interdependent approach in the fight
against environmental degradation
A Pragmatic Care Ethics applied to the Environmental Crisis
Ianthe Smulders July 3, 2020 BA thesis Political Philosophy, University of Amsterdam
This study explores different approaches to mainstream liberal modes of thinking in order to offer the possibility of radical change in the fight against environmental degradation. John Dewey offers an alternative democratic theory that departs from an inherent interdependence among people. In The Public and its Problems Dewey denies individualism as doctrine, and argues that an imagined political individualism leads to an eclipse of the democratic public. Dewey’s political theory examines activities encompassing the public sphere. Consequently he ignores a moral experience in the private sphere and therefore lacks a gendered perspective, because women historically have been limited to this sphere. Feminist authors describe the moral outlooks of women in terms of caring relations and therefore also critique independence-oriented thinking. Carol Gilligan establishes an Ethics of Care, in which particular relations and emotions are important. This moral theory has been scrutinized and complemented by, among others, Virginia Held. In her book, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global, she characterizes Ethics of Care as a relational, contextual and partial theory. As this theory is founded on work performed by women in the private sphere, it lacks a description of the public sphere. Therefore, this thesis integrates Early Pragmatism and Ethics of Care, overcoming the shortcomings of both. This ethical and political theory ‘Pragmatic Care Ethics’ is finally applied to the environmental crisis. Since environmental response has predominantly been independence-oriented, ahistorical, impartial and justice-based, this study will propose a (1) relational, (2) historical, (3) experimental and (4) empathic approach to offer radical change in the fight against environmental degradation.
Table of contents
Table of contents 2
Introduction 3
Early Pragmatism 6
Ethics of Care 11
Pragmatic Care Ethics applied to the Ecological Crisis 14
Conclusion 21
Literature 23
1. Introduction
‘How dare you? - You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words’, said climate activist Greta Thunberg to world leaders at the 2019 UN climate action summit in New York. ‘We are in the beginning of a mass extinction and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth - how dare you!' (Guardian News, 00:20–03:21). Greta Thunberg inspired a worldwide movement, Fridays for Future, that “strike because we care for our planet and for each other”. This future generation resists to live in a world which has been excessively polluted by ‘ours’. Although an environmental crisis has long been established, public action seems to be procrastinated. Why is there so little progress in the fight against environmental degradation? The media and
scientific community has reported abundantly on the environmental crisis, stating that it will be highly disruptive for societies in the near future if we do not act soon. Despite the fact that some intra- and interstate agreements have been made, such as the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (SDG) by the United Nations, not every membering nation has implemented sufficient policies in order to achieve these goals (United Nations). On top of that, based on the political developments in Western nationstates, it seems that climate scepticism is growing, adopted by right wing politicians and included in their political agenda. What reasons can account for this climate apathy or lack of collective agency?
The world today is understood as a collective of individuals. Rational agents that are able to express their needs and wants in isolation of others and can act accordingly. Questions that drive our inquiry are often on an individual level. Would it matter if only I stop flying? Should it make a difference if I become a vegetarian? The individualist doctrine not only obscures the need for collective agency, but also creates a lack of concern in the fight against environmental degradation. The question which then arises is a crucial one: whose problem is climate change? Is it for instance the meat-eater, the meat-producer or the meat-industry? And which role does the government play in the intricate web of consumer, producer and markets? It is easy to point fingers and therefore retract oneself from the solution. Thinking of people, companies and governments as independent actors is how people are historically socialized to think in Western democracies. But what if individualism turned out to be a hoax? What if this independence is only perceived as self-governance, but the problem is way too large for any of the independent actors to tackle? I believe this is the point we have reached in the fight against environmental degradation. Hence, this thesis will explore theories that criticise independent-oriented thinking and oppose this with interdependent modes of thinking to offer radical change in the fight against environmental degradation.
Whatever the many different explanations could be, it is important that we slow down
environmental degradation and ideally stop harming the environment altogether. But the real question
is, how do we make this change? What needs to happen in order to fight environmental degradation? Apart from scientists working on for instance, physical apparatus to remove microplastics from the sea, produce machinery to use renewable sources for our electricity consumption and grow fruits and vegetables vertically instead of horizontally, this highly complex problem also needs a social
approach. We need this in order to answer questions politically, economically and psychologically. For example, which role does the nation state play? How are corporations, producers and citizens to be regulated? And how can the denier become a believer?
Environmental responses, social reactions to climate change, have predominantly been independence-oriented, ahistorical, impartial and justice-based. An example is the loss of biodiversity and emissions produced because of the independent human stance in agriculture. Pesticides kill anything alive in agricultural soils and halving the production and consumption of animal products could reduce emissions by 40% (“Change the CAP! Open letter to the EU”). Instead of solutions in which humans acknowledge their dependence on nature, environmental response has frequently done the opposite: environmental response is often dominating nature, trying to overcome our dependency, not in interaction with the environment, but by attempting to show our independence of natural processes. Another good example is the heightening of dykes. Rather than endless augmentation, environmental response could focus on natural ways to stop rising sea levels. This cultural
independence of nature is often accompanied by ahistorical, impartial and justice-based environmental responses. An example is two akin cases dealt with by the judges of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) described by Diederik Baazil in Dutch newspaper De Groene Amsterdammer. The first is of shrimp fishermen in the United States. They were limited by fishing legislation in order to protect threatened sea turtles. Consequently, the export of shrimp to the US was almost impossible because these rules applied. However, India also took measures to protect sea turtles, but different ones. The WTO decided in this case the environment was used as an excuse by the US to uphold protectionist measures. The second case played in India where most of the energy production was reliant on coal and therefore the government decided to invest in solar energy. They wanted to limit import of foreign solar panels in order to encourage local production. However, due to the central focus on justice, in which the WTO should act according to rational and impartial rules - whether it concerns the US or India - this request was declined. A justice-based morality is juxtaposed with a care-based morality in Feminist theory. Feminist ethicists criticize the nearly exclusive focus on justice in the dominant moral outlooks of recent decades. They recognize the masculine bias in this focal point and explore alternative moral perspectives that center around care (Held 1995: 1).
