The Effect of the ‘Refugee Situation’ on
Dutch Official Development Aid Allocation
Author:
C. Hubert
Student Number: 11335084
Supervisor:
Dr. E.F. Ersanilli
Second Reader:
Dr. S. Krapohl
Completed:
January 2021
1
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 2
Theoretical Framework ... 5
Aid Allocation Trends ... 5
Donor Benefits of Aid ... 7
Migration Development Nexus ... 8
Methodology ... 11
Results ... 13
Dutch Recent Developments ... 13
General ODA Budget ... 14
In-Donor Refugee Costs ... 15
Humanitarian Aid ... 17
Geographic Allocation ... 19
Sectoral Allocation... 21
Thematic Allocation ... 23
Discussion & Conclusions ... 25
Sources ... 28
Appendix I - Glossary ... 33
2
Introduction
Historically, to some extent contemporary pressing political issues have always had a role in ODA allocation (Voorhoeve, 1977; Wall, 1995; Aning, 2010). A view that Official Development Aid (ODA) can be used to help or incentivize political goals from donor countries usually described as ‘unintended’ effects. Yet, recent developments on the assessment of aid have shown that diverging goals and aims from donor and recipient countries cause ineffective aid (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018). This could have sparked the trend towards the inclusion of donor-sided aims and the benefits development aid could have thereto in the political and academic debate. This donor side of aid quickly gained grounds to the point that it has reached formal representation in ODA policy. Aid with the inclusion of donor goals shows itself to be increasingly closer to ‘win-win’ or ‘mutually beneficial’ aid, an incentive originally intended to spark and accommodate South-South cooperation or the donorship of Middle Income Countries (MICs) (OECD, 2016). The idea of implementing donor-sided goals and benefits as a given aspect of developmental aid, implies the usage of conditionality or selectivity amongst donors to their recipients (Minoui & Reddy, 2010). The usage of conditionality, previously primarily found in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and migrant remittances, appears to be dangerous due to ODA being the only mode of development assistance where non-conditionality can effectively be enforced to provide aid to those recipients who would otherwise not receive any aid (Driffield & Jones, 2013). Conditionality therefore excludes recipients, possibly in dire need of ODA, on the basis to which that conditionality is applied against the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) premises of “Leave No One Behind” (OECD, 2018; pp. 1).
The 2015 peak of the ‘refugee situation’, more commonly referred to as the ‘European migrant crisis’, has made an impact on international politics, with migration flows and issues rapidly gaining a lot of attention especially so in European political priority. The 2015 peak, concerning the exorbitantly high amount of refugee inflow towards Europe reaching over a million that year (IOM, 2015), sparked an uprising of anti-immigrant parties, mainly within the political right (DW, 2018). These parties in turn, influenced international and domestic politics in many ways regarding migration, including the volume and allocation of ODA. In combination with a general trend of ‘aid fatigue’ (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018) and a shift towards the security issues of migration rather than the positive effect it has on development, the effect the ‘refugee situation’ could have on development aid could lead to more ‘ineffective’ aid aimed to accommodate donor goals.
A link between migration and development had been established and the emergence of a migration-development nexus had been happening before the 2015 peak of the ‘refugee situation’, yet recent studies express concerns to the accelerating factor it could have and possible
3 overcompensation it could cause (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017). Responses to the 2015 peak include a tremendous increase of money spent on asylum applicants and ad hoc multilateral and unitary European efforts to deter the migration flow. These asylum applicant expenditures, or in-donor refugee costs, could be taken from or counted as ODA budget resulting in some countries having disproportionally high ODA disbursements and/or in-donor refugee costs as a share thereof (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017). European efforts were widespread tapping into reserves to support countries stopping the migration flow before it reached Europe as well as special initiatives being set up to deal with the, possibly continuing, situation such as the European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) specifically designed to deter and manage ongoing migration as well as address the ‘root causes’ and drivers for future migration (EC, 2015).
The Netherlands increased both their ODA disbursements and more significantly so their share of in-donor refugee costs. Next to making use of both these efforts, decreasing their ‘effectively’ spent ODA, they add an ingenious structure of the movement of budget from future years based on their projected GDP growth possibly restricting future ODA budgets (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017). This in combination with the Netherlands being a historically reliable and generous donor of ODA (OECD, 2020) gives them a rather interesting and possibly exemplary role amongst DAC donors. With the most recent findings on these trends concerning the influence of migration flows and pressures on ODA allocations concluding at data provided for the year of the peak (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017), it remains to be seen what the more persistent effects of this event on ODA are in contrast to the more temporary, ad hoc reactions. The inclusion of the Netherlands in their research gives me the opportunity to intensively and accurately compare these ‘reactions’ to the integration of on-going trends. This entails placing my findings in the general emergence of links between migration and development and how that affects ODA allocation, and the effect the ‘refugee situation’ has on this trend as opposed to action taken do deal with the peak specifically.
This leads me to analyse what the effect of the ‘refugee situation’ is on Dutch allocation of ODA. In order to do so, this research focusses on three different aspects of ODA allocation. Firstly geographical, to assess a shift in allocation concerning the influence of migratory-strategic relevance in terms of proximity and relation to the (ir)regular migration route(s) to Europe1. Second, sectoral to
observe shifts in priority fields and the industries or communities and groups the Netherlands focusses on. And lastly thematic, to attempt to visualize the impact of migration-related aid shifts across all projects beyond their geographic or sectoral categorization. This research mainly being conducted through the extensive databases of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
4 (OECD), alike Knoll & Sheriff’s (2017), enables me to comprehensively compare over time as well as allowing future research to do so over different time periods and donors. The theory is structured to accentuate or nuance results, predictions and concerns given by Knoll & Sheriff (2017) to provide an explanation to both compliant and deviating findings. These findings therefore hopefully pose as a constructive base for shifts and influences ahead.
