. The Council Secretariat had also a stake regarding the administrative procedures. Its role is to provide supportive services to the Council in different policy fields including foreign affairs where the EEAS was now responsible. However, officials who were transferred to the EEAS felt like Secretariat involvement would create unnecessary duplications. Thus, administrative procedures were an issue which heavily impacted EU inter-institutional relations. The interviews later on will show how these issues were resolved.
Secondly, staffing and organizational structure was a big point of contention between the EEAS and all three aforementioned EU institutional actors. This issue was heavily debated, because the Commission would stand to lose an avenue of big influence in EU foreign policy. The Commission would appoint external representations for the EU and instruct these officials
6 N. Helwig, ‘The high Representative of the Union: The Quest for Leadership in EU Foreign Policy’, in: D. Spence
and J. Bátora (eds.), The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia (Basingstoke 2015) 87-104, 98.
7 J. Morgenstern-Pomorski, The Contested Diplomacy of the European External Action Service: Inception, Establishment and Consolidation (London 2018) 146.
previously, but that would now become the responsibility of the EEAS. The nomination procedure for senior positions within the EEAS was in particular heavily contested. Officials already associated with the EEAS had tried using their informational advantage for more influence on how staffing would be arranged.8 On the other hand, the Commission advocated
for a consultative committee that would draw up a list of candidates according to a fixed set of criteria. Using a committee would mirror processes which are used by the Commission itself and would provide the Commission with two distinct advantages.9 First, the Commission would have
to agree on the list that the committee would create. Secondly, the committee would include a Commission representative as well who could sway and control the other representatives knowing the Commission has to give consent.
Thus, the Commission has been in conflict with the EEAS regarding how to staff the diplomatic service. However, the Commission was not the only institution which had taken issue with the EEAS regarding its personnel. Firstly, the Council Secretariat, on orders from the European Council, was tasked to help out the EEAS with management of information systems and administrative processes. However, the Secretariat did not consider work for the EEAS as something that external relations staff within the Secretariat had to handle. Thus, the necessary staff, according to the EEAS, was not transferred as was promised by the European Council. Furthermore, sometimes the Secretariat created new functions and transferred those to the EEAS while there was no person sitting on that post yet.10 Secondly, member states themselves
kept hindering the EEAS as well, because they wanted assurance that an adequate amount of staff was chosen by member states. These member states did not want their own national embassies having to compete with delegations from the EU itself. As a response, the treaty stipulated that at least one third of all EEAS staff would be from member states.11 Lastly, EP
members thought staffing the EEAS should be done democratically. Having advocated for procedures similar to the United States (US) style of hearing out potential future ambassadors before they are chosen, the EP managed to partially obtain their wishes. It was agreed upon that the EP could organize hearings before an ambassador would start his or her work, but the hearing had to be after a candidate was already appointed.
Lastly, budgetary issues became a major headache between the EU institutions. The EEAS wanted necessary funds in order to do their job in a proper manner. These funds had to come
8 Z. Murdoch, S. Gaenzle and J. Trondal, ‘Making the Grade, Keeping the Gate: The Recruitment of Member-States
Diplomats to the European External Action Service (EEAS)’, DSEU Policy Paper 13 (2013) 1-13, 5.
9 Z. Murdoch, S. Gaenzle and J. Trondal, ‘Building Foreign Affairs Capacity in the EU: Recruitment of Member State
Officials to the European External Action Service’, Public Administration 92:1 (2014) 71-86, 85.
10 J.H. Morgenstern, ‘Teething Problems of the European External Action Service’, EUSA Review 24:2 (2011) 18-20,
18.
11 Council of the European Union 2010b, Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service 2010/427/EU, Art. 6 (9).
from the Commission and the Secretariat. Furthermore, these budgetary decisions have to be approved by the EP as part of the normal budgetary procedure. These institutions saw their chance to influence the EEAS’ behavior, because of their necessary involvement. Thus, the created situation is that the EEAS needs permission from the Commission for essential purchases. The Commission is in its right to provide or deny these funds. This gives the Commission immense leverage over the EEAS which has not been well received by officials working for the EEAS.12 These employees feel constrained and judged by the looming presence
of the Commission. On the other hand, there was tension between the EEAS and the Council Secretariat regarding decoupling financial ties and services. The Secretariat wanted to end service-level agreements which were in place, because it found them unnecessary. They thought that these specific services were the responsibility of the EEAS itself.13 These
agreements ranged from hosting political meetings in Council buildings to controlling mission expense claims for the EEAS staff.14 The EEAS itself was content with the arrangements as they
existed, but did not contest the Secretariat’s decision to quit these services. However, the EEAS did take precautionary measures by pointing out that the Secretariat should provide the EEAS with the necessary funds to take on the responsibility of covering these services.15
Member states have attempted to intervene in budgetary affairs of the EEAS as well. They advocated the need of budget neutrality and specification regarding the added value of the EEAS. Furthermore, member states felt that a budget decrease was in order, but that got overturned by the EP. The EEAS was in its infancy and had newly assigned roles which required increases of their budget which the EP respected. Nonetheless, the parliament has had an influential role in binding the EEAS to the Commission in regard to budgetary measures. Insisting that the EEAS should be held responsible by the Commission regarding operational
expenditures could strengthen the EP’s influence over the EEAS.16 How this influence works is
explained as followed. The Commission is often seen as predecessor of the EEAS, because the HR is a commissioner and a Commission directorate was previously responsible for external relations matters. The EP has no such connection to the EEAS and it made no sense for it to have budgetary control over the EEAS. However, the EP does have budgetary rights in matters of the Commission and thus their agreement is required whenever budgetary revision for the Commission is done. Therefore, an EEAS connected to the Commission gives the EP influence over its actions.