However, environmental ethics seem to be motivated by concern for future generations, caring for non humans and the environment has not been a central point of focus (Whyte and Cuomo 2017: 3). Instead, focus liberal philosophers ‘on ideals such as “stewardship,” “biotic citizen,”
“rights-holder,” and “manager,” and frame moral issues in abstract, economic and legalistic terms’ (Kheel, 2008; Whyte, 2014 in Whyte and Cuomo 2017: 3). This thesis will analyse underlying ethical frameworks in order to oppose mainstream and conventional liberal concepts that sustain the current fight against environmental degradation. The early pragmatism of American philosopher John Dewey can provide insight in the inherent interdependence of people, with as result, the need and want for a State. However Dewey’s theory lacks a gendered perspective, because his main focus encompasses the public sphere. With a sole focus on the public sphere one does not simply overlook lived experience in the private sphere, but also leaves this realm outside decision making processes encompassing the public sphere. This is problematic because women are consequently more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. First of all, because women generally perform the household work and care for children, the sick and the elderly, they are physically limited to their homes. For example, during the Asian tsunami in 2004, 70 percent of the victims were women, because they were trapped in their homes. Secondly, because women often do not have the same economic opportunities and access to productive resources as men, they are often poorer, receive less education and are not involved in political, community and household decision-making processes that affect their lives (Habtezion: 4-5). To overcome this problem I will turn to Feminist theory. These scholars also take an interdependent approach, establishing an Ethics of Care. This is a moral
experience previously overlooked because of the philosophical focus on the public sphere. This theory has however, a focus on the private sphere, because this is where women perform care work and therefore lacks a political theory that describes the public sphere. In order to overcome problems of both theories, I will attempt to integrate them and the resulting amalgamation will be coined:
Pragmatic Care Ethics. This integrated ethical and political theory will provide a critical and different approach to mainstream liberal modes of thinking in order to offer possibility of radical change in the fight against environmental degradation. Hence, the research question for this thesis is:
How could Pragmatic Care Ethics offer possibility of radical change in the fight against environmental degradation?
The first chapter will explore Early Pragmatism on the basis of political theory by John Dewey. The following chapter will characterize Ethics of Care as described by Carol Gilligan and Virginia Held. The last chapter integrates both theories in order to shine light on environmental darkness and offer a different approach to ingrained and naturalized liberal modes of thinking.
2. Early Pragmatism
This chapter will focus on the acknowledgement of the ecological crisis and why underlying assumptions of Liberalism have indirect and even perverse consequences on the embodiment of the problem. Therefore one may turn to an unconventional democratic theorist, political philosopher, John Dewey.
In his book The Public and its Problems Dewey (2016) [1927] steers away from an essential
definition of ‘The State’. He characterizes the state as an a posteriori structure that is the outcome of regulated problems responding to the consequences of human interaction. In contrast to influential political philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, who assume the state apparatus as cause for human interaction, Dewey argues that the state is only the result of the need and want for the
regulation of problems, because people naturally interact with one another (72-74). These interactions have consequences and when these are no longer private, officers will be appointed to regulate the problems arising. Hence, Dewey offers a pragmatic definition of the state, that is to say, how the state comes into practice (71).
Dewey commences with the introduction of a new dichotomy, one between ‘private’ and ‘public’. Once again he argues against influential philosophers like Rousseau and Hobbes. The underlying assumption in the work of these social contract thinkers is that politically meaningful transactions start at the level of the individual. In Rousseau’s contract theory, the individual is born with certain natural rights and by becoming a social animal these rights can become conflicted. Therefore people are in need of a social contract (Bertram). In Hobbes’ theory, the individual has unlimited freedom and is only tamed out of the ‘war against all’ when contracted to a monarch with absolute power (Hobbes 2016 [1651]). How the social contract originated, and simultaneously defining the state and determining which characteristics make the state legitimate, is not important for this argument. What is important, is that politically meaningful transactions start at the level of the individual. Dewey however, argues that politically meaningful transactions only take place on the level of ‘a public’. The public is not the individual, nor a social transaction between person ‘a’ and ‘b’. These transactions are private. Only when the transaction between ‘a’ and ‘b’ has consequences for ‘c’ (and ‘d’), the interaction becomes politically meaningful, because there is a public that is affected by the transaction (66-67). Thus, conjoint behaviour becomes politically meaningful when the consequences of a transaction between ‘a’ and ‘b’ have consequences for a third party. These consequences are “indirect, extensive, enduring and serious (157)” and so the public has a common interest in controlling these consequences (84). This is how a state comes into practice. This
dichotomy has multiple implications that argue against liberal doctrines of (I) individualism, (II) the difference between nature and artefact and (III) the distinction of spheres.
First, Dewey claims that the ontological concept on the level of the political individual is empty. However previous theories of the state vary in their nature, they “spring from a root of shared error: the taking of causal agency instead of consequences as the heart of the problem (72)”. This fallacy leads people to think that there is something politically meaningful before the existence of a public. But, only through conjoint activity, contributing to consequences that affect people beyond those immediately concerned in the interaction, is the public able to address problems and direct action. Liberal philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau take the individual as starting point for their political theory, whilst Dewey argues that individualism as doctrine obscures the facts. The only fact to be accepted is the fact of connection. Individuals act in association. Behaviour is modified by its connection with others, may it be another person, the environment or the subject-matter of the form of thought (73-75). People are not isolated carriers of rights, or entities that are fully aware of their needs and wants and consequently act accordingly. People’s needs and wants are only established and given meaning in interaction with one each other.