5
Theoretical Framework
ODA as a global consensus to make an effort in combating international inequality stems from 1970, when the UN enacted a resolution on disarmament and imposed the suggestion of making better use of money dedicated to defensive measures by stating that “peace and security in the world, like development, are indivisible, and recognizing the universal responsibilities and obligations in this regard,” (UN, 1969;A/RES/2602 (XXIV), pp. 15). Later, this recommendation gained more substance by the resolution of the UN General Assembly that the aim for the size of these resources is 0.7% GNI for developed, or post 1970 industrialized, countries (UNGA, 1970). This resolution, specifying the general aims, goals and foci of developmental aid, distinguishes countries that are fit as donor, recipient or neither. The aim of 0.7% GNI still persists, however as of 2019 only 5 countries2 have
achieved that goal (for that year) (OECD, 2020).
Aid Allocation Trends
In 1977, Voorhoeve assessed the workings and disbursement the first global effort to reduce inequality. The motives that seemed to drive this early stage of ODA could be reduced to economic, humanitarian and political. Economic drivers mostly consisted of the creation and inclusion of foreign markets and supplies and humanitarian drivers targeted the alleviation of poverty and disease. The range of political drivers was relatively broad and differed per donor, being most visibly divided on political ideology3 (Voorhoeve, 1977). Of the DAC countries, the developed signatories to the UN
resolution, only two4 had reached the 0.7% goal with an average of 0.36% amongst DAC countries. DAC
countries that have a relatively high volume of ODA tended to allocate funds based on colonial relations, strategic or military interests and political ideology, especially after truly humanitarian aid for the worst off was not deemed successful in terms of economic growth (Voorhoeve, 1977). This shows in relatively disproportionate aid allocation to members of the British Commonwealth, the Franc Zone and important countries in military conflicts at the time (Voorhoeve, 1977).
In the period between the initial phase of ODA and 1989, Wall (1995) found that prioritization shifted towards countries with the lowest per capita incomes as opposed to human rights and infant mortality, which were among the most influential topics in political discourse. Furthermore, an imposition of political conditionality arose. To refrain from possibly funding a humanitarian or political disaster, donor countries took the political and civil rights of a recipient government into account. These political and civil rights in turn were assessed by donor countries, arguably making such
2 Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
3 DAC countries (Democratic/Western), OPEC countries (Autocratic) and Communist countries. 4 Sweden and the Netherlands.
6 preconditions Western imposed. Wall (1995) also introduces the idea that since ODA is additional income in the perspective of recipient countries, donor countries are interchangeable. Whereas donor countries have differing priorities within this given set, recipients to donor countries are not. In line with this conditionality, the EC formally established a link between democracy and development in 1986 and proclaiming themselves as the international protector of human rights (Baehr, 1994).
Zanger (2000) shows the conditionality of donors in contrast to the ODA expenditures of the EC as an entity are not defined by the priorities of a single national government. The EC primarily granted aid towards the ACP countries in general, unallocated and therefore unconditional, in contrast to their member states. For the end of the 20th century, with a focus on European countries, national
donors prioritize their (former) colonial empire and beyond that political conditionality such as level of democracy and military expenditures. This suggests a conditionality towards recipients as to which are eligible for ODA, and within those eligible a selectivity applies according to strategic and economic factors.
Aning (2010) shows that the importance of humanitarian considerations rose over time, from 3% in the 1980s to 10% in 2002 (OECD, 2003). He states that part of this increase is the inclusion of “expenses for persons arriving from countries experiencing civil war or those migrating due to humanitarian or political reasons” (Aning, 2010; pp. 22-23). This establishes a preliminary link between migration and development aid, but was not regarded as such. In the years 1995-2006 political discourse concentrated on newly established links between development and security. Most prominently in the eyes of the War on Terror (WoT) (Aning, 2010). He suggests the emergence of a (new) development-security nexus visible in the conditionality and selectivity of ODA as well as leveraging compliance. Conditionality applying to the role a developing country has within the WoT, refraining from funding ‘terrorist’ producing countries and their militaries. Selectivity in the potential role a developing country could play in the WoT and their willingness to do so, implying conditionality on the goals and aims of ODA. Leveraging as to justify their initiatives to do so, promising ODA to countries that (inter)nationally align their aims to donors. This is most visible in the almost unanimous ‘purchased’ vote authorising war in Iraq with the regional capability to do so and the immediate retraction of ODA allocated by the US to Yemen, who voted against (Aning, 2010).
In contrast to formal representation, Aning (2010) observes the allocation of ODA being determined by the concerns on security by donors rather than the need for security by recipients. He also establishes the mutual need for security in order to achieve sustainable developments and need for development to achieve sustainable security. This implies the focus on security by donors restricting development and by extension security itself. He also shows the effect a single phenomenon
7 (9/11) can have on the allocation of ODA. Knoll & Sheriff (2017) identified a similar trend arising afterwards in regard to migration. They argue that the emergence of in-donor refugee costs and an increase in general migration to donor countries causes for a shift of allocation towards countries ”that are strategically relevant from a migration perspective.” (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017; pp. 22). Alike 9/11, the 2015 ‘refugee situation’ could pose as an accelerator of this trend insinuating a prominently visible representation of this trend after 2015.
Donor Benefits of Aid
Development assistance consists of three main inflows of foreign money, namely ODA, FDI and migrant remittances (Driffield & Jones, 2013). ODA, as discussed above, is aid provided at least concessional, but primarily and recently only (OECD, 2020) as a grant by actors in the public sector. FDI is a local investment, usually partaking ownership, by private actors from foreign countries. FDI or the allocation thereof can be stimulated, advised or restricted by governments, but not decided. Migrant remittances pertain to more personal relations, allowing labour migrants to use their newly acquainted wealth to financially support their families back home. This stresses the importance of the non-conditionality of ODA, since other modes of development assistance are inherently conditional.
Recent developments concerning the reporting and assessment of aid have emphasized the importance of the donors’ agenda. DAC members, being primarily democratic, have been experiencing ‘aid fatigue’ amongst their constituency due to the general ineffectiveness of ODA on GDP growth. Combined with increasing transparency throughout ODA processes this shifted the political discourse from recipient needs to ‘win-win’ or ‘mutually beneficial’ ODA in an effort to justify these expenditures (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018). This while ‘win-win’ or ‘mutually beneficial’ ODA was originally intended to incentivize and accommodate South-South cooperation and MIC donors. Including the benefits of donor countries in ODA can increase the volume and by extension the overall effect thereof, as well as shifting the assessment of the effectivity of aid to the level that the goals of both donor and recipient countries are achieved. Keijzer & Lundsgaarde (2018) argue that ‘mutually beneficial’ aid is not new, rather the intentions of donor countries were previously described as ‘unintended effects’ diverging and mismatching the aims and goals of donor and recipient countries. Framing ODA as ‘mutually beneficial’ therefore allows for more efficient selectivity in long-term ODA partnerships to increase the functionality and feasibility of ODA incentives (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018).
