Radboud University Nijmegen
School of Management
Economic Geography
Department of Geography, Spatial Planning & Environment
Master Thesis 2018
Collective ownership as key incentive for sustainable agricultural
development: a casestudy at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel
Date: 4 december 2018
Author: Marijn Bruurs - s4328590
Internship organisation: Herenboeren Nederland
Supervisors:
Arnoud Lagendijk, Radboud University
Boudewijn Tooren, Herenboeren Nederland
Preface
Dear reader,
Before you lies the thesis research: ‘collective ownership as key incentive for sustainable
agricultural development: a case study at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel’. This thesis is written
to fulfil the graduation requirements of the master Social Geography with specialisation in
Economic Geography at the Radboud University Nijmegen. I was engaged in researching and
writing this thesis from March to October 2018.
This research was conducted at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel. With the establishment of
the Herenboerderij, a unique opportunity presented itself to investigate an alternative system
for food production. Therefore, I developed a ‘Community Based Natural Resource
Management’ (CBNRM) Framework that I tested based on a qualitative research design.
The research was difficult, but conducting extensive investigation has allowed me to
find satisfying answers. Fortunately, both my supervisor from Radboud Univesity, Arnoud
Lagendijk, and my supervisors from Herenboeren Nederland, Geert van der Veer and
Boudewijn Tooren, were always available and willing to answer my queries.
I would like to thank my supervisors for their excellent guidance and support during this
process. I also would like to thank all of the respondents, without whose cooperation I would
not have been able to conduct this analysis.
To the other people from Herenboeren Nederland: I would like to thank you for your
wonderful cooperation as well. Your support, information and insights were crucial for the
results of this thesis. On top of that, you motivated me to continue with my research by your
many enthusiastic feedbacks. Finally, special thanks goes out to my family and friends. I
benefitted from debating issues with you. If I ever lost interest or focus, you kept me in line.
I hope you enjoy reading it,
Marijn Bruurs
Abstract
Title: Collective ownership as key incentive for sustainable agricultural development: a case study at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel.
Author: Marijn J.W. Bruurs
Date: March 2019
Place: Radboud University, Nijmegen
Main themes: Community Based Natural Resource Management, Collective ownership,
Community, Shared Values, Co-management, Social Values, Social Sustainability. This thesis research is about the Herenboerderij in Boxtel: a mixed farm of 20 hectares that is collectively owned by a community of approximately 170 members. This research is best characterised as a single case study in which the local case in Boxtel is extensively analysed. This analysis took place in two stages. First, a more general-level of analysis was used to assess the initiative as a Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) initiative. For this analysis, I developed a framework that is based on an extensive literature review in which dissimilar parts of literature got assed. To overcome any bias, I selected both case studies as articles and reports from various parts of the world. The resulting framework is composed of four different building blocks: (1) collective ownership, (2) community, (3) shared values and (4) co-management structures. To conclude the general-level of analysis I assessed each building block individually and gave a description of the ways in which the Herenboerderij in Boxtel organised the specific building block.
Although these building blocks are separable, their interaction determines the effectiveness of the organisation. After the general-level of analysis, I moved to the second, more specific analysis in which I assessed the interactions. Therefore, I operationalised the different building blocks into indicators after which I used qualitative methods of both participant observation as semi-structured interviews with members of the community behind the Herenboerderij in Boxtel. I participated in both management activities from Herenboeren Nederland as community activities from Herenboeren Boxtel. The semi-structured interviews formed the basis for the more specific level of analysis. I found out that the interactions between separate building blocks in Boxtel are not sufficient. The main discrepancy exists between the building block (1) collective ownership and (4) co-management structures. Especially the co-management structures are insufficient: individual members are not able to fully attain ownership and therefore lack the ability to alternate the operational rules. This result in some indecisiveness that makes certain members feel uncomfortable. Instead of finding common ground and consensus, many group discussions turn into attempts to convince each other. As such, my conclusion and recommendation is the development of a platform (digital and/or physical) that can facilitate the search for consensus and common ground. On top of that, this platform will keep individual members up-to-date of current developments, interests and opinions.
Chapter 1 – Introduction 1
1.1 The Problematic Context 2
1.2 Stakeholders and Interactions 3
1.3 Sustainability Goals 4
1.4 Need for an integral approach 5
1.5 Research Objective 7
Chapter 2 – Community Based Natural Resource Management 10
2.1 History of CBRNM 10
Chapter 3 – Building Blocks 13
3.1 Ownership 13
Practical Meaning of Ownership 13 Conceptual Meaning of Ownership 14
3.2 Community 16
Stakeholder Approach 16
Different Types of Stakeholders 17
3.3 Co-Management 19
Design Principles 20
3.4 Social Values 24
Shared Values 24
3.5 Social Value Contributions and Social Value Outcomes 25
Social Value Contributions 25 Social Value Outcomes 26
Chapter 4 – The Herenboerderij Case 29
5.1 History 29
5.2 The Concept 29
5.3 Property Right Regimes 30
Current State of Affairs 31 Desired State of Affairs 32
5.4 Stakeholder Framework 33
Stakeholders with two or less attributes 34 Definitive Stakeholders 37
Chapter 5 – Conceptual Framework 40
Chapter 6 – Methodological Approach 41
6.1 Deskresearch 41
6.2 Case-Study 42
6.3 Research Model 44
Chapter 7 – Operationalisation 46
7.1 Indicators 46
7.2 Selection of Respondents 50
7.3 Interview Guide 52
Chapter 8 – Findings 53
8.1 Basic organisation and activities 53
8.2 Shared Values 54
Commitment 55
Trust & Transparency 56 Equality & Solidarity 57
8.3 Community 58
Connectedness 59 Participation 59 Social Cohesion 60
8.4 Collective Ownership 61
Whose voice is heard 61
Whose voice is codified 61
Who is affected by the action 62
8.5 Co-management 63
Collective Choice Arrangements 63
Monitoring, Graduated Sanctions &Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 65
Recognition of rights to organize 65
Chapter 9 – Results 66
Chapter 10 – Conclusion 72
10.1 Reflection and possible follow up studies 74
References
Appendix
1
Chapter 1 – Introduction
‘’Sustainability is nowadays accepted by all stakeholders as a guiding principle for both policy making and corporate strategies’’ (Finkbeiner, Schau, Lehman & Traverso, 2010, p. 3309)
The quote really shows the spirit of the time we live in. Sustainability is nowadays not only popular in policymaking, but also within corporate strategies. Consequently, sustainability is a container for all sorts of developments. I explicitly couple sustainability to development by which I follow the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). In 1980, the WCED published ‘Our Common Future’ that stated that sustainable development should not have any negative influence on the abilities of future generations (Holden, 2007). The publication explicitly stated that sustainability has both ecological and social notions by which it tries to respond to a long-standing tradition of separatism. ‘’Separation between human being and nature, society and nature has a long tradition, at least in the culture that becomes globalized today: the Western one’’ (Brocchi, 2008, p. 30). Brocchi (2008) discusses ‘’the dramatic consequences which this cultural separation can bring’’ (p. 30).