12 Morgenstern-Pomorski, The Contested Diplomacy of the European External Action Service, 151. 13 European External Action Service, EEAS Review 2013 (Brussels 2013) 10.
14 European External Action Service, 2013 Annual Activity Report (Brussels 2013) 5.
15 C. Onestini, ‘A Hybrid Service: Organising Efficient EU Foreign Policy’, in: D. Spence and J. Bátora (eds.), The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia (Basingstoke 2015) 65-86, 75.
16 S. Blockmans, C. Hillion, M. Cremona, D. Curtin, G. De Baere, S. Duke, C. Eckes, B. Van Vooren, R.A. Wessel and J.
Thus, budgetary issues are one of the major conflicting points between the European institutions which is not that surprising considering the impact money allocation has on the capacities of these institutions. Therefore, the three major areas which have been identified are the administrative processes, budget and staffing/organizational structure. Awareness of these three areas assists in answering the research question during analysis. However, reviewing the literature on neorealism and the EEAS elaborates further on this institution and its relation to the other institutions. Furthermore, it showcases why this thesis is a valuable addition to the existing academic work.
Consequently, after analyzing the literature in the following section, the methodology shall be discussed and context surrounding the data collection will be given. What follows beyond that is the analysis of multiple documents which will contribute to the main argument made within this thesis. The argument made is that an external shock has shifted the focus of officials completely in an opposite manner based on neorealist thought.17 Policy makers within the EU were mainly
concentrated on internal matters before the Ukrainian crisis, but the annexation of Crimea forced a unified and outward looking response. This shift of focus has provided Mogherini with the necessary support and maneuverability to do her job as HR more effectively.
Chapter 2:
Literature review.
The short existence of the EEAS has not withheld academics from researching it. Hence, an extensive amount of literature about this organization and its activities has been written. However, the literature has focused a lot on presenting empirical data which has left conceptualizing the EEAS and the stages it has gone through in the dark.18 This chapter will
focus on theoretical frameworks and the theories belonging to them. Frameworks are seen as umbrella terms under which specific theories are placed. Within international relations studies three frameworks are most often used. These are neorealism, social-constructivism and institutionalism. This chapter will first explain the strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks with some of their corresponding theories shown as example. Secondly, it will clarify why this thesis favors neorealism above the others in regards to the research question despite its weaknesses. This includes providing the relevance of this framework for answering the main research question of this thesis. Lastly, it is emphasized how this thesis fits within the landscape of such diverse literature.
Neorealism
There are two defined strengths within the framework of neorealism. One is the fact that neorealism does not use human nature as explanation for the occurrence of conflict in the realm of international relations. Instead, it believes that conflict occurs through the
international system which is based on states. Neorealism as described by Kenneth Waltz, in
Theory of International Politics, advocates that the international system of states places
advantage on those states who attempt to maximize power.19 However, power is not an end
goal according to neorealism, but a means to obtain security. This idea responds to classical realism as advocated by Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations.20 For classical realism
argued that humans struggle for power whereby obtaining it is an end goal. Such a distinction allowed neorealism to explain why some states choose not to obtain more power within the international system and stay dormant. According to neorealism these kind of states realize they will jeopardize their safety if they seek more power.
The second strength of neorealism is the systemic approach of their framework. Through the use of neorealism one could better predict what kind of behavior states will engage in. It
18 A.E. Juncos and K. Pomorska, ‘The European External Action Service’, in: K.E. Jørgenson, Å.K. Aarstad, E.
Drieskens, K. Laatikainen and B. Tonra (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy 1 (2015) 238-248, 239.
19 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London 1979) 88.
foregoes examining the subjective nature of motives from individuals or states.21 Instead, it
highlights the anarchic nature of the world system as cause for conflict. In this case anarchic is seen as no overarching authority who forces states to behave a certain manner. This system forces nations to struggle for security and therefore expose their intended behavior. Thus, one can know beforehand what a state will attempt to do through neorealism, while that is much harder with frameworks based on a subjective reasoning.22
Although this systemic approach is seen by some as a strength, others might denounce it as a weakness. Critics of neorealism state that fundamental changes within the international system are not properly taken into account by the framework. These are the two hardest hitting
critiques thus far: neorealism does not explain the creation of supranational organizations like the EU and the increase in security seen all around the globe, because of peaceful natured democracies. This has led to Mearsheimer’ publication of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics in 2001. It divided neorealism into two separate distinctions. These branches were named
offensive realism and defensive realism. The difference between these two lies in the amount of power that a state supposedly aims for. Mearsheimer believed and advocated for the fact that states desire much more power than Waltz would say.23 The ultimate end goal for states is,
according to Mearsheimer, obtaining regional hegemony through maximizing one’s relative power output. This aggressive behavior has led his theory to be known as offensive realism, while the theory of Waltz is seen as defensive.
Furthermore, Mearsheimer formulated a response to one of the two aforementioned critiques. It is known as the democratic peace theory, which argues that known democratic societies will not fight other known democracies for a multitude of reasons (e.g. loss of wealth, harder to justify war, democracies appear non-hostile).24 Mearsheimer poses that democratic peace
theory supporters choose their desired outcome through nitpicking their own definition of a democracy. Furthermore, Mearsheimer claims that certain events which would have sparked conflict between democracies were only avoided by other factors than those that the
democratic peace theory advocates.25
The other criticism is not fully justified either. It stated that the state centric view of neorealism does not compute with international integration.26 However, this idea comes forth out of a
21 K. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (1988) 615-628. 22 A. Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Judgement of Human
Nature (New York 2004).