Matching aims and goals of donor and recipient countries also implies a sense of conditionality or selectivity on the donor of ODA (Minoui & Reddy, 2010). Although usually not imposed, increased selectiveness on donors implies a decrease in number of recipients per donor to provide more specific, contextually informed, long-term development cooperation, which has a positive influence on growth
8 of the recipient(s) (Minoui & Reddy, 2010). Knoll & Sheriff (2017) argue that, especially in Europe, because of the trend of increasingly including benefits for donor countries the volume of ODA has increased. Although most prominently because of the increasing in-donor refugee costs, which could, and to a more limited extent can5, be reported as ODA. This raises concern to the attainment of the
0.7% ODA of GNI goal, increasingly including costs not contributing to development in developing countries and therefore testing the credibility of ODA (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017).
Migration Development Nexus
Historically, politics of immigration have had a reactionary character. A states’ capacity to deal with (unwanted) immigration depends on domestic economic performance, migratory pressures and issue salience (Freeman, 1994). This results in the accumulation of flaws in migration policy and the capacity to deal with it, until the pressure on the issue requires immediate action by public demand or the occurrence of a crisis. Over time, the frequency of these crises and/or prioritization of migration as a political issue have increased (Freeman 1994). Likewise, the amount of new or adjusted policies implemented targeting immigration and asylum has increased alongside the application numbers or rejection rates (Helbling & Kalkum, 2018). While immigration policies seem to have become more liberal, immigration control has intensified (Adepoju et al., 2010).
Since 2003, the link between migration and development has gained formal representation by the inclusion of obligatory readmission to ACP countries from the EU. This tendency has extended to the point where development aid is promised or granted as a reward for compliance with migration management demands by donors or even to buy votes or signatures in multilateral migration agreements. Needless to say, this granted aid was also expected to contribute to the deterrence of (irregular) migration in the broadest sense (Adepoju et al., 2010). This in turn has implications for and raises concerns over the conditionality and selectivity of aid. It suggests aid to be conditional to countries with strategic-migratory relevance to the donor. In addition, selective within those who are relevant on intent to increase migration management and promote return migration. In light of mutually beneficial aid, this also incentivises donor countries to increase the volume of aid to this particular set of recipients.
In contrast to the aims of these incentives, development can have a positive effect on (irregular) emigration, especially so in LDCs. From the assumption that the aim of ODA in regard to migration is to “foster development that renders migration less needed.” (Clemens & Postel, 2018; pp. 2), statistical evidence proves the opposite. Low economic prospects and youth employment
5 OECD guidelines restricted donors to only include costs of refugee applicants for one year after arrival in response to these increasing costs as part of ODA (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017).
9 incentivise people to emigrate, while an increase in GDP per capita can enable them to do so. Especially so in LDCs due to a significantly decreasing infant mortality rate well before a decrease in fertility rates, causing an increase in population size making it even harder to provide youth employment and economic prospects (Clemens & Postel, 2018). Clemens & Postel (2018) therefore conclude not a shift in geographical allocation of ODA to migratory-strategic relevant countries in the perspective of donors in an attempt to deter migration, but rather a shift in migration related projects in the broadest sense to combat the ‘root causes’ of migration.
Knoll & Sheriff (2017) observed that European humanitarian aid shifted primarily to the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’, suggesting strong influences of strategic-migratory relevance to the geographical allocation of ODA. On the longer term, and specifically relevant for the Netherlands having priority partner countries, this could diverge development efforts in countries that are and are not strategic-migratory relevant significantly. As selectivity or conditionality on aid can increase the effectiveness thereof (Minoui & Reddy, 2010), donors collectively doing so could exclude certain LDCs from receiving aid increasing inequality amongst eligible recipients of aid. This is most visible in the creation of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), specifically designed to tackle the ‘root causes’ of migration and improve migration management to which the Netherlands is a significant donor (EC, 2019). Knoll & Sheriff (2017) conclude that political discourse has greatly shifted towards migration deterrence.
The combination of theory suggests an overinclusion of the donor-sided benefits in ODA, especially within the migration-development nexus. This overinclusion partially due to the selective or even conditional focus on strategic-migratory relevant countries but also to the projects aiming to decrease the flow of (irregular) migrants to donor countries. Whether that is aimed more towards the management of migration or the ‘root causes’ of migration, the latter seeming to include a very wide range of subjects from reproductive health to conflict prevention to employment creation. This suggests a shift in the framework of conditional geographic and thematic ODA allocation, as well as formal representation thereof. It remains to be seen whether the alleged ineffectiveness of migration deterrence through ODA has an impact on these aspects.
For the Netherlands specifically, Knoll & Sheriff (2017) found that in contrast to historic evidence the ODA as share of GNI has been continuously dropping below the 0.7% target with an exception of 2015. This because of a rising costs in in-donor refugee costs due to the spike in refugee inflow and the Netherlands reporting the highest average cost per asylum applicant6. These
unexpected costs were partially compensated from future ODA budgets (Figure 1) and with the prediction of a continuity of these costs leads to the first hypothesis (1) a lower general ODA budget,
10 Table 1: Dutch Budgetary Shifts (Source: Knoll & Sheriff, 2017)
including in-donor refugee costs. Knoll & Sheriff (2017) also find a 71% increase in the volume of the humanitarian aid budget in 2015, primarily accountable to the 222% increase in budget spent to the Syria-Iraq region (Ploumen, 2016), with the remainder of ODA budget being mostly geographically unallocated I suggest the hypothesis (2) a shift in geographic allocation of primarily humanitarian aid towards countries with strategic-migratory relevance. The lack of shifts in sectoral allocation (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017) and theory on political discourse towards the ‘root causes’ of migration I expect (3) a sectoral shift to an overall inclusion of the ‘root causes’ of migration. And lastly, based on the prediction towards more projects targeting migration management, reception in the region, AVR and diasporic support and critique towards the lack of appropriate reporting opportunities thereto I expect (4) an inclusion of those thematic targets both within the OECD reporting methods as Dutch ODA allocation.