The main issue is that human beings are part of nature, and nature is part of human beings. Nevertheless, this insight seems challenging for the cultural and social sciences as well as for the whole modern age (Brocchi, 2008). ‘’Therefore, a cultural change oriented to sustainability means also a paradigmatic change’’ (Brocchi, 2008). The case of this thesis research can represent just this paradigmatic change. This research is about the Herenboerderij in Boxtel: a mixed farm of 20 hectares, collectively owned by a community of approximately 170 members. Together the community hires a farmer who works on the land and produces exclusively for the members who own the farm. Due to this organisation, the property of the farm is transformed into a social relationship that defines the members to a benefit stream. On top of that, the property becomes allied with assumptions about moral judgement and what is perceived as acceptable in terms of people-environment actions by those claiming property rights (McMorran, Scott & Price, 2014). As such, a collective responsibility for problem solving can arise which is acknowledged to create more support. Why this collective ownership represents a paradigmatic shift that can provide a key incentive for sustainable resource management and development will be elaborated in this chapter. To fully comprehend this development, I start with explaining the problematic context. Hereafter I can explain how the Herenboerderij represents a paradigm shift of integral approaches that are breaking with common agricultural tradition.
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1.1 The problematic context
‘’Contemporary natural resource issues are, by their very definition, wicked in nature’’
(Lachapelle & McCool, 2005, p. 279) Just as the quote states: issues around natural resources are wicked by nature. Wicked problems involve ‘’multiple and competing values and goals, little scientific agreements on cause-effect relationships, limited time and resources, incomplete information, and structural inequities in access to information and the distribution of political power (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005, p. 179). This thesis research is conducted in an agricultural context and since agriculture is concerned with natural resource production, the issues that arise in this context are wicked in nature. Most of the ‘wickedness’ is the result of competing values and goals that characterize the agricultural context. For example, a farmer in between producers of gentech seeds, fertilizer and pesticides on the one side, and supermarkets, distributors and multinationals on the other side (Greenpeace, n.d.). Three groups of stakeholders with different positions in the chain of production. All have their goal of continuity and this can lead to competing goals and messy situations.
On top of that, technological development continued, which led to the broadening and extension of production of goods and services in ecosystems beyond commodities (McCool & Guthrie, 2001). As result, there is little agreement over what ecosystems should produce. At the same time science continued to provide information, while the movement of management to consideration of sustainable goals has resulted in increased recognition of uncertainty in decision-making (McCool & Guthrie, 2001). To make matters more complex, scientists who use science-based models of planning have also little agreement on long-term effects of management action. This makes the use of such models increasingly problematic.
The previous is only a short overview of the messy context and the wicked issues that arise in an agricultural context. The agricultural context relevant for this thesis, is the Dutch one. As such, the context is also influenced by the economic, social and political settings in The Netherlands. In recent years, these settings are becoming more dominated by sustainability goals that consequently have their impact on the agricultural context. All stakeholders are individually influenced by these settings, but their interactions will determine the levels of sustainability. As such, the main issues are the result of (1) a large number of stakeholders that (2) do not necessarily understand each other or have their interests aligned. This context therefore needs an (3) integral approach that connects stakeholders and interests. All will be elaborated.
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1.2 Stakeholders and interactions
A large number of stakeholders characterizes the agricultural context in The Netherlands. The interactions between these stakeholders will determine the levels of sustainability for the system. Therefore, if different stakeholder interests and goals are not aligned, this will have its negative consequences for the levels of sustainability. To deepen the argumentation and analysis of these mechanisms I turned to Ostrom (2009). She states that every humanly used resource is embedded in a complex, social-ecological system (SES). Such a system is composed of multiple subsystems that interact to produce outcomes on the SES level (Ostrom, 2009). In turn, these outcomes influence the subsystems and their components. Ostrom (2009) summarizes these statements in the following
framework.
So, while every subsystem is influenced by its own components, they produce relevant outcomes on the SES level. This means that the interactions between subsystems determines the success of the outcomes. However, if the movement of the subsystems is not aligned it creates discrepancies in the interactions between them. For example, scientists recognize the uncertainties in decision-making and therefore continue to provide information. At the same time, managers get lost in the quantity of information and only experience more uncertainty. Or a farmer who notices that the price for his seeds is driven up, while the price for his products is driven down. As such, the discrepancies do not only lead to uncertainty but also uneven power relationships. The farmer is trapped in the middle and is left with too little funds to improve his business.
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1.3 Sustainability Goals
As stated before, the complex SES in The Netherlands is influenced by the social, economic and political settings that becomes dominated by sustainability goals. The domination of sustainability can be traced back to the Paris Climate Agreement. This agreement was signed during the United Nations Climate Conference that took place in Paris at the end of 2015. In general, the agreement consists of approaches to become sustainable and therefore reduce global warming. To avoid any misconception around sustainability, first the definition will be provided.
The WCED introduced the term sustainability in 1980 and explicitly coupled it to development in their publication ‘Our Common Future’ (Holden, 2007). The WCED stated that sustainable development meant that it should not have any negative impact on the abilities of future generations. According to the WCED, this had two major preconditions: the ‘ecological sustainability’ and the ‘basic human needs’. The first, the ecological sustainability, means that ‘’at minimum, sustainable development must not endanger the natural systems that support life on Earth: the atmosphere, the waters, the soils and the living beings’’ (holder, 2007, p. 26). Compromising an ecological system has its negative impact, on for example, biodiversity and therefore would limit the possibilities for future generations. Consequently, such a development would not be sustainable.
The second precondition, the basic human needs, refers to ‘’meeting the basic human needs of all extending to all opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life’’ (Holden, 2007, p. 27). In this sense, human needs firstly consist of healthcare, housing and employment. Secondly, it is concerned with aspirations. But in providing the ability for people to follow their aspirations, development can only be sustainable if it also assures long-term ecological sustainability (Holden, 2007).