23 J.J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York 2001) 20.
24 C. Layne, ‘Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace’, in: M.E. Brown, O.R. Coté, Jr., S.M. Lynn-Jones and
S.E. Miller (eds.), Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge 1998) 176-220, 176.
25 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 40.
26 S. Collard-Wexler, ‘Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union’, European Journal of International Relations 12:3 (2006) 397-432.
superficial look into the workings of the EU and other supranational institutions for that matter. States willingly submit to supranational institutions, because they believe it to be an
enhancement to their chances of survival.27 Brexit, contested projects like the Nordstream II and
the United Nations (UN) being too often ignored prove that nations remain prime actors in international affairs. The UK’s decision to leave the union has to be respected and was based on individual prosperity assessments (i.e. the UK would have more money to spend on their
National Health Service). In this regard, behavior of the European nations is best explained through the work of Stephen Waltz. This is because it describes perception of threat as possible motive for alliance formation.28 Individual nations feel safe enough to delegate aspects of
sovereignty to the EU, because the option of safe withdrawal has been negotiated.
Furthermore, European nations no longer feel threatened for their existence by their European allies in comparison to third-party nations. Thus, a neorealist will advocate realpolitik as the one and only successful form of governance, because it enhances the chances of survival for states. Alliance formation can play a role in this if suited to the interests of nations.
Institutionalism
The EEAS led to an interesting development within the academic world. Ever since the work of Smith there has been a general consensus about the fact that the EU is on a path of increasing institutionalization.29 This has led some to formulate a framework based on the progress of the
institution itself. Hence, Institutionalism argues that policy-making, politics in general and the behavior of actors can only be understood through the context of the institutions themselves.30
What this means is that institutionalist writers look at the role of informal and formal procedures, norms, practices and conventions within the realm of international relations. Furthermore, they believe that supranational institutions are actors in itself and not purely a means to an end for nations.
Focus on institutions as actors, within international relations studies, provides the following strengths. First, it explains the continued use of supranational institutions, such as the UN structure, even though they are more than occasionally portrayed as ineffective by states. It is argued that supranational institutions continuously adapt to the needs of states in order to project their influence. Secondly, inclusion of non-state actors is taken into account, because
27 J.M. Grieco, ‘State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Reinterpretation of the Maastricht
Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union’, in: B. Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London 1996) 262-305; M.W. Mosser, ‘Engineering Influence: The Subtle Power of Smaller States in International Relations’, UNC Graduate Conference (Chapel Hill 2000).
28 S.M. Waltz, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca 1987) 17.
29 M.E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge 2004). 30 S. Steinmo, ‘Institutionalism’, in: J.D. Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam 2015) 181-185, 181.
they often express themselves through supranational institutions. Thus, there is a more holistic approach during an institutional research since more factors are taken into account.
As an example, Van Vooren did a traditional legal-institutionalist analysis of the EEAS and found that it should be considered as a ‘sui generis’ – or one of a kind - type of organization.31 Such a
conclusion was backed by Juncos and Pomorska as well.32 A second study, based on an
institutionalist approach, was conducted by Vanhoonacker and Reslow. They analyzed the EEAS as a construction of rational design based on international experience. Past experiences, which were then implemented in the EEAS design, came mainly from how the EC and the Council Secretariat conducted themselves over the past. This idea was earlier proposed by Koremenos
et al, but elaborated upon by Vanhoonacker and Reslow.33 In that regard, Vanhoonacker and
Reslow acknowledge the possibility to proclaim the EEAS as a sui generis type of organization. However, they remain skeptical by stating that a majority of its design elements are not
different from other international institutions.34 As a response to these conclusions, Henökl put
forth that studies should explore the EEAS as something of an emergence of a new dimension.35
The ‘European diplomatic space’ was coming together to form a new area of expertise within European political affairs.
Despite its strengths, there is a glaring weakness within the framework of institutionalism. Through the use of many variables, in order to create a holistic approach, there is no way to provide any meaningful conclusions which could assist as future reference. For example, this type of research gives little explanation as to why certain recognizable characteristics and conduct appear from the organization over a large amount of instances and time.36 Thus,
potential patterns are not actively engaged upon. In the same vein, institutionalism places too much agency on the capabilities of institutions in influencing human behavior.37 The
preferences and goals of human actors are too diverse, ambiguous and difficult to express.
Social-constructivism
31 B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’, Common Market Law Review 48:1 (2011) 475-502.
32 Juncos and Pomorska, ‘The European External Action Service’, 245.
33 B. Koremenos, C. Lipson and D. Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, in: B. Koremenos, C.
Lipson and D. Snidal (eds.), The Rational Design of International Institutions (Cambridge 2004) 1-40.
34 S. Vanhoonacker and N. Reslow, ‘The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by Understanding
Backwards’, European Foreign Affairs Review 15:1 (2010) 1-18, 17.
35 T. Henökl, ‘Conceptualizing the European Diplomatic Space: A Framework for Analysis of the European External
Action Service’, Journal of European Integration 36:5 (2014) 453-471.
36 J. Bátora, ‘The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’: The EEAS as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in
Diplomacy’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51:4 (2013) 598-613, 610.
37 P.A. Hall and R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies 44:5 (1996)
The social-constructivists use a different approach to studying the EEAS. These types of studies experience the EEAS more as a ‘social body’ than as a mindless extension of the member states will.38 Thus, through the use of social interaction something larger is created by words and
deeds. The strength of this framework lies in encompassing the culture and identity of nations in order to predict their behavior. Identity and culture are expressed in social norms, rules and understandings. Furthermore, social-constructivists perceive the world of international relations not as something materialistic, but as an amalgamation of shared beliefs. This allows for a simple explanation as to why nations manifest themselves as friends within the realm of international politics.