Coherently, Dewey also argues against a natural conception of the political individual. “The idea of a natural individual in his isolation possessed of full-fledged wants, of energies to be expended according to his own volition, and of a ready-made faculty of foresight and prudent calculation is as much a fiction in psychology as the doctrine of the individual in possession of antecedent political rights is one in politics (138)”. Thus, the individual is not born with rights, but rights are claimed by the individual through the public. This has implications for the foundation of philosophical liberalism that states that the individual is free until it harms others (Mill 2003 [1859]: 121). Because, how is this ‘harm’ to be determined? Who is harming who exactly? He argues that, aside from the needs for survival of the individual, all needs and wants are contingent. What people think is necessary, is naturalized by powerful institutions, or otherwise determined, but not by natural wants and needs, nor by a priori natural rights. Whatever is a legitimate problem is only to be determined when the
consequences of conjoint behaviour become visible (138-139). So whomever is harmed by who is only a posteriori ascertained. Thus, the distinction between natural and artificial only exists on the level of perception.
Finally, the dichotomy between private and public implies that according to Dewey there is no distinction between the economic and political sphere. This is something that Western democracies usually distinguish between. But, because every problem that arises from conjoint behaviour is a public problem, should therefore be addressed by the state. The liberal conception of ‘laissez-faire’, implicitly meaning that economical forces will eventually always attain an equilibrium, so that the state does not have to intervene, is thus artificial and contradictory with Dewey’s conception of the
state. Consequences recognized by a public as a problem should be regulated by the state, including problems that arise because of economic (or cultural, religious, etc.) activity. This breaks with the liberal tradition where the market and state are perceived as independent actors. If the state exists of officers that represent the public, they should be able to direct action in favour of the public, whether this is a political or economical matter.
These implications argue against the liberal doctrine that takes the individual as a starting point: a person with a priori rights and a rational agent that is able to determine in isolation what their needs and wants are. It departs from the fundamental fact that people always act in connection and only through this interaction the public is able to acknowledge and address problems. This democratic theory has consequences that reach far beyond our understanding of the state. Liberalist thinking structures are naturalized in human consciousness through powerful institutions, and affect the ways people give meaning to the world. This has implications for the acknowledgment of public problems (such as the ecological crisis), but also obscures the fundamental fact of connection.
That is to say, Dewey constitutes a problem. He argues that as a consequence of the vast complexities of the modern age, which was continental expansion in his time (one might argue that this expansion is global today), a ‘Great Community’ has been transformed into a ‘Great Society’ (157). “We have inherited, in short, local town-meetings practices and ideas. But we live and act and have our begin in a continental nation state (147)”. He argues that conjoint behaviour is most basically understood in an agrarian society, where people live together knowing one another personally (145). The ‘indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences’ that spring from joined activity call a public into existence. However, these communities have changed, developed, but most importantly expanded, and consequently have a rather impersonal basis in juxtaposition to the interpersonal basis of smaller communities. These impersonal societies, he calls, a ‘Great Society’. About this transformation, Dewey writes (157, author’s emphasis):
Indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling these consequences. But the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences, [has] formed such immense and consolidated unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself.
Thus, within a Great Society the public can no longer identify and distinguish itself. Dewey calls this ‘The Eclipse of the Public’. This has severe consequences for his democratic theory, because the
public should address the problems that are consequently regulated by the state. But when the public can no longer identify and distinguish itself, one could argue that democracy is in crisis, because the public is fractured and therefore, can no longer address the problems that should be regulated (144). The problem the public is facing today is that we do not live in orderly towns where everybody is acquainted, but in a global economy. And so, how do we know where problems start? And how to distinguish one problem from the other? On top of that, there are concealing mechanisms in place that fracture the public even further. Big business is to be conflated with the whole apparatus of political activities. “Business is the order of the day, and the attempt to stop or deflect its course is as futile as Mrs. Partington essaying to sweep back the tides with a broom” (151). A healthy public should be able to acknowledge and address the scope of indirect consequences, but because the vast expansion and concealing mechanisms ‘the Public seems to be lost’ (149). The consequence is that people that have no interest in regulating the problems of the public can still be in powerful positions. Whether this person or collective is part of the political apparatus, or serves their own interests through market-led systems, they are not an officer of the public when the public is not mobilized. In short, democracy is in crisis due to the eclipse of the public and as a consequence, the public can no longer address the problems that should be regulated by the state.
2.1 Ecological crisis
When applying this theory to our democratic understanding one may find new insights regarding another crisis: the ecological crisis. Understanding the crisis for its highly complex and global interconnectedness of people, industry and nature it is difficult for the public to identify and distinguish itself.
When, for example, Noah takes an aeroplane to travel to Barcelona, it is most likely not his intention to emit carbon dioxide. Conjoint behaviour results in direct and evident consequences, meaning for this person to visit an old friend. Interaction however, also results in indirect (and
sometimes even perverse) consequences. People used to interact in small-scale, geographically limited societies. In the past few centuries this has expanded to a global network where (some) people can not only physically travel everywhere relatively easy, but also maintain contact by way of modern
telecommunications. Noah is happy to explore the city and reunite with his old friend Lydia, however on his way there he has, possibly subconsciously, contributed to consequences besides himself and his friend, so that person ‘c’ (and ‘d’) experience the (negative) consequences of climate change.