To summarize: sustainable development consists of both an ecological as social component. (Surprisingly) this already got recognized in 1980 by the WCED and perfectly relates to Ostrom’s (2009) framework in which both ecological and human components interact to produce outcomes. However, since the subsystems only produce outcomes on the SES level, the sustainability goals must become an integral part of the SES. This means that subsystems must contribute to these goals and have to interact in such a way that the goals can be reached. Consequently, separatism in which both social as ecological components got separated has to be countered. Social and ecological components must be combined in a new integral paradigm that ensures that the interactions contribute to sustainability on the SES level.
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1.4 Need for an integral approach
The recognition for an integral approach is not new. From 2008 and onwards, the agri- and horticulture, wood- and nature-sector in The Netherlands already work together on sustainability with the National Government (Het Rijk) and other partners in the ‘Convenant Schone en Zuinige Agrosectoren’ (Agreement on Clean and Efficient Agrosectors). In this agreement, the sector formulated collective goals for 2020, stating the levels by which the emission of greenhouse gases had to be reduced (RVO, 2016). The agreement explicitly mentions and integral approach that has to involve the whole agricultural sector.
Until now, this agreement already resulted in a reduction of emission rates. In 2014 the level of agricultural emission was reduced to 14 percent of the national emission (RVO, 2016). These emissions mainly consist of carbon dioxide due to the use of fuels, methane from animals and manure, and nitrous oxide from soil emissions. Unfortunately, emissions are not the only problem in the agricultural sector. Biodiversity and nutrients are also of importance, especially in the case of food production. The unavoidable precondition that the processes of emissions, biodiversity and nutrients are intertwined and closely related only underlines the necessity of an integral approach (RVO, 2016).
These policy developments resulted in the concept of ‘natuurinclusieve landbouw’ (nature-inclusive agriculture). This concept states that the agriculture should use and integrate the natural environment in their management. In turn, this approach should result in an active contribution to the quality of the same natural environment. The nature-inclusive agriculture therefore produces food inside the boundaries of nature, climate and the living environment that all have their positive effects on biodiversity (Erisman, van Eekeren, van Doorn, Geertsema & Polman, 2017). This general description will be explained more precisely by the following principles:
1. Biodiversity forms an essential basis for a resilient agricultural- and food system.
Consequently, biodiversity should be included in the agricultural management to provide natural disease- and pest-resistance, pollination, water supply and filtering, naturally fertile soils and healthy soil structures (van Doorn, Melman, Westerlink, Polman, Vogelzang & Korevaar, 2016). Van Doorn, et al., (2016) call this ‘functional agrobiodiversity’ and state that the nature-inclusive concept starts with maintaining, reinforcing and exploiting biodiversity. 2. Using this functional agrobiodiversity and simultaneously reduce water and emission, allow a
farmer to use his or her resources more effectively. In turn, this minimizes the impact on water, soil and air. Consequently, a positive feedback loop is created in which species can flourish while negative impact is minimized (van Doorn, et al., 2016).
3. The species that a farmer uses should be suited to the local environment. This creates a green infrastructure in which flora and fauna can flourish. On top of that, the landscape elements also reinforce the earlier mentioned functional agrobiodiversity.
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Together, these principles connect four interconnected elements of nature: (1) functional agrobiodiversity, which refers to soil quality based on mineral loops. (2) Landscape diversity, which should contribute to the first principle. (3) Source areas and connection zones and (4) maintaining and promoting specific species. These elements are summarized in the following figure:
This nature-inclusive agri-cultural concept connects all natural components within the SES and therefore provides an integral solution. Consequently, the ecological precondition of sustainable development can be satisfied. However, this leaves the human precondition of sustainable development to be considered. The nature-inclusive agricultural approach should therefore be complemented with a concept that connects social actors as well.
This concept is found in ‘Community Based Natural Resource Management’ (CBNRM). The most important characteristic of this concept is that a local community that already uses or relies on a natural resource should be involved in the management of this resource. As such, CBNRM connects actors of a SES and tries to bind the interactions between them in a specific setting. Lines of interaction become more direct and this takes away some of the complexity in a SES. This line of argumentation is represented by the following model:
Figure 2 – Nature-inclusive Agriculture: connecting four natural elements. Erisman, et al. (2017)
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1.5 Research Objective
This paragraph presents a readers guide. This guide functions as short explanation on the main argumentation structure of this thesis research. An elaboration on the different arguments will follow after the figure. This elaboration will lead to the research objective, main research question and subquestions.
The reading guide shows the main argumentation structure of this thesis. The first step (1. Introduction) in this thesis is an elaboration on the current, complex and problematic agricultural context. Originated in a long-standing tradition of separatism in the Western world, the agriculture in the Netherlands currently operates in a complex Social-Economic-System (SES). Such a system is characterised by a wide variety of actors whose interactions determines the levels of sustainability. This is argued to be problematic because sustainability goals are diffused by the amount of different interests from, and interactions of both social and ecological components. The problematic and complex context provides the basic argument to strive towards more integral approaches when it comes to agricultural sustainability. The need for more integral approaches is not new and already is acknowledged by the WCED in 1980 and the Dutch National Government in 2008. Both government bodies propose initiatives to reconnect separate social and ecological components.
A concept that also proposes to (re-)connect different social and ecological actors is Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Consequently, the second step in this thesis research is to argue how a CBNRM initiative represents the necessary integral approach to achieve sustainability
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in an agricultural context (2. CBNRM). CBNRM is a concept that is well researched in other parts of the world. Although this provides a broad knowledge base, there are also many differences between the available studies. For example, differences in organisation and therefore differences in the values it creates within the involved community. Based on an elaborate deskresearch this thesis research introduces a framework to analyze different CBNRM initiatives (3. Building Blocks).
From there this thesis research moves to the Herenboerderij in Boxtel that is a local implementation of CBNRM (4. The Herenboerderij Case). The Herenboerderij states that if a community becomes collectively responsible to produce food, it will increase the individual ‘food-awareness’ and happiness of all people involved. On top of that, local associations of townspeople who engage in collaborative vision building related to sustainable land development can add value, engagement and motivation that together can build the new sustainability discourses (Smulders-Dane, et. al., 2016). If one tries to create ownership in processes and decisions resulting from them, ownership becomes a shared definition of a problem (La Chapelle & McCool, 2005). In turn, the shared problem definition is required to address a problem and seek an integral solution that positively influences the chance of support within a community (5. Conceptual Model).