11
Methodology
Knoll & Sheriff (2017) assessed the emergence of the link between migration and development in political discourse and policy, mostly focussed on ODA. Their research made use of the then available data until 2014, 2015 being preliminary. I investigate the more settled, persistent effect of the 2015 peak of the ‘refugee situation’ on this trend. I attempt to do so by visualizing ODA data by thematic, sectoral and geographical allocation in line with the research conducted by Knoll & Sheriff (2017). Whereas they include a set of 5 cases7, I will focus on extending one case study due to the scope of
this research. The case study extended is the one of the Netherlands due to language convenience and document accessibility. As one of goals is to assess the occurrence of predictions by Knoll & Sheriff (2017), I use the same (updated) dataset to provide a comprehensive comparison with the addition of extra resources where deemed logical or necessary.
I operationalize this research in essence to the research of Knoll & Sheriff (2017) to test the persistence and accuracy of their findings in terms of trends, expectations and predictions. Additionally, I identify the argumentation of these results first within the used dataset and set out theoretical framework and, if necessary, beyond through government documents. As opposed to the research conducted by Knoll & Sheriff (2017), I will not offer an assessment of aid effectiveness primarily due to these findings being based on interviews with high-level officials whom I do not have access to. Due to this being a single case study I focus the results on ODA granted and allocated by Dutch ministries at the costs of international (yearly) contributions, which pertain more to European and/or international trends instead of Dutch.
Used data comes primarily from the OECD, more specifically their developments statistics and Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Within the development statistics, primary sources are the DAC5, DCRPP2020, DAC2a and DAC3a. Additionally, I use data on refugees, asylum seekers and migrant internationally from UN organs8 and domestically from the Dutch Central Agency for Statistics (CBS).
The CRS includes data up until 2018 and the OECD development statistics generally include preliminary 2019 data, data from other sources is limited accordingly.
I conduct a keyword research over the project-specific CRS data in 2018 operationalized through the same methodology as in Knoll & Sheriff (2017) to provide a comparison not only over the years, but also to the new thematic category within CRS data relating to migration specific projects9
7 The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and the EU.
8 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
12 taken into usage by Dutch reportion in 2018. Therefore, I have done so only in 2018, since doing so for every year is beyond the scale of this research. All OECD data was extracted and updated the latest at 02/01/2021. The keyword research searches for usage of the terms ‘refugee’, ‘smuggling’, ‘border management’, ‘displacement’, ‘trafficking’, ‘migration’, ‘mobility’, ‘border security’, ‘migrant’, ‘return’, ‘root cause’, ‘diaspora’, ‘reintegration’, ‘scholarship’, ‘remittance’ and their Dutch equivalents in project descriptions. Multiple usages and usages beyond migratory relevance are corrected by hand.
CRS data is reliant on the extent to which government officials have given accurate and comprehensive descriptions, since research covering the full reporting of each individual project is way beyond the scope and scale of this research. Definitions given by the OECD (2021) to distinguish between commitments and disbursement (Appendix II) suggest that strong comparisons between them within a certain year in the context of this research is irrelevant, and a comprehensive comparison over all years entails covering the full reporting of each individual project and is thus also beyond the scope and scale of this research. Data of the year 2019, where given, is entirely preliminary and thus inherently unreliable but provides the most accurate prediction for that year of available data at the time of writing.
Throughout this research, a number of different currencies in different fiscal years are used. In the OECD statistics and CRS database the constant value of the USD 2018 is used and will therefore pose as the main or baseline currency in the results. Where necessary, I convert amount reports in currencies other than USD to USD using the average exchange rate during the year of reporting, followed by a correction for inflation within USD currency to 2018. When useful, I include the used currency, whereas amounts without specified currency or fiscal year can be read as USD 2018.
13
Results
Dutch Recent Developments
Historically, the Netherlands has had an exemplary and reliable character amongst ODA donors, being one of the first and few to attain and hold the international goal of ODA at least being 0.7% of GNI (Voorhoeve, 1977; Rosche 2018; OECD 2020). The contradictory budget cuts, reinforced by the restrictions imposed on future budgets due to shifts, caused ODA in 2017 to reach the lowest point since 1974. The budget cuts are attributed to the rise of right-wing populism and their development scepticism (Rosche, 2018). The decline in ODA is twofold, consisting of a general decrease in ODA budget as well as an increasing share of in-donor refugee costs most prominently during and due to the 2015 peak of the ‘refugee situation’, which is not unanimously recognized as a ‘worthy’ allocation of ODA (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017; Rosche, 2018). On top of the previously discussed budget shifts, parliamentary questions suggested that the government have calculated their GNI growth based on outdated (lower) numbers to accommodate a further decrease in ODA budget (Rosche, 2018). Next to the unusually high costs per asylum seeker the Netherlands also decided to spread their 1-year after arrival costs over 2 years (63% & 37% respectively) to prevent even further ‘effective’ budget decline in case of the ‘refugee situation’ persisting (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017).
The new coalition elected in 2017 committed to increase ODA again between 2018-2021 and corrected the usage of GNI data, despite keeping the previously implemented budget cuts in place. This resulted in a projected lesser decrease in ODA budget. In line with other DAC donors but in contrast to the Dutch reputation the significant and most prominent economic growth since the 2008 recession and projected continuation thereof has not yet found its way to the ODA budget (Rosche 2018). The projected return to the 0.7% standard is in 2030, which has raised concern towards meeting demands around the internationally established SDGs. Another concern, attributed to the rise of in-donor refugee costs, is the decreasing predictability and reliability of Dutch ODA. These costs are predicted to be 10% in the future (Rosche, 2018), as opposed to the expected 20% in 2016 (Knoll & Sheriff, 2017). The Netherlands engages in a trend denominated as ‘Aid for Trade’ (WTO, 2021), an incentive to promote and partially subsidize Dutch SMEs and MNCs abroad to contribute to the reduction of poverty. This incentive has not yet proven its efficiency and is currently costing more than the increased returns it is supposed to generate. Nevertheless, ‘Aid for Trade’ is expected to stay part of Dutch ODA (Rosche, 2018).