An example of this is Bátora describing, through the constructivist framework, that the EEAS can be seen as an ‘interstitial organization’. This is experienced as an organization that draws upon and recombines different aspects from adjacent organizational grounds.39 It does this through a
continued process of sharing ideas and practices. Thus, an interstitial organization spans over multiple types of organizational structures. Such an approach clarifies why there is strong tendency for organizational learning and innovation within the EEAS.
Furthermore, social-constructivists have looked into the particular practices that EU diplomats engage in.40 Examining the differences between EU level diplomats and national ones
supposedly better highlights the different beliefs of nations and the EU. From this perspective, Adler-Nissen argues that a neorealist vision on the EEAS cannot be seen as correct. The EEAS should be seen as challenging national diplomatic services which is incompatible with the neorealist ideal that only states are actors in foreign policy. Adler-Nissen believes that the existence of the EEAS is creating uncertainty regarding the future of national diplomatic
services, because the EEAS is a quasi-supranational diplomatic corps and interacts on its own in the social dynamics of diplomacy.41 This sentiment is backed by a growing number of authors
including Spence, Smith et al; Lefebvre and Hillion. For example, Smith and his colleagues wrote
38 R. Adler-Nissen, ‘Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy: The Struggle between National Foreign Services and
the EU’s External Action Service’, Review of International Studies 40:1 (2014) 657-681; M.K.D. Cross, ‘Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment & Training to the EEAS’, European Foreign Affairs Review 16:4 (2011) 447-464; A.E. Juncos and K. Pomorska, ‘’In the face of adversity’: Explaining the Attitudes of EEAS Officials Vis-à-vis the New Service’, Journal of European Public Policy 20:9 (2013) 1332-1349; T. Henökl and J. Trondal, ‘Unveiling the Anatomy of Autonomy: Dissecting Actor-level Independence in the European External Action Service’, Journal of European
Public Policy 22:10 (2015) 1426-1447. 39 Bátora, ‘The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’, 599.
40 M. Kuus, ‘Transnational Diplomacy in Europe: What is Transcended and how?’, in: J. Dittmer and F. McConnell
(eds.), Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives (London 2016) 41-58, 44.
a volume exploring the different sides of the EEAS and its origins.42 As conclusion, Smith et al.
determine that national diplomatic services will indeed have to compete more and more with its European equivalent and will have to re-invent themselves in order to remain valuable. Nonetheless, social-constructivism is not free of criticism itself. Social-constructivists value norms in international relations highly as something that helps explain behavior of states. However, arguments have been made that states disregard norms whenever they see this fit for their own interests.43 An important aspect surrounding this is uncertainty which can cripple
states into conflict. This is based on the security dilemma whereby states who start actively improving their security increase desire for others to improve theirs as well. Playing the security dilemma often results into an arms race. Social-constructivists focus on dialogue, ideas and sharing beliefs. However, this does not account for the difficulty states face when obtaining trustworthy information.44
These are the strengths and weaknesses of the three main theoretical frameworks (i.e. neorealism, social-constructivism and institutionalism) in the field of international relations studies are described. With this in mind it appears that neorealism is better equipped to answer the research question within this thesis. This sentiment stems from taking the situation as has happened regarding the EEAS-Commission relation into account. Chapter one described the issues which were prevalent ever since the creation of the EEAS. Furthermore, it has been noted by Morgenstern-Pomorski that a significant change had taken place in the relationship ever since Mogherini became HR.45 This occurred in 2014, and as the analysis will show, Mogherini
quickly advocated the importance of Ukraine and it forcing the EU to be more coherent and unified. The framework of neorealism can assist in providing answers regarding this change. For increased union was only achieved to project more power towards the existential threat. Calls for unity were only loudly prevalent when Ukraine was attacked.46 The annexation within
Ukraine is a hard power move against the norms of our time, which social-constructivism struggles with. Furthermore, institutionalism does not encompass the actions of Russia either. The annexation goes directly against what supranational institutions stand for namely self-determination. When an existential crisis arises, such was the case when the EEAS-Commission relation significantly changed, nations look towards their own capabilities first and compare their power capabilities against each other. Waltz mentioned alliance formation as response to existential threats, which seems like the most reasonable explanation for the research question at the moment. Thus, it is believed that only neorealism, as an international relations
42 M. Smith, S. Keukeleire and S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Introduction’, in: M. Smith, S. Keukeleire and S. Vanhoonacker
(eds.), The Diplomatic System of the European Union: Evolution, Change and Challenges (London 2016) 1-8, 2.
43 S.D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, International Security 20:3 (1995) 115-151, 115.
44 D.C. Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay’, International Security 25:2
(2000) 187-212, 200.
45 Morgenstern-Pomorski, The Contested Diplomacy of the European External Action Service, 8.
framework, is capable of explaining how the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission so quickly changed.
This thesis is embeds itself within the literature for the following reasons. Firstly, it is a
continuation of the debate which is still ongoing between neorealists and social-constructivists. The actions of Russia have brought neorealism to the forefront of international relations studies as this thesis will showcase. Secondly, a call for increased research was made by the author of
The Contested Diplomacy regarding the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission.
Morgenstern-Pomorski proclaimed it a remarkable topic for research when he pointed out the difference between the EEAS and the Commission ever since Mogherini became HR. This thesis answers that call by providing a comprehensive response to that peculiar change of the status quo. Thus, this thesis is part of the theoretical debate, but also part of the literature regarding the European Union and its institutions.
Chapter 3:
Methodology.