These notions are mostly based upon assumptions. And especially in The Netherlands there is a lack of evidence to support these claims. Therefore, this thesis research will be a first exploration to provide evidence for these assumptions. This will be done by conducting a casestudy at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel (6. Methodological Approach). But as the specific organisation might differ, the main characteristic of CBNRM is a form of collective ownership. Together with the other three building blocks, collective ownership serves as a necessity in organizing CBNRM (7. Operationalisation).
Collective ownerships transform the property to a social relationship that connects the interests and goals of all those claiming property rights. This means, on the one hand, that all the people who claim property rights have a share in the benefits that are created on the property. On the other hand, this means that certain problems that arise on the property are also shared. Interventions to solve such problems therefore require a consensus within the community. This latter notion is especially important. It relates back to the shared definition of a problem. This shared problem definition is a requirement for collaborative vision building. Together the shared definition and the collective vision building can positively influence the engagement and motivation of the community. In turn, all these mechanisms improve the chance of support for certain solutions and interventions. Following this logic, collective ownership is the key incentive to create a new sustainability discourses (by which I mean the consensuses that a diverse community reaches and the interventions and practices resulting from them). I described the general hypothesis of the mechanisms I expect to find at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel. These mechanisms are derived from other empirical studies and studies on collective vision/strategy building. An exploration on these mechanisms can lead to valuable insights for planners who try to achieve sustainability within the wicked context of agricultural development. Resulting from
9 the research objective the main question that will be addressed in this thesis is: How do ecological and social components interact within the community based natural resource management organisation at the ‘Herenboerderij’ in Boxtel?
With the help of the following subquestions, an answer to the main question will be provided:
1. What are the necessary building blocks to organise a Community Based Natural Resource Management initiative?
2. How is the Community Based Natural Resource Management organised at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel?
3. Which interactions can be recognised in this form of natural resource management? 4. What is the result of these interactions?
The model shows the two distinguishable levels of analysis used in this thesis: the general-level and the specific level. The general-level fits the research design of a deskresearch. As such, the general-level, is especially important for the first two subquestions of this thesis research. These identification questions result in concepts and categories. In this thesis, these categories are translated to building blocks that are elaborated in chapter 3. These building blocks are operationalised and incorporated in an interview guide. With this operationalisation, I move from a general-level of analysis to a specific level of analysis that is especially important for the last two subquestion. In the specific level of analysis, I will be testing my findings at the local site of the Herenboerderij in Boxtel. The operationalisation will be discussed in chapter 7. In this chapter, I will also elaborate on the method used for data collection and analysis for the general-analysis.
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Chapter 2 – Community Based Natural Resource Management
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is a concept that connects. The most important characteristic of the concept is that a local community that already uses and relies on a natural resource should be involved in the management of this resource. As such, the concept connects actors of a SES and tries to bind the interaction between them in a specific setting. Lines of interaction therefore become more direct and this can take away some complexity in a SES. Since the Herenboerderij in Boxtel is a local implementation of this concept, a detailed elaboration on the building blocks necessary for such forms of organisation will follow. These building blocks are derived from a comparative literature review in which dissimilar pieces of literature are assessed. My explanation on CBRNM begins with a short overview on the history of the CBNRM concept. This history shows the difficulties of separating human beings from nature and how this resulted in approaches to connect again.
2.1 History of CBNRM
The history of community involvement in natural resource management can be best understood in relation to the Western conservation model. From the 18th century and onwards, Western ideals of people-free landscapes, designated for leisure and consumption, played an influential role in determining the land use in the colonized regions of the world (Dressler, Büscher, Schoon, Brockington, Hayes, Kull, McCharty & Shrestha, 2010). These conservation ideals led to the development of protected areas (PA’s) in which human activity became limited or even prohibited. While there are more PA’s preceding the Yellowstone National Park as America’s first national park in 1872, its management model became the de facto model for most protected areas (Dressler, et al., 2010). In this management model, biodiversity conservation was based on a series of actions focused on completely restricting human activities within PA’s. This model got widely accepted and was popular among scientist, politicians, policy- and decision-makers (Ortega-Álvarez, Sánchez-González, Velera-Bermejo, & Berlang-García, 2017). However, the model also brought some concerns. For example, conservation policies that criminalized the communities, who were depending on resources, for what they harvested, and on top of that, since identity is closely tied to livelihoods, for who they were (Dressler, et al., 2010). In some cases this resulted in the displacement of local communities living in PA’s and subsequently the prohibition to use their resources.
11 This context of exclusion, inequality and human suffering led to resistance and a political struggle. From the 1960s, social movements with their emancipatory objectives grew in strength. Critical scholars who worked on participatory approaches with local communities supported them. These scholars argued that the present conservation models eventually silenced the people who held the greatest knowledge about their own state of affairs (Dressler, et al., 2010). This participatory research led to the statement that local communities could define priorities through their experiences and knowledge that would enhance their capacities for action (Dressler, et al., 2010; Ryan & Robinson, 1990). These grassroot initiatives pressed for community-based solutions in larger environmental problems. Form the 1970s this was recognized and incorporated in the broader socio-economic policy domain. It became widely acknowledged that local people, who already used, relied and managed natural resources, were in the best position to conserve them. The CBNRM agenda had been set (Dressler, et al., 2010).
From the 1980s and onwards the CBNRM agenda was subject to ‘’the scaling up, institutionalizing and merging of community and conservation concerns in a political-administrative conservation regime’’ (Dressler, et al., 2010, p. 7). For example, the publication of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future, specifically connected sustainability to development in which both economic and social values were set as basic principles. This resulted in a wide range of large scale, integrated conservation and development projects with different levels of success. Since all these projects were situated in specific local contexts, it is sometimes hard to determine the general building blocks of successful CBNRM initiatives. Therefore, I engaged in an extensive evaluation of dissimilar studies on CBNRM. To overcome any bias or context sensitivity, I assessed case studies from all around the world. I assed recent studies from Africa (Musavengane, Simatele, 2016; Agyare, Murray, Dearden & Rollins, 2015; Schoneveld & Zoomers, 2015), South America (Bragagnolo, Correia, Malhado, De Marins & Ladle, 2017), South-East Asia (Vadrevu, Ohara & Justice, 2017; Yang & Pomeroy, 2017) and Europe (Ballesteros & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2018; Warren & McFadyen, 2010; Mackenzie, 2006). After analysing the different studies, I found four general building blocks: ownership, community involvement, co-management structures and social values. Before I start with a theoretical elaboration on these building blocks, I will provide an overview. It is a concise overview in which I explain the reasons why the building block is important and what the specific challenges for the Herenboerderij in Boxtel are. In the next chapter, I will provide definitions and frameworks for analysis of each building block separately.