These consequences are not only indirect, because so many different steps of conjoint behaviour that have made air travel possible, are invisible for Noah and Lydia. For example, all the steps of the production of an aeroplane or airport, or the industries behind all air traffic and all the scientists and personnel that are involved. But these consequences are also indirect because they affect
people (in all sorts of ways) that they are not aware of. That makes the highly complex consequences of conjoint behaviour, for example air travel, such an impersonal industry. If Noah knew person ‘c’ and ‘d’, he would possibly decide to take different transport to Barcelona, or not go at all. This is an example of the ‘enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated scope of indirect consequences’ from which the public cannot identify and distinguish itself. This contribution to environmental degradation should be addressed by the public, but how can this public distinguish and identify itself in this day and age?
Dewey sees communication as key to transforming a Great Society back to a Great Community. He writes, “The only possible solution: the perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action (181)”. With communication he does not only refer to the obvious and visible forms of communication, like spoken or written language through media, but also a philosophical linguistic argument, that is, the way we give meaning to the world. Conjoint behaviour shapes the way humans think and communicate. Hence, meanings are produced when people interact with one another. Thus, the ways people give meaning to the world, or the concerns different publics might share, are dependent on their relational activities (178-179).
Because the ‘ultra-modern’ age has transformed the Great Community into a Great Society, or has led the Great Society into further decay, the public is no longer able to identify and distinguish itself. One solution is to expose dominant ethical, political and economical structures that influence our thinking structures and propose radically different values and practices that oppose imagined political individualism, in order to change ways we give meaning to the world and promote collective agency. Dewey’s theory emphasizes the importance of collective agency for democracy.
Because of an inherent interdependence among people, specifically the consequences of conjoint behaviour, not only with other humans, but also the environment, the state comes into practice. How is it possible that we steered away from this interdependence in the public sphere? This has not only led to an empty concept of the political individual, but also to the mass ignorance of problems that encompass a vastly complex interconnectedness. The complexity of the ecological crisis is a poignant example. Whereas Dewey describes the inherent interdependence of people in terms of a work relation, in favour of technological production and an almost inborn revolutionary disposition of humans, Feminist theory has a different take on the interdependence of people and the environment. Although Dewey distinguishes between the private and the public, his political theory mainly encompasses the public sphere. His focus is not only on the public sphere, but this is also the political meaningful realm. This sphere acquires meaning through conjoined activity, but focuses on interaction between people and objects in favour of a work relation. Feminist theory however,
explores a moral experience previously overlooked by philosophers that focus on the public sphere: the relational experience of women performing care work in the private sphere. In order to radically oppose underlying structures that promote individuality and independence this thesis will turn to Feminist Ethics, more specifically Ethics of Care.
3. Ethics of Care
Moral philosopher Carol Gilligan shows us the limits of independent-oriented thinking. In her essay Women’s Rights and Women’s Judgement she explores the antagonistic relation between justice and care. In most societies women were (and often still are) in charge of the household work and caretaking of children, the elderly and the sick. This moral experience has been denied by the philosophical focus on the public sphere and has led to an androcentric moral philosophy. Gilligan argues against the model of psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who she assisted with his research, in which he describes the six different stages of moral development. The key characteristic throughout this ethical deliberation is that of Justice. This empirical study however, was only endorsed by interviews with men. Gilligan criticises this androcentric model and performs an empirical study solely consisting of interviews with female students (Sander-Staudt). In this research she calls for a ‘Declaration of the Sentiments’ (Gilligan 1989: 128) and opposes Kohlberg's model with an ‘Ethics of Care’. Kohlberg’s model is independence-orientated. The six stages of moral development take the individual as starting point and describe how -he- morally deliberates -his- acts according to principles of justice. This model assumes an inherent independence of the moral actor. Gilligan shows however, that it is also possible to orientate oneself interdependent on others. A model for moral deliberation in which the agent considers it moral to care for others, but simultaneously does not exclude its own existence from the equation (Gilligan 1989: 149).
Ethics of Care is founded in light of the postpatriarchial society (Held 2005: 19). Virginia Held writes in her book The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global, “As a feminist ethic, the ethics of care is certainly not a mere description or generalization of women’s attitudes and activities as developed under patriarchal conditions. To be acceptable, it must be a feminist ethic, open to both women and men to adopt (20)”. This relational moral approach could offer solutions to climate apathy, because central to moral deliberation is to have concern for personal caring relations. Before Ethics of Care is applied to the ecological crisis, the following paragraphs will outline this moral theory.
Without an explicit definition or methodology, Ethics of Care (care ethics) acknowledges the
universal human need for care and therefore the dependency on each other. Everybody needs to be cared for at least once in his or her life. Hence, caretaking and caregiving is essential to human existence. “The ethics of care attends to this central concern of human life and delineates the moral values involved (Held 2005:10)”. The following values are important in moral deliberation.
First, the moral agent should make use of his or her capacity for emotions. If we take women’s everyday moral experiences into account, we must acknowledge the emotional aspect of morality. The quality of caretaking and caregiving is dependent on emotional values like sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, attentiveness and responsiveness, since they contribute to interpersonal contexts. Other emotions are not denied of being salient in contemplation, but most importantly emotions need to be reflected on. Because emotions can be misleading or worse, people should not be led by raw or first emotions, but by emotions that have been reflected upon (Held 2005: 11-12). As Held puts it “we need an ethics of care, not just care itself. The various aspects and expressions of care and caring relations need to be subjected to moral scrutiny and evaluated, not just observed and described (2005: 11)”. Additionally, an excess of particular emotions can also be misleading. For example, too much empathy could lead to a denial of care for the self (Held 2005: 10-11). Dominant ethical theories deny that capacities for emotion can be informative in moral deliberation. The self-interested, rational agent is the starting point for deontology and utilitarianism.