In order to advocate for a neorealist view on the change of status quo between the EEAS and Commission; and to include the role of member states, important sources shall be official documents from the EEAS, HR and the Commission. Furthermore, interviews conducted with officials of the EEAS and interviews by other researches will be used. Through these sources and extra secondary literature comparison between the status quo before February 2014 and afterwards can be conducted. Such a comparison will show that the Ukrainian crisis was the main reason for a change in attitude. This would align with the insights that neorealist
framework provides regarding behavior of states and their formation of alliances. The following selection of documents have been identified as crucial in answering the research question. Firstly, a document created by Commission president Barroso in 2005 showcases his thoughts and experiences regarding the creation of the EEAS and what it should become. The document is called Joint Progress Report to the European Council by the Secretary-General/High
Representative and the Commission. It starts with an overview of the decisions that have led up
to the creation of the EEAS, then describes the form and function the EEAS should take. It continues with issues that had to be resolved or are still ongoing and ends with administrative related questions and a concluding remark. This document is therefore excellent material in order to know Barroso’s intentions regarding the EEAS. Furthermore, it will showcase that the organization had to struggle for its own place with the Commission. Secondly, Ashton had to attend a so-called evidence session before the House of Lords in the UK. This session, which was chaired by a select committee which specialized in European Union affairs, has been recorded through transcript and subsequently made public. It is called Evidence Session with Baroness
Ashton of Upholland, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission and was conducted on the 14th of June 2011. The experiences of
Ashton are recorded within this document and give a wonderful overview of the challenges she had to face. Nineteen questions have been submitted to Ashton by the committee which she has given extensive answers to. Thirdly, Juncker’s Political Guidelines for the next European
Commission which he presented in Strasbourg on 15th of July 2014. Published a couple months
after the onset of the crisis in Ukraine, this document showcases Juncker’s advocacy for better representation in the field of foreign policy. This document can therefore show how the Commission would have changed their position vis-à-vis the EEAS in theory. Fourthly, the
European Union Global Strategy from the EEAS and Mogherini can help determine how the
relation changed. This strategy is from 2016 and encapsulates the current goals and behavior of the EEAS. It documents the activities which the EEAS wants to engage in. Interesting insights into the changing dynamic from Ashton’s EEAS and Mogherini’s EEAS stand out by including this document.
These four documents will be researched through a form of content analysis. What this means is that a systematic analysis of the textual information will be done as described by Halperin and Heath.47 The advantage of using this method lies in the fact that it does not interfere with the
subject that is being studied. It circumvents the so called ‘Heisenberg Effect’, which stipulates that human behavior changes when the subject is aware of being studied by the researcher.48
Nevertheless, there are some downsides to content analysis. For example, such analysis tends to be descriptive by nature and generally incapable of generating conclusions which tell something about general theory. Why is it important to look at the text within the primary source documents? These documents are all political pieces intended to inform the public of what is going on within these political institutions. Political communication requires the public to be receptive in order to retain some sense of importance.49 Language is the most important
factor within communication, because through it we send messages, express our emotions and give meaning to objects, subjects or acts. This thesis wants to argue that a certain event was the main driving force behind a change of relationship between the EEAS and the Commission. Knowing with what kind of language these institutions communicated before and after this particular event is therefore paramount.
Due to its disadvantages content analysis should not be the only research method used. That would be insufficient in order to answer the research question properly. Therefore, interviews remain a necessary and useful tool that can complement the content analysis. One major disadvantage of all types of interviews is that participants are prone to biases and prejudices. This relates not only to the interviewees, but also the interviewers themselves. The two most known interview types are structured and unstructured forms of interviews. The difference between the two lies in the kind of approach that the interviewer takes. If the interviewer nudges the interviewee into answering questions direct and concise, then a more structured approach is taken. The opposite, an unstructured interview, happens when the interviewee is allowed to talk about experiences within a wide range of subject matter. Both have advantages and disadvantages which have influenced the decision on what type of interview this thesis would conduct.50 Structured interviews are capable of making direct comparisons between each
interview, because they have been standardized. Standardization also increases reliability of the conclusions taken from such interviews. An argument could be made that a structured interview does not give the interviewee the room to fully express his or her thoughts. Sadly, this appears
47 S. Halperin and O. Heath, Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills (Oxford 2017) 345.
48 K. Coessens and J.P. Van Bendegem, ‘Expectations of What Scientific Research could (not) Do’, in: P. Smeyers and
M. Depaepe (eds.), Educational Research: Why ‘What Works’ Doesn’t Work (Dordrecht 2006) 109-126, 121.
49 G. Álvarez-Benito, I.M. Íñigo-Mora, ‘Introduction’, in: G. Álvarez-Benito, G. Fernández-Díaz and I.M. Íñigo-Mora
(eds.), Discourse and Politics (Cambridge 2009) 1-11, 2.
to be true and is therefore acknowledged as a large disadvantage of structured interviews.51 On
the other hand, unstructured interviews do allow interviewees to tell their stories to its fullest potential. Furthermore, an unstructured interview has the ability to make a respondent feel more at ease and willing to provide answers, because of its informal nature. However, a large disadvantage for the researcher is the difficulty in comparing unstructured interviews, which is something that should weigh heavy into considerations. Nonetheless, there are authors who advocate that unstructured interviews can be just as reliable as structured ones.52 Taking these
advantages and disadvantages into consideration, it appears that unstructured interviews will allow for the most beneficial results with regards to answering the research question. Knowing what difference between the EEAS and the Commission occurred close to the Ukrainian crisis requires an open and relaxed environment for the interviewees. Furthermore, spotting the change in dynamic can only occur when interviewees explain in detail what kind of relation there originally was and how it changed. This is very much subjected to individual
interpretations which can better be registered through unstructured interviews.