Up until 2018, the approach of the Dutch government regarding migration and development was based on predictions and concerns around the 2015 peak of the ‘refugee situation. As of 2018, that approach has shifted towards a more comprehensive and inclusive approach considering the expected
14 population growth in Africa and South Asia, instability around Europe and climate change amongst others as drivers for future migration (Dutch Government, 2018). This inclusive approach shapes new priorities for migration relevant ODA, namely; (1) prevention of irregular migration, (2) increased support to and protection of refugees and displaced persons regionally, and (3) promotion of regular, legal migration routes. Within this framework, the government states to focus on the second priority bilaterally, while the other two priorities rely on multilateral action through IGOs and NGOs for which the Netherlands will advocate (Dutch Government, 2018). In addition, they intend to engage in a ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ approach in migration relevant ODA, meaning that bilateral partnerships with the Netherlands will incentivize return migration and migration management. This means that incorporation of these incentives and action thereto results in positive influence on future ODA granting whilst not doing so results in fewer ODA, with possible reductions beyond migration related ODA (Dutch Government, 2018).
General ODA Budget
After the significant rise in ODA as a share of GNI in 2015, attributed to the peak of the ‘refugee situation’, the Dutch government expected a decrease in budget by €750 million per year increasing to €1 billion from 2017 on (AIV, 2016). Although the amount of disbursed ODA stabilized at a little higher average after the refugee situation than before (Figure 1), the ODA as a share of GNI has dropped further (Table 2). Despite both the drop in volume and share of ODA from 2015-2016, the ODA without in-donor refugee costs rose. This suggests that both the rise in substantial ODA as well as the rise of that allocated to in-donor refugee costs were ad hoc and temporary. One could therefore also argue that between 2015-2016, the ‘effective’ ODA increased. The continuing gap after the peak of the ‘refugee situation’ between net ODA and ODA without in-donor refugee costs can partially be attributed to the budgetary shifts implemented to preserve ongoing projects. The expected net ODA for 2019, in line with complementary increasement in budget and previously planned cuts, is the same as 2018 and is not expected to rise above that until 2022(HGIS, 2019).
15
In-Donor Refugee Costs
The Dutch government distinguishes refugees between ‘first asylum application’ and ‘following family members’ (FFM) (CBS, 2020). When an asylum seeker arriving in the Netherlands is granted asylum, they can request an authorization for temporary stay to reunite with their family. If granted, FFM can enter the Netherlands on a derived asylum permit from the original asylum seeker, after which they have roughly 6 months to apply for asylum themselves. This system creates a certain delay for spikes in refugee arrivals, such as the one in 2015 (Figure 2). One must keep in mind that the delay instigates 6 months after asylum was granted rather than applied for. The granting (or denial) of asylum is estimated to take about 6 months as well, but often takes longer (AIDA, 2016). Next to the budgetary shifts, additional in-donor refugee costs can be attributed to this delay. When a spike in asylum applications occurs, a period roughly 1 to 1,5 year after can be expected where their associated FFM application are increased. In turn, this can account for the increase of in-donor refugee costs as a share of net ODA between 2016-2017.
Figure 2: Asylum Applications in the Netherlands (Source: CBS, 2020) $4.000 $5.000 $6.000 $7.000 $8.000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 U SD 2018 , mil lion s
Total Net Disbursed Total Commitments Without In-Donor Refugee Costs
16 The budget made available through shifts (Table 1) caused concern as well. Not only are the shifts a restriction on future budgets, if the increased refugee inflow were to continue, additional budget needed to be available for each year after. The refugee inflow turned out to be much lower than expected (Figure 2), resulting in the Dutch government saving roughly $450 mln over the next 3 years, which is slightly less than the $523 mln (€449 mln) they shifted to the 2015 budget leaving room for either earlier balance restoration or earlier budget growth due to GNI growth (Figure 3). The allocated budget for in-donor refugee costs amount up to €420 mln in 2019 (MJV, 2018) and €376 mln in 2020 (HGIS, 2019), being significantly lower than previously allocated budgets and giving opportunity for ‘effective’ budget growth. This also means that the share of in-donor refugee costs of total ODA stabilizes closer to the 10% expectancy, rather than the 20%. For the coming years the combined increases and decreases has led the Dutch Government to aim for again achieving 0.7% ODA as share of GNI, minus €1.4 bln, leading to an expected more persistent percentage of 0.54% from 2022 on with complete return to the 0.7% standard in 2030 (HGIS, 2019). Nevertheless, while Dutch ODA as share of GNI decreased to below the DAC target, they are still performing well above the DAC average (Figure 3).
Table 3: Dutch ODA Commitments and Disbursements (Source: OECD Statistics)
0,2% 0,3% 0,4% 0,5% 0,6% 0,7% 0,8% 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 ODA a s Sh ar e o f GN I Projection Actual DAC Target DAC Average
17
Humanitarian Aid
Alike the budgetary shifts to match in-donor refugee costs, the necessarily increased budget allocated as humanitarian aid as described by Knoll & Sherrif (2017) in 2015 ($250 mln) was shifted from GDP growth in 2016 and 2020, and the flexibility of the Emergency Relief Fund in 2016 and 2017 (MBZ, 2015). After 2015, the humanitarian aid budget has remained relatively stable at the 2014 level with an exception in 2017. This can be accounted for by either or a combination of two developments. Firstly, as discussed above, 2017 had the most significant delayed in-donor refugee costs (FFM), requiring an increase in that budget next to the planned restrictions. Secondly, a rather spurious and relatively significant occurrence of debt relief gains a share of bilateral ODA (Figure 4). Most likely, this has to do with the shift in reporting of ODA from money disbursed with a certain share of grant to only the grant equivalent and thus excluding loans and by extension debts from ODA (OECD, 2017). With the relatively stable amount of total bilateral ODA from 2014-2018 (except 2015), only in 2017 the increased amounts of budget in other sectors affected the share of humanitarian aid. By extension, due to the stable total amount, also the volume of humanitarian aid.