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Building Block Why Herenboerderij Challenge
Ownership Response to the:
- Displacement of local communities - Tragedy of the commons - How to involve members
- Let (all) members participate - Let members feel
responsible
Community - Initiatives are
community-based - Local communities
possess knowledge - Connecting
stakeholders to take away some complexity
- How to connect stakeholders and members - How to create a
sustainable community
Shared Values - Certain homogeneity levels are necessary to connect people
- Mutual understandings and problem
definitions
- How to set long-term goals which are collectively supported - How to create an
inclusive and representative consensus
Co-Management - Common Pool
Resources need co-management structures - Guarantee fairness and
equality
- How to organize the co-management structures - How to provide
inclusive structures - How to avoid one
dominant group
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Chapter 3 – Building Blocks
In this chapter I elaborate on the four building blocks derived from a comparative analysis of dissimilar pieces of literature. The overview of building blocks is a contribution to the academic literature base around CBNRM initiatives. Although, CBNRM and its individual building blocks are well-researched topics, a systematic and general overview of necessary building blocks is missing. As such, this thesis research will try to provide a baseline on which every CBNRM initiative can be assessed. On top of that, this overview of building blocks will help to assess and understand the specific CBNRM organisation in Boxtel. In the following the four different building blocks – (1) ownership, (2) community, (3) co-management and (4) social values – will be explained separately. It is important to already mention a difference in analysis. The first two building blocks are especially important for a meta-level of analysis while the latter two are more specific and dependent from local settings.
3.1 Ownership
The concept of ownership is frequently mentioned in the literature on CBNRM initiatives. On the one hand, this is a response to the protected areas model in which communities are displaced and removed from their original properties. The CBNRM initiators therefore plea to give back the property and at the same time use the knowledge these communities possess. This represents a more practical notion of property and ownership which results in jurisdictions and property right regimes. On the other hand, the literature mentions ownership in a conceptual way in which ownership is not solely evolving around property but more around public interests and responsibilities. This double role of ownership makes it a key building block for CBNRM initiatives. I will elaborate on notions of ownership.
3.1.1 Practical meaning of ownership
Both economists and biologists have argued that commonly owned resources are intrinsically difficult to manage and tend to be unstainable (Berkes & Kislalioglu, 1989). This problem is better known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ mentioned by Hardin (1986). His notion refers to a situation in which individuals all act according their own self-interest, while the collective carries the externalities of these actions (Hardin, 1968). Of course, the precondition of this notion is that the individuals act on a common property. But that resources produced on such a property are doomed to be overexploited is a very deterministic, economic model that shows the spirit of that period.
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From the 1980s and onwards, many researchers began to reject this deterministic notion of the tragedy of the commons. Researchers argued that users of common properties often live in communities and use properties that are never absolutely private or government-owned (Berkes & Kislalioglu, 1989). As such, the economic notion that assumes self-seeking and essentially unconnected individuals was rejected. On top of that, researchers stated that common property resources are defined by two characteristics: difficulty of exclusion and subtractability – ‘’that is the capability of each user of subtracting from the welfare of other users’’ (Berkes & Kislalioglu, 1989, p. 568).
In this sense, ownership is more about the levels of access and the allocation of power. Berkes & Kislalioglu (1989) translate this practical notion of ownership into property right regimes. They distinguish four general analytical frameworks of property right regimes. Although these frameworks are distinguishable, the real world is often characterised by a combination of multiple regimes:
1. Open-access regime: the property is characterised by an absence of property rights. Consequently, access to the resource is free and open to all, with no management interventions. This form of property right regimes closely relates to the tragedy of the commons and is therefore noted to be unsustainable on the long-term.
2. Private property: this property right regime is mostly a response to the commons problem. In order to be able to control harvest, economist argue for the rising of private property rights. This then refers to a situation in which exclusive rights are allocated to individual firms or individuals. These individuals and firms are then able to control harvest through, for example, quotas.
3. State property: the property is characterised by a government that has full jurisdiction over the resource, its allocation and conservation. Any management decisions are made by technical experts on behalf of all the users. This property right regimes thus represents a sort of ‘greater good’ principle in which the government protects the collective against overexploiting.
4. Communal property: in this situation the common property and/or the resource is held or controlled by an identifiable community of users. This form of property right regime is the result of the earlier described consensus but is still subject to criticism in which researchers argue that overexploiting is still a real danger.
3.1.2 Conceptual meaning of ownership
‘’The quantity and quality of public engagement required to create a sense of ownership assumes an active and participatory citizenry characterised by interpersonal trust, cooperative relationships, and other elements of social capital’’
(Lachapelle & McCool, 2005, pp. 283-284)
Besides a practical notion of ownership – which is especially important for the allocation of power – ownership within CBNRM initiatives also has conceptual implications. Ownership in this sense is not
15 concerned with legal and jurisdictional issues of property rights and title over related resources. Ownership in a conceptual sense is concerned with the notion that the public has interest in, and a sense for responsibility for stewardship, of public resources (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005). This conceptual notion of ownership is a response to the traditional planning processes that emphasizes technical analysis and limits citizen involvement. The traditional models create tensions between citizens and institutions, especially in a context that is characterised as wicked. In turn, this tension has negative impact on the relationships which results in distrust, inaction and even litigation. Lachapelle & McCool (2005) therefore argue that creating individual ownership is one way of addressing this problem. Ownership in this sense is defined as responsibility, obligation and caring imbued by individuals in problem situations (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005). But the researchers go even further and ‘’expand and clarify the definitions of ownership to include three distinct characteristics’’ (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005, p. 281):
1. Whose voice is heard: The first characteristic is about framing problems. Problems that arise on a common property can be framed to either benefit or harm the individual in terms of claims, meanings and viability. Logically the way a problem is framed is influenced by underlying assumptions and guide strategies that in turn influence the desired outcomes. Ownership in this sense is about ‘’the processes by which voices are heard and considered legitimate or valid’’ (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005, p. 281). When an individual achieves the right to have his or her interpretation accepted as correct, he or she can attain ownership. This ownership then can be used in the process of problem-solving approaches: to achieve mutual goals and understandings, agreements on data and shared definitions of problems must be reached (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005).