As a small caveat, questionnaires have not been considered as a research method, because there tends to be a significantly lower response rate.53 Although an advantage is the possibility
of a large and simultaneous distribution, there is no guarantee that answers have not occurred from confusion regarding the questions. This cannot be resolved since the interviewer is not present to provide further explanation, which is not a problem during interviews.
A causal implication is made through the use of this thesis’ research question. Arguing that the Ukrainian crisis changed the relationship between the EEAS and Commission requires probable identification of that causality. The relation between the EEAS and Commission, which was strained with competition, turf wars and disagreements, is designated as situation A or the
original position. An external event, in this case the Ukrainian crisis, is the mechanism or shock
which brings about change onto A and is therefore designated as S. The shock causes a change within the original situation, which in this case created smoother cooperation and an outward focus between the EEAS and Commission and is designated as situation B. Thus, what this thesis advocates is that S was the primary cause of B in case A. Shock S can be seen as a necessary, contributing or a so-called INUS condition.54 INUS refers to something that is neither necessary
nor sufficient in order to achieve the observed outcome. However, it is an essential part of a
51 K.I. Van der Zee, A.B. Bakker and P. Bakker, ‘Why Are Structured Interviews so Rarely Used in Personnel
Selection’, Journal of Applied Psychology 87:1 (2002) 176-184, 176.
52 R. Axelson, C. Kreiter, K. Ferguson, C. Solow and K. Huebner, ‘Medical School Preadmission Interviews: Are
Structured Interviews More Reliable Than Unstructured Interviews?’, Teaching and Learning Medicine 22:4 (2010) 241-245, 244.
53 D.P. Wallace and C. Van Fleet, Knowledge into Action: Research and Evaluation in Library and Information Science
(Santa Barbara 2012) 187.
combination of factors which together are jointly sufficient for obtaining the outcome.55 What
this means is that S could not be the only cause in itself that would trigger situation B. However, this does not diminish the worth of S, because it is still necessary, in combination with other INUS conditions, in order to fulfill the required causality to generate B. Being a contributing condition means that this specific condition could be absent and still the end result will be obtained. In this regard S would only put extra weight into a situation that would result in B no matter if S existed or not. Lastly, S can be a necessary factor in order to reach situation B. Without S there would be no B. Looking at causality in terms of necessity has been one of the core concepts within social science literature and is one of the best ways to argue a position.56 It
will be argued that the Ukrainian crisis was a necessary condition for increased cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission, despite the attractiveness of labeling it as an UNIS condition. This position stems from the general idea that events shape policy whereby politicians are almost always reactionary to these types of happenings. Best formulated by Macmillan, British prime minister from 1957-1963, as ‘Events, dear boy, events’ is what requires immediate responses from institutions.57 Thus, it shall be argued that S was a necessary cause of
B in the case of A. The analyzed documents and interviews shall provide the necessary evidence
to support this statement. Through the rigorous process of a qualitative analysis, which shall focus on the content and determine their meaning, motives and purposes, an argument can be made to support the statement. This argument will be further supported by the answers given from the interviewees. The language within the documents and the interviews will play a vital role in detecting changes within the EEAS and Commission relationship as has been mentioned before.
55 J.I. Mackie, ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly 2:4 (1965) 245-264, 246.
56 G. Goertz, ‘Cause, Correlation, and Necessary Conditions’, in: G. Goertz and H. Starr, Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications (Lanham 2003) 47-64, 48.
Chapter 4:
Content analysis.
Barroso’s Joint Progress Report 2005
For the analysis, it is worth mentioning in what context this report has appeared. June 2005 was supposed to be the culmination of decade old work regarding European integration. Throughout Europe multiple referendums were going to be held which would decide whether to adopt the Constitutional Treaty or not. These referendums were mostly on an advisory basis. Believing that the referendums would be a mere formality, Barroso and his team started progress reports on the construction of the EEAS which received its mandate by the treaty. However, French and Dutch citizens rejected the Constitutional Treaty on May 29 and June 1 respectively. The
Barroso report was released shortly after on June 9 and does not reference the results of the referendums. Most likely there was not enough time to properly include the results of the referendums and its consequences in the report. Nevertheless, the context shows a busy period for the European Union and very much focused on internal and domestic politics.
The size and presentation of the document already gives an indication of its goal. It was created to share its contents in a succinct manner through bullet points and large subheadings. The sociological-constructivist tone becomes evident when the text is analyzed. In line with Bátora’s theory of an ‘interstitial organization’, in which the EEAS is built as a mixture of past
experiences, the text of Barroso’s document highlights desires of stakeholders to create something unique. Sentences such as ‘service of a Sui Generis nature’, ‘not a new ‘institution’’ and ‘duplication of functions should be avoided’ are clear evidence of this constructivist approach.58
A key area highlighted by the document is the organizational structure of the service. The main point of discussion within this area is which kind of role the preparatory bodies, delegations and EEAS personnel have to play. Preparatory bodies consist of experts which focus on technical aspects of portfolios and are vital in obtaining the right information. Certain setups or
‘configurations’ of these preparatory bodies, with portfolio’s based on foreign relations, could now be chaired by the EEAS instead of the rotating presidency as was usual. These bodies are filled with national experts and often used as tools of influence by member states. Therefore, Barroso recommended that the rotating presidency remains as chair of these bodies as was done before.59 This arrangement was formed through social constructivist behavior, because
member states created this system through mutual agreement. The same case of social constructivism applies to the delegation and personnel parts as well. The ongoing discussions are highlighted in Barroso’s report, because there was not yet a clear plan on how personnel
58 Council of the European Union, European External Action Service (Brussels 2005) 4. 59 Ibidem, 5.
was drafted and if delegations would be acting on behalf of the EU as a whole only or in the interest of groups of member states as well. It is evident that there was an ongoing social practice of interaction between member states and EU institutions to construct the EEAS.