On top of that, the utilitarian is presupposed to be impartial regarding other agents afflicted. Whereas care ethics promotes the caretaking and caregiving to particular people or groups that are, for example close to you, utilitarianism has an impersonal basis, in which it promotes the most good for the most people. This impersonal based morality emerged from a focus on the public sphere. Big groups, made up of people that do not necessarily have kinship- or friendship ties, but engage in political activities, morally deliberate differently from people that are physically and mentally limited to the private sphere, with as main focus the responsibility of caring for the people closest to them. Consequently, women evolved moral outlooks that revolve around caring relations to particular people. As Held (2005) puts it, there are two extremes. One of the ‘selfish individual’ and one of ‘humanity as a whole’. Utilitarianism, and to some degree also Kantian ethics, focus on these two extreme poles, and do not leave much room for everything in between. These theories make
deductions and abstractions of ethical deliberation and often overlook personal relations. Care ethics, on the other hand, focuses especially on the area in between the two extremes. Care ethicists neither pursue their own individual interests, nor act in sake of what is ‘good’ for humanity in general. “Their characteristic stance is neither egoistic nor altruistic (13)”. They care for particular other persons, not excluding themselves from the relation (Gilligan 1989: 149; Held 2005: 13). One can not morally deliberate without having reflected on relations between persons, beings and entities involved in the situation.
Furthermore, because it is important to consider particular relationships, care ethics embraces contingency in juxtaposition to the universal. Care should not be in the realm “outside morality”, but particular relations, between for example parent and child, are to be considered and evaluated in moral deliberation (Held 2005: 10). However, even though Feminist authors disagree whether justice-based morality and care-based morality are compatible, they agree that ‘morality should not be limited to abstract rules’ (Held 2005: 12). “For instance, persons do not choose which gender, racial, class, ethnic, religious, national, or cultural groups to be brought up in, yet these sorts of ties may be important aspects of who they are and how their experience can contribute to moral understanding (Held: 2005: 13)”. Care ethics is, in short, dependent on different situations, partial in relationships and therefore contextual. This leaves room for reflection upon historical processes and to act according to power relations that have been constituted.
One of these power relations is embedded in the distinction between the private and public sphere. “The traditional view, built into the dominant moral theories, is that the household is a private sphere beyond politics into which government, based on consent, should not intrude (Held 2005: 13)”. Because pan-cultural, women, more often than men, perform the household work, this leaves them dependent on the labour work of their partners and vulnerable to domestic violence. The politicized public sphere, opposed to the ‘raw’ private sphere, has led to think of moral deliberation as an
impersonal and rational process. The existence of a self-interested, atomistic, rational and autonomous agent is criticized by care ethicists. This doctrine obscures the relational and interdependence
universal to human existence (Held 2005: 13-14)
Furthermore, care ethics should not only be described in terms of care as ‘value’, but also with the practices it entails. In chapter two, Held summarizes defining characteristics of care ethics,
systematized by care as ‘value’ and care as ‘practice’. She argues that ‘justice’ as a value has many practices, such as law enforcement and court proceedings. In the same way ‘care’ as a value, should be described by practices in order to determine the normative evaluation underlying the actual practices of care, such as sensitivity, trust and mutual concern (Held 2005: 38).
Care ethics is often linked to practices of women in the private sphere, such as caring for children or other family members (22). At least this is where foundational authors like Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings preceded from (27-28). However, Held and Robinson advocate for care ethics to encompass the public sphere as well (22) . With the main focus on work performed in the private 1 sphere, ethics of care lacks a theory of the public sphere. Because the public sphere is characterized by ‘a framework of justice-equality-rights-obligations’, whereas the private sphere is characterized by ‘a network of care-relatedness-trust’ (Held 1995: 2), these domains are not simply integrated or
1 Ethics of care as an opposing model for morality has been applied, by numerous authors, not only on an ethical level, but
also on a political, global and economical level (Held 2005).
combined. Traditional division of labour, contributing to different moral outlooks, are not simply changed because these thinking structures are ingrained in our everyday lives. The Feminist debate whether justice and care are compatible is still relevant. It has been argued that a care-based morality would contribute to social arrangements and public policy, most obviously in health and welfare (Held 1995: 3). I argue that an interdependent care-based morality, in juxtaposition to current independence-based moral orientations, could offer radical change in environmental response. Climate apathy could be replaced with feelings of empathy and compassion. Not only towards future generations, but also animals and non sentient beings. However, to promote collective agency one could argue that care ethics is in need of a political theory to reason why care should be integrated in the public sphere in the fight against environmental degradation. Therefore the next chapter will explore how care ethics, as a moral theory, can contribute to political theory by the integration of Early Pragmatism and Ethics of Care.
4. Pragmatic Care Ethics applied to the Ecological Crisis
In 2004, Véronique Mottier has examined how far pragmatism and feminist theory sharecharacteristics and why they have failed to ‘rendezvous’ until now. Her focus however, is with the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty and only towards her conclusion she analyzes the resemblance of early pragmatism and Feminist theory. In contrast with most Feminist theory, neo-pragmatism is criticized for centralizing the subject as a rational, self-interested, autonomous individual. Also, other strands of Feminist theory that explore the affinities between liberal and feminist conceptions of 2 citizenship, share this presupposition of the rational agent (Dietz in Mottier 2004: 329). However, early pragmatism, including the work of Dewey, rejects the liberal model of citizenship in favour of a more relational approach (330). Thus, early pragmatism has more potential for a convergence with care ethics, than neo-pragmatism (333). This chapter will attempt to do so by the integration of Ethics of Care as moral theory, with political implications, and Early Pragmatism as political theory, with ethical implications. I will refer to this amalgamation as: Pragmatic Care Ethics. The next paragraph will briefly present the characteristics of this new ethical and political theory.