2. Whose voice is codified: As is implicitly mentioned in the previous characteristic, ownership is not solely concerned with problem definitions, but also with outcomes. Ownership in this sense challenges conventional notions of power and control over outcomes. Citizens ‘’are apathetic because they are powerless, not powerless because they are apathetic’’ (Barber, 1984, p. 272). Ownership thus reallocates power and direct authority over decision-making and the execution of actions to the individual level.
3. Who is affected by the action: Following the logic of the previous characteristics, this one is about who is affected by the actions. Ownership in this sense is concerned with the distribution across diverse social, political and ecological scales. This means that plans and decisions are distributed, accepted and ‘owned’ spatially (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005). Distribution is both defined by a horizontal and vertical notion. Horizontal ownership is concerned with the interaction of involved individuals and institutions in a physical place that is subject to the plans. Vertical ownership refers to scales and the linking of local, regional, national and sometimes even international interests (Lachapelle & McCool, 2005).
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Ownership Two definitions:
Practical ownership: ownership over property and resources. Conceptual ownership: ownership over problems and solutions.
Ownership is a key building block and will be assessed on both definitions. Practical ownership is operationalised with property right regimes, while conceptual ownership is operationalised by three characteristics that will be assessed empirically.
3.2 Community
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, collective ownership connects a community to the profits of a natural resource management. This, complemented with the community-based nature of CBNRM initiatives, makes the necessity of an identifiable community as building block evident. To relate the building block to the previous one: those who attain ownership form the community. To operationalise this building block the question ‘who counts as community and who gets involved’ is very important. To provide answers to this question, the literature around stakeholder identification is consulted.
3.2.1 Stakeholder Approach
CBNRM is argued to represent an integral approach that connects different actors within a complex SES. This has its implications for both ecological as social components in a SES. In this paragraph, I will zoom in on the characteristics of social components that will be connected more directly in a CBNRM initiative. To make this operational a framework for stakeholder identification is needed. This means that the position and influence of different stakeholders will be explained. According to Freeman (1994) a stakeholder is ‘’any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievements of the organisation’s objectives’’ (p. 411). He uses this very broad definition to not exclude any stakeholder. Of course, this definition is too broad and lacking general descriptions. Therefore, I turned to Ronald, Bradley & Wood (1997) who argue that a stakeholder can be identified by his or her possession of one, two or all three of the following attributes:
1. Power: relates to the ability of a stakeholder to influence the organisation. In other words, power
represents ‘’a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not have otherwise done’’ (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997, p. 865). In practice, a stakeholder can use different kinds of power based on the resources used to exercise this power: coercive power (physical resource of force), utilitarian power (material or financial resources) or normative power (symbolic resources) (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997). 2. Legitimacy: relates to the relationship a stakeholder has with the organisation. This can be based
on a social construct, such as property rights or a moral claim, but is also entangled with power. Important to state is that power and legitimacy can exist independently, but when combined create authority (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997). To better define legitimacy, I turned to Suchman
17 (1995): ‘’legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). This definition is still broad and difficult to operationalize, but it contains the condition that legitimacy is only attained in a social system that is based on three levels of analysis: the individual, the organisational and the societal level. This implies that legitimacy is a desirable social good that can be negotiated differently at various level of social organisation (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997).
3. Urgency: this final attribute adds dynamics of interactions to the relationship between stakeholders
and organisations. Urgency in this sense, relates to (1) the time-sensitivity of a relationship or claim and (2) the critical nature of a claim of relationship for a specific stakeholder. This results in the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997).
These three attributes will form the meta-level analytical framework, and this brings along assumptions. First, these attributes are not static but can change for any stakeholder. Secondly, these attributes are constructed in reality and therefore do not represent objective norms. Finally, a stakeholder is not necessarily conscious of its attributes, or when he or she is, does not have to act accordingly. Consequently, these attributes represent the dynamism: ‘’that is, they provide a preliminary framework for understanding how stakeholders can gain or lose salience to a firm’s management’’ (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997, p. 868). Salience – in this sense – is defined as the degree to which managers prioritize stakeholder claims.
3.2.2 Different types of Stakeholders
A stakeholder can be identified by the possession of one, two or all three of the previous described attributes. Logically, individuals or entities that do not possess one of these attributes are ‘non-stakeholders’. Because, not all stakeholders possess the same attributes, one could make a distinction in seven types of stakeholders. Ronald, Bradley & Wood (1997) classify seven types of stakeholders in three general categories based on the number of attributes they possess. These types are displayed in figure 5 on the next page.
Latent Stakeholders
The first general category concerns stakeholders who only possess one of the attributes. As result, these are latent stakeholders whose salience will be low. Managers may well be doing nothing about these stakeholders. In practice, three types of latent stakeholders exist:
1. Dormant Stakeholders: these stakeholders hold coercive, utilitarian or symbolic power, but this power remains unused due to their lack of legitimacy or urgency.
2. Discretionary Stakeholders: these stakeholders possess legitimacy but have no urgent claims or power to influence the firm. A scholar can be an example.
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3. Demanding Stakeholders: these are the stakeholders with urgent claims, but no power or legitimacy. Ronald, Bradley & Wood (1997) call them ‘’mosquitoes buzzing in the ear’’ (p. 875).
Expectant Stakeholders
This general category is concerned with stakeholders who possess two attributes. The combination of two attributes makes these stakeholders expecting. Due to their attributes, their active versus passive stance will be corresponding with the responsiveness of the organisation. Consequently, the stakeholder salience will be moderate (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997). The types of stakeholders belonging to this category are:
4. Dominant Stakeholders: are stakeholders that both possess power and legitimacy to influence the organisation. In most cases, mechanisms are in place that acknowledge these stakeholders – a board for example. Due to the nature of these stakeholders and the mechanisms in place to hear them out, these stakeholders get a lot of attention and ‘matter’ to managers.
5. Dangerous Stakeholders: are stakeholders that possess power and urgency, but lack legitimacy, which can make them dangerous. ‘’Coercion is suggested as a descriptor because the use of coercive power often accompanies illegitimate status’’ (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997, p. 877).
6. Dependent Stakeholders: are stakeholders who have urgent and legitimate claims but lack the power to carry out their will. Consequently, these stakeholders are characterized as dependent stakeholders: they need others to advocate for them.