Figure 4: Dutch ODA per Category as Share of Total Bilateral ODA Commitments (Source: OECD Statistics) Note: The unallocated/unspecified budget of 2010 is negative, causing a less than 100% in the graph.
18 Within humanitarian aid, which saw a tremendous increase in the amount allocated to the Syria-Iraq region10 in 2015 (222%), effects were also temporary. The share of humanitarian aid granted
to the Syria-Iraq region remained stable throughout 2013-2015 around 25%, only increasing in volume alongside the total volume increase of humanitarian aid (Figure 5). The allocation of humanitarian aid to the Syria-Iraq region over the period 2015-2018 follows the pattern of in-donor refugee costs. The decrease in available budget in 2016 and the decrease in humanitarian aid deemed necessary for the Syria-Iraq region allows for a significant rise in volume granted to other crises ($58 mln) and an even more significant share (22% to 53%). In 2018, the amount granted as well as the share of geographically specified humanitarian aid decreased due to a rise in unspecified costs. While the accurate tracking of geographically unspecified grants are beyond the scope of this research, it mostly consists of contributions to multilateral organizations. International efforts show that over 2017-2018 the crisis in the Syria-Iraq region did not receive more aid than before but rather total multilateral humanitarian aid spending increased due to deteriorating crises elsewhere11 (UNOCHA, 2017). Plans for 2019 and
beyond show a rise for geographically specified ODA, stating that unearmarked contributions remain predictable while the humanitarian aid budget increases by about €200 mln (MBZ, 2018). The geographic allocation thereof, in line with evidence, will focus on the prolonged crises in the Syria-Iraq region, Yemen, Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa and Bangladesh.
10 This includes: The Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The usually included Egypt is left out due to not being a recipient of Dutch humanitarian aid.
11 Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, the DRC, Libya, Somalia and Sudan. The remaining levels of aid granted to crises alongside the Syria-Iraq region are Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen.
19
Geographic Allocation
The majority of Dutch ODA commitments have been, and still are, geographically unspecified (Figure 6). In 2015, the amount of total ODA commitments increased tremendously, back to 2010 levels. The increased amount mostly went to unspecified regions, yet due to the significant increase of geographically unspecified ODA as share of the total in 2014 the overall increased amount translated to roughly the same shares. Only an emergence of European allocated aid accounted for a decrease in the share allocated to Asia, yet this can be explained by the amount of budget allocated to Asia, most prominently the Middle East, remaining the same while the European portion of aid is most dominantly allocated to Turkey12. Both relating to the Syria-Iraq region and can thus be argued as a relatively
similar allocation despite a shift over continental allocation. From 2016 on, the shift in amount of total committed ODA is mostly seen in the amount of geographically unspecified ODA with after 2017 a slight increase in both share and amount allocated to Africa (partially) at the cost of that to Asia. This due to a significant decrease in ODA commitments to Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
In 2017, there is a significant and persistent rise in ODA spent north of the Sahara (Table 4). CRS data shows that projects in this area are mainly aimed on the “justice, equality and employment for women and youth” next to the “combatting of human trafficking” and AVR. Both contribute to the deterrence of (irregular) migration, yet one more directly so than the other. In 2018, the newly introduced and now implemented subcategory of “government & civil society”, namely the “facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility” (OECD CRS, 2017) answered the call from Knoll & Sheriff (2017) for a thematic inclusion of migration management. This
12 In 2015 described as “Europe, regional”, but due to reporting on 2016 almost definitely Turkey.
20 category makes up for 0.5% of total Dutch ODA; thereof 50% north of the Sahara and 50% south13.
Shifts within Sub-Saharan Africa seem to have little to do with migration based on project descriptions.
The Asia region has seen a very significant change over the years (Table 5). The ODA disbursed per region shifted gradually between 2011-2019 (except 2015) from being predominantly allocated in South and Central Asia (76.3% in 2011) to the Middle East (72.4% in 2019). The increased shift to the Middle East in 2015 can be attributed to the peak of the ‘refugee situation’ while the inconsistencies in 2016 and 2018 of allocation to South and Central Asia can be attributed to the deteriorating situation and call for emergency aid to the Afghan region.
The geographic allocation of humanitarian aid shows that aid to the Americas diminished after 201114 (Table 6), despite the ongoing crisis in Colombia (UNOCHA, 2017). Aid committed to the Asian
region has remained relatively stable over time with a significant dip in 2011 and spike in 2017. The former can be explained by a temporary absence of humanitarian aid allocated to Afghanistan starting in 2011, one year before the visible increase towards the Middle Eastern region. The latter is most likely a combination of decreased humanitarian aid budget with the expected delayed asylum applicants (FFM), causing both the rise in share of commitments to Asia as well as lower share of disbursements. An increase in geographically unspecified aid seems to be a more persistent trend, taken into account that the spike in the ‘refugee situation’ is a rather spurious occurrence. In 2018 geographically unspecified aid rose again, mostly at the costs of African aid due to a re-emergence of aid granted to Afghanistan.
13 Allocated to Tunisia, Ethiopia and Niger.
14 Aid allocated to the Americas in 2018 seems to be an administrative error.
Table 4: Dutch Geographic Allocation of ODA within Africa (USD 2018, millions)(Source: OECD Statistics)
21 After 2018, the Netherlands pledges to further decrease country allocated aid whilst further focussing on specific regions, namely Sub-Saharan Africa15 and the MENA region, next to upholding aid
to Afghanistan and Bangladesh (MBZ, 2018). They state to do so in pursuit of the prevention of conflict and instability, in line with the SDGs, while only mentioning the relevance of this in countries/regions in proximity to Europe or with relevance to the (ir)regular migration route to Europe. Beyond this implied conditionality, they formally present to be selective on (1) necessity, suggesting a (further) shift towards LDCs, (2) potential, projected results that are implied to be of relevance to both the Netherlands as the region, and (3) contextual information, aiming towards the possible influence on long-term political relationships and regional assistance (MBZ, 2018).