The second key area which the document points out are individual issues going on at the time of writing and Barroso’s opinion regarding these issues. For example, Barroso states that the responsibilities of the HR as outlined in the treaty has to be ensured by proper policy-making and resource allocation. Furthermore, there is information on how consistency regarding external actions should be achieved and a part about which principles the EEAS should adhere to. These smaller paragraphs end with administrative questions like how to do the payments of staff and which protocols should be followed by who. Thus, this key area is filled with minor pieces of information about issues which have less priority and can be resolved in the future. As final example, Barroso specifies that stakeholders have expressed desire for filling in
responsibilities of the HR and boundaries which the office may not cross at all.60 These issues
are not all specified from a viewpoint of necessity, like neorealism would advocate, but from a shared interest which have to be smoothened further. In conclusion, the Barroso commission was busy orchestrating the buildup of a new entity which was given the goal to supersede the standard mold of institutions which already existed. The EEAS was based on the amalgamation of multiple ideas from different nations which would therefore make it a constructivist idea from the onset.
Ashton’s Evidence Session 2011
When Ashton was conducting her meeting with the House of Lords committee an idealistic surge was felt in western powers. It was the start of the Arab spring which would see North African and Middle Eastern dictatorships tumble in the wake of democratic protests. The 2008 financial crisis had passed, but for the European countries this was substituted by the so-called European sovereign debt crisis with the debt of Greece as highlight. Despite the political
instability surrounding the European Union, there remained a more inward focus as was evident by daily held meetings on overcoming the European debt crisis. Barely any increase of
resources, except for during the intervention in Libya, were going towards the Arab spring protests.61
Throughout the session, Ashton emphasizes that her role as HR has been an ongoing process. Her duty as HR has been to look for consensus between the member states in order to act on an international level.62 This approach based on compromise is a defining feature of the
60 Ibidem, 10.
61 N. Bremberg, ‘Making sense of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings: foreign policy practice at times of crisis’, European Security 25:4 (2016) 423-441, 432.
constructivist framework of international relations. Ashton explains to the committee that what the EEAS contributes is different than what member states have done individually regarding foreign affairs. She mentions 27 voices which are molded into a single one with more impact on the global stage.63 Besides positive effects of this consensus structure, Ashton also states
multiple issues which were ongoing at the time. Reallocation of resources was a daily reality, because not enough financial assistance was made available for the EEAS. Member states have in general been hesitant to increase budgets. Another issue which has a hard time to reach consensus is priority setting. Ashton explains that member states often times need to be convinced which can be a long process.64 This results in certain foreign policy missions
remaining underdeveloped while the situation would require otherwise.
The answers that Ashton provides contain a spirit of consensus building as mentioned earlier. Evidence of this are statements like ‘complete the work on bringing the people together into one place’, ‘continue to work to try to make those issues where we have a common view as effective as possible’ and ‘member states share information, discuss joint actions and work out an European response’.65 Thus, what Ashton tries to explain to the committee is the same as
was evident in Barroso’s report. The European Union and the EEAS has been a constructed process. It has not developed through necessity, but rather by an accumulated political will from different member states who acknowledged the added value of a European based foreign policy service.
Juncker’s Political Guidelines 2014
2014 looked to be a year in which the European Union and its members would fully regain control over its own destiny. The worst of the financial crisis and the corresponding European debt crisis was passing and faith in Europe and its leaders was going up. However, just two months in and a conflict on the border of the EU erupted between Ukrainian and Russian military personnel. This Russian action is often seen as a response to the association agreement talks between the EU and Ukraine.66 Nonetheless, the move had shocked European officials into
a different state of mind regarding European integration.
Juncker’s document has as goal to introduce what kind of policies he would be aiming for during his presidency of the Commission. It is written as a binding together of three separate pieces, namely Juncker’s agenda plan as president of the Commission, his opening statement to the EP plenary session and a statement given, in the EP plenary session, before the vote deciding the approval of his College proposal. The first section, his agenda plan for 2014-2019, has ten points of action which are all about avoiding disaster and solving EU wide problems. The strengthening
63 Ibidem, 8. 64 Ibidem, 7. 65 Ibidem, 7, 11, 28.
job market, smoothening digitalization and securing global governance are some of those points. Section two and three, which are both statements to the EP plenary session highlight the issues at stake and the state at which the European Union was at. It is very much spoken from a
realpolitik point of view.
The nature of the document is one of urgency and it is calling for action. ‘We urgently need a common foreign and security policy’, ‘In the defence sector we must have enhanced
cooperation’, The Ukraine crisis … show how important it is that Europe is united externally’ and ‘If we want a role to play in the future we have to play it now’.67 Juncker does his best to convey
that a host of different forces are threatening the European Union and its individual member states. According to him these issues have to be addressed as soon as possible. External crises (e.g. in Ukraine & Middle East), high (youth) unemployment, increasing extremist views and Euroscepticism are some of the looming threats Juncker points out. The behavior and tone displaying in this document suits the framework of neorealism incredibly well. As mentioned earlier, neorealism states that actors are forced to respond when existential threats arise in order to secure their own continued survival. Juncker emphasizes the problems that certain individual member states are experiencing in 2014 and exclaims that further cooperation increases survival chances. Examples are ‘Several of our Member States are still far away from sustainable growth and adequate levels of investment’, ‘We need to diversify our energy sources, and reduce the high energy dependency of several of our Member States’ and
‘Member states should also create more synergies in defence procurement’.68 Juncker mentions
what effect the crisis in Ukraine has on the EU and potential dangers from the crisis which were narrowly avoided. He notes that the Ukrainian crisis forces Europe to unite as a front against the outside world.69 That the EU has to act as a stronger Global actor in order to not get pushed
around and submit so easily to annexations on European territory. Furthermore, Juncker expresses relief that the EU has one monetary system, because events like the Ukraine crisis would have caused monetary wars.