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Definitive Stakeholders
This is the last group of stakeholders that possess all three attributes. In most cases, these stakeholders are part of the dominant coalition (type 4) and thus already possess power and legitimacy. When a stakeholder from this coalition expresses an urgent claim, the management cannot neglect him and this creates an immediate mandate for action. By gaining urgency, the stakeholder moves from the dominant type to the definitive type (Ronald, Bradley & Wood, 1997). Gaining urgency is the most common movement of stakeholders, but of course every expectant stakeholder can become definitive by acquiring the missing attribute.
Building Block Definition Further use
Community Social actors who attain ownership within a CBNRM initiative
A stakeholder framework operationalises the community building block.
Stakeholders will be identified by their possession of one, two or all three attributes power, legitimacy and/or urgency
3.3 Co-Management
In the literature on CBNRM-initiatives, the most common form of organisation is best characterised as co-management. Central to this form of organisation is a distribution of rights and responsibilities (Plummer & Fitzgibbon, 2004). This definition or main characteristic is of course very broad, but just as Berkes (1994) states: ‘’it would be pointless to try to define the term co-management more precisely because of the wide variety of possible arrangements’’ (Berkes, 1994, p. 18).
Still, a more integrative understanding can and has to be made. A valuable addition in this perspective is found in Yandle (2003). Yandle (2003) connects co-management settings to a spectrum of management approaches and property rights, ‘’usually ranging from bureaucratic control to community-based management’’ (Yandle, 2003, p. 180). However, many researchers argue that market-based regulations also play an influential role in the development of co-management organisations. Yandle (2003) confirms this in her research on co-management organisations in New Zealand. Her results reveal a more integrative understanding of co-management, as is represented in figure 6.
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Looking at figure 6, co-management can be best understood as a spectrum of institutional arrangements in which responsibilities are shared. In CBNRM-initiatives this means that responsibilities are shared between the users and the management. As such, the co-management within a CBNRM-initiative includes all potential users of a specific resource (Yandle, 2003). This underscores the need for the earlier described property right regimes. Either a community, an individual or a company needs a strong bundle of property rights as foundation for a co-management regime (Yandle, 2003). Consequently, the non-exclusive character of a resource that is held in common becomes central to both the definition of property right regimes and co-management (Plummer & Fitzgibbon, 2004).
3.3.1 Design Principles
Many researchers mention a Common Pool Resource (CPR) setting when a natural resource is exploited through a co-management organisation. Building on extensive case studies, Ostrom (1990) defines seven general conditions for a CPR setting. Although, she noted that there are many differences in specific institutions across the world, she states that these conditions are of significant influence in determining the success of the organisation. Ostrom (1990) therefore names these conditions ‘design principles’ by which she means: ‘’an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the CPR’s and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90). In this thesis research, the seven design principles by Ostrom (1990) will be used as a framework to analyse the co-management organisation at the Herenboerderij in Boxtel. As such, these principles are indicative and not necessarily, objective conditions. All seven principles will be elaborated in the following.
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1. Clearly Defined Boundaries
‘’Individuals or households who have the rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 91).
Ostrom (1990) mentions the defining of boundaries of both the CPR and the people that use it, as first step in organizing collective action. Without forming boundaries, the CPR faces the risk of being reaped by individuals who did not contribute to the efforts. In this case, the CPR can lose returns, or at least the return will not be as high as expected (Ostrom, 1990). The earlier mentioned property right regimes are very important in this matter. These regimes define access and especially access to whom. As such, they form the boundaries for both the CPR itself as for the individuals who are allowed to extract resource units. Therefore, the boundaries in this case will be translated to property right regimes in which the most common form is a communal property right (often mentioned in the literature as a ‘common property’).
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
‘’Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or money’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 92).
Such rules are mostly meant to preserve the CPR. Due to the wide variety in local conditions, such rules cannot be generalized to ‘overall’ rules. The rules therefore must be tailored to the local conditions in which the CPR setting is embedded. An example of such a rule can be found in the water management. In places where water is scarce, the restrictive rules need to guarantee the availability of water. One could think of quota by which the use of the resource is limited to avoid overexploitation.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
‘’Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 93).
Principle 3 is also concerned with local embeddedness. The operational rules of a CPR should be tailored to the local circumstances and more importantly: local stakeholders should be able to modify these rules to better fit them in a specific context. This will positively affect the success and chance of support (Ostrom, 1990). However, Ostrom (1990), notes that ‘’even in repeated settings where reputation is important and where individuals share the norm of keeping arrangements, reputation and shared norms are insufficient by themselves to produce stable cooperative behaviour over the long run’’ (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 93-94). This empirical notion results in the following principles 4 and 5.
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4. Monitoring
‘’Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 94).
5. Graduated sanctions
‘’Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 94).
Because principle 4 and 5 are much intertwined and exist in mutual interdependence of each other, these principles will be explained together. Simply put: monitoring is necessary to identify individuals who break the rules and sanctions are sometimes needed to put this individual ‘back in line’. CPR settings are described to counter the tragedy of the commons; therefore, the organisation of such a setting needs to withhold people from neo-liberal deterministic behaviour. Consequently, the organisation has to promote collective action over individual action. To further explain the mechanism necessary to achieve this behaviour, Ostrom (1990) opts the term quasi-voluntary compliance. Levi (1998) who extracted the concept from legal theory introduced the term. This theory states that law cannot solely rely on coercion, but has to be voluntary practiced by social actors (Pavone, 2015). Such behaviour is mentioned as voluntary because individuals choose to comply, but it becomes ‘quasi-voluntary’ due to the risk of punishment when an individual chooses not to comply. Levi (1998) uses the taxpayer as example: paying taxes is voluntary. Voluntary in the sense that an individual can chose to comply in situations in which they are not directly coerced. But at the same time, paying taxes becomes quasi-voluntary, because noncompliant is subject to coercion (Ostrom, 1990; Pavone, 2015). Finally, the ways by which an individual adopts this quasi-voluntary strategy is influenced by the collective nature of rules. ‘’Taxpayers are strategic actors who will cooperate only when they expect others to cooperate as well. The compliance of each depends on the compliance of others’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 94).