Sectoral Allocation
The disbursements of sector-allocable aid has seen, in line with Knoll & Sheriff (2017), no significant changes after 2012 (Figure 7). The rather insignificant changes in share of sector-allocable aid is coherent with the shifts in the total sector-allocable budget, meaning that an in- or decrease in total budget primarily shows in the share of multi-sector / cross-cutting aid suggesting budget shifts are taken from or given to that sector. The slight yet visible increase in the share of the production sector from 2016 onwards is part of an increasing allocation within that sector to the agricultural sector16, again suggesting a shift towards LDCs entertaining a more primary sector. Although not
explicitly stating so, a number of these subjects, if not all, can be identified as ‘root causes’ for migration, refuge and displacement. This 2016 sectoral shift is part of the geographical shift towards the Syria-Iraq region, including the accommodation of Syrian refugees in the agricultural sector in the Middle East locally. After 2016, this increased share in the production sector seems to be more equally
15 Consistent of the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. 16 Including forestry and fishing.
22 geographically disbursed amongst other LDCs in need17. From 2018 onwards, the Netherlands intends
to further increase this trend of employment creation and inclusion in the focus regions mainly consisting of LDCs. Alongside previous prominent focus on the inclusion of women and girls, the youth and, where possible, refugee and displaced persons are increasingly included (MBZ, 2018).
Within the sector of social infrastructure and services, a persistent decrease in amount and share of aid is disbursed to education, with the exception of 2018. The 2018 increase of roughly 90% is primarily geographically unspecified aid towards basic education and scholarships. A similar trend is visible with increased disbursement in 2018 to basic nutrition partially geographically unspecified, and partially to Sub-Saharan Africa and Bangladesh. Population policies, programmes and reproductive healthproject targets seem to mainly contribute to reproductive health and rights. Within the category of government and civil society, 2017 and 2018 signify a trend of increased budget to employment creation. Almost the entirety of the budget is disbursed between regional Africa, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Jordan and Lebanon. Disbursements to Africa seem to focus on the eradication of (forced) child labour, while disbursements to Asia focus on employment creation for refugees and displaced persons. A noteworthy unexpected yet significant and persistent decrease in budget allocated to environmental protection is visible. After 2018, the government explains the decrease in bilateral environmental projects due to overall inclusion of environmental sustainability over projects. The increased allocation to the educational sector is said to persist, in line with increasing (economic)
17 Most prominently Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana and Bangladesh.
23 prospects for women, youth and displaced persons and refugees to complement employment creation. A continuation of the focus on reproductive health and rights is expected, with formal representation implying the deterrence of unwanted or unexpected population growth (MBZ, 2018).
Thematic Allocation
Recently, the amount of projects that can be considered ‘Aid for Trade’ and their respective volume have been relatively low. With an average of about 25% of projects between 2010-2018, below the DAC average of 30% (WTO, 2021), suggesting room for (the emergence of) other thematic priorities. Knoll & Sheriff (2017) made and estimation of the thematic emergence of migration related projects based on a keyword research, resulting in the thematic presence of migration in 3.3% and 2.0% of total projects in 2013 and 2014 respectively. This partially due the absence of an indicator of migration related projects within the CRS database itself. To put the estimate from Knoll & Sheriff (2017) as well as the new subcategory in the CRS into perspective, I conducted a similar keyword research following their methodology over 2018 data. Whereas the CRS subcategory amounts to 0.2% of total disbursed ODA over 3 different projects, the keyword research resulted in migration related projects being 5.3% of total disbursed ODA over 81 projects. A difference of $196 mln, suggesting either a substantial overestimation of migration focussed projects or an overall increase in discourse and/or reporting focus on migratory themes. When including the in-donor refugee costs in the keyword research the share of migration related projects amounts to 22% of total ODA, making it a contender for a priority thematic alongside the existent ‘Aid for Trade’. The government themselves stated to have allocated 11.6% of ODA to projects specifically targeting refugees or migration, including in-donor refugee costs (MBZ, 2018). Including projects partially related to refugees or migration amounts to 19.4%, closer to the 22% resulting from the keyword result but still lower suggesting the inclusion of migration and refugees beyond projects targeted specifically or partially thereto.
Within this framework of migration, the expected priority fields as set out by Knoll & Sheriff (2017) being primarily AVR turn out to receive little attention. AVR amounting to 14.5% of migratory relevant spending, 6.2% including in-donor refugee costs. Likewise, support to diasporic organisation amounts to 0.01% of migratory relevant spending. The remaining two fields, migration management and reception in the region, amount to a combined share of 70%18 suggesting a tremendous
prioritization of reception in the region since migration management should be, and mostly is, captured by the CRS subcategory accounting for merely 3.8% of migratory relevant ODA. Noteworthy is the emergence of projects containing the word ‘scholarship’, accounting for 17% of migratory relevant ODA exceeding the previously identified priority fields of AVR, diasporic support and possibly
24 migration management. This is in line with government policy plans, combining aid towards migration management and the reception of refugees in a system of positive reinforcement (MBZ, 2018) linking it to conditionality for future aid (Dutch Government, 2018). The emergence of ‘scholarship’ projects logically links to the (re-)emergence of aid allocated to the educational sector to improve (economic) prospects and employment creation in LDCs, which now includes refugees and displaced persons next to the previously prominent targeting on women and girls. AVR seems to have completely shifted to the EU as a multilateral and single actor, whereas diasporic support received no formal attention (MBZ, 2018).
25
Discussion & Conclusions
To assess the effect the ‘refugee situation’ has on the allocation of Dutch ODA I will provide the current state of the general ODA budget and its future projections, followed by more detailed findings on geographical, sectoral and thematic shifts. From there, I conclude the effects these combined aspects have on the migration related conditionality and selectivity of Dutch ODA and how these conclusions are limited.