First of all, pragmatic care ethics is not essentialized by specific characteristics, but learns from historical processes that constitute meaning plus values and practices accordingly. Secondly, it incorporates the notion of the private and public dichotomy of John Dewey and therefore abolishes the distinction between the private and public sphere. If the state should interfere, it should be determined dynamically on a case by case basis. Thirdly, pragmatic care ethics recognizes the
2 (see Squires, Nash, Pateman, James, Phillips and Mouffe)
importance of perception. It is therefore an experimental framework, in which the subjective
experience is fundamental to moral and political deliberation. The theory is therefore contextual and contingent. Finally, moral deliberation is inclusive of emotions. Pragmatic care ethics has a relational and intersubjective character. Interdependence is built on caring relations, which are particular and partial. Hence, it is fundamental to include feelings of others in deciding how to morally and politically deliberate. The next subchapters will elaborate on these four characteristics of pragmatic care ethics and consequently apply them to the ecological crisis in order to offer radical change in the fight against environmental degradation.
1. Relational approach: care for humans, non-humans and beings
Mottier (2004) argues that early pragmatism could offer an alternative model of ethics of care. Opposed to the individualistic ethics of Liberalism, Dewey, among other early pragmatists, promotes a social ethics based on caretaking for the ‘youngest members of society’ (331). Because Dewey holds the relational dimension of social life accountable for any form of politically meaningful action, he offers an alternative understanding to the autonomous, atomistic and rational agent (330-331). In early pragmatism interrelationships are crucial to the origin of the state, but also inherently human. Ethics of care take interrelationships as the truly universal quality of every human. As Held puts it, “The ethics of care has the great advantage in a moral theory of being based on experience that is truly universal: the experience of having been cared for (Held 2005: 9)”.
Whyte and Cuomo (2017) have shown how care ethics can be applied to environmental ethics. They argue that care ethics, visible in indigenous and feminist discourses, can provide guidance for environmental ethical decision making on action and policy (5).
As methodology they have researched political discourses of different indigenous
environmental movements and conclude that themes of knowledge, responsibility, reciprocity and moral repair are of importance (9). Without using the exact terminology of “care”, declarations of these movements nevertheless emphasize the moral significance of interdependence. They describe indigenous conceptions of care as follows (4):
(1) emphasize the importance of awareness of one’s place in a web of different connections spanning many different parties, including humans, non-human beings and entities (e.g., wild rice, bodies of water), and collectives (e.g., forests, seasonal cycles);
(2) understand moral connections as involving relationships of interdependence that motivate reciprocal responsibilities;
(3) valorize certain skills and virtues, such as the wisdom of grandparents and elders, attentiveness to the environment, and indigenous stewardship practices;
(4) seek to restore people and communities who are wounded from injustices by rebuilding relationships that can generate responsibilities pertinent to current environmental challenges such as biodiversity conservation and climate change;
(5) conceive of political autonomy as involving the protection of the responsibility to serve as stewards of lands, the environmental quality of which is vital for sustenance.
For many different reasons they invoke indigenous knowledge and moral theories for ethical and policy decision making on environmental issues (9-14), but important for this thesis is the relation between care ethics and environmental ethics, because they advocate for a Feminist care-based environmental ethics. Firstly, because care ethics does not exclude the environment, nor context, from moral deliberation. This ‘caring-for’ can be extended to non-human animals. Animal rights activists and theorists have already adopted care ethics and link the maltreatment of animals to other forms of social injustice. Moreover, care ethics can be applied to not only sentient beings, but also other beings or entities. Whyte and Cuomo give the example of a tree-hugging Chipko movement in India, which was ethically inclusive of other beings (trees), and showed to be interdependent of other economical relations, to put a halt to exploitation (19). Finally, they dismiss the singular existence of one moral deliberation model, but point to the pluralistic nature of some environmental movements. Next to the moral salience of care, particular feminist discussions about the environmental crisis do not exclude the importance of laws and policy to fight environmental degradation (20). Another approach that distinguishes pragmatic care ethics when applied to environmental ethics is one of historical significance.
2. Historical approach: what one can learn from non-essentialist theory
Mottier (2004) presents care ethics as a normative theory actualized by maternalist theory. Maternalists ground this relational morality in mothering activities. They claim that care ethics is morally superior and should therefore also be realized in the public sphere. Relational skills, such as emotions and recognition of others’ needs and vulnerability, should be integrated into the public sphere (330). Other feminist theorists however, criticize maternal thinking for essentializing, or naturalizing caregiving and caretaking to be women’s work. Relational morality is consequently ascribed to the concept of ‘femininity’, or more specifically ‘maternity’.
Additionally, Dietz criticizes maternal thinking for making the same mistakes as liberal thinkers, namely that it is ahistorical and universal. Instead of having an historic approach, in which intrinsic caring values could be ascribed to women because of their socialized role as caretaker, these traits are essentializing the gender identity of women (Dietz in Mottier 2004: 330). This is the point where Dewey’s pragmatic theory could put an end to this discussion. Instead of determining the
essential characterizations of a state, one has to look at the causal factors bringing a state into
existence. This theory offers an historic and non-essentialist approach to the state, and can be applied to care ethics. Because historically and pan-culturally women have been domesticated to the private sphere, and consciously as well as subcounsciously have been excluded from the public sphere, they consequently can adopt a different model for moral deliberation. The same could be said about men, or anyone identifying as neither or both of these genders: anyone who has performed work of
caregiving and caretaking, ranging from caregiving to a child to relational dimensions of team sports, can apply care ethics in moral deliberation.