European Union Global Strategy 2016
The migratory crisis has put large strains on the European integration project. Around the time of the Brexit vote and US President Obama’s final months in office, Mogherini and her staff published the European Union Global Strategy document. Its goal is to be a guideline from which the EU can formulate their global stance. Such a document was necessary, because multiple challenges, with global ramifications, were ongoing at the time. Thus, the Global
67 J.C. Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (Strasbourg
2014) 9, 19, 25.
68 Ibidem, 1, 5, 9.
69 D. Lane, ‘The International Context: Russia, Ukraine and the Drift to East-West Confrontation’, in: B. Kagarlitsky,
Strategy is a tool with which Mogherini exercises her responsibilities. The document consists of 60 pages with a foreword by Mogherini herself.
The document propagates a vision of the EEAS, supported by three points, which will be used to focus efforts for the betterment of the European Union.70 Firstly, a strategy is devised that
includes the promotion of European citizen’s interests. Secondly, principles are underlined which will form as a basis of conduct for the EEAS as organization. Thirdly, priorities are identified which revolve around security, resilience, cooperation, global governance and integrated approaches. Furthermore, the document has a section on how this vision of the future EEAS can actually come into existence through action.
Comparable to Juncker’s document, the EU global strategy is very much focused on addressing existential threats. As an example, its first point does so by focusing on certain principles which unite the European people together. The EU wants to advocate for these principles
internationally in order to remain cohesive itself. It is part of the ‘Principled Pragmatism’
programme which allows for flexibility in international relations, but also the stability of a moral compass.71 The containment of individual power politics plays a huge role herein, because that
goes against international law and would disadvantage the comparatively small European nations. There are writers who would point this out as the EU admitting to the return of
realpolitik, but with its own twist.72 Such a statement can be supported by showcasing the
language which is used in the document. ‘We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has
brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned’.73 These types of
rhetoric align with a realpolitik viewpoint of the world. The document notes the increased need for hard power capabilities, because soft power requires sufficient hard power. ‘For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand’.74 There is also a stronger condemnation in this document
regarding Russia and its actions versus Ukraine. In fact, it is mentioned that Russian behavior struck at the core of European security order. This shows the severity of what is at stake and how important power relations have become these past years.
Comparison analyzed documents
70 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (Brussels 2016) 7. 71 A.E. Juncos, ‘Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?’, European Security 26:1
(2017) 1-18, 2.
72 S. Biscop, ‘The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics’, in: J. Woischnik (ed.), Might and Right in World Politics (Rio de Janeiro 2016) 91-101, 92.; S. Giusti, ‘From a Regional to a Global Power, in Potency:
The EU’s Global Strategy’, in: S. Giusti and I. Mirkina (eds.), The EU in a Trans-European Space: External Relations
across Europe, Asia and the Middle East (Cham 2019) 21-42, 34.; 73 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action, 3. 74 Ibidem, 4.
When comparing the two documents from the presidents of the Commission, it is observed that a fundamental change occurs in the use of language and tone of the document. Barroso’s way of communicating is much more focused on the search for consensus. During his tenure as president there was less pressure on taken measures to integrate. The EEAS was seen as an institution which could be sui generis with a different role than national diplomatic services. The document is focused on internal issues (e.g. member states’ opinions) and prevention of
doubling up responsibilities. There is no acknowledgement of external threats which necessitate a European diplomatic service of strength. Actions of Barroso during his terms in office
correspond with the tone of this document. Barroso had no desire to strengthen the HR post more than was required by the Lisbon Treaty.75 Some examples are that he placed the portfolio
of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the hands of a different commissioner. Secondly, Ashton’s coordination capabilities were limited due to specific working modalities set up by Barroso. Lastly, the European ambassador to Washington was appointed by Barroso instead of by Ashton and was a close associate of him. This period was characterized by constructivists thought, while Juncker and Mogherini’s period was characterized by neorealism. For example, Juncker reached out to his HR and strengthened her position, because of necessity. As
mentioned earlier, Juncker spoke about the need to create a stronger global role for the
European Union. He took measures which saw the role of HR strengthened in order to deal with these external threats.76 Some of these actions were grouping multiple commissioners (Trade,
Development & Humanitarian Aid and Neighbourhood Policy) together under Mogherini so as to better coordinate efforts. Secondly, Juncker made sure that pragmatic arrangements were in place that allowed Mogherini to draw on instruments and expertise from all of the Commission. Lastly, Juncker publicly advocated that the role of HR and Mogherini matter and should be treated accordingly. Thus, the important take-away is that under Barroso’s lead there was no force which created a need to integrate on more politically sensitive issues
(social-constructivism), while during Juncker’s tenure outside threats did require further integration as response (neorealism).
The same trend can be observed through the two documents from HR Ashton and HR
Mogherini. Whereas Mogherini advocates for certain actions which have to be undertaken in order to remain globally relevant and safe, Ashton describes the internal struggles which have been had during the setting up of the EEAS and further elaborates that nothing more was done than required by the Lisbon Treaty. Through this comparison it should have become crystal clear that times have changed between the tenure of Barroso/Ashton and Juncker/Mogherini.
75 N. Helwig, ‘Agent Interaction as a Source of Discretion for the EU High Representative’, in: T. Delreux, J.