The general Dutch ODA budget experiences a complex interaction of multiple events. Firstly, budget cuts implemented by a coalition with relatively more aid sceptics limited ODA disbursements up to and beyond 2018. These aid sceptics rose in reaction to the 2015 peak of the ‘refugee situation’, but lost their significance alongside the decreasing number of refugee inflows. Secondly, increased budgets by the following coalition attempted to counteract the previously enacted cuts. Due to the severity of the cuts the recent increases in budgets have merely prevented the ODA budget to become even lower, while real increases in budget as well as ODA as share of GNI are not expected until after 2022 with a projected return to the DAC standard the Netherlands has historically adhered to in 2030. This partially proves the hypothesis (1) as the general ODA budget is lower, although efforts are being made to increase that budget again and the in-donor refugee costs no longer play a role in the volume of the ODA budget as significant as in 2015. A new peak in refugee inflows before that time could potentially spark new budget cuts.
The geographical allocation of Dutch ODA has been influenced by the ‘refugee situation’ as visible in further shifts towards regions of strategic-migratory relevance to Europe, namely the MENA region, African focus regions, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. This proves hypothesis (2) in that countries that are not of strategic-migratory relevance to Europe receive little to no aid, but next to this conditionality it is not selective on refugee outflow against expectations. Geographically specified aid had seen a rapid shift towards the Syria-Iraq region in 2015, especially so regarding humanitarian aid. Although the shift towards the Middle East was persistent, after 2015 other developing countries within this region were increasingly included. Within Africa, the Netherlands has been primarily focussed on the Horn of Africa with specific partner countries. Partially due to coordinated international efforts in Africa, but possibly also because of their relevance to refugee inflow in the Netherlands. Alike the Middle East, efforts in Africa gradually shifted towards increased inclusion of the rest of the continent with emerging aid towards Northern Africa in relation to migration management and the inclusion of the Sahel and Great Lakes regions as focus regions next to the Horn of Africa.
26 While the allocation of aid over sectors has not seen significant change, within sectors evidence can be found that projects increasingly target refugees and displaced persons, their host communities and regions susceptible to the ‘root causes’ of migration. Next to partially proving hypothesis (3) it also suggests a stronger focus on effective reception and integration of refugees and displaced persons in the region as a second(ary) objective. Most prominently, the production sector has seen a shift towards the agricultural sector in line with the geographical shifts towards more and lower developed countries. Projects in this sector in turn experience an increased inclusion of vulnerable groups, including refugees and displaced persons. This next to the projects on employment creation for youth and women, in an effort to deter future (irregular) migration. In line with the incentive to create economic prospects also the education sector has received more attention, and will receive even more in the future. The disappearing of projects towards environmental sustainability transferred to an overall inclusion thereof over projects, possibly partially in the fear of future climate migration.
These geographic and sectoral shifts lead to a significantly increased thematic use of migration in ODA. With the increased discourse around regional refugees and displaced persons being amongst the ‘worst off’ they have been the almost exclusive recipients of humanitarian aid as well as gaining overall inclusion over projects targeting vulnerable groups. The increased use of migration as a theme has amounted to levels similar to those of the previously dominant ‘Aid for Trade’ thematic, alongside being formally used as the main driver for both geographic and sectoral allocation of (new) projects in an effort to prevent future refugee outflows. In contrast to expectation, AVR and diasporic support have seen little support in Dutch bilateral ODA, with the suggestion of AVR having shifted to projects by the EU multilaterally and as a single actor. A disproportional percentage of 70% of migration related ODA has been used towards migration management and reception in the region, more prominently so the latter. This focus appears to continue after 2018, with formal representation of a focus towards supporting regional refugees and displaced persons and preventing or limiting the ‘root causes’ of migration. Combining this with the introduction of the new OECD reporting category proves hypothesis (4), but due to its disproportionate underrepresentation of Dutch migratory relevant ODA projects does not provide an accurate measurement.
All considered, these changes have implications on the conditionality and selectivity of ODA. While the theory suggests that conditionality in essence is not new, it has most certainly shifted towards the prioritization of migration. Formal representation also now includes this conditionality, stating the focus on countries who most need development measured by the presence of or susceptibility to the ‘root causes’ of migration still including conflict, which has also been used in the security-development nexus. Not explicitly stating so, but due to framing around European proximity
27 and mentioning of only a certain set of countries conditionality on this migration being relevant to Europe and by extension the Netherlands is also implied. This is exemplified by the inclusion of Afghanistan and Bangladesh, with relatively low proximity whilst being existing origin countries from refugees on the migration route to Europe. Within this set of countries selectivity applies to countries willing to engage in migration management and return migration, in light of the positive reinforcement it has on development, to the extent of another layer of negative conditionality in the case of non-compliance.
Since Dutch ODA is primarily geographically unspecified, drawn conclusions on geographical shifts only apply to the part that is not. Geographically unspecified aid consists mostly of (un)earmarked contributions to IGOs and NGOs, therefore it can to a certain extent be assumed that these conclusions apply to the totality of bilateral Dutch ODA and thus the part of ODA the Netherlands allocates as a unitary actor. Assessing the geographic allocation of geographically unspecified aid requires an analysis of aid allocation of non-national actors and would pose as an interesting subject for further research, next to comparing these findings to other (groups of) donors or future developments.
28
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33
Appendix I -
Glossary
ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific countries AVR - Assisted Voluntary Return
DAC - Development Assistance Committee
CRS - Creditor Reporting System
EC - European Commission
EU - European Union
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment FFM - Following Family Members GDP - Gross Domestic Product GNI - Gross National Income
IGO - Intergovernmental Organization
LDCs - Least Developed Countries
MENA - Middle East and North Africa
MIC - Middle Income Country
MNC - Multinational Corporation
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization ODA - Official Development Aid
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries SDG - Sustainable Development Goal
SMEs - Small and Medium Enterprises
34
Appendix II -
OECD Definitions on Commitment and Disbursement
Definitions given by the OECD (2021) regarding ODA commitments and disbursements as set out in the DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts.
Commitment
“A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments to multilateral organisations are reported as the sum of (i) any disbursements in the year reported on which have not previously been notified as commitments and (ii) expected disbursements in the following year.”
Disbursement
“The release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. In the case of activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded gross (the total amount disbursed over a given accounting period) or net (the gross amount less any repayments of loan principal or recoveries on grants received during the same period). It can take several years to disburse a commitment.”