Anti-essentialist feminists, most prominently Judith Butler and Chantal Mouffe, share this view. They both reject the ontological existence of gender identity (Mottier 2004: 33). Mouffe argues that the processes through which sex difference is socially constructed are important. This is the domain in society in which power relations operate (Mouffe in Mottier 2004: 332). This is a
pragmatist, non-essential, standpoint, because power relations operate in the processes (causal factors) that characterize, determine, essentialize and naturalize gender identity. Without having an essential definition of gender identity, one can still analyze the processes that are constitutive of this identity.
In short, pragmatic care ethics study the historical processes that constituted a relational and interdependent ethical framework. It will be studied according to its practices, instead of searching for an essential definition. This resonates an argument put forward by Held, “Some advocates of the ethics of care resist generalizing this approach into something that can be fitted into the form of a moral theory. They see it as a mosaic of insights and value the way it is sensitive to contextual nuance and particular narratives rather than making the abstract and universal claims of more familiar moral theories (2005: 10)”.
An historical approach in the fight against environmental degradation is twofold. First is the inclusion of other modes of knowledge production. For example, Whyte and Cuomo have studied indigenous knowledge to offer a different perspective on the Western nature/culture distinction, in which human agents consider themselves to be independent of nature. They have showed that in other knowledge systems people do not see themselves separate from nature, but rather as part of nature. Indigenous Peoples of Mother Earth state that environmental response must respect that ‘we are the land and the land is us’ (2017: 4). Thus, an historical approach is inclusive of knowledge systems produced outside of modes of knowledge produced by Western scientific perspectives.
Secondly, pragmatic care ethics focuses on historical processes and the power relations that have already been established. The responsibility for environmental response cannot dismiss centuries of imperialism and exploitation of natural resources and indigenous communities. Not only
established relations should be of importance in environmental policy and action, but also the lessons
we have learned from colonisation (and ongoing colonisation) and other historical processes that are constitutive of power relations. If for example, a big oil company decides to refine their oil elsewhere in the world because of high paid labour work, high environmental taxes or a restraint on CO2 emissions in their local country, they are not fighting environmental degradation, they are simply relocating it. In short, for solutions in the environmental crisis, societies should not just learn from historical processes and other knowledge systems, but can also change the course of the future, so the past is not repeated.
3. Experimental approach: a non-absolutist standpoint
Another facet of Dewey’s political theory that can contribute to Feminist theory is his dichotomy between the private and public. Not to be conflated with the private and public sphere, but rather how to integrate this notion into the debate whether the private sphere should become politicized. In most (Western) democracies the private sphere is separate from any political realm, and should therefore not be interfered with by the state (Held 2005). Feminist authors argue that this is problematic for the recognition of women. Assuming there are two opposing positions, one of complete integration of the two spheres, and one standpoint in which the private and public spheres are wholly separate. On this spectrum, most Feminist authors argue to either abolish the distinction, or to keep them separated only to some extent (Mottier 2004: 329). There are two compelling arguments worth considering, when contemplating the integration of Dewey’s notion of the private and public as well as the distinction between the two spheres.
First of all, according to Dewey, all transactions that are solely between two people are private. It is important to note that the transaction should not have consequences for a third party. Thus, the state can only become an interfering entity whenever a transaction is considered public. One could argue this should sustain the distinction between the two spheres to some extent, because some transactions regarding the family, or the social, only have consequences for the persons already included. However, I would argue this is too straightforward. Because of the structural subordination of women to the private sphere in correlation to devalued housework some ‘private’ transactions are no longer private, because it has consequences for women and men as a social group. For example, in the Netherlands, maternity leave for women is three months, whereas paternity leave was only two days until 2019 (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken). If a man and women have a baby, and the father would like to stay at home to care for the baby, his leave would be unpaid, and more importantly ‘leave’ could lead to unemployment. Whereas the mother might be inhibited to grow in her work, because women can be viewed as “potential baby machines” and consequently valued as limited employees. In this example the interaction between two people seemed private, but the consequences contribute to social inequalities and affect power relations. Thus, the distinction between the two
spheres is meaningless, because every transaction is different and therefore needs to be reformulated from case to case. Dewey writes “[because of] the far-reaching character of consequences, whether in space or time; their settle, uniform and recurrent nature (…) there is often room for dispute. The line of demarcation between actions left to private initiative and management and those regulated by the state has to be discovered experimentally (2016 [1927]: 107)”. Chantal Mouffe makes a similar argument. She argues against a conception of citizenship that is gendered or gender-neutral, starting at the democratic notion of real equality and liberty of all citizens. She wants to focus on the political issues and claims determining gender identities and not on fixed or essential gender identities. “Accordingly, the distinction between the private and the public sphere needs to be redefined from case to case, according to the type of political demands, and not in a fixed and permanent way. Rather than seeking to define the interests of ‘women’, the feminist movement should seek strategic alliances with other social groups to defend together their political claims regarding specific issues (Mouffe in Mottier: 332)”. By integrating Dewey’s definition of private and public, pragmatic care ethics would argue to abolish the distinction between the two spheres, and experimentally decide which interactions are considered to be private or public. Hence, pragmatic care ethics is experimentally studied
according to its practices. That means that knowledge is empiristic, contextual and contingent.
Even though the abolishment between the ontological existence of a private and public sphere is not directly important for the ecological crisis, the experimental nature of pragmatic care ethics is. Other ethical theories are uncompromising and inflexible, whereas pragmatic care ethics is contextual and responsive. The experimental nature creates space for people to make mistakes and try new things, and to be independent of absolutistic determinism. This term can be explained with an example in people’s decision to become a vegetarian. A fairly rational moral deliberation is that it would not really make a difference if only the moral agent stops eating meat. Production would still go on, and the impact on the environment would be minimal. Care ethics however, is relational of nature, and could offer alternative moral deliberation models where people prioritize their own relation with nature, above universal and absolutistic models. One’s deliberation is based on interdependent relations, for example between people, or between people and nature. Thus, having to choose whether to become a vegetarian is not based on one’s independent status in relation to the problem and
humanity as a whole, but is particular and contextual. In favour of the personal care relation a moral agent has with animals, he or she can decide whether to become vegetarian. This perspective is always subject to change. Pragmatism considers the public to be their own officers and find solutions to regulate the consequences, because a Great Community always has interest in the resolution. Because both theories and their integration are experimental, pragmatic care ethics relies on perception, grounded in subjective experience.