Although this suggests that individuals hold each other ‘in line’, Levi (1998) emphasizes the role of coercion that is often provided by an external ruler (Pavone, 2015). She states that it is an essential condition to achieve quasi-voluntary compliance as form of contingent behaviour. This is where Ostrom (1990) breaks with Levi and states that coercion is exercised differently in CPR settings. ‘’CPR appropriators create their own internal enforcement to (1) deter those who are tempted to break rules and thereby (2) assure quasi-voluntary compliers that others also comply’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 95). This creates a self-sustaining mechanism: individuals who are tempted to break rules stand in direct contact with each other. Consequently, the individuals monitor each other not to break rules. This makes monitoring a natural by-product of using a common pool resource (Ostrom, 1990).
23 Principle 4, monitoring, is now explained, but sanctioning might still be implicit. Often, sanctioning is not even necessary, due to monitoring mechanisms that keep individuals in line. In such cases, the risk of punishment is enough, but of course a situation of noncompliance can still arise. Sanctioning may be necessary to assure desired behaviour again. According to Ostrom (1990) sanctioning can work in three ways: (1) It will stop the offense from continuing. (2) It becomes clear that someone else is likely to be caught in a similar situation, which increases the confidence in the level of quasi-voluntary compliance. (3) A punishment will be imposed by which the individual loses his or her reputation of reliability. This will provide a motivation for the individual to regain his or her reputation by which he or she again must comply to the rules (Ostrom, 1990).
So far, I explained the first five principles from Ostrom (1990) which now can be summarized in an interrelated manner. CPR appropriators must be able to design their own operational rules (principle 3), that are conditioned to the local circumstances (principle 2) and determine which individuals own rights to profit from the CPR (principle 1). On top of that, individuals who themselves are appropriators, or are accountable by them, should be able to enforce these operational rules (principle 4 & 5). Consequently, this results in a commitment and the natural by-product of monitoring which will keep the individuals from overexploiting the CPR and remain in collective action. This only leaves two principles.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
‘’Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflict among appropriators or between appropriators and officials’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 100).
Rules are always subject to interpretation and therefore different individuals can understand rules differently. Conflict can be the result of this difference in interpretation. Consequently, individuals need mechanisms and (physical) space for discussing and resolving conflict if they are supposed to follow rules over a longer period of time (Ostrom, 1990).
7.
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
‘’The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 101).
Ostrom (1990) noticed that in many cases ‘’appropriators frequently devise their own rules without creating formal governmental jurisdictions for this purpose’’ (Ostrom, 1990, p. 101). Only when an external government gives at least minimal recognition to the legitimacy of such rules, the appropriators become able to enforce them themselves.
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Building Block Definition Further use
Co-management A spectrum of (community-, market-, bureaucracy-based) institutional arrangements in which responsibilities are shared.
The co-management building block is operationalised by Ostrom’s framework that suggests 7 design principles that will be used to assess the effectiveness and success of a co-management setting.
3.4 Social Values
Until now, I have discussed three building blocks that together form the basis of a CBNRM initiative. As stated in the beginning of this chapter: a CBNRM initiative incorporates a local community. CBNRM promotors advocate that this involvement create social value for the individuals. This means that social values are an intrinsic part of CBNRM settings. More precisely: social values are resulting from the policies and operating practices that characterise a CBNRM organisation. In turn, many researchers use these social benefits to argue the relevancy and urgency of CBNRM initiatives. In other words, social value provide CBNRM initiatives with a ‘license to operate’. Consequently, social value is the final building block. This paragraph will begin with an elaboration on the definition of social value used in this research where after I operationalise the building block.
3.4.1 Shared Values
A clear definition of social values is somewhat difficult to provide since the literature around social values is very specific and often context dependent. On top of that, the operational definition of social value is not the same in every case study. As such, I turned to Porter & Kramer (2011) who discuss shared values rather than social values. The researchers break with the neoliberal tradition that defines the market with economic needs. Porter & Kramer (2011) state that the concept of shared values also recognizes societal needs. It becomes ‘shared’, because these societal needs can be argued to be of economic value: many social harms frequently create internal costs for firms (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Examples of such costs can be the waste of energy or raw materials, accidents or the need for training to compensate a lack of education. While managers still state to lose investment by addressing societal needs, Porter & Kramer (2011) argue that this statement is wrong. Innovating through – for example – the use of new technologies, operating methods or management approaches can increase the productivity and expand the markets. Shared value in this sense is not about redistribution nor personal values, but about expanding the total pool of economic and social value (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Consequently, ‘’the concept of shared value can be defined as policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates’’ (Porter & Kramer, p. 6). Concepts alongside which these shared values will be assessed are derived from comparable case studies.
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3.
5 Social Value Contributions and Social Value Outcomes
Before engaging in the social values of CBNRM initiatives, I must first distinguish values that can be expected to result from the policy and operating practices (outcomes) versus values that influence the success of these policies and operating practices (contributions). This is only a thin line, because when a certain mechanism contributes to the effectiveness or success of policies and operating practices that create social values, one could argue that these contributions are values as well. Still I believe the two are distinguishable, because in the end an individual member will mostly recognize the values resulting from the policy and operating practices and less those influencing them.
3.5.1 Social value contributions
Social value contributions influence the level of effectiveness or success of the co-management policies present within a CBNRM initiative. This means that these social values contribute to the structures and the interactions necessary to create a smooth co-management setting. Contributions are not to be confused with the earlier mentioned design principles for co-management. The contributions are not to be seen as requirements nor as design principles, but as contributions. The contributions that will be discussed are: commitment, trust & solidarity and awareness.
Commitment
Commitment is about the intention of social actors within a collaboration. It refers to the willingness of social actors to approach the collaboration with a long-term perspective (van der Ploeg, 2010). According to van der Ploeg (2010) social actors can express three types of commitment: affective, calculative and normative commitment. The first type refers to the emotional commitment felt to contribute in a collaboration. As such, this type of commitment transcends a pure contractual relationship. Secondly, the calculative commitment refers to social actors who assess a collaboration by comparing the benefits and costs of maintaining the relationship. Finally, the normative commitment refers to social actors who have the feeling of a moral duty to maintain the collaboration. Without giving a normative judgement, any type of commitment can positively affect the continuity of the cooperation. At the same time, the type of commitment influences the next indicator of trust & transparency.
Trust & Transparency
Trust within collaborations often exists in two ways: as relational trust (credibility trust) and emotional trust (benevolent trust) (van der Ploeg, 2010). The first type of trust refers to the believe that a partner has the intention and ability to fulfil obligations and to deliver the agreed contributions to the collaboration. The latter refer to the believe that the partner will behave benevolent towards the relationship (van der Ploeg, 2010). As such, trust is firstly determined by a ‘belief’, but the levels of