4. Empathic approach: intersubjectivity between moral agents
Instead of rationalist strategies that dominate the political, both Dewey and care ethics promote intersubjectivity and include the emotional. Dewey defines his notion of ‘having an experience’ in Art as Experience. Dewey (2005) [1934] writes that having ‘an experience’ is different from experience. Having an experience is distinguished as a unity with a singular quality that penetrates the experience (35-36). This quality is emotional. However, emotions are not private. They are established in the relation between the perceived entity and the perceiver. The perceiver does something, they observe something, as well as undergo something, they suffer something. Thus, the emotions lie in the relation between the ‘doing’ and the ‘undergoing’ of the perceiver (41-42). This phenomenological argument emphasizes the importance of perception and describes the intersubjectivity of people. Care ethics as well as early pragmatism does not have absolutistic or rational ethical rules that would apply to every citizen, because every citizen is ‘radically equal’. They are contextual theories that empirically
determine their philosophical starting point. Care ethics has relationships at the basis of its framework. Importantly, these relations are not abstract or impartial, they already exist and have emotional
qualities. Furthermore, both are contingent theories. Different situations demand different strategies and acquire meaning through different people. Thus, pragmatic care ethics is inclusive of emotions, but just like care ethics reflects upon them and evaluates them in moral deliberation.
The inclusion of the emotional and promotion of dispositions that make us have feelings of empathy, compassion, sympathy to sustain caring relations can offer radical change in interaction with nature. Instead of rational scientific concepts, as to put a halt to global warming at a maximum rise of 1.5 degrees, an empathic approach would contribute to other environmental responses. To think of the world as a complex network built on caring relations an agent can use his or her emotional capacities in moral deliberation. Having the responsibility to care for each other, ourselves and nature brings a different dimension to environmental response. The emotional realm is currently tied to the private sphere, and in correlation to this banned from the public sphere, or reflected upon as ‘pre-cognitive’. This distinction is however meaningless in pragmatic care ethics because emotions are fundamental to moral deliberation. I am not proposing to replace the rational with the emotional, one can also
combine the capacities for both, but more importantly to be inclusive of emotions instead of actively suppressing feelings that conflict with rationality, impartiality or absolutism. 3
3 To include feelings of empathy towards (sentient) animals could imply a large shift in the meat- and dairy industry. This
shift could have positive implications in the fight against environmental degradation.
Conclusion
This thesis has explored the convergence between Ethics of Care and Early Pragmatism. Early pragmatism is a political theory that opposes individualism. People work together and only through this conjoined activity they acquire meaning about the world around them. As a result of the impersonal expansion due to global processes, the democratic public can no longer identify and distinguish itself. This is a problem for the acknowledgment of the ecological crisis. In order to overcome climate apathy and direct collective agency, this thesis explores theories that oppose ingrained and naturalized liberal thinking structures to offer radical change in the fight against environmental degradation. Dewey’s solution to the ‘Eclipse of the Public’ is one of communication. In this thesis, this solution is explored in the ways people give meaning to the world. Because Dewey offers a political theory that opposes individualism, but lacks a gendered perspective, one may turn to Ethics of Care that approach the inherent interdependence of people from a perspective of caring relations. Gilligan describes a moral theory previously overlooked, because of the unpolitical private sphere, where (still) mostly women operate to perform work focused on caretaking and caregiving. Held describes Ethics of Care as a contextual, relational and partial ethical theory, in which moral deliberation is influenced by caring relations between people. However, because care ethics focuses on the work performed in the private sphere, this thesis combines Early Pragmatism and Ethics of Care to oppose individualism and independence-based thinking with an ethical and political theory: Pragmatic Care Ethics. This integrated theory offers different approaches to current environmental responses. It is in favour of a (1) relational, (2) historical, (3) experimental and (4) empathic approach. These are suggestions to offer different views to current environmental responses, that have so far been overarchingly rational, independent of nature, unhistorical and justice-based. The four
propositions should not be viewed as a replacement for current environmental responses, but should perform as alternative approaches that oppose individualism and independence-oriented mental frameworks to offer the possibility of radical change in the fight against environmental degradation. However, several aspects are important to consider. First of all, the exploration of Early Pragmatism and Ethics of Care has been limited in this thesis. There are other early pragmatists and Feminist theorists that elaborated on the theories. Integrating their work could lead to more affinity or the theories could become antagonistic. Further research could integrate more authors than John Dewey, Carol Gilligan and Virginia Held for a comprehensive overview. Furthermore, Dewey has multiple other works on diverse topics, such as education and art. A scrutiny of more of his work, could become conflicted with ethical implications of his political work in this thesis. Finally, similar conclusions could have been reached by integrating ethics of care in to the public sphere, as has been
attempted by other Feminist authors as well. However the similarities of both theories, departing from different standpoints, is interesting to explore different critiques on individualism and address
collective agency. To overcome climate apathy and promote collective agency, environmental responses can adopt new ways of thinking that advocate interdependence opposed to independence. The young generation of Future for Fridays, inspired by Greta Thunberg, is mobilizing a public in which care for the environment is valued and the independent stance of big business is exposed. ‘How dare you!’, she utters. She addresses world leaders to invoke an empathic reaction and uses her emotional capacity to reach them. If they would only start listening.
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